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JEAN L. BROOKES,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. q~- /':/I,:t q~ -r;~,,",,-
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
:
V.
.
.
RONALD L. HESS,
Defendant
COMPLAINT
AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney,
Charles Rector, Esquire, of Costopoulos, Foster and Fields, and
respectfully represents as follows:
1. Plaintiff, Jean L. Brookes, is an adult individual who
resides at 831 E. Winding Hill Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
2. Defendant, Ronald L. Hess, is an adult individual who
resides at 435 W. Simpson Street, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
3. Both parties are unmarried adults and residents of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
4. In the months preceding June of 1994, Defendant proposed
marriage to Plaintiff and at that time, Plaintiff felt it was
inappropriate and untimely because of Defendant's care and custody
of his three children. Plaintiff and Defendant nonetheless agreed
to cooperate and to work towards that goal so that they would have
a future together.
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5. On or about June of 1994, the parties began spending
overnights at Defendant's home at his request and Plaintiff
contributed financially to improvements to Defendant's home and the
purchase of furnishings for his home.
6. Based upon Defendant's representations and promises to
Plaintiff that a future marriage might occur and his further
representations that irrespective of a future marriage, that they
would financially work towards the goal of sharing their lives
together, Plaintiff continued to regularly contribute to the
maintenance and improvement to the Defendant's home and provided
monies for the purchase of numerous furnishings, all of which are
still contained in the home.
7. Throughout the time that the parties spent considerable
time together at Defendant I s home, they were in a confidential
relationship in which Plaintiff reasonably believed that Defendant
would not act in a manner inconsistent with her welfare, and
Pl&intiff trusted Defendant and believed that Defendant would not
abuse such confidential relationship nor take advantage of
Plaintiff's trust to obtain improvements to his home and items of
.
personal property for his own benefit.
8. Defendant deliberately misrepresented his intentions to
Plaintiff for the purpose of acquiring from her financial
contributions for improvement of his home and furnishings.
relationship. Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition). see confidential relationship.
There was no dominance or influence by Defendant. Quite the contrary, in the
instant case, the Defendant will testify that he repeatedly told Plaintiff that he
could not afford the services and products that she was ~urchasing but that she
nevertheless wanted to purchase them anyway.
That the Plaintiff advanced money in the form of products and services to
Defendant's house is clear. The issue is whether the purchase of products and
services were gifts. In its simplest form, a gift is defined as a voluntary transfer of
property made to another gratuitously and without consideration. Black's Law
Dictionarv (6th Edition) ree gift. FUfther, our courts have recognized that a gift
cannot be later revoked. Richette vs. Aiello, supra. Plaintiff's misplaced
confidence is not sufficient to justify revocation of gifts to the Defendant. e.g.
Baum\lartner vs.
In Roberson vs. Davis, the issue before the court was whether the court
should impose a constructive trust on ploperty in which a woman had lived in a
meritritious relationship with a married',;nan. The court rejected the woman's claim
to the interest in real estate finding that the property was purchased and financed
solely by the man. Of significance to the instant case, in Roberson the woman
made a gift of a swimming pool to the residence. The court found that the
swimming pool was a gift: although the pool was initially financed by the woman,
3
Defendant's home. There was no agreement between the partiell that Plaintiff
would contribute financially to improvements to Defendant's home or the purchase
of furnishings for his home. It is specifically averred by Defendant that Defendant
repeiltedly told Plaintiff that he was not in a financial position to get the it6ms that
Plaintiff purchased for him or make the improvements that she did to the home, and
that she did that without his agreement.
6. Denied as stated. Defendant is without knowledge sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of this averment particularly as it relates to what the Plaintiff's
mental state was during the time that she decided to purchase various items for
Defendant's residence and to make the improvements to Defendant's home. It is
specifically denied that Defendant ever represented or promised to Plaintiff that in
exchange for receipt of those items of personal property or repairs to the home that
he would marry her. It is specifically averred that Defendant consistently told
Plaintiff that he could not afford the items that she was purchasing for him and
could not afford the improvements that she made to the home.
7. Denied. Defendant is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is
demanded at the trial of this case.
