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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-01483 i --L; " '. ~ ~ ~' q: "::::' , (t Q \, ~ "~ ~ ~ '" ~ I ,I l ~ ~ " - " . " :) . - U ", CY)~' ~') ~.' -.....:" , c:I"l'SIIc,I1,n,nlclllllpl,lnl.dlv 111. nS) 12.'17,01 Mard,2J,2lMMl GAIL G. CALLANAN, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE NO. 98 - 1483 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE VS. WILLIAM P. CALLANAN, Defendant PRAECIPE TO TRANSMIT RECORD To the Prothonotary: Transmit the record, together with the following information, to the court for entry of a divorce decree: 1. Ground for divorce: irretrievable breakdown under Section 3301 (c) 2291 (d)(1) of the Divorce Code, (Strike out Inapplicable section), 2, Date and manner of service of the complaint: Certified Mail; Return Receipt signed by Defendant, William p, Callanan, dated May 1,1998. 3, (Complete either paragraph (a) or (b)), (a) Date of execution of the affidavit of consent required by Section 3301 (c) of the Divorce Code: by the Plaintiff January 27, 2000; by the Defendant January 27,2000 (b) (1) Dale ef execution of the Plaintiff's affidavit reElLJlroel by Sestion 2301 (d) ef the Diverse Ceele: (2) Date ef servise ef the Plaintiff's affielavit upon the Defendant: 4. Related claims pending: None 5, Complete either (a) or (b), (a) Date and manner of service of the notice of intention to file Praecipe to transmit record, a copy of which is attached: (b) Date Plaintiffs Waiver of Notice In 3301 (c) Divorce was filed with the Prothonotary: January 27, 2000 Date Defendant's Waiver of Notice in 3301 (c) Divorce was filed with the Prothonotary: January 27, 2000 for Plaintiff 0>- 0\ 0:,; ~ j:l~ Ir. tJ~G! "" .:.:;3 __ r..'C' - 1:59 l.1.:...' '- ( '= '.J~ _~ u.. :;.1:: '7'6 !;;)~ ao" ~ <::> ~_.C) LJ.jl. _..J .-32 G.:'.: c.:: ,-,-;:: r::: 0.. ,iilU "'" iJdo... w_ ;,. 0 <::> d CJ ..-- .......-. ~ '- <'I f::; c:.;; ..-.\ ,-~ .. UJC': -. 5~r', -. u~~ .... u. r~' U- n?:. t;i'() -.- [ij u~h: 1 ::s:~ r.r......7 tti~! ~'M "llO t':': !t~Cl.. .,,-~ :1.: ,- ,.. II, t:'~ a C> eel ji ij >.. 1; , ~ ,;-,: ..-= I.!J~:,: :~l<r r:\. 1._1 i;J ;'j-(: ~5.: ," )--, -'-', ::;;f~ ii '.1.:.. C)~-: .,;~ f;~~.: '"'. ('.J :"JZ ,,--- U:t . .'-.. ;~ti to i--:" u:-: ;.1)0. -'l ::-E :,l.. a ::> '-) 0 U .., , GAIL G. CALLANAN, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION. DIVORCE VS. Defendant NO. 98 - 1483 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE WILLIAM P. CALLANAN, AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1, A Complaint in Divorce under ~ 3301 (c) of the Divorce Code was filed on March 18,1998, 2, The marriage of plaintiff and defendant Is Irretrievably broken and ninety days have elapsed from the date of filing and service of the Complaint. 3, I consent to the entry of a final Decree in Divorce after service of notice of Intention to request entry of the Decree, I verify that the statements made In this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, Information and belief, I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa,C,S, 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities, (<-.:.>:.-1.. G c .~.... Gail G, Callanan, Pial liff Date: 0 I , 2. '5 , 0 CJ WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER ~3301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1, I consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce without notice, 2, I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted, 3, I understand that I will not be divorced until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the Decree will be sent to me immediately after It is filed with the Prothonotary, I verify that the statements made in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa,C,S, 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: DI' '2.';;. 00 G:-~ G". C.~\_ Gail G, Callanan. PI Intiff .. i \l >- f;. ..- "'-.'" z ,'. \,. :.~~ t1~2\ ' J-rr. ,~ ~~.., " ~ G~;I. c~ C\~ I:L:.;, />- ,- ~.~1- (l) ~-, '.' N .")..;<:.: " I_,r- 'V'_'" 1'1..... 'l"tjrb f:[.~U -- ..- .c.l: rf:\Cl.. i:". :;E IJ, t:) :::,) " () CJ U :. GAIL G. CALLANAN, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF plain tiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW VB. NO. 96 - 1463 CIVIL 19 WILLIAM P. CALLANAN, Defendant IN DIVORCE STATUS SHEET ~: ACTIVITIES: PRETRIAL STATEMENTS DUE 9/10/99. ~ M. 11"'- a 2:00 p. (h, i 2-: m. I'''''' I'" ';' (,'--i~,,': ,~,~~1. (0~-,',,<j ,,~,- C~'~~'~~' &?"~~t;- , .' ( -. .. r (- -, ..'. ...., '. , . - .,.:{ \ /,. /FAfJ'Y (' r)\r~!t:;~/Ic.C,- . / //1)'].)5 r . . . ~U C;./lt """tv, ~ UMJ...VA.JftLf-/l<-MLt/ /,u...b/~~. ~ ./lrLf'L-H ~ ~ ~ ..w~ ~'4:t.. vuJ.J, 1.(.";''; (.->-- L"LU..,,^,-(j~A. 6" M~ ~u.d. '~" . ~ .,. <t~ Co (cc (~f W<t I . VI ~ 1.".:....1.. ( ",*_1,~ 1.vw..,.t , (.v-.tl "t1-4,~ ~ ...vT.~ .&> llt~. ~ ~ Cl ~ ..:1. e:: 1-- N ::.l-.:(' uQ 0'" ~)"'- ..,. c..)~ Ffo 0:: C)~ J:~r: ~f; a;. :t.;r.;; :,);-~ u.'; - (1 "5 L1~ t.' Ut i-,S ll.l (!) n.. CJ .;.-:. ,'- c:> ::> 0 '" c.:> >- .:r ?:; ~ N ..:.. I- .' ::l-< ufo! !2 Cl'- . "T !:. (.) :;= 04: l:l::c ..x :;;., r~l;:J ~~:=' If) :':;Ui f L" - 5z iJ.J.. u. ~;r -Jll, c-' ,J)lU a:.., '-" 1I.\~ f~ c=: ':,1 ll. (0 ::J C> 0' c.:> LAW OFFICES FLOWER. MORGENTHAL, FLOWER & LINDSAY ^ PROffl.,\SIONAI. l'ORI"ORATION 11 EAST H[GH STREET CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA 170[3.3016 JAMI!S D. A.OWER ROOER M. MOROE/lmIAL JAMI!S D. PLOWER. JR. CAROL J. LINDSAY (717) 24J.5SI3 PAX: (717) 24J.6SIO e.mlll: FMR. LlW@lol.com D1L'fSCII 8< MOROE/lmIAL (1975.1985) PLOWER. KRAMER MOROE/lmIAL&: PLOWER (1985-1992) June 8,1998 Emily Hoffman, Esquire 106 North Front Street P. O. Box 11476 Harrisburg, PA 17108 FilE COpy Callanan v. Callanan No. 98-1483 Civil Term Dear Emily: Thank you for thB answers to Interrogatories and the documents we requested. However, the'documBnts provided are not all those we requested. While there is a July statement from Smith Barney. missing are the statements for all of your client's accounts at Members First Federal Credit Union from March 1, 1997 through September 30, 1997, and all statements from his Shearson LBhman account from March 1, 1997 through September 30, 1997. Further, he has not provided us with the documentation for any marital debt he claims, including the Montgomery Ward and Visa Accounts. There is no response to our request for an~' agreement with employers for work as an independent contractor. Mr. Callanan has had close to three months to pull this information together. Please ask your client to see to it that we get the information within the next seven (7) days. or we will need to file a Motion to Compel with the court. Please consider this letter an additional request for documents. We need to see copies of the joint federal incomB tax returns, as filed, for each year from 1994 to the present. PI Base provide the documentation of the amount of stock in Reynolds and Reynolds which your client may purchase. Please ask your client to disclose his inheritances and expectancies as set out on SchedulB A (G) of the Interrogatories. Inheritances and expectancies may not be marital property, but thBY arB a relevant factor in thB Divorce Code of the division of property. We arB entitled to that information. I look forward to working with you to mOVB this case toward conclusion. VBry truly yours, FLOWER. MORGENTHAL. FLOWER & LINDSAY, P.C. ~ Carol J. Lindsay CJLltjb cc: Gail G. C81lamm FiI. ,5312.97.01 """'"~'''I'm''~''''''' ;':""'1~~~"\i: .'