HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-05994
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CAROL M. MOLIN
PENNA.
STATE OF
Plaintiff
No.
00 - 5994
VERSUS
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III
Defendant
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DECREE IN
DIVORCE
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,)<Jo( ,IT IS ORDERED AND
AND NOW,
N ~ JO
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CAROL M, MOLIN
DECREED THAT
, PLAINTIFF,
AND
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III
, DEFENDANT,
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ARE DIVORCED FROM THE BONDS OF MATRIMONY.
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THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OF THE FOLLOWING CLAIMS WHICH HAVE
BEEN RAISED OF RECORD IN THIS ACTION FOR WHICH A FINAL ORDER HAS NOT
YET BEEN ENTERED;
Property Settlement Agreement dated September 5, 2001 is
incorporated into this Order
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PROTHONOTARY
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Molin8.23,OI AgmtDisk3
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS IS AN Agreement made this a day 0~~01, by and between William H. Molin,
Ill, (hereinafter referred to as Husband) and Carol M. Molin, (hereinafter referred to as Wife).
WHEREAS, Husband and Wife were married on February 27,1971; and
WHEREAS, various differences have arisen between Husband and Wife, whereby they have been
living separate and apart; and
WHEREAS, the Wite has commenced a divorce action against Husband docketed at No. 2000 -
5994 in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to enter into an amicable settlement to provide for all of the property
rights of the parties and to dispose of the rights and obligations of each to the other in respect to
support, maintenance, alimony, counsel fees, equitable distribution, and all other rights and
obligations under the Divorce Code of 1980, as amended, and it is the intention and agreement of
the parties that this Agreement be a full, complete and final settlement of all of those rights and
obligations under said Divorce Code; and
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in exchange of mutual considerations, and intending to be bound by
the provisions hereof, the parties agree that their recitals form a part of this Agreement and waive
any right to counseling under the Divorce Code of 1980, as amended, and right to counsel fees,
costs, alimony, support, maintenance, and any other rights under the said Divorce Code not
provided for herein and agree as follows:
1
The parties agree that it shall be lawful for each party, at all times hereafter, to live separate and
apart from the other, at such place or places as he or she may, from time to time, choose or deem fit.
Each party shall be free from interference, authority or contact by the other, as fully as if he or she
were single and unmarried, except as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Agreement. Neither party shall molest the other or attempt to endeavor to molest the other, nor
compel the other to cohabit with the other, or in any way harass or malign the other, nor in any way
interfere with the peaceful existence, separate and apart, from the other.
2
The parties jointly own real estate located at 408 Arlington Road, Camp Hill, Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania (Arlington Road Property). Wife agrees to execute a deed transterring her interest in
the Arlington Road Property to Husband, and Husband agrees to assume all existing loans owing on
the Arlington Road Property to include the Fifth Third Mortgage Company Loan and the loan from
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PNC Bank. Husband will refinance said loans into his own name, and Husband will have Wife's
name removed from said loans".., <J r ~.--I.. \::-. I, :LIJ'" I ,'^,,^ q//}O I d I _
v." M./-~ 10 - 5 ~I
3
Husband will retain ownership of the 1993 Cadillac automobile, and Wife waives any claims with
respect to that property. Husband will hold Wife harmless with regard to any outstanding liens on
said automobile.
4
Wife shall retain the 199.0 Ford Taurus automobile, and Husband waives any claims to that
property. Wife will hold Husban harmless with regard to any outstanding liens on said automobile.
5
Husband shall retain his existing lRA account which is located at the Vanguard Group and has an
estimated value of $19,000.00. Wife waives any claim with respect to that account.
6
Wife shall retain her 401K account located at T. Rowe Price which has an estimated value of
$80,000.00. Husband waives any claim to that account.
7
Husband will deliver to Wife the following items of personal property:
A. Two (2) white upholstered living room chairs.
B. Two (2) green and blue striped upholstered living room chairs with matching
pillows.
C. Schrefler family mantel clock.
D. Schrefler family china.
E. Personal books.
F. Personal clothing, shoes & toiletries.
G. Blender.
H. Six (6) foot step ladder.
1. Two (2) Bombay end tables.
J. Bombay sofa table.
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8
Wife shall deliver to Husband the following items of personal property:
A
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
'H.
-I.
1.
Dremel tool and accessories.
Keys for 1993 Cadillac.
Keys to safety deposit box.
American Indian prints (\2). }0/5' b (
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Framed bird prints (4). \ III /q /.,
C~eo Br?och a.\~\O\ fA"*"
Anttque Rinv: (/0/1'- O\\l \
h,d;all JM..klace. Qfl' l1., \ a-
Lapel pm~ 5")
Gold~th 20 poillf d~moJ).jtw )0'
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Except for the items set forth above, each party waives any claims on items of personal property in
the other parties possession. This shall conclude the two rifles currently in the possession of Wife
which shall remain under the exclusive ownership and possession of Wife. Husband will cooperate
with Wife in the transfer of ownership of these two rifles in the event Husband is required to sign
any documentation.
10
Each party hereby represents they have disclosed all of the marital assets to the other party in the
negotiations for the consummation of this Agreement.
11
The parties agree to execute the Consent Affidavits in order to fInalize the divorce, the Wife agrees
to proceed with finalizing the divorce case. The parties agree that the tem1S of this agreement are
contingent upon Husband signing the appropriate affidavits and waivers in order to complete the
divorce. Upon Husband signing this agreement and submitting the affidavits and waivers for the
divorce to Wife, Wife will promptly transmit her consent and waivers along with Husband's
consent and waiver and a copy of the executed Property Settlement Agreement to the court for
incorporation into a decree of divorce.
12
Both parties shall incur their own legal expenses with respect to this divorce litigation.
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13
The parties agree that they will not contract or incur any debt or liability for which the other party
might be responsible and shall indemnify and save the other party harmless from any and all claims
or demands made against that party by reason of such debts or obligations incurred by the other
party. Each party warrants that they have not incurred any debt or liability for which the other party
will be or might be responsible for since the separation of the parties.
14
Should a decree, judgment or order of separation or divorce be obtained by either of the parties in
this or any other sate, country, or jurisdiction, each of the parties hereby consents and agrees that
this Agreement and all of its covenants shall not be affected in any way by any such separation or
divorce; and that nothing in any such decree, judgment, order or further modification and revision
thereof shall alter, amend or vary any term of this Agreement, whether or not either or both of the
parties shall remarry, it being understood by and between the parties hereto that this Agreement
shall survive and shall not be merged into any decree, judgment, or order of divorce or separation.
