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HomeMy WebLinkAbout96-01844 ~ ) 'j ~~ -t~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ I:J i.. \~ ,1 .. - ~~ [U " , .~ I' f\~ ~ f. \3y~ , ~ I' , , l-' , '*\) ~\" ~ '-:i . >- ffi :f ! !! Z::l ~ CJ... t:: e ~ ell i i! !ui~~1 :! ~ J: 2 U Ul R Z II: R c{w ~J: . v, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO, f~. /~I(II /",J0P.._ LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL JAMES N, BAKER, II Petitioner COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Respondent ORDER AND NOW, this /f/Aday of () f{J', l l', , 199B, upon consideration of the within I Petition, It Is hereby ordered that a heerlng be held on the (i (i) day of at If), 3() 'ii'~~Ck In Courtroom No, ~, Cumberland County (~) fI II "._ ,199B, ,/ Courthouse, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Notice at saId hearing shall be gIven to the Department of Transportation at least 30 days prior to the date of the scheduled hearing by certified mall by Petitioner's counsel, By the Court: J, v, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ; NO, ., v I r 'I 'I CL~'..'..(~C'- JAMES N, BAKER, II Petitioner COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Respondent , , : LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL AND NOW, this 8111 day 01 Apr ii, 1996, comes James N, Baker, II, by his attomeys, Mancke, Wagner, Hershey & Tully, who respectfully represent: 1, Your Petitioner, James N, Baker, II, Is an adult Individual residing at 601 Erlord Road, Camp Hili, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and Is a licensed operator 01 motor vehicles In the Commonwealth 01 Pennsylvania, 2, Your Petitioner received a notice 01 auspenslon 01 his operating prlvlleges, a copy 01 which Is attached hereto and made a part hereol as exhibit "A", 3, Your Petitioner believes that said license suspension Is Illegal, unjust and Improper under the law, 4, Your Petitioner believes that said license suspension Is Improper and Illegal for reasons which Include but are not limited to the following: (a) the action violates the principles 01 double Jeopardy and collateral estoppel and are In violation of the Pennsylvania Consll1utlon, the Oklahoma Consll1utlon and the Federal Constitution and all related and applicable State Rules 01 Criminal Procedure, (b) your Petitioner Is being penalized a second time for actions for which he had previously been penalized and/or charges were dismissed, (0) notice to the public Is contained In the Pennsylvania Bulletin Vol, 24, No, 45, Nov, 5, 1994, p, 5609, Indicated that only charges of "drunk driving" are reciprocal and the charges against the defendant did not constitute drunk driving, (d) notification to the public concemlng reciprocity as well as the Driver Ucense Compact and Administrative Procedures Manual, clearly Indicate that driving a motor vehicle while under the Influence Is limited to those charges which specifically are "driving a motor vehicle while under the Influence at alcoholic beverages or a narcotic to a degree which renders the driver Incapable ot safely driving a motor vehicle" of which conduct the def,lndant was not guilty, (e) the Pennsylvania Bulletin, as well as the Driver Ucense Compact and Administrative Procedures Manual, clearly Indicates that the licensing authority In the home state shall give "such effeot tl) the conduct as Is provided by the laws of the home state" and under the laws of the home state your Petitioner would be ARD eligible and/or eligible for preadJudlcatlon program under the Federal Diversionary Program, (I) the Driver Ucense Compact Is not being enforced In Pennsylvania except for a few violations and said enforcement therefore denies equal protection and due process and has resulted In Illegal delegation of authority and violation ot law, 2 " .' cntHlll I 11,1 E AI,TlI lIF I'EtH1SVLVANIA UEI'AR rllEN r Ill' TIlAll Sl'lIllTA T I lIN Ihll"!illl Ill' 1l1'lv"I' 1,le"II,III!1 1I''''I'.l5h'"'!I, PA 1/123 "IAllell 11, I') ')(, JAtl1:S N UAKEI{ II 8Ul I:I{I'OHD I{D ~LULU8~2200U1U8 IIUl O:J/lJ'I/1'\'lL 1'111'11,11'1'1 1lJ/i!U/l'IL2 C Atll' IIILL PA 17Ul1 DOill' Hullll'.I,l: I A' il l'oslIll Ill' lh" lI"II.,,'ll1\lIlIl 1'l!Co.lV.lII!! 1I0l.lflcill.loll 1'1'011\ OKLAIIIlHA of YUill' clIllv.I.:lillll Oil 11/~~1I/1'l'l!; Ill' I.ll1IVING UNDER INFLUENCE Oil ll/ll'll1 'l,)!;, I-Ih.lch .I, ollll.lv"l"lll III Soclioll 3731 of lho Pn. 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SUI1I1IIlU" CIIIIY of' tho "1'110,,1 Hhlch YOII f11nd I-I1l:h thu CI1I1I'I:, \:u I:ho DOl'"rt- IIIOl1t, \-1111 1105\:1101111 tho OOllill'tIllOI1\:' 5 "10\:1011 1I011dll1'} " f'111,,1 doclslol1 hy thu COIII'I If thu illIIIO,,1 I.,as f'ilod \-I1\:h.l11 thl! 1'0- IIUil'Ol1 30 dilY5. 1I0\-lOVOI',.if YOIII' III'.iv.i1Il!lo \:11 Ulllll'''\:I1 it cOllllllorcl"l IlIotOI' voh.lclo h"5 houl1 DISQUALIFIED, il 51Ul1od SIlIlOI'sodo"s hy tho jllduo 111115t "CI:IIIIIII"I1Y YOIII' "11110"1. 2, NON-RESIDENT - If' yOII "rn 110\: " 1'05.11111l1t of 1'011I1sylv"l1i", YOII IIIl1st fllo "11 "1'110,,1 .-I1\:h \:hu COliI'I: uf COl1l1ll011 Plo"s III lho 1'011l1sylval1i" COIlI1\:Y \-Ihuro thu vlolatllll1 OCl:lIl'l'oll, SU11111nu" COpy of \:ho "I'poal \-Ihlch YIIII fll",1 \-I1l:h thu COIII't, \:0 I:ho 001'''1' \:11I011 \:, \-1111 1'1I5tl'0110 tho OUl'"rI:IIIUI1\:'5 "c\:lol1 1'011111110 " fll1"l 1100:151011 hy \:ho COlli'\: if I:hu .1II111lUl 1-1"5 fllotl \-1.il:h.l11 tho rOlllllrotl 311 lIays. THE APPEAL MUST DE SENT DY CERTIFIED MAIL TO: PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL ROOM 103, TRANSPORTATION & SAFETY DUILDING HARRISDURG, PA, 17120 " " ,.. " . . i JAMES N. BAKER, II, PETITIONER IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA i j v, 96-1844 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, : BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING RESPONDENT LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL ORDER AND NOW,Ihis ,z.~ day of l4"fu..'" I , 1996, upon moll on by the Department ofTmnsportation, the hearing in the above referenced appeal is continued, BY THE COURT: 4~, A IL J. / Distribution: George H, Kabusk, Esquire, 103 Tmnsportation and Safely Building, Harrisburg, Po, 17120 John B. Mancke, Esquire, 2233 North Front Street, Harrisburg, P A 17110 ~~.... C""'-~.L ~/I.