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8. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant misrepresented any of his
intentions to Plaintiff concerning their relationship end that he ever made any
misrepresentations for the sole purpose of acquiring from Plaintiff financial
contributions for improvements to the home and for personal property. It is averred
that Defendant repeatedly told Plaintiff that he was not in a financial position to pay
for the items he purchased or the improvements to the home.
9. Denied. This averment is a legal conclusion and no answer is required.
To the extent an answer is required, it is specifically denied in total.
10. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff has
demanded payment from Defendant for the items she purchased and gave to
Defendant and for the improvements that she made to his home. It is specifically
denied that Plaintiff is entitled to receive any repayment of the financial
contributions or furnishings or other assets that she purchased for Defendant that
are at his home.
11. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant ever made an agreement
with Plaintiff to pay her the amount of $10,000.00 as reimbursement for her
financial contributions or return any items purchased by her located in the home. In
the event that there were any discussions between Plaintiff and Defendant, the
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discussions were solely related to settlement of these various claims and in no way
are a binding agreHment between the parties.
12. Denied. Paragraph 12 is a legal conclusion to which no answer is
required. To the extent that an answer is required, it is specifically denied.
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests this Honorable Court to enter judgment in
his favor and against Plaintiff, together with costs of suit.
NEW MATTER
13. Paragraphs 1 through 12 are incorporated herein by reference as if more
fully set forth.
14. Plaintiff and Defendant had an on again, off again relation'lhip that
began some time in 1991.
15. Plaintiff was aware that Defendant had a history of mental problems and
in fact during the course of their relationship, Defendant was treated on several
occasions for depression and other related mental illnesses.
16. Plaintiff knew that she could control Defendant as a result of his mental
problems and took advantage of Defendant's condition in her ralationship with him.
17. Plaintiff and Defendant, during the course of the relationship, had
discussions about marriage but those discussions consistently ended because
Plaintiff was unwilling to commit herself to Defendant as long as Defendant was
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the primary care taker and responsible person for his minor children who were living
at Defendant's residence.
18. Plaintiff always maintained a separate residence from Defendant
throughout the course of the relationship.
19. Plaintiff and Defendant never cohabitated as that term is defined in the
Divorce Code, in that they always maintained separate residences, separate
checking accounts, and other indices of being separate and never held themselves
out to the general public as cohabitating in any way.
20. During the cour!>e of their relationship, Plaintiff was intimately familiar
with Defendant's financial condition during the course of her relationship with him
and knew that Defendant was not in a financial position to purchase new items for
his home or make improvements.
21. Plaintiff repeatedly bought items of personal property for Defendant and
on each occasion told Defendant that those items were a gift to him.
22. Plaintiff repeatedly made improvements to Defendant's residence
without Defendant's approval or agreement, and repeatedly told Defendant that all
of the improvements were gifts to him,
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to the residence, Plaintiff at no time indicated to Defendant that he would be
required to repay her for the gifts and improvements.
29. There are no writings evidencing the alleged loan of the funds for the
personal property or for the improvements to Defendant's residence. Plaintiff's
claims are barred by the Statute of Fraud.
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests this Honorable Court enter judgment
against Plaintiff together with costs of suit.
COUNTERCLAIM
30. Paragraphs 1 through 29 are incorporated herein by reference.
31. Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant is unsubstantiated and a
continued form of harassment by Plaintiff against Defendant.
32. Defendant has incurred substantial legal fees as a result of Plaintiff's
actions in filing this unsubstantiated and unwarranted Complaint against Defendant.
33. Plaintiff's filing of an action in equity has placed a cloud on Defendant's
title and has prevented him from refinancing various debts to reduce his interest
payments for his various obligations.
34, Defendant would not have incurred these additional interest payments
but for the action of Plaintiff filing this suit in equity against him since by filing the
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knowledge or information to form a belief as to the remaining averment alleging that
Defendant suffered from "other related mental illnesses" and proof thereof is demanded.
