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Home My WebLink About97-00708 '\ c:. . c..I- i Q l~ I I l.f I~ I l1l. ! ~ I J I~ II... IV) i ' ! ~...~ I ""- I '. I I f. \. I~ I j- . . I - I .: iC) I , i I Do 10 . ~ I i ~/ ~ C) < ~. f BONNIE SUE STRUNK. Pctitioncr IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA o v, CIVIL ACTION-LAW IN PROTECTION FROM ABUSE FRANSISCO MOFFA, Rcspondcnt NO. 97- 70g- CIVIl. TERM NOTICE You have becn sucd in court, If you wish to defend against the elaims set forth in the following pages, you must take action promptly after this Petition, Order and Notice are served. hy appcaring pcrsonally or by attorncy at the hearing scheduled by the Court .md prcscnting to the Court your defenses or objcctions to the claims sct forth against you. You arc warned that if you fail to do so the Court nmy proceed without you and a judgmcnt may he cntcrcll against you by the Court. without furthcr noticc. for any moncy claimcd in thc Pctition or filr any other claim or rclicf rcqucsted by thc Plaintifr. You may losc moncy or propcrty or othcr rights important to you. FEES AN)) COSTS If thc casc gocs to hcaring and thc judgc grants a protcction Ordcr, a surcharge of $25,00 will hc asscsscd against you. You may also hc rcquircll to pay allorncy fces to thc Family l.aw Clinic t'or its rcprcscntation of thc plaintifr. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE, IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE. GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP, Court Administrator, Fourth Floor Cumberland County Courthouse Carlislc. Pcnnsylvania 17013 717/240-6200 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 The Court of Common Picas of Cumherland County is rcquircd by law to comply with the Amcricans with Disahilities Act of !990. For information about accessible I;tcilities and rcasomthlc accommodations availahle to disahled inllivilluals having husincss bcforc thc court, plcasc conl<lct our officc, All arrangcments must bc madc atlcast 72 hours prior to allY hcaring or husincss hclilrc thc court. You must allcnd thc schellulcd conkrcnce or hearing. " , V. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION-LAW IN PROTECTION FROM ABUSE BONNIE SUE STRUNK, Petitioner FRANSISCO MOFFA, Respondent NO, 97- 7t)f; CIVIL TERM TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER AND NOW, this \'2,.\t:., day of Ft'bl"ZI\' 1997, upon presentation and consideration of the within Petition, and upon finding that petitioner, Bonnie Sue Strunk, residing in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, is in immediate and present danger of abuse from respondent, the following Temporary Order is entered. 1. Fransisco Moffa is hereby enjoined from physically abusing or harassing Bonnie Strunk or placing her in fear of abuse, either personally or through his agents. 2, Fransisco Moffa is hereby ordered to stay away from petitioner's residence and her places of employment at CIT, 262 Silver Springs Rd., Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania and The Fairfield, Exit 18A of Rt. 83, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. 3, Fransisco Moffa is ordered to refrain from having any direct or indirect contact with the Bonnie Strunk including, but not limited to, telephone and written communications. 4. Fransisco Moffa is enjoined from harassing and stalking Bonnie Strunk and from harassing her relatives. 5. A violation of the Order may subject the respondent to: i) arrest under 23 Pa,C.S, ~6113; ii) a private criminal complaint under 23 Pa,C.S, ~6113.1; iii) a charge of indirect criminal BONNIE SUE STRUNK Petitioner IN THE COURT 01' COMMON PLF;AS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. FRANSISCO MOFFA, Respondent CIVIL AC'I'ION - LAW IN PROTECTION FROM ABUSE NO, 97- '1ap CIVIL TERM PETITION FOR PROTECTION FROM ABUSE The pefifion of 90nnie S"e Sf<"nk <eapeCff"'ly <ep<eaenfa ., fOllows: 1. The pefifione<, 90nnie S"e Sf<"nk, ia . 21 ye.< old 'dulf individu., vho ia di.gnOaed 'a bOrde<line menf."y <ef'rded. Sh, cU<<,nfly <eaidea af 'n undiacloaed 'dd<eaa in fhe c'<e of C"mbe<l,"d 'eny MHM, " Weaf High "<eef, C'rliale, Comberl,"d COunty, PennsYlvania 17013. 