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Home My WebLink About96-03553 \ .J Q ~ ~ .. ~ ~ ~ " -' }fr ... 't ~ .. " .... ~ Ul ~ I: <t2 " ", ',,- '. \ I ~ t~ ~ . ... 01 ~ a ',11 ,! ~ , , " h' , '111 ,/ "~ i ." , " r,,1 I .(' i' " ,>1','/ ( 'J j ilil \ " , , J' I, 'J , " l"I", I'd:i ,,~./I \ " , " , " 3. 1)lnlnllff did nol l1Ie n summons or n cumplnlnltothc previous docket number, nlthough J>lnlnllff c1l1lms 1111 cquhnhlc ownership interest in Ihe premises. 4. On June Ill, 1996. the l>efendnnls flied nn Emergcncy Pctitlon to Strlkc to orlglnsl lis pcndcns, nrllulng In pari Ihnt thc Plnlnllff had not fullowcd thc proper lis pendens Ollng procedure. 5. On June 19, 1996, Ihls Cuurt held u henrlng onlhe mcrits of thc Plaintiff's underlying claim IInd It also consldcred thc proccdural propriety of Plulntlff's lis pendcns. 6. By Memorandum Opll1lonllnd Order dated June 24, 19%, this Court granted the Emcrgcncy Pelitlon to Strike on the grounds thut Plaintiff had improperly indexl:d the lis pendens without commencing uny undcrlylng IItlgllllon, hutthc Court did not address the merits of Plaintiff's claim. 7. As instructed by the Court's Memorandum Opinion, Defcndants now prcscntthis Rencwcd Petition to Strike Lis Pcndcns In responsc to Plaintiff's r"ccnt tiling of a Wril of Summons and re-Indexlng of thc Lis Pcndens In this mattcr. 8. Plaintiffs underlying claim remains the same, to wit: that a Iclfcr senl from Russ Bardolf ("Bardolf") of Shipley Oil Company ("Shipley") to Plaintiff on March 21, 1996, constilutes an enforceable written contract that requires BL&B to scllthc premises 10 Plainll ff. Grounds for I{Cllucstcd Rcllef 9. As sel forlh In the Defendants' previous Petition to Strike, t1lL~re lire several reusuns why the Bardolf leller of Mllrch 21, 1996, is not suflicientto obligate BL&B to sell lhe premises to lhe PlaiJlIlff fur the Illllowlng rellSllllS: A. Allllltlllles relevant hereto, Bardolf was neither a principal nor llll agenl uf B1.&B, but instead WIIS merely an employee of Shipley, the broker of record for BL&D, Wilh no authority, express. implied or nppnrent, to bind IlI.&B. D. There exists no writing regarding the sale of the premises to Plnintlff signr-d by a principal or authorized agent of 1l1.&Il, and therefore, no binding agreement can exist between the IlL&1l and the Plaintiff. C. Even If the March 21, 1996 Bardolf letter were actually executed by B1.&B or an authorized agent thereof, it would not comply with the Stalute of Frauds, which requires all essential terms of a contrllct111~ set forth in the writing, for the following reasons: 1. There was no "meeting of the minds" necessary to creale a binding agreement; many mailers relevant to the potential sale were left unresolved belween the parties, most notably an agrccment regarding the environmcntal condition of the premises and any future clean-up responsibility or liability; 2. There was no agrccment by the Plaintiff to be bound to purchase lhe premises; 3. There was no agreement with respect to settlement location and date, deed preparation. transfer tax. title Issues. or tax prorations; 4. During prcllmllHlry ncgl)tintlons between the parties, BL&B specltlcally notitled Plaintiff !lUll It would rcqulre II deed restriction prohibiting the future sale of gasoline or conveniencc slore products on the premises, but the leller of March 21, 1996 makes no mcntion of this requlremcnt; 10. The evidence n:celved by this Court during the June 19, 1996 hcurlng reveals that Bardolf's leller was simply a "cover Icllcr" for u package of cnvironmenlul reports, and only eSlabllshed the purchase prlcc of the premises, but was not Intcnded 10 be a binding agreement. II. The parties agreed that n wrillcn contract contuining all of the esscntlal terms of the transaction would be subsequcntly draftcd by counscl and signcd by the parties, and Plaintlrrs last contact with Bardolf, prior 10 asserting that a cor1lmct exists, was a voice mail message asking whether Plaintiff's counselor BL&B's counsel would draft an agreemcnt. 