16. Denied. It Is denied that Plaintiff knew that she could control Defendant
as a result of his mental problems and further denied that she took advantage of
Defendant's mental condition in her relationship with him and proof thereof is
demanded. By way of further answer, Plaintiff and Defendant shared a serious
committed relationship and Defendant's depression, for which he received medication
and which resulted In his hospitalization on only one occasion during their relationship,
did not affect the parties' relationship. To the extent that any further answer is required,
Defendant's hospitalization resulted from his discontinuation of his medication without
Plaintiffs knowledge.
17. Admitted In part and denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff and
Defendant, during the course of their relationship had discussions about marriage which
discussions consistently ended because of Plaintiffs unwillingness to marry Defendant
as long as Defendant was primary caretaker of his minor children at his residence. Itls
denied that Plaintiff at any time was unwilling to commit herself to Defendant which
commitment had previously occurred in her relationship with him. By way of further
answer, Plaintiff and Defendant committed to spend the rest of their lives together,
married or unmarried.
18. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff maintained
a separate residence from Defendant throughout the course of their relationship. It is
denied however that Plaintiff did not spend much of her time at Plaintiff's home and
proof thereof is demanded. By way of further answer, Defendant agreed that It was
appropriate for Plaintiff to maintain her separate residence to care for her elderly father,
even following their marriage.
19. Admitted.
20. Admitted.
21. Admitted in part and denied in part. It Is admitted that at times Plaintiff
gifted various items to Defendant which Items Plaintiff Is not requesting return of or
reimbursement for from Defendant. It Is denied that all financial contributions of Plaintiff
to Defendant were gifts and proof thereof Is demanded. By way of further answer,
Plaintiff provided loans to Defendant during their relationship on thrae occasions, one of
which loans was repaid to Plaintiff. Plaintiff further paid for fumlshlngs and
Improvements to Defendant's home In reliance upon his promise that they would spend
their lives together. Defendant further told Plaintiff on numerous occasions to not
purchase a home or townhouse of her own because she would be living at Defendant's
home.
22. Denied. It is denied that Plaintiff, at any time, made improvements to
Defendant's residence without Defendant's approval and agreement and proof thereof Is
demanded. It Is further denied that Plaintiff at any time told Defendant that the various
improvements were gifts to him, with the exception of the sidewalk and fence
improvements which Plaintiff explicitly gifted to Defendant and for which Plaintiff in the
Instant litigation is not seeking reimbursement.
23. Denied. Paragraph 23 constitutes legal conclusions which require no
answer and are deemed denied. To the extent that any further answer Is required, it is
denied that the financial contributions made to Defendant were gifts and proof thereof is
demanded.
24. Denied. It Is denied that Plaintiff at any time made gifts of various costs
and fumishings to Defendant which are the subject matter of this litigation and proof
thereof Is demanded. To the extent that any further answer is required, Defendant
abruptly broke off the parties' relationship after having received the financial benefit of
Plaintiffs contributions both monetarily and with fumishings all of which are In the
current possession and control of the Defendant.
25. Admitted. By way of further answer, Plaintiff was, through her financial
contributions and otherwise, Investing In her future with Defendant consistent with the
parties' agreement to spend the remainder of their lives together. Defendant on
numerous occasions assured Plaintiff that they would be together forever and that she
should not under any circumstances invest her money for instance, in another home or
townhouse, which statements Plaintiff relied upon to her delriment.
26. Admitted. By way of further answer, Plaintiffs expactation consitltent with
her discussions with Defendant was that they would spend their lives together.
27. Admitted.
26. Denied. The premise of Paragraph 26 which suggests that all Items were
purchased for the benefll of Defendant including financial contributions and furnishings
is denied. By way of further answer, PI..intiff made financial contributions to the parties'
relationship, all of which financial contributions in the form of furnishings and home
improvements are now in the exclulllve control and custody of Defendant. To the extent
that any further answer is required, Plaintiff gifted sevpral items to Defendant during
their relationship that she is not seeking reimbursement for and that are not the subject
matter of this litigation.
29. Denied. Paragraph 29 constitutes a series of legal conclusions which
require no answer and are deemed denied. To the extent that any further answer is
required, the Statute of Frauds Is Inapplicable to the instant action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that your Honorable Court dismiss with
prejudice Defendant's New Matter.
