HomeMy WebLinkAbout03-0033 YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. fF YOU WISH TO DEFEND
AGAINST THE CLAIMS SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES, YOU MUST
TAKE ACTION WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS COMPLAINT AND NOTICE
ARE SERVED, BY EI%'TERING A WRITTEN APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY
AN ATTORNEY AND FILING IN W-RITII~3 WITH THE COURT YOUR DEFENSES
OR OBJECTIONS TO THE CLAII~S SET FORTH AGAINST YOU. yOU ARE WARNED
THAT IF YOU FAIL TO DO $O THE CASE MAY PROCEED WITHOUT YOU AND
A JUDGMENT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU BY T~E COURT W~THOUT,FURTHER___
NOTICE FOR ANY MONEY CLAIMED IN THE COMPLAINT OR ~OR ANY OTHER
CLAIM OR RELIEF REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. YOU ~AY LOSE MONEY
OR PROPERTY OR OTHER RIGHTS IMPORTANT TO YOO. 1:
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF
YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO THE TELEPHONE
OR THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL
HELP.
CLIV~ERLAND COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
2 LIBERTY AVENUE
CARLISLE PA 17013
717 249 3166
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
5-,
S TA~ILEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
%rs.
NATICNAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DAUPHIN COUNTY, PEbEqSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION--LAW
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
The National Football League, by and through its counsel,
McNee~, Wallace & Nurick, hereby makes the following Preliminary
Objecuions to Plaintiff's Complaint:
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE NATURE OF A DEMI/RRE2
TO COUNTS I ~NiD__II OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPL~.iNT
-. As Plaintiff sets forth in Paragraph 4 of his Complaint,
in 1997, Plaintiff filed an action in Federal Court against
Defendant based upon the same factual hllegations set forth in
this Complaint.
2. A true and correct copy of the Complaint filed by
Plaintiff in the Federal Court is attached hereto, made a part
hereof, and marked Exhibit "A".
3. In the Federal action, Plaintiff moved to amend his
Complalnt to add claims for fraud and negligent misrepresenta-
tion. A true and correct copy of that Motion to Amend is
attached hereto, made a part hereof, and marked Exhibit
3. As Plaintiff also states in Paragraph 4 of the
Comp_~,.~u, final judgment was entered by the Middle District
Court in Plaintiff,s Pedera! Court action. A true and correct
copy of Judge Ca!dwell,s Order dated October 31, 1997 is attached
hereto, made a part hereof, and marked Ex_hibit
~ As set forth in Judge Caldwell s Order (_xh_b_t "C"),
before dismissing the case, Judge Caldwe!l granted Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend his Complaint to add claims for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation.
6. In the Federal Court Order, the Court dismissed
Plaintiff's Complaint, including the claims of age
discri~uination, fraud~ and negligent misrepresenuation.
7. In the instant ac=ion, Pl~i=~tiff fails to set forth a
claim ~pon which relief can be granted because his claims ~re
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
8. That is, the parties to both actions are the same,
Pla~ntiff,s claims are based upon the same factual background,
and the ultimate and controlling issues are identical.
9. B~cause Plaintiff has already had an opportuJity to
appear and assert his rights in Federal Court, the instant action
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, Defendant National Football League, respectfully
requests that Plaintiff,s Complaint be dismissed for legal
insufficiency.
~i~'?~w PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN T~E N~m= ~ A DEMURRER
10. In Counts ! and I! off
Ccmp~ a~ nt,
Plaintiff
to allege a claim of "deliberate negligence".
11. Pennsylvania does not recognize a tort of "deliberate
negligence".
12. In the alternative, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim for "deliberate negligence" upon which relief can be
granted.
WHEREFORE, Defendant National Football League, respectfully
requests tha'O Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed for legal
insufficiency.
PRELIMINARY OB~=CTION IN THE NATURE OF A DEMURRER
TO COUNTS I ANID ii Q~ PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
13. In Paragraph 5 of his Complaint, Plainti~[ States that
he was eligible for the NFL draft and appears to state that the
draft procedures are attached as Exhibit "A". Unfortunately,
Plaintiff has attached only three (3) pages of the draft
procedures to the Complaint.
14. Because Plaintiff relies on a written document, the
draft procedures, to establish that he was eligible for the
draft, Defendant appropriately attaches a true and correct of the
Eligibility Rules and Draft Procedures and refers to them. A
true and correct copy of the ~ligibility Rules and Draf~
Procedures are attached hereto, made a part hereof, and marked
E~ibit "D".
.~/"/' 15. As ExUrbS5 "D" establishes, the rule specify when a
prospective fcc~ba!l player is eligible to participate in the
annual player draft.
16. A prospective player who plays college fcctba!!
generally is eligible for the draft in the year following the
expiration of his college eligibility, and prospective players
who do not play college football are generally eligible to
participate in the draft held four (4) years after they enter
college. (Exhibit "D", ¶(I) and (4)).
~7. If selected in the draft by an NFL member team, a
prospective football player is placed on the reserve list cf that
team and, for a perio~ cf time, or until released by the team,
may negotiate and accept employment o~!y wizh that team.
18. Prospective football players who are eiigib~e for the
draft but not selected are thereafter ~free agents" and are free
to seek and accept emp!cyment with any member team of the
National Football League.
19. Because Plaintiff entered college in the early 1970's,
(Complaint, ¶9) he would have been eligible for one of the annual
drafts conducted in the mid-1970's.
20. In 1997, when Plaintiff alleges he applied for the
draft, he was actually a "free agent" and was free to seek
employment with any member team in the National Football League
directly.
For these reascns, it is clear ~haz plaintiff's
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
WHEREFORE, Defendan~ National Fco~ba!l League, respecZfu!ly
requests that P!ain~iff,s Complaint be dismissed for legal
insufficiency.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE NATURE OF A DEMURRER
A/VD ALTERNATI~ MOTION TO STRIKN
22. In his Complaint, Plaintiff requests relief in the
2ature of punitive damages.
23. PlaiHtiff fails to state any claim upon which relief in
the -~ ~
n=~u~e of punitive ~mages can be granted.
WHEREFORE, Defendant National Football League, respectfully
requests that the Court dismiss, with prejudice, Plaintiff's
claim for punitive damages or, in the alternative, that the Court
strike from the Complaint said prayers for relief for punitive
damages.
pRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION TO STRiR~,i
24. In his Complaint, Plaintiff requests damages "in excess
of Twenty Million ($20,000,000.00) Dollars."
25. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021(b), provides
"that any pleading demanding relief for unlicfuidated damages
shall not claim any specific sum" (emphasis added). Plaintiff,s
Complaint which requests damages in e~cess cf Twenty Million
($20,000,000.00) Dollars should be stricken.
WHEREFORE, Defendant National Fcctbal! League, respeczful!y
rec~:es~s tha~ this Cour~ strike ~-'~==
...... ~=_=='s claim for damages in
excess cf Twenty Million ($20,000,000.00) Dollars.
Respectfully submitted,
McNEES, WALLACE & NI/RICK
~.D. No. 7~269
100 Pine Stree~
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
{717) 232-8000
ATtorneys foe Defendant
Date: October 19, 1998
STANLEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
WASHINGTON REDSKINS,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 02-572
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAiNTiFF'S INTERROGATORIES
Defendant Washington Redskins, by and through its attorneys, McNees Wallace &
Nurick LLC, hereby files Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories as follows:
1. Did Coach Marry Schottenheim (sic) allow free agents to try out for the
Washington Redskins Football Teard'?
ANSWER: The term "try out" is ambiguous. The Redskins do not allow people
to participate in organized team events without first executing a contract. With
this proviso - Yes, the Washington Redskins did allow free agents to "try out"
for the 2001 football team.
2. What is the name and address of Washington Redskins Insurance Company?
ANSWER: The Washington Redskins possess no applicable insurance
coverage.
Respectfully submitted,
McNEES WALLACE & NURICK LLC
By -Elizabeth A. Magu~~
Attorney I.D. No.,,89853
Charles T. Young, Jr.
Attorney I.D. No. 80680
100 Pine Street
P. O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
(717) 237-5397
Attorneys for Defendant Washington Redskins
IL,/
Dated: March I-I, 2002
VERIFICATION
Subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to
authorities), I, Melissa Gertz, hereby certify that I have the authority to execute this
Verification on behalf of the Washington Redskins, that I have reviewed the Answers to
Plaintiff's Interrogatories, and that they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge,
information and belief.
