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CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL VANIA
v.
: NO. 00-1668 CIVIL TERM
ALLISON B. KLIPA and
BASIL N. {(LIP A,
Defendants
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS OF CHARGE
1. ISSUES IN THE CASE
The plaintiff claims that she was injured and sustained damage as a result of the negligent
conduct of the defendant. The plaintiff has the burden of proving her claims.
The defendants deny the plaintiffs claims (and assert as an affirmative defense that the
plaintiff was herself negligent and that such negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about
plaintiffs injuries. The defendants have the burden of proving this affirmative defense.)
Based upon the evidence presented at this trial, the only issues for you to decide in
accordance with the law as I shall give it you, are:
First: Was the defendant negligent?
Second:
Was the defendant's conduct a substantial factor in bringing about harm to
the plaintiff?
2. NEGLIGENCE - Definition
The legal term negligence, otherwise known as carelessness, is the absence of ordinary
care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the circumstances here presented.
Negligent conduct may consist either of an act or an omission to act when there is a duty to do
so. In other words, negligence is the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do in light of
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all the surrounding circumstances established by the evidence in this case. It is for you to
determine how a reasonably careful person would act in those circumstances.
3. ORDINARY CARE - Definition
Ordinary care is the care a reasonably careful person would use under the circumstances
presented in this case. It is the duty of every person to use ordinary care not only for his own
safety and the protection of his property, but also to avoid injury to others. What constitutes
ordinary care varies according to the particular circumstances and conditions existing then and
there. The amount of care required by the law must be in keeping with the degree of danger
involved.
4. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In this case you have heard what the law calls circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of facts, or circumstances, from which it is reasonable to infer the
existence of another fact. You may consider circumstantial evidence and you should give it
whatever weight you believe it deserves,
5. BURDEN OF PROOF
In civil cases such as this one, the plaintiff has the burden of proving those contentions
which entitle her to relief.
When a party has the burden of proof on a particular issue, his contention on that issue
must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The evidence establishes a
contention by a fair preponderance of the evidence if you are persuaded that it is more probably
accurate and true than not.
To put it another way, think, if you will, of an ordinary balance scale, with a pan on each
side. Onto one side of the scale, place all of the evidence favorable to the plaintiff; onto the
other, place all of the evidence favorable to the defendant. If, after considering the comparable
weight of the evidence, you feel that the scales tip, ever so slightly or to the slightest degree, in
favor of the plaintiff, your verdict must be for the plaintiff. If the scales tip in favor of the
defendant, or are equally balanced, your verdict must be for the defendant.
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the following propositions;; that the
defendant was negligent, and that that negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the
accident. If, after considering all of the evidence, you feel persuaded that these propositions are
more probably true than not true, your verdict must be for the plaintiff. Otherwise, your verdict
should be for the defendant.
6. DAMAGES
If you find that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, you must then find an amount of
money damages you believe will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for all the
physical and financial injury she has sustained as a result of the accident. The amount you award
today must compensate the plaintiff completely for damage sustained in the past, as well as
damage the plaintiff will sustain in the future.
7. INJURIES TO ADULT NOT RESULTING IN DEATH
The damages recoverable by the plaintiff in this case and the items that go to make them
up, each of which I will discuss separately, are as follow:
(a) MEDICAL EXPENSES
The plaintiff is entitled to be compensated in the amount of all medical expenses
reasonably incurred for the diagnosis treatment and cure of her injuries in the past.
These expenses, as alleged by the plaintiff, amount to $7,375.79; an exhibit will be
submitted to you, itemizing these costs, for your consideration during deliberation.
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If you find in favor of the plaintiff and award damages to the plaintiff in the form
of medical expenses the amount you award for medical expenses is limited to the amount
actually paid. In this case it was stipulated that the amount actually paid was $7,375.79,
This amount will not be retained by the plaintiff, but will be required by law to be paid to
the Commonwealth ofPeunsylvania, Department of Public Welfare as reimbursement of
the medical bills paid by the Department of Public Welfare. 62 P.S, ~ 1409(b)(9).
(b) PAST PAIN AND SUFFERING
The plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for such physical
pain, mental anguish, discomfort, inconvenience and distress as you find she has endured,
from the time of the accident until today.
(c) FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING
The plaintiff is entitle to be fairly and adequately compensated for such physical
pain, mental anguish, discomfort, inconvenience and distress as you believe she will
endure in the future as a result of her injuries.
(d) EMBARRASSMENT AND HUMILIATION
The plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for such
embarrassment and humiliation as you believe she has endured and will continue to
endure in the future as a result of her injuries.
(e) DISFIGUREMENT
The disfigurement which the plaintiff sustained as a result of this accident is a
separate item of damages recognized by the law, Therefore, in addition to such sums as
you award for pain and suffering and for embarrassment and humiliation, the plaintiff is
entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for the disfigurement she has suffered in
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the past as a result of this accident, and which she will continue to suffer during the future
duration of her life.
(1) ENJOYMENT OF LIFE
The plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for past, present
and future loss of her ability to enjoy any of the pleasures of life as a result of her
injuries.
8. LIMITATION ON VEHICLE PASSING
Whenever any vehicle is stopped at any crosswalk at an intersection or at any marked
crosswalk to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle
approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass the stopped vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S.A. ~
3541(c).
Respectfully submitted,
~~
Attorney for Plaintiff
ID# 41301
101 S. Market Street
Mechanicsburg, P A 17055
(717) 796-2100
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F:\FILESIDATAFILE\DONBGAL.DOC\161-pfc.l/drg
Created; l0l3l10108:37:47AM
Revised: 1lI02fOl 1O:36:57.AM
3050.161 '
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CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLV ANlA
v.
NO. 2000-1668 CIVIL ACTION - LAW
ALLISON KLIP A and BASIL KLIP A,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
DEFENDANT ALLISON B. KLIP A'S POINTS FOR CHARGE
1.
3.01 (Civ)
NEGLIGENCE--Definition
The legal term negligence, otherwise known as carelessness, is the absence of ordinary care
which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the circumstances here presented. Negligent
conduct may consist either of an act or an omission to act when there is a duty to do so. In other
words, negligence is the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the
doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do, in light of all the surrounding
circumstances established by the evidence in this case. It is for you to determine how a reasonably
careful person would act in those circumstances.
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2. 3.02 (Civ) ORDINARY CARE--Def1nition
Ordinary care is the care a reasonably careful person would use under the circumstances
presented in this case. It is the duty of every person to use ordinary care not only for his or her own
safety and the protection of his or her property, but also to avoid injury to others. What constitutes
ordinary care varies according to the particular circumstances and conditions existing then and there.
The amount of care required by the law must be in keeping with the degree of danger involved.
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3. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE:
A person having the right of way has the right to presume that others will comply with the
duty to recognize it and yield to it. See Barnev v. Foradas, 305 Pa. Super 404, 408, 451 A.2d 710,
712 (Pa. Super. 1982). All pedestrians have duties prior to stepping onto the highway and to
continue to look as they cross to secure their safe passage. See id. A plaintiff-pedestrian's failure
to meet this duty constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law. See id.
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4.
5.03 (Civ)
NUMBER OF WITNESSES
The number of witnesses offered by one side or the other does not, in itself, determine the
weight of the evidence. It is a factor, but only one of many factors which you should consider.
Whether the witnesses appear to be biased or unbiased; whether they are interested or disinterested
persons, are among the important factors which go to the reliability oftheir testimony, The important
thing is the quality of the testimony of each witness. In short, the test is not which side brings the
greater number of witnesses or presents the greater quantity of evidence; but which witness or
witnesses, and which evidence, you consider most worthy of belief. Even the testimony of one
witness may outweigh that of many, if you have reason to believe his or her testimony in preference
to theirs. Obviously, however, where the testimony of the witnesses appears to you to be of the same
quality, the weight of numbers assumes particular significance.
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5. 5.04 (Civ) CONFLICTING TESTIMONY
You may find inconsistencies in the evidence. Even actual contradictions in the testimony
of witnesses do not necessarily mean that any witness has been wilfully false. Poor memory is not
uncommon. Sometimes a witness forgets; sometimes the witness remembers incorrectly. It is also
true that two persons witnessing an incident may see or hear it differently,
If different parts of the testimony of any witness or witnesses appear to be inconsistent, you
the jury should try to reconcile the conflicting statements, whether of the same or different witnesses,
and you shonld do so if it can be done fairly and satisfactorily.
If, however, you decide that there is a genuine and irreconcilable conflict of testimony, it is
your function and duty to determine which, if any, of the contradictory statements you will believe.
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6. 5,07 (Civ) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In this case you have heard what the law calls circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of facts, or circumstances, from which it is reasonable to infer the
existence of another fact. You may consider circumstantial evidence and you should give it whatever
weight you believe it deserves.
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7, 5.50 (Civ) BURDEN OF PROOF
In civil cases such as this one, the plaintiffhas the burden of proving those contentions which
entitle her to relief.
When a party has the burden of proof on a particular issue, his or her contention on that issue
must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The evidence establishes a contention
by a fair preponderance of the evidence if you are persuaded that it is more probably accurate and
true than not.
To put it another way, think, if you will, of an ordinary balance scale, with a pan on each
side. Onto one side of the scale, place all of the evidence favorable to the plaintiff; onto the other,
place all of the evidence favorable to the defendant. If, after considering the comparable weight of
the evidence, you feel that the scales tip, ever so slightly or to the slightest degree, in favor of the
plaintiff, your verdict must be for the plaintiff. If the scales tip in favor of the defendant, or are
equally balanced, your verdict must be for the defendant.
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the following propositions: that the
defendant was negligent, and such negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident.
If, after considering all ofthe evidence, you feel persuaded that these propositions are more probably
true than not true, your verdict must be for the plaintiff. Otherwise, your verdict should be for the
defendant.
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8. 75 Pa. C.S.A. S 3113(a)(2), (b) - Pedestrian control-signals.
The non-flashing phrase "DON'T WALK" illuminating from a pedestrian control device
means that a pedestrian should not start to cross the roadway in the direction of the signaL
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9. S 244-9(A)(I), (B). Pedestrian Control Signals - Borough Code
Wherever special pedestrian controls are in place in the Borough, every pedestrian facing a
steady or flashing "DON'T WALK" signal shall not start to cross the roadway in the direction of
the signaL Any pedestrian who fails to obey the directions of a "DON'T WALK" signal shall be
guilty of a summary offense.
,
10. The driver of a vehicle of a motor vehicle approaching a crosswalk is not bound to
anticipate that a pedestrian might suddenly and unexpectedly walk into the path of the vehicle.
Smith v. Pittman, 152 A.2d 470,396 Pa. 296 (1959).
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11. Motor vehicle driver was not required to anticipate that pedestrian might come out
from behind parked automobile and into the path of the car. McAteer v. Highland Coffee Co.. 139
A.585, 291 Pa. 32 (1927).
12. Driver need not anticipate the unexpected acts of person not in her path of travel.
Watson v. Lit Bros., 135 A. 631,288 Pa. 175 (1927).
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13. Pedestrian who steps in front of a moving caris negligent. Watson v. Lit Bros.. 135
A. 631, 288 Pa. Sup (1927).
14. BINDING INSTRUCTION:
As Plaintiff admitted crossing the highway in disregard of an illuminated "DON'T WALK"
signal (and without looking for traffic), she is negligent as a matter of law and you must so find.