It is specifically agreed, however, that a copy of this Agreement or the substance of the provisions
thereof, may be incorporated by reference into any divorce, judgment or its decree. This
incorporation, however, shall not be regarded as a merger, it being the specific intent of the parties
to permit this Agreement to survive any judgment and to be forever binding and conclusive upon
the parties.
IS
Husband and Wife do hereby mutually remise, release, quit claim or torever discharge the other and
the estate of such other, for all time to come, and for all purposes whatsoever, from any and all
rights, title and interest, or claims in or against the estate of such other, of whatever nature and
wherever situate, which he or she now has or at anytime hereafter may have against such other, the
estate of such other or any part thereof, whether arising out of any former acts, contracts,
engagements or liabilities of such other or by way of dower or courtesy of claims in the nature of
dower or courtesy, or widow's or widower's rights, family exemption or similar allowance or under
the intestate laws; or the right to take against the spouse's will; or the right to treat a lifetime
conveyance by the other as testamentary or all or other rights of the surviving spouse to participate
in a deceased spouse's estate, whether arising under the laws of Pennsylvania, any state,
commonwealth or territory of the United States, or any other country or any right which either party
may now have or at anytime hereafter have for past, present or future support or maintenance,
alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, costs or expenses, whether arising as a result of the
marital relation or otherwise, except and only except all rights and agreements and obligations of
whatsoever nature arising or which may arise under this Agreement or for the breach of any
provision thereof. It is the intention of Husband and Wife to give to each other by the execution of
this Agreement a full, complete and general release with respect to any and all property of any kind
or nature, real, personal or mixed, which the other now owns or may hereafter acquire, except and
only except all rights and agreements and obligations of whatsoever nature arising or which may
arise under this Agreement or for the breach of any provision thereof.
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16
Each of the parties shall, from time to time, at the request of the other, execute, acknowledge and
deliver to the other party any and all further instruments or documents that may be reasonably
required to give full torce and effect to the provisions of this Agreement.
17
A modification or waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be effective only if made
in writing and executed with the same formality as this Agreement. The failure of either party to
insist upon the strict performance of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed
as a waiver of any subsequent default of the Sallle or similar nature.
18
This Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties and there are no representations,
warranties, covenants or undertakings other than those expressly set forth herein.
19
lt is specifIcally understood and agreed by and between the parties thereto that each paragraph
hereof shall be deemed to be a separate and independent agreement.
20
If either party breaches any provision of this Agreement, the other party shall have the right, at his
or her election, to sue for damages for such breach or seek such other remedies or relief as may be
available to him or her and the party breaching this Agreement shall be responsible for payment of
legal fees and costs incurred by the other in enforcing the rights under this Agreement, or in seeking
such other remedies or relief as may be available to him or her.
21
This Agreement shall be construed under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
22
lf any term, condition, clause or provision of this Agreement shall be determined or declared to be
void or invalid in law or otherwise, then only that term, condition, clause or provision shall be
stricken from this Agreement, and, in all other respects, this Agreement shall be valid and continue
in full force, effect and operation.
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23
Except as otherwise set forth herein, this Agreement shall be binding and shall inure to the benefit
of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns.
24
Wife further agrees to indemnify and hold Husband harmless with respect to any claims that may be
tiled against Husband in connection with a certainjudgrnent note in favor of Wife's parents.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF; the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year tirst
above written.
W1TNESS
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William H. Molin I.
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Carol M. Molin
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v
: NO. 00 - 5994 CIVIL
WILLIAM H, MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
PRAECIPE TO TRANSMIT RECORD
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Transmit the record, together with the following infonnation, to the Court for entry of a
divorce decree:
1. Ground for Divorce: Irretrievable breakdown under Section (X)3301(c) ()3301(d)(1)
ofthe Divorce Code. (Check applicable section.)
2. Date and manner of service of the Complaint: By 'First Class US Mail on or about
August 30, 2000. Certificate of Service is hereby attached.
3, (Complete either paragraph (a) or (b).
(a) Date of execution of the affidavit of consent required by Section 3301(c) of the
Divorce Code: By Plaintiff: September 20, 2001; Defendant: September 5, 2001.
(b) (1) Date of execution ofthe Plaintiffs affidavit required by Section 3301(d) of the
Divorcc Code:_; (2) Date of service of the Plaintiffs affidavit upon the Defendant:_.
4. Related claims pending: None.
5. Complete either (a) (b),
(a) Date and manner of service of the notice of intention to fIle praecipe to transmit
record, a copy of which is attached:
(b) Date Plaintiffs Waiver of Notice in ~3301(c) Divorce was filed with the
Prothonotary: October 12,2001.
(c) Date Defendant's Waiver of Notice in ~3302(c) Divorce was filed with the
Prothonotary: September 7, 2001.
df/----
Hubcrt X. Gilroy, Esquire
Attorney for I>efendant
Broujos & Gilroy, PC
4 North Hanover Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
717-243-4574
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CAROL M, MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs,
WILLIAM H, MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO 6:J - K(}(]J.J c;;;;&
IN DIVORCf Tn
NOT ICE
T 0
DEFEND
You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against
the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take
prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the
case may proceed without you and a decree of divorce or
annulment may be entered against you by the court, A judgment
may also be entered against you for any other claim or relief
requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money
or property or other rights important to you, including custody
or visitation of your children.
When the ground for the divorce is indignities or
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request
marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available
in the Office of the Prothonotary at:
Office of the Prothonotary
Cumberland County Court House
1 Courthouse Square
Carlisle, PA 17013-3387
IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF
PROPERTY, LAWYER'S FEES OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT
iIS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO
NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE
OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP.
CUMBERLAND COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
2 LIBERTY AVENUE
CARLISLE PA 17013
717-249-3166
CAROL M, MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO, tJo - 599'1 ~ I~
IN DIVORCE
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO COUNSELING
You are one of the parties in the above captioned action in
divorce, By virtue of Section 202 of the Pennsylvania Divorce
Code, it is a duty of the Court to advise both parties of the
availability of counseling and upon request of either provide both
parties a list of qualified professionals who provide such
services.
I Accordingly,
i
icounselors
;1
if you desire counseling a list of marriage
is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at:
Office of the Prothonotary
Cumberland County Court House
1 Courthouse Square
Carlisle, PA 17013-3387
Prothonotary
, ;j'lf>
CAROL M, MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. (}/) S9t},/ ~ ..,~
IN DIVORCE
CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE
1. Plaintiff is
residing at 1077
Cumberland County,
Carol M.
Unit 1,
Molin, a citizen of Pennsylvania,
Lancaster Boulevard, Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania.
2, Defendant is William H.