Washington Redskins
Dated: March ,2002
"a ~ertz, Esquire"-.-~
Assistant General Counsel
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served by U.S. first-class mail, postage prepaid, upon the
following:
Mr. Stanley Bethea
533 Curtin Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Dated: March
2002
Charles T. Young, ¢ ~
Counsel for Defendant Washington Redskins
STANLEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and
PAUL TAGLIABUE~ COMMISSIONER~
N.F.L.~
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DAUPHIN COUNTY~ PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 2310 S 2000
ORDER
AND NOW, to wit: this 26~" day of April, 2001, it is HEREBY
ORDERED that:
(1) The Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint is
DENIED;
(2) The Defendants' Motlon for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. Furthermore, following a hearing on March
26, 2001, at whlch the Plaintiff was afforded the
opportunity to be heard, yet failed to appear after
receiving notice of same, the Defendants' Motlon for
Permanent Injunction ls also GRANTED; and
The Plaintiff is hereby ENJOINED from filing suit
agalnst the Defendants, .thelr empioyees, or agents, in
either state or federal court wlthout prior leave of
thls Court. The Pialnt±ff'may obtaln the ieave of
thls Court through a properly fiIed petition which
shows that the proposed flling: (1) can survlve a
motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) ls not
barred by principles of issue preclusion (collateral
estoppel) or claim preclusion (res judlcata); (3) is
not repetitive and not in violation of a court order;
and (4) complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civll
Procedure and the Dauphin County Local Rules of Court,
in all respects; and
30
If the Plaintiff should choose to seek the leave of
this Court to file suit against the Befendants, their
employees, or agents, he is directed to forward such
petition to the Dauphin County Court Administrator's
Office, for review by the staff attorneys of that
Office, and subsequent approval of the Court
Administrator, for filing. The Plaintiff is further
directed to attach a copy of this Order on the face of
any such petition; and
The Court ORDERS the Prothonotary to file and enter
into the docket this Order and Permanent Injunction,
and FURTHER ORDERS the Prothonotary to forward a
certified copy of this Opinion and Order to the Clerk
of Court for the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. This Order does not
apply to the filing of timely notices of appeal from
this Count to the Pennsylvania Superior Count and
papers solely in furtherance of such appeal, nor does
this Order apply to lawsuits involving different
Defendants; and
The Court further ORDERS the Prothonotary not to
accept for filing any Complaint or similar initiation
of clvil actlon by the Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea,
against the Defendants, their employees or agents,
wlthout an appropriate Order of Court authorizing such
flllng, after such pleadings have been reviewed and
approved by the Court Administrator as aforesaid; and
HOWEVER, the foregoing provisions of injunction shall
not be applicable to any such civil action which ls
flled on behalf of the Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea, by
an attorney who ls duly licensed to practlce law in
this Commonwealth; provided, however that any attorney
undertaking such representation of the Plaintiff in
such matters shall be professionally responsible for
any such fillngs; and
(3) The Defendants' Motion to Strike the Case from the
April 2001 Civil Trial List is GRANTED;
31
(4) The Defendants' Motion to Strike the Case from the
April 2001 Argument Court List is GRANTED;
(5)
The Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea, is hereby SANCTIONED in
the total amount of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) for
his violations of dudge Hoover's Order of August 16,
2000, together with the violations of the Local Rules
of Dauphin County (Rule 215.1(1)), and this Court's
Order of February 8, 2001, and such payment ls ORDERED
to be made within thirty (30) days of the date of this
Order, and shall be made payable to the use of the Law
Library of Dauphin County;
(6)
The Defendants' Petition for the Award of Attorneys'
Fees and Costs ls hereby GRANTED. The Plaintiff is
ORDERED to reimburse the Defendants in the amount of
$7,684.53 for the legal fees and costs whlch they have
incurred. A dudgment in the amount of $7,684.53 is
hereby granted to the Defendants and against the
Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea, in sald amount, and shall
be entered on the Prothonotary's docket;
(7) The Plaintiff's Pet±tlon to Amend (04/20/2001) and
Motion to Strike (04/23/2001) are both DENIED; and
(8)
The Dauphin County Sheriff shall immediately effect
personal, 1n-hand, service of a certified copy of this
Opinion and Order upon the Plaintiff, Stanle~ Bethea.~
BY THE COURT:
32
STANLEY BETHEA~
Plaintiff
Vm
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and
PAUL TAGLIABUE~ COUMISSIONER~
N.F.L.~
Defendants
BEFORE: Clark~ J.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DAUPHIN COUNTY~ PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 2310
S 2000
OPINION AND ORDER
The Pla±nt±ff, Stanley Bethea (Bethea), f±led a pro se
c±v±l Compla±nt ±n the above capt±oned matter on June 1, 2000.
In that Compla±nt, Bethea asserts a cla±m for [ntent±onal
[nfl±ct±on of Emot±onal D±stress (Count [)4, and also ra±ses a
separate cla±m for Pun±t±ve Damages (Count [[)2. Both Counts are
asserted as a result of the Nat±onal Football League's (NFL)
The Plaintiff also claims the NFL is liable under principles of respondeat superior/vicarious
liability, but this claim is made within the introductory language of the Complaint, rather than within an
individual Count.
2 We should note that a claim for punitive damages is not a cause of action, and should not be plead
in a separate count as if it were. As stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, "[i]f no cause of action
exists, then no independent action exists for a claim of punitive damage since punitive damages is only an
element of damages. To this extent, punitive damages must, by necessity, be related to the injury-
producing cause of action." Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97, 101, 555 A.2d 800, 802
(1989)(emphasis in original)(citing Rhodes v. Heberling, 306 Pa. Super. 35,451 A.2d 1378 (1982)). See
also Todd v. Burnquist, 116 Dauph. 383 (1996), and Majid v. Vartan, 114 Dauph. 351 (1994).
alleged failure to list Bethea's name among the football players
eliuible for the NFL's 1999 player draft,
The Complaint also attempts to state other issues under the
heading "New Matter (Res JudYcata)" We first note that New
Matter is reserved for responsive pleadings, rather than as a
major component of an original Complaint. In both Counts that
Bethea puts forward under this heading, he simply details two of
his prior proceedings: one before the United States District
Court (CV-97-1032, M.D. Pa), Ynfra; and, one of the actions
of Common Pleas (4250-S-
brought in the Dauphin County Court
1998), Jnrra. Amazingly, Bethea notes in this section of his
Complaint that both of these cases received final judgments, yet
Bethea somehow continues to believe this justifies, in some
manner, his pursuit for legal relief.
Unfortunately, this pro se civil action is the latest in a
very long list of pro se civil actions instituted by Bethea. A
cursory review of the Prothonotary's docket of Dauphin County
reveals at least twelve (12) prior pro se civil actions. The
Clerk's docket for the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania reveals another eleven (11) such
pro se actions. See Footnote Nos. 10 & 11 herein for a listing
of those other pro se actions.
The NFL Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter on June
27, 2000. The Defendants' New Matter raises three (3) Counts
based on res judicata. In Count I of the Defendants' New
Matter, the NFL notes that Bethea previously brought a similar
claim in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Bethea v. National Football League (amended
caption), M.D. Pa, Civil Action No. 1: CV-97-1032, appeal
dismissed, 149 F.3d 1163 (3rd Cir. 1998). Bethea initially
alleged age discrimination in that case, and he was later
allowed to amend the Complaint to include claims for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation. These claims arose from the
alleged failure of the NFL to list Bethea for the 1997 draft,
and the Honorable William W. Caldwell ultimately granted the
NFL's Motion for Summary Judgment by Order dated October 31,
1997.
In Count II of the Defendants' New Matter, the NFL details
the first civil action brought by Bethea in the Dauphin County
Court of Common Pleas. Bethea v. National Football League,
3
Dauph. Co., Clvll Actlon No. 4250-S-1998. The Honorable
Jeann±ne Turgeon granted the Preliminary Object±ons flled by the
NFL, and dismissed that actlon, wlth prejudice, by Order dated
March 5, 1999. That actlon also arose from the NFL's alleged
fallure to 11st Bethea for the very same 1997 draft. On appeal,
the Superlor Court of Pennsylvan±a afflrmed Judge Turgeon's
decision. Bethea v. Natlonal Football League, 1999 Pa. Super.
LEXIS 3464, No. 496 MDA 1999 (Pa. Super. Oct. 5, 1999).
As Count III of the Defendants' New Matter indicates,
Bethea then proceeded to f11e yet another actlon ±n the Dauphln
County Court of Common Pleas. Bethea v. Natlonal Football.