>..jq~, ,..,&,6'- 5. The Commonwealth Court on July 29, 1996, in David 1. Sullivan v. Commonwealth ofPenn&ylvania, Department of Transportation. Bureau of Driver LicensinlJ. No, 2786 C,D, 1995, issued an opinion regarding the Compact. Copy attached, 6, In Sullivan the Commonwealth Court held that the Department does not have authority to suspend a driver's license based on an out-of-state conviction pursuant to the Compact, 7, The undersigned coumel has been infonned by his superiors that the Department will be filing a petition for alloca/llr to the Supreme Court in Sullivan, 8. The Commonwealth Court on May 31, 1996, in David James Olmstead v, Commonwealth ofPenn&ylvania. Department of Transportation. Bureau of Driver LicensinlJ, No, 325 I C,D, 1995, issued an opinion regarding the Compact, Copy attached, 9. In Olmstead the Commonwealth Court held that a New York driving while ability Imparted statute is not substantially similar to the Pennsylvania driving under the influence statute, therefore, the Department did not have authority pursuant to the Compact to suspend the driver's operating privilege based on that out-of-state conviction, 10, The undersigned counsel has been infonned by his superiors that the Department filed apetitionfor allocatllrto the Supreme Court in Olmstead, 11. The undersigned counsel requests a continuance to allow the Supreme Court to act on the above mentioned petitions for alloca/llr, 12, The motorist's operating privilege has been restored pending appeal pursuant to Section 1550 of the Vehicle Code, 13, The undersigned counsel contacted John B, Mancke, Esquire. attorney for the petitioner, and Mr, Mancke indicated he has no objection to the granting of a continuance in this -..A. ! . . - IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT 01" PENNSYLVANIA DAVID JAMES OLMSTEAD, Appellant v. No. 3251 C.D. 1995 SUBHITTEDI March 29, 1996 COHHONWEALTlI 01" PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING BEFORE I HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, President JUdge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, JUdge HONORABLE CHARLES A. LORD, Senior Judge Ol'IIfIOIf BY 8111I0R JUDGI LORD I'ILlD. Mav 31, 1996 David James Olmstead appeals an order ot the Bradtord County Court ot Common Pleas that dismissed his appeal and upheld the one- year suspenaion ot his driving privilege by the Department ot Transportation, Bureau at Driver Licensing (DOT). On June 29, 1995, Olmstead was convicted in the State ot New York ot the ottense at Driving while ability impaired, a violation ot N.Y. Vehicle', Trattic Law, Article 31, 11192(1). Pursuant to the Driver License Compact ot 1961 (compact),' New York reported its conviction ot Olm.tead to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, his home state. By letter dated August 9, 1995, DOT then intormed Olastead a. tallow.. As . re.ult of the Department receiving notitication tro. NI'If YORK of your conviction on 06/29/1995 ot DRIVING " 'Neither party rai... the question of the legality ot the Compact. UNDER INPLUENCE[Z) on 06/04/1995, which is .quival.nt to s.ction 3731 ot the Pa. V.hicl. Cod., your driving privil.g. is b.ing SUSPENDED tor a p.riod ot 1 YEAR(S), as mandat.d by s.ction 15328 ot the V.hicl. Cod.. (Footnot. add.d). s.ction 1532(b) (3) ot the Cod., 75 Pa. C.S. S1532(b) (3) attords that "[t)h. d.partm.nt shall susp.nd the op.rating privil.g. ot any driv.r tor 12 months upon r.c.iving a c.rtiti.d record ot the driv.r's conviction ot s.ction 3731[3) (relating to driving und.r intlu.nc. ot alcohol or controll.d .ub.tanc.)...." (Footnote added). Olmstead appealed his one-year suspension to the common pleas court, which uph.ld it. H. th.n p.tition.d this Court tor r.vi.w, raising thes. issues: 1) whether the New York ottense ot "Driving while ability impaired" (DWAI) is substantially similar to the ott.n.e in Pennsylvania ot "Driving under the intluenc." (DUI) tor purposes ot r.ciprocal suspensions under the Compact I and 2) wh.n deciding it a N.w York ottens. is substantially similar to the Pennsylvania ott.ns. ot DOI, must the court recoqniz. the distinction betw..n New York's "Driving while intoxicated" (DWI) and DWAI statut.s.. ~e certitied record prove. that Olmst.ad was convict.d in New York ot the specitio ottense ot "Driving while ability impair.d." We caution DOT to be more precise when intorming a lic.n..e wby hi. or h.r driving privilege i. being susp.nded or revoked. 3S.ction 3731 ot the Cod., 75 Pa. C.S. 13731. .our scope ot r.vi.w ot a common pleas court d.cision in a lic.n.. .uspension app.al is limit.d to a det.rmination ot wheth.r tinding. ot taot are .upport.d by .ubstantial .vid.no., an .rror ot law was oo..itt.d, or the court abused it. disor.tion. Decartment 2 f We vill begin by comparing Nev York'. DWAI .tatut. vith our own DUI .tatut.. N.v York'. DWAI statute provide.: 11111, Op.rating. aotor v.hicle whUe Wld.r th. intluaac. ot alcohol or drug. 1. Driving vhil. ability impaired. No person shall op.rat. a motor v.hicl. while the p.reon'. ability to op.rat. .uch motor v.hicl. t. impaired by the con.UlIIption or alcohol. According to Pennsylvania's DUI atatut.: 13731. Driving WIder iIItlu.nc. ot alcohol or oontroll.d .Ub.tanc. ea) orren.. derined.-A person ehall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control or the movement or any vehicle: el) while under the intlu.nce or alcohol to a degr.e which render. the person incapable or .are drivingl .. . (4) while the amount or alcohol by weight in the blood or the p.r.on i. 0.10t or great.r... Olmstead argue. that, in Nev York, impairment to any ext.nt vill .upport a conviction ror DWAI and p.nn.ylvania has no e...ntially similar orren.e. He ....rt. that, in.t.ad, P.nn.ylvania'.,DUI statute is .Ubstantially akin to Nev York's OWl .tatut., vhich afford.: IUI2. Opentillg a aotor vehicle whUe UDder the influence of alcohol or drug. ... 2. Driving vhil. intoxicated, per .... No person .hall opera4le1-t1Ot10r-veMol. vMl-.-.uch pereon -has ,..a.o .of on. p.r c.ntua or more by v.ight of alcohol in the per.on'e blood a. .hown by chemical analy.t. of .uch person'. af Tran.nortatlon. Bur.au of Driv.r Licen.ina v. Pel1m.th, 528 A.2d 1090 (pa. ClDVlth. 1987). 3 blood, breath, urine or saliva, made punuant to the provi.ion. ot .ection eleven hundred ninety-tour ot this article. 