2. The reaponde", Fr,"aiaco MOff., ia '" .dul f indi vid", vho ia eurrenfly on bail pending re,olUfion Of crimin., chargea baaed upon the facts Set forth in this Petition. reaidea .f 193 "aaf M.in Sfreef, Apf. " Shiremana fOWn , ReSpondent Moffa PennsYlvania, 17055, 3. The rea,onde" ia ,"e "ep'''her of fhe Pefifioner and <eaided Vifh 'efifione< and pefifione<'a mOfher during fhe flm, relevant to this action. '. 'ea,onde" h.a ".bu,ed' fhe ,efifioner aa fhOf ferm ia defined at 23 Pa'C'S,A. %102(a): a, In September 1996, the respondent awoke the Petitioner and told her to try on some Clothes. Respondent then told petitioner to pull her pants down because he wanted to teach the petitioner about sex. The respondent proceeded to rape the petitioner and threatened to kill her if she told anyone. b. The following morning, the respondent again raped and threatened the petitioner. c. Since the respondent's arrest on November IB, 1996, he has repeatedly made phone calls to the petitioner's mother's residence asking if the petitioner was going to drop the charges, During one phone conversation with the petitioner, the respondent threatened petitioner stating "I'm gonna hurt you," He also stated that he would find out where the petitioner lived if she moved and threatened to rape her again stating "I'll do you again." Respondent also stated that the next time he raped her he was "gonna kill" her and that she would "be in the cemetery laying." d. The petitioner was also threatened by the respondent through his friend, Bobby Fleckinger, who came to the petitioner's residence after the respondent's arrest telling petitioner to change her story. Fleckinger later called the petitioner and told her that he would knock her down the steps, cut her tongue out, rape her, and kill her if she persisted with her charges against the respondent. 5. The petitioner believes and therefore avers that she is in immediate and present danger of serious abuse from respondent and that she is in need of protection [rom abuse, WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of the "Protection From Abuse Act" 23 Pa.C.S. 56101 et seq., petitioner prays this Court to grant the following relief: A, Grant a Temporary Order pursuant to the "Protection From Abuse Act": 1) Directing Fransisco Moffa to refrain from abusing petitioner and from placing her in fear of imminent serious bodily injury either personally or through his agents; 2) Excluding Fransisco Moffa from entering petitioner's current residence or any residence that petitioner occupies and entering onto the property of such residence; 3) Directing Fransisco Moffa to refrain from having any contact with petitioner by phone, mail, or by any other means; 4) Directing the respondent to pay the administrative costs and fees required for filing the Petition; 5) Any such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just. B. Schedule a hearing in accordance with the provisions of the "Protection From Abuse Act", and after such hearing, enter an order against the respondent, to be in effect for one year, as follows: 1) Directing Fransisco Moffa to refrain from abusing the petitioner and from placing her in fear of imminent serious bodily injury either personally or through his agents; ',!" ,r., " ' c -. 1 ~ ' . ,~- '-""'" ~'A" ~_ . 7' ''L.~- " . ..'..:'1, , ':.",~':r ',~ ~ '~ ..~ .'..i '. c' '.,- .." . ~' .., '", i.:""~':';;' ,;l .~ ..'~ ' :;-.> '~ : " " rOl J~ .~ ,. .. :,\;' .~:;;';:. , . J~ ',,: .',:;,,;-"" .:,<.< ',:..~ , , " ;,~ '.\- " ,'1" , ~ , , \ .e , ;, ,~~ BONNIE SUE STRUNK. Pctitioncr IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA t \, ." . , v. CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN PROTECTION FROM ABUSE ::; FRANCISCO MOFFA, Rcsponllent NO, 97-708 CIVIL TERM REI'LY TO RULE TO SHOW CAUSE STATEMENT OF FACTS On Fcbruary 12, 1997. thc Family Law Clinic filcd a Protcction from Abuse Pctition on bchalf of Bonnie Suc Strunk. The pctition allegcd tbat Ms, Strunk had been raped by the rcsponllent anll that responllcnt had made a numbcr of thrcatcning phone calls to thc pctitioner after the incidcnt. Prior to the tiling of the PFA, rcsponllcnt had been charged witb rape, On thc samc day thc petition was tilcd. a Tcmporary Orller was issuell and a hearing was sct for Fehruary 21, 1997. Upon oral rcquest from opposing counsel, thc hearing was reschedu1cd for Fcbruary 27, 1997. On Fcbruary 20, 1997. Judge Bayley amended the defendant's bail order, orllcring that the llefcndant have "no contact llircct or indircct with thc alleged victim Bonnie Strunk." In light of the amendcd hail ordcr. the Family Law Clinic, at thc petitioner's request, filcll a Praccipe to lliscontinue lhc PFA action. On March 5. 