Pennsylvania, residing at 408
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
Molin, III, a
Arlington Road,
citizen of
Camp Hill,
13. Plaintiff and Defendant are SUl luris and have been bonafide
I residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for at least six
,
, months immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint.
4, The parties are husband and wife and were lawfully married on
February 27, 1971, in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania,
5, The marriage is irretrievably broken.
6. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant is in the military or naval
service of the United States or its allies within the provisions
of the Soldiers' & Sailors' Civil Relief Act of the Congress of
1940 and its amendments.
7, There has been no
instituted by either
, , jurisdiction.
prior
of the
action for divorce or annulment
parties in this or any other
II
8, The Plaintiff has been advised
of
the
the
availability of
Court require the
counseling and of the right to request
parties to participate in counseling.
that
COUNT I
Request for a Fault Divorce
Under 3301 (a) (6) of the Divorce Code
9, The prior paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.
10, Defendant has offered such indignities to the Plaintiff, who
is the innocent and injured spouse, as to render Plaintiff's
condition intolerable and life burdensome.
11, This action is not collusive.
12. Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling
and that Plaintiff and Defendant have the right to request the
Court to require the parties to participate in such counseling.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court
enter a Decree of Divorce, pursuant to 3301(a) (6) of the Divorce
Code,
COUNT II
Request for Divorce Due to Irretrievable Breakdown
Under 3301 (c) of the Divorce Code
13, The prior paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated
Iherein by reference thereto.
I
14, The marriage of the parties is irretrievably broken.
15, After ninety (90) days have elapsed from the date of the
filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff intends to file an affidavit
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consenting to a divorce. Plaintiff believes that Defendant may
also file such an affidavit.
16, Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling
and that Plaintiff and Defendant have the right to request the
Court to require the parties to participate in such counseling,
WHEREFORE, if both parties file affidavits to a divorce after
ninety (90) days have elapsed from the filing of this Complaint,
Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter a Decree of
Divorce, pursuant to 330l(c) of the Divorce Code.
COUNT I II
Request for Divorce Due to Irretrievable Breakdown
Under 3301(d) of the Divorce Code
17. The prior paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated
herein by reference thereto,
118. The marriage of the parties is irretrievably broken,
19. After a period of two (2) years has elapsed from the date of
separation, Plaintiff intends to file her affidavit of having
lived separate and apart.
20, Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling
and that Plaintiff and Defendant have the right to request the
Court to require the parties to participate in such counseling.
WHEREFORE, if two (2) years have elapsed from the date of
separation and Plaintiff has filed her affidavit, Plaintiff
respectfully requests the Court to enter a Decree of Divorce,
pursuant to 330l(d) of the Divorce Code.
ii
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COUNT IV
Request for Equitable Distribution of
Marital Property Under 3104, 3323, 3501, 3502 and 3503
of the Divorce Code
21, The prior paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.
22. Plaintiff and Defendant have acquired property, both real and
personal during their marriage from the date of said marriage
until the date of their separation.
23. Plaintiff and Defendant have been unable to agree as to an
equitable distribution of said property,
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to
equitably distribute the marital property of the parties, pursuant
to 3104 and 3502(a) of the Divorce Code,
COUNT V
Request for Alimony Pendente Lite
and Alimony under 3104, 3323, 3701, 3702 and 3704
of the Divorce Code
24. The prior paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.
25. Plaintiff is unable to sustain herself during the course of
litigation,
26, Plaintiff lacks sufficient property to
reasonable needs and is unable to sustain
appropriate employment.
provide
herself
for her
through
i27. Defendant has the means and ability to pay Alimony Pendente
Lite and Alimony to Defendant.
II
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the Court to enter an award of
alimony pendente lite until final hearing and thereupon to enter
an Order of alimony in her favor,
COUNT VI
Request for Counsel Fees, Costs and Expenses Under
3104, 3323, 3502(e) and 3702 of the Divorce Code
28, The prior paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.
29, Plaintiff has employed Mary A, Etter Dissinger, Esquire of
the law firm of Dissinger & Dissinger to represent her in this
matrimonial cause,
,
I
30. Plaintiff is unable to pay the necessary counsel fees, costs,
and expenses and Defendant is more than able to pay them.
WHEREFORE, reserving the right to apply to the Court for
. ,temporary counsel fees, costs and expenses, prior to final
hearing, Plaintiff requests that, after final hearing, the Court
order Defendant to pay Plaintiff's reasonable counsel fees, costs
and expenses.
Respectfully submitted,
DISSINGER & DISSINGER
Ma thew D, Strohm
Attorney for Plaintiff
Supreme Court 1D # 76724
28 North Thirty-second Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011
717-975-2840
II
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VERIFICATION
I, Carol M. Molin, verify that the statements made in the
Divorce Complaint are true and correct. I understand that false
statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S,
~4904 relating to unsworn falsification,
Cud 1ft l!ltt,~
Carol M. Molin, Plaintiff
CAROL M, MOLIN,
Plaintiff
vs,
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION
NO.
IN DIVORCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Matthew D. Strohm, Esquire, hereby certify that on the
date set forth below I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document upon the Defendant, William H, Molin, III, by
First Class United States mail addressed as follows:
Date:
S/3d/oD
William H. Molin, III
408 Arlington Road
C~p Hill, PA ~ ; j 1;&
Matthew D, Strohm, Esquire
-'.', -, '-' <-
CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL VANIA
v
00 -- 5994
CIVIL TERM
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
: IN DIVORCE
AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT AND
WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST
ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER
SECTION 3301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE
1. A Complaint in divorce under Section 3301(C) of the Divorce Code was filed on August 30,
2000.
2. Defendant acknowledges receipt and accepts service of the Complaint on or about
September I, 2000.
3. The marriage of the Plaintiff and Defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety days have
elapsed from the date ofthe tiling ofthe Complaint.
4. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce without notice.
5. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or
expenses if] do not claim them before a divorce is granted.
6. I understand that I will not be divorced until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and
that a copy of the Decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary.
7. I have been advised of the availability of marriage counseling and understand that I may
request that the Court require counseling. I do not request that the Court require counseling.
I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false
statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. 94904 relating to unsworn
falsification to authorities.
Date:
j/a-O/6/
I
WI4!1(~
Carol M. Molin, Plaintiff
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v
: 00-5994
CIVIL TERM
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, Ill,
Defendant
: IN DIVORCE
AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT AND
WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST
ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER
SECTION 3301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE
1. A Complaint in divorce under Section 3301(C) of the Divorce Code was fIled on August 30,
2000.
2. Defendant acknowledges receipt and accepts service of the Complaint on or about
September 1,2000.