3. Orivinq while intoxicated. Ho per. on .hall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. The Court ot Appeal. ot Hew York has explain.d that OWAI i. a l..ser included ottense ot DWI. s.. PeoDl. v. Hoaa, 416 H.E.2d 1033 (1981). In PeoDle v. Cruz, 399 H.E.2d 513 (1979), aDD.d dismissed, 446 U.S. 901 (1980), the Court ot App.als .lucidated the, distinction between when a driver is merely impair.d by alcohol or is intoxicated. In ~, the Court explained that, with respect to H.Y. Vehicle , Trattic LaW, Article 31, 51192(1), "the question in .ach case is whether, by voluntarily consuminq alcohol, this particular detendant has actually impaired, ~ ~ extent, t~. physical and mental abilities which he is expected to poss.ss in order to op.rat. a v.hicle a. a reasonable and prudent driver." la., 399 H.E.2d at 516. (Emphasis added). As to intoxicatio~, tor purpos.. ot subcliviaion 3 of 11192, the Court explained that it "is a qreater deqree of impairm.nt which i. reach.d when the driver has voluntarily con.umed alcohol to the extent that he i. incapable ot employinq the phy.ical and mental abilities which he i. expected to po..... in oreler to operate a vehicle a. a rea.onable and prudent driv.r." la" 399 H.E.2d at 517. H. Y .-Yehie-le-'-!'raffic-lJav;-1\l'1:ic-le-31; -U,-l-9!~2)'~c) provide. that a blood alcohol level of more than .07' but le.. than .10' .hall con.titute prima tacie evidence that a person'. ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption. Th. 4 .tatute al.o provid.. that this ranq. ot w.iqht ot alcohol in the blood amount. to prima faci. evidence that a per.on was not intoxicat.d. While, admittedly, in Pennsylvania a driver need not have a blood alcohol level ot .10' before h. or sh. could be convicted ot DUI, in order to .upport a conviction wh.re th.r. i. no .vid.nc. to this .ftect, DOT mu.t prove that the driver, operator or per.on in actual physical control ot the motor vehicle was influ.nc.d by alcohol to a deqree that he or she could not drive safely. ~ Commonwealth v. Bvers, 437 Pa. Superior ct. 502, 650 A.2d 468 (1994) tor DOT'. burden of proot under section 3731(a)(1) of the Cod.. certainly, s.ction 3731(a) (1) cannot reasonably b. interpreted to detine DUI as any alcohol-related impairment, no matter how minor, where that impairment doe. not affect a person's ability to b. a .ate driver. Aa the trial court recognized, our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Horn, 395 Pa. 585, 150 A.2d 872 (1959) and again in Commonwealth v. Gri.cavaa., 512 Pa. 540, 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) said that the .tate ot b.ing "under the intluence" include., not only all the obvious condition. and deqree. ot intoxication, but .ub.tantial impairm.nt by alcohol ot. the abiliti.. ....ntial to operating an automobile sately. Further, the Supreme Court explained in Griscavaae that ".ub.tantial impairm.nt, in this context, mean. a diainution or enteebl..ent in the ability to exerci.e judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to chanqinq circum.tance. and condition.. It. meaninq i. not limited to .ome 5 . extreme condition ot di.ability." ~., 512 Pa. at 545, 517 A.2d at 1258. What the trial court in the matter ~ iUdice tailed to note, however, 18 that sub.tantial impairment 18 not ot course any impairment, and to this extent our DUI ottens. ditter. qreatly trom New York'. DHAI ott.nse, which punishes much le.. eqreqious conduct behind the wheel. Article IV ot the Compact attords in relevant partlS ."ICT 0' CONVICTION- (1) The licensinq authority in the home state, tor the purposes ot suspension, revocation, or limitation ot the license to operate a motor vehicl., shall qive the sam. ettect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Articl. 111,[') as it would it such conduct had occurrsd in the home state, in the case ot convictions torI ... (b) Drivinq a motor vehicle while under the intlu.nc. ot alcoholic beveraqes or a narcotic to a deqree which rend.rs the driver incapabl. ot sat.ly drivinq a motor vehicle, ... (2) As to oth.r conviction., r.ported pursuant to Articl. III, the licensinq authority in the home state shall qiv. such ett.ct to the conduct a. i. provid.d by the law. ot the ho.. .tate. (Footnot. add.d). Becau.. N.w York did not report that Olmst.ad had driv.n while -'Notl1 '-w. -quote -here --from -~."-Dr!ver' L!-c.n.. Compact, Ac:lJainiatraUv. Procedur.. Manual 1990, provid.d to u. in the c.rtitied r.cord. 'Articl. III ot the Compact conc.rn. report. ot conviction troa the lic.ndnq authority ot a party atate to the licendnq authority ot the ho.. stat. ot the lic.n.... 6 , as mandated by 75 Po.. C.S. 51532(b) (3). At the statutory appeal hearinq, DOT "asserted its authority to suspend sullivan's license based on the Nebraska conviction under the Driver License Compact (Compact), effective January 1, 1995, pursuant to notice published in 24 Po.. Bull. 5609. Accordinq to DOT, the Compact authorizes the home state to qive effect to the out-of-state conduct as provided by the laws of the home state. DOT then moved to admit a copy of the Nebraska conviction report. Counsel for sullivan objected to admission of the report as inadmissible hearsay because the document was not properly certified as required by 42 Po.. C.S. 55328(0.). In addition, counsel for Sullivan asserted the followinq: 1r the notice purported to suspend the license under 75 Po.. C.S. 51532(b) for violation of 75 Po.. C.S. 53731, and sullivan did not violate that section; 2) for the notice to be valid, it must set forth the authority under which DOT is proceedinq; and 3) DOT had no authority to suspend sullivan's license under the Vehicle Code or under the Driver License compact, which has not been enacted into law in the commonwealth. Common Pleas sustained Sullivan's appeal. The court found that DOT's notice was deficient in that it failed to set forth the authority upon which DOT based the suspension, and it found that the Nebraska conviction report was ~ot properly certified. DOT appealed. Our review of a common pleas decision in a motorist's 2 , statutory appeal trom suspension ot his or her operating privilege is limited to determining whether necessary tindings ot tact were supported by competent evidence at record and whether the trial court committed errors ot law or abused its discretion. commonwealth v. Danforth, 530 Pa. 327, 608 A.2d .1044 (1992). Betore this court, DOT asserts 1) that the notice was sutticiently intormative to apprise sullivan ot the tactual and statutory basis tor the suspension and to provide him with the opportunity to adequately prepare a detense, and 2) that DOT's certiticati~n ot the Nebraska conviction report was admissible as a DOT document pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S. S1550(d). DOT