12. Thereafter, when neithcr party took furthcr action to complete the negotiations, BL&B accepted an offcr to purchase the prcmises and a deposit from a third party. 13. The third party, howevcr. refused to closc thc sale and tcrminated its agreement with BL&B, solely on the grounds that a lis pendens has been Indcxed by Plaintiff against the property. 14. Accordingly, BL&B has already been substantially harmed by Plaintiff's actions, and it will continue to suffer irreparable harm in not b'ling able to transfer thc premises so long as the lis pendens remains on the docket. 15. In addition, prospective third-party purchasers will be prejudiced by the existence of the lis pendens as well. i.:i\r'.'IIa\lIt..~. t lIU." v. IN TRB COURT or COHKON PLEAS OF CUMBBRLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANlA NO. q6 -35'"5".3 ~ r~ IN BQUITY DAVID s. BlOWN INT!RPRtSES, Plaintiff II. L. , B. ASSOC:. , and SUll'L~Y OIL COMPANY, Defendant. PllAEOIPE TO Till PRO'.rIlOIlOURY I P1G.DG enter Ilia pendens aqainet B. L. . B. ASSOC., . P~nnDylvani& limited partnerahip, and ~Rl~~~Y OIL COMPANY in reference to the r.al eetate known and numbered al 5200 SimpaoD Farry Road, Lower Allen Townahip, Cumberland County, Penn.yivani., .. more fully d..aribed in the attaohed exhibit. STONI! LarAWR G E (Q ~ ~~ t'"; By 8 ~ .... '''::'1 Dev '- - ';e 1.0. 785 1':.:: ~ '"'~ 414 Bridge Street, P.O. Box ~ " E .... New Cumberland, PA 17070 c N ,.~ ~I.-! - .-'. Telephonel (717) 774-7435 "= ~iE ;::: ... b , 'J) {3 Attorney" fOT Ptllintiff Q'1 JU... -lJ:J-199E U I : ': FI'IJ"I (LI~,' E' , ) [;'; 1 , bUf:P, '- '= '>~'U'I HJ DlWL...IlIL.J ::::a~~..rrY 11I.u...-WU-Allia 'l'aVlla~ia. lhlabuln. CDU,tl,. "UM No. 11 M.L TlIAT ell/ITAIII tuat ar pue.l lit hnr.l ..t.uae. In tAw.r Allin 'I'ewnllhlp, CUlIbarl.nd Count.y, Pennayivanla, lJaUl1dld and d.lcrlbed In .ccordlnaa ~Ith I .urvev .nd plan th.rft~t ~ada lJy D,P, Rlthnllll.rllar, R.q1atera.s Surveyor, d.tad Detou.r 11, 19U, III ~aUow.: BEOIHIIIIIO at ~n Iran plp. at th. Intara.etlQn ot thu Southa~n r lqht ot way 11 na at S IlIp40n t'nry Road 'L, It. 110, 510) .nd th. SouthwUtun rl'lht Qt w.y llna ot W..lay Dr.lv. (L.R, Ho. 210691/ thonoe alontjJ the SOllthwOlltarn rlqht of w.y lln. ot W~lIhy Orllle (L.R. 110. 1l069) Sauth 44 11aqr... 50 .1nut.. En.t a dist.nce ot L~O,O (aat to an Irlm plpa at: llnd. n~w ar tOnlarly ,,~ Wlnd.ar AII.aellt.., Ine., thlnea 110nq land. naw or rot~.rly ot Wind.Qr .....oel.ts., Inc. South 10 dl\lr,u 20 mlnuel. lI..st a dht.nc~ ot 150.0 ~...t to on Iron pip., th.neo 110nq 11m. north 4~ dallt..a ~O .inuta. Weill: I dlstlnc. or 150.0 hIlt to In Iron Illpl .t tha South.rn .I\lht ot woy lln. o~ 31mpaon rarry Ko.d (L.R, No, 510) I the~~" .long thft Southern right ot way ltnft of Simpson rer~. Road (L,R. Ifa. "01 1I0rth eo degruu 20 ..tnutu ' ,..~ ~ ,ust.nc" or aU.a tut to ttl. pllcl! 0' ur.alInfINQ. CONTAIIIU;'; lB. JIlJ 'quara toat. TIUtC~ NO. Zl TI1a Or.ntor .tllo ..ml.a., rd.a".. Ind quit olal.. and by thea" pra...nta dO.1 r..il., r.l..sa and quit olela unto the .ald (It:Bnh.., III Its rlqht., Htl. and Intlrnt in thlt, portion 0' tAqldatlltlt Rauta 21069 lying betli..n tha c.ntar line ot Shulsy Road and the W."tetn right-at-way lln. 0' Leqial.tiv. 21069, and allo in th.t porllon or L.ql.1atllte Routs 570 IYlnq batw..n the cant.r lIn. ot SbplOIl rarry Rood snd tho! Southern riqht-ot-way line ot anld Leqlllltilte RQuta 570. B III 110 TlfE SAHli pualan which W.dl.y Corporation. . penn.ylv.nl. corporation, by It. dead datad Janulry 11. 1967, and raoord.d In the ot( I e. at the Record.. 