3. The marriage of the Plaintiff and Defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety days have
elapsed from the date of the fIling ofthe Complaint.
4. I consent to the entry of a fInal decree of divorce without notice.
5. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division ofpropelty, lawyer's fees or
expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted.
6. I understand that I will not be divorced until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and
that a copy of the Decree will be sent to me immediately after it is fIled with the Prothonotary.
7. I have been advised of the availability of marriage counseling and understand that I may
request that the Court require counseling. I do not request that the Court require counseling.
I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false
statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. ~4904 relating to unsworn
falsifIcation to authorities.
Date: 1- 5-0/
P~/!~Jl7
William H. Molin, III, D6en nt
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
V5.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. ).000- 59"1~
IN DIVORCE
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF
O,~~
55
Mary A. Etter Dissinger, the attorney for Plaintiff, being
duly sworn according to law, says that she mailed by United States
Certified Mail, Restricted Delivery, a true and correct copy of
the Plaintiff's Complaint in Divorce in this action to the
D~fendant at his residence, and that Defendant did receive same as
eV~denced by the signed receipt dated September 01, 2000, attached
he'ceto as Exhibit "A",
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Mary A. ' Et~; ~sin;e~ cJ ,.
Attorney for Plaintiff
28 North Thirty-second Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011
717-975-2840
Sworn to and subscribed
before tJ;hiS S:/1J... day
Of~ ..v......, 2000.
~
NOTARIAl. ilEAL
'MARTHA!.. BOom, Nom!)' Public
Camp Hill Bom. Cumbellmld County
My Commission Expires July 12. 2004
[J Complete items 1 anrlIor 2 for additional services.
Complete Items 3, 4a, and 4b.
[J Print your name and address on the reverse of this form so that we can return this
card to you~"'-"" " ' '-
[J Attach this form to the front of the mailpiece, or on the back if space does not
permit.
[] Write "Return Receipt Requested" on t.hemailpiece.belowthe article number.
[] The Return Receipt will show to whom the article was delivered and the date
delivered.
3. Article Addressed to:
William H. Molin, III
, 408 Arlington Road
,Camp Hill, PA 17011
M.'''ICTED
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL VANIA
v
: NO, 00 - 5994 CIVIL
WILLIAM H, MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE
I, Hubert X. Gilroy, Esquire and the law firm of Broujos & Gilroy, P.C. hereby
enters and appearance on behalf of defendant William H, Molin, III in the above matter.
Also, on behalf of defendant William H. Molin, III, his attorney hereby
acknowledges that a copy of the Complaint and Notice to Plea that was filed in the above
matter was served on defendant by First Class U.S. Mail on or about August 30,2000,
and counsel for the defendant hereby acknowledges and accepts service as of that date.
Date: 1{l/~ '( (CI
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Hubert X. Gilroy, Esquire
Attorney for Defendant
Broujos & Gilroy, P.C.
4 North Hanover Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
717-243-4574
Sworn and subscribed
before me this ~
day of October, 2001
L.~J~A_A- ~W~
Notary Pu he
Notarial Seal
Bridget Ann Corcoran, Notary Public
Carlisle Bora, CU":lberland County
My Commission Expires June 10, 2002
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Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE
NO. 00-5994 CIVIL TERM
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 16th day of November, 2000, the
hearing scheduled for November 29, 2000, is continued
generally to be rescheduled at the request of either party.
Counsel are invited to submit memoranda of law in support of
their respective positions by November 29, 2000.
Edward E. Guido, J.
Lindsay D. Baird, Esquire
For the Defendant
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Mary A. Dissinger, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
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CAROL M. MOLIN : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYL VANIA
V.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III
: NO. 2000-5994 CIVIL
CNIL ACTION - DNORCE
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 9TH day of NOVEMBER, 2000, on the Order of Court dated,
Novenlber 6, 2000, ordering marriage counseling is VACATED. A hearing on the
Petition for Counseling is scheduled for Wednesday, November 29,2000, at 10:15 a.m.
Edward E. Guido, J.
t~ -fYl o.JJ
11- 9 'ao
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in Courtroom # 5 of the Cumberland County Courthouse.
Mary A. Dissinger, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Lindsay D. Baird, Esquire
For the Defendant
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CAROL M, MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WILLIAM H, MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO, 00-5994 CIVIL
IN DIVORCE
ORDER
AND NOW this day of
Petition For Counseling is denied.
, 2000, the
By the Court,
J.
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
AND NOW this day of
hearing on the within Petition
Counseling is scheduled for
, 2000, at
Number of the Cumberland
tl
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION
NO, 00-5994 CIVIL
IN DIVORCE
ORDER
, 2000, a
for Obj ections To Petition For
, the day of
o'clock
,m. in Court Room
County Court House,
By the Court,
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.
CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs,
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVIL
IN DIVORCE
OBJECTIONS TO PETITION FOR COUNSELING
AND NOW comes the Plaintiff in this matter, the Respondent to
the Petition For Counseling, Carol M. Molin, who responds to the
Petition For Counseling and raises as new matter the fact that
there was a Protection From Abuse Order granted to Plaintiff
herein on August 10, 2000, against the Defendant in this action,
and therefore requests the Court not to order marital counseling.
Plaintiff responds to Petition For Counseling as follows:
1. ADMITTED.
2, ADMITTED,
3, ADMITTED.
4. ADMITTED.
5. ADMITTED.
6. DENIED. It is denied that the Petitioner believes the
parties marriage is not irretrievably broken, It is further
denied that marital difficulties of the parties can be resolved
"easily", or at all, with marital counseling, By way of further
answer, it is averred that Mr, Molin has reported to at least one
(1) mutual acquaintance of the parties, that he has given up the
idea of reconciliation with Plaintiff,
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7. Plaintiff is without
deny, and therefore, saying it
sufficient knowledge to admit or
is denied.
8. ADMITTED.
NEW MATTER
9. Plaintiff sought protection from abuse from the Defendant
by filing an action to Docket number 2000-5478 in Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania,
10, A Protection
day of August 2000 to
County, Pennsylvania.
Exhibit "A".)
From Abuse Order was entered on the 10th
Docket number 2000-5478 in Cumberland
(A copy of said Order is attached as
11. The underlying bases for filing the Protection From
Abuse Complaint (See copy of Protection From Abuse Complaint
attached as Exhibit "B") were:
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A, "On or about July 17, 2000, Defendant screamed in
Plaintiff's face, and threatened to kill her if
she quit her job, causing her to fear for her
safety."