de tends the adequacy ot its notice ot suspension on due process grounds, but the issue is not precisely tramed in terms ot due process. In substance, Sullivan's objection and the basis tor his statutory appeal, is that DOT had no authority to suspend sullivan's license tor the Nebraska conviction either under 75 Pa. C.S. S1532(b), as stated in the notice, or under any other law ot the commonwealth. At the statutory hearing, when DOT first revealed that it was proceeding under the Driver License Compact (Notes ot Testimony at p. 2.), sullivan immediately asserted DOT's lack ot authority to have entered into an interstate compact and its lack ot authority to proceed under the Compact. (Notes ot Testimony at' p. 4.) We now consider whether DOT has the authority (or jurisdiction) to suspend a driver'. license based on an out-ot- state conviction pursuant to the Compact. The power and authority 3 to be exercised by administrative agencies must be either expressly conferred or given by necessary implication by the legislature. DeDllrtment. of Environmental Resources v, But.ler Count.v Mushroom lAID, 499 Pa. 509, 454 A.2d 1 (1982). According to DOT, the General Assembly, in 75 Pa. C.S. 56146, specifically authorized the Secretary of Transportation to enter into the Compact on the COllll1\onwealth'lI behalf. That section, in pertinent part, permits the Secretary t.o enter into agreements relating to enforcement of this title, including, but not limited tOI (1) the Driver License Compact and any other agreements to notify any state of violations incurred by residents of that state I (2) agreements to suspend or revoke the operating privilege of Pennsylvania licensed drivers who are convicted in Federal court or in another state of any offense essentially similar to those enumerated in section 1532(a) and (b) (relating to revocation or suspension of operating privilege); 75 Pa. C.S. 56146. "All agreements, arrangements and declarations, and amendments thereto, shall be in writing and shall be published , in compliance with Part II of Title 45 (relating to publication and effectiveness of Commonwealth documents). The department shall provide copies for public distribution upon request.11 75 Pa. C.S. 56152. Although 75 Pa. C.S. 56146 does specifically mention the Compact in its grant of authority to enter into enforcement agreements, that authority is insufficient to give the compact the effect ot law. A state can delegate to an administrative agency the authority to enter into an interstate compact, but a state may 4 ....... join a compact only in the manner specified in the compact. Participation in the Driver License compact is only by enactment. Article VIII of the Compact provides, "(1) This compact shall enter into force and become effective as to any state when it has enacted the same into law[/]" and "(2) [a]ny party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same...... The Driver License compact: AdIIlinistrative Procedures Manual 4-5/ U.S. Dep't of Transp. (1990). A history, published as Appendix E of the Administrative Procedures Manual/ characteFizes the Compact as "[a]n interstate compact .. . a formal and contractual agreement between two or more States/ ... enacted into State law in each participating jurisdiction, usually with identical wording." IlL. at 37. Participation in the compact must be effected by enactment/ and the Compact/ by its own ~erms/ is not effective until it is enacted into law.2 2 Enactment is "[t]he method or process by which a bill in the Legislature becomes a law." Black's Law Dictionary 472, (5th ed. 1979). All participating states have enacted the Compact into law: Ala. Code 5532-6-30 - 32-6-36 (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. 5528-1601- 28-1605; Ark. Code 5527-17-101 - 27-17-106; Cal. Veh. Code 515000 et seq. (West); Colo. Rev. Stat. 5524-60-1101 - 24-60-1107; 1992 Conn. Acts 92-186 (Reg. Sess.); Del. Code tit. 21/ 58101; D.C. Code 5540-1501/ 40-1502 (1981); 23 Fla. Stat. Ann. 55322.43-322.48 (West); Haw. Rev. Stat. 552B6C-l, 286C-2; Idaho Code 5549-2001 - 49-2003; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 625/ para. 5/6-700 - 5/6-708 (Smith- Hurd); Ind. Code Ann. 559-28-1-1 - 9-28-1-6 (West); Iowa Code 55321C.l/ 321C.2; Kan. Stat. Ann. 558-1212 - 8-1218; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5532:1420-32:1425; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 29, 55631-675; Md. Transp. Code'5516-701 - 16-708; Minn. Stat. 55171.50-171.56/ Miss. Code Ann. 5563-1-101 - 63-1-113 (1972)/ ijo. Ann. Stat. 55301.600- 302.605 (Vernon); Mont. Code Ann. 5561-5-401 -61-5-406; 2A Neb. Rev. Stat. app. at 840 (Reissue 1985); Nev. Rev. Stat. 55483.640- 483.690; N.H. Rev. Stat 5263.77; N.J. Stat. Ann. 5539150-1 - 39150- 14 (West); N.M. Stat. Ann. 5566-5-49 - 66-5-51 (Michie 1978)/ N.Y. Veh. 'Trat. Law 5516 (McKinney 1989); N.C. Gen. Stat. 5520-4.21 - 20-4.30; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 54507.60 (Baldwin); Okla. Stat. tit. 5 , In contrast, Florida's Nonresident Violator Compact, 23 Fla. stat. Ann. 55322.49-322.50, which follows the Florida Driver License Compact in the Florida statutes, provides for participation by resolution. Article VII of Florida's Nonresident Violator Compact states that entry into the compact is made by -resolution of ratification, executed by authorized officials of the applyinq jurisdiction, and includinq a citation of the authority by which the jurisdiction is empowered to become a party to the compact. 23 Fla. stat. Ann. 5322.50. If the Driver License Compact pr~vided for such a procedure, other than enactment, the authorization in 75 Pa. c.s. 56146 would be sufficient to permit DOT to join the Compact by aqreement; however, it does not. The Commonwealth's attempt to participate in the Compact without enactment threatens the Compact's effectiveness in other states. Decisions from jurisdictions where the Compact has been enacted illustrate the kind of problems that can arise when the Compact has not been enacted in the reportinq state. In PeODle v. siems, 523 N.E.2d 727 (Ill. App. ct. 1988), an Illinois appeals court refused to uphold a license suspension based on a Kentucky conviction because Kentucky had not enacted the Compact. In McKenzie v. Reaistrar, No. 95-01-005, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 854 (Ohio ct. App. Mar. 5, 1996) (per curiam), the court reached the 47, 55781-7881 Or. Rev. stat. 5802.5401 S.c. Code Ann. 5556-1-610 - 56-1-690 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Utah Code Ann. 5541-2-501 - 41-2-506 (1953); vt. stat. Ann. tit. 23,553901-3910; Va. Code 5546.2-483 - 46.2-488 (1950) 1 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 5546.21.010-46.21.040 (West); W. Va. Code 5517B-1A-1, 17B-1A-2 (1986) 1 Wyo. stat. 5531-7-201, 31- 7-202 (1977). 