0 t O.ed. in Ind tor C::ulb..hnd CQunty, Pennayl"ani. In Rac:o.d Book 1-22, PDqa J11, qnntad and oonveyerl unto HObl1 all Corporation, . N." YlJrk oarporatlon, a..ntor herein. BEING part of tho uame prltllliuB which MOBILE OIL CORPORATION, II New yo.k carpor.Lion, by their daed dated Oeclmber 29, 1994, and recorded In rho Office of tho Recordor of D.ads for Cu~berland County, Ponnlylvanla, on J.~uar>, 3, 199~, In Record 8oo~ 117. Psge 25, granted and conveyed unto B L 4 B Ae5ocI3te., .! P~nn.ylvani~ limited partnar.hlp, mT>t. P.f)~ ',- " .1 '. t' , , I I'" , l: , ~l ,~ w (1-. , ,. 1Jf i "I , I : I " --'0- v~ ~:Z ~ I:- ~ ~ 3 ';"":J dO. 1 , " &~ ~ ~ ~ ~j m f ~~ i~~ :, Ill' ~~~ ~ . ~~ I> ~~~ iit ~r!l . ~ o-l III I ~i ~ is Il1 ~ ---- - --.- . .:: -. r ~:--~. "c" ;;'-:;;.';..-'" :.. '.~:.''; -:::'C.:: ._. =_.:.....'::~:.,; :. _ _. ~.- - . -.-.......... . ~ ~ ~ ::J g .J ~,~ u- ~ ~ g &~ ~ e .~~ ,fg $~ .~~d2! ~ ~ i. ~~ 1 < ~ & \.~ < , ,- - ,.~~.',.;:-:;-::..-::I.;: ::-_::;~~~;';':'-:::~"=;~::-~-===";::;:-';:.=:-':_-==:;::"::::"'"':;.=--'::~-:;~::::..L~-:; ~ , I , 'I , , " DAVID S. BROWN ENTERPRISES, I Plaintiff I I V. I I BL&B ASSOCIATES, and SHIPLEY I OIL COMPANY, I Defendants I IN THE COUR'r OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 96-3553 EQUITY TERM IN REI RENEWED PETITION TO STRIKE LIS PENDENS BEFORE SUEELY. P.J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Before the oourt is the renewed petition of defendants BL&B Assooiates (BL&B) and Shipley oil Company (Shipley) filed on July 3, 1996, to str.ike a lis pendens entered in the above-captioned action by plaintiff David S. Brown Enterprises (Brown Enterprises). Brown Ente~prises answer.ed the petition on August 1, 1995, and the parties have agreed to allow this court to decide the matter based on the record of a hearing held on June 19, 1996.' The facts adduced at the hearing on this matter, summarized in our opinion of June 24, 1996, indicate that this matter arose out of negotiations about real estate located at 5200 Simpson Ferry Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County (5200 Simpson Ferry Rd.). The parties had some preliminary discussions about the property in early 1995, but never progressed beyond preliminary negotiations. In early 1996, BL&B, through Russell Bardolf (Bardolf), contacted Brown Enterprises and offered to sell the 'The June 19, 1996, hearing arose out of an earlier petition to strike a lis pendens filed in an action at 96.2294 Civil Term. We filed an opinion on June 24, 1996, striking the lis pendens because there was no underlying litigation upon which to base a lis pendens. 'I NO. 96-3553 EQUITY TERM property at 5200 Simpson Ferry ad. On March 15, 1996, Bardolf sent a fax to Arthur Adler (Adler) at Brown Enterprises reiterating that BL&B had an active interest in Belling the propercy. Several oonversation~ followed between Bardolf and Adler or Howard Brown leading to a letter Bent on March 21, 1996 from Bardolf to Howard Brown. Among other thinge, the letter statedr "Shipley accepts your offer to pay $75,000 for this property in an as is condition. We look forward to an expeditious review of these documents and settlement." Thereafter, when n~ither party took further action toward settlement, BL&B contracted to sell the property to a third party for a sum considerably higher than $75,000. Upon learning of BL&B's intention to sell to a third party, Drown Enterprises, through Adler, wrote to Bardolf stating that Brown Enterprises believed that the parties had a valid contract based on the March 21/ 1996 letter. On April 29, 1996, Brown Enterprises filed the lis pendens at 96-2294 Civil, which was stricken by our opinion and order of June 24, 1996. On June 27, 1996, Brown Enterprises commenced the above-captioned Equity action by