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CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEA~OFC)
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLV~IA~
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ALLISON B. KLIPA,
Defendant
00-1668 CIVIL TERM
IN RE:
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
ORDER OF COURT
A pre-trial conference was held on Thursday, October
18, 2001, before the Honorable George E. Hoffer, President Judge.
In this automobile negligence case, R. Mark Thomas,
Esquire, represents plaintiff and Thomas J. Williams, Esquire,
represents the defendant, both for trial.
Plaintiff was a pedestrian claiming to walk in the
intersection with the right-of-way on the traffic signal, and she
claims she was negligently struck by the defendant; the defendant
claims that they had the green light when the Plaintiff darted out
in front of her.
Regardless of how the accident happened, Plaintiff
was struck and broke her leg and sustained other abrasions and
contusions. Routine negligence and contributory negligence law
controls the jury charge.
This is a jury trial estimated to take one and a half
days to try, with four challenges apiece. Defendant is from
Florida and will be flying up for the trial. The Court suggests
to the administrator scheduling the case that perhaps a jury can
be picked Tuesday or Wednesday to try the case starting Wednesday
or Thursday, depending on the trial schedule.
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Defendant Basil Klipa was a co-owner of the vehicle
along with Allison Klipa. Plaintiff agrees that, on that basis,
Basil can no longer be held as a defendant, and the case will
proceed to trial against Allison only.
Each party has examined the witness list of the other
side and raises no objections to any witness or exhibits. The
deposition of Dr. Baker, treating physician of Plaintiff, is
scheduled for Wednesday, October 24, 2001, at 1:00 p.m., and that
deposition will be presented in court by a reading of it.
By the Court,
r, P.J.
R. Mark Thomas, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Thomas J. Williams, Esquire
For the Defendant
Court Administrator's Office
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CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
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IN RE:
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
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ALLISON B. KLIPA,
Defendant
00-1668 CIVIL TERM
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ORDER OF COURT
18, 2001, before the Honorable George E. Hoffer, President Judge.
In this automobile negligence case, R. Mark Thomas,
Esquire, represents Plaintiff and Thomas J. Williams, Esquire,
represents the defendant, both for trial.
Plaintiff was a pedestrian claiming to walk in the
intersection with the right-of-way on the traffic signal, and she
claims she was negligently struck by the defendant; the defendant
claims that they had the green light when the plaintiff darted out
in front of her.
Regardless of how the accident happened, Plaintiff
was struck and broke her leg and sustained other abrasions and
contusions. Routine negligence and contributory negligence law
controls the jury charge.
This is a jury trial estimated to take one and a half
days to try, with four challenges apiece. Defendant is from
Florida and will be flying up for the trial. The Court suggests
to the administrator scheduling the case that perhaps a jury can
be picked Tuesday or Wednesday to try the case starting Wednesday
or Thursday, depending on the trial schedule.
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Defendant Basil Klipa was a co-owner of the vehicle
along with Allison Klipa. Plaintiff agrees that, on that basis,
Basil can no longer be held as a defendant, and the case will
proceed to trial against Allison only.
Each party has examined the witness list of the other
side and raises no objections to any witness or exhibits. The
deposition of Dr. Baker, treating physician of Plaintiff, is
scheduled for Wednesday, October 24, 2001, at 1:00 p.m., and that
deposition will be presented in court by a reading of it.
By the Court,
R. Mark Thomas, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Thomas J. Williams, Esquire
For the Defendant
Court Administrator's Office
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CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
: NO. 2000-1668 CIVIL TERM
ALLISON B. KLIPA and
BASIL N. KLIP A,
Defendants
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFF'S PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM
1. THE BASIC FACTS AS TO LIABILITY
The plaintiff was a pedestrian who was crossing High Street at the intersection of High
Street and Pitt Street in the Borough of Carlisle on August 20,1999 when she was struck by a
vehicle being driven by defendant Allison B. Klipa which was owned by defendant Basil N.
Klipa. Plaintiff was in the crosswalk at the time she was struck and the defendant is liable in
as much as the defendant failed to have her vehicle under proper and adequate control, failed
to observe the plaintiff in the crosswalk, although defendant had sufficient time to see
plaintiff, and failed to yield to the pedestrian within the crosswalk.
2. BASIC FACTS AS TO DAMAGES
As a result of being struck by the vehicle driven by defendant, plaintiff suffered a
fracture to her left leg which required surgery and the insertion of screws. After several days
in the Carlisle Hospital plaintiff was admitted to the HealthSouth Rehab where she remained
for a period of two (2) weeks. The total medical bills for the treatment and care of the
plaintiff was $37,138.65.
In addition to the medical bills plaintiff suffered the pain and suffering incident to the
injury and the loss of the enjoyment oflife for a substantial period oftime until her leg healed.
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3. PRINCIPAL ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND DAMAGES
Plaintiff claims that the light was red for traffic on High Street at the time she entered
into the crosswalk to cross over the street. Defendant contends that the light was green and
that plaintiff was facing a flashing "Don't Walk" sign but proceeded into the street anyway.
The main issue is liability.
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Plaintiff was cited for violating Pedestrian-control signals, 75 Pa.C.S. 3113(a)(2) and
entered a plea of nolo contendre. Evidence of this plea is inadmissible pursuant to Pa. Rules
of Evidence No, 410(a)(2).
5. IDENTITY OF WITNESSES TO BE CALLED
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6. LIST OF EXHIBITS WITH BRIEF IDENTIFICATION
1. Diagram of the intersection with measurements indicating distance from curb
to point of impact
2. Photographs depicting the view from the defendant's vehicle of the
approaching intersection and crosswalk
3. Photographs of the street pavement advising drivers to yield to pedestrians in
crosswalk and various photographs of the scene ofthe accident
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4. Permit for the traffic signals at the intersection of Pitt and High Streets
showing the delays and the timing of the change of lights
7. CURRENT STATUS OF SETTLEMENTNEGOTlATlONS
The defendants have offered a nuisance sum to settle which the plaintiff has rejected.
Respectfully submitted,
~~
R. Mark Thomas, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff
ID# 41301
101 S. Market Street
Mechanicsburg, P A 17055
(717) 796-2100
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#8
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
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V.
ALLISON B. KLIPA,
Defendant
00-1668 CIVIL TERM
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IN RE: PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
ORDER OF COURT
A pre-trial conference was held on Thursday, October
18, 2001, before the Honorable George E. Hoffer, President Judge.
In this automobile negligence case, R. Mark Thomas,
Esquire, represents Plaintiff and Thomas J. Williams, Esquire,
represents the defendant, both for trial.
Plaintiff was a pedestrian claiming to walk in the
intersection with the right-of-way on the traffic signal, and she
claims she was negligently struck by the defendant; the defendant
claims that they had the green light when the Plaintiff darted out
in front of her.
Regardless of how the accident happened, Plaintiff
was struck and broke her leg and sustained other abrasions and
contusions. Routine negligence and contributory negligence law
controls the jury charge.
This is a jury trial estimated to take one and a half
days to try, with four challenges apiece. Defendant is from
Florida and will be flying up for the trial. The Court suggests
to the administrator scheduling the case that perhaps a jury can
be picked Tuesday or Wednesday to try the case starting Wednesday
or Thursday, depending on the trial schedule.
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Defendant Basil Klipa was a co-owner of the vehicle
along with Allison Klipa. Plaintiff agrees that, on that basis,
Basil can no longer be held as a defendant, and the case will
proceed to trial against Allison only.
Each party has examined the witness list of the other
side and raises no objections to any witness or exhibits. The
deposition of Dr. Baker, treating physician of Plaintiff, is
scheduled for Wednesday, October 24, 2001, at 1:00 p.m., and that
deposition will be presented in court by a reading of it.
By the Court,
R. Mark Thomas, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Thomas J. Williams, Esquire
For the Defendant
Court Administrator's Office
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F:\FILES\DATAFILE\DONEGAL.DOC\161-ptlr\.1Itde
Created: 04/04/00 02:29:50 PM
. Revised: 1~12101 08:26:22 AM
3050.161
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL V ANlA
v.
ALLISON KLIPA an~,~
Defenu "
H\">. 2000-1668 CIVIL ACTION - LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
DEFENDANTS' PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM
I. FACTS
Defendant, Allison Klipa, was driving a 1999 Honda Civic, which was co-owned by her
father, Basil Klipa, on August 20, 1999. At that time, Defendant Allison Klipa was driving west
on West High Street in Carlisle when Plaintiff stepped out in front of her vehicle at the intersection
with College Street. Defendant had the green light and Plaintiff had a "don't walk" light..
Defendant hit the Plaintiff in her left leg with her vehicle and Plaintiff broke her left leg. Plaintiff
admitted to the responding police officer that she knew that a steady "don't walk" light was on, but
still proceeded to cross the street.
II. STATEMENT OF DAMAGES:
Please refer to Plaintiff s Pre-Trial Memorandum. Some of Plaintiff s medical expenses were
paid by Defendant's carrier and are not recoverable. The balance, if any, was apparently paid by
Medicare.
m ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND DAMAGES:
Whether Plaintiff's claim is barred by her own contributory negligence and/or comparative
negligence.
IV. LEGAL ISSUES:
None. This is a straight forward auto case.
'<;1
V. WITNESSES:
1. Defendant, Allison Klipa, 3015 South Fletcher Avenue, Apt. 3, FernandinaBeach,FL
2. Defendant, Basil Klipa, 573 Farmhouse Lane, Hurnmelstown, P A.
t/
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V
6.
VI.
Officer L. Kell, Carlisle Police Department, 53 West South Street, Carlisle, P A.
Michael T. Keiser, Public Works Director, Carlisle Borough, 53 West South Street,
Carlisle, P A.
Mr. Darryl Weaver, 155 Pennsylvania Avenue, Carlisle, P A.
Mr. Brandon Parro, 820 3'd Avenue, Hershey, P A.
Plaintiff, Carol Casatelli, on cross-examination.
EXHIBITS:
1. Police Accident Report and/or diagram of accident scene of August 20,1999.
2. Photographs of the scene ofthe accident and of Plaintiff.
3. Witness statement of Mr. Darryl Weaver.
4. Medical bills of Plaintiff.
5. Deposition transcripts of the parties.
6. Traffic Studies for West High Street and North Pitt Street, Carlisle.
VII. SETTLEMENT:
Defendant offered $1 ,000.00 to Plaintiff on April 3, 2001. Plaintiff has not made a demand.
MARTSON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
.;:
1N~
~
By'
Thomas J. Wil' s, Esquire
Ten East High Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
(717) 243-3341
Attorneys for Defendants Allison Klipa and
Basil Klipa
Dated: October 11, 2001
,
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, ,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Tricia D. Eckenroad, an authorized agent for Martson Deardorff Williams & Otto, hereby
certify that a copy ofthe foregoing Pre-Trial Memorandum was served this date by depositing same
in the Post Office at Carlisle, P A, first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Stephanie Chertok, Esquire
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
R. Mark Thomas, Esquire
101 South Market Street
Mechanicsburg, P A 17055
MARTSON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
~(J
cia D. Eckenroad
n East HIgh Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
(717) 243-3341
~~
Dated: October 11, 2001
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765 A.2d 786
564 Pa. 156
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Jaynet A. MOORHEAD, Administratrix of the
Estate of Catherine B. Baxter,
Deceased, Appellant
v.
CROZER CHESTER MEDICAL CENTER,
Appellee.
Argued April 27, 1999.
Decided Jan. 29, 2001.