League, Dauph. Co., C±v11 Actlon No. 5022-S-1999. In that
act±on, Bethea clalmed the NFL was liable to hlm for emotional
dlstress and vicarious 1lability. The Honorable Rlchard A.
Lewls slgned an Order on June 23, 2000 that discontinued that
actlon, w±th prejudice. Agaln, Bethea clalmed the NFL was
11able to h±m because it falled to 11st hlm wlth other ellglble
players for the 1999 player draft.
the lnstant matter, on June 30, 2000, Bethea flled
Prelim±nary Objections to the Defendants' Answer and New Matter
wherein he claimed res judicata did not apply (even though he
himself plead that very same matter in his original Complaint).
The Honorable Todd A. Hoover dismissed
Objections on August 29, 2000, and directed
Answer to Defendants' New Uatter. Bethea
Defendants' New Matter on September 12,
the Preliminary
Bethea to file an
filed a Reply to
2000 that simply
detailed the previously adjudicated cases, and then referenced a
separate cause of action for harassment, which Bethea claimed is
outside of the application of res judicata.
The Defendants, in the meantime, filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and Permanent Injunction Barring Further Lawsuits
Against the Defendants without Prior Leave of Court, with a
Uemorandum 3, 2000. Bethea
of Law in Support, on August
responded by filing a Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Permanent Injunction, and Protective Order, claiming
the motions filed by the Defendants were procedurally incorrect,
and they lacked merit. The Defendants ask this Court to dismiss
the immediate action, and also request that Bethea be required
~0 receive leave from the Court before filing agy lawsuits in
the future against the NFL, which would include Defendants who
are privies of the NFL.
Bethea also filed a Motion to Compel Discovery on July 11,
2000. The Befendants responded by filing a Motion for
Protective Order on August 3, 2000. The Honorable Todd
Hoover granted the Defendants'
a
A.
Motion for a Protective Order,
and stayed all discovery in the case pending the resolution of
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent
Injunction. Incredibly, Bethea f±led a Certificate of Readiness
to have the case listed for trial, and, at the same time, served
the Defendants with Final Interrogatories on February 12, 2001.3
Not only did the service of Interrogatories upon the Defendants
apparently violate Judge Hoover's Order, but this was also a
blatant violation of Local Rule 215.1(1), which states:
"THE CERTIFICATE OF READINESS CONFIRMS THAT
ALL DISCOVERY IN THE CASE HAS BEEN
COMPLETED~ THAT ALL NECESSARY PARTIES AND
WITNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE~ THAT SERIOUS
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED~
AND THAT THE CASE IS READY IN ALL RESPECTS
FOR TRIAL."
Dauphin County Local Rules of Court, 215.1(1).4
Prior to this, Bethea also filed a Certificate of Readiness on November 27, 2000, but this Court
struck the case from the January 2001 trial list due to the outstanding Motion for Summary Judgment and
Permanent Injunction.
As will be discussed infra, the Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive notice of Judge Hoover's
August 16, 2000 Order until February 2001. This Court observes, however, that this allegation is
irrelevant when the application of Local Rule 215.1(1) is considered.
On February 7, 2001, the Defendants filed a Motion to
Strike the Case from the February Argument Court list. By Order
dated February 8, 2001, this Court removed the case from the
February Argument Court list, and ordered that the case not be
re-listed for Argument Court until the Motion for Summary
Judgment and Permanent Injunction is resolved. This Court also
issued an Order on February 13, 2001 scheduling a hearing on
March 26, 2001, at which hearing the Motion for Summary Judgment
and Permanent Injunction would be considered, as well as
Bethea's Motion to Amend the Complaint, which was filed on
August 7, 2000. The Befendants filed a Motion to Strike the
Case from the Trial List and to Sanction the Plaintiff on
February 16, 2001.~ As a result of thls Motlon, and Bethea's
actlons on February 12, 2001, this Court amended the Order of
February 13, 2001 by Order dated February 20, 2001. The Amended
Order stated that the hearlng scheduled for March 26, 2001 would
also lnclude arguments from the Plaintiff as to why sanctions
5 The Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendants' Motion to Strike the Case from the Trial List and Sanction
the. Plaintiff on February 20, 2001. Bethea asserts within that Reply that this Court informed him dtmng the
October 2000 Argument Court that Pennsylvania did not have a Permanent Injunction. However, it is the
common procedure for this Court to transcribe the arguments presented to it during Argument Court sessions.
A review of that transcript from the October 12, 2001 argument court session clearly indicates that, at no time,
did this Court inform the Plaintiff in this manner. See Notes of Arguments, October 12, 2001, pp. 1-8-~ This
provides further illustration of the Plakntiff's determination to continue a fi-ivolous action, and his
unwillingness to accept that his cause of action has previously been adjudicated.
should not be ±mposed upon h±m for h±s act±ons of February 12,
2001.
Bethea then w±thdrew h±s Mot±on for Leave to F±rst Amend
the Compla±nt on February 20, 2001. However, on March 19, 2001,
Bethea aga±n f±led a Mot&on for Leave to f±le a F±rst Amended
Compla±nt, and s±multaneously f±led a F±rst Amended Compla±nt.
On the same date, Bethea f±led a Praec±pe to l±st the Mot±on to
Amend for Argument Court ±n Apr±l 2001. On March 21, 2001, the
Befendants f±led a Mot±on to Str±ke the Case from the Argument
L±st, and requested that the Pla±nt±ff aga±n be sanct±oned for
v±olat±ng the February 8, 2001 Order of th±s Court.
On March 21, 2001, th±s Court ±ssued a Rule upon the
Pla±nt±ff to show cause why he should not be sanct±oned for
v±olat±ng the February 8, 2001 Order. The Rule was made
returnable at the March 26, 2001 hearlng. The Pla±ntlff,
however, falled to appear for the hearlng on March 26, 2001.
The Court is very sat±sfled, from statements made durlng that
hearlng by Befense counsel, that Bethea had notlce of the
hearlng through telephone conversations that took place between
Befendants' counsel and Bethea whlch speclf±cally referenced the
hearlng, and from the fact that the Plaint±fl lncluded a copy of
thls Court's Order of February 20, 2001 in hls Supplemental
Reproduced Record, whlch was f±led on March 7, 2001. The Order
of February 20, 2001 clearly states that a hearlng was scheduled
for March 26, 2001.
Follow±rig the hearlng of March 26, 2001, the Defendants
f11ed a Petltlon for the Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on
Aprll 2, 2001. The Defendants request that thls Court award
them attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,684.53, whlch ls
seventy-f±ve percent (75%) of the total amount of fees and costs
clalmed. As a result, the Court lssued a Rule upon the
Plaintiff on Apr±l $, 2001 to show cause why such Petlt±on
should not be granted. The De~endants f11ed a BP±el in Support
of the Petitlon for the Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on
Aprll 9, 2001. The Pla±ntlff flled a Brlef ±n Response to
Defendants' Petltlon fop the Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs
on Apr11 11, 2000.
In llght of th±s extensive procedural background, thls
Court w111 now conslder the following: the Plaintiff's Motlon
for Leave to Flrst Amend the Complaint; the Defendants' Motlon
for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunct±on Barr±ng Further
Lawsu±ts; the requests by the Defendants regard±ng sanct±ons;
the Mot±ors by the Defendants to str±ke the case from the tr±al
and Argument Court l±sts; the Defendants' Pet±t±on for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs; and two (2) other mot±ons f±led by
the Plaint±fl shortly before publication of thls Oplnlon.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
We w111 flrst address the Plaintiff's Mot±on to Amend the
Compla±nt. Bethea's March 19, 2001 Motlon appears to propose
sllght changes to the language contained in the Complaint fop
the clalms of intentional infliction of emot±onal dlstress and
respondeat superlor/v±carlous 1lability. In±tlally, ±t ls
important to note that these clalmed causes of action were aiso
raised ln, and were the basls of, the 1999 Dauph±n County case
rl±sted above, whlch the Honorable Rlchard A. Lewls dismissed
wlth prejud±ce, on June 23, 2000 (5022 S 1999). Due to the
application of res judicata principles that w111 be discussed
10
more fully below,
be denied.6
the Motion to First Amend the
Complaint must
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We w±ll now discuss the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Summary judgment may be entered:
[a]fter the relevant pleadings are closed, but within
such time as not to unreasonably delay trial,
whenever there is no genuine issue of
any material fact as to a necessary
6. In order to make the record as comprehensive as possible, the Court will also address the
Plaintiff's Motion to First Amend the Complaint that was withdrawn on February 20, 2001. That Motion
appeared to make a reference to a cause of action for harassment. A factually deficient reference to a
harassment claim was also made by the Plaintiff in his September 12, 2000 Reply to Defendants' New
Matter, and the Plaintiff also referenced such a cause of action at oral argument on October 12, 2000. In
several filings, Bethea has included copies of a letter allegedly written to him by the NFL which
contained the following three (3) lines:
NFL
Stanley Bethea
Go Enter The Golf Tournament
Plaintiff's Complaint, June 1, 2000, Exhibit D.