Counterclaim
30. No answer required.
31. Denied. Paragraph 31 constitutes a series of legal conclusions which
require no answer and are deemed denied. To the extent that any furthbr answer is
required, it is denied that Plaintiff's complaint is unsubstantiated and further denied that
it constitutes harassment by Plaintiff of Defendant.
Memorandum of law at 1.> The plaintiff wishes to clarify once again that she is not seeking
the legal remedy of damages for breach of contract or for tort. To the extent that she seeks
a monetary award, the plaintiff seeks the equitable remedy of "restitution" or
"reimbursement" to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment.
Unlike legal claims based on express or implied contract, a claim of unjust enrichment
does not depend upon the existence of an agreement between the parties. Rather, the claim
is grounded on the equitable principle that one who has received a benefit has a duty to make
restitution where retaining the benefit without restitution would be unjust. See Dan B.
Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 3 4.1 (1973); Restatement of Restitution 3 I
(1937). The Pennsylvania courts have long recognized that restitution and constructive trust
are equitable remedies designed to prevent unjust enrichment. E.g., Robbins v. Kristofic, 434
Pa. Super. 392, 643 A.2d 1079, 1083 (1994) (citing Partrick & Wilkins Co. v. Reliance
Insurance Co., 500 Pa. 399,456 A.2d 1348, 1351 (1983)).
Claims based upon unjust enrichment are often asserted between cohabitants upon
tennination of the relationship. See Annotation, Property RightsXCohabitation, 3 A.loR.4th
13 (1981 & Supp. 1997); Collins v. Davis, 68 N.C. App. 588, 315 S.E.2d 759 (1984)
(upholding unjust enrichment claim by which male cohabitant sought $10,000
reimbursement for money and labor expended in improving female cohabitant's home). In
Pennsylvania, Roberson v. Davis, 397 Pa. Super. 292, 580 A.2d 39 (1990), constitutes the
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reimburse the woman for her contribution to the cost of the swimming pool. The initial cash
involvement had been paid by the woman, but the remaining payments had been made by the
man; the trial court had found that the initial cash payment by the woman had been a gift to
the man. [d. at 41.
In this case, the furniture and other household items purchased by the plaintiff and
used by the parties in the defendant's residence should be ordered returned to her, just as the
automobile fo~ which the woman paid in Roberson was ordered returned to her. The plaintiff
in this case has presented satisfactory evidence that she purchased these items of personal
property, and the defendant's evidence that each and every item was a gift to him is simply
insufficient.
Unlike the woman in Roberson, the plaintiff in this case does not seek a one-half
interest in the real property titled in the defendant. Rather, she seeks only reimbursement of,
or a constructive trust to secure, her contributions to the cost of various improvements to the
property. Further, unlike the woman's contribution toward the swimming pool construction
in Roberson, the plaintiffs cash outlays in this case were not gifts to the defendant.
Although the defendant's Memorandum of Law contains repeated declarations that
the plaintiffs contributions to the improvement of his property were gifts to him (Defendant's
Memorandum of Law at 3), he fails to recognize that he bears the burden of proving an inter
vivos gift by clear, precise, and convincing evidence. E.g., Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 441 Pa,
Super. 230, 657 A.2d 34, 37 (1995); Hera v. McCon/lick, 425 Pa. Super. 432, 625 A.2d 682,
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686 (1993). Indeed, an alleged donee must prove all three elements of an inter vivos gift:
(I) donative intent; (2) delivery (actual or constructive); and (3) acceptance. E.g., In re
Sipe's Estate, 492 Pa. 125,422 A.2d 826, 828 (1980); Hera v. McCormick, 625 A.2d at 686;
In re Estate of Sou pc off. 329 Pa. Super. 130,477 A.2d 1388, 1390 (1984).
The defendant will be unable to meet this burden. The Defendant has acknowledged
in deposition that Plaintiff paid for the personal property and improvements in question to
his home. He also admits that these improvements increased the value of his property. The
Plaintiff will testify that her rationale for financing such improvements was her commitment
to Defendant at his request to spend the rest of her life with him.
Rather than supporting the defendant's gift theory, the evidence in this case actually
shows that the plaintiffs contributions to improving the defendant's property were not gifts.
