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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-02734 ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ 'J , . '<l ~ ~ ~ - - .~ . ~ ').. .~ '.~ ".";'\, . , ,\ . ';~:~ ..." ". >: ;", 'F,' at' "';'i' .,.J .;;~ :-~;~ . "{j :':,~ ...., '}i:'1 ~ ::l :J~' ; I I I I i I I I l \ ~ ? .-:"J ....; r- - I,', , 1.__ ,.l ... .... .., ... g .... G ~ < ~ z ~ III ~ < ... ~ > \I U ~ i5 >- ii: ~ ~ z ~ -< z :; ~ ~ lC ::J z . ::j !!: " '" ?' 2 < 0 v -. . .. .......:..... .. DENNIS KNAUB d/b/a : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CARLISLE RENT A WRECK : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : 97-2734 CIVIL TERM BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR. ORDER OF COURT n 0 " c: ,....) ., -0 :,- -r.'r , fTlt;. ~;:: ~.- r: ".." ~~.'- tll,~" -.J , .1...' ~l; . , -;:1 ;1~/ 'i- ,-) ~,d ~; (") :.:: ~;;E~ -..(j r:- c.rn ..,. .. --, ::;1 ~- -< r" :.n -< IN RE: ARBITRATION PANEL AND NOW. June 17, 2002, the Court having been informed that Jason Kutulakis, Esquire, is unavailable for the above-captioned arbitration hearing, Ronald Johnson, Esquire, is appointed in his stead. By the Court, Geo P.J. Anthony DeLuca, Esquire Chairman Court Administrator \ i ... I - - I . i " 8'-. I I .. ~. , , ~ I i .- - I - , ~ , ~ , ~ - ~ - t,.1J I..l 1,1-1 ~ l!? - " 'S 0 c- o UI " W ..- ~ rt ~ :l - J -' al vi all!?C1 c-c In . m 'c l)"t -'-a. In >ocm In cE!C1 '" ~ OLL. c I'. ..r:: .- S , ....('1')= c..- 0 I <(..-CC 1'- ! .... It Ww lI.o lI.c O::l :1:' .1- wz WW CJf! ltll) O~ wo. CJ " '" M M WM a:~ <0 ::l" o~ 11)< wz 11)< ::l~ 0> :J:II) I-z a:z ::lw 00. o , WW zoJ o!!! oJ a: < o . \ 1 . . j ! i i I I I I I I I j c.. .J .J . :.: t l.:.: ~ ou :: < :II: :I: -J !;, <<l t;: ~ v: ~ :c ~ :.:.: . ~ z ;:: ~ :; ~ ~ e ;: rJ". '.': :? ." 2 ..: ;, Ill}) ,J,/, T; \ ..... co o ..... ,"" c') '...... '...., 'i'.:) '- ~;:. ~ P \,:.1 ;-.> - \.>ol U ~l ~ " ,-;, l) ~ s CT Vl ~ <i u ::> I- . .J~ Vl ~!tl c ~~co~ .JVl",c.. >I-",Vl ZZ><:c o~o~ i:~~d Z:lqo ~-c..t:Q to- o ~ - ~ ~ ~ !!: 1 _.'" ~ ~ :: ~ ~ ~ : :" ;..0: = v. V. :.. :t " ~ E UJ ! , I I '" m 00 Lt' '" m + l"- I m I m I I"- ... , , L . - ." 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C1:I :: 0 :l z: r. o:wz HH'" ..: 8 Q) U r--..:I "-' ;; - OIOW Z..:lc.. :co:Q OIH a: .' ~ O~c.. zO: 01> '" uO W": ~W ....H 0 '" U QU t.:l1O U ~ 1010 ~ We.. "- 0: :Co l1l 8 "- Z .Q " H 'tI . , . . . 6, In connection therewith, Plaintiff and Beth Eppley entered into a contract for the rental of a silver Cavalier automobile, with Beth Eppley identified as the renter, A true and correct copy of the rental agreement number 0790-05185 ("rental agreement") is appended hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated. 7, The rental agreement provided for the designation of "additional renter" as would be authorized by Beth Eppley, Defendant, Beth Eppley, informed representatives of Plaintiff that her son, Robert Eppley, Jr. would be an authorized renter, 8. The rental agreement defines "Vehicle" to include the vehicle described in the agreement as well as any replacement vehicle. Further, the rental agreement provides that the renter and any additional renter are jointly and severally liable under the tenns of the rental agreement. 9, On or about October 31, 1996, Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr, came to Plaintiff's business and requested that a replacement vehicle be provided for the Cavalier previously rented to Beth Eppley. Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr. executed a Vehicle Replacement Fonn which amended the rental agreement. A true and correct copy of the Vehicle Replacement Fonn is appended hereto as Exhibit "B" and is incorporated, 10. Plaintiff released a 1991 Dodge Spirit, ("vehicle"), to Robert Eppley, Jr. in reliance upon the amendment to the prior rental agreement and the rental agreement. II, Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representations of Beth Eppley to believe that Robert Eppley, Jr., her son, was authorized to enter into the Vehicle Replacement Fonn on behalf of Beth Eppley. 3 original agreement nor did she inform Plaintiff that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr, could be an authorized renter, 8, Denied, The Agreement speaks for itself as to the terms and conditions contained therein, The allegations as to joint and several liability are irrelevant to any issue of liability in that there was no "additional renter" under the original agreement or authorized later. 9. Admitted. 10, Denied, Plaintifl's reliance could not have been based upon the original rental agreement, because no additional renters were authorized under same. Furthennore, to the best of Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s knowledge and belief there was no alteration or amendment to said original agreement to which Defendant Beth Eppley consented, 11. Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr, merely went to Plaintifl's place of business and requested a different vehicle, He never stated that he had Defendant Beth Eppley's consent, nor did Plaintiff inquire about any such consent. 12, Denied in part and admitted in part. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. denies that he was traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Rather, he was not familiar with the road in question. 13. Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. did not operate the vehicle in a negligent, grossly negligent, wanton and/or willful manner. 14, Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. disputes the losses for the following reasons: (a) In detennining the fair market value of a vehicle, clearly one must give weight to the fact that this was a rental vehicle with 104,568 miles on it Thus, Defendant denies that the value at the time of accident was $5995,00; rather, the value was no greater than $4405.00, the amount that Plaintiff demanded following the accident (b) Plaintiff had a duty to mitigate damages following the accident. Defendant denies that damages for loss of use in excess of ISO days can be recovered by Plaintiff, Therefore, Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to damages for loss of use for a period greaterthan 10 to 14 days. (c) Defendant does not understand how Plaintiff is demanding storage costs for this vehicle. If the vehicle was rendered a total loss, it should have been delivered to the salvage yard immediately, Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any damages for storage, in that the vehicle could have been stored on Plaintifl's property prior to being sent to the junkyard, 15, Admitted. Defendant Beth Eppley purchased collision insurance at the time of the rental of the Cavalier, and thus both Defendants feel that together they are liable only for the first $500,00 of damages to any damaged vehicle. ~ Ctl ~ ..:l 7- t r;-. 6~~ -,. :c .;"J";;' it ...: ._;.:; . . i..,: <;! co C"l r' ;"'''lll - a: l:'I -:; ;": r'~ .... u:. 1}~ :;t: .....0'_ . LtJul ~ ~ 0'~ 0- .~ ~ I""" :J 0' (.) 9. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. requested a replacement vehicle for the Cavalier. Inasmuch as Defendant Beth Eppley was not with her son at the time, she is without sufficient knowledge or information to fonn a belief as to whether EKhibit B is a copy of any document that her son eKecuted and she demands proof then:of at trial. 10, Denied, Plaintill's reliance was not based upon the original rental agreement, because Defendant Beth Eppley did not authorize additional renters under same, Accordingly, Plaintill's release of the 1991 Dodge Spirit had to have been predicated upon some agreement between PlaintilTand Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr, II. Denied, Defendant Beth Eppley never made any representation or statement that reasonably could have construed as authorizing her son as an additional renter, There was no reason for her son to have a more valuable vehicle for the few days that his own automobile was in the repair shop, and thus she did not authorize, and would not have authorized, the transaction in question, 12, Admitted in part and denied in part, Defendant Beth Eppley has no firsthand knowledge concerning the accident in question, and she has not visited the accident site, Accordingly, she admits that her son was in an accident in which the Dodge Spirit was damaged, but as to the particulars she is without knowledge or infonnation sufficient to fonn a belief as to the truth thereof, with proof demanded at trial. 13, Denied, Defendant Beth Eppley is not aware of any circumstances to support the allegation that her son drove the vehicle in a grossly negligent, willful or wanton manner, Defendant Beth Eppley is without knowledge or infonnation sufficient to fonn a belief as to the truth of the allegation that the vehicle was rendered a total loss, and proof thereof is demanded at trial. 14, Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley disputes the losses for the following reasons: (a) In detennining the fair market value of a vehicle, clearly one must give weight to the fact that this was a rental vehicle with 104,568 miles on it. Thus, Defendant denies that the value at the time of accident was $5995.00; rather, the value was no greater than $4405,00, the amount that PlaintilT demanded following the accident. (b) PlaintilThad a duty to mitigate damages following the accident. Defendant Beth Eppley denies that damages for loss of use in eKcess of 150 days can be recovered by PlaintilT, Therefore, Defendant Beth Eppley denies that PlaintilT is entitled to damages for loss of use for a period greater than 10 to 14 days. (c) Defendant Beth Eppley does not understand how PlaintilTis demanding storage costs for this vehicle. If the vehicle was rendered a total loss, it should have been delivered to the salvage yard immediately, Defendant Beth Eppley denies that PlaintilT is COUNT.ll 23. The allegations contained in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses to paragraphs I through 22, inclusive, are incorporated herein and made a pan hercof as if more fully set forth, 24. Admitted, 25. Denied, The rental agreement could not be modified without the consent of Defendant Beth Eppley, and Defendant Beth Eppley did not consent to its modification, The original rental agreement provided for no additional renter, and that provision remained in full force and effect as between Plaintiff and Defendant Beth Eppley, 26, Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley did not witness the accident and did not visit the accident scene thereafter, Therefore, she is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these averments, and proof thereof is demanded at trial. Moreover, Defendant Beth Eppley did not inspect or drive the Dodge Spirit that Plaintiff released to Defendant Roben Eppley, Jr., and thus Defendant Beth Eppley does not know if said vehicle was in a safe condition, Le., that it handled and braked in a proper manner. In any event, from what information Defendant Beth Eppley does possess concerning the accident, she knows of no circumstances which could constitute wilful, wanton or reckless conduct on the pan of the driver. 27, Denied, There damages should have been paid under the collision coverage purchased under the rental agreement. Defendant Beth Eppley has no liability for any of these damages except possibly the $500.00 deductible under the collision coverage, WHEREFORE, Defendant Beth Eppley demands that judgment be entered in her favor and against Plaintiff, COUNT III 28. The allegations contained in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses to paragraphs I through 27, inclusive, are incorporated herein and made a pan hereof as if more fully set forth, 29. Denied, Defendant Beth Eppley had no reason to believe that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr, would operate the vehicle in a negligent fashion, Her son was involved in an accident several years prior to the signing of the rental agreement, but evidently he had driven vehicles in a safe and proper manner in the three or four year period preceding this rental. 30, Admitted in pan and denied in pan, Plaintiff knew that Defendant Roben Eppley, Jr., an adult, would be operating the vehicle. Accordingly, the only time Defendant Beth Eppley could "protect and safeguard" the vehicle was at those times when it was on her premises. & C\J 1= - J 9 :.s IUP .r t J-.. ffi~, :t: c)::;; ~r-.; ,,< C)~ Cl -'- r,; 0 :"",-ij) WL.. N .}~ [:'! 'J ""0" c.-.. ; l(lJ r~ ~ ::J~ ... Lt. .... :s 0 cr u " " . PlaintilT or without the knowledge of Defendant, Beth Eppley, this averment is denied, 38. Denied. To the contrary, this modification was made with the consent of am! in the presence of Defendant, Beth Eppley. 39. Denied. To the extent this averment constitutes conclusions offact or law, no response is required. To the extent a response may be required it is specifically denied that the modification released Defendant, Beth Eppley from liability for the damages incurred by Plaintiff. 40. Denied. To the extenlthis averment constitutes conclusions of fact or law, no response is required. To the extent a response may be required it is specifically denied that the rental agreement absolved Defendant, Beth Eppley from the damages sustained by Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, PlaintilTdemandsjudgment in his favor and against Defendant as set forth in the complaint together with costs and expenses. ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM 41. Denied. To the extent this averment constitutes conclusions of fact or law, no response is required. Strict proof thereof is demanded. 42. Denied. To the extent this averment constitutes conclusions of fact or law, no response is required. To the extent a response may be required, PlaintilT answers that the rental agreement was understood by Defendant, Beth Eppley. Further, Defendant, Beth Eppley did request that Plaintiff enter into the agreement so as to permit rental of a vehicle to her son, Robert Eppley, Jr., the rental agreement meets the requirements of the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act ("Act"), the PlaintilTmade a good faith elTort to comply with the Act and the parties finished what was required under the contract i.e., PlaintilTprovided a rental vehicle to Defendant, Beth Eppley, and Defendant made payment for the daily rental amount. The obligation of Defendant, Beth Eppley, while provided for and established through the rental agreement is not part of the performance of the rental agreement absent negligence and/or wilful and wanton destruction of the vehicle rented. 43. Denied. Defendant, Beth Eppley, was provided with the rcntal agreement prior to executing said agreement and had an opportunity to review the rental agreement and the exclusions for collision coverage arc set forth clearly therein. 44. Denied. It is denicd that PlaintilTviolated the Act. Further, it is dcnicd that Defendant, Beth Eppley, has sulTered damage. Moreover, it is denied that the Act is applicable. WHEREFORE, PlaintilTdemandsjudgment in his favor and against the Defendant as set forth in Plaintilrs complaint together with costs and expenses. NEW MATTER TO COUNTERCLAIM 45. The counterclaim fails to state a claim against Plaintiff. 46. PlaintilTis estopped from asserting a claim against PlaintilTbecause PlaintilTrelicd upon Defendant's actions to enter into the rental agreement. 47. Defendant's actions were intended to procure a vehicle from PlaintilTfor the primary use of Defendant's son and not for herself, therefore, the Act is not applicable. 48. The rental agreement is exempt from the provisions of the Act. 49. The rental agreement complies with the provisions of the Act. 50. The Act does not void a contract or otherwise alTect its validity. 51. No liability will stand under the Act if the parties have completed what was required under the contract. PlaintilT rented a vehicle to Defendant and her agent, Robert Eppley, Jr., and Defendant paid the rental rate as required by the rental agreement. Defendant has failed and DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION-LAW V. BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT A. EPPLEY, JR., Defendants. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certifY that on August I, 1997, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien, Baric & Scherer, did serve a copy of the Answer and New Matter To Counterclaim and Reply To New Matter, by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows: Stephen B. Lipson, Esquire 169 West High Street Suite 4 Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 ~P~Ii-, David A. Baric, Esquire ..,.. cr.' r::. If''. .:> \.~ /. ., .' U.1~:! - " '. , ...~.... L."'" .-', . '. ~? (;... ...... ...,,; ~; L';'~ c- .::) @l~ .> ..'~ .... .:'-~:,:;! ri!\...I: L'J, ,<,11 ...l_. ::.J :~::- \.- ..." , \,.1,. r- :.) 0 '" U 1r. C'J ~ , ~? 1-" .. 5.... ..Ie ..:1 ,~);:-l (1;~ :c ;:;z fi: ~-:' < t:- (:t==J (~ll.:. :.5= {~'< r- ~ (.1' ):z t.:..l "- ~\'.. .' . ,;i/J: <'"I ~ .n , -'J .'; ... ",1 3 \..' 1.:1 DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff, BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants. · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. qT'-o/75ff- d_-Z · CIVIL ACTION-LAW NOTICE You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this complaint and notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by an attorney and filing in writing with the court, your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the court without further notice for any money claimed in the complaint or for any other claim or relief requested by the plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE· IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Court Administrator Cumberland County Courthouse Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 Telephone Number (717) 240-6200 DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff, BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants. · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 'NO. 4?7- o~ 73 · CIVIL ACTION-LAW COMPLAINT AND NOW, comes Plaimiff, Dennis A. Knaub, d/b/a Carlisle Rent A Wreck, by and through his attorneys, O'BRIEN, BARIC AND SCHERER, and files this complaint and in support thereof sets forth the following: 1. Plaintiff, Dennis A. Knaub, is an adult individual d/b/a Carlisle Rent A Wreck with a place of business at 519 South Hanover Street, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Defendant, Beth A. Eppley, is an adult individual with a residence at 1131 Pine Road, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr. is an adult individual with a residence at 1131 Pine Road, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania and is the son of Defendant, Beth Eppley. 