Although the Plaintiff included a photocopy of the envelope the letter was allegedly sent in,
which bears the NFL logo and return address, the letter itself contains no letterhead or signature which
connects it to the NFL organization. Furthermore, this Court notes that this case is a civil action at law.
The case law is quite clear that Pennsylvania courts do not recognize a civil cause of action for
harassment. As stated in Michelfelder v. Bensalem Twp. Sch. Dist., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9173, *4
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 2000), "Pennsylvania has criminalized harassment but has not provided a private civil
cause of action for harassment per se." See also Funderburg v. Gangl, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4875, '13
(E.D. Pa. April 12, 1995). As a result of these considerations, there is no civil cause of action for
harassment which can be recognized by this Court. However, even if there were such a cause of action
for harassment, nothing pled by Bethea would support such a claim. Indeed, if anyone has a claim for
harassment in this matter, it would be the Defendants.
element of the cause of act±on or
defense wh±ch could be establ±shed by
add±t±onal d±scovery or expert report,
or
±f, after the complet±on of d±scovery
relevant to the mot±on, ±nclud±ng the
product±on of expert reports, an
adverse party who w±ll hear the burden
of proof at tr±al has fa±led to produce
ev±dence of facts essent±al to the
cause of act±on or defense wh±ch ±n a
jury tr±al would requ±re the ±ssues to
be subm±tted to a jury.
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
The burden ±s on the mov±ng party to establ±sh that there
are no genu±ne ±ssues of mater±al fact and ±t ±s ent±tled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Butterf±eld v. G±untol±,
670 A.2d 646, 651, 448 Pa. Super. 1 (1995). Zn add±t±on, the
record must be v±ewed ±n the l±ght most favorable to the non-
mov±ng party and all doubts must be resolved aga±nst the mov±ng
party. Id. at 650.
The Defendants argue that they are ent±tled to summary
judgment based on the doctr±ne of res judicata, wh±ch "bars any
future su±t between the same part±es on the same cause of
act±on", after there has been a f±nal val±d judgment by a court
of competent jut±sd±ct±on. Stevenson v. S±lverman, 208 A.2d
12
786, 788, 417 Pa. 187, 190 (1965)(c±tat±ons om±tted). As
deta±led above, the Pla±nt±ff has ±n±t±ated three (3) pr±or
lawsu±ts based on the NFL's alleged fa±lure to l±st h±m on a
draft l±st.7 The Un±ted States D±str±ct Court for the M±ddle
D±str±ct of Pennsylvan±a prev±ously rendered a f±nal val±d
judgment, as d±d the Dauph±n County Court of Common Pleas, on
these ±ssues.
As the underly±ng cause of act±on rema±ns the same ±n the
±nstant lawsu±t, th±s Court ±s obi±gated, as a matter of law, to
grant the Defendants' Mot±on for Summary Judgment ±n accordance
w±th the doctr±ne of res judicata.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvan±a has clearly stated that
four (4) cond±t±ons must be met ±n order for res judicata to
preva±l: "1) Ident±ty ±n the th±ng sued upon; 2) Ident±ty of
the cause of act±on; 3) ~dent±ty of person and part±es to the
act±on; and 4) Ident±ty of the qual±ty or capac±ty of the
7. This is an appropriate time to reemphasize the language in the March 5, 1999 Memorandum
Opinion of the Honorable Jeannine Turgeon, which stated that the NFL has no obligation to list Bethea
with draft eligible players. The NFL is entitled to some discretion in running its operations, and while
Bethea is permitted to file for special permission to be listed as draf~ eligible under the rules of the NFL,
there is nothing within those rules that state such special permission MUST be granted. Indeed, Bethea
is in a better bargaining position as a free agent, in that he can shop his alleged exceptional athletic
talents to any of the teams within the NFL, rather than having the rights to his services controlled by one
(1) team should he be drafted.
13
part±es suing or sued." Stevenson, supra,' at 787.-788. First,
all of the previous lawsuits, along with the instant action,
arise because the NFL did not list Bethea with other eligible
players for the draft, and Bethea sought damages as a result.
~n short, Bethea is now seeking monetary compensation for not
being placed on the player draft list, just as he was in the
previous actions.
Second, the claims made by the Plaintiff in the various
lawsuits, while semantically characterized somewhat differently,
all arise from the same essential claimed cause of action, to
wit: the NFL's failure to list Bethea for the player draft.
Third, the parties to the actions are virtually the same.
Bethea is the Plaintiff in each lawsuit, and the NFL is the
primary Defendant.s
Finally, there is also an identity of quality or capacity
in all instances, as Bethea has initiated each of the lawsuits
8. Although the Plaintiff might argue that Mr. Tagliabue was not named in all of the lawsuits, it is well
settled that res judicata principles apply to privies of the parties to a lawsuit, and Mr. Tagliabue would
certainly qualify as a privy to the NFL, which is the primary Defendant in each action. See Stevenson, supra,
at 788.
14
as an individual allegedly harmed by the NFL. As such, the four
(4) conditions necessary to trigger the application of res
judicata are clearly met, and this Court is required to honor
the prior adjudication of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and those of the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas.
It must be remembered that "[t]he essential inquiry is
whether the ultimate and controlling issues have been decided in
a prior proceeding in which the present parties had an
opportunity to appear and assert their rights." Schultz v. City
of Philadelphia, 460 A.2d 833, 835, 314 Pa. Super. 194, 199
(1983)(citation omitted). This Court finds that the controlling
issues have been decided previously, inasmuch as all of the
Plaintiff's lawsuits against the NFL have centered on the NFL's
failure to list the Plaintiff with draft eligible players.
Therefore, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted, as they are entitled to such as a matter of law.
15
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION
This Court must next consider the Defendants' Motion for a
Permanent Injunction Barring Plaintiff from Filing Suit Against
the Defendants Without Prior Leave of Court. It is
overwhelmingly clear to this Court that Bethea is determined to
seek some form of relief from the NFL, on account of his
apparent perceptions of some wrong done to him.
This is
evidenced by the four (4) actions that Bethea has filed against
the NFL based on the same cause(s) of action. The first three
(3) have already received a valid final judgment, beginning with
the first action filed in the Federal District Court, and
dismissed by Judge Caldwell in 1997.
Following the most recent hearing before this Court on
March 26, 2001, it is also quite clear that the Defendants are
entitled to the Permanent Injunction. It should be clearly
understood that this injunction is not intended to deprive the
Plaintiff of access to the courts, but, rather, to protect the
Defendants against repeated, vexatious litigation based on the
same, previously adjudicated cause(s) of action.
16
The Pennsylvan±a Supreme Oourt has clearly stated that "a
court has power to enjo±n repeated fr±volous act±ons by
'pert±nac±ous l±t±gants' and such ±njunct±ons were known to
common law," but, however,
accompan±ed by f±nd±ngs and
mean±ngful rev±ew."
502 Pa. 447, 448
Department of
"the±r entry must at least be
analys±s suff±c±ent to allow
T±ll± v. Copob±anco, 466 A.2d 1334, 1335,
(1983)(c±t±ng Gordon v. Un±ted States
Just±ce, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977)).
Furthermore, we are l±kew±se m±ndful that "[a]bsent adequate
¢±nd±ngs and analys±s such an ±njunct±on ±mproperly ±mp±nges on
Art. I, §11 of the Pennsylvan±a Const±tut±on." T±ll± at 1335.
Th±s Court ±s conf±dent that the rev±ews o¢ the pr±or
adjud±cat±ons above, coupled w±th the March 26, 2001 hear±ng,
and the f±nd±ngs and analys±s conta±ned here±n, prov±de
compell±ng just±f±cat±on for the ±ssuance of a Permanent
Injunct±on without ±mp±ng±ng upon the Const±tut±onal r±ghts of
the Pla±nt±ff. The mult±ple f±l±ngs made by the Pla±nt±ff based
on the same cause(s) of act±on certa±nly ±nd±cate an uny±eld±ng
l±t±gant, who seems to be unw±ll±ng or unable to conform to the
rule of law.