1997. counsel for respondent filcd a pctition to strike off thc discontinuance. ARGUMENT Respondent has failed to show prejudice or the deprivation of any substantial right that would warrant the court to strike off the discontinuance and compel the petitioner to pursue the Protection from Abuse action. 1 l'a.R.C.I'. 229(a) prol'illes li.r a lliscontinuancc as "Ihe exclusivc mctholl or voluntary tcrmination or an aClion. in whole or in part, hy the plaintilT hcrorc commcnccmcnt or lhe Irial. " Howel'cr, Ihc Rulc allows a COUI'lIo slrike off a lliscontinuance "in orllcr 10 prolccl Ihc riglns of any party from unreasonahle inconvcnience. I'Cxalion. harassment, expensc. or prejullice." Pa.R.C.I'. 229(e), In llelermining whelher 10 grant a lliscontillllance wilholll prejllllice, the Superior eourlllHS hclll that a COUrlmusl "consillcr alllilets anll wcigh cquilies" byeonsillering thc "bcnefits or injuries" which may rcsullto the respCClivc sillcs if a lliseolllinuancc is gralllell. Foti v. Askinas, 639 A,21l 807,808 CPa. Super. Cl. 1994), A lliscolllinuance that is "prcjudicial 10 the rig hIs or othcrs" should nOI bc pcrminell 10 slanll. Brown v. T. W. Phillins Gas & Oil. 74 A.211 105 (Pa. 1950). A lliseontinuanec is prejullicialonly if it crrecls a substantial right or a parly. Foti. 639 A.211. at 1l01l. Pursu.1I1110 Ihis st.lI1darll. rcsponllclll has fililed to cstablish lhat Ibe discolllinuance or thc PFA aClion is prcjudicial to his rig IllS or is in any manner bcneficial 10 thc pClilioncr, Respondent claims lhal Ihc allcgations in thc Prolection from Abuse petilion are "vcxatious. prcjudicial and pcrjurious" anll rclics on FOIi, sunra, a mcllicalmalpracticc case. 10 supporl his cOlllcntion for slriking pClitioner's lliscontinuancc, FOli is factually dislinguisbable from the case al hand, In Foti, the plaintiff-parents brought suit against the defendants on behalf of lheir minor daughter alleging thai the child's deformities resulted from the fact that the mOlher lOok a drug prcscrihcd to her by Ihc llefcndant lluring the first lrimcster of her prcgnancy, Following Icnglhy prc-lrial discovcry spanning fivc ycars involving numerous llcposiliolls. intcrrogatorics anll scvcral motions, the plaintiffs werc unable to find an CXpcrt mcllie.1I witncss to tcslify on lheir bchalf. At lhat point, thc plaintiffs moved for and wcrc 2 grantcll a lliscolllinuunce. Thc Superior Court found that the trial court abuscll its lliscrction hy granting the motion to discontinuc without prcjullicc holding that thc lliscontinuuncc wus prcjulliciul to the llcfcnllants. Thc five ycars of effort and cxpcnsc involvcd in lliscovcry. thc court's invo1vemcnt of timc in thc mallcr, anll thc unccrHlinty of futurc litigation werc all factors considcrcll hy the court. The court found th<ll thc lliscontinuance would "provide an advulllagc to thc appcllcc- minor and woulll prcjullicc appelhtnts." J..\l Thc discontinuance would "hcm:fit immcasuruhly" thc minor-appcllcc hy thc cxtendcd period shc woulll have to prcparc hcr case a second time. while it woulll unduly prejullicc thc defcndallls due 10 the cxpcnsive, lime-consuming lliscovcry and thc thrc<ll of being subjectcd tothc same litigation at somc time in the future. The position of thc rcspondent in this mallcr is llistinctly lliffercnt from thc llefcndallls in Foti, Rcspondcnt has ncithcr bccn prcjudiccd nor inconvcnicnccd by thc discontinuancc of the PFA. Ncitbcr party inllulged in timely or cxpensivc lliscovery, anll tbc tempomry orllcr wus in cffcct for only ten llays prior to tbe liling of the pctition to lliscontinuc, Thc petition in this mailer was tilcd to protcct thc pctitioncr since no othcr adcquate altcrmllivc remclly wus uvailablc at thc timc and rcspondcnt Ims failcd to dcmonstrate how lliscontinuing this mullcr will causc him "inconvcnicnce" or how striking thc discontinuuncc