4. Plaintiffis in the business of renting vehicles to individuals and businesses· 5. On or about October 29, 1996, Beth Eppley came to Plaintiff's place of business and requested a rental vehicle. Beth Eppley informed Plaintiff's representatives that the vehicle was being rented by her for the use of her son, Robert Eppley, Jr. Beth Eppley was aware that Plaintiff would not directly rent a vehicle to her son, Robert Eppley, Jr. 6. In connection therewith, Plaintiff and Beth Eppley entered into a contract for the rental of a silver Cavalier automobile, with Beth Eppley identified as the renter. A true and correct copy of the rental agreement number 0790-05185 ("rental agreement") is appended hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated. 7. The rental agreement provided for the designation of "additional renter" as would be authorized by Beth Eppley. Defendant, Beth Eppley, informed representatives of Plaintiffthat her son, Robert Eppley, Jr. would be an authorized renter. 8. The rental agreement defines "Vehicle" to include the vehicle described in the agreement as well as any replacement vehicle. Further, the rental agreement provides that the renter and any additional renter are jointly and severally liable under the terms of the rental agreement. 9. On or about October 31, 1996, Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr. came to Plaintiff's business and requested that a replacement vehicle be provided for the Cavalier previously rented to Beth Eppley. Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr. executed a Vehicle Replacement Form which amended the rental agreement. A true and correct copy of the Vehicle Replacement Form is appended hereto as Exhibit "B" and is incorporated. 10. Plaintiff`released a 1991 Dodge Spirit, ("vehicle"), to Robert Eppley, Jr. in reliance upon the amendment to the prior rental agreement and the rental agreement. 11. Plaintiff`reasonably relied upon the representations of Beth Eppley to believe that Robert Eppley, Jr., her son, was authorized to enter into the Vehicle Replacement Form on behalf of Beth Eppley. 12. On October 31, 1996, Robert Eppley, Jr., while driving the vehicle of Plaintiff at an excessive speed, did cause severe damage to the vehicle when he caused the vehicle to skid through a stop intersection on Pine Hill Road in North Middleton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, striking a fence and several posts before coming to a stop in a field. 13. As a consequence of the neglect, gross neglect, wanton and wilful operation of the vehicle by Robert Eppley, Jr., the vehicle was rendered a total loss. 14. The value of the vehicle at the time of loss was $5,995.00. Additionally, Plaintiff has incurred the following losses to March 31, 1996: loss of use of $3,012.45 (per diem amount of $19.95); storage costs of $1,510.00 (per diem amount of $10.00); and towing charges of $60.00. 15. Plaintiffhas made demand upon Defendants Beth Eppley and Robert Eppley, Jr. to compensate Plaintiff for his loss and the Defendants have failed and refused to compensate Plaintiff. CO[JNT I-BREACtt OF CONTRACT BETIt EPPLEY ANI) ROBERT EPPLEY~ ~ 16. Plaintiff.incorporates by reference paragraphs one through fiiteen as though set forth at length. 17. Defendant, Beth Eppley, held out her son, Robert Eppley, Jr., as having authority to drive the vehicle rented to her by Plaintiff. and, further, Beth Eppley lead Plaintiff's representatives to believe that Robert Eppley, Jr. was authorized to enter into modifications to the rental agreement on her behalf. Beth Eppley informed representatives of Plaintiffthat her son, Robert Eppley, Jr. was authorized as an "additional renter" under the rental agreement. 18. Plaintiff did reasonably rely upon these representations of Beth Eppley in agreeing to the modification of the original rental agreement through the Vehicle Replacement Form. 19. The rental agreement requires Beth Eppley and Robert Eppley, Jr. to pay Plaintiff for all damage to the vehicle, loss of use of the vehicle, all administrative and recovery costs, towing costs, storage fees and all attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff in seeking to recover the foregoing damages. 20. Defendants have breached the rental agreement by failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff the amounts due and owing as a consequence of the destruction of the vehicle. 21. Plaintiff has performed all conditions precedent to recovery under the rental agreement. 22. Plaintiff has made demand upon the Defendants for the damages incurred and Defendants have failed and refused to compensate Plainti~.. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Beth Eppley and Robert Eppley, Jr. as follows: a) $5,995.00 as the value of the vehicle; b) $3,012.45 as loss of use of the vehicle to March 31, 1997 ( per diem of $19.95); c) $1,510.00 storage costs to March 31, 1997 (per diem of $10.00); d) administrative fee of $250.00; e) towing charges of $60.00; and f) attorney fees, costs of this action and interest. COUNT H- NEGLIGENCE ROBERT EPPLEY, JR. 23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs one through twenty-two as though set forth at length. 24. Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr. had a duty to operate the vehicle ofPlaintiffin a reasonable manner. 25. Robert Eppley, Jr. was designated as an additional renter under the rental agreement as modified. 26. Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr. breached the duty of care he owed to Plaintiff by operating the vehicle in a negligent, careless and/or reckless manner including, but not limited to the following: a) failing to operate the vehicle at reasonable speed; b) failing to keep the vehicle within his control; c) falling to keep the vehicle on the roadway; d) failing to obey traffic control devices; e) operating the vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code; more particularly by violating § 75 Pa. C.S.A.§§ 3323 and 3714; f) causing the vehicle to run into fence and posts offofthe roadway; and g) otherwise operating the vehicle in a careless fashion. 27. As a direct and proximate result of the carelessness of Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr., Plaintiffhas sustained the following damages: loss of the vehicle, storage costs, loss of use, towing charges, administrative fees all as more fully set forth hereinabove. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Robert Eppley, Jr. as follows: a) $5,995.00 as the value of the vehicle; b) $3,012.45 as loss of use of the vehicle to March 3 l, 1997 (per diem of $19.95); c) $1,510.00 storage costs to March 3 l, 1997 (per diem of $10.00); d) administrative fee of $250.00 and e) towing charges of $60.00. COUNT Ill- NEGLIGENCE BETH EPPLEY 28. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs one through twenty-six as though set forth at length. 29. Defendant, Beth Eppley, knew or through the exercise of reasonable care should have known that it was foreseeable that her son, Robert Eppley, Jr. would operate the vehicle in a negligent fashion. 30. Defendant, Beth Eppley, had a duty to Plaintiffto protect and safeguard the vehicle rented and otherwise use the vehicle in a responsible fashion. 31. Defendant, Beth Eppley's breached this duty of care and was negligem, which negligence included, but was not limited to, the following: a) designating Robert Eppley, Jr. as an additional renter under the rental agreement when she knew or through the exercise of reasonable care should have known that it was foreseeable that he would operate the vehicle in a negligent fashion; b) failing to exercise the proper degree of comrol over the vehicle rented; c) failing to limit the authority of Robert Eppley, Jr. to act on her behalf; d) leading the Plaintiffto believe that Robert Eppley, Jr. was a competent driver of the vehicle and would operate the vehicle in an appropriate manner; and e) inducing Plalntiffto rent a vehicle which would be operated be Robert Eppley, Jr. when she knew or should have known by the exercise of reasonable care that it was foreseeable that Robert Eppley, Jr. would operate the vehicle in a negligent fashion; WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Beth Eppley as follows: a) $5,995.00 as the value of the vehicle; b) $3,012.45 as loss of use of the vehicle to March 31, 1997 (per diem of $19.95); c) $1,510.00 storage costs to March 31, 1997 (per diem of $10.00); d) administrative fee of $250.00 and e) towing charges of $60.00. COUNT IV- NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT BETH EPPLEY 32. Plaintiffincorporates by reference paragraphs one through thirty as though set forth at length. 33. Defendant, Beth Eppley, had a duty to Plaintiffto see that the vehicle rented by Plaintiff to her and her son would be operated in a careful manner and would not be damaged. 34. Defendant, Beth Eppley, breached her duty of care to Plaintiff by negligently entrusting the vehicle to Robert Eppley, Jr. which negligence included, but was not limited to, the following: a) authorizing Robert Eppley, Jr. as an additional renter under the rental agreement and permitting Robert Eppley, Jr. to operate the vehicle when she knew or through the exercise of reasonable care should have known that it was foreseeable that Robert Eppley, Jr. would operate the vehicle in a negligent manner; b) falling to exercise the proper degree of control over Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr. to prevent him from operating the vehicle in a negligent manner when she had the ability to control said activities and knew, or should have known, of the necessity for exercising such control; c) entrusting the vehicle to Robert Eppley, Jr. when she knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that Robert Eppley, Jr. was not mature and was incapable of safely operating the vehicle; and d) being otherwise negligent as may be revealed by discovery. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Beth Eppley as follows: a) $5,995.00 as the value of the vehicle; b) $3,012.45 as loss of use of the vehicle to March 31, 1997 (per diem of $19.95); c) $1,510.00 storage costs to March 31, 1997 (per diem of $10.00); d) administrative fee of $250.00 and e) towing charges of $60.00. Respectfully Submitted, O'BRIEN, BARIC & SCHERER BY: ' David A. Baric, Esquire I.D. #44853 17 West South Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 717-249-6873 Attorney for Plaintiff VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Complaint are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. // DENNIS A KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION - LAW ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AN-l} ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE Please enter my appearance on behalf of Defendant Beth A. Eppley. I accept service of the Complaint on behalf of Defendant Beth A. Eppley and certify that I am authorized to do so. Dated: June SL-, 1997 Stephen B. Lipson Attorney for Defendant, Beth A. Eppley 169 W. High Street, STE. 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 DENNIS A KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION - LAW DEFENDANT BETH A. EPPI,EY'S ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER AND COUNTERCLAIM 1. - 2. Admitted. 3. Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. has not resided at 1131 Pine Road, Carlisle since March of 1997, when he entered the Armed Forces of the United States. Whether Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. considers 1131 Pine Road to be his "domicile" is a question that only he can answer. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted in part and denied in part. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. had requested a rental vehicle but Plaintiff required that the renter be an individual with a credit card. Accordingly, Defendant Beth Eppley went to Plaintiffs place of business to assist her son, who needed a vehicle while his vehicle was in the repair shop. Defendant Beth Eppley knew of no reason why Plaintiff would not rent directly to her son other than her son's lack of a credit card. 6. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Beth Eppley executed an agreement for rental of a high-mileage Cavalier automobile to be driven by her son. It is denied that Exhibit A is a tree and correct copy of said agreement. Evidently Plaintiff made an unauthorized, material attention of said agreement by striking out the typed word "NONE" and printing "As Authorized by Beth Eppley" at the line captioned Additional Renter. 7. Denied. At the time that Defendant Beth Eppley executed the agreement, under "Additional Renter" it stated "None". Defendant Beth Eppley never authorized the alteration of said Agreement, nor did she tell Plaintiff or his representatives that Robert Eppley, Jr. could be an authorized renter. 8. Denied. The Agreement speaks for itself as to the temis and conditions contained therein. However, because Defendant Beth Eppley never authorized her son as an additional renter, she is not jointly or severally liable for damage to the car that Plaintiff leased to him. 9. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. requested a replacement vehicle for the Cavalier. Inasmuch as Defendant Beth Eppley was not with her son at the time, she is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to whether Exhibit B is a copy of any document that her son executed and she demands proof thereof at trial. 10. Denied. Plaintiff's reliance was not based upon the original rental agreement, because Defendant Beth Eppley did not authorize additional renters under same. Accordingly, Plaintiffs release of the 1991 Dodge Spirit had to have been predicated upon some agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. 11. Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley never made any representation or statement that reasonably could have construed as authorizing her son as an additional renter. There was no reason for her son to have a more valuable vehicle for the few days that his own automobile was in the repair shop, and thus she did not authorize, and would not have authorized, the transaction in question. 12. Admitted in part and denied in part. Defendant Beth Eppley has no firsthand knowledge concerning the accident in question, and she has not visited the accident site. Accordingly, she admits that her son was in an accident in which the Dodge Spirit was damaged, but as to the particulars she is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the troth thereof, with proof demanded at trial. 13. Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley is not aware of any circumstances to support the allegation that her son drove the vehicle in a grossly negligent, willful or wanton manner. Defendant Beth Eppley is without knowledge or infommtion sufficient to form a belief as to the troth of the allegation that the vehicle was rendered a total loss, and proof thereof is demanded at trial. 14. Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley disputes the losses for the following reasons: (a) In determining the fair market value of a vehicle, clearly one must give weight to the fact that this was a rental vehicle with 104,568 miles on it. Thus, Defendant denies that the value at the time of accident was $5995.00; rather, the value was no greater than $4405.00, the amount that Plaintiff demanded following the accident. (b) Plaintiff had a duty to mitigate damages following the accident. Defendant Beth Eppley denies that damages for loss of use in excess of 150 days can be recovered by Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant Beth Eppley denies that Plaintiff is entitled to damages for loss of use for a period greater than 10 to 14 days. (c) Defendant Beth Eppley does not understand how Plaintiff is demanding storage costs for this vehicle. If the vehicle was rendered a total loss, it should have been delivered to the salvage yard immediately. Defendant Beth Eppley denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any damages for storage, in that the vehicle could have stored on Plaintiff's property prior to being sent to the junkyard. 15. Admitted. Defendant Beth Eppley purchased collision insurance at the time of the rental of the Cavalier, and thus she is liable for only the first $500.00 of damages to that vehicle. For this reason, as well as because of the facts contained in her responses to Plaintiffs allegations, Defendant Beth Eppley cannot be liable to Plaintiff for an amount greater than $500.00. 16. The allegations contained in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses to paragraph 1 through 15, inclusive, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof as if more fully set forth. 17. Admitted. in part and denied in part. Both Plaintiff and Defendant Beth Eppley knew that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. would be operating the Cavalier that was rented initially - Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. was the individual in need for that vehicle, and Defendant Beth Eppley signed a rental agreement only because she possessed a credit card. The remaining averments of this paragraph are denied. As stated earlier, Defendant Beth Eppley never authorized her son as an "additional renter" nor did she in any way lead Plaintiff to believe that her son could modify the original agreement. 18. Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley never made the alleged representations, and thus any attempted modification of the original agreement by Plaintiff was of no legal effect. 19. Denied. The rental agreement speaks for itself as to its terms and conditions. However, for the reason stated in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses in the preceding paragraphs, her liability under the original contract was limited to the $500.00 deductible on collision coverage. 20. Denied, for the reasons stated in preceding paragraphs. 21. Denied. This is a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 22. Admitted, for the reasons expressed in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses in this Answer and New Matter. WHEREFORE, Defendant Beth Eppley demands that judgment be entered in her favor and against Plaintiff. 23. The allegations contained in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses to paragraphs 1 through 22, inclusive, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof as if more fully set forth. 24. Admitted. 25. Denied. The rental agreement could not be modified without the consent of Defendant Beth Eppley, and Defendant Beth Eppley did not consent to its modification. The original rental agreement provided for no additional renter, and that provision remained in full force and effect as between Plaintiff and Defendant Beth Eppley. 26. Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley did not witness the accident and did not visit the accident scene thereafter. Therefore, she is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the troth of these averments, and proof thereof is demanded at trial. Moreover, Defendant Beth Eppley did not inspect or drive the Dodge Spirit that Plaintiff released to Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr., and thus Defendant Beth Eppley does not know if said vehicle was in a safe condition, i.e., that it handled and braked in a proper manner. In any event, from what information Defendant Beth Eppley does possess concerning the accident, she knows of no circumstances which could constitute wilful, wanton or reckless conduct on the part of the driver. 27. Denied. There damages should have been paid under the collision coverage purchased under the rental agreement. Defendant Beth Eppley has no liability for any of these damages except possibly the $500.00 deductible under the collision coverage. WHEREFORE, Defendant Beth Eppley demands that judgment be entered in her favor and against Plaintiff. COIINT 28. The allegations contained in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses to paragraphs 1 through 27, inclusive, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof as if more fully set forth. 29. Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley had no reason to believe that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. would operate the vehicle in a negligent fashion. Her son was involved in an accident several years prior to the signing of the rental agreement, but evidently he had driven vehicles in a safe and proper manner in the three or four year period preceding this rental. 30. Admitted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff knew that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr., an adult, would be operating the vehicle. Accordingly, the only time Defendant Beth Eppley could "protect and safeguard" the vehicle was at those times when it was on her premises. 31. Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley breached no standard of care owed to Plaintiff and specifically: (a) Defendant Beth Eppley did not designate Robert Eppley, Jr. as an "additional renter", and she had no reason to believe that he would not operate the vehicle in a safe and proper manner; (b) Defendant Beth Eppley exercised proper control over the vehicle to the limited degree that she was able to do so; (c) Robert Eppley, Jr. had no authority to act on behalf of Defendant Beth Eppley, and Defendant Beth Eppley is not aware of any occasion that he did so with regard to the instant transaction; (d) Defendant Beth Eppley made no statements to Plaintiff with regard to the driving ability of her son. If Plaintiff had any concerns in this regard, it should have inquired about same. However, Plaintiff did not inquire of Defendant Beth Eppley as to her sons driving ability or record. (e) Defendant Beth Eppley did not induce Plaintiff to rent a vehicle to her son. To the contrary, Plaintiff was ready and willing to rent a vehicle to Defendant Robert Eppley, Ir. if he had a credit card. Furthemlore, Defendant Beth Eppley had no reason to believe that her son would drive in a negligent fashion. WHEREFORE, Defendant Beth Eppley demands that judgment be entered in her favor and against Plaintiff. COUNT 32. The allegations contained in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses to paragraphs 1 through 31, inclusive, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof as if more fully set forth. 33. Admitted in part and denied in part. Defendant Beth Eppley had a duty to safeguard the vehicle at those times that it was on her property. However, Plaintiff knew that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. would be operating the vehicle, and to the best of Defendant Beth Eppley's knowledge Plaintiff never ever asked Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. about his driving record. Defendant Beth Eppley did all within her limited authority to protect the vehicle but she had no duty to Plaintiff under the theory of negligent entmstment - the vehicle was entrusted to Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. by Plaintiff ! 34. Denied, for the reasons cited in Paragraph 33, supra, as well as: (a) Denied for the reasons stated in Defendant Beth Eppley's responses to Paragraph 31 (a), supra. (b) Denied, Defendant Robert Eppley, Ir. was a competent adult to whom Plaintiff entrusted the vehicle. Defendant Beth Eppley knew of no reason why control over her son's activities was necessary, nor did she owe to Plaintiff any duty of control. (c) Denied. Defendant Beth Eppley did not entrust the vehicle to her son - Plaintiff did. Moreover, Defendant Beth Eppley thought that her son was mature and capable of safe operation of the vehicle. (d) Denied. WHEREFORE, Defendant Beth Eppley demands that judgment be entered in her favor and against Plaintiff. 35. Because Defendant Beth Eppley signed no contract authorizing her son to be an "additional renter", any purported theory of liability against her for breach of contract as to the replacement vehicle is barred by the Statute of Frauds. 36. There was a lack of consideration with regard to Plaintiffs attempted oral modification of the original rental agreement, and thus said alleged modification, by which Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr., was made an "additional renter" is not enforceable as to Defendant Beth Eppley. 37. Plaintiff altered the terms of the written agreement between it and Defendant Beth Eppley by striking out the typed word "NONE" and printing in its stead "As Authorized by Beth Eppley" under the category "Additional Renter". 38. This alteration occurred after the contract was fully executed, and the alteration was without the authorization or consent of Defendant Beth Eppley. 39. This alteration was material, and thus this unauthorized alteration released Defendant Beth Eppley from any liability whatsoever on either the rental agreement that she signed or the vehicle replacement fomi that Plaintiff alleges was signed by Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. 40 The release of liability of Defendant Beth Eppley under the rental agreement further relieved her of any and all alleged responsibility for "protecting and safeguarding" the replacement vehicle. Accordingly, Defendant Beth Eppley has no liability whatsoever under theories of negligence or negligent entrustment. WHEREFORE, Defendant Beth Eppley demands that judgment be entered in her favor and against Plaintiff. COUNTER CLAIM 41. The rental agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Beth Eppley was subject to the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act, 73 P.S. § 2201, et. seq. The fact that the agreement contained some purported collision limitations did not render the agreement an insurance contract or insurance policy, and thus the rental agreement did not fall within any of the exceptions to said Act. 42. The rental agreement, especially as it related to the collision coverage and exceptions, violated the terms of the act. The contract did not contain short sentences and paragraphs, it had sentences that contained more than one condition, it utilized technical legal te~ms (e.g., "damage waiver", "void", "breaches", "reckless, willful and wanton manner"), and it contained cross- references. As such, the agreement, and specifically the "damage waiver", was not drafted in a manner that any layperson could understand. 43. Defendant Beth Eppley did not understand the provisions of the damage waiver; to the contrary, she thought that she was purchasing collision insurance consistent with that provided by ordinary automobile insurance policies. 44. Plaintiffs wilful violation of the terms and conditions of the Plain Language Act caused Defendant Beth Eppley to suffer damages, and consistent with § 2207 of said Act she is entitled to the following from Plaintiff: (a) statutory damages of $100.00; (b) her court costs, if any; and (c) reasonable attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, Defendant Beth Eppley demands judgment against Plaintiff for: (a) $100.00 (b) all court costs that she may incur; and (c) reasonable attorney's fees that she has incurred, and will incur in defending this action. Respectfully submitted, Stephen B. Lipson Counsel for Defendant Beth A. Eppley 169 W. High Street, Ste. 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 VERII~ICATION I verify that the statements made in this Answer with New Matter and Counter Claim are tree and correct to my personal knowledge. I understand that any false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pennsylvania C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Dated:9~,j~ /C~/ /q~,7 Beth -&.'Epp~y DENNIS A KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION - LAW pROOF OF SERVICE Stephen B. Lipson, counsel for Defendant Beth A. Eppley, hereby certifies that he has, this~.[~day of June, 1997 served a lxue and correct copy of Defendant Beth A. Eppley's Answer with New Matter and Counterclaim upon Plaimiff by mailing it by first class mail, postage prepaid to Plaintiffs counsel of record, David A. Baric, Esq., at the following address: O'Brien, Baric & Scherer 17 W. South Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Dated: June ~:ff, 1997 Stephen B. Lipson ~J Counsel for Defendant, Beth A. Eppley 169 W. High Street, STE. 