B, "Prior incidents of abuse that the Defendant
has committed against Plaintiff or the minor
child/ren, (including any threats, injuries, or
incidents of stalking) are as follows:"
C. "On or about July 02, 2000, Defendant grabbed
Plaintiff by the arm and shoved her, causing her
to fall down steps. Plaintiff sustained bruising
on her arm, both legs, and soreness about her
ankle as a result of this incident,"
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D. "Since approximately May 2000, at least once a week
Defendant has intimidated Plaintiff by yelling and
screaming at her while advancing toward her in a
threatening posture, and by raising his fist back,
and threatening to hit her."
E. "In or about February 2000, Defendant threw a video
cassette at Plaintiff, causing her to have to move,
narrowly avoiding being hit by the cassette, which
struck the wall and breaking the cassette,"
F. "Since approximately 1974, Defendant has abused
Plaintiff in way including, but not limited to,
shoving, grabbing, slapping, and throwing
household objects at her such as a glass ashtray,
a drinking glass, a video cassette, etc. Defendant
threatened Plaintiff on several occasions telling
her that she will not leave him, threatened to kill
her if she left him, and made threatening remarks
to Plaintiff referring to the hollow head bullets
that he keeps with his guns and describing the
massive damage the bullets do to a person shot with
the bullets. Defendant told Plaintiff on several
occasions that he has nothing to live for
and threatened that he should cOIlllllit suicide."
12. Plaintiff believes that the Petition For Marital
Counseling is simply an .attempt to circumvent the Protection From
Abuse Order barring Defendant from contact with Plaintiff, and an
harassment of Plaintiff which is a violation of the Protection
From Abuse Order,
13. Plaintiff in this divorce action is fearful for her
physical well-being and safety, because if counseling sessions are
required, Defendant will know her whereabouts and the times which
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she is to appear for their joint counseling sessions, and she is
fearful of ambush by the Defendant.
14. The Protection From Abuse Order in and of itself is not
sufficient security to Plaintiff that she will not be endangered
going to or from the counseling sessions, or while in counseling,
if the Court orders counseling,
15, The allegations of Plaintiff in the Protection From
Abuse Order, should be sufficient evidence to any Court that
marital counseling would not be successful for the parties, and
that the marriage is irretrievably broken,
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court not
order marital counseling,
Respectfully submitted,
DISSINGER & DISSINGER
~~(~~nger, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff
28 North Thirty-seccmd Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011
(717) 975-2840
~-
VERIFICATION
I, Carol M. MOlin, verify that the statements made in the
foregoing document are true and correct. I understand that false
statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.
C.S,~4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
U'
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9 2000 \
cAJ'
AUG
CAROL MARIE MOLIN,
Plaintiff
: In the Court of Common Pleas of
: CUMBERLAND County,
: PENNSYLVANIA
v.
: Civil Action - Law
WILLIAM HANS MOLIN, m,
Defendant
: No. 00-5478
PROTECTION FROM ABUSE
FINAL ORDER OF COURT
Defendant's Name is: WILLIAM HANS MOLIN, ill,
Defendant's Date of Birth is: November 8, 1940
Defendant's Social Security Number is: 209-32-0891
Name(s) of All protected persons, including Plaintiff and minor children:
1. CAROL MARIE MOLIN
tD"P--
AND NOW, this4sb Day of August, 2000 the court having jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject-matter, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED as follows:
Pursuant to consent of the parties, which does not constitute Defendant's
admission to the averments of abuse in the petition. The following order
will be entered:
Plaintiff's request for a final protection order is granted.
1. Defendant shall not abuse, stalk, harass, threaten the Plaintiff or any
other protected person in any place where they might be found.
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2. Defendant is prohibited from having ANY CONTACT with the
Plaintiff, or any other person protected under this Order, at any location,
including but not limited to any contact at Plaintiffs school, business, or
place of employement. Defendant is specifically ordered to stay away
from the following locations for the duration of this order.
Plaintiff's current residence (confidential), which is leased in her
name only, or any other residence she may establish for herself
during the term of this Order,
Plaintiff's place of employment:
Standard Register Company
550 Gettysburg Road
Mechanicsburg, PA
3. Defendant shall not contact the Plaintiff, or any other person protected
under this Order, by telephone or by any other means, including through
third persons.
4. Defendant shall immediately turn over to the Sherifl's Office, or to a
local law enforcement agency for delivery to the Sherifl's Office, any
firearms license the Defendant may possess, and the following weapons
used or threatened to be used by Defendant in an act of abuse against
Plaintiff and/or the minor children.
1. SHOTGUNS
2. RIFLES
3. HANDGUNS
5. Defendant is prohibited from possessing, transferring or acquiring any
other firearms license or weapons for the duration of this order. The
Defendant has 30 days after expirations of this order to petition the
Court for return of confiscated weapons.
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6. The following additional relief is granted as authorized by 96108 of the
Act:
Defendant is prohibited from having any contact with Plaintiff's
relatives.
Defendant is enjoined from harassing Plaintiff's relatives.
Defendant is enjoined from damaging or destroying any property
jointly owned by the parties or owned solely by Plaintiff.
The conrt costs and fees are waived.
7. A certified copy ofthis Order shall be provided to the police department
where Plaintiff resides and any other agency specified hereafter:
CAMP Hll,L POLICE DEPARTMENT
UPPER ALLEN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT
8. TIDS ORDER SUPERSEDES:
1. ANY PRIOR PF A ORDER
9. All provisions of this order shall expire on: February 9, 2002
NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT
VIOLATION OF TIDS ORDER MAY RESULT IN YOUR ARREST
ON THE CHARGE OF INDIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT WHICH
IS PUNISHABLE BY A FINE OF UP TO $1,000 AND/OR A JAIL
SENTENCE OF UP TO SIX MONTHS. 23 PAC.S. 96114.
VIOLATION MAY ALSO SUBJECT YOU TO PROSECUTION AND
CRIMINAL PENALTIES UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES
CODE.
THIS ORDER IS ENFORCEABLE IN ALL FIFTY (50) STATES, THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TRIBAL LANDS, U.S. TERRITORIES
AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO UNDER THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, 18U.S.C. S2265. IF YOU
TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE STATE AND INTENTIONALLY
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VIOLATE THIS ORDER, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO FEDERAL
cRtMlNAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THAT ACT. 18 U.S.C 992261-
2262. IF THE BRADY INDICATOR PARAGRAPH APPEARS IN THE
ORDER, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO FEDERAL PROSECUTION
AND PENALTIES UNDER THE "BRADY" PROVl$IONS OF THE
GUN CONTROL ACT, 18 U.S.c. S922(G), FOR POSSESSION,
TRANSPORT OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS OR AMMUNITION.
NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
The police who have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs residence OR any
location where a violation of this order occurs OR where the defendant
may be located, shall enforce this order. An arrest for violation of
Paragraphs 1 through 5 of this order may be without warrant, based soley
on probable cause, whether or not the violation is committed in the
presence of the police. 23 Pa.C.S. 96113.
Subsequent to arrest, the police officer shall seize all weapons used or
threatened to be used during the violation of the protection order or during
prior incidents of abuse. The Cumberland County Sheriff's Department
shall maintain possession of the weapons until further order of this Court.
When the defendant is placed under arrest for violation of this order, the
defendant shall be taken to the appropriate authority or authorities before
whom defendant is to be arraigned. A "Complaint for Indirect Criminal
Contempt" shall then be completed and signed by the police officer OR the
plaintiff. Plaintiffs presence and signature are not required to file the
complaint.
IT sufficient grounds for violation of this order are alleged, the defendant
shall be arraigned, bond set and both parties given notice of the, date ofthe
hearing.
BY THE COURT:
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I George E. Hoffer, P. J e
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Prot
If entered pursuant to the consent of plaintiff and defendant:
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Distribution to:
Joan Carey, Attorney for Plaintiff
LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
William Hans Molin, Ill, Defendant
408 Arlington Road
Camp Hill, PA 1701 I
Faxed & Mailed to PSP
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PFAD Number: GXlI 17139U
CAROL MARIE MOLIN,
Plaintiff
: In the Court of Common Pleas of
: CUMBERLAND County,
: PENNSYL V ANlA
v.
: Civil Action - Law
WILLIAM HANS MOLIN, ill,
Defendant
: No. 60- S4-7~
PROTECTION FROM ABUSE
PETITION FOR PROTECTION FROM ABUSE
I. Plaintiff's name is:
CAROL MARIE MOLIN
2. 1, (the Plaintiff), am filing this Petition on behalf of:
- myself
3. Name(s) of ALL person(s), including minor children, who seek protection from abuse.
a. CAROL MARIE MOLIN
4. Plaintiffs address is
confidential
5. Defendant's Name is:
WILLIAM HANS MOLIN, ill,
EXHI$IT
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6. Defendant is believed to live at the following address:
408 Arlington Road, Camp HiO, PA 17011
7. Defendant's Social Security Number is:
209-32-0891
8. Defendant's Date of Birth is:
November 8, 1940
9. Defendant's Place of employment is:
Townsend Resources, 2331 Market Street, Camp HiO, PA 17011
10. Defendant is an adult.
11. The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is:
Spouse
12. The defendant has been involved in a criminal court action.
13. The defendant is not currently on probation / parole
14. The facts of the most recent incident of abuse are as follows:
On about Monday, July 17, 2000
location: 408 Arlington Road, Camp Hill, PA, the marital residence
On or about July 17,2000, Defendant screamed in Plaintiff's face, and threatened
to kill her if she quit her job, causing her to fear for her safety.
15. Prior incidents of abuse that the Defendant has committed against Plaintiff or the minor
childlren, (including any threats, injuries, or incidents of stalking) are as follows:
On or about July 2, 2000, Defendant grabbed Plaintiff by the arm and shoved her,
causing her to fall down steps. Plaintiff snstained bruising on her arm, both legs,
and soreness about her ankle as a result of this incident.
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Since approximately May 2000, at least once a week Defendant has intimidated
Plaintiff by yelling and screaming at her while advancing toward her in a
threatening posture, and by raising his fist back, and threatening to hit her.
In or about February 2000, Defendant threw a video cassette at Plaintiff, causing
her to have to move, narrowly avoiding being hit by the cassette, which struck the
wall, causing an indentation in the wall and breaking the cassette.
Since approximately 1974, Defendant has abused Plaintiff in ways including, but
not limited to, shoving, grabbing, slapping, and throwing household objects at her
such as a glass ashtray, a drinking glass, a video cassette, etc. Defendant
threatened Plaintiff on several occasions telling her that she will not leave him,
threatened to kill her if she left him, and made threatening remarks to Plaintiff
referring to the hollow head bullets that he keeps with his guns and describing the
massive damage the bullets do to a person shot with the bullets. Defendant told
Plaintiff on several occasions that he has nothing to live for and threatened that he
should commit suicide.
16. The Defendant has used, or threatened to use, the following weapon(s) against the
Plaintiff or the minor child/ren:
a. Shotguns
b. Rifles
c. Handguns
17. The police department(s) or law enforcement agencies that should be provided with a
copy of the protection order are:
CAMP Hll,L POLICE DEPARTMENT
UPPER ALLEN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT
18. There is an immediate and present danger of further abuse from the Defendant.
19. FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH ABOVE, I REQUEST THAT THE COURT
ENTER A TEMPORARY ORDER, and AFTER HEARING, A FINAL ORDER
THAT WOULD DO THE FOLLOWING:
a. Restrain Defendant from abusing, threatening, harassing, or stalking
Plaintiff and/or minor child/ren in any place where Plaintiff may be
found.
b. Prohibit Defendant from having any contact with Plaintiff and/or
minor child/ren, either in person, by telephone, or in writing,
.
..,
personally or through third persons, including but not limited to any
contact at Plaintiffs school, business, or place of employment, except
as the court may find necessary with respect to partial custody and/or
visitation with the minor child/ren.
c. Prohibit Defendant from having any contact with Plaintiff's relatives
and Plaintiffs children listed in this petition, except as the court may
find necessary with respect to partial custody and/or visitation with
the minor child/ren.
d. Order Defendant to temporarily turn over weapons to the Sheriff of
this County and prohibit Defendant from transferring, acquiring, or
possessing any such weapons for the duration of the Order.
e. Order Defendant to pay the costs of this action, including filing and
service fees.
f. Order the following additional relief, not listed above:
Enjoin Defendant from harassing Plaintiff's relatives.
Prohibit Defendant from damaging and/or destroying any
property jointly owned by the parties or owned solely by
Plaintiff.
Order Defendant to pay $250.00 to reimburse one of Legal
Services, loc.'s funding sources toward the cost oflitigation in
this case.
g. Grant such other relief as the court deems appropriate.
h. Order the police or other law enforcement agency to serve the
Defendant with a copy of this Petition, any Order issued, and the
Order for Hearing. The petitioner will inform the designated authority
of any addresses, other than the Defendant's residence, where
Defendant can be served.
Respectfully submitted,
w_~
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.
VERIFICATION
I verifY that I am the Petitioner as designated in the present action and that the facts and
statements contained in the above Petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I
understand that any false statements are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.94904, relating
to unSworn falsification to authorities.
Dated:
'i/ 1-/ p-CJCJ cJ
/
.~@~/It'~.
