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Home My WebLink About98-00160 '. >-... ~ tII > ,; II) 4- t " ~ ~. " '\ . , \ \ ) ) / . / / (, ... ~ - . . , - c:J 4. At said time, Defendant Jason C. Fry was the operator of a 1989 Chevrolet and was traveling on Spring Road in North Middleton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Defendant Jason J. Fry disregarded a red traffic signal and struck Plaintiff's vehicle, thereby causing a collision of the two vehicles. 5. Defendant Jason C. Fry was negligent and careless in the operation of said motor vehicle for the following reasons which include: a. proceeding through an intersection when it was unsafe to do so; b. failure to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle; c. disregarding the rights, safety and position of other vehicles on the road, including Plaintiff John Roberts; and/or, d. failure to stop in time to avoid a collision with the motor vehicle operated by Plaintiff ,John Roberts; e. negligence per se; f. failure to abide by the applicable statutes, rules , and regulations of the road, including Title 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3112 (3) (i) and Section 4525 (a) . 6. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Jason C. Fry's negligence and carelessness / and not due to any act or failure to act on the part of plaintiff John Roberts. Plaintiff John Roberts suffered a serious impairment of a bodily function, great pain and suffering, traumatic anxiety, depression, and other injuries, Bome or all of which may be permanent, including 1 limited range of motion and pain in the lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spine, hip and leg pain and numbness, headaches, bulging discs at L3-4 and L4.5 regions, broad protrusion of the L5-81 disc, contusions of his ribs, as well as injuries to his left leg and foot. 7. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Jason C. Fry's negligence and carelessness, plaintiff John Roberts has been, and may continue to be in the future/ unable to attend to his usual habits, customs, vocation and enjoyment of life. B. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Jason C. Fry's negligence and carelessness/ plaintiff John Roherts has been in the past, and may continue to be in the future, required to undergo medical treatments and procedures, 9. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Jason C. Fry's negligence and carelessness, plaintiff John Roberts has ~j .,.. lfl ~: Cr,; ...:t i'" --:-.. . ~1I0 (11 ~-.) ."( l >~ .~. -:1 C'l' .... (J ., Li_f;: lj" .. o( , i I;..' e,j C' ...... '.. _~I ~-;., u .. c_ l'i.J "': ..", ., '.- IL ('''' "'i 0 Q \ 0 ,;) ".... , '(2) Ie, ~ J0 c0 '" ~ ~ !{ ~ ~"<'~ rlN'l "" 11 ~~ ,..... ~ I;;J ~ >- c> , , (.: q; IS':> 7 -:'.. : ~j .--r 1-. .. u,~~! ('1 ~.) ;~; ft'. - ,"' ,,~ I..) ~)~ ~v 0.. \:J ~'.~ 0 _~" J ") (~< : ~~~, ;~; a.. ...- fl' c.r~ n~ CD a;'l I.1J D.lo.. r~~ lL. ".:;: l.t.. (0 ::') 0 C1'I 0 5, The averments contained in Parugraph 5 of I'luintift's Compluint are eonclusions of law or fact to which no response is necessury. To the extent that a response is deemed necessary, the avennents ure denied parsuant to Pu. R.C.p. 1029(e). By way of further Answer, Defendant hereby incorporates by reference Paragruph 15 of his Ncw Matter as though fully set forth herein. 6-11. The averments contained in I'aragruphs 6 through II of Plaintiffs Complaint are cone Ius ions of law or fact to which no response is necessary, To the extent that a response is deemed necessary, the averments are denied pursuant to Pa. R.C,P. 1029(e). It is speci,fically denied that PJaintiffis entitled to recover damages under tho Full Tort provision of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. WHEREFORE, Defendunt, Jason C. Fry, demands judgment in his favor and against Plaintiff, and that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and costs of this action, NEW MATTER 12. The averments set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint fail to state a claim or cause of action against Defendant upon which relief muy be granted. 13, Any claim or cause of action set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint is barred by operation of the contributory/comparative negligence of Plaintiff, as muy be developed during discovery, 14, Any claim or cause of action set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint is barred by operation of Plaintiffs assumption ofa known risk, as may be developed during discovery. 2 15. Any claim or cause of action set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, including specifically, but not limited to, any claim or cause of action which, by reason of lack ofspecificily of pleading, is not directly or specifically set forth in the language of Plaintiffs Complaint, but which Plaintiff seeks to raise at a later time by further amendment, claiming to have preserved such claim or cause of action within Plaintiffs Complaint. 