Patient filed medical malpractice action against
hospital after she suffered fall at hospital, for which
she was treated at hospital. The Court of Common
Pleas, Delaware County, Civil Division, No.
94.5637, Harry J. Bradley, J., entered judgment on
jury verdict for patient and awarded $46,500.
Hospital appealed. The Superior Court, No, 261
PHL 1997, 705 A.2d 452, affIrmed. Hospital
appealed, The Supreme Court, No. 184 M.D.
Appeal Docket 1998, Cappy, J., held that patient's
recovery for past medical services was limited to the
amount acmally paid and accepted as full payment
for services rendered by hospital, rather than the fair
and reasonable value of the medical services.
Affirmed.
Zappala, J., concurred in result.
Nigro, J., filed dissenting opinion.
West Headnotes
[I] Appeal and Error ~856(1)
30k856( I)
Appellate court may affrrm the order of the court
below if the result reached is correct without regard
to the grounds relied upon by that court.
[2] Appeal and Error ~842(2)
30k842(2)
On appeal, conclusions of law are always subject to
review.
[3] Courts ~99(6)
106k99(6)
Page 1
[3] Stipulations ~3
3631<3
Parties may by stipulation resolve questions of fact
or limit the issues, and, if the stipulations do not
affect the jurisdiction of the court or the due order
of the business and convenience of the court, they
become the law of the case.
[4] Stipulations ~14(1O)
363kI4(1O)
In medical malpractice action, evaluation of legal
issue regarding amount of recovery for past medical
services to which patient was entitled was not
precluded by stipulation setting fair and reasonable
value of medical services received.
[5] Physicians and Surgeons ~18.11O
299k18.110
In medical malpractice action, patient is entitled to
recover the reasonable value of medical services.
[6] Hospitals ~8
204k8
In medical malpractice action arlsmg from fall
patient suffered while at hospital, for which she was
treated at hospital, patient's recovery for past
medical expenses was limited to the amount actually
paid and accepted as full payment for services
rendered by hospital, rather than the fair and
reasonable value of the medical services.
[7] Physicians and Surgeons ~18.110
299k18.11O
The past medical expenses for which a plaintiff may
recover in medical malpractice action must be such
as have been actually paid, or such as, in the
judgment of the jury, are reasonably necessary to be
incurred.
[8] Physicians and Surgeons ~18.110
299k18,11O
In medical malpractice action, when a plaintiff will
continue to incur expenses for medical services, it is
appropriate for the factfinder to determine the
amount of damages which will compensate the
Copr. <<:> West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works
,
765 A.2d 786
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786)
plaintiff for those expenses that are reasonably
necessary to be incurred,
[9J Physicians and Surgeons ~18.1I0
299k18.1I0
In medical malpractice action, where the exact
amount of expenses has been established by contract
and those expenses have been satisfied, there is no
longer any issue as to the amount of expenses for
which the plaintiff will be liable; in such a case, the
injured party should be limited to recovering the
amount paid for the medical services.
[IOJ Damages ~15
U5k15
It is a basic principle of tort law that damages are to
be compensatory to the full extent of the injury
sustained, but the award should be limited to
compensation and compensation alone.
*787 Joseph M. Fioravanti, Media, for appellant,
Janet Moorhead.
R. Bruce Morrison, Philadelphia, Daniel J. Sheery,
for Crozer Chester Medical Center,
Before FLAHERTY, C.J.,
CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO,
SAYLOR, JJ.
and ZAPPALA,
NEWMAN and
OPINION [FNIJ
FNl. This opinion was reassigned to this author.
CAPPY, Justice.
[I] The issue in this case concerns the appropriate
measure of compensatory damages for past medical
expenses. For the following reasons, we affirm the
order of the Superior Court, although on different
grounds. [FN2]
FN2. W. may affrrm the order of the court below
if the result reached is correct without regard to the
grounds relied upon by that court. PenM)/lvania
Game Comm'n v. State Civil Service Comm'n
(Toth), 561 Pa.19, 747 A.2d 887, 888 n.1 (2000)
(citations omitted).
Appellant's decedent Catherine Baxter ("Baxter")
fell and injured herself while she was a patient at
Appellee's facility, Appellee provided medical
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services to Baxter for the injuries she received.
Subsequently, Baxter commenced a medical
malpractice action against Appellee. Following
Baxter's death, Appellant, as administratrix of
Baxter's estate, was substituted as the plaintiff. As
the case proceeded to trial, an issue arose as to the
appropriate measure of compensatory damages for
Baxter's past medical expenses. The court reserved
that issue for itself and submitted the case to the
jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Appellant,
awarding $46,500 in non-economic damages
including pain and suffering.
In an "Agreed Upon Statement of Facts Pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P.I925", the parties established the
following facts with regard to the issue of
compensation for past medical .788 expenses:
Baxter was covered by Medicare as well as a "Blue
Cross 65" supplemental plan, for which she had paid
premiums. R. 12a. The fair and reasonable value
of the medical services rendered to Baxter was
$108,668.31. Id. The Medicare allowance for
those services was $12,167.40. Id. Of the
$12,167.40, eighty percent was paid by Medicare
and twenty percent was paid by Blue Cross 65. Id.
Appellee was a voluntary participant in the Medicare
program and consequently accepted the $12,167.40
as payment in full for the medical services it
rendered. Id. Appellee cannot obtain the difference
of the cost of its services and the Medicare
allowance (i.e. $96,500.91) from Appellant or from
any other source. R. 12a-13a. Conversely,
Appellant never was and never will be legally
obligated to pay more than $12,167.40 for the
medical services, R. 13a. Appellant contended that
she was entitled to the full $108,668.31, while
Appellee maintained that her recovery was limited to
$12,167.40. R.12a.
The trial court agreed with Appellee that Appellant
was entitled to recover $12,167.40, the amount
actually paid and accepted as full payment for the
medical services rendered by Appellee. On appeal,
a divided panel of the Superior Court affirmed, but
on different grounds. Two judges, relying on
Kashner v, Geisinger, 432 Pa.Super. 361, 638 A.2d
980 (1994), determined that the reasonable value of
the services was $108,668.31, but that Appellee was
entitled to a setoff of $96,500.91 since Appellee, as
tortfeasor, forgave that amount, thereby contributing
that amount towards its liability. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts ~ 920A(I) [FN3]. Since
Copr. (Q West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works
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765 A.2d 786
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786, *788)
Appellee's liability for damages after the setoff was
$12,167.40, the same amount awarded by the trial
court, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's
judgment. One judge dissented, arguing that
Appellee was not entitled to a setoff for forgiving
the excess amount because Appellee was
contractually bound to accept that amount and
therefore made no contribution to Appellant that
Appellant had not already received from Medicare.
FN3. Section 920A, emilled "Effect of Payments
Made to Injured Party" , provides:
(I) A payment made by a tortfeasor or by a person
acting for him to a person whom he has injured is
credited against his tort liability, as are payments
made by another who is, or believes he is, subject
to the same tort liability.
(2) Payments made to or benefits conferred on the
injured party from other sources are not credited
against the tortfeasor's liability, although they
cover all or a part of the harm for which the
tortfeasor is liable.
Appellant conteuds that Appellee is not entitled to a
setoff because it was contractually bound to accept
the Medicare allowance and therefore made no
payment to Baxter; that a setoff presupposes an
existing obligation of the plaintiff which in this case
is non-existent; that the collateral source rule
precludes Appellee from profiting from the
Medicare benefits; and that the Superior Court's
decision arbitrarily assigns second-class claimant
status to senior citizens who provide for their
retirement medical expenses. Appellee counters
that the trial court correctly determined that the
reasonable value of the services was the amount
actually paid, and in the alternative, the Superior
Court properly granted a setoff.
[2] On appeal, conclusions of law are always
subject to our review. Fiore v. Fiore, 405 Pa. 303,
174 A.2d 858, 859 (1961). As this issue involves a
question of law, our scope of review is plenary.
Phillips v. A- Best Products Co., 542 Pa. 124, 665
A.2d 1167, 1170 (1995). The issue we must
resolve is this: is Appellant entitled to collect the
additional amount of $96,500.91, or is her recovery
limited to $12,167.40, the amount actually paid for
the medical services? We find that consistent with
principles of fair compensation, she is entitled to the
amount actually paid.
*789 [3][4] Initially, we will address Appellant's
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contention that Appellee is bound by the "Agreed
Upon Statement Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.1925," which
indicates that the fair and reasonable value of the
medical services is $108,668.31. R. 12a. "Parties
may by stipulation resolve questions of fact or limit
the issues, and, if the stipulations do not affect the
jurisdiction of the court or the due order of the
business and convenience of the court, they become
the law of the case." Parsonese v. Midland Nat'l
Ins. Co., 550 Pa. 423, 706 A,2d 814, 815 (1998)
(citations omitted). In this case, the statement was
only as to facts (R.R. 11a), and this court's review
of a legal issue cannot be supplanted by a
stipnlation. See Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town &
Country Shopping Center v. Board of Property
Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny Co.,
417 Pa. 243, 209 A.2d 394 (1965) (stipulation as to
fair market value is merely evidentiary expedient on
appeal and does not change court's obligation to
determine correctness of the assessment as a whole).
It is clear that Appellee was not conceding that
Appellant was entitled to the full $108,668.31; to
the contrary, both parties agreed that Appellee
contended that Appellant's recovery should be
limited to $12,167.40. R.12a. The stipulation
cannot preclude this court's evaluation of the legal
issue regarding the amount of damages to which
Appellant is entitled.
[5][6] Pennsylvania case law allows a plaintiff to
recover the reasonable value of medical services.
See, e.g., Piwoz v, Iannacone, 406 Pa. 588, 178
A.2d 707 (1962); Fougeray v. Pflieger, 314 Pa. 65,
170 A. 257 (1934). The controlling question in this
case is whether the definition of "reasonable value"
permits an injured party to recover from the
tortfeasor damages in an amount greater than the
amount that the plaintiff has actually paid or for
which he or she has incurred liability. We find that
the amount paid and accepted by Appellee as
payment in full for the medical services is the
amount Appellant is entitled to recover as
compensatory damages.
[7] [8][9] "The expenses for which a plaintiff may
recover must be such as have been actually paid, or
such as, in the judgment of the jury, are reasonably
necessary to be incurred." Goodhart v. Penn. R.R,
Co., 177 Pa. I, 35 A. 191, 192 (1896), Appellant
concedes that pursuant to agreements with Medicare
and Blue Cross, Appellee was contractually
obligated to accept $12,167.40 as full payment for
Copr. @ West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works
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765 A.2d 786
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786, *789)
services rendered. When a plaintiff will continue to
incur expenses for medical services, it is appropriate
for the factfmder to determine the amount of
damages which will compensate the plaintiff for
those expenses that "are reasonably necessary to be
incurred." Conversely, where, as here, the exact
amount of expenses has been established by contract
and those expenses have been satisfied, there is no
longer any issue as to the amount of expenses for
which the plaintiff will be liable. In the latter case,
the injured party should be limited to recovering the
amount paid for the medical services. See 25
Corpus Juris Secundum, Damages ~ 91(3) (1996 &
Supp.1999) ("Where the amount paid for medical
services is in accordance with a contractual schedule
of rates, recovery is limited to that amount although
the reasonable value of the services in the absence of
contract is higher. ") (footnote omitted).