Carol Marie Molin, Plaintiff
liIWl!l~~]-"i'
.
.
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVIL
IN DIVORCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Mary A. Etter Dissinger, Esquire, hereby certify that on
the date set forth below I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document upon the attorney for the Defendant, William H.
Molin, III" by First Class United States Mail addressed as
follows:
Lindsay Dare Baird
37 South Hanover Street
CarliSle, PA 17013-3307
Date:
tI!ilcrv
~ A:7((Cf~si~r, Es'lUire
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
VS.
WilLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVil ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVil
IN DIVORCE
PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
To: Curtis Long, Prothonotary
Kindly enter my appearance on behalf of William H. Molin, III, Defendent in the above
matter.
Dated: November 2, 2000
mdsay D. B~ird, Esq re
37 South Hanover Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 243-5732
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DISSINGER~
. DISSINGER
Camp Hill Offices: 717.975.2840/voice . 717.975.39:>4/["
Marysville Offices: 717.957.3474/voke. 711_9:S7.131G;fax_
December 1, 2000
')"".l' Honorable JUdge E:dward E. Guido
C:umberland County Courthouse
l':le Courthouse Square
':'.or'l.isle, FA 17013
Re: Molin v. Molin (No, 00-Sg94)
\ k'''''ll~ Judge. Guidp:
To refresh your memory, this is the case where the Defendant
!!u"band requested marital counseling. Plaintiff opposes that
"i.'quest because "he has a Protection From Abuse Order against
f".' fcudant. You postponed the previously scheduled hearing and
!~Rcinded a prior Order that directed.counseling to allow time
(.;1[' counsel to tile memorandum in :support at our respective
l'c.,,;itians. I dId not fi'le a memorandum because I could find no
..1"' f' ini ti 'Ie legal authority to support our position.
I am in rece.i.pt ot the Det'endant's Amended Memorandum which
i L<'>S Liberto v. Liberto, 520 A.2d. 45B (Po.. Super. 1987). In
{.1 h,'rto, the Superior Court held that the trial, court was nol:
,'Mjuired to order the statutorily mandated marrialle cOl1nseling
""t1\1ested by hu:sband where, the record showed that, there was no
""i.listic possibility of reconciliation. Id. at 460, 461. I ,'C'.
<!1."Flre of this case and, clearly, it supports my eli-ent's
!~.';';i.tion. However, as an officer of the courtF I feel that i.t ~l~:
r".\, nbligation .to inform YOUr Honor as to why I did not file a
~H'mnrandurn based on Libe:rto.
The Liberto case was decided in 1987, before the most recen~
I r'vLsions to __the Divorce Code in 1990~ The sections under revi.cw
'I I'he 1,iberto case were 201 (d) (2) and 202 which were as follow,,:
201 (d) (2) If a hearing has been held
pursuant to paragraph (1) (ii), and the court
determines that there is a reasonable
prospect of reconciliation, then the court
shall continue the matter. [d]uring such
periOd, the court shall require counseling as
prOVided in section 202.
Artomeys at Law
28 NOM Thitty-serond S""t. Camp HilL PA 17011
400 South Srate Road. MarysvilJe, M 17053
PZ"62 ~ol..6 LrL
~3~NISSIa ~ ~3~HISSIa
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120-d
202(c) Whenever the court orders a
continuation periq~ as provided in section
201 (d) {2l, the court shall require up to a
maximUm 'of three counseling 5essionsT _ +
Since th<i'L_:t.Jberto decision, the Divorce Code has been
updated and no longer contains the provisions of 201 (dl (21
c,'Lating to counseling when there is a reasonable prospect of
u'~onciliation.: The counseling provision today is found 1;1 ~330c
,'ul.:l reads:
3302{a) Indignities.-Whenever indignities
undel:: section 3301 (a) (6) (relating to grounds
for divorce) is the ground tor divorce, the
court shall require up to a maximum of three
counseling sessions whe~e either ot the
parties requests it.
(c) Irretrievahle breakdown.-Whenever the
court orders a continuation period as
provided for irretrievable breakdown in
"ection 3)01 (d) (2), the court shaJ.l require
up to a maximum of three couIl~eli.hq :sessions
The revised statute eliminates the re~uirement that a
r'''t.lsibility of reconciliation exist before a court must order
,,,.,,-cital counseling, I am of the opinion that the reasoning l')f
11:"X,iberto case should still apply. A party should not be
p.enui tted to delay the divorce proceedings by requesting mar it" 1
,'''.unseling when the"e ,is nO indication at all th.at counseling
wL~uld aid in pteserving the marriage. Ho~ever, I could not
(,t.hi-cally file. a rnemora_nduro based on Liberto when I was ~ware c:
I he Change in the statutory autho"ity which, effectively,
nullifies the holding of,Liberto.
My associate has done extenai'1le research into the
.1.<-glslativeli.iistory of the 1990 Divorce Code in ';'n effort to
,'j ~coVer why the lan<;luage regarding reconciliation was
,,] iminated. No remarks were made on the Senate or Howse Ooc>!' in
,~rerence to that particular section. The bill was referred tu
t ::10' Judiciary Committee and no legislative report was issued th.:)\:
w"uld give any guidance as to the legislative intent with rpga~ti
':' the pa"ticular section at issue here. The driving force
1,< hind the new legislation waS the Family Law Section of the
i'nmsy1vania B,ar Association. Even if I could find a member or
: E,('! drafting cpmmittee to give: a reason for th~ change, I cnuld
II; t 1egitimate.ly argue that that was, in fact, the legisl~ti\le
i ,..tent because members of the Bar Association are not
J.<.qislators,
t:>Z62. ~.L6. J...1;,L
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Although I do not believe the legislature intended to
r t~quire counseling ih a case where one spouse has a PFA again~ r
,'he other -spou_Se, aside f:Lorn COIt'U."non sen:se,_ "J; 90 _hot havo any
.lttthority for that position. Obviously, there is no possibilU"
.-,!" l:econcil,ia_tion for the5e parties. I am baffled 35" to bov" :;:i.t:
J \,;,'fondant can. assert that the marriaqe is not ir:retrievably
l'l:oken when be. consented to a Pli'A that prohibits him [rom havH"
.'n~i contact with the Plaintiff for eighteen months.
ThanK you for your time and attention to this matter.
l'lNlse advise if you \-lish to reschedule a hearing.
Very truly YOUrs,
-....-n, Ct-<-'( ()~_._ .