6 same conclusion, aqain based on KentuckY not havinq enacted the Compact. In Division of Motor Vehicles v. Kleinert, 486 A.2d 1324 (N.J. Super. ct. App. Div. 1985), the court reached a contrary conclusion, upholdinq a suspension based on a Vermont conviction even thouqh Vermont was not a member state, but only because another New Jersey statute, other than the Compact, authorized suspension based on an out-of-state conviction. The Compact's lanquaqe requirinq enactment is consistent with the Commonwealth's established leqal principles. Article III of the Compact would have the effect of makinq an out-of-state traffic offense punishable within the Commonwealth, ~ at 3, in contravention of the well-settled rule that only the leqislature has the power to define criminal offenses and to determine the punishment to be imposed.] Not only has the Compact not been enacted in the commonwealth, DOT has not complied with the procedures required to qive effect to reciprocal aqreements authorized by 75 Pa. C.S. 56146. DOT has failed to publish the Compact in compliance with Part II of Title 45, as specified in 75 Pa. C.S. 56152. DOT published a notice of its membership in the compact with a synopsis, 24 Pa. Bull. 5609 (1994). The full text of the Compact has never appeared in the Pennsylvania Bulletin or in the Pennsylvania'Codej therefore, DOT is not entitled to the statutory ] Section 107 Of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. 5107. In pertinent part, "(b) CommOD law orimea aboliahed. -- No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is a crime under this title or another statute of this Commonwealth." 18 Pa. C.S. Sl07(b). 7 ~ presumption of 45 Pa. C.S. 5905 that the document was duly promulgated and that all applicable regulations were followed.. We are dismayed with DOT's lack of candor during all phases of this litigation. In its notice to sullivan, DOT made no mention ot the Compact as the basis for the license suspension; sullivan made his appeal knowing that his Nebraska traffic violation was not a violation of 75 Pa. C.S. 51532(b). At the statutory hearing, DOT announced that it was proceeding under the compact, citing to the Pennsylvania Bulletin. DOT's brief to this Court quotes liberally from the Compact. At no time was the Compact made part of the record in this case, even though the compact is not published and is available to the. public only through DOT. In weighing the merits of the arguments, the Court is entitled to review the Compact in its entirety, not just those provisions that DOT deems pertinent. Because the Compact itself requires that it be enacted into law by the legislatures of all the participating states and because the Commonwealth has never enacted the Compact, DOT is without authority to proceed under the compact to suspend the operator's license of any Commonwealth resident based on an out-of- state conviction for any traffic offense. At the present time, DOT may not suspend an operator's license based on an out-of-state · 45 Pa. C.S. 5905 provides that publication of a document in the code or the bulletin creates a rebuttable presumption that the document was duly issued or promulgated, approved as to legality, and all requirements otherwise met. Even if DOT were entitled to the presumption, our conclusion that the Compact is invalid unless enacted effectively rebuts this presumption. S . conviction except as provided in 75 Pa. C.S. 51532' or in some other statute. We need not address DOT's evidentiary issue or the adequacy ot DOT's notice ot suspension. Accordingly, the order ot the Court ot Common Pleas ot,Allegheny County is affirmed. ~ ' GARDNER COLINS, President Jud Judge smith dissents. ~ 00'1' hall thft a\lthor!ty to suspend operating privileges based on conv1.ct.ion of enUlllerated of tenses involving controlled substances "under the laws at the united states, this Commonwealth or any other state." 75 Pa. C.S. 51532(c). Had the legislature included the quoted phrase in subsection (b) (3), perhaps DOT would have had the neces8llry authority to suspend Sullivan's license regardless at the validity ot the Compact. - 9 JAMES N, BAKER, II, PETITIONER IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v, 96-1844 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYL VANIA, : DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING RESPONDENT LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL MOTION TO REMAND TO THE DEPARTMENT TO RESCIND THE SUSPENSION The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Trnnsportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department), by and through its attorney, George H, Kabusk, Esquire, respectfully represents as follows: I. The Department mailed to James N, Baker, II, a notice dated March II, 1996, infonning him that as a result of the Department of Transportntion (Department) receiving notification from Oklahoma of his conviction on November 30, 1995, of driving under the influence on November 9, 1995, whleh the Department deemed equivalent to Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, his driving privilege was being suspended for one year as mandated by Section 1532B of the Vehicle Code, 2, Mr, Baker filed an appeal of the above mentioned suspension, 3, A hearing in the matter was scheduled for August 15, 1996, at 9:00 a,m, In Courtroom number 4. 4, The malter was continued pending, among other things, the appeal of Sullival/ v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 682 A,2d 5 CPa, Cmwlth, 1996), 5. The suspension which is the subject of this appeal is based on thc Driver's License Compact. 6, The Commonwealth Court on July 29, 1996, in Su//il'anl', Commonwealth of PenllSylvania, Department of Transportation. Bureau of Driver Licensing, 682 A,2d 5 (Pa, Cmwlth, 1996) held that the Department did not have authority 10 suspend a driver's license based on an out-of-Slate conviction pursuant to the Driver's License Compact because it had nol been properly enacted into law. 7, The Supreme Court accepted petillon for al/ocatllr filed by the Department. 