This evaluation of the reasonable value of services
is in accord with the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
~ 911 comment h (1977), which states: "When the
plaintiff seeks to recover for expenditures made or
liability incurred to third persons for services
rendered, normally the amount recovered is the
reasonable value of the services rather than the
amount paid or charged. If, however, the injured
person paid less than the exchange rate, he can
recover no more than the amount paid, except when
the low rate was intended as a gift to him. " It also
is consistent with the approach taken in other
jurisdictions. *790 See Hanif v. Housing Authority
of Yolo County, 200 Cal.App.3d 635, 641, 246
Cal.Rptr. 192 (1988) (declining to award plaintiff
amount in excess of the amount actually paid by
Medi-Cal, and stating "when the evidence shows a
sum certain to have been paid or incurred for past
medical care and services, whether by the plaintiff
or by an independent source, that sum certain is the
most the plaintiff may recover for that care despite
the fact it may have been less than the prevailing
market rate. "); Bates v. Hogg, 22 Kan.App.2d 702,
921 P.2d 249, rev. den. 260 Kan. 991 (1996)
(plaintiff properly prohibited from admitting
evidence of market value of medical services;
because of medical provider's contractual
agreement, the amount allowed by Medicaid
represented the customary charge under the
circumstances). Given Appellee's contractnal
obligations, the trial court did not err in determining
that Appellant was limited to recovering $12,167.40,
the amount that was paid and accepted as payment in
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full for past medical expenses.
[10] Awarding Appellant the additional amount of
$96,500.91 would provide her with a windfall and
would violate fundamental tenets of just
compensation. It is a basic principle of tort law that
"damages are to be compensatory to the full extent
of the injury sustained, but the award should be
limited to compensation and compensation alone."
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 299, 306, 282 A.2d
206, 228 (1971) (citations omitted). Appellant
never has, and never will, incur the $96,500.91 sum
from Appellee as an expense, We discern no
principled basis upon which to justify awarding that
additional amount.
Our approach is consistent with theories of fair
compensation reflected in Pennsylvania case law,
such as the following: remedies seek to put the
injured person in a position as nearly as possible
equivalent to his or her position prior to the tort,
Trotsky v. Civil Service Comm 'n, City of Pittsburgh,
539 Pa. 356, 652 A.2d 813, 817 (1995); evidence
of damages cannot be presumed (Maxwell v.
Schaefer, 381 Pa. 13, 112 A.2d 69, 73 (1955)) and
must be reasonably precise in order to provide the
jury with an adequate framework upon which to
base a verdict, Nakles v. Union Real Estate Co. of
Pittsburgh, 415 Pa. 407, 204 A.2d 50, 52 (1964);
an injured party cannot recover twice for the same
injury, on the theory that duplicative recovery
results in unjust enrichment, Rossi v. State Farm
Auto. Ins. Co., 318 Pa.Super. 386, 465 A.2d 8, 10
(1983); the loss the injured person sustained should
be compensated with the least burden to the
wrongdoer, consistent with the idea of fair
compensation to the person injured, Incollingo, 282
A.2d at 228; a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate
damages, Thompson v. De Long, 267 Pa. 212, 110
A. 251, 253 (1920); and a defendant may show
such facts in mitigation to preclude the plaintiff from
obtaining full compensation for damages occasioned
by himself or herself, see Robison v. Rupert, 23 Pa.
523, 525 (1854).
Additionally, we fmd that the collateral source rule
is inapplicable to the additional amount of
$96,500.91. The rule "provides that payments
from a collateral source shall not diminish the
damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.
[Citation omitted]. The principle behind the
collateral source rule is that it is better for the
Copr. <<:> West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works
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765 A.2d 786
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786, *790)
Page 5
wronged plaintiff to receive a potential windfall that
for a tortfeasor to be relieved of responsibility for
the wrong." Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664
A.2d 96, 100 (1995). Appellant relies upon
comment b to the Restatement (Second) of Torts ~
920A, which provides in pertinent part: "If the
plaintiff was himself responsible for the benefit, as
by maintaining his own insurance or by making
advantageous employment arrangements, the law
allows him to keep it for himself. If the benefit
was a gift to the plaintiff from a third party or
established for him by law, he should not be
deprived of the advantage that it confers." Appellant
also cites to comment c of that same section, which
provides that Social Security benefits are the type of
collateral benefits which cannot be subtracted from
the plaintiff s recovery.
FN4. Because of the Superior Court's reliance on
Kashner v. Geisinger, 432 Pa.Super. 361, 638
A.2d 980 (1994), the reasoning of that case
warrants further commentary. In Kashner, the
plaintiff was treated at Geisinger Medical Center
(GMC) and Geisinger Clinic (the Clinic) by Dr.
Arthur Colley. The plaintiff brought a medical
malpractice action against all three providers; the
Clinic and Dr. Colley each were found to be fifty
percent negligent, While a portion of the
plaintiff's medical bills were paid by the
Department of Public Welfare (DPW). the
remainder were "written off" by GMC and
forgiven by the Clinic, The trial court limited the
amount of medical expenses submitted to the jury
to the amounts paid by DPW. The Superior Court
reversed, finding that the trial court erred in
preventing the plaintiff from proving medical
expenses in excess of the amounts paid by DPW.
The court determined that "the amount actually
paid for medical services does not alone determine
the reasonable value of those medical services.
Nor does it limit the fmder of fact in making such a
determination." 638 A.2d at 983 (citations
omitted). In support of this proposition, the
Kashner court summarized a holding in Brown v.
White, 202 Pa. 297, 51 A. 962 (1902) as "the
damages entitled to plaintiff for medical expenses
are determined by assessing what would reasonably
compensate the physicians providing the services
regardless of what the physicians had actually been
paid." 638 A.2d at 983. This interpretation in the
context of this case is misleading. In Brown. the
trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover damages for expenses incurred for medical
service rendered by her physicians, although there
was no evidence showing the amount of money
expended for the services, nor what the services
were reasonably worth. In sustaining this allegation
of error, the Brown court held that the plaintiff
must "furnish the jury evidence from which they
could determine what had been paid for such
services, or such amounts as the services were
reasonably worth." 51 A. at %5.
Additionally, the Kashner court relied upon D.
Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, ~ 8.1
at 543 . (1973) which stated: "The measure of
recovery is not the cost of services ... but their
reasonable value.... [R]ecovery does not depend on
whether there is any bill at all, and the tortfeasor is
liable for the value of medical services even if they
are given without charge, since it is their value and
not their cost that counts." A more recent version
of that same treatise indicates in the very next
sentence that: "It has been said, however. that if
lbe provider of medical services charges less lban
their value without intending a gift, the plaintiff's
recovery is limited to the liability incurred." D.
D.bbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies ~
8.1(3) at 377 (1993) (footnote omitted). Thus, we
do not !intl the quoted language in Kashner to be a
c.mplete or fInal authority on this issue.
Finally, the Kashner court relied on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts ~ 924. cmt. f (1979)
which states: "The value of medical services made
necessary by the tort can ordinarily be recovered
although they have created no liability or expense
to the injured person, as when a physician donates
his services (See ~ 920A) ." As noted above, we
fInd another provision, Restatement (Second) of
*791 Clearly, Appellant is entitled to recover
$12,167.40, the amount which was paid on her
behalf by Medicare and Blue Cross, the collateral
sources. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ~
920A(2), supra, note 2. But the essential point to
recognize is that Appellee is not seeking to diminish
Appellant's recovery by this amount. Rather, the
issue is whether Appellant is entitled to collect the
additional amount of $96,500.91 as an expense.
Appellant did not pay $96,500.91, nor did Medicare
or Blue Cross pay that amount on her behalf. The
collateral source rule does not apply to the illusory
"charge" of $96,500.91 since that amount was not
paid by any collateral source. See McAmis v.
Wallace, 980 F.Supp. 181 (W.D.Va.1997)
(collateral source rule did not require that plaintiff
recover the amount of the Medicaid write-off since
no one incurred the written-off amount); Bales,
supra (collateral source rule did not apply to amount
written off pursuant to Medicaid contract).
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Superior
Court, but on different grounds. [FN4]
Copr. @ West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.s. Gov!. Works
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765 A.2d 786
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786, *791)
Tons ~ 911, cmt. h, which limits the tortfeasor's
liability to the amount paid if it is "less than the
exchange rate" unless "the low rate was intended
as a gift to [the injured party]", to be more
applicable to the instant case.
Justice SAYLOR did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this matter.
Justice ZAPPALA concurs in the result.
Justice NIGRO mes a dissenting opinion.
*792 NIGRO, Justice, dissenting..
Because I cannot agree that the amount actually
paid and accepted by Appellee ("Crozer") as
payment in full for the medical services rendered
($12,167.40) is the amount Appellant's decedent
("Baxter") is entitled to recover as compensatory
damages, I must respectfully dissent. Instead, I
would affirm that portion of the Superior Court's
decision in which it found that Baxter is entitled to
the reasonable value of the medical services
provided ($108,668.31).
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(1969); 1 SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA
JURISPRUDENCE 2D ~ 9:59 (West 1999).
Unlike the majority, I believe the circumstances in
the instant case clearly indicate that Baxter is
entitled to $108,668.31 in compensatory damages.
In finding that Baxter is only entitled to $12,167.40
in compensatory damages, the majority makes much
of the fact that Crozer was contractually obligated to
accept that amount as payment in full. While that
may be true, such reasoning fails to take into
account the fact that if Baxter had not been covered
by Medicare and Blue Cross 65 or some other health
insurance at the time of her faIl at Crozer, she
would have been personally responsible to Crozer as
her medical provider for her entire medical bill of
$108,668.3 I. Perhaps more importantly, the
parties actually stipulated that $108,668.31 was the
reasonable value of the medical services rendered to
Baxter following her fall. [FNl] Thus, I agree with
the Superior Court that Baxter is entitled to the
reasonable value of the medical services provided to
her by Crozer. [FN2]
FNI. It bears noting that Crozer could have
litigated the reasonable value of the medical
services it provided to Baxter in the trial court and
could have argued to the trier of fact that the
amount accepted as payment in full for such
services from Medicare and Blue Cross 65 is the
most accurate barometer for calculating the
reasonable value of the medical services provided
to Baxter. But Crnzer forewent that opportunity,
and instead opted to stipulate to the reasonable
value of the services while arguing that: (I)
Baxter's compensatory damages should be limited
to the amount of the payment from Medicare and
Blue Cross 65; and (2) it was entitled to a setoff in
the amount of the difference between the
reasonable value of the medical services provided
and the amount accepted as payment in full from
Medicare and Blue Cross 65.
As noted by the majority, the primary objective of a
compensatory damage award is to provide just
compensation for the injured party's loss, so that the
injured party may be made whole, and be restored to
a position as nearly as possible equivalent to her
position prior to the tort, See, e.g., Trosky v. Civil
Servo Comm 'n., City of Pittsburgh, 539 Pa. 356,
652 A.2d 813 (1995); Feingold v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d
1270 (1986). To that end, compensatory damages
are imposed to shift the loss from a wholly innocent
party to one who is at fault. Esmond V. Liscio, 209
Pa.Super. 200, 213, 224 A.2d 793, 799-800 (1966).
A personal injury plaintiff's recovery for past
medical expenses made necessary by a tortfeasor's
wrongdoing is limited to the reasonable value of the
medical services provided. See Kaslmer V.