17
Pursuant to th±s finding, the Plaintiff is directed to
comply with the accompany±ng Order should he feel compelled to
file any future ~awsuits against the Defendants. The Court
would also like to advise the P~aintiff at this time that his
Zegal documents submitted in the various legal proceedings to
th±s point have been woefuZly deficient. The Plaintiff is
reminded that he is entitled to no greater ~en±ency based on his
pr'o se status. T~erefore, any future legal documents must
conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Dauphin County Local Ru~es of Court. If the Plaintiff is
incapable of doing this, he is encouraged to retain legaZ
counsel to advise him in these matters.
The Plaintiff ls
further cautioned that any violation of thls Permanent
Znjunctlon w111 subject hlm to contempt proceedings whlch may
result in further sanctions, including posslble imprisonment.
In a tlme of ever-increasing court activity, no court can afford
to waste valuable judlclal resources and tlme evaluating
frivolous and/or previously adjudicated clalms.
At this time, the Court finds it appropriate to discuss the
rather unusual equity-based lssue in thls case. lhe Plaintiff
flled the lnstant Comp[alnt as a clvll actlon at law.
18
Thereafter, the Defendants sought an equ±table remedy ±n the
form of an ±njunct±on. Wh±le the case law clearly supports the
±ssuance of a Permanent Injunct±on to deter l±t±gants from
f±l±ng vexat±ous' lawsu±ts, th±s Court was unw±ll±ng to grant
such an equ±table remedy ±n an act±on at law w±thout f±rst
afford±rig the Pla±hr±fl an opportun±ty to be heard on the
matter. In short, although ±t Ks well establ±shed that the
equ±ty s±de of the court Ks always open, Pa.R.C.P. No. 1502, and
"equ±table tel±el Ks ava±lable to prevent a mult±pl±c±ty of
lawsuits," Lultweller v. Northchester Corporation, 319 A.2d 899,
902, 456 Pa. 530, 533 (1974), thls Court opted to delay
cons±derat±on of the exerc±se of the equ±ty powers we have ±n an
act±on at law, so as to prov±de the Pla±nt±ff w±th h±s
const±tut±onal r±ghts of due process (hear±ng) before mak±ng any
decKs±on on the same.9 As the Pennsylvan±a Supreme Court has
stated, '[t]he power of the courts to ±ssue ±njunct±ons should
be exerc±sed w±th great caut±on and only where the reason and
necess±ty therefore are clearly establ±shed.' R±ck v. Cramp,
357 Pa. 83, 91, 53 A.2d 84, 88-89 (1947)(c±tat±ons om±tted).
While it is undisputed that Bethea has participated in several oral arguments before the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas, there is no evidence that he was ever afforded an opportunity for an
official hearing on the issue of the appropriateness of the injunctive relief sought by the Defendants.
19
In 11ght of such caut±onary language, and because there
does not appear to be any case law on polnt deallng wlth the
grantlng of an equitable remedy ina clvll actlon at law of thls
preclse nature, and further because the Plaintiff had not
recelved a hearlng to thls polnt, the Court found ltself to be
constitutionally compelled to provlde the Plaintiff wlth the
opportunity to be heard prlor to considering whether or not to
lssue a Permanent Injunction. Although the Plaintiff chose not
to take advantage of that opportunity, and lndeed falled to
appear, or otherwise be represented at such hearlng, the Court
±s now satisfied that the grantlng of a Permanent Injunction ls
warranted, and, in fact, necessary to abate future abuse by the
Plaintiff of the judlclal resources of thls Commonwealth,
including the Federal Courts slttlng hereln.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, cltlng Lyons v. Importers
and Traders' Nat. Bank, 214 Pa. 428, 434, 63 A. 827, 829 (1906),
stated that '[t]he obvlous ground of the jurisdiction of courts
of equlty in cases of thls sort ls to suppress useless
litigation and to prevent a multlpl±clty of su±ts.' Trees v.
Glenn, 319 Pa. 487, 495, 181 A. 579, 582 (1935). That Court
also polnted to the language of Mr. Justlce Story in hls work
20
ent±tled Equ±ty Jur±sprudence, in which he stated, 'the power
has ±n many instances been recogn±zed at law as rest±rig on the
very circumstances that without such ±nterpos±tion the party can
do nothing but repeatedly resort to Zaw; and when suits have
proceeded to such an extent as to become vexatious, for that
very reason the jurisd±ct±on of a court of equity attaches.'
Id.
The Court also notes that it is fully within our power to
requlre the Plaintiff to seek the leave of this Court prlor to
fll±ng suit ina Federal Court as well as our Court. As stated
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:
[1In such a case it may restraln a party
from prosecuting a subsequent suit in
another jurisdiction, whether the objects of
the two suits are the same or not, if the
effect of the second suit is to wlthdraw
from the court first acquiring jur±sdlctlon
a part of the subject-matter of the first
sult. When an lnjunct±on ls granted for
this purpose, it ls in no just sense a
prohibition to those courts in the exercise
of the±r jurisdiction. It ls not addressed
to them and does not even assume to
interfere wlth them. The process is
dlrected only to the partles. It nelther
assumes any superiority over the court in
whlch the proceedings are had, nor denles
its jurlsd±ctlon.
Trees v. G~enn, 319 Pa. 487, 491, 181A. 579, 580 (1935).
21
~ The time has come where this Court is obligated to prevent
the Plaintiff from further burdening this, or any other court,
by filing a lawsu±t that has prev±ously been litigated. The
Plaint±ff appears to be unwilling to acknowledge that he has
repeatedly abused the civil process. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8351.
It is obvious from the instant line of cases naming the NFL as a
Defendant, and from various other suits filed by the Plaintiff
in Dauphin County~°, and the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania,TM that the Court is faced with
These are the known pro se civil actions instituted in Dauphin County by the Plaintiff, Stanley
Bethea: Stanley Bethea v. Advance Security, 258 S 1994 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v.
Global Safety, et al., 420 S 1994 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. Broad Street Market, 1470
S 1994 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. Harrisburg Hospital, 2056 S 1994 (dismissed by
Judge Jeannine Turgeon as frivolous); Stanley Bethea v. Harrisburg Hospital, 2290 S 1994 (discontinued
by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. New Cumberland Army Depot, 409 S 1995 (transferred to U.S. District
Court); Stanley Bethea v. Barry B. Moore, M.D., 1174 S 1995 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea
v. Setco, 1504 S 1995 (dismissed by Judge Richard A. Lewis as frivolous and legally deficient); In Re:
Change of Name of Stanley Bethea, 2060 S 1995 (dismissed by Judge Todd A. Hoover as frivolous - as
noted in this Opinion, Footnote 11 herein); Stanley Bethea v. Harrisburg Area Community College,
2468 S 1995 (dismissed by Senior Judge William W. Lipsitt as frivolous); Stanley Bethea v. National
Football League, 4250 S 1998 (dismissed on resjudicata grounds by Judge Jeannine Turgeon, Superior
Court appeal affmued - as previously noted in this Opinion); Stanley Bethea v. National Football
League, et al., 5022 S 1999 (discontinued by Judge Richard A. Lewis, with prejudice - as previously
noted in this Opinion).
These are the known pro se civil actions instituted in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, by the Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea: Stanley Bethea v. Employment
Standards, et. al., 93 CV 1089 (dismissed by Judge Sylvia H. Rambo as frivolous); Stanley Bethea v.
Global Safety, 94 CV 293 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell under 42 USC 1983); Stanley
Bethea v. Setco, 94 CV 555 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell); Stanley Bethea v. Defense
Distribution Region East, et. al.; 95 CV 250 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. Hamilton Health
Center, Inc., 96 CV 1825 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell as frivolous); Stanley Bethea v.
Hamilton Health Centers, Inc., 96 CV 2086 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell for failure to state
a claim); Stanley Bethea v. Hamilton Health Center, Inc., 97 CV 145 (dismissed by Judge William W.