8, The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court in Sullivan v, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Departmelll of Transportation, B,lreau of Driver Licensing, No, 0023 W,D, Appeal Docket 1997, in an opinion issued on February 26, 1998. 9. The Department had no authority to suspend the motorist's operating privilege in this matter because the Commonwealth had not properly enacted the Driver's License Compact at the time when the Department took this action, 10, The Commonwealth enacted into law the Driver's License Compact by Section lOaf Act ofl996, Dec, 10, P,L. 925, No, 149, effective December 10.1996, at 75 Pa, C,S, 1581-1585, II, The enactment of the Driver's License Compact has no effect on this suspension which was based upon the Driver's License Compact before it was enacted. See Moreland v, Department of Transportation, 70 I A,2d 294 CPa, Cwmlh, 1997), 12, The motorist's operating privilr.ge has been restorcd pending appeal pursuant to Section 1550 of the Vehicle Code, - 13, The undersigned counsel contacted John B, Mancke, Esquire, allorney for the petitioner, and Mr, Mancke indicated he has no objection to the gmnting of the Motion to REMAND AND RESCIND the Suspension which is the basis of this appeal and Mr, Mancke concurs with the allached proposed Order, WHEREFORE, the Department respectfully requests that its Motion to REMAND and RESCIND the Suspension which is the basis of this appeal be granted, Respectfully submilled, }br~l!~c George H, Kabusk, Esquire Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department ofTrnnsportation Office of Chief Counsel Riverfront Office Center 1101 South Front Street Harrisburg, P A 17104-2516 (717) 787-2830 Date: March 12, 1998 [J.158'97] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT DAVID J. SULLIVAN No. 0023 W,D. Appeal Docket 1997 Appellee Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered July 29, 1996 a t No, 2786 C, D. 95 affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil Division, entered September 20, 1995 at No. S.A. 2008 of 1995 682 A,2d 5 (Pa, Cmwlth. 1996) v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING Appellant Argued: September 18, 1997 OPINION OF THE COURT MADAME JUSTICE NEWMAN DECIDED: FEBRUARY 26, 1998 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT) appeals from an Order of the Commonwealth Court that affirmed an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) sustaining David J. sullivan's (Sullivan) statutory appeal of a one-year license suspension imposed pursuant to Section l532(b) (3) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S, S 1532(b) (3) ,I We granted allocatur to 1 75 Pa.C,S. S 1532 (b) (3) provides in part that: [PennDOT] shall suspend the operating privilege of any driver for 12 months upon receiving a certified record of the driver's conviction of section 3731 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or 3733 (relating to fleeing or attempting to elude police officer) (continued, . .) . . decide the issue of whether, at the time of Sullivan's license suspension, PennDOT had the authority to suspend a driver's license based on an out-of-state conviction pursuant to the Driver License compact of 1961 (compact), Because we conclude that, at the relevant time, the commonwealth had not enacted the Compact into law, we affirm the Order of the Commonwealth Court. FACTUAl. AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Compact is a contractual agreement among states intended to promote compliance with each party state's driving laws and regulations, Besides Pennsylvania, the compact has thirty- nine party jurisdictions (thirty- eight states and the District of Columbia), each of which has enacted the Compact into law by statute.2 (,. . continued) or an adjudication of delinquency based on section 3731 or 3733, . , . 2 ~ Ala, Code 55 32-6-30 to 361 Ariz. Rev. Stat. 55 28-1601 to 16051 Ark. Code 55 27-17-101 to 106/ Ca1, Veh. Code 5 15000 et seg,l Colo, Rev. Stat, 55 24-60-1101 to 11071 1992 Conn. Acts 92-186 (Reg. Sess.) 1 Del. Code tit, 21, 5 8101; D,C.Code 55 40-1501 and 15021 23 Fla. Stat. Ann. 55 322.43 to 322,481 Haw. Rev, Stat. 55 286C-1 and 286C-2/ Idaho Code 55 49-2001 to 20031 Ill, Ann. Stat. ch. 625, ~ 5/6-700 to 7081 Ind, Code Ann, 55 9-28-1-1 to 61 Iowa Code 55 321C.1 and 321C.21 Ran, Stat. Ann, 55 8-1212 to 12181 La. Rev. Stat, Ann. 5~ 32:1420 to 14251 Me. Rev. Stat. tit, 29, 5~ 631 to 6751 Md. Transp. Code 55 16-701 to 708/ Minn. Stat. ~~ 171.50 to 561 Miss, Code Ann, 55 63-1-101 to 1131 Mo, Ann. Stat. ~~ 301.600 to 302.6051 Mont. Code Ann, 55 61-5-401 to 4061 2A Neb, Rev. Stat. App, at 8401 Nev, Rev, Stat, 55 483.640 to 483.6901 N.H, Rev. Stat. 5 263.771 N.J. Stat, Ann. 55 39:5D-1 to 141 N.M. Stat. Ann. 55 66-5-49 to 511 N.Y, Veh. & Traf. Law 5 5161 N,C. Gen. Stat. 55 20-4.21 to 4,30/ Ohio Rev. Code Ann, 5 4507.60 Okla,Stat. tit, 47, H 781 to 7881 Or. Rev. Stat, 5802.5401 S.C, Code Ann. 55 56-1-610 to 690/ Utah Code Ann, 55 41-2-501 to 5061 Vt. Stat. Ann. (continued.,. ) [J-158-1997] - 2 Article III of the Compact provides that, "[t!he licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction [for an offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle! of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee." pursuant to Article IV(1) of the compactl The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation, or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state, in the case of convictions forI or negligent operation of homicide a motor (a) Manslaughter reSUlting from the vehicle/ (b) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or a narcotic to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, (c) Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used, or (d) Failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident reSUlting in the death or personal injury of another. On March 28, 1995, sullivan, a resident and licensed driver of Pennsylvania, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) in Nebraska, which is a party to the compact. Pursuant to the Compact, Nebraska reported sullivan'S conviction to PennDOT. By (.. ,continued) tit. 23, 55 3901 to 3910, Va, Code 55 46,2-483 to 4BB, Wash. Rev. Code Ann, 55 46.21.010 to 46,21.040 (West), W.Va. Code 55 17B-1A-1 and 2, Wyo. Stat. 55 31-7-201 and 202. [J-15B-1997] - 3 notice dated May 25, 1995, PennDOT informed sullivan that his conviction for DUI in Nebraska was equivalent to a violation of section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa,C,S. ~ 