writ of summons and filed a eecond lis pendens. DISCUSSION We recognize initially that a court may cancel a lis pendens where it operates harshly or unjustly. See, 14 Standard Pa. Practice 2d 579129. Clearly, if the lis pendens in the present matter is not properly entered, then it operates unjustly on the 2 NO. 96-3553 EQUITY TERM defendants. BL&B and Shipley have asserted three grounds upon whioh they oontend this oourt should find that no oontraot of sale existed here and therefore strike the lie pendens. They contend that any claim based on an alleged contract between the parties lacks mer.it, that the lis pendene produces undue harm and prejudice to petitioners and to prospeotive third party purchasers, and that Brown Enterpriseo, by instituting this action on the Law side of the Court/ has acknowledged an adequate remedy at law and therefore lis pendens, an equitable remedy, is impropflr. With regard to the petitioners' third contention, we note that this case is now on the Equity sidR of the court. Therefore the third contention is moot. Ae to petitioners' second argument, we agree tha~ the lis pendens is a hardship to them and to prospective purchasers. However, we cannot decide if it is an ~ndue hardship without deciding whether the parties entered into a valid contract. Therefore, we will address petitionors' initial argument, for that will dictate our action. It is well established in Pennsylvania that in order to satisfy the statute of Frauds, contracts for the sale of real property must be in writing. 33 P.S. S1 et sea. Furthermore, the writing must be signed by the party granting the interest. Lona v. Browq, 393 Pa.Super 312/ 317/ 582 A.2d 359/ 361 (1990). The writing must set fort,h the essential terms of the contract, and one or more writings may be used to satisfy the statute as 3 NO. 96-3553 EQUITY TERM long as all are Bigned or attaohed to a signed writing. 14. In the present oase, the writing offered by Brown Bnterprises to take this oase out of the Statute of Frauds ia the above-quoted letter from Bardolf to Howard Brown. Although the letter states, "Shipley aocepts your offer to pay $75,000 for this property in an as is condition," it also atates, "We look forward to an expeditious review of these documents and settlement." Based on the testimony we heard sbout this letter, we are satisfied that it wes part of the negotiation process and not an agreement of sale. Simply put, there was more to be done after the letter before an agreement would be consummated. The letter was mainly concerned with the delivery of environmental reports, which were the subject of negotiations between the parties. Furthermore, the letter stated clearly that the reports should be reviewed, and then settlement would take plaoe. We recognize that Brown Bnterprises believes that this letter represents the agreement of the partieo, and we are cognizant of Howard Brown's statement that he often conducts business in this manner. Notwithstanding Brown Bnterprises' normal busineso practices, when the sale of real property is involved, the law requires a writing clearly setting out the terms, describing the land and signed by the party granting the interest. That convention was simply not followed here. The case cited above, Lona v. Brown, is quite instructive in this matter beoause it describes the types of writings that are 4 NO. 96-3553 EQUITY TERM sufficient to satisfy the statute of Frauds. In 1&J1g, following a series of negotiations, the parties agreed to transfer a parcel of real property located in a residential subdivision. HowBver, when the buyer put stakes on the property to mark the proposed location of a house, the seller balked. The buyer sued for specific performance and the seller claimed that the Statute of Frauds had never been satisfied and