22
noth±ng short of a vexat±ous l±t±gant, who ks ±ntent on
burden±ng the courts of Dauph±n County and the Federal D±str±ct
Court w±th prev±ously l±t±gated su±ts, or quest±onable ones, at
best,~2
SANCT'rONS
As ment±oned above, the Defendants requested sanct±ons
because the Pla±nt±ff v±olated Judge Hoover's August 16, 2000
'Order, and s±multaneously v±olated Local Rule 215.1(1). That
Order spec±f±cally stayed all d±scovery pend±ng 'resolut±on of
the Mot±on for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunct±on, yet
the Pla±nt±ff served F±nal Interrogator±es upon the Defendants
on February 12, 2001. In afford±ng the Defendant every benef±t
of the doubt ±n th±s matter, ±nc[ud±ng h±s most recent
Caldwell for failure to state a claim); Stanley Bethea v. World League 97 CV 1032 (Defendants Motion
for Summary Judgment granted by Judge William W. Caldwell - as previously noted in this Opinion);
Stanley Bethea v. Players Association, N.F.L., 98 CV 723 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell for
failure to state a claim); Stanley Bethea v. Bronstein-Jefferies Professional Association, 98 CV 1088
(dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell for failure to state a claim); Stanley Bethea v. Players
Association, N.F.L., 98 CV 1267 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell for failure to state a claim).
Another example of the Plaintiff's apparent mindset in filing these suits is exemplified by his
1995 Change of Name Petition. In that Petition, the Plaintiff attempted to change his name to "World
Saviour [sic]" (No. 2060-S-1995), and claimed therein that he (Bethea) was the only one who could
provide peace in the Middle East. See Petition for Name Change, May 16, 1995. The Honorable Todd A.
Hoover, by Memorandum and Order dated June 5, 1995, dismissed the Petition as frivolous after
discovering that the Honorable John C. Dowling denied the same request in 1991 (No. 4852-S-1990).
23
assert±ons concern±ng late rece±pt of Judge Hoover's Order of
August 16, 2000, th±s Court w±ll only cons±der the v±olat±on of
Local Rule 215.1(1) for the purposes of th±s part±cular act±on
of th±s case. As a result, th±s Court w±ll sanct±on the
Pla±nt±ff ±n the amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) for
that conduct.
On February 8, 2001, th±s Court also clearly ordered that
th±s case NOT be re-l±sted for Argument Court pend±ng resolut±on
of the Mot±on for Summary Judgment and Permanent Znjunct±on.
Nevertheless, the Pla±nt±ff f±led a Praec±pe on March 19, 2001
to l±st h±s Mot±on to F±rst Amend the Compla±nt for the Apr±l
2001 Argument Court. The Court w±ll also sanct±on the Pla±nt±ff
an add±t±onal Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) for that v±olat±on.~3
On the advent of publ±sh±ng th±s 0p±n±on, Apr±l 20, 2001,
Bethea once aga±n f±led a Pet±t±on For The [s±c] Mot±on for
Leave to F±rst Amend the Compla±nt. In th±s recent l±t±g±ous
render±ng from Bethea, he asserts that h±s present cause of
This Court would like to note that we chose only to impose monetary sanctions upon the Plaintiff
as a result of the instant contemptuous conduct. The Court did so in lieu of initiating contempt
proceedings. We will likely not avoid contempt proceedings in the future if there should be further
v/olations of our orders!
24
action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress.~4 As
a result of the determinations set forth herein, the Court did
not require the Defendants to file a response to that Petition.
Furthermore, because this Court granted the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, there is no need to consider the instant
Petition.~5
And of even more current vintage, on April 23, 2001, Bethea
filed another pleading which he captioned "Plaintiff's Motion To
Strike The Defendant"s [sic] Request For Sanction Stating
Plaintiff's Flagrant Disregard Of Local Rule 215.1(1) and FEES
AND COSTS." (Emphasis and errors in original). In that Motion,
the Plaintiff claims the Defendants' request for sanctions
should be stricken because Bethea did not receive Judge Hoover's
Order of August 16, 2000, which stayed all discovery, until
February, 2001.~6 The Plaintiff fails to realize, however, that
Unfortunately, we are again required to note that Bethea's latest assertion of a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress was one of the causes of action that was dismissed, with
prejudice, by the Order of Judge Lewis, dated June 23, 2000. We also note that Bethea instituted the
present civil action on June 1, 2000, before the prior action was even resolved by Judge Lewis.
The Court would like to note that the Plaintiff avoided sanctions for this action only because he
did not list the case for Argument Court. Otherwise, this Court would not have hesitated to sanction the
Plaintiff again for violating a Court Order.
16 Bethea claims in this Motion that the Dauphin County Prothonotary, Stephen E. Farina, withheld
the Order of August 16, 2000, attributing this to the allegation "that Mr. Stephen E. Farina was biased
toward [sic] the Plaintiff." Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Defendant"s [sic] Request for Sanction stating
25
his reception of Judge Hoover's Order, regardless of when it
occurred, is completely independent of his blatant violation of
Local Rule 215.1(1). The Court willingly concedes that none of
the previous Orders referenced Local Rule 215.1(1). Since the
Plaintiff has chosen to initiate this civil action in a pro se
capacity, he is, nevertheless, fully responsible to acquaint
himself with, and abide by, the Locai Rules of Court.
As stated above, the Plaintiff is being sanctioned for
filing a Certificate of Readiness to have the case listed for
trial, while simultaneously serving the Defendants with Final
Interrogatories, on February 12, 2001. The filing of the
Certificate of Readiness is an unequivocal certification to the
Court that ALL discovery has been completed. Given Bethea's
service of interrogatories at that same time, the filing of the
Certificate constituted a misrepresentation to the Court. This
violation of Local Rule 215.1(1) will not be overlooked due to
the Plaintiff's alleged late reception of Judge Hoover's Order,
Plaintiff s Flagrant Disregard of Local Rule 215.1 (1) and FEES AND COSTS, April 23,2001, p. 1. This
Court can only interpret this to mean that Bethea thinks Mr. Farina is biased against him. Regardless,
Bethea offers nothing beyond this allegation to substantiate this claim, such as the envelope it was
contained in with the date of its mailing, or any other thing evidencing when it was actually received.
Without more, this Court is left with no choice but to view this assertion as merely another attempt by
Bethea to further his own interests, much as he did when he falsely claimed that this Court informed him
that Pennsylvania did not have a Permanent Injunction. See Footnote No. 5, supra.
26
espec±ally in light of the fact that such an Order would have
had no influence over the violation. In short, even if this
Court were to accept the Plaintiff's claim that he did not
receive the August 2000 Order until February 2001, that still
would fail to justify his service of interrogatories at the same
time he was certifying the case as ready for trial.
The instant case has already been removed from the April
2001 Argument Court list pursuant to this Court's Order of
February 8, 2001, and the case was also removed from the April
civil trial list by Amended Order of this Court on April 16,
2001.
DEFENDANTS' MOTTON FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES & COSTS
This Court also finds that the Defendants are entitled to
the award of attorneys' fees and costs for the litigation that
they have been subjected to by the bad faith and vexatious
conduct of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has failed to accept
the fact that he has no legal recourse because the NFL has
chosen not to list him as a draft eligible player. Uoreover,
27
the Plaintiff has chosen to lgnore the prlor decisions of the
Dauphln County Court of Common Pleas, as well as the Unlted
States Dlstrlct Court for the Mlddle Distrlct of Pennsylvania.
42 Pa.C.S.A. §2503 llsts the following among those entltled
to recelve reasonable counsel fees:
(7) Any participant who is awarded counsel
fees as a sanct±on agalnst another
participant for dilatory, obdurate or
vexatious conduct durlng the pendency of a
matter.
(9) Any participant who ls awarded counsel
fees because the conduct of another party in
commenc±ng the matter or otherwise was
arb±trary, vexatious or in bad falth.
There can be llttle doubt that the Plaintiff exercised bad
falth in initiating
these Defendants.
thls present lawsuit - the fourth namlng
Thls lawsult has served only to further
therefore,
harass and annoy the Defendants in thls matter and,
thls Court flnds that such vexatious conduct on behalf of the
Plaintiff warrants the ±ssuance of an award of attorneys' fees
and costs.
The Plaintiff merely argues in his Brief that such fees and
costs shouid not be awarded because the Plaintiff has flled a
Motion for Leave to First Amend bls Complaint. Thls response by
28
the Plaintiff does nothing to justify the initiation of four
lawsuits against the Defendants for essentially the same
cause(s) of action. The Plaintiff further claims that,
"Intentional Infliction of Emotionai Distress has not been heard
in State or Federal Court." Piaintiff's Brief in Response to
Defendants' Petition for the Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs,
April 11, 2001, p.1. However, once again, th±s statement
ignores the case that was dismissed with prejudice by Judge
Lewis in 2000. This situation offers yet another exampie of the
Plaintiff's unwillingness and/or inability to accept the rule of
law on this cause(s) of action.