Geisinger Clinic, 432 Pa.Super. 361, 367-68, 638
A.2d 980, 983 (1994)(discussing plaintiff's right to
recover reasonable value of medical services made
necessary by tortfeasor's wrongdoing and noting that
trier of fact must look to a variety of factors in
determining the reasonable value of the medical
service provided); see also Piwoz v. Iannacone, 406
Pa. 588, 178 A.2d 707 (1962); Brown v. White,
202 Pa. 297, 312, 51 A. 962, 965 (1902): Ratay v,
Yu Chen Liu, 215 Pa.Super. 547, 260 A.2d 484
Copr. Ii;) West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works
FN2. As the majority notes, however, the Superior
Court also found that Cmzer is entitled to a setoff
in the amount of the difference between the
reasonable value of the medical services provided
($108,668.31) and the amount accepted as payment
in full ($12,167.40). I disagree with this finding.
"It is only where the tortfeasor himself makes a
payment towards his ton liability that the payment
will have the effect of reducing his liability."
Kllshner, 432 Pa.Super. at 368, 638 A.2d at 984.
No such payment in the form of free medical
services or a voluntary relinquislunent of a right to
,
765 A.2d 786
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786, .792)
collect occurred in the instant case. Crorer was
required, pursuant to its preexisting contract with
the federal government to participate in the
Medicare program, to provide the services in
question for $12,167.40. In my view, Appellant
sbould not be made to bear tbe cost of Crozer's
agreement with the federal government, and
Crozer sbould not be granted a setoff simply
because it chose to become a Medicare provider
and subsequently treated Baxter for the injuries sbe
sustained due to Crozer's own negligence. See
restatement (Second) of Torrs ~ 920A(2)(1979)(
"[B]enefits conferred on the injured parry from
other sources are not credited against the
tortfeasor's liability. although they cover all or a
pari of the harm for which the tortfeasor is
liable. "). As noted by Judge Olszewski in bis
dissenting opinion below, "[Crozer] did not
contribute anything to [Baxter] that [Baxter] bad
not already received from Medicare." Moorhead~
705 A.2d at 456 (Olszewski, J., ,dissenting). Thus,
I would reverse the decision of the Superior Court
to the extent that it granted Crozer a setoff in the
amount of the difference between the stipulated
reasonable value of the medical services provided
and the amount that Crozer accepted as payment in
full for such services pursuant to its voluntary
participation in the Medicare program.
.793 In reaching a different conclusion, i.e.,
finding that Baxter is only entitled to $12,167.40 as
compensatory damages, the majority determines that
wbere the amount initially billed by a plaintiff's
health care provider is greater than the amount
eventually accepted by the provider as payment in
full for its services, the plaintiff's compensatory
damages for past medical expenses should be limited
to the amount actually paid to the provider. By
doing so, the majority carves out a broad exception
to the established rule of law in this Commonwealth
that personal injury plaintiffs are allowed to recover
the reasonable value of the medical services made
necessary by the wrongdoer's tortious conduct.
Contrary to the majority's holding, it is the value,
and not the ultimate cost, of medical services made
necessary by the tortfeasor's negligence that
determines the proper measure of compensatory
damages for past medical expenses. See Kashner,
432 Pa.Super. at 367-68, 638 A.2d at 983 (noting
that while the amount actually paid for medical
services is relevant to determining the reasonable
value of those services, it is still the value of the
services, and not the cost, on which recovery of
compensatory damages for said services depends);
see also restatement (Second) of Torts ~ 924 cmt. f
-
n:a._
-
Page 7
(1979) ("the value of medical services made
necessary by a tort can ordinarily be recovered
although they have created no liability or expense to
the injured person"). [FN3]
FN3. I further note that the majority ignores the
fact that the underlying bases for tort recovery of
medical expenses and the payment of an insured's
medical benefits are distinct. The basis for the
former is liability--an injured party is entitled to
receive compensation, including the reasonable
value of mediqal services, from a culpable
tortfeasor. The basis for the latter is contractual--
bealth insurers are contractually obligated to pay
medical benefits to, or on behalf of, their insureds.
See Michael F. Flynn, Private Medical InsurOflce
and the Collateral Source Rule: A Good Bet?, 22
U. TOL. L. REV. 39, 65 (1990). Likewise.
medical providers are sometimes contractually
obligated to accept as payment in full
reimbursement from health insurers which is less
than the reasonable value of the services actually
provided to the insured. By concluding that the
contractual obligations between an insured and his
or her bealth insurer and a medical provider and
that insurer diminish the insured's recovery of
compensatory damages, the majority blurs the
distinction between the bases for tort recovery of
medical expenses and payment of an insured's
medical benefits.
In addition, by creating this exception to the rule
that injured plaintiffs are entitled to recover the
reasonable value of their medical services made
necessary by the wrongdoer's tortious conduct, the
majority seriously undermines the collateral source
rule. This Court recently defined the collateral
source rule and described the principle behind the
rule in Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 456, 664
A.2d 96, 100 (1995), where we stated:
The collateral source rule provides that payments
from a collateral source shall not diminish the
damages otherwise recoverable *794 from the
wrongdoer. See generally, Beechwoods Flying
Service, Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp.,
504 Pa. 618, 476 A.2d 350 (1984). The principle
behind the collateral source rule is that it is better
for the wronged plaintiff to receive a potential
windfall than for a tortfeasor to be relieved of
respollSibility for the wrong.
By diminishing the amount of compellSatory
damages otherwise recoverable from a wrongdoer
based on payments made to the wronged plaintiff by
a collateral source, the new rule advanced by the
Cope. I\';) West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works
.
~-
\
765 A.2d 786
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786, *794)
majority clearly violates the conateral source rule.
According to the majority, when a medical provider
contracts with a third party payor to accept an
amount less than the reasonable value of the medical
services provided as payment in full, the purpose of
compensatory damages is no longer served by
permitting an injured plaintiff to recover the
reasonable value of her past medical services made
necessary by the medical provider's tortious
conduct. The majority repeatedly notes that the
actua1 medical expenses paid on behalf of Baxter by
Medicare totaled $12,167.40, and contends that any
further recovery agains[ Crozer in the nature of
compensatory damages for past medical expenses
would constitute a windfall. Although the majority
chooses [0 emphasize the $12,167.40 payment that
Medicare and Blue Cross 65 made to Crozer on
Baxter's behalf, that is not the proper focus. Rather,
the collateral source rule prohibits the wrongdoer
from diminishing the damages recoverable against it
based on the payments, compensation, or benefits
that a conateral source confers on a wronged
plaintiff on account of her injury. See, e.g.,
Hileman v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie R.R. Co., 546
Pa. 433, 439, 685 A.2d 994, 997 (1996)(collateral
source rule prohibits defendants from introducing
evidence that the plaintiff received compensation on
account of his injury from a collateral source);
Beechwoods, 504 Pa. at 623, 476 A.2d at 352
(collateral source rule was intended to avoid
precluding obtainment of redress for injuries merely
because coverage for the injury was provided by a
collateral source, such as insurance). In the context
of the instant case, then, the focus for collateral
source purposes is on the payment, compensation, or
benefit conferred on Baxter by Medicare and Blue
Cross 65 when they fully covered her post-injury
medical treatment at Crozer.
It can hardly be argued that the benefit conferred on
Baxter by Medicare and Blue Cross 65 was equal
only to $12,167.40, the amount allowed by
Medicare and ultimately accepted as payment in full
by Crozer. Instead, by fully covering Baxter's
post-injury medical services, Medicare and Blue
Cross 65 conferred a benefit on Baxter equal to the
reasonable value of the medical services provided,
which the parties stipulated to be $108,668.31. The
collateral source rule dictates that Crozer cannot
profit from the benefit that Baxter received from her
health insurers, but that is exactly what the majority
allows today. [FN4]
--~
-,,"',
PageS
FN4. In support of its conclusion, the majority alS!)
claims that awarding Baxter the additional amount
of $96,500.91 would violate the tenets of fair
compensation. The majority claims that its
conclusion is consistent with several theories: that
damages cannot be presmoed, that damages must
be reasonably precise, that duplicative recovery
results in unjust enrichment, that the injured person
should be compensated with the least burden to the
wrongdoer, and that a plaintiff bas a duty to
mitigate damages.
There were no presumed damages in this case. In
fact, the parties stipulated to the exact amount of
the medical expenses: $108,668.31. While it is
true that an injured party cannot recover twice for
one injury. under the collateral source rule, the
tortfeasor is required to pay for all the harm he
causes, even if this creates a double compensation
for part of the plaintiff's i'1iuries. restatement
(Second) of Torts ~ 920A cmt. b. Moreover. the
principle behind the collateral source rule, that it is
better for the wronged plaintiff to receive a
windfall than for the tortfeasor to pay less than the
damages he owes, specifically refutes the
majority's contention. Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa.
449,456, 664 A.2d 96, 100 (1995).
Finally, the majority fmds that the principle of
damage mitigation applies in the instant case. For
example, the majority cites Robison v. Rupert, 23
Pa. 523 (1854), where this Court beld that the
plaintiff could not receive full compensation for
damages caused when the defendant shot into a
crowd of youths rioting outside his home. I fail to
see how this rule of law applies to the instant case.
Moreover. it stretches the bounds of relevance to
analogize a patient injured by the negligence of a
medical provider to the trespassing plaintiff in
Robison, who was injured after provoking the
defendant landowner.
*795 In addition, the majority's reliance on
Comment h to the Restatement (Second) of Torts ~
911 for the assessment of the reasonable value of
medical services provided to Baxter is misplaced.
While Section 911 generally governs valuation,
Comment h deals specifically with the measure of
recovery for a plaintiff "who sues for the value of
his services tortiously obtained by the defendant's
fraud or duress, or for the value of services
rendered in an attempt to mitigate damages. " That
provision is clearly not applicable to the instant case.
The majority ignores Section 920A, which
specifically explains the effects of benefits provided
by collateral sources:
[Collateral-source benefits] do not have the effect
Copr. @West2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
""~
~.=
,
765 A.2d 786
(Cite as: 765 A.2d 786, *795)
of reducing the recovery against the defendant.
The injured party's net loss may have been
reduced correspondingly, and to the extent that the
defendant is required to pay the total amount there
may be a double compensation for a part of the
plaintiff's injury. But it is the position of the law
that a benefit that is directed to the injured party
should not be shifted so as to become a windfall
for. the tortfeasor. If the plaintiff was himself
responsible for the benefit, as by maintaining his
own insurance "', the law allows him to keep it
for himself. If the benefit was ... established for
him by law, he should not be deprived of the
benefit that it confers. The law does not
differentiate between the nature of the benefits, so
long as they did not come from the defendant or a
person acting for him.
restatement (Second) of Torts ~ 920A em!. b.
Furthermore, although Comment f to Section 924
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts clearly states
that the "value of medical services made necessary
by the tort can ordinarily be recovered although they
have created no liability or expense to the injured
person," the majority inexplicably finds Section 911
"to be more applicable to the instant case,"
Majority Opinion, 765 A.2d at 791 n. 4.
~~
.
Page 9
In my view, the decision of the majority improperly
limits the recovery of medical expenses by creating
an exception to tortfeasor liability. Although it is
the tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all
harm that he causes, and not just the net loss of the
injured party, the majority exempts tortfeasors from
liability for collateral benefits received by injured
plaintiffs. Based on the above analysis, I would
affIrm that portion of the Superior Court opinion
holding that Baxter is entitled to recover the
reasonable value of the medical services
($108,668.31) provided to her by Crozer as
compensatory damages. However, I cannot agree
with the Superior Court's conclusion that Crozer is
entitled to a setoff for the difference between the
reasonable value of the medical services
($108,668.31) and the amount that Crozer accepted
as payment in full pursuant to its voluntary
participation in the Medicare program ($12,167.40).