.it M'"'I' ~.~~~.. . 'l,',.~ '~'i<"if"j.r:;";'" ~. . {,lI','.1M, ~."'! 'fi:\'..;ilt.:', .\l1J;"dt.....'r" "" ,f, ~.~..d'''''.: .' """'.f..l:!" ...,~",F"~<I. 'c.::r:<.._,,,",, . "'P';;<"~'A/~.. .'" ....~'" ',',.. h "',' ~ '.~1"'. i~~}.t;; ;~i. a Il'r!f~r~o\!(~''';'!i'' .;i,;?}~~;~~"~'.::~. ',~<'~~;'~~" ~~\~:(~, . r, ":'f,';~?'vli.{t~!:. ~'~,!.~lJ1{\"~~,~ \~ t-~' ;r, ("'. 1i ~?.: c U.l~;: (~ jq:';"!.!, () ,:, ~'.l , :t: (~: . I..' . , '.".., ~. .,", ~l~: ("!;;~ .....r )1.'.: ~l (,", 1.11',< 'I ',' "'~lIJ ~ " ~- (,'1' :" .,:p: F' F: '. .'. It, el (0,) , ()'~ (j )1 (To be reported nt: 741 A.2d 792) 1999 PA Super 282 (Cite ns: 1999 WL 1044678 (I'n.Suller.)) Shnron Ruth VERIIOI.EK, Appellee, v. Cnrl Lee VERIIOU:K. AJIJlellnnt. Wour ellses). Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Submllled Sept. 8, 1999. Filed Nov. 19. 1999. Divorce action was brought. TIle Court of Common Pleas, Mercer County, Civil Division. No. 1448 C.D. 1992, Wherry, J., granted divorce and rcinstated husband's obligation to pay alimony pendentc lite to wife, and husband appealed. The Superior Court. No. 2445 Pillsburgh 1997, Stevens, J., held that husband's inherilance was marital property since the inherltcd fnnds were coming led with marital funds and husband did not consider the inherited funds to be separate, non-marilal property. Affirmed. [1] DIVORCE €=>223 134k223 Appeilate court will not disturb trial court's determinations regarding eqnilable distribution, allorney fees. and alimony pendente lite, absent abuse of diserellon, and trial court has abused ils discretion If it failed to follow proper legal procedures or misapplied the law. [1] DIVORCE €=>235 134k235 Appeilate court will not disturb trial court's determinations regarding equilable distrlbulion, allomey fees, and alimony pendente lite, absent abuse of discretion, and trial court has nbused ils discretion if it failed to follow proper legal procedures or misapplied the law. [I] DIVORCE €=>252.1 134k252. [ Appeilate court will not disturb trial court's determinations regarding equilable distribution. allorney fees, and alimony pendente IIle. absent abuse of discretion. and trial court has abused ils discretion if iI failed 10 follow proper legal procedures or misapplied the law. [1] DIVORCE €=>286(4) 134k286(4) Appellate court will not disturb trial court's l'lI"e [ detcrminallons regarding equitable distribution, allorney fees, and alimony pendente IIle, ahsent nbnse of discretion, and trial eonrt has abnsed Its discretion If iI failed to follow proper legal procedures or misapplied Ihe law. [I] DIVORCE €=>286(5) 134k286(5) Appellate court will not disturb trial court's determinations regarding equitable distribution, nllorney fees, and alhnony pendente lite, absent abuse of discretion. and trial court has abused ils discretion If It failed to foilow proper legal procedures or misapplied the law. [2] DlVORCf: €=>184(3) 134kI84(3) When reviewing allegations concerning validity of entry of divorce decree, appellate court evnluates the record de novo and decides independently whelher legal cause of acllon in divorce exists. [3] DIVORCE €=>252.3(4) 134k252.3(4) Husband who inilially asserled that stock shares were jointly owned by him and his wife as tenants In the entirety was estopped from subsequently asserting that the shares of stock were non-marllal property; although husband alleged that his prior representation regarding joint ownership of stock was result of memory lapses stemming from his treatment for depression and his reliance on prior allorney's incorrect recollections. these reasons did not constilute good cause for why he should be allowed to change his posilion regarding ownership of stock. [4] DIVORCE €=>253(3) 134k253(3) Since Divorce Code docs not contain a specific method for valuing assets. trial COUrt must exercise lis discretion and rely on the estimates. inventories, records of purchase prices, and appraisals submilled by Ihe parties, and court Is free to accept all, none, or porlions of tile lestimony regarding the lrue and correcl value of property; addilionally. court may rcjcct evidence offcred by bolll parties in favor of ils own valuation method. 23 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 3501 et seq. [5] DIVORCE €=>252.1 134k252.1 In divorce action. trial court had the discretion. as fact finder. to accept wife's expert's evidence regarding valuation of stock, which was marital Copr. <J:J West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. GOVI. Works (To be reported ot: 741 A.2d 792) (Cite us: 1999 WL 1044678 (l'u.Suller,)) property, and Ihus, court did not abuse lis discretion In acccpllng wife's expert's calculallon of future Income or In refusing 10 dlscoulll stock's value. [5] DIVORCE <!;::>2S3(3) 134k2S3(3) [n divorce action, trial court had the dlscretloo, as fact finder, to acccpt wife's cxpcrt's cvldence regarding valuation of stock, which was marital property, and thus, court did not abusc lis discretion In acccptlng wlfc's expcrt's calculation of future Incomc or In refusing to discount stock's valuc. [6] DIVORCE <!;::>2S3(3) 134k2S3(3) [n divorce action, wlfc's expcrt's tcstimony concerning his sccond rcport, which valucd stock using capitalization of carnlngs mcthod, did not excccd fair scope of wlfc's cxpcrt's first report which valued stock on comparable salcs mcthod, and as such, courl did not abuse lis discretion by considcring wife's expert's sccond rcport, and tcstimony relating thcreto, in valuing shares of stock, which were marital propcrty; bccausc husband's own expert used capitalization method, wife's expert's tcstimony conccrning valuation using thc same method did not create unfair surprisc. [7] DIVORCE <!;::>2S2.3(3) 134k2S2.3(3) Once non-marital propcrty is combincd and comingled with marital propcrty, it loscs its identity as non-marital property and takcs on the status of marital property. [8] DIVORCE <!;::>2S2.3(3) 134k2S2.3(3) Husband's inheritance was marital propcrty because the inheritcd funds were comingled with marital funds and husband did not consider the inherited funds to be separate, non-marital property, and fact that the inherited moncy was initially placed in account bearing husband's name alone did not require a different conclusion; the money which was originally inherited by husband was laler used, in part, to purchase joint marital property and the remainder was placed in account used by bOUl spouses. [9] APPEAL AND ERROR <!;::>983(2) 30k983(2) Trial court's aUlhority to modify or rescind order is almost entirely discretionary, and this power may be exercised sua spome, or may be Invoked by a request l'uge2 for reconsldcratlon filed hy the pnrties, and court's decision to decline 10 exercise such power will not be revlcwed onnppeal. 