Accordingly, this Court enters the following:
29
STANLEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 03-33
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
Defendant, National Football League ("NFL"), by and through its attorneys,
McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, hereby files these Preliminary Objections to the
Plaintiff's Complaint. In support thereof, the NFL states the following:
THE PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiff Stanley Bethea has filed suit against the NFL, asserting a claim of
negligence based on the NFL's alleged negligence in failing to inform Plaintiff of the
eligibility rules for trying out as a free agent for an NFL football team.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION//1: PERMANENT INJUNCTION
2. Plaintiff is acting in direct violation of Judge Lawrence Clark's Order of
July 16, 2001. (See attached Exhibit "A.") The Order provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
(1) The PERMANENT INJUNCTION entered against the
Defendant by the April 26, 2001 Order of this Court is CONTINUED.
The Plaintiff IS HEREBY ENJOINED from filing a lawsuit against the
above-captioned Defendants, their employees, or agents, in either
state or federal court without prior leave of this Court.
In violation of the above permanent injunction, Plaintiff failed to obtain leave of
Court prior to filing the instant action.
granted.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION #2: DEMURRER
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
Under the circumstances described in Plaintiff's Complaint, there can be
no cause of action for negligence.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION #3
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
4. Plaintiff's claims were litigated in Bethea v. Washington Redskins,
Cumberland Co. No. 02-0572. By Opinion and Order dated November 18, 2002,
Judge Edgar Bailey granted the Washington Redskins' Preliminary Objections and
dismissed Plaintiff's action. Plaintiff's present claims are barred by res judicata
and/or collateral estoppel.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant National Football League respectfully requests
that the Court (1) grant these Preliminary Objections, (2) dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint with prejudice, and (3) due to the frivolous nature of Plaintiff's action,
award attorneys' fees and costs in favor of the NFL and against Plaintiff.
McNEES WALLACE & NURICK LLC
~harles T. O%~ ~ B 0
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
Phone: (717) 237-5397
Fax: (717) 237-5300
Attorneys for Defendant
National Football League
Dated: January 21, 2003
Exhibit A
STANLEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
Mm
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and
PAUL TAGLIABUE, COMMISSIONER
N.L.F.,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 2310 S 2000
AMENDED ORDER
Th±s Court ±ssued an Order ±n the above capt±oned matter on
Apr±l 26, 2001, wh±ch ENJOINED the Pla±nt±ff from fi[±ng su±t
aga±nst the Defendants. Th±s Amended Order ±s ±ntended to
c[ar±fy and affirm that Apr±[ 26, 2001 Order, and d±rects the
P~a±nt±ff on how to proceed w±th further f±l±ngs nam±ng the
Defendants, subject to the terms and cond±t±ons of that or±ginaZ
Order and th±s Amended Order, as foZ~ows:
(1) The PERMANENT INJUNCTION entered aga±nst the Defendant
by the Apr±~ 26, 2001 Order of this Court ±s CONTINUED, The
P~a±nt±ff IS HEREBY ENJOINED from f±~±ng a Zawsu±t aga±nst the
above-capt±oned Defendants, the±r employees, or agents, in
e±ther state or federal court w±thout pr±or leave of th±s Court.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff IS HEREBY ENJOINED from f±~±ng any
pet±t±ons, mot±ons or other plead±rigs, whatsoever, regard±ng the
above-capt±oned case aga±nst the Defendants, the±r employees, or
agents, ±n e±ther state or federal court w±thout pr±or leave of
th±s Court, The Pla±nt±ff ±s spec±f±cally rem±nded that th±s
Court GRANTED the Defendant's Dot±on for Summary Judgment ±n the
Apr±l 26, 2001 Order, As such, the case docketed at 2310 S 2000
rece±ved a FINAL ADJUDICATIOH from th±s Court, and any further
mot±ons or plead±ngs f±led by the Pla±nt±ff, under that docket,
w±ll be cons±dered to be prima facia fr±volous and vexat±ous
conduct by the' Pla±nt±ff, Th±s Amended Order, however, does not
apply to the f±l±ng of a TIMELY Not±ce of Appeal from th±s Court
to the Pennsylvan±a Superior Court or documents solely ±n
furtherance of such appeal, nor does this Amended Order apply to
lawsuits ±nvolv±ng d±fferent Defendants; and
(2) Should the Pla±nt±ff feel compelled to f±le a separate
lawsuit against the above named Defendants, their employees, or
agents, ±n e±ther state or federal court, the Pla±nt±ff MUST
seek the leave of this Court by f±ling a pet±t±on w±th the
DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, for rev±ew by staff
attorneys of that office, and subsequent approval of the Court
Administrator BEFORE any such lawsuit can ult±mately be f±led
with the ~DAUPHIH COUNTY PROTHONOTARY'$ OFFICE, In order to
obta±n the leave of th±s Court, the Pla±hr±fl must show, through
2
a deta±led legal wr±t±ng attached to the sa±d pet±t±on, that the
new lawsu±t: (a) can surv±ve a mot±on for judgment on the
p~ead±ngs; (b) ±s not barred by pr±nc±p~es of ±ssue prec~us±on
(co~atera~ estoppel) or c~a±m prec~us±on (ces judicata); (c) ±s
not repet±t±ve and not ±n v±olat±on of any court order; and (d)
compS±es ±n a~l other respects w±th the Pennsy~van±a Ru~es of
C±v±~ Procedure and the Dauph±n County Loca~ Ru~es of Court,
Should the Pla±nt±ff sat±sly the requ±rements of th±s Amended
Order for f±~±ng a NEW ~aWsu±t aga±nst the above named
Defendants, the±r employees, or agents, the DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT
ADMINISTRATOR w±~ so ±nd±cate by attach±rig a s±gned wr±t±ng to
the face of the Comp~a±nt, then forward±rig the Comp~a±nt to the
DAUPHIN COUNTY PROTHONOTARY'S OFFICE for f±~±ng; and
(3) The Plaintiff ls further dlrected to attach a copy of
th±s Amended Order to the face of any pet±t±on for the leave of
th±s Court prlor to fll±ng such petltion w±th the DAUPHIN COUNTY
COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE; and
(4) The Court further ORDERS the Prothonotary not to
accept for fll±ng any Complaint, mot±on, petition, memorandum,
or any other Zegal document from the Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea,
agalnst tlhe above named Defendants, thelr employees, or agents,
wlthout the approval of the DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S
3
OFFICE, as deta±ied above, and FURTHER ORDERS the Prothonotary
to d±ssem±nate the contents of th±s Amended Order to the ent±re
staff of h±s Off±ce; and
(5) The Court ORDERS the Prothonotary to f±le and enter
±nto the docket th±s Amended Order, and FURTHER ORDERS the
Prothonotary to forward a cert±f±ed copy of th±s Amended Order
to the Clerk of Court for the Un±ted States D±str±ct Court for
the M±ddle D±str±ct of Pennsylvan±a; and
(6) The foregoing prov±s±ons of th±s Injunction SHALL HOT
be appl±cable to any such c±v±l act±on f±led on behalf of
Pla±nt±ff, Stanley Bethea, by an attorney who Ks duly l±censed
to pract±ce law ±n th±s Commonwealth; prov±ded, however, that
any attorney undertak±ng such representat±on of the Pla±hr±fl ±n
such matters shall be profess±onally responsible for any
f111ngs; and
(7) Should the Plaintiff vlolate thls Amended Order, he
faces the d±stlnct poss±bil±ty of being charged with ind±rect
cr±mlnal contempt, and ±f found to be' gu±lty of same, may be
punlshed by a flne and/or lmpr±sonment, as provlded by law; and
4
(8) Additionally, should the Plaintiff vlolate th±s
Amended Order, he faces the possib±llty of belng charged wlth
clvll contempt, and if found gu±lty of same, may be punlshed as
provlded by law, wh±ch array of sanctions may lnclude and or all
of the following: Confinement, Punltlve Damages, and Speclal
Damages (±ncludlng attorney's fees, expenses and costs for any
respond±rig party ±n such matters); and
(9) Inasmuch as thls Court has already granted the
Defendants Mot±on for Summary Judgment in our prev±ous Order of
Apr11 26, 2001, the Plaintiff's lnstant Motlon for Leave to Flle
a Flrst Amended Complaint, flled on June 12, 2001, IS HEREBY
DEHIED; and
(10) The Dauphln County Sherlff shall immediately effect
personal, 1n-hand, servlce of a certified copy of thls Amended
Order upon the Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea.