Accordingly, I would award Baxter additional
compensatory damages in the amount of
$96,500.91, which is the difference between the
reasonable value of the medical services provided to
Baxter and the amount of compensatory damages for
past medical expenses awarded by the trial court.
END OF DOCUMENT
Copr. @ West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
,..",..-~
'0"''',,"
~
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
v.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA
NO. 2000- I {p H CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
ALLISON B. KLlPA and
BASIL N. KLlPA,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
NOTICE TO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims set
forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this
Complaint and Notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by
attorney and filing in writing with the Court your defenses or objections to the claims set
forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed without
you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court without further notice for
any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or relief requested by the
Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE.
IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR
TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU
CAN GET LEGAL HELP.
Cumberland County Lawyers Referral Service
2 Liberty Ave.
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-3166
TO: ALLISON B. KLlPA and
BASIL N. KLlPA:
You ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED To FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THE ENCLOSED
COMPLAINT WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS FROM SERVICE HEREOF OR A JUDGMENT MAY BE
ENTERED AGAINST You.
G1C -k2
PETER J. Russo
.
R. MARK THOMAS, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 41301
101 South Market Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 796-2100
PETER J. RUSSO, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 72897
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-2721
STEPHANIE E. CHERTOK, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 52651
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-1177
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
v.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA
NO. 2000- / t, t, (' CIVIL TERM
ALLISON B. KLlPA and
BASIL N. KLlPA,
Defendants
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMPLAINT
AIND NOW COMES, the Plaintiff, by and through her counsel and make the
within Complaint against Defendant as follows:
1, Plaintiff Carol Casatelli, is an adult individual residing at 65 West Louther
Street, Apartment #C3, Carlisle, PA 17013.
2. Defendant, Allison B. Klipa, is an adult individual residing at 572 Farmhouse
Lane, Hummelstown, PA 17036 and the registered owner of a 1999 Honda Civic
bearing Pennsylvania registration number BXX5886.
-'-
'I
.
3. Defendant, Basil N. Klipa, is an adult individual residing at 572 Farmhouse
Lane, Hummelstown, PA 17036 and the registered owner of a 1999 Honda Civic
bearing Pennsylvania registration number BXX5886.
4. At all times material to this action, Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, was a
pedestrian.
5. At all times material to this action, Defendant, Allison B. Klipa, was operating
the 1999 Honda Civic owned by Defendant, Basil N. Klipa and Allison B. Klipa, and
bearing Pennsylvania registration number BXX5886.
6. At all times material hereto, there were no adverse weather conditions at the
time of the accident.
7. On August 20, 1999, at approximately 4:04 p.m., Defendant, Allison B. Klipa,
was traveling West in the left lane of West High Street.
8. On August 20,1999, at approximately 4:04 p.m., Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli,
was crossing the left hand lane of West High Street in a southerly direction in the
crosswalk in the intersection of Pitt Street when suddenly and without warning Plaintiff,
Carol A. Casatelli was struck by the vehicle driven by Defendant, Allison B. Klipa.
9. On August 20, 1999, at approximately 4:04 p.m., as a result of being struck by
the vehicle driven by Defendant, Allison B. Klipa, Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, was
thrown up onto the hood of the Defendant's vehicle,
10. On August 20,1999, at approximately 4:04 p.m., Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli,
after being thrown up onto the hood of the vehicle driven by Defendant, Allison B. Klipa,
she rolled off of the hood and onto the roadway in front of the car.
11. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant, Allison B.
Klipa, Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, has suffered serious bodily injury as set forth in full
hereinafter.
COUNT 1
CASATELLI v. KLlPA
12. Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, incorporates and makes a part of this Count
paragraphs 1 through 11 of this Complaint as is fully set forth,
-'0._
^
13. The occurrence of the aforesaid accident and the injuries to Plaintiff, Carol
A. Casatelli, resulting therefrom were caused directly and proximately by the negligence
of the Defendant, Allison B. Klipa, generally and more specifically as set forth below;
(a) In failing to apply the brakes in time to avoid a collision with the
plaintiff;
(b) In failing to have the vehicle under proper and adequate control;
(c) In failing to observe the plaintiff on the highway;
(d) In failing to keep a reasonable lookout for pedestrians lawfully on
the road;
(e) In failing to yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian already upon the
highway;
(f) operating her motor vehicle at an excessive rate of speed;
in failing to stop, slow or swerv.e her motor vehicle when she knew or
should have known that by failing to do so she would strike the
Plaintiff;
(g) operating a vehicle into Plaintiff, a pedestrian;
(h) failing to warn of the approach of her vehicle; and
(i) failing to operate her vehicle at a speed that would permit her to stop
within the assured clear distance ahead.
14. As the direct and proximate result of the carelessness and negligence of the
Defendant, Allison B. Klipa, as described in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint,
Plaintiff, Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, sustained severe and disabling injuries to the bones,
muscles, blood vessels, tissues, nerves, tendons and nervous system of her body
including, but not limited to, fractured bones, emotional upset, the full extent of which
injuries are not yet known and some or all of which will be permanent in nature.
15. As the direct and proximate result of the carelessness and negligence of the
Defendant, Allison B. Klipa, as described in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint,
Plaintiff, Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, has been obliged to receive and undergo medical
attention and care and to incur various medical expenses for the injuries which she has
suffered, and she will be obliged to require in the future medicines, medical care,
hospitalization and treatment and will in the future continue to be compelled to expend
large sums of money and incur monetary obligations for such care and treatment.
16. As the direct and proximate result of the carelessness and negligence of the
Defendant, Allison B. Klipa, as described in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint,
Plaintiff, Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, has been disabled and will continue to be disabled
from performing her usual duties and avocations with a consequent loss of earnings,
earning power and earning potential and has suffered and will continue to suffer
excruciating and agonizing aches, pains, mental anguish, humiliation, disfigurement and
deformity as well as limitation and restriction of her usual activities, pursuits and
pleasures.
17. Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli , believes, and therefore avers, that her injuries
are permanent in nature.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, seeks damages from Defendant,
Allison B. Klipa, in an amount in excess of the jurisdictional amount, together with lawful
interest thereon, plus delay damages and costs of suit and demands a trial by jury.
Respec:f(~itted'
G-:h - -
Peter J. Russo
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-2721
Date: 3/ ao/t1:>
~,~ "........
-"'{
.
R. MARK THOMAS, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 41301
101 South Market Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 796-2100
PETER J. RUSSO, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 72897
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-2721
STEPHANIE E. CHERTOK, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 52651
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-1177
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA
v.
NO. 2000-
CIVIL TERM
ALLISON B. KLlPA and
BASIL N. KLlPA,
Defendants
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
VERIFICATION
I, Carol A. Casatelli, verify that the statements made in the forgoing document are
true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the
penalties of 18 Pa. C. S. 9 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
,
~ /t ~U/~
Carol A. Casatelli
Date: "3//1-;' lot?
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F:\FILES\DATAFILE\DONEGAL.LTR\l61-pra.I1tde
Created: 04/04/0002:29:50PM
Revised: 04/04/00 02:36:47 PM
3050,161
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
NO. 2000-1668 CIVIL ACTION - LAW
ALLISON KLIP A and BASIL KLIP A,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PRAECIPE
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY:
Enter the appearance of MARTS ON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO on behalf of
Defendants in the above matter.
MARTSON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
By '1 L~ N:Li-:-.-
Thomas J. Wil s, Esquire
Ten East High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 243-3341
Attorneys for Defendants Allison Klipa and
Basil Klipa
Dated: April 4, 2000
'_~M__"~
,..
--........
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Tricia D. Eckenroad, an authorized agent for Martson Deardorff Williams & Otto, hereby
certifY that a copy of the foregoing Praecipe was served this date by depositing same in the Post
Office at Carlisle, P A, first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Peter 1. Russo, Esquire
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
MARTSON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
~Fkol), ~
Ten East High Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
(717) 243-3341
Dated: April 4, 2000
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SHERIFF'S RETURN - OUT OF COUNTY
CASE NO: 2000-01668 P
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
CASATELLI CAROL A
VS
KLIPA ALLISON B ET AL
R. Thomas Kline
, Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff who being
duly sworn according to law, says, that he made a diligent search and
and inquiry for the within named DEFENDANT
, to wit:
KLIPA ALLISON B
but was unable to locate Her
in his bailiwick. He therefore
deputized the sheriff of DAUPHIN
County, pennsylvania, to
serve the within COMPLAINT & NOTICE
On April
7th , 2000 , this office was in receipt of the
attached return from DAUPHIN
Sheriff's Costs:
Docketing
Out of County
Surcharge
DEP. DAUPHIN CO
18.00
9.00
10.00
65.75
.00
102.75
04/07/2000
PETER RUSSO
~/~
R. 'Thomas Kline
Sheriff of Cumberland County
Sworn and subscribed to before me
this
/I ~ day of (}n-. ~
v
.,l,..trjrO
C}r-
A.D.
Q~
prothonot~
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SHERIFF'S RETURN - OUT OF COUNTY
CASE NO: 2000-01668 P
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
CASATELLI CAROL A
VS
KLIPA ALLISON B ET AL
R. Thomas Kline
, Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff who being
duly sworn according to law, says, that he made a diligent search and
and inquiry for the within named DEFENDANT
, to wit:
KLIPA BASIL N
but was unable to locate Him
in his bailiwick. He therefore
deputized the sheriff of DAUPHIN
County, pennsylvania, to
serve the within COMPLAINT & NOTICE
On April
7th , 2000 , this office was in receipt of the
attached return from DAUPHIN
Sheriff's Costs:
Docketing
Out of County
Surcharge
6.00
.00
10.00
.00
.00
16.00
04/07/2000
PETER RUSSO
S
R. Thomas Kline
Sheriff of Cumberland County
Sworn and subscribed to before me
this II ~ day of ~
;2 [K.K) A.D.
~Q.~ ~
Prothonotary
,'-
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-
~
@t1itt of tq~ ~4~~iff
William T. Tully
Solicitor
Ralph G. McAllister
Chief Deputy
Mary Jane Snyder
Real Estate Deputy
Michael W. Rinehart
Assistant Chief Deputy
Dauphin COunty
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101
ph: (717) 255-2660 fax: (717) 255-2889
Jack Lotwick
Sheriff
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
CASATELLI CAROL A
vs
County of Dauphin
KLIPA ALLISON B
Sheriff's Return
No. 0668-T - -2000
OTHER COUNTY NO. 2000-1668
AND NOW: March 28, 2000
at 9:08PM served the within
NOTICE & COMPLAINT IN CIVIL ACTION
upon
KLIPA ALLISON B
by personally handing
to BASIL N KLIPA-FATHER
1 true attested copy(ies)
of the original
NOTICE & COMPLAINT IN CIVIL ACTION
and making known
to him/her the contents thereof at 572 FARHOUSE LANE
HUMMELSTOWN, PA 17036-0000
Sworn and subscribed to
So Answers,
Jf~
before me this 30TH day of MARCH, 2000
f\
I \
~ C-. (.f)f1AMW
I
Sheriff of Dauphin County, Pa.