42 Pa.C.S.A. g SSOS, [9] MOTIONS <!;::>39 267k39 Trial court's authority to modify or rescind order is almost entirely discretionary, and this powcr may be exerclscd sua sponte, or may be Invoked by a rcqucst for rcconslderatlon filcd by Ihe parties, and court's decision to dccline to exercise such power will not be revlcwed on appeal. 42 Pa.C.S.A. g SSOS. [9] MOTIONS <!;::>S8 267kS8 Trial court's authority to modify or rescind order Is almost entirely discretionary, and this power may be exercised sua sponte, or may be invoked by a request for reconsideration filed by the parties, and court's decision to decline to exercise such power will nor be reviewcd on appeal. 42 Pa.C.S.A. g SSOS. [9] MOTIONS <!;::>S9(1) 267kS9(1 ) Trial court's authority to modify or rescind order is almost entirely discretionary, and this power may be exercised sua sponte, or may be invoked by a request for reconsideration filed by the parties, and court's decision to decline to exercise such power will not be reviewed on appeal. 42 Pa.C.S.A. g SSOS. [10] MOTIONS <!;::>39 267k39 Trial court may consider motion for reconsideration only if it is filed within 30 days of the entry of the disputed order, and after the expiration of 30 days, trial court loses its ,broad discretion 10 modify, and the order can be opened or vacated only upon showing of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject malter, fatal defect apparent on face of the record, or some other evidence of extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. g SSOS. [11] BANKRUPTCY <!;::>2062 Slk2062 Trial court had jurisdiction 10 reinstale husband's obligation to pay alimony pendente lite; court emered its order in response to wife's petition for emergency relief from automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and in ordering that automatic stay be lifted, court reinstated husband's obligation to pay alimony pendente lite upon determining that wife had demonstrated need for maimenance and professioaal Copr. ~ West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works (To be reported at: 741 A.2d 792) (Clle as: 1999 WL 1044678 (I'u.Super,)) services during pendency of husband's bankruptcy. [11] BANKRUPTCY <$=2442 S1k2442 Trial court had Jurisdiction to reinstate husband's obligation 10 pay alimony pendente lite; court entered lis order In response to wife's petition for emergency relief from automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and In ordering that automallc stay be lifted, court reinstated husband's obligation to pay alimony pendente lite upon determining that wife had demonstrated need for maintenance and professional services during pendency of husband's bankruptcy. [12] DIVORCE <$=59 134kS9 [f statutory prerequisite for entry of divorce decree Is not fulfilled, then procedural defect has occurred, and such defect docs not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. [13] DIVORCE <$=179 134k179 Husband waived, for purposes of appeal, his challenge to procedural aspects of divorce proceedings by failing to raise that challenge in his exceptions 10 the Master's Report. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 1920.SS-2(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A. [14] DIVORCE <$=224 134k224 [f party shows actual need, award of attorney fees is appropriate to put the panies on par in maintaining or defending action for divorce. [15] DIVORCE <$=227(1) 134k227(1) Award to wife of $16,8S7 in supplemental attorney fees was warranted in divorce action, where wife demonstrated actual need, despite fact that she had received large settlement under the suggested equitable distribution scheme. [16] DIVORCE <$=227(1) I 34k227(1) Wife was entitled to attorney fees in the amount of $33,142 because that amount represented the expenses directly incurred by wife relating to husband's attempt to obstruct the prosecution of wife's claim for equitable distribution. 42 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 2S03(7). Anna Belle Jones, Mercer, for appellant. Kenneth J. Horoho, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellee. Page 3 Before McEWEN, President Judge, and DEL SOLE, KELLY, POPOVICH, JOHNSON, FORD ELLIOTT, EAK[N, JOYCE and STEVENS, JJ. STEVENS, J.: .1 , I Appellant Carl Lee Verholek (Husband) appeals from a Final Decree ia divorce and Order of alimony and equitable distribution entered on August 20, [997, and from an Order entered un October [S, 1997, which reinstated Husband's obligation to pay alimony pendente lite to Appellee Sharon Ruth Verholek (Wife). [FNI] We affirm. , 2 The relevant facts and procedural history arc as follows: On September 10, 1992, Wife filed a Complaint in divorce. Husband and Wife separated on January I, 1993, and, on January 3, 1994, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony pendente lite in the amount of $4,700.00 per month and referred the panies' remaining equitable distribution, alimony, and counsel fee claims to a Master, who held a hearing and filed a Repon, to which both parties filed timely Exceptions. The trial court's Final Decree and Order, entered on August 20, 1997, adopted in part and rejected in part the Master's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Final Decree granted a divorce and the Order directed that the marital estate be divided equally, ordered Husband to pay $4,700.00 per month to Wife for six months as alimony, determined that alimony pendente lite arrearages amounted to $8,400.00, terminated Wife's alimony pendente lite, and determined that Wife was entitled to an award of $SO,OOO.OO for attorney's fees. [FN2] , 3 On September 19, 1997, Husband filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition in the Western District of Pennsylvania, which Petition triggered the automatic stay provisions under the federal Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U .S.C. ~ 362(a). The automatic stay applied to the August 20, 1997 Final Decree and Order and to the January 3, 1994 Order regarding alimony pendente lite. Wife filed an Emergency Motion requesting relief from the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Court granted Wife's request, allowing Wife to pursue the collection of alimony, alimony pendente lite, and alimony pendente lite arrears from Husband's earnings. Consequently, on October IS, 1997, the trial court entered an Order reinstating Husband's obligation to pay Wife alimony pendente lite according to the terms of the January 3, 1994 Order. On November Copr. <0 West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works (To be reported at: 741 A.2d 792) (Cite os: 1999 WL 1044678, "I (l'o.Super.)) 20, 1997, the Bankruptcy Court granled both parties relief 10 pursue any appeals from Orders arising out of Ihe divorce proceedings. 