3731,3 and, accordingly, PennDOT was suspending his license for one year pursuant to 75 Pa,C.S, ~ 1532(b) (3). The notice, however, made no reference to the Compact. Sullivan appealed to the trial court, arguing, inter alJJ1, that he had not been convicted of a violation of 75 Pa.C,S. ~ 3731, and that PennDOT had no authority to suspend his license based on an out'of-state conviction. At the hearing on September 20, 1995, PennDOT for the first time cited the Compact as authority for its suspension of Sullivan's license. PennDOT' s attorney mistakenly identified the Compact as the "Interstate Compact Act", and cited to Pennsylvania Bulletin Volume 24, Number 45 (November 5, 1994). He argued that: under Article 4 of that compact, the effect of a conviction of DUI reported to the department, the licensing authority in the home state, that is Pennsylvania, shall give such effect to the conduct as provided by the laws in the home state. Under the laws of Pennsylvania, under Section 1532(b), when a person is convicted of Section 3731 of the Motor Vehicle Code, it is a one year suspension. R.R. at 9a-10a, Although Sullivan's counsel did not address the issue of whether the Compact was effective as to the Commonwealth, 3 75 Pa,C.S. ~ 3731 provides that no person shall operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substance to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving, or while the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is 0,10\ or greater. [J-158-1997] - 4 " , he did argue that PennDOT improperly failed to notify Sullivan that the suspension of his license was based on the Compact. The trial court sustained Sullivan's appeal, and PennDOT appealed to the commonwealth Court, The Commonwealth Court considered Article VIII of the Compact, which provides as follows: (1) This compact shall enter into force and become effective as to any state when it has enacted the same into law. (2) Any party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same. . , The court concluded that the Commonwealth had not "enacted [the Compact] into law" as required by Article VIII(l), and, therefore, PennDOT lacked the authority to suspend Sullivan's license based on his conviction in Nebraska. DISCUSSION On appeal to this Court, PennDOT first argues that the Commonwealth Court should not have addressed the issue of whether the Commonwealth enacted the Compact into law, because Sullivan did not raise it in the trial court. In the first instance, PennDOT overlooks the fact that, until the September 20, 1995 hearing, it had not notified Sullivan that it was relying on the Compact for authority to suspend his license. Moreover, the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be raised on appeal applies only to appellants, not to appellees. ~ Commonwealth v, Katze, 540 Pa. 416, 658 A.2d 345 (1995) (plurality opinion) I [J-158-1997] . 5 Sherwood v, Elaart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899 (1955). As an appellee, Sullivan was not precluded from raising in the Commonweal th Court the issue of whether the Compact had been enacted into law, I PennDOT next argues that the Commonwealth did enact the Compact into law pursuant to Section 6146 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa,C,S. ~ 6146, which provides as follows: The secretary may enter into agreements relating to the enforcement of this title, including, but not limited to: (1) the Driver License Compact and any other agreements to notify any state of violations incurred by residents of that state, , . According to PennDOT, the Secretary's exercising the authori ty conferred upon him by 75 Pa.C.S, ~ 6146(1) is sufficient to consti tute enactment of the Compact into law. \ We regretfully disagree. I In its brief, PennDOT makes reference to Pa.R.A,P, 1551, which governs the scope of review of quasijudicial orders. Rule 1551 provides, in part, that, "[n] 0 question shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised before the government unit except: (1) Questions involving the validity of a statute, , . ." Although the question of whether the Commonwealth enacted the Compact into law involves the effect of Section 6146 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C,S, ~ 6146, that statute's validity is not at issue. Accordingly, Rule 1551(a) (1) is inapplicable. \ Pursuant to Section 6152 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C,S. ~ 6152, agreements entered into by the Secretary must be published in compliance with Part II of Title 45, In the Commonwealth Court, Sullivan argued that PennDOT's published notice failed to comply with those requirements, in that the notice contained only a synopsis of the Compact and not the full text. However, because we conclude that enactment of the Compact into law requires the passage of a statute by the Legislature, we do not address the adequacy of the pUblished notice. [J-158'1997] - 6 The Compact is a contract between states. Accordingly, we are bound to interpret its terms according to their plain meaning. Baa, ~, Steuart v. McChesnev, 498 Pa. 45, 444 A.2d 659 (1982). Furthermore, this Court will not rewrite the terms of a contract, nor give them a meaning that conflicts with that of the language used. ~, at 50-51, 444 A.2d at 662 (quoting Robert F. Felte. Inc. v. White, 451 Pa. 137, 144, 302 A.2d 347, 351 (1973) (quoting "aoartv v. William Akers. Jr. Co.. Inc., 342 Pa. 236, 239, 20 A.2d 317, 319 (1941))). Pursuant to Article VIII(l) of the Compact, its provisions "enter into force and become effective as to any state when it has enacted the [Compact] into law." In the context of law making, the plain meaning of the term "enactment" is "[t)he method or process by which a bill in the Legislature becomes a law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990). The language of Article VIII(2) of the Compact supports this interpretation. It provides that, "[a]ny party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same. . . ." If the passage of a statute were not also required for entry into the Compact, the withdrawal provision of Article VIII(2) would be incongruously burdensome. We cannot conclude that the Compact's drafters intended such a disparity between entry into and withdrawal from the Compact, nor are we empowered to give the terms of the contract a meaning inconsistent with the drafters' clear intent. Baa, ~, Steuart, 498 Pa. at 48-49, 444 A.2d at 661; Felte, 451 Pa. at 143-44, 302 A.2d