PROTHONOTARY
By
Deputy Sheriff
Sheriff's Costs: $65.75 PD 03/24/2000
RCPT NO 135008
PF!GC
,.=~.~~
~
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@tlitt of tq~ ~4~~iff
William T. Tully
Solicitor
Ralph G. McAllister
Chief Deputy
Mary Jane Snyder
Real Estste Deputy
Michael W. Rinehart
Assistant Chief Deputy
Dauphin COunty
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 171 0 1
ph: (717)255-2660 fax: (717)255-2889
Jack Lotwick
Sheriff
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
CASATELLI CAROL A
vs
County of Danphin
KLIPA ALLISON B
Sheriff's Return
No.0668-T - -2000
OTHER COUNTY NO. 2000-1668
AND NOW: March 28, 2000
at 9:08PM served the within
NOTICE & COMPLAINT IN CIVIL ACTION
upon
KLIPA BASIL N
by personally handing
to DEFT
1 true attested copy(ies)
of the original
NOTICE & COMPLAINT IN CIVIL ACTION
and making known
to him/her the contents thereof at 572 FARHOUSE LANE
HUMMELSTOWN, PA 17036-0000
Sworn and subscribed to
So Answers,
Jf~
before me this 30TH day f\ MARCH, 2000
I \
SiJiinlwn.) t-. ( f- )()fiA4~Q)
! .
I
Sheriff of Dauphin County, Pa.
PROTHONOTARY
By
Deputy Sheriff
Sheriff's Costs: $65.75 PD 03/24/2000
RCPT NO 135008
PF/GC
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In The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
Carol A. Casatelli
VS.
Allison B. Klipa, et.
Serve: Allison B. Klipa
al.
No. 20-1668 Civil
Now,
3/20/00
, 20 to (J , I, SHERIFF OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, P A, do
hereby deputize the Sheriff of Dauphin
County to execute this Writ, this
deputation being made at the request and risk of the Plaintiff. . ~~.
. ~~~.. ~
Sheriff of Cumberland County, P A
Affidavit of Service
Now,
,20_, at
0' clock
M. served the
within
upon
at
by handing to
copy ofthe original
a
and made known to
the contents thereof.
So answers,
Sheriff of
County, PA
Sworn and subscribed before
me this_day of ,20_
COSTS
SERVICE
MILEAGE
AFFIDAVIT
$
$
~ 0>'
, "..:..i~- " '-,
- .
In The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
Carol A. Casatelli
VS.
Allison B. Klipa, et. al.
Serve: Basil N. Klipa
No. 20-1668 Civil
Now,
3/20/00
, 20 to (J , I, SHERIFF OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, P A, do
hereby deputize the Sheriff of Dauphin
County to exe.cute this Writ, this
deputation being made at the request and risk of the Plaintiff.
. r~~~~(
Sheriff of Cumber and County, P A
Affidavit of Service
Now,
, 20_, at
o'clock
M. served the
within
upon
at
by handing to
a
copy of the original
and made known to
the contents thereof.
So answers,
Sheriff of
County, PA
Sworn and subscribed before
methis_dayof ,20_
COSTS
SERVICE
MILEAGE
AFFIDAVIT .
$
$
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F:\Fll.ESIDA T AFILEIDONEGAL.DOC\161-ans.lItde
Created: 04/04f0002:29:50PM
Revised: 04fl9/0012:03:56PM
3050.1~1
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL VANIA
v.
NO. 2000-1668 CIVIL ACTION - LAW
ALLISON KLIP A and BASIL KLIP A,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER
TO: CAROL A, CASATELLI, Plaintiff, and her attorney, PETER J. RUSSO, ESQUIRE
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THE
ENCLOSED NEW MATTER WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS FROM SERVICE HEREOF
OR A JUDGMENT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU.
AND NOW, comes Defendant, Allison B. Klipa, by and through her attorneys, MAR TSON
DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO, and hereby answers Plaintiffs Complaint as follows:
1-7. Admitted.
8. Admitted in part, denied in part. Plaintiff illegally attempted to cross West High
Street at its intersection with Pitt Street against an illuminated "DON'T WALK" light and directly
into the path of westbound traffic on West High Street which had a green light and the right-of-way,
and Plaintiff was then struck by the vehicle driven by Defendant Allison B. Klipa.
9. Admitted.
10. Denied in that, after reasonable investigation, Defendant Allison B. Klipa is unable
to state with certainty as to how Plaintiff got offthe hood of her vehicle; and consequently, demands
proof thereof, if relevant, at trial.
11. Denied. Plaintiffwas on her feet and moving about without apparent injury following
the collision. Afterreasonable investigation to date, Defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the nature and extent of injuries, if any, suffered by Plaintiff.
~.
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COUNT I
CASATELLI v. KLIPA
12. Defendant incorporates Paragraphs I through II hereof.
13. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Allison B. Klipa was negligent in
general or as specifically set forth in Paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint. On the contrary,
Defendant Allison B. Klipa at all times operated her vehicle carefully, safely and in compliance with
all laws and regulations.
14-17. Denied. Afterreasonable investigation to date, Defendant Allison B. Klipa is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the nature or extent of Plain tiff s injuries,
if any, her medical treatment, loss of earnings, pain, suffering and/or permanency, all of which are,
therefore, denied and strict proof demanded.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Allison B. Klipademands that Plaintiff s Complaint be dismissed
and judgment entered in her favor.
NEW MATTER
18. Paragraphs I through 17 hereof are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
19. At the time of the collision in question, westbound traffic on West High Street,
including the vehicle being operated by Defendant Allison B. Klipa, had a green light at the
intersection with Pitt Street.
20. At the time of the collision in question, Plaintiff was attempting to cross West High
Street against an illuminated "DON'T WALK" signal.
21. As a result of the collision in question, Plaintiff received a citation for attempting to
cross West High Street against an illuminated "DON'T WALK" signal pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.
93113 (a) (2) and Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to such citation.
22. Immediately following the collision in question, Plaintiffwas able to stand and walle
23. At the time of the collision in question, Plaintiff was under the influence of
medication prescribed for depression and anxiety.
24. As Plaintiff was crossing West High Street immediately prior to the collision in
question, she was unaware there was westbound traffic approaching the intersection.
~~
-
25. Plaintiff was surprised when she was struck by the vehicle operated by Defendant
Allison B. Klipa and initially did not know what had struck her.
26. Plaintiff did not see the vehicle operated by Defendant Allison B. K1ipa prior to the
impact.
27. Following the collision, Plaintiff believed it was a station wagon that struck her.
28. Plaintiffs claim is barred by her own contributory and/or comparative negligence.
29. Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury by attempting to illegally cross a busy state
highway against an illuminated "DON'T WALK" signal and without first checking to see that the
roadway was clear of approaching vehicles.
WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment in her favor and against Plaintiff, together
with costs of suit.
Respectfully submitted,
MARTSON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
By
Thomas J. Williams, Esquire
Ten East High Street
Carlisle,PA 17013
(717) 243-3341
Dated: Aprill~ 2000
Attorneys for Defendants Allison Klipa and
Basil Klipa
-I
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VERIFICATION
I, Thomas J. Williams, Esquire, counsel for Defendant Allison B. Klipa depose and say,
subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. Section 4904, that the facts set forth in the foregoing
pleading are true and correct to the best of my knowledge; that my client is presently unavailable;
that I am authorized to execute this Verification on her behalf.
Date: April 112000
'^' J.Q,.~-
, Esquire
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Tricia D. Eckenroad, an authorized agent for Martson Deardorff Williams & Otto, hereby
certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer With New Matter was served this date by depositing
same in the Post Office at Carlisle, P A, first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Peter J. Russo, Esquire
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
MARTSON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
c51Ji~eQ. ~
Ten East High Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
(717) 243-3341
Dated: April 1 ~ 2000
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F:\FILES\DATAFILE\DONEGAL.DOC\161-po.1ftde
Created; 04/04/00 02:29:50 PM
Revised: 04/19/00 12:02:59 PM
3050.161
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
NO. 2000-1668 CIVIL ACTION - LAW
ALLISON KLIP A and BASIL KLIP A,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT BASIL N. KLIPA
AND NOW, comes the Defendant, Basil N. Klipa, by and through his attorneys, MARTS ON
DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO, and demurs to Plaintiffs Complaint for the following
reasons:
I. The Complaint alleges that this action arises out of a motor vehicle collision between
the Plaintiff, as a pedestrian, and Defendant Allison B. Klipa (daughter of Defendant Basil N. Klipa)
as the operator of a 1999 Honda Civic.
2. The Complaint alleges that Defendant Allison B. Klipa was an adult at the time of
the collision on August 20, 1999.
3. The only allegation in the Complaint against Defendant Basil N. Klipa is that he was
a co-owner of the 1999 Honda Civic, along with his daughter, Defendant Allison B. Klipa.
4. There is no allegation that Defendant Basil N. Klipa was in any way involved in this
collision, nor was even present at the time of the collision, nor that his daughter, Defendant Allison
B. Klipa, was not a licensed driver.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Basil N. Klipa demurs to the Complaint against him.
Respectfully submitted,
MARTS ON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
By T:T!:;W~' E':::~-
Ten East High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 243-3341
Attorneys for Defendants Allison Klipa and
Basil Klipa
Dated: April 19, 2000
"
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~~
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Tricia D. Eckenroad, an authorized agent for Martson Deardorff Williams & Otto, hereby
certify that a copy of the foregoing Preliminary Objections was served this date by depositing same
in the Post Office at Carlisle, P A, first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Peter J. Russo, Esquire
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
MARTS ON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
~A~/~ N. (1 JtW~
l:.J~a D. Eckenroad ,.
Ten East High Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
(717) 243-3341
Dated: April 19, 2000
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CASATELLI
Vs.
KLIPA
NO. 2000 1668
CERTIFICATE
PREREQUISITE TO SERVICE OF A SUBPOENA
PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
As a prerequisite to service of & subpoena(s) for documents and things
pursuant to Rule 4009.22 THOMAS J WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE certifies that:
1. A Notice of Intent to Serve the Subpoena(s) with a copy of
the subpoena(s) attached thereto was mailed or delivered to
each party at least twenty days prior to the date on which
the subpoena(s) is sought to be served,
2. A copy of the Notice of Intent, including the proposed
subpoena(s) is attached to this certificate,
3. No objection to the subpoena(s) has been received, and
4. The subpoena(s) which will be served is identical to
the subpoena(s) which is attached to the Notice of Intent
to Serve the Subpoena(s) .
Pate:
5/22/00
"
,
THOMAS J WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE
TEN E HIGH ST
CARLISLE, PA 17013
717-243-3341
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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rNQurRrES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO:
MEDICAL LEGAL REPRODUCTIONS, INC.
4940 DISSTON STREET
PHILADELPHIA PA 19135
(215) 335-3581
File #: M263093
By: Cara Peters
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CASATELLI
Vs.
KLIPA
No. 2000 1668
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE A SUBPOENA TO PRODUCE
DOCUMENTS AND THINGS FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.21
,
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TO: PETER RUSSO, ESQ
DEFENDANT intends to serve a subpoena(s) identical to
the one(s) attached to this notice. You have twenty (20) days
from the date listed below in which to file of record and serve upon
the undersigned an objection to the subpoena. If no objection is
made the subpoena may be served.
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Date: 4/28/00
THOMAS J WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE
TEN E HIGH ST
CARLISLE, PA 17013
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
INQUIRIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO:
MEDICAL LEGAL REPRODUCTIONS, INC.