will protcct him from "harassmcnt" or "cxpcnsc." The rcspondcnt has not bcen "injurcd" hy thc discontinuancc of this action anll is. in fact. in no llilTcrcnt position now that thc Protcction from Ahusc action has bcen lliscontinucll tbun he was in bcfore thc PFA was riled. Thc pctitioncr has also nol "bcncfited" in any way duc to thc lliscontinuancc of this action. As noted in Foti, the court stated that in ordcr for a lliscontinuance to bc prejullicial. it 3 must cffcct a subsl<lnti<ll right of a party. Foti. 639 A,:!d <It HOH: Scc also Pcsta v. Brown, 13M A.:!ll 690 (\'a, Supcr. Ct. 195M) (lliscontinuancc allo\Vcll hcc<lusc dcICnllant was not llc;Jrivcll of any suhstanti<ll right nor othcrwisc prcjudiccd). Thc rcsponllcnt has failcd to llcmonstnttc bcyond thc gcncralitics in his Pctition to Slrikc thai thc lliscontinuancc of Ihis action infringcs on a subslantial right. In Brown v. T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co" 74 A,:!ll 105 (Pa. 1950). thc plaint ills (hushanll and wifc) sought to rccovcr damagcs for loss hy rirc lluc to thc ncgligcncc of Ihc allegcll agcnt of thc llcfcnll.lI1t. <I Pcnnsylvania corporal ion, Aftcr riling thrcc amcnllcll compl<lints, thc plaintiffs initialcd SUil on thc same c.lUse of action in fcllcral llislrict court. Thc plaintiffs were allowcd to discontinuc thcir aClion in statc court and lhe llcfcnd<lnt appealcll. The Pcnnsylvania Supremc Court hcld lhal <I discontinuancc should nnt bc permilled if it "is prcjullicialto the rights of othcrs." III al 108. Thc Court statcd thai forum shopping was not a Icgally sufTicicnt rC<lson to lliscontinuc an action. anll "oncc lhc jurisdiclion of <I competcnt court h<ls .Illachcd. discontinuancc of <In .Iction ought not be pcnnillcd ovcr ohjcclion of thc allversary if thc only rcason for lliscontinuing is lhe plaintiff's llcsirc to inslilute an action for lhe same causc in <lnOlhcr filrum." III Brown docs nOI support slriking Ihc lliscontinuancc in Ihis mallcr. Thc pctilioncr did not lliscolllinuc thc Petition from Ahuse aClion to llclay or to shop for <I bCllcr tilrum. Sbc simply concludcd that pursuing thc action was unncccssary since the prolcctivc rcmelly she was sceking had bcen providcd through thc amcnlled bail order. Since thc amended bail ordcr of Fcbruary 20th now offcrs the petitioner adequ<llc proleclion. tbc pctitioncr shoulll nOI bc filrced to pursuc a civil action lhal is unncccssary, rcpctilious. and a wastc of thc court's rcsourccs. 4 BONNIE SUE STRUNK, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY. PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW V. FRANCISCO MOFFA, Defendant 97-0708 CIVIL TERM RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AND NOW, this ~ day of March, 1997, upon prcsentation of the within Petition to Strike Off a Discontinuance, filed by tbe Defendant, a Rule is hereby issued upon the Plaintiff to show cause, if any she has, why the relief requested herein should not be granted. This Rule is returnable --1! days aftcr service upon Plaintiff's attorney, Family Law Clinic, BY THE COURT, -) I , ) 'J ,- , ,-- " ., '_J "J ~ , , :;") :iJ ) :..) .') ~) I ra ~ -- en :-.. -< 6, On or about Novcmbcr, 1996, thc Plaintiff had made allcgations that thc Defendant had raped her somc time in Scptcmbcr or Octobcr, 1996, Thc allcgations containcd in hcr initial report diffcred significantly from thc factual allegations madc in thc current Pctition for Protcetion from Abuse, 7, On January 16, 1997, the Pctitioncr, after contacting Defcndant's prcsent attorney, Ron Turo, Esquirc, did comc to Mr. Turo's office in Carlislc, Pcnnsylvania, to makc a statement under oath, 8. At that time, bcforc a Notary Public and Court Stenographcr, thc Plaintiff, Bonnic Strunk, spceifieally denied that any rape had occurrcd as previously rcportcd and, furthcrmore, testified that shc truthfully was now indicating that thc evcnts had not occurred as prcviously allcged and, furthermore. indicatcd tbat she mercly wanted to bavc thc Defcndant loekcd up so that he would not vcrbally abusc hcr mother, 9, Following the filing of the Protcction from Abuse Pctition, whieb contains false, pcrjurious, mislcading, vcxatious and untruc allcgations, thc Court did schcdulc a hcaring for Fcbruary 21. 