11 4 Husband filed 0 timely direct oppeal wllh Ihis Courl. Following appellate argumenr, a three-judge panel of Ihis Court filed a memorandum on July 28, 1998; judge Cavanaugh filed a dissen!. Thereafter, Husband filed a PClllion for Reargument! Reconsideration en bane, which was granted by tltis Court, and Ihe original panel memorandum and dissent were wilhdrawn. \", 11 5 Husband raises seven issues on appeal, alleging Ihe following: (I) The trial court erred in finding Ihat tile 310 sbares of Cauron, Inc. (Cauron) stock were marllal property and Ihat Husband was estopped from asserting Ihat Ihe stock was non-marital property; "2 (2) The trial court erred in valuing 310 shares of CaUron stock because it failed to apply discounts for lack of marketability and minority inrerest in determining its fair market value; (3) The trial court erred in permiUing Wife's expert to testify regarding a second business valualion report, which was only one-page and was used in valuing Ihe 310 shares of CaUron stock; (4) The trial court erred in finding that Husband's $54,000.00 inheritance was marital property; (5) The trial court erred in reinstating Wife's alimony pendente lite since Ihe court lacked jurisdiction and Wife failed to appeal from Ihe Final Decree and Order terminating alimony pendenre lite; (6) The trial court lacked Ihe aulhority to COler a Divorce Decree and equllable distribution order since an affidavit was never filed; (7) The trial court erred in awarding Wife excessive auorney's fees wilhout any basis. (FN3] (1](2] 11 6 Our standard of review of awards of equllable distribution. counsel fees, and alimony pendenre lite is well seuled: we will not disturb a trial court's determinations absenr an abuse of discretion. See Rulh v. Rulh, 316 Pa.Super. 282,462 A.2d 135[ (1983) (equitable distribution); Remick v. Remick, 310 Pa.Super. 23, 456 A.2d 163 (1983) (en banc ) (alimony pendenre lite, award of counscl fces). A Irial court has abosed ils discrelion if Ihe trial court "failed to follow proper legal procedures or misapplied Ihe law." Braderman v. Braderman, 339 Pa.Super. [85, 488 A.2d 613, 615 ([985). We will not usurp Ihe trial court's role as fact-finder. Rulh, supra. [n reviewing allegations concerning Ihe Pnge 4 validlly of the cntry of a divorce decree. we evaluale lIle record de novo and decide indepcndenrly whelher a legal cause of aClion in divorce exists. See Jayne v. Jayne, 443 Pa.Super. 664, 663 A.2d 169 (1995). (3] 11 7 Husband's firsl contenlion is lhat Ihe trial court erred in concluding Ihat the 310 shares of CaUron stock were marllal property and Ihat Husband was eSlopped from asserting lIlat Ihe shares were non- marilal property. During tile beginning of Ihis Iiligation, Husband asserted Ihat tile 310 shares of CaUron stock were jointly owned by him and Wife as tenants in the entirety. Doring Ihe course of Ihe Masler's hearing, however, Husband sought 10 reclassify Ihe 310 shares of CaUron Slock as non- marital property. When Ihe Master gave Hosband Ihe opportunlly to show good cause why he should be allowed to change his posllion regarding ownership of Ihe CaUron slock, Husband asserted Ihat he had good cause because his prior representations regarding Ihe joinr ownership of Ihe stock allegedly were Ihe result of Ihe following: (I) his memory lapses stemming from his lrealmenr for depression, (2) his reliance on a prior auorney's incorrect recolleclions, and (3) his current auorney's reliance on CaUron' s corporate auorney's incorrect recolleclions. The Master conclUded Ihal Husband's reasons did not constllute good cause and Ihal Husband, Iherefore, was eSlopped by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.33 (FN4] from asserting Ihat Ihe stock shares were non-marllal property. The trial court adopted Ihat conclusion and We conclude Ihat Ihe trial court commiUed no error of law, complied wilh proper legal procedures, and did not abuse its discrelion in concluding Ihat Husband was estopped from asserting Ihat Ihe 310 shares of CaUron slock were non-marital property. I " I, :1 !} ,I,": \1', 'i" 'f "3 (4] 11 8 Husband's second and Ihird arguments relate to Ihe trial court's valualion of Ihe 310 shares of Cauron stock. The Divorce Code docs nOI conrain a specific melhod for valuing assets. The trial court must exercise its discretion and rely on Ihe estimales, invenrories, records of purchase prices, and appraisals submiued by Ihe parties. See Smilh v. Smilh, 439 Pa.Super. 283, 653 A.2d 1259 (1995). The courl is free to accept all, none, or porlions of Ihe testimony regarding Ihe true and correct value of property. See Aleuo v. Aleuo, 371 Pa.Super. 230, 537 A.2d 1383 (1988). Addilionally, Ihe court may reject evidence offered by bolh parlies in favor of lis own valuation melhod. See Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 377 Pa.Super. 268, 547 A.2d 362 (1988). Copr. i1:l West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works (To be reported at: 741 A.2d 792) (Clle as: 1999 WL 1044678, .3 (l'a.Super.)) ~ 9 [n Ihls case, Wife's expert submllled a rcport basing his valuation of Callron on a comparable sales method. 111e Master rejected the analysis and requested that Wife's expert submit a new report using the capitalization of earnings melhod used In Husband's expert's report. Wife's expert submllled a second report. The Master, however, performed his own calculation of the capitalization rate, using Wife's expert's calculation as a starting point but eliminating a certain factor included by Wife's expert. Further, In determining the value of the stock, the Master accepted Wife's expert's computation of Callron's projected future Income. The trial court adopted the Master's findings and conclusions relating to the valuation of the Callron stock. [5] ~ 10 On appeal, Husband argues that the trial court should have discounted the stock's value because of Its lack of marketability and because the stock represented a minority interest. Husband, however, has not demonstrated that the trial court applied improper legal procedures or misapplied the relevant law. Wife's expert's second report [FN5] Indicated that a discount for marketability was nol needed under the valuation method adopted by Husband and the expert testified that a minority discount was not needed because the company was not valued as a whole. N.T. 1/10/96 at 259. The trial court had the discretion, as fact-finder, to accept Wife's expert's evidence. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Wife's expert's calculation of Callron's future income or in refusing to discount the stock's value. ~ 11 We also find meritless Husband's contention that the trial court erred in permllllng Wife's expert to testify regarding a second report valuing the Callron stock because the report contained material beyond the scope of Wife's expert's first report. ~ 12 [n deciding whether an expert's testimony is within the fair scope of his report, we are mindful of the following principles: [t is impossible to formulate a hard and fast rule for determining when a particular expert's testimony exceeds the fair scope of his or her pretrial report.... The controlling principle which must guide is whether the purpose of [I'ennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure] 4003.5 is being served[, which purpose] is to avoid unfair surprise by enabling the adversary to prepare a response to the expert testimony. .4 Wilkes-Barre [ran & Wire Works, Inc. v. Pargas l'ageS of Wilkes-Barre, [nc" 348 l'a.Supcr. 