16. Thc injuries allegcd to have been suffcred by Plaintiff as a result of this accident are not the result of any negligence on the part of Defendant, but instead either existed prior to August 26, 1996, or are the results of the pre-existing medical condilions of Plainti ff. 17. AI all material times, it is believed, and therefore averred, that Plaintiff was a named insured under an automobile policy with State Farm Insurance Company under which Plaintiff elected a limited tort option. 18. The aforesaid election of the limited tort option by Plaintiff is in complete conformance with the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, as codified at 75 Pac C.S.A. * 1701 ~,. specifically the notice provisions as set forth at 75 Pac C,S.A. * 1791.1 (b). 19. The injuries alleged to have been sustained by Plaintiff do not meet the definition of "serious i'1jury" as set forth at 75 Pac C.S,A * 1702, and Plaintiffs claim or cause of action is therefore barred by Plaintiffs election of the limited tort option and the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, specifically 75 Pac C.S,A. * 1705(d), 20, Any claim or calise ofuction set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint is barrcd or limited 3 ~f:' ... (:\,\ f" r ll-' C., -"1 C. . , - G-: , n.;., IL L () l , 1,0 C; ,;' ~.~, ~ .. . I 'y t: , r< ;"i tn " , , i-J,.., I. JL';' LL en ;:::1 () U\ () responsive pleading is required, answering plaintiff specifically denies that he was contributorily or comparatively negligent. To the contrary, Plaintiff's inj uries were caused solely by the negligence of Defendant, Fry as set out in detail in Plaintiff's Complaint. 14. Denied. Answering defendant is advised by counsel and therefore avers that the allegations contained in the corresponding paragraph of the Defendant's New Matter are automatically deemed denied as conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. Strict proof thereof is demanded at. trial, if material. To the extent however, a responsive pleading is required, answering Plaintiff specifically denies that he assumed any known risk which lead or may have lead to the happening of the complained of motor vehicle accident. 15. Denied. Answering defendant is advised by counsel and therefore avers that the allegations cont.ained in the corresponding paragraph of the Defendant's New Matter are automatically deemed denied as conclusions of law t.o which nq responsi ve pleading is required. Strict proof thereof is demanded at trial, if material. To the extent however, a responsive pleading may be required, Plaintiff specifically denies that his cause of action is, in any way, barred by any applicable Statute of Limitations as set forth in the corresponding paragraph of Defendant's New Matter, 1'0 the contrary, Plaintiff preserves all such future claims as may be permissible by Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or applicable case law. 16. Denied. Answering defendant is advised by counsel and therefore avers that the allegations contained in the corresponding paragraph of the Defendant's New Matter are automatically deemed denied as conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. Strict proof thereof is demanded at trial, if material. To the extent however, that a responsive pleading may be required answe~ing Plaintiff specifically denies that his injuries are not the result of any negligence on the part of Defendant, but instead existed prior to August 26, 1996 or are the result of the pre-existing medical conditions of Plaintiff. To the contrary, Plaintiff's injuries were solely and proximately caused by the negligence of Defendant as more fully set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, and were in no way pre-existing medical conditions. 1? Admitted. 18. Denied. Answering defendant is advised by counsel and therefore avers that the allegations contained in the corresponding paragraph of the Defendant's New Matter are automatically deemed denied as conclusions of law to which no responsi ve pleading is required. strict proof thereof is demanded at trial, if material. 19. Denied. Answering defendant is advised by counsel and therefore avers that the allegations contained in the corresponding paragraph of the Defendant's New Matter are automatically deemed denied as conclusions of law to which no responsi ve pleading is required. Strict proof thereof is demanded at trial, if material. To the extent, however that a responsive pleading may be required. Plaintiff specifically denies that the injuries he sustained in the subject motor vehicle collision do not meet the definition of "serious injury" as set forth at 75 Pa. C.S.A, section 1702 and further specifically denies that Plaintiff's claim or cause of action is therefore barred by Plaintiff's election of the limited tort option and the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, specifically 75 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 1705 (d). To the contrary, Plaintiff's injuries are serious debilitating injuries which remove Plaintiff from the limiting effects of 75 Pa. C.S.A. 1701 et. seq. 20. Denied. Answering defendant is advised by counsel and therefore avers that the allegations contained in the corresponding paragraph of the Defendant's New Matter are automatically deemed denied as conclusions of law to which no