1997, at which timc prcscnt counsel could not attcnd. 10. Upon oral rcqucst, a hearing was rcsehcdulcd until Thursday, Fcbruary 27, 1997. Pursuant to that Order. thc Tcmporary Protcetivc Order remaincd in full force and cffect. I I. On Fcbruary 20, 1997, the Pctitioncr, through hcr attorney, Family Law CIi!1ie, did attcmpt to withdraw the Protcction from Abuse Ordcr, without prcjudice, and did file a Praceipc to do so in the Officc ofthc Prothonotary of Cumberland County, 12, Upon reccipt of said Praecipe, prcsent counsel did indicatc to Judge Olcr his opposition, and a mccting in ehambcrs was held with Judgc Olcr on Thursday, Fcbruary 27. 1997, with Family Law Clinic attorncys. 13, Pursuant to that mccting, thc Court instructed prescnt counsel to filc of record any objcctions thc Dcfcndant may have to the attcmpted discontinuancc of this action. 14, Pursuant to Rulc of Civil Proccdurc 229, a discontinuance shall bc the exclusive mcthod of voluntary termination of an action by thc plaintiff before commcnccment of the trial. IS, Howcvcr, pursuant to thc samc Rule, "tbc Court, upon pctition and aftcr notice, may strike off thc discontinuancc in ordcr to protect thc rights of any party from unreasonable ineonvcniencc, vcxation, harassmcnt, cxpensc or prcjudice," See Paragraph C. 16. Thc discontinuancc in this casc would sevcrely inconvenience, harass and prcjudiee the Defendant. Furthermorc, thc action in this case is vexatious, pcrjurious and untrue in its allcgations which continuc to remain of rccord, 17. Thc Dcfcndant, if this mattcr is strickcn, will bc forccd to continuc to defend against untrue rapc allcgations in a criminal trial, thus cxposing himsclfto scvere potential prcjudicc; and, furthcrnlOrc, should now bc afTordcd the opportunity to fully investigate the , \ BONNIE SUE STRUNK, Petitioner IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN PROTECTION FROM ABUSE v. FRANCISCO MOFFA, Respondent NO.97-708 CIVIL TERM ANSWER TO PETITION TO STRIKE OFF DISCONTINUANCE NOW COMES the Petitioner, Bonnie Sue Strunk, by and through her attorneys, the Family Law Clinic, and answers as follows: 1. Admitted. 1./ --. J- , .' (J(l.-4/ /--'-U./l 2. Admitted. j'~r 3. Admitted. 4. Denied. Tbe Petitioner alleged in her petitio tioner's mother's residence and threatened the Petitioner, not Petitioner's mother. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted that the Petitioner made allegations to the police in November 1996 that she had been raped by the Respondent. Denied tbat her initial report to the police differed significantly from the factual allegations made in the Protection from Abuse Petition. 7. Denied that the Petitioner personally contacted Attorney Ron Turo. Admitted that the Petitioner went to Attorney Turo's office on January 16, 1997 and made a statement under oath. 8. Admitted, 9, Admitted tbat after the filing of the Protection from Abuse Petition the Court scheduled a hearing for February 21, 1997. Denied that the allegations set forth in the Protection from Abuse Petition were "false, perjurious, misleading, vexatious and untrue.. 10. Admitted. J 1. Admilled. J2. AdmiUed. 13. Admilled. J4, Legal conclusion to which no response is required. 15. Legal conclusion to which no response is required. J6. Denied that the allegations set forth in the complaint are "vexatious, perjurious and untrue" and further deny that the diseontinuance would "severely inconvenience, harass and prejudice" the Respondent. J7. Denied. By way of further answer, Respondent has pleaded nolo contendere to the underlying criminal Sexual Assault charges and will not have to defend against these allegations in any further criminal prOCeeding. J8. Admitted that Fori v. Askinas, 639 A.2d 807 (Pa. Super. CI. 1994), is a case in which the court discusses the prejudice that may OCcur where an action is discontinued. Denied that &ti is similar to the instant case. Jt is further denied that the Respondent will suffer prejudice from the discontinuance of this action. J9. The quotation from Fori is a legal conclusion to which no response is required. Denied that Fori controls the resolution of the present case. Denied that the Petitioner is required to come forward and "verify her allegations" in this action. Denied that discontinuance by Petitioner must result in a termination of this action with prejudice. 