285, 502 A.2d 210, 212-13 (1985). [6] ~ 13 Here, Wife's expert originally submilled a valuation report, which used tile comparable sales metilOd In valuing the Callron stock, and Husband submilled a valuation report, which used the capitalization method. During the Master's hearing, the Master concluded that Husband's expert's use of the capitalization method was corrccl, and the Master requested Wife's expert 10 prepare a new valuation of the Callron stock using the capitalization method. Shortly thereafter, Wife submitted a report which contained the requested valuation using Husband's capitalization method, and her expert lestified with regard thereto. [FN6] Based on these facts, we conclude that Wife's expert's testimony concerning the second report did not exceed the fair scope of Wife's expert's first report. Moreover, because Husband's own expert used the capitalization method in preparing his report, we cannot conclude th~t Wife's expert's testimony concerning valuation using the same method created unfair surprise. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Wife's expert's second report, and testimony relating thereto, in \'aluing the 310 shares of Callron stock. [7] ~ 14 Husband's next contention is that the trial court erred in concluding tlmt Husband's $54,000.00 inheritance, which he received upon his mother's death, was marital property. Generally, property acquired during the marriage by bequest, devise, or descent is non-marital property. 23 l'a.C.S.A. ~ 3501(a)(3). However, once non-marital properly is combined and co- mingled with marital property, it loses its identity as non-marital property and takes on the status of marilal property. Gruver v. Gruver, 372 Pa.Super. 194, 539 A.2d 395 (1988): Bold v. Bold, 358 Pa.Super. 7, 516 A.2d 741 (1986). 1115 [n this case, Husband testified that he received a $54,000.00 inheritance from his mother and that he put Ihe money into an account, which bore his name alone, but which also contained marital assets. N.T. 3/15/96 at 1002. Husband further testified that he used part of the inheritance money to buy the parties' first marital home, which was acquired in joint names, and that the remainder was placed into a brokerage account, which was opened after the marriage with marital funds. N.T. 3/15/96 at 1002; Plaintiff's E.xhibit 57. Moreover, Husband testified' Ihat he never considered any of the assets to br" separated, including tile inheritance money. N.T. 3! Copr. rQ West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.~. Govt. Works (To be reported at: 741 A.2d 792) (Cite os: 1999 WL 1044678, *4 (l'a.Super.)) 15/96 at 1002. [8] 1116 Because thc Inherited funds were co-mingled with marital funds. and Husband did not consider the inherited funds 10 be separate, non-marital property, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Husband's inheritance was marital propcrty. See Rohrer v. Rohrer, 715 A.2d 463 (Pa.Super.[998) (finding that Inherited money which moves in and out of marital accounts loses its non-marital characteristic); Barner v. Barncr, 364 Pa.Super. I, 527 A.2d 122 (1987) (holding that in detennining whether an asset is "marital property" we must consider the parties' intents); Madden v. Madden, 336 Pa.Super. 552, 486 A.2d 401 (1985) (holding that although certificates of deposit were originally acquired by the appellant as a gift from his mother, the certificates were later co-mingled with marital property and, thus, became "marital property"). We note that the fact that the inherited money was initially placed in an account bearing Husband's name alone docs not require a different conclusion in this case. As discussed supra, the money which was originally inherited by Husband was later used, in part, to purchase joint marital property and the remainder was placed in an account used by both spouses. See Rohrer, supra. *s 11 17 Husband's next allegation Is that the trial court erred in reinstating Wife's alimony pendente lite since the court lacked jurisdiction and Wife failed to appeal from the Final Decree and Order tenninating alimony pendente lite. Specifically, Husband argues that (1) the October 15, 1997 reinstatement order was entered more than thirty days after the entry of the Order tenninating Wife's alimony pendente lite, and (2) Wife did not seck reconsideration of the Final Decree and the order tenninating her alimony pendente lite. [FN7] [9)[IOJ 11 18 Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 5505, the Irial court "upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within thirty days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior tennination of any tenn of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed. " The lower court's authority under 42 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 5505 to modify or rescind an order "is almost entirely discrctionary; this powcr may be exercised sua sponte, or may be invoked by a request for reconsideration filed by the parties, and Ihe court's decision to decline to exercise such power will not be reviewed on appeal." Although 42 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 5505 gives the trial court I'nge6 broad discretion, the trial court may consider a motion for reconsideration only if the motion for reconsideration is filed within Ihirty days of the entry of the disputed order. After the expiration of thirty days, tile trial court loses its broad discretion to modify, and the order can be opened or vacated only upon a showing of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, a fatal defect apparent on Ihe face of tile record or some other evidence of "extraordinary cause justifying Intervention by the court. " Stockton v. Stockton, 698 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Pa.Super.1997) (citations and quotation omitted). [IIJ 11 19 In the case sub judice, the trial court entered its order in response to Wife's petition for emergency relief from the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. [n ordering that the automatic stay be lifted, the trial court reinstated Husband's Obligation to pay alimony pendente lite upon detennining that "Plaintiff/Wife ha[d] demonstrated the need for maintenance and professional services during the pendency of Defendant/Husband's bankruptcy." We conclude that such circumstances constitute "exlraordinary cause, II and, therefore, we fmd that the Irial court had jurisdiction to reinstate Husband's obligation to pay alimony pendente lite. 1120 Husband's next argument is that the Irial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Decree in Divorce and, hence, an order of equitable distribution. Specifically, Husband argues that, because no affidavit was filed in this case alleging that Husband and Wife lived separate and apart for at least two years and that the marriage was irretrievably broken, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Final Decree pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 3301(d). [FN8J *6 [12)[13J 11 21 Husband's argument mischaracterizes the nature of subject matter jurisdiction. Generally, subject matter jurisdiction has been defined as the court's power to hear cases of the class to which the case at issue belongs. See Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 396 Pa.Super. 