The evidence further shows that the defendant would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain the benefit of the improvements without reimbursing the plaintiff.
Therefore, this Court should order the defendant to make restitution to the plaintiff in the
amount requested, or this Court should impose a trust or equitable lien on the property for
the amount requested.
In the alternative, the plaintiff requests this Court to order specific performance ofa
settlement agreement entered into by the parties in satisfaction of all claims arising from their
relationship. Following the Defendants abrupt termination of the parties' relationship,
Plaintiff asked Defendant for the sum of $10,000.00 as reimbursement to her for
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improvements made to Defendant's home and for the return of four (4) items of personal
property. The Defendant agreed to this settlement but none of the requested money or
personal property was rc;ceived by Plaintiff.
Although no Pennsylvania case has been reported that involves the enforceability of
a settlement agreement between cohabitants, courts in other states have enforced such
agreements without hesitation. For example, in Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d j94, 596
(Wyo. 1981), a woman sought specific performance of an oral settlement agreement that she
and her former partner had made when their relationship ended. The trial court found that
the parties had entered into an express oral contract to settle the woman's cohabitation claims
for $15,000. The court then ordered the man to perform his pan of the bargain. In affirming,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held that there was no public policy bar to enforcing such an
agreement between cohabitants. The court observed that the fact of cohabitation does not
render the parties incapable of contracting with one another. Accord Donnell v. Stogel, 1 (j 1
A.D.2d 93, 560 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1990) (enforcing written settlement agreement between
former cohabitants).
Because an express oral contract between cohabitants to share accumulated property
was held valid and enforceable in Knauer v. Knauer, 323 Pa. Super. 206, 470 A.2d 553
(1983), it appears clear that enforcing a settlement agreement between cohabitants would not
run afoul of the public policy of this Commonwealth. Therefore, this Court should order
specific performance of the parties' settlement agreement.
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.
PRAECIPE FOR L1STI'lG CASE FOR AR(jll~llNT
(Mu~1 be type"rillen and submilled in duplicalel
TO THE PROTHONOT AR'1' IOF CUMBERLAND COUNTY:
Please Ii.llhe within mailer for Ihe next:
o Pre. Trial Argumenl Court
[iJ Argument Courl
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. ------.---.----..
....---.-----.---------
CAPTION OF CASE
(enllre capllon mu'l be .tated in full)
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Jean L. Brookes
(Plainllrt)
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vs.
.
Ronald L. Hess
(Defendanl)
vs.
No. 1215 _' Civil ~ity
Ic?L_
I. Stale matter 10 be argued (I. e., plaintifr. motion for new trial,
defendant'. demurrer 10 complaint, etc.):
Defendant's Preliminary Objection to Plaintiff's comglaint
2. Idenllfy counsel ';'ho wll\ argue case:
(a) for plaintiff: Charles Rector, Esquire
(b) fordefendant: Michael L. Bangs, Esquire
3. I will notify all parties in writing wilhin twu day. Ihallhi, case Ii.. been
listed for argument._
)
Dated:
9/9/96
PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR TRIAL
(Mult be typewrltt.n Ind lubmllt.d In dupllclt.)
{i)AUG 0 Ii 1997
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CAPTION OF CASE
(.nllr. clpllon mUlt b. IItated In full)
(check one)
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(Check one)
Pl.... nit th. following ca..:
, ( for JURY trial It the next term of civil court.
( X) for trial without a Jury.
) Assumpsit
Jean L. Brookes
) Trespass
Trespass (Motor Vehlcl.)
(
(X)
~qlJfty I ~ong~rUC~iv9 Trust)
(other)
(Plaintiff)
vs.
The trial list will be called on 1 0/1 4 / 9 7
Ronald L. Hess
and
Trials commence on 1 1 /1 n / Q 7
(Defendant)
,Pretrials will be held on 10/22/97
(Briefs are due 5 days before pretrials.)
(The party listing this case for trial shall provIde
forthwith a copy of the praecipe to all counsel,
pursuant to local Rule 214-1.)
vs.