that the parties had never reached an agreement. The Superior Court decided on appeal that the Statute of Frauds had boen satisfied. The Court credited three documentsl a deed that was written and signed but not deliveredl a release of restrictions signed by the parties and all landowners in the subdivision where the property was located I and a "Restrictive Agreement" which limited tho use of the property. The Superior Court found that thess documents, all signed by the pat'ties in interest, contained the essential elements to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. In the present case, we have only a letter from a real estate broker discussing environmental reports and terms and stating that settlement was anticipated. We think it goes too far to hold that such a communication represents an agreement of sale sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and we shall not so hold. 5 3. Plaintiff did not tile a summons or a complaint to the previous do.:ket number. although Plaintiff claims un equitable ownership il1terest In the premises. 4. On June 10, 1996, the Defendants tilcd an Emergcncy Petition to Strike to nr;2inallis pendens, arguing in part lhutthe Plaintiff hlld nOl followcd the proper lis pendens filing procedure, 5, On June 19, 1996, this Court held a hcarlng on the mcrits of the Plaintiffs underlying claim and It also consldercd the procedural propricty of Plaintiff's lis pendens. 6. By Memorandum Opinion and Order dutcd June 14. 1996, this Court granted the Emergency Petition to Strike on the grounds thuI Plaintiff had improperly Indexed the lis pendens without commencing any underlying litigation. but the Court did not address the merits of Plaintiffs claim. 7. As Instrucled by the Court's Memorandum Opinion. DcfendanlS now present this Renewed Petition to Slrike Lis Pendcns in response to Plaintiffs recent tiling or' a Writ of Summons and re-indexlng of the Lis Pcndens In this matter. 8. Plaintiffs underlying claim remains the same. to wit: that a Ictter sent from Russ Bardolf ("Bardolf') of Shipley Oil Company ("Shipley") to Pluillliffon March 21,1996. constitutes an enforceable written contract that requires BL&B to sell the premises to Plaintiff. .,.-J) Orounds for Requested Relief 9. As set forth in Ihe Defendilnts' prevIous Petition to Strike. there are several reasons why the Bardolf ICllcr of March ~ I. 19lJfJ. is not suftident to obligate BL&B to sell th~ premises to the Plaintiff lilr the followmg rCilsons: A. At all times relevalll hereto. Bardolf was neither a principal nor an agent of BL&B. but instead was merely iln employec of Shipley. Ihe broker of recCJrd for BL&B. with no authority, express. Implied or apparent. to bind BL&B, B. There exists no writing rcgilrding thc sale of the premises to Plaintiff signed by a principal or authorized agcnt of BL&B, ilnd therefore. no binding agreement can exist between the BL&B and thc Plaintiff, C. Even if the March 21. 1996 Bardolf leller were ,Ictually executed by BL&B or an alllhorized ,Igent thereof, it would not complv with the Statute of Frauds. which requires all essential terms of a contract be set forth in the writing, for the following reasons: I. There was no "meeting of thc minds" necessary to create a binding agreement: many matters relevant to the potential sale wele left unresolved between the parties. most nOlably an agreement regarding the environmental condition of the premises and any future clean-up responsibility or lia~i1ity; 2. There was no ilgrecment by the Plaintiff to be bound to purchase the premises: J. There was no agreemcnt with respect to settlement location and date. deed preparation. transfer tax. titi<: issues. or lax prorations: .l. Puring preliminary negotiations between the parties. BL&B specillclllly nOlit1ed Plalnliff that II would require a ueeu reslrictlon prohibiting the future sllle of gasoline or CllllWllIence slore "rouucts on the premises. hut the leller ot March 21. 