531, 579 A.2d 377 (1990). Here, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. Section 301 of the Divorce Code provides that the courts of common pleas have original jurisdiction in cases of divorce. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 3301. [f a statutory prerequisite for the entry of a divorce decree is not fulfilled, then a procedural defect has occurred; such a defect docs not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, Copr. (!;) West 2000 No Claim 10 Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works (To be reported at: 741 A.2d 792) (Cite os: 1999 WL 1044678, 06 (Pn.Super,)) I'age 7 because Husband's conlentlon is a challenge to Ihe procedural aspccls of divorce proceedings, and because Husband failed to raise thaI challenge in his Exceptions 10 the Master's Report, we conclude that he has waived that Issue on appeal. See Pa.R.C.P.1920.55-2(b). on October 15, 1997. ~ 28 Affirmed. ~ 22 Husband's final contention Is that the trial courl erred In awarding Wife allorney's fees in an excessive amount. We disagree. PNI. lIusband also appeals from an Order enlered on September IS, 1997, denying Husband's Motion for Supersedeas and from an Order entered on November 6. 1997. dismissing Husband's Mallon to Strike the Order entered on Oelober IS, 1997. Because Husband failed 10 address any Issues relal<'llto Ihose appeals In his appellate brief. we will nol consider Ihem on appeal and deem Ihem to be waived. [14] 11 23 If a party shows actual need, an award of counsel fees Is appropriate to PUI the parties on par in maintaining or defending an action for divorce. See Johnson v. Johnson, 365 Pa.Super. 409, 529 A.2d 1123 ([987). Moreover, a party to an action may be awarded counsel fees when another party engages in dilatory, obdurate, or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 2503(7). [15] ~ 24 [n the case sub judice, the trial court adopled the Findings and Conclusions of the Master relating to two awards of attorney's fees to Wife. An award of $16,857.00 in supplemental counsel fees was based on the Master's conclusion that Wife demonstrated actual need, despite the fact thaI she received a large selllement under the suggested equitable distribution scheme. Master's Report, 8/231 96, at 19. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support that conclusion and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife supplemental counsel fees. PN2. We note Ihat we will discuss olher Plndlngs and Conclusions found In the Pinal Deer,.. and Order In suhsequenl parts of this decision. FN3. lIusband's Issues have been renumbered for the sake of effective appellate review. FN4. Rule 1920.33 provides as follows: "A party shall. excepl upon good canse shown, be barred from offering any evidence Ihat Is inconsislent with or which goes beyond the fair scope of the information set forth in the pre-trial statement. It Pa.R.C. P. 1920.33(d)(2). FNS. As will be discussed Infra, the trial court properly considered Wlfe's expert's second report and tesllmony relating Iherelo. [16] 11 25 An award of $33, [42.00 in counsel fees was based on Husband's actions that obstructed the timely and orderly prosecution of Wife's claim for equitable distribution. [d. at 18-19. The Master determined that the amount of the award was "clearly appropriate" because that amount represented the expenses directly incurred by Wife relating to Husband's attempt to obstruct the prosecution of Wife's claim for equitable distribution. [FN9] FN6. Husband contends tbal the report submiued by Wlfe's expert al the request of the Masler was not admiued Into evidence. According to an affidavit filed by Ihe Master, however, It Is clear tbat the report was admlued inlo evidence. Revised Affidavit Concerning Exhibit 49, 12110/97, at 1. 11 26 After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court had a sufficient basis for determining that Husband's conduct was obdurate, dilatory, or vexatious. [FNIO] Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife attorney's fees for Husband's conduct during the pendeney of this case. FN7. We no'e that Husband conlends that Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701(a) prevented the trial court from Issuing the Oclober IS, 1997 Order beeause his own appeal from lbe Final Decree and Order was pending at that time. However, this Court dismissed Husband's appeal of the Final Order and Decree on OClober 10, 1997, without prejudice. Thus, no appeal was pending at the time Ihe trial court issued Ihe Oclober IS, 1997 reinstatement order. 0711 27 For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's Final Decree and Order entered on August 20, 1997, and the trial court's Order entered PN8. See,ion 3301(d) of Ihe Divorce Code provides that "[t]he court may grant a divorce where a Complaint has been filed alleging Ihat the marriage Is irretrievably broken and an affidavit has been filed alleging the parties have lived separale and apart for a period of at least two years and tbat the marriage is irretrievably broken...." 23 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 3301(d). Copr. @ West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govl. Works ~. to file a praecipe transmitting the record to the Court requeBting a final decree in divorce. Ms, Lindsay. MS. LINDSAY: 1. The parties have agreed that the marital estate is valued at $148,532.90. 2. Wife shall receive 55% of the marital estate and acknowledges having received an advance on equitable distribution of $8/925.00. Therefore, wife will receive $72,768.00 froln the escrow account which received the proceeds of sale of the marital house. The escrow account is held by Steven Fishman, Esquire. On the date of this agreement, the parties will advise Mr. Fishman of its terms and ask him to make distribution accordingly. wife will also receive 55% of any increase in value in the escrow account since the original deposit into the account was made. Husband will receive the balance of the escrow account after that calculation is made. The parties agree that interest has accrued on the account since the original deposit in 1999 and some interest may have accrued in addition in the year 2000. The parties agree that wife will report on her federal income tax return for 1999 and for the year 2000, 55% of any earnings on the escrow account and husband will report on his federal income tax return 45% of any earnings on the account. 3. Husband will retain his Member's 1st checking account I Menmer's 1st savings account, his Sa11umon IRA, and the 1997 Honda Passport. Husband is also acknowledging an obligation for $5,100.00 in mortgage arrears which accrued prior to the sale of the marital home. That figure has already been taken into account in producing the calculations which call for the distribution set out in this agreement. 