BY THE COURT:
July 16, 2001
Lawrence F. Clark, Jr., Judge
5
D];STR;[BUTTON:
El±zabeth A. rVlaguschak, Esqu±re, 100 P±ne Street, P.O. Box 1166,
Harr±sburg, PA 17108-1166
Charles T. Young, Esqu±re, 100 P±ne Street, P.O. Box 1166,
Harr±sburg, PA 17108-1166
Stanley Bethea, 533 Curt±n Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110
Deborah Freeman, Esquire, Deputy Court Administrator
Stephen E. Farina, Prothonotary
James H. Rowland, Jr., Esquire, 812-A North 17TM Street,
Harrisburg, PA 17103
Clerk of Court, U.S.D.C. for M.D. of PA
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served by U.S. first-class mail upon the following:
Stanley Bethea
533 Curtin Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Charles T. You~?//Jr.' ~-~J
Counsel for Defendant
National Football League
Dated: January'7,I, 2003
STANLEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 03-33
PRAEC!PE TO DISCONTINUE
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Pursuant to
discontinued~
Dated: January"~__?, 2003
229~ Kindly mark the above
Sincerely,
Plaintiff Stanley Bethea, Pro Se
action
IN THE INTEREST OF:
CRYSTAL JO MARTIN and
JESSICA LEE MARTIN
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
: NO. 2003-33
MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS
AND NOW, t is _~ day of June, 2003, comes Teresa Martin, mother of Crystal Jo
Martin and Jessica Lee Martin, the above-named juveniles, by and through herpro bono counsel,
Wendy J. F. Grella, Esquire, and respectfully requests Your Honorable Court grant her Motion
for Transcripts and, in support thereof, avers the following:
On or about May 12, 2003, Ms. Theresa Martin received a letter from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare indicating that a report
of suspected abuse involving her children was investigated and the status was
"Indicated."
Subsequently, undersigned counsel received a referral from MidPenn Legal Services to
represent Ms. Martin as a conflict from their office, which representation was
accepted.
On or about Tuesday, June 17, 2003, undersigned counsel forwarded a letter to the
Secretary of Public Welfare indicating that Ms. Martin was appealing the finding of the
Indicated report and requesting that the report be destroyed or amended due to its
inaccuracy.
It is undersigned counsel's understanding that on or about May 7, 2003, Ms. Martin
appeared before Your Honorable Court for the purposes of a Children and Youth
proceeding.
As a result of that hearing, Your Honorable Court issued an Order placing the two
minor children with their aunt.
Undersigned counsel believes that the transcript frora this proceeding is necessary and
relevant to prepare for Ms. Martin's appeal.
7. Ms. Martin is indigent and unable to afford the exper~tse of such transcript.
WHEREFORE, undersigned counsel respectfully requests Your Honorable Court order that
the Notes of Testimony presented at the May 7, 2003, Children and Youth proceeding be
transcribed and filed of record with a copy provided to undersigned counsel, at the cost of the
County.
Respectfully submitted ~
Wendy J. }
200 North Hanover Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 243-.5551
(800) 347-5552
VERIFICATION
I verify that the statements made in the foregoing document are true and correct. I
understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section
4904, relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities.
THERESA MARTIN
1N THE 1NTEREST OF:
CRYSTAL JO MARTIN and
JESSICA LEE MARTIN
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
: NO. 2003-33
PETITION TO MAKE RULE ABSOLUTE
AND NOW comes Teresa Martin, mother of Crystal .Io Martin and Jessica Lee Martin,
the above named juveniles, by and through her pro bono counsel, Wendy J. F. Grella, Esquire,
and respectfully requests your Honorable Court to grant her Petition to Make Rules Absolute and
in support thereof, avers the following:
On or about July 1, 2003, undersigned counsel filed a Motion for Transcripts with
regard to the above referenced matter.
By Order of Court dated July 8, 2003, Your Honorable Court issued a Rule upon all
parties to show cause as to why Petitioner's Motion for Transcripts of the May 7,
2003, hearing should not be granted.
3. This Rule was returnable ten (10) days after service. (see attached Exhibit "A")
4. Undersigned counsel received the above referenced[ Rule on or about July 11, 2003.
To date, undersigned counsel has not received a response from any of the parties
indicating why Petitioner's Motion for Transcripts of the May 7, 2003, hearing should
not be granted.
6. Ten days has expired since service of the aforesaid Rule to Show Cause.
VERIFICATION
I verify that the statements made in the foregoing document are true and correct. I
understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section
4904, relating to unswom falsifications to authorities.
DATE: ~~ F. GR~Q~UIRE
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE INTEREST OF:
CRYSTAL JO MARTIN
JESSICA LEE MARTIN
2003 JUVENILE 0033
On the 8th day of July 2003 2003, at the instance of Judge Edward E. Guido
Rule on:
Wendy J. F. Grella, Esquire
Griffie & Associates
200 North Hanover Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
AND NOW, this 10th day of July 2003, Rule issued in accordance with the attached Order
of Court.
Dennis E. Lebo, Clerk of Court
Testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand and affixed the seal of said Court at
Carlisle, this 10th day of July 2003
Dennis E. Lebo, Clerk of Court
IN THE INTERST OF
CRYSTAL JO MARTIN
JESSICA LEE MARTIN
: IN THE COURT OF COIvIMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
: 2003 JUVENILE 0033
:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, THIS 8TM day of JULY, 2003, a Rule is issued upon all
parties to Show Cause why the Petitioner's Motion for Transcript of the
May 7, 2003 hearing should not be granted.
Rule returnable ten (10) days after service.
Lindsay D. Baird, Esquire
Brian Bomman, Esquire
Wendy Grella, Esquire
Jacqueline M. Vemey, Esquire
Ruby D. Weeks, Esquire
Michael Whare, Esquire
CCC&Y
Probation
Edward E. Guido, J.
A TRUE COPY FROM RECORD
In Testimony whereof, I here unto set my hand
and the seal of sa~L.Court at Carlisle, PA.
' -/ '~- Cl~rk of'the Cburt
Cumberland Ceun~
CAS~
~ C~ O
STANLEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
· DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
VS,
2310 CV 2000
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND
PAUL TAGLIABUE, COMMISSIONER,
N.F.L.,
Defendant
: CIVIL. ACTION - LAW :
ORDER
AND NOW THIS day of ~o~ey, 2003, upon consideration of the Motion
For Leave of Court submitted to the Court Administrator's Office in accordance with the
order entered in this matter filed on July 16, 2001, Plaintiff is not required to obtain our
permission to file an action in Cumberland County. Plaintiff is only required to obtain
our permission before filing an action against Defendants in either Dauphi,n County or in
the United States District Court for the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania. However,
Plaintiff is admonished to carefully scrutinize Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
1023.1-1023.4, which provide for the imposition of severe sanctions for the filing of
frivolous pleadings or motions.
DIsTRIbUTION:
Stanley Bethea, 533 Curtin Street, Harrisburg, Pa. 17110
Charles Young, Esquire, 100 Pine Street, P.O. Box 1166, Harrisburg, Pa.
~BYTHE ~RT:
17108-1166
STANLEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
Vo
WASHINGTON REDSKINS,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 02-572
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES
Defendant Washington Redskins, by and through its attorneys, McNees Wallace &
Nurick LLC, hereby files Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories .as follows:
1. Did Coach Marty Schottenheim (sic) allow free agents to try out for the
Washington Redskins Football Team?
ANSWER: The term "try out" is ambiguous. The Redskins do not allow people
to participate in organized team events without first executing a contract. With
this proviso - Yes, the Washington Redskins did a~llow free agents to "try out"
for the 2001 football team.
2. What is the name and address of Washington Redskins Insurance Company?
ANSWER: The Washington Redskins possess no applicable insurance
coverage.
Dated: March jcl, 2002
Respectfully subrnitted,
McNEES WALLACE & NURICK LLC
Elizabeth A. Magu,Ccr~
Attorney I.D. No.~9853
Charles T. Young, Jr.
Attorney I.D. No. 80680
100 Pine Street
P. O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
(717) 237-.5397
Attorneys for Defendant Washington Redskins
STANLEY BETHEA,
Plaintiff
PAUL TAGLIABUE,
COMMISSIONER N.F.L.
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 03-0033 CIVIL TERM
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 26th day of August, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiff's
Motion To Reinstate Action Pursuant To Pa. R.J.A. No. 1901, the motion is denied.
BY THE COURT,
Stanley Bethea
533 Curtin Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Charles Young, Jr., Esq.
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
Attorney for Defendant
:re