1991] Illake:i no mention of this requirement: 10. The evidence received by this Court during the Junc 19. 1.991] hearing reveals that Bardolfs leller was simply a "cover letter" for a packagc of environmental reports. and only established the purchase price ot the premises. hut was not intended to be a binding agreement. 11. The parties agreed that a written contract containing ali of the essemial terms of the transaction would be subsequently drafted by courtsel and signed hy the parties. and Plaintiffs last contact with Bardolf. prior to asserting that a contract exists. was a voice mall message asking whether Plaintiff's counsel or BL&I3's counsel would draft an agreement. 12. Thereafter. \~hcn neither party took further action to complete the negotilltions. BL&B accepted llJ1 otfer to purchase the premises and a deposit from a third party. [3. The third party. however. refused to close the sale and tl~rminated its agreement with BL&B. solely on the grounds that a lis pendens has been indexed by Plaintiff against the property. 14. Accordingly. BL&B has already been substantially harmed by Plaintiffs actions. llJ1d it will continue to sutfer irreparable harm in not being able 10 transfer the premises so long as the lis pendens remains on the docket. 15. In addition. prospectiw third-party purchasers will he prejudiced by lhe existence of the lis pendens as well. . __ .oJ .._... .......'" .. ......... r _..... . ,.... .. ~ of '....' , ..I.'ot...........,...\o . ........ ;..j \~,. \411"'.""'" Lt.. ,... '" v. IN THE COURT or COHHON PLEAS OF CUMBBRLAND COUN'l'Y, PENNSYLVAtlIA NO. f/6-3S"S3 ~I~ IN EQUITY DAVID s. BROWN ENTERPRISES, Plaint:iff a. L. , B. ASSOC., and 5DIPLEY OIL COMPANY, Defendants PRAECIPE TO Tn: PRO'1'BONOTARY I Please enter a lis pendens against B. L. , B. ASSOC., a Pennsylvania limited partnership, and SHIP~Y OIL COMPANY in ~eferenoe to the real estate known and numberld AI 5200 5~pBon Ferry Road, tower Allen TownBhip, Cumberland County, Pennlylvania, aa more fully d.lc~ibed in the aetaohed exhibit. STONE LaFAV'ER , SiN! I G ,~",'J I ~ <n I " ~ ~" I I c-; ,'- / II ' '" ~ -. By , I l", " ~~, S --"'<If!' Ii,./, oh . ~!>: -'~ I.D. 785 " '- ..~ .' r,:: c8 ,~.":iio 414 Bridge St~eet. P.O. Box E .~i:! - ':~ New Cumberland, PA 17070 ft'''', N - -, Telephone I ( 717) 774-7435 .... "=' 3J: ;:: ~ b ',i:) 8 Attorneys for Plaintiff Q'> . 8 III ;.l ~ 0 t- o ~ '1"- t' .rot 00 ~ I"- ~ .0-1 P- . j:l. ~ .rot I:l' .c ~ ~ .0( '" 1Il III ....Ilo .~ .S I QJ '" . QJ. eo r:: J QJ ~"'IIl, ~ III r:: .... i:l"l QJ - III o III III 10... I .... . .... co 0-11"- ~ &l . III I"- QJ '" I I g ~ (1\01,8...,0( l"l !i' IM'O C""oo' III 1Il =_.rot BI"- I III ~ '" . &l u-I l"l e I ~ .rot Q I"- 141 CD . .~ I> ...."" C7I CD ~ .~ QJI"- I ~ . .rot t-oot~Z_ III ... u I I '" . i Iol . CD . 1)lj\lJU\tJ....ltbnm, 11.'4.." DAVID S. BROWN ENTERPRISES, Plaintiff I IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF I CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 96 - j ,').) 3 tfl4.-~ TJ2~.",-, I IN EQUITY I I v. B. L. & B. ASSOC., and SHIPLEY OIL COMPANY, Defendants PllAECII>E TO THB PROTHONOTARY I Please enter a lis pendens against B. L. & D. ASSOC., a Pennsylvania limited partnership, and SHIPLEY OIL COMPANY in reference to the real estate known and numbered as 5200 Simpson Ferry Road, Lower Allen Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, as more fully described in the attached exhibit. By E Attorneys for Plaintiff - ~ 00 ~ ~ f"'\ .... ~ ~. .;II ,f r'l vI r:- .....) :i ~ ., ", J ,tl ~ ~ ~ lJ" " . ~1;' , " " , g: ..; .j '..) I~' ,'J <;) \' N .. . ~ [L:' " I'll ~ ,. ~. (... I 1.1. <,!) (.) 0' \, ,