at 351. Thus, we hold that the [J-158-1997] - 7 compact becomeB effective aB to the Commonweal th only when the J,egislature paBBeB a statute adopting it. Any other construction would impermiBBibly Btrain the language of the contract beyond its plain meaning. NotwithBtanding the Compact'B expresB language, PennDOT argueB that, in pasBing Section 6146 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 6146, the Legislature properly delegated to the Secretary of TranBportation (Secretary) the authority to enter into the Compact. Overall, the Legislature may delegate policy making authority to an adminiBtrative agency, BO long aB the Legislature makeB the "baBic policy choiceB" and eBtabliflhes "adequate BtandardB which will guide and restrain the exerciBe of the delegated adminiBtrative functions." Gillioan v. PennBvlvania Horse Racino Commission, 492 Pa. 92, 96, 422 A.2d 487, 489 (1980) (citing william Penn parkino Garaoe. Inc. v. City of pittsburoh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975); Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Countv Board of school Directors of Alleohenv County, 418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965); Belovskv v. Redevelooment Authoritv of the city of philadelohia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947)). Here, PennDOT assertB that Section 6141 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 6141, evinceB the Legislature' B basic policy choice to participate in interstate agreements regarding the regulation of drivers,6 and that Section 6 Section 6141 of the Vehicle Code, entitled "Declaration of pOlicy", provides that: It is the policy of this Commonwealth to promote and (continued.. .) [J.158.1997] . 8 6146 adequately limits the Secretary's discretion in entering into such agreements, e.g., by specifically referring to the Compact. Thus, PennDOT concludes, by delegating to the Secretary the authority to enter into the Compact, the Legislature obviated the need to pass a statute enacting the Compact into law. PennDOT's argument is unavailing, however, because it conflicts with the separation of powers mandated by the pennsylvania Constitution. Article II, Section 1 provides that, "It]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives;" and Article III, Section 1 provides that, "lnJo law shall be passed except by bill. In light of these " constitutional provisions, "Ii]t is axiomatic that the LegiSlature cannot constitutionally delegate the power to make law to any other branch of government or to any other body or authority." Gillioan, 492 Pa. at 95, 422 A.2d at 489 (citing State Board of Chirooractic Examiners v. Life Fellowshio of Pennsvlvania, 44l Pa. 293, 272 A.2d 478 (1971)). (. . . continued) encourage the fullest possible use of its highway system by authorizing the making and execution of reciprocal agreements, arrangements and declarations with other states, provinces, territories and countries with respect to drivers licensed and vehicles registered in this and other states, provinces, territories and countries, thus contributing to the economic and social development and growth of this Commonwealth. 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 6141. [J-158-l997] - 9 In Ruch v. Wilhelm, 352 Pa. 586, 43 A.2d 894 (1945), thiB Court held that the power of "substantive enactment" iB vested in the Legislature alone. Thus, the Court determined that, "[a]uthority may be given to a government official or an administrative agency to make rules and regulations to cover mere matters of detail for the implementation of a statute, but where the statute itself is lacking in eBBential substantive provisionB the law doeB not permit a tranBfer of the power to Bupply them, for the legiBlature cannot delegate itB power to make a law." ~, at 592-93, 43 A.2d at 897. In thiB caBe, we view 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 6146 (1) merely aB a delegation of authority to implement the mechanicB of the compact in the Commonwealth. PurBuant to the ConBtitution'B Beparation of powerB, however, the LegiBlature could not delegate to the Secretary the power to enact the Compact into law aB required by itB termB. ThuB, while not unconBtitutional, 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 6146(1) iB inBufficient to render the Compact effective aB to the Commonwealth. Indeed, the LegiBlature Beemed to concede as much in pas Bing Act No. 1996-149 (Act). Although the Secretary had purported to enter into the Compact effective January 1, 1995, on December 10, 1996, the LegiBlature paBBed the Act, which, inter al.i.a, added Section 1581 to the Vehicle Code. That section Bets forth the full text of the Compact and provideB that, ,,[tJ he Driver' B LicenBe [J.158-1997] . 10 compact is herebv enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein. . . " 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 1581 (emphasis added). Had the Compact been enacted into law previously, the addition of 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 1581 would have been unnecessary. Thus, in enacting 75 P.S. ~ 1581, the Legislature anticipated our holding that the delegation of authority to the Secretary pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 6146 was insufficient to effectuate the Commonwealth's entry into the Compact, and that a statute enacting the Compact into law would be necessary.' In this case, however, PennDOT suspended Sullivan's license more than a year before the Legislature enacted the Compact into law pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 1581. Consequently, PennDOT lacked the authority to suspend Sullivan's license based on his out-of- state DUI conviction. The Order of the Commonweal th Court is therefore affirmed. Note that the language of 75 Pa.C.S. ~ 1581 comports with other Pennsylvania statutes pursuant to which various interstate compacts and agreements have been enacted into law. Baa,~, 3 P.S. ~ 214-41 (enacting Pest Control Compact); 24 P.S. ~ 2401.1 (enacting Interstate Agreement on Qualifications of Educational Personnel); 24 P.S. ~ 5401 (enacting Compact for Education); 32 P. S. ~ 816.1 (enacting Ohio River Valley Water sanitation COfllpact) ; 32 P.S. ~ 817.1 (enacting Great Lakes Basin Compact); 35 Pa.C.S. ~ 7111 (enacting Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact); 42 Pa.C.S. ~ 9101 (enacting Agreement on Detainers); 61 P.S. ~ 1062 (enacting Interstate corrections Compact) . , [J-l58'1997] . II