4. Presently, husband is under an order of support to pay $683.00 per month for the support of two children. By February 1st, 2000, husband will make a lump sum payment directly to wife, that is not through the Domestic Relations Office, of $2,049.00 or whatever amount the support arrears stand at the time he makes the payment. At the same time, that is on or . . ~; - about February 1st, 2000, husband will pay to wife $4,09B.00 which represents a six months advance on child support at the rate of $683,00 per month. Upon receipt of the two payments set forth in this paragraph wife will immediately notify the office of Domestic Relations in writing of the receipt of the payments and their nature which are for arrears and payment in advance for child support for which husband shall receive credit. Neither party will petition for a modification of the child support order until August 1st, 2000, absent a change in circumstances such as a change in primary custody of the children. Husband's attaining employment shall not be such a change of circumstance. 5. The parties are in agreement that their household tangible personal property has been satisfactorily divided and shall be the exclusive property of the party in whose possession it is as of the date of this agreement. 6. Wife withdraws her claim for counsel fees and costs. 7. Except as herein otherwise provided, each party may dispose of his or her property in any way and each party hereby waives and relinquishes any and all rights he or she may now have or hereafter acquire under the present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property or the estate of the other as a result of the marital relationship including without limitation I statutory allowance, widow's allowance, right of intestacy I right to take against the will of the other, and right to act as administrator or executor in the other's estate. Each will at the request of the other execute, acknowledge I and deliver any and all instruments which may be necessary or advisable to carry into effect this mutual waiver and relinquishment of all such interest, rights, and claims. MS. LINDSAY: Ms. Ca1lanan, have you heard the terms of the agreement as I have dictated them here today? MS. CALLANAN: Yes. MS. LINDSAY: Do you understand them? MS. CALLANAN: Yes. . . . . - . MS. LINDSAY: Do you have any questions about them? MS. CALLANAN: No. MS, LINDSAY: Are they agreeable to you? MS. CALLANAN: Yes. MS. HOFFMAN: Mr. Callanan, have you heard the terms of the agreement dictated on the record today? MR. CALLANAN: Yes. MS. HOFFMAN: Do you understand them? MR. CALLANAN: Yes. MS. HOFFMAN: Do you have any questions? MR. CALLANAN: No. MS. HOFFMAN: Do you agree to those terms? MR. CALLANAN: Yes. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement I that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to the methods and procedu,L"cs of "r.forcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: . LJ dsa Attorn r PI b~Uwc m ly L6 Hoffman Attorney for Defendant J./~ lid , , (Q'-~ b. C'~\M Gail G. Calla In , ~ to file a praecipe transmitting the record to the Court requesting a final decree in divorce. Ms. Lindsay. MS. LINDSAY: 1. The parties have agreed that the marital estate is valued at $148,532.90. 2. Wife shall receive 55% of the marital estate and acknowledges having received an advance on equitable distribution of $8/925.00. Therefore, wife will receive $72,768.00 from the escrow account which received the proceeds of sale of the marital house. The escrow account is held by Steven Fishman, Esquire. On the date of this agreement I the parties will advise Mr. Fishman of its terms and ask him to make distribution accordingly. Wife will also receive 55% of any increase in value in the escrow account since the original deposit into the account was made. Husband will receive the balance of the escrow account after that calculation is made. The parties agree that interest has accrued on the account since the original deposit in 1999 and some interest may have accrued in addition in the year 2000. The parties agree that wife will report on her federal income tax return for 1999 and for the year 2000, 55% of any earnings on the escrow account and husband will report on his federal income tax return 45% of any earnings on the account. 3. Husband will retain his Member's 1st checking account I Member's 1st savings account, his Sallomon IRA, and the 1997 Honda Passport. Husband is also acknowledging an obligation for $5,100.00 in mortgage arrears which accrued prior to the sale of the marital home. That figure has already been taken into account in producing the calculations which call for the distribution set out in this agreement. 4. PresentlYI husband is under an order of support to pay $683.00 per month for the support of two children. By February 1st, 2000, husband will make a lump sum payment directly to wife, that is not through the Domestic Relations Office, of $2,049.00 or whatever amount the support arrears stand at the time he makes the payment, At the same time, that is on or , ~ about February 1st, 2000, husband will pay to wife $4,098,00 which repreBents a six monthB advance on child support at the rate of $683.00 per month. Upon receipt of the two payments set forth in this paragraph wife will immediately notify the office of Domestic Relations in writing of the receipt of the payments and their nature which are for arrears and payment in advance for child support for which husband shall receive credit. Neither party will petition for a modification of the child support order until August 1st, 2000, absent a change in circumstances such as a change in primary custody of the children. Husband's attaining employment shall not be such a change of circumstance. 5. The parties are in agreement that their household tangible personal property has been satisfactorily divided and shall be the exclusive property of the party in whose possession it is as of the date of this agreement. 6. Wife withdraws her claim for counsel fees and costs. 7. Except as herein otherwise provided, each party may dispose of his or her property in any way and each party hereby waives and relinquishes any and all rights he or she may now have or hereafter acquire under the present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property or the estate of the other as a result of the marital relationship including without limitation, statutory allowance, widow's allowance, right of intestacy, right to take against the will of the other I and right to act as administrator or executor in the other's estate. Each will at the request of the other execute I acknowledge, and deliver any and all instruments which may be necessary or advisable to carry into effect this mutual waiver and relinquishment of all such interest, rights I and claims. MS. LINDSAY: Ms. Callanan, have you heard the terms of the agreement as I have dictated them here today? MS. CALLANAN: Yes. MS. LINDSAY: Do you understand them? MS. CALLANAN: Yes. . . . MS. LINDSAY: Do you have any questions about them? MS, CALLANAN: No. MS. LINDSAY: Are they agreeable to you? MS. CALLANAN: Yes. MS. HOFFMAN: Mr. Callanan, have you heard the terms of the agreement dictated on the record today? MR. CALLANAN: Yes, MS. HOFFMAN: Do you understand them? MR. CALLANAN: Yes. MS. HOFFMAN: Do you have any questions? MR. CALLANAN: No. MS. HOFFMAN : Do you agree to those terms? MR. CALLANAN: Yes. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement, that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to the methods and procedures of enforcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: Carol J. Lindsay Attorney for Plaintiff Gail G. Callanan Emily Long Hoffman Attorney for Defendant William P. Callanan .' MS. LINDSAY: Do you have any questions about them? 11S. CAI,LANAN: No. MS. LINDSAY: Are they agreeable to you? MS. CALLANAN: Yes. MS. HOFFMAN: Mr. Callanan, have you heard the terms of the agreement dictated on the record today? MR. CALLANAN : Yes. MS. HOFFMAN: Do you understand them? MR. CALLANAN : Yes. MS. HOFFMAN: Do you have any questionB? MR. CALLANAN : No. MS. HOFFMAN: Do you agree to those terms? MR. CALLANAN: Yes. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement, that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to lhe methods and procedures of enforcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: J./3/1d I . b'-~ b. c ~~\ 'v- Gail G. Calla ,1m Emily Long Hoffman Attorney for Defendant William P. Callanan >- <:j .~ rr; ;1: (\,1 f: n f;'~ li t;., ~~~J ._ (\F. '.J:..::-: i( f , ~.: ' )"'-'s ',.~ ..-~ r~; I ~) :$ '/ ' ~ :. ~~J C:, ~- '.:'r;j !'Ii '} )::'~ tl. (.... '- > I. UJ '~l ~iL I.'...; . :.~ ~ :j c...1 '-':) (J EM[LYLONO HOFFMAN. . : . ^TTORNBV ^T lAW I' , 105 NO~I".ONT"TRIBT "^RRI!BU.O. 'BNNSVLV^NI^ 1710lSol47A 17171 233-11I1 . ". '" , . " GA[L G. CALLANAN, Plainti ff [N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE WILLIAM P. CALLANAN Defendant No. 98 - 1483 IN DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO CUSTODY PETITION AND NOW, comes William P. Callanan, by and through his attorney, Emily Long Hoffman, and responds to Plaintiffs Petition as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. This is an avennent to which no response is required. 4. Admitted. 5. Denied. Currently there is no custody Order in effect and the parties shore physical custody of the children with Father having every other weekend and other additional times. 6. Admitted in part, Denied in part. The children have also resided with William P. Callanan from July 4, 1997 to present. 7. Admitted. 8. Denied. Father is not married. 9. Admitted. 10. Denied. Father also resides with the children. 11. This is an avennent to which no response is required. 12. This is an avennent to which no response is required. 13. This is an avennent to which no response is required. 14. Denied. [t is denied that the best interest and penn anent welfare of the children will be served by granting the relief requested because the children have lived in Pennsylvania for their entire lives and their friends and family are located in and near Pennsylvania. GAIL G. CALLANAN, . IN THE OOURT OF CXJMMON PLEAS OF . Plaintiff/Petitioner . CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA . . . vs. : NO. 98-1483 CIVIL TERM . . WILLIAM P. CALLANAN , . CIVIL ACTION - LAW . Defendant/ReBpondent . IN CUSTODY . OODER OF CXXlRT AND tDJ, this -; C) Ii, day of upon conBideration of the attached Custody ordered and directed as follows: :r '.2 I:2 Co , 2000, Conciliation Report I it is 1. A Hearing is scheduled in Court Room # 1 , of the Cumberland County Court House on the 7th day of AugUBt, 2000, at 9:30 o'clock a.m., and on the 10th day of August, 2000, at 9:30 o'clock a:iii:";" at which tIme testimony wfIlbe taken. For purposes of the Hearing, tiieMotherl Gail G. Callanan, shall be deemed to be the moving party and shall proceed initially with testimony. Counsel for the parties shall file with the Court and opposing counsel a Memorandum setting forth each party's position on custody, a list of witneBseB who are expected to testify at the Hearing, and a sunmary of the anticipated testimony of each witness. These Memoranda shall be filed at least 10 daYB prior to the Hearing date. 2. Pending further Order of Court or agreement of the partiesl the Mother shall have primary J;hysical custody of the Children and the Father shall have partial physical custody on alternating weekends fran Friday through SUnday with the times to be arranged by agreement of the parties I and any additional times as arranged by agreement. BY THE COURT I J. ee: Carol J. LindsaYI Esquire - Counsel for Mother Emily L. Hoffman I Esquire - Counsel for Father c~~ L-;$OO RK~ GAIL G. CALLANAN, . IN THE CXlURT OF CXlMMON PLEAS OF . plaintiff/petitioner . CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA . . . vs. . NO. 98-1483 CIVIL TERM . . . WILLIAM P. CALLANAN , . CIVIL ACTION - LAW . Defendant/ReBpondent . IN CUSTODY . ~ cn<<:ILIATION 5lMlARY REl'CRT IN ACXXlUlIlNCE Wl'l'B cnmmLAND CXUfl'Y RULE OF CIVIL PRJo '0<' 'llRB 1915.3-8, the undersigned CUstody Conciliator submits the following report: 1. ~e pertinent information concerning the Children who are the subjectB of thiB litigation is as follows: NAME DATE OF BIRTH amRPNrLY IN CUS'lOOY OF Keagan William Callanan Kelsey Shea Callanan March 5, 1987 August 15, 1991 Mother Mother 2. A Conciliation Conference was held on June 14, 2000, with the following individuals in attendance: The Mother, Gail G. Callanan, with her counBel, Carol J. Lindsay, Esquire, and the Father, William P. Callanan, with his counsel, Emily Hoffman, Esquire. 3. Although there are no existing custody orders in this matter, since the parties separated in July 1997, the Children have primarily resided with the Mother and the Father has regularly had custody periods on alternating weekendB and additional timeB arranged by agreement of the parties. The Mother plans to move to Florida as soon as poBsible, where her hUBband currently resides and works. In anticipation of the relocation, the Mother filed thiB request for custody seeking primary physical custody of the Children with periodB of partial CUBtody in the Father. The parties were not able to reach an agreement at the Conference and it will be necessary to schedule a Hearing. 4. The Mother's position on custody is as follows: The Mother believes it would be in the beBt intereBt of the Children to reside with her during the school year in Florida and with the Father during the majority of the sUllll1er school breaks and extended school holidays. The Mother stated that she has always been the Children's primary caretaker. According to the Mother, the Children desire to rrove to Florida and in particular, the partieB' oldeBt Child is looking forward to repeating seventh grade in a new school. The Mother has left her employment in Pennsylvania and her leaBe ends July 1. The Mother stated that she and her