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff, BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants. · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION-LAW NOTICE TO PLEAD TO: Stephen B. Lipson, Esquire 169 West High Street Suite 4 Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 You are hereby notified that you have twenty (20) days in which to plead to the enclosed Answer And New Matter To Counterclaim and Reply To New Matter or a Default Judgment may be entered against you. Date: O'BRIEN, BARIC & SCHERER David A. Baric, Esquire I.D. ~44853 17 West South Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 (717) 249-6873 DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff, BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT A. EPPLEY, JR., Defendants. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION-LAW ANSWER AND NEW MATTER TO COUNTERCLAIM AN~ REPLY TO NEW MATTER AND NOW, comes Plaintiff, Dennis A. Knaub, d/b/a Carlisle Rent A Wreck, by and through his attorneys, O'BR1F. N, BARIC AND SCHERER, and files this Answer and New Matter to Counterclaim of Defendant Beth Eppley and Reply to New Matter and in support thereof sets forth the following: REPLY TO NEW MATTER 35. Denied. To the contra_nd, the modification to the rental agreement was made in the presence of and with the knowledge of Defendant, Beth Eppley. 36. Denied. To the extent this averment constitutes a conclusion of fact or law, no response is required. To the extent a response may be required, Plaintiff answers that the modification to the rental agreement was made in the presence of and with the knowledge of Defendant, Beth Eppley. 37. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that the rental agreement was modified by striking out the word "none" and adding the language "As authorized by Beth Eppley". To the extent this averment implies that this amendment was made unilaterally by the Plaintiff or without the knowledge of Defendant, Beth Eppley, this averment is denied. 38. Denied. To the contrary, this modification was made with the consent of and in the presence of Defendant, Beth Eppley. 39. Denied. To the extent this avefi~ient constitutes conclusions of fact or law, no response is required. To the extent a response may be required it is specifically denied that the modification released Defendant, Beth Eppley from liability for the damages incurred by Plaintiff. 40. Denied. To the extent this averment constitutes conclusions of fact or law, no response is required. To the extent a response may be required it is specifically denied that the rental agreement absolved Defendant, Beth Eppley from the damages sustained by Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment in his favor and against Defendant as set forth in the complaint together with costs and expenses. ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM 41. Deniedl To the extent this averment constitutes conclusions of fact or law, no response is required. Strict proof thereof is demanded. 42. Denied. To the extent this averment constitutes conclusions of fact or law, no response is required. To the extent a response may be required, Plaintiff answers that the rental agreement was understood by Defendant, Beth Eppley. Further, Defendant, Beth Eppley did request that Plaintiff enter into the agreement so as to permit rental of a vehicle to her son, Robert Eppley, Jr., the rental agreement meets the requirements of the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act ("Act"), the Plaintiffmade a good faith effort to comply with the Act and the parties finished what was required under the contract i.e., Plaintiffprovided a rental vehicle to Defendant, Beth Eppley, and Defendant made payment for the daily rental amount. The obligation of Defendant, Beth Eppley, while provided for and established through the rental agreement is not part of the performance of the rental agreement absent negligence and/or wilful and wanton destruction of the vehicle rented. 43. Denied. Defendant, Beth Eppley, was provided with the rental agreement prior to executing said agreement and had an opportunity to review the rental agreement and the exclusions for collision coverage are set forth clearly therein. 44. Denied. It is denied that Plaintiffviolated the Act. Further, it is denied that Defendant, Beth Eppley, has suffered damage. Moreover, it is denied that the Act is applicable. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment in his favor and against the Defendant as set forth in Plaintiff's complaint together with costs and expenses. NEW MATTER TO COUNTERCLAEM 45. The counterclaim fails to state a claim against Plaintiff 46. Plalntiffis estopped from asserting a claim against Plaintiffbecause Plaintiff relied upon Defendant's actions to enter into the rental agreement. 47. Defendant's actions were intended to procure a vehicle from Plaintiff for the primary use of Defendant's son and not for herself, therefore, the Act is not applicable. 48. The rental agreement is exempt from the provisions of the Act. 49. The rental agreement complies with the provisions of the Act. 50. The Act does not void a contract or otherwise affect its validity. 51. No liability will stand under the Act if the parties have completed what was required under the contract. Plaintiff rented a vehicle to Defendant and her agent, Robert Eppley, Jr., and Defendant paid the rental rate as required by the rental agreement. Defendant has failed and refused to pay for damages accruing to Plaintiff as a result of the destruction of the vehicle which claim was not at the essence of the rental agreement and should not, absent the negligence of Defendant and Robert Eppley, Jr., have occurred. 52. The handwritten amendment to the rental agreement was placed on the agreement in the presence of and with the knowledge of Defendant, Beth Eppley. 53. The actions which would constitute a breach of the rental agreement are set forth in enlarged type on the agreement and were readable and understandable in all respects. A breach of the rental agreement would occur for specifically defined actions which actions included, but were not limited to, using the vehicle in a manner which violated the law. Defendant's contention that she believed she had insurance for the vehicle which insurance would include damages accruing from operation of the vehicle in a manner which violated the law is not supportable. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffdemands judgment in his favor and against Defendant, Beth Eppley. Respectfully submitted, O'BRIF~N, BARIC AND SCHERER David A. Baric, Esquire ID//44853 17 West South Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-6873 Attorney for Plaintiff dab.dir/litigation/rent/rent~ans VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Answer and New Matter To Counterclaim and Reply To New Matter are true and correct. I understand that false statemems herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. . ~ DENNIS KNAUB DATED: DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaimiff, BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT A. EPPLEY, JR., Defendants. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION-LAW CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on August 1, 1997, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien, Baric & Scherer, did serve a copy of the Answer and New Matter To Counterclaim and Reply To New Matter, by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows: Stephen B. Lipson, Esquire 169 West High Street Suite 4 Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 David A. Baric, Esquire DENNIS A KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE Please enter my appearance on behalf of Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. I accept service of the Complaint on behalf of Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. and certify that I am authorized to do so. Dated: August JT' , 1997 Stephen B. Lipson Attorney for Defendant, Robert Eppley, Jr. 169 W. High Street, STE. 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 DENNIS A KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION - LAW COUNTER-REPLY OF DEFENDANT BETH A. EPPLEY TO PLAINTIFF'S NEW MATTER TO COUNTERCLAIM 45. Denied. This is a conclusion of law to which no respOnsive pleading is required. 46. Denied. This is a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required. Defendant Beth Eppley does not know to what "actions" Plaintiff is referring, but Plaintiff drafted its language in the standard form rental agreement without relying upon representations of any individual, much less Defendant. 47-50. Denied. These allegations are conclusions of law and/or fact to which no responsive pleading is required. 51. Denied. The allegations as to the applicability of the Act is a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required. Defendant Beth Eppley denies that the issue of insurance coverage does not go to the essence of the rental agreement; to the contrary, it is the most important provision in said agreement, as evidenced by the dollar amount that Plaintiff is attempting to recover in this litigation! 52. Denied. The handwritten alteration of the rental agreement was done while Defendant Beth Eppley was not present. In addition, it occurred without her consent and after the original agreement was fully executed. 