No. 1 215
Civil
19 96
Indicate the altomey who will try case for the party who flies this praecipe:
Charles Rector, ESQuire
Indicate trial counsel for other parties If known:
Michael Bangs, Esquire to Defendant
This case Is ready for trial.
SID'" ~ flJ/2-
c....
Print Name: Charles Rector, Esquire
Date: 7 / 30/97
Attorney for:
Plaintiff
1 OctotJer 2, 1997. 9:10 [).m.
2 Carlisle. Pennsylvania
3
4 (Whereupon, the folloWing collOQUY
5 was held:)
6 THE COURT: Whot is the si tuatlon?
7 MR. RECTOR: May it please the Court. Your
8 Honor. we have reached agreement in th~ adjudication. the
9 equity action, of Brookes versus Hess. I can brieflY
10 outline that agreement for the Court,
11 Your Honor, the parties ore agreeing to
12 settle this matter far the sum of $8,000.00 ta be paid to
13 the plaintiff by defendant as follows:
14 Commencing on November 1st of 1997 and each
15 month thereafter, the defendant will pay interest at 8
16 percent to plaintiff, and that monthly payment will be an
17 interest only payment on the unpaid balance.
18 Thereafter, Your Honor, on or before April
19 1st of each and every year, the defendant will pay to
20 plaintiff the sum of $1,500.00 on or before April I.
21 THE COURT: On principal?
22 MR. RECTOR: Principal. thnt is correct, Your
23 Honor, until the balance of $8,000.00 is paid in full.
24 Wi th respect to personal property, the
25 defendant will make available this Saturday ot 1:00 p,m. the
?
1 following items for the plaintiff to pick UP They Include
2 on oak table and six choirs. n bross flnnr lump. 0 quilt
3 hanger with wall screws, a green lap throw and material
4 hanging in the moster bedroom
5 Your Honor, the parties further aQree that
6 untll such time os the prlnclpnl Is paid in full to
7 plaintiff that the current equity action docketed at q6-1215
8 w111 remaIn active untIl such time, as I sold, the bolance
9 is paid in full.
10 THE COURT: You sold until the principal is
11 paid in full, principal and all interest?
12 MR. RECTOR: Yes, Your Honor.
13 THE COURT: Principal and interest Is paid in
14 full .
15 MR. RECTOR: And lastly, the rlefendant agrees
16 to secure the payments due and owing through the execution
17 of a note and mortgage which I will prepare and present to
18 his counsel as soon as possible,
19 THE COURT: That will be placerj on record
20 then?
21 MR. RECTOR. Yes, Your Honor.
22 MR. BANGS: Yes.
23 MR. RECTOR: Ms. Brook.es. hove YOU heard the
24 QQreement that I' ve rec i ted to the COllr t"
25 MS, BROOKES: Yes. I hove
,
1 MR. RECTOR: Do you understand iP
2 MS. BROOKES: Yes.
3 MR, RECTOR: Do you agree with It.)
4 MS. BROOKES: Yes.
5 MR. RECTOR: Do you ~Iove any ques tions?
6 MS, BROOKES: No,
7 MR. BANGS: Mr, Hes s. have you heard the
8 agreement that Mr. Rector has dictnted to the Court?
9 MR. HESS: Yes,
10 MR. BANGS: Do YOU hove any questions about
11 it?
12 MR. HESS: No.
13 MR. BANGS: Do YOU under stand it?
14 MR. HESS: Yes.
15 MR. BANGS: Are you in agreement with it?
16 MR. HESS: Yes.
17 THE COURT: And os discussed in chambers, if
18 this case comes UP for non-activity on the standard purge
19 list, there is on agreement that it will be removed from the
20 purge list and remain active until the settlement is
21 consummated in full, is that correct?
22 MR. RECTOR: Yes. Your Honor.
23 MR, BANGS: Correct.
24 THE COURT: Ami thot nf>ither party wJll
25 otherwise see~ the entry of 0 Judgment of non-pros until the
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1 agreement 1s completed in its entirety.
2 MR. RECTOR: Yes, Your Honor.
3 MR. BANGS: Thut's correct.
4 (Whereupon, the colloQUY was concluded
5 at 9:15 a.m.)
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