Mary A. Etter Dissinger
Attorney at Law
~"I\F.D:klk
,'C': Carol Mo:lin
Lindsay Dare Baird, Esquire
vi 1"" 3-00-56.5
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DISSINGER & DISSINGER
717 975 3924
P.01
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DISSINGER~
. DISSINGER
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Camp Hill Offices: 717.97S.2840/voice. 711.97S.3n4/lax
Marysvill< Offic<s: 717.9S7.3474/voice . 711.957.2316/I.x
FAX COVER SHEET
DA TE:
December 01. 2000
,'AX NUMBER:
(717 )
'"
240-64~2
TO.
The Honorable
Judge Edward E. Guido
fROM:
Mary A. Etter Dissinger, Esquire
Rl;':
Molin v. Molin 100-5994)
PAGES:
( 4 )
HAJ/D COpy TO FOllOW
Yes
x
No
Hyou do flot rocaive 811 pages clearly, please calJ 975.2840.
J'nQ j,'ifof'm.rion contlli,.,d in this fceslmllo: ~ ".n.rmitted by.n .ttDrnoy, Ir ia pnvi}I/JfIH .lId confid/fflP.I, inlShded tltlly lv," o.'~
US~ of rlle Indi'ficJ1,J61 or entity Jt8tnftd ,dove. Hth.I8.4MOI thIs mM~'g. 16 not the Intendet/ "eipjtJ(1t~ you are hereby rKl tillt-vl
thft ~flY di.uf#rpi~tJon~ distllbrnlo/'J or eopy;ng fJf the t:otnmul'lle,rJolI . .trict1y pfohlblrt1td. If tJ,~ communlcatJlJn h.... h~lj!;f1
NtCc/vm! In 1/1(M" ph!!4Se Imml!X!farely norJfy fI8 b'( telephone" ~JJf/fCt if /IeIC4I...ry~ .MJ fDrUM r},.. fJ""gi,,.J fUelSlIgtll to (4 ~f ~h~
$b~'rI<'Jj ~rld,lU. tII~ the UMed Sfdu P04CM Setn1CfJ (w. Will wtfJbun_ pINe_gel, Th..nk you.
Attorney.' at Law
28 North ThirtY.Second Street. Camp Hill, PA 17011
400 South State Road. Marysville. PA 17053
. ..
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. .
CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYL V ANlA
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVIL
IN DIVORCE
AMENDED MEMORANDUM
Issue:
Is the Court compelled to order the marriage counseling petitioned for by the defendant
husband pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 93302, in that plaintiff wife had filed a Complaint in Divorce
under 23 Pa. C.S.A. 3301(c) and (d), and 3301(a)(6)?
Suggested answer: Yes.
Facts:
The parties were married on February 27, 1971 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Wife
(plaintiff) left the marital residence on August 7, 2000. Wife applied for and a PF A consent order
was issued on August 10, 2000 by the Honorable President Judge George E. Hoffer. Wife filed a
Complaint in Divorce on August 30, 2000.
Husband petitioned for court-ordered counseling on November 2,2000. This Honorable
Court signed an order mandating counseling in consideration of this petition. A telephone call
between counsel for the parties noted the absence of mention of the PF A in husband's Petition
for Counseling. Husband amended the petition on November 7, 2000. Wife (plaintiff) filed an
objection to the amended petition.
An Order was issued on November 9, 2000 vacating the previously ordered marriage
counseling.
A telephonic hearing conference was held on November 16,2000, during which this
Honorable Court directed counsel to research the issue at hand and to submit Memoranda not
later than November 29,2000.
Discussion:
The statutory authority states:
~ 3302. Counseling
(a) Indignities. - Whenever indignities under section 330l(a)(6) (relating to
grounds for divorce) is the ground for divorce, the court shall require up to a maximum of three
counseling sessions where either of the parties requests it.
(b) Mutual consent. - Whenever mutual consent under section 3301 (c) is the
ground for divorce, the court shall require up to a maximum of three counseling sessions within
the 90 days following the commencement of the action where either of the parties requests it.
",,,.
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(c)Irretrievable breakdown. - Whenever the court orders a continuation period
as provided for irretrievable breakdown in section 3301 (d)(2), the court shall require up to a
maximum of three counseling sessions within the time period where either of the parties requests
it or may require such counseling where the parties have at least one child under 16 years of age.
The statute is clear in stating that the Court is compelled to order the marriage counseling
in the absence of case law interpreting the statute differently. The case law on this subject is very
limited.
However, the issue did arise in Liberto v. Liberto, 520 A.2d 458 (Pa.Super. 1987). A copy
of that case is attached for ease of reference. In that case, distinguishable from ours, husband and
wife were separated for three years, both parties had signed consent affidavits and the party
seeking counseling had previously rejected same. (emphasis added). In Liberto, the husband
requested counseling at the 201 (d) hearing. Given the procedural history, the Court determined
that the marriage was irretrievably broken, denied the request for counseliNg and issued a final
decree in divorce. At appeal, the final decree was affIrmed. Judge Cavanaugh, in his concurring
opinion stated:
"I write separately to emphasize that the counseling provisions contained in the Divorce
Code are intended to be utilized whenever it appears that there is a reasonable prospect of
reconciliation between the parties and that such a determination should not be avoided
merely upon the testimony of one party that the marriage is irretrievably broken."
In the present case, husband does not feel that the marriage is irretrievably broken and is
hopeful that counseling will provide the means to preserve a marriage of almost thirty-years
duration. The parties had separated before and counseling was instrumental in bringing them
back together.
Conclusion:
In the absence of case law interpreting a statute differently, the clear language of the
statute is the prevailing authority. It is Husband's position that the Court is compelled to order
the counseling requested given the facts in the present case.
Respectfully submitted,
sdANJ~
~~ay Dare Baird, Esquire
Counsel for Defendant
, .
, '"~,
, ,
CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVIL
IN DIVORCE
MEMORANDUM
Issue:
Is the Court compelled to order the marriage counseling petitioned for by the defendant
husband pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A 93302, in that plaintiff wife had filed a Complaint in Divorce
under 23 Pa. C.S.A. 330l(c) and (d), and 330l(a)(6)?
Suggested answer: Yes.
Facts:
The parties were married on February 27, 1971 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Wife
applied for and a PF A consent order was issued on August 10, 2000 by the Honorable President
Judge George E. Hoffer. Wife (plaintiff) filed a Complaint in Divorce on August 30, 2000 and
left the marital residence on September 7,2000.
Husband petitioned for court-ordered counseling on November 2, 2000. This Honorable
Court signed an order mandating counseling in consideration ofthis petition. A telephone call
between counsel for the parties noted the absence of mention of the PFA in husband's Petition
for Counseling. Husband amended the petition on November 7, 2000. Wife (plaintiff) filed an
objection to the amended petition.
An Order was issued on November 9, 2000 vacating the previously ordered marriage
counseling