53. Denied. To the extent that these allegations contain conclusions of law and/or fact, no responsive pleading is required. Defendant Beth Eppley denies that she understood these alleged conditions on the second page of the agreement. Moreover, collision coverage in automobile insurance policies does provide coverage for damages that result from "violations of law", e.g., reckless driving, proceeding through a red light, etc. Defendant Beth Eppley thought that she was purchasing said standard coverage from Plaintiff, and had Plaintiff complied with the Plain Language Act Defendant Beth Eppley would not have entered into the Agreement due to the potential liability from an ordinary automobile accident. Respectfully submitted, S~ephen B. Lipson Counsel for Defendant, Beth Eppley 169 W. High Street, STE. 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 I verify that the statements made in this Counter-Reply are tree and correct to my personal knowledge. I understand that any false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pennsylvania C.S. §4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. ~Defendan{, }~eth ./[i Ep~ley DENNIS A KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION - LAW PROOF OF SERVICE Stephen B. Lipson, counsel for Defendant Beth A. Eppley, hereby certifies that he has, this,2-~Y~-day of August, 1997 served a true and correct copy of Defendant Beth A. Eppley's Coumer-Reply upon Plaintiff by mailing it by first class mail, postage prepaid to Plaintiffs counsel of record, David A. Baric, Esq., at the following address: O'Brien, Baric & Scherer 17 W. South Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Dated: August.¢~, 1997 S~ephen B. Lipson Counsel for Defendant, Beth A. Eppley 169 W. High Street, STE. 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 DENNIS A KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants : CIVIL ACTION - LAW DEFENDANT ROBERT EPPLEY...IR'S ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER AND COUNTERCLAIM 1. - 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted in part and denied in part. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. currently is in the Armed Forces at N.A.S. Pensacola, Florida. However, he does consider the 1131 Pine Road address to be his domicile. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted in part and denied in part. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. initially went to Plaintiff's place of business and requested a rental vehicle. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. does not recall the exact conversation that he had with Plaintiff's representative, but he is fairly certain that he could not be a renter because he did not have a credit card. Therefore, he later went to Plaintiff's place of business with Defendant Beth Eppley, who signed the form to enable Defendant to have a rental vehicle while his vehicle was being repaired. 6. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Beth Eppley executed an agreement with Plaintiff for the rental of a high mileage Cavalier to be driven by Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. However, Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to whether Exhibit "A" is a tree and correct copy of the agreement. Although he was present at the time that Defendant Beth Eppley signed the agreement, he did not see the entire agreement and thus cannot say if Exhibit "A" is what his mother signed. In addition, he does not know whether Exhibit "A" is a copy of the agreement as it looked at the time that his mother signed it or whether there were subsequent changes made to it. 7. Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. was an additional driver, not an additional renter, under the original agreement. Moreover, Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. believes and therefore avers that Defendant Beth Eppley subsequently did not authorize any alteration of said original agreement nor did she inform Plaintiff that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. could be an authorized renter. 8. Denied. The Agreement speaks for itself as to the terms and conditions contained therein. The allegations as to joint and several liability are irrelevant to any issue of liability in that there was no "additional renter" under the original agreement or authorized later. 9. Admitted. 10. Denied. Plaintiffs reliance could not have been based upon the original rental agreement, because no additional renters were authorized under same. Furthermore, to the best of Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s knowledge and belief there was no alteration or amendment to said original agreement to which Defendant Beth Eppley consented. 11. Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. merely went to Plaintiffs place of business and requested a different vehicle. He never stated that he had Defendant Beth Eppley's consent, nor did Plaintiff inquire about any such consent. 12. Denied in part and admitted in part. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. denies that he was traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Rather, he was not familiar with the road in question. 13. Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. did not operate the vehicle in a negligent, grossly negligent, wanton and/or willful manner. 14. Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. disputes the losses for the following reasons: (a) In determining the fair market value of a vehicle, clearly one must give weight to the fact that this was a rental vehicle with 104,568 miles on it. Thus, Defendant denies that the value at the time of accident was $5995.00; rather, the value was no greater than $4405.00, the amount that Plaintiff demanded following the accident. (b) Plaintiff had a duty to mitigate damages following the accident. Defendant denies that damages for loss of use in excess of 150 days can be recovered by Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to damages for loss of use for a period greater than 10 to 14 days. (c) Defendant does not understand how Plaintiff is demanding storage costs for this vehicle. If the vehicle was rendered a total loss, it should have been delivered to the salvage yard immediately. Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any damages for storage, in that the vehicle could have been stored on Plaintiffs property prior to being sent to the junkyard. 15. Admitted. Defendant Beth Eppley purchased collision insurance at the time of the rental of the Cavalier, and thus both Defendants feel that together they are liable only for the first $500.00 of damages to any damaged vehicle. 16. The allegations contained in Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s responses to paragraph 1 through 15, inclusive, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof as if more fully set forth. 17. Denied. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. was designated as an additional driver under the original rental agreement. To the best of Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s knowledge, information and belief, Defendant Beth Eppley never authorized him as an additional renter or entered into any agreement to modify the original rental agreement. 18. Denied. Plaintiff could not rely upon representations that, to the best of Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s knowledge, were not made by Defendant Beth Eppley. 19. Denied. The rental agreement speaks for itself as to its temis and conditions. However, Defendants' liability is limited to the $500.00 deductible on collision coverage that was purchased. 20. Denied, for the reasons stated in preceding paragraphs. 21. Denied. This is a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 22. Admitted, for the reasons expressed in Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s responses in this Answer. WHEREFORE, Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. demands that judgment be entered in his favor and against Plaintiff. 23. The allegations contained in Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s responses to paragraphs 1 through 22, inclusive, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof as if more fully set forth. 24. Admitted. 25. Denied. The rental agreement could not be modified without the consent of Defendant Beth Eppley, and to the best of Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s knowledge Defendant Beth Eppley did not consent to any modification. The original rental agreement provided for no additional renter. 26. Denied generally pursuant to Pa. R. C.P. No. 1029 (e). 27. Denied. These damages should have been paid under the collision coverage purchased under the rental agreement. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. has no liability for any of these damages except possibly the $500.00 deductible under the collision coverage. WHEREFORE, Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. demands that judgment be entered in his favor and against Plaintiff. COUNTS IH AND IV 28. - 34. These allegations are directed against Defendant Beth Eppley alone. However, to the degree that Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. is under any obligation to respond to same, he hereby incorporates Paragraphs 28 through 34 of Defendant Beth Eppley's Answer as his own responses to these averments. See Pa. R.C.P. 1019 (g). COUNTER CLAIM 35. The rental agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. was subject to the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act, 73 P.S. § 2201, et. seq. The fact that the agreement contained some purported collision limitations did not render the agreement an insurance contract or insurance policy, and thus the rental agreement did not fall within any of the exceptions to said Act. 36. The rental agreement, especially as it related to the collision coverage and exceptions, violated the terms of the act. The contract did not contain short sentences and paragraphs, it had sentences that contained more than one condition, it utilized technical legal terms (e.g., "damage waiver", "void", "breaches", "reckless, willful and wanton manner"), and it contained cross- references. As such, the agreement, and specifically the "damage waiver", was not drafted in a manner that any layperson could understand. 37. Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. did not understand the provisions of the damage waiver; to the contrary, he thought that he was purchasing collision insurance consistent with that provided by ordinary automobile insurance policies. 38. Plaintiffs wilful violation of the terms and conditions of the Plain Language Act caused Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. to suffer damages, and consistent with § 2207 of said Act he is entitled to the following from Plaintiff: (a) statutory damages of $100.00; (b) his court costs, if any; and (c) reasonable attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. demands judgment against Plaintiff for: (a) $100.00 (b) all court costs that he may incur; and (c) reasonable attorney's fees that he has incurred, and will incur in defending this action. Respectfully submitted, Stephen B. Lipson Counsel for Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. 169 W. High Strp,~t, Ste. 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 I verify that the statements made in this Answer with New Matter and Counter Claim are tree and correct to my personal knowledge. I understand that any false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pennsylvania C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Dated: DENNIS A KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION - LAW PROOF OF SERVICE Stephen B. Lipson, counsel for Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr. hereby certifies that he has, thisY--~day of December, 1997 served a true and correct copy of Defendant Robert Eppley, Jr.'s Answer with New Matter and Counterclaim upon Plainfiffby mailing it by first class mail, postage prepaid to Plaintiff's counsel of record, David A. Baric, Esq., at the following address: O'Brien, Baric & Scherer 17 W. South Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Dated: December ~, 1997 Stephen B. Lipson Counsel for Defendant, Beth A. Eppley 169 W. High Street, STE. 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A VVRECK Vo BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT T. EPPLEY, JR. · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM IN RE: APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, September 27, 1999, the Court having been infot~-~ed that the above-case cannot be heard until the defendant, who is in the military, becomes available, the panel of arbitrators previously appointed is vacated, and the Chairman, Robert R. Black, Esquire, Esquire, shall receive the sum of $50.00. By the Court, / ~'~-~) Geo~ E. Hoffer, Robert R. Black, Esquire _ c~ ~ ~/~"/~.~. P'J. :ssg DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff, Vo BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION-LAW PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE To the Prothonotary: Please enter the appearance of Douglas B. Marcello and Michele J. Thorp and Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP as counsel for Defendants in the above matter. POB 999 Harrisburg, PA 17108-0999 Date: PRAECIPE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE To the Prothonotary: Please withdraw the appearance of Stephen B. Lipson, Esquire as counsel for Defendants in the above matter. Date: 1~, :119897.1 StepHen B. Lipson, Esquire 169 W. High Street Suite 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I. Michele J. Thorp, Esquire for the law firm Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP, hereby state that a tree and correct copy of the foregoing documents was served upon ail counsel of record by first class United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows, on the date set forth below: By First Class U.S. Mail: David A. Baric, Esquire O'Brien, Baric & Scherer 17 W. South Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Dated: THOMAS, THOMAS & HAFER, LLP ROBERT R. BLACK LAW OFFICES LANDIS lB BLACK 36 SOUTH HANOVER STREET CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17015 TELEPHONE (717) 243-3727 FAX (717') 243,-82'59 September 14, 1999 J. BOYD LANDIS JOSEPH J. McINTOSH The Honorable George E. Hoffer, P.]. Cumberland County Courthouse One Courthouse Square Carlisle, PA 17013 Arbitration Hearing Rent-A-Wreck v. Eppley No. 97-2734 Civil Term Dear Judge Hoffer: I am advised that the defendant in captioned matter is in the military and unavailable for an arbitration hearing. Accordingly, it is requested that my commission be vacated and the plaintiff can make application for a hearing at a later date, when the defendant is in the area. Thank you very much for your attention to this matter. Very truly yours, Robert R. Black RRB:skg cc: David A. Baric, Esq. Stephen B. Lipson, Esq. STEPHEN B. LIPSON Attorney at Law 169 W. High Street, Suite 4 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3929 Fax (717) 249-6277 May 19, 1999 Robert R. Black, Esq. 36 South Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Re: Arbitration hearing - Rent -A-Wreck v. Eppley Dear Bob: I spoke with Defendant Beth Eppley today concerning the availability of her son, Defendant Robert Eppley, to attend an arbitration hearing. Mr. Eppley is a member of the Armed Forces and presently is at Camp Pendleton in California. He has no leave coming in the near future; in fact, soon he will be having knee surgery, with any recupemtion/rehab'flitation occurring in California. The only suggestion that I can offer is to delay the seheduling of the hearing until Beth Eppley learns that her son will be receiving leave time. She hopes that he will be able to return to this area for the Christmas holiday period, but there are no guarantees of same. A copy of this letter is being sent to Dave Baric, Esq., so that he may apprise you of his position. Thank you for your understanding in this matter. Sincerely, Stephen B. Lipson, Esquire SBL:psw ddJoLI3S ,~ )~3ell~ 6661 ~ ,LVH ROBERT R. BLACK LAW OFFICES LANDIS lB BLACK 36 SOUTH HANOVER STREET CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17013 TELEPHONE ( 717 ) 245 -$T27 F~O( (717~ 24-~-8239 September 14, 1999 J. BOYD LANDIS JOSEPH J. McINTOSH t1940 - 19T2~ The Honorable George E. Hoffer, P.J. Cumberland County Courthouse One Courthouse Square Carlisle, PA 17013 Arbitration Hearing Rent-A-Wreck v. Eppley No. 97-2734 Civil Term Dear Judge Hoffer: I am advised that the defendant in captioned matter is in the military and unavailable for an arbitration hearing. Accordingly, it is requested that my commission be vacated and the plaintiff can make application for a hearing at a later date, when the defendant is in the area. Thank you very much for your attention to this matter. Very truly yours, Robert R. Black RRB:skg cc: David A. Baric, Esq. Stephen B. Lipson, Esq. DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff, BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, pENNSYLVANIA : : NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM ; : CIVIL ACTION-LAW : ORDER OF COURT AND Now, and action as prayed for. ,2002, in consideration of the foregoing petition, , Esq., , Esq. , Esq. are appointed arbitrators in the above-captioned BY THE COURT, DENNIS A. KNAUB, d/b/a CARLISLE RENT A WRECK, Plaintiff, Vo BETH A. EPPLEY and ROBERT EPPLEY, JR., Defendants. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : NO. 97-2734 CIVIL TERM . : CIVIL ACTION-LAW : : PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS TO THE HONORABLE, JUDGES OF SAID COURT: David A. Baric, Esquire, counsel for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned action, respectfully represents that: 1. The above-captioned action is at issue. 2. The claim of the plaintiff in the action is $10,827.45. The following attorneys are interested in the case as counsel or are otherwise disqualified to sit as arbitrators: David A. Baric, Esquire and Michele J. Thorp, Esquire. WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays your Honorable Court to appoint three (3) arbitrators to whom the case shall be submitted. Respectfully submiJ~, David A. Baric, Esquire O'Brien, Baric & Scherer 17 West South Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 (717) 249-6873 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on March 12, 2002, I, David A. Baric, Esquire of O'Brien, Baric & Scherer, did serve a copy of the Petition For Appointment Of Arbitrators, by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows: Michele J. Thorp, Esquire Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP 305 North Front Street Sixth Floor P.O. Box 999 Pennsylvania 17108 David A. Baric, Esquire