20. Denied, The Respondent will not be prejudiced by the discontinuance of this action. Further denied that the allegations in the Protection from Abuse Petition are "vexatious, prejUdicial and perjurious." involving numerous depositions, interrogatories and several motions, the plaintiffs were unable to find an expert medical witness to testify on their behalf. At that point, the plaintiffs moved for and were granted a discontinuance. The Superior Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to discontinue without prejudice bolding that the discontinuance was prejudicial to the defendants. The five years of effort and expense involved in discovery, the court's involvement of time in the matter, and the uncertainty of future litigation were all factors considered by the court. The court found that the discontinuance would "provide an advantage to the appellee-minor and would prejudice appellants." Id. The discontinuance would "benefit immeasurably" the minor-appellee by the extended period she would have to prepare her case a second time, while it would unduly prejudice the defendants due to the expensive, time-consuming discovery and the threat of being subjected to the same litigation at some time in the future. The position of the respondent in this matter is distinctly different from the defendants in.E2li.. Respondent has neither been prejudiced nor inconvenienced by the discontinuance of the PFA. Neither party indulged in timely or expensive discovery, and the temporary order was in effect for only ten days prior to the filing of the petition to discontinue. The petition in this matter was filed to protect the petitioner since no other adequate alternative remedy was available at the time and respondent has failed to demonstrate how discontinuing this matter will cause him "inconvenience" or how striking the discontinuance will protect him from "harassment" or "expense." The respondent has not been "injured" by the discontinuance of this action and is, in fact, in no different position now that the Protection from Abuse action has been discontinued than he was in before the PFA was filed. The only change that has occurred transpired on March 14, 1997, when Respondent pled nolo contendere to sexual assault against Bonnie Strunk which incorporated a parole provision prohibiting Respondent from having any contact with the Petitioner. As noted in Foti, the court stated that in order for a discontinuance to be prejudicial, it must effect a substantial right of a party. Foti, 639 A.2d at 808; ~ ~ Pesta v, Brown, 138 A.2d 690 (Pa, Super. Ct. 1958) (discontinuance allowed because defendant was not deprived of any substantial right nor otberwise prejudiced). The respondent has failed to demonstrate beyond the generalities in his Petition to Strike that the discontinuance of this action infringes on a substantial rigbt. In Brown v. T. W. Pbillips Gas & Oil Co., 74 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1950), the plaintiffs (husband and wife) sought to recover damages for loss by fire due to the negligence of tbe alleged agent of the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation. After filing three amended complaints, the plaintiffs initiated suit on the same cause of action in federal district court, The plaintiffs were allowed to discontinue their action in state court and the defendant appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a discontinuance should not be permitted if it "is prejudicial to the rights of others." !Q. at 108. The Court stated that forum shopping was not a legally sufficient reason to discontinue an action, and "once the jurisdiction of a competent court has attached, discontinuance of an action ought not be permitted over objection of the adversary if the only reason for discontinuing is the plaintiffs desire to institute an action for the same cause in another forum." ll1.. Brown does not support striking the discontinuance in this matter. The petitioner did not discontinue the Petition from Abuse action to delay or to shop for a better forum. She simply concluded that pursuing the action was unnecessary since the protective remedy she