4940 DISSTON STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19135
(215) 335-3581
By: Cara Peters
Enc(s): Copy of subpoena(s)
Counsel return card
File #: M263093
. .
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a:MDIWEALTH OF PE2'lNSYLVANlA
~ OF CUMBERLl\ND
CASATELLI
Vs.
Fi 1e No.
2000 1668
KLIPA
DONEGAL COMPANIES, FPB
TO: ATTN. SEll]>! H"1\lN"
~ TO PRODUCE DOO.JoENTS OR llil NGS
FOfl 0 I $CCl'lIERY PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
UN IT PO BOX 302, MARIETTA PA
17547
. ("'-"e of Person or Entity)
Within twenty (20) days after service of this subpoena, you are ordered by the court t
produce the following docunen~EE XffXCHED ADDENDQM
., .
at
MEDICAL LEGAL REPRODUCTIONS, INf~~~~s~ DISSTON
S'l'. ,
.t'tilLA., FA
You may deliver or mail legible copies of the cloct.rnents or produce things requested c.
this subpoena, together with the certificate of' Caliiliance, to the party making thl
request at the address listed above. You have the right to seek in advance the rea~.onab I
cost of pre9aring the copies or producing the things sought.
If you fail to produce the docunents or things required by this subpoena within t....ent'
(20) days after its serv~ce. the party, serving. thi:;. s\..!Ppoena may seek a court orde.
carpel ling you to caTPly with it. '. .,. ..
1H I S SUBPOENA WAS
NA/'E :
ADDRESS :
I SSUEO AT "THE REQlEST OF 1liE FOLLCW I NG PERSON:
THOMAS J WILLIAMS, ESQ
'E'EN E ~nGH S''T'
CARLJ.SLti, PA i7013
TELEPH::lNE:
SUPREI'E CXlURT
ATTORNEY FOR:
10 # 215-335-3212
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DEFENDANT
BY 1liE OOJRT: ... ~
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ProthonotarylC ~, Civil
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DiviS10t'l
M263093=-Ol
DATE:
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Sea I "of the Court
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(Eff. 7/97)
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ADDENDUM TO SUBPOENA
CASATELLI
Vs.
KLIPA
No. 2000 1668
CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS FOR: DONEGAL COMPANIES
ALL FIRST PARTY BENEFITS RECORDS.
PERTAINING TO:
NAME: CAROL A CASATELLI
ADDRESS: 65 W LOUTHER ST CARLISLE PA
DATE OF BIRTH: 06/20/65
SSAN: 176506780
CERTll<'lliD PHOTOCOPffiS OF THE RECORDS WILL BE
ACCEPTED IN LffiU OF YOUR PERSONAL APPEARANCE.
County of: CUMBERLAND
MLR File #: M263093-01
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PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR TRIAL
(Must be typewritten and submitted in duplicate}
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
Please list the fOllowing case:
\'
(Check one)
xx) for JURY trial at the next term of civil court.
for trial without a jury.
.
CAPTION OF CASE
(entire caption must be stated in full)
(check one)
Assumpsit
Trespass
CAROL A. CASATELL I
~xx) Trespass (Motor Vehicle)
(otherl
(Plaintiffl
vs.
ALISON KLIPA AND BASIL KLIPA
The trial list will be called on 10/9/01
and
Trials commence on 11/5/01
(Defendantl
PretrIals will be held on 10/17/01
(Briefs are due 5 days before pretrials. I
VS.
(The party listing this case for trial shall provide
forthWith a copy of the praecipe to all counsel.
pursuant to local Rule 214.1.)
No. HinR
Civil Artirm
Law
.1I:92QQO
'ndicate the attorney who will try case for the party who files this praecipe:
Defendants: Thomas J. Williams, Esauire, 10 E. Hiah St., Carlisle, PA 17013;~43-3341
Indicate tnal counsel for orner parties If known:
Plaintiff: R. Mark Thomas, Esquire, 101 S. Market St., MechanicsQurg. pa .l1Q~796-2600
This case IS reaav for tnaL
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Pnnt Name: Thomas J. llllarns, ESQUIre
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CAROL A. CASA TELLI,
Plaintiff
vs.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 2000-1668
ALLISON B. KLlPA and
BASIL KLlPA
Defendants
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO NEW MATTER
18. No response necessary.
19. Denied. At least one witness has stated that Defendant, Allison B. Klipa
had a yellow light when she entered the intersection of West High Street and Pitt Street.
20. Denied. When Plaintiff attempted to .cross West High Street the "Don't
Walk" signal may have been flashing rather than solidly illuminated.
21. Denied. Plaintiff entered a plea of no contest to the citation that was
issued.
22. Denied. Immediately following the collision, Plaintiff suffered a broken leg
and she was lying on the street until an ambulance arrived to take her to the hospital.
23. Admitted.
24. Denied. Immediately prior to the collision Plaintiff was aware of
westbound traffic approaching the intersection that stopped as she began to cross with
in the crosswalk.
25. Denied. Plaintiff knew that a car had struck her, but she was surprised
that a car had struck her as she had completed crossing the first lane of traffic where a
.car was waiting for her to pass by with in the crosswalk. Her only surprise was that a
car in the second lane failed to stop as the car in the first lane had done.
26. Admitted.
27. Neither admitted or denied. Plaintiff was lying in the street following the
collision and she therefore could not see the specific body style of the vehicle that
struck her.
28. Denied.
-
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29. Denied. Plaintiff attempted to legally cross a street by walking with in a
designated crosswalk. Furthermore, she began crossing when the traffic in the first
lane stopped in order to permit her to cross.
Respe.ctfully submitted,
Dated: ,I ~I ! era
~
Peter J. Russo, EsqUire
Attorney for Plaintiff
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717)249-2721
~.
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R. MARK THOMAS, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 41301
101 South Market Street
Me.chani.csburg, PA 17055
(717) 796-2100
PETER J. RUSSO, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 72897
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-2721
STEPHANIE E. CHERTOK, ESQUIRE
PA Supreme Court ID: 52651
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-1177
CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA
v.
NO. 2000-
CIVIL TERM
ALLISON B. KLlPA and
BASil N. KLlPA,
Defendants
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
VERI FICA liON
I, Carol A. Casatelli, verify that the statements made in the forgoing document are
true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the
penalties of 18 Pa. C. S. S 4904 relating to unsworn falsifi.cation to authorities.
(J~/J;...e rt l&L1A"""hI/';
Carol A. Casatelli
Date: J'~ 'dtCo, dOC:O
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CAROL A. CASA TELLI,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
VS.
: NO. 2000-1668
ALLISON B. KLlPA and
BASIL KLlPA
Defendants
: CIVIL ACTION-LAW
: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Peter J. Russo, hereby certify that 1 am on this day serving a copy of the
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO NEW MATTER
upon the person (s) and in the manner indicated below, service by First-Class Mail,
Postage Prepaid, and Addressed as Follows:
THOMAS J. WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE
MARTSON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO
10 E. HIGH STREET
CARLISLE, PA 17013
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Peter J. Russo
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-2721
Date: I (2'/ Crv
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STEPHANIE E. CHERTOK, ESQUIRE
Supreme Court I.D. - 52651
61 West Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-1177
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Attorney for Plaintiff
Carol A. Casatelli
CAROL A. CASATELLI
Plaintiff
v.
ALLISON B. KLIPA
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL VANIA
NO. 00-1668
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Kindly withdraw the appearance of Peter 1. Russo, Esquire as counsel for Plaintiff Carol
A. Casatelli in the above-captioned matter.
By~L-
PETER 1. RUSS ,ESQUIRE
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Kindly enter the appearance of Stephanie E. Chertok, Esquire on behalf of Plaintiff Carol
A. Casatelli in the above-captioned matter.
BY:
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CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL VANIA
v.
NO. 2000-1668
ALLISON B. KLIP A and
BASIL KLIP A,
Defendants
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
NOTICE OF ORAL DEPOSITION
NOTICE is hereby given that pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4007.1, the oral deposition of the
Plaintiff, Carol Casatelli, will be taken on December 28, 2000 at 9:30 a.m. Following the
Plaintiffs deposition, at approximately 10:15 a.m., the deposition of the Defendant, Allison
Klipa, will be taken.
The depositions will be conducted at 61 W. Louther St., Carlisle, PA 17013. The
depositions will continue until complete and you are hereby invited to attend and to examine the
witnesses as you deem fit.
Said depositions shall take place at the above address and shall be before a Court
Reporter or other person authorized to take depositions under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Said depositions shall pertain to the above captioned matter.
DATE,lt101ou BY, ~
~ ~ S hanie E. Chertok
Attomey for Plaintiff
PA Supreme Court ID - 52651
61 W. Louther St.
Carlisle, PA 17013
717-258-1177
R. Mark Thomas
Attorney for Plaintiff
PA Supreme Court ID - 41301
101 S. Market St.
Mechanicsburg, P A 17055
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CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
: NO. 2000-1668
ALLISON B. KLIP A and
BASIL KLIP A,
Defendants
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Stephanie E. Chertok, co-counsel for the Plaintiff, Carol A. Casatelli, does hereby
certify that a copy of the Notice of Oral Deposition was served this
8~
day of
"DECEM6E(\
, 2000, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, upon those listed below:
Thomas Williams, Esq.
10 E. High St.
Carlisle, P A 17013
/s~
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff
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CAROL A. CASATELLI,
Plaintiff
vs.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
00-1668 CIVIL
ALLISON KLIP A,
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
VERDICT
QUESTION I - Do you find that the defendant was negligent?
Yes ~ No
If you answer question I "No," the plaintiff cannot recover and you should not answer
any further questions and should return to the courtroom.
QUESTION 2 - Was the defendant's negligence a substantial factual in bringing about
the plaintiff's harm?
Yes
No V
If you answer question 2 "No," the plaintiff cannot recover and you should not answer
any further questions and should return to the courtroom.
QUESTION 3 - Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?
Yes v" No
If you answer question 3 "No," proceed to question 5.
QUESTION 4 - If you answered question 3 "Yes," was the plaintiffs contributory
negligence a substantial factor in bringing about her harm?
Yes v' No
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QUESTION 5 - Taking the combined negligence that was a substantial factor in bringing
about the plaintiff s harm as 100%, what percentage of that causal negligence was attributable to
the defendant and what percentage was attributable to the plaintiff?
Percentage of causal negligence attributable to the defendant:
/3%
";7 %
Percentage of causal negligence attributable to the plaintiff:
100%
If you have found the plaintiff's causal negligence to be greater than 50%, then the
plaintiff cannot recover and you should not answer question 6 and should return to the
courtroom.
QUESTION 6 - State the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of the accident without regard to and without reduction by the percentage of causal negligence, if
any, that you have attributed to the plaintiff.
$
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Carol A. Casatelli
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL VANIA
V
Alison Klipa and Basil Klipa
: NO. 00-1668 CIVIL TERM
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, November 28,2001, upon relation of the Court Administrator that
this case cannot be reached this trial term due to the number of cases on the trial list, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that this case be continued until the January trial term.
The Prothonotary is directed to relist this case for the January trial term. Counsel are notified that
they need not attend the Call of the List and no additional Pretrial Conference will be scheduled
unless requested by either party. This case will be given preference and placed at the head of the
list.
By the Court,
Thomas J. Williams, III, Esquire '" \
For the Plaintiff ~ ~
R. Mark Thomas, Esquire (//--4-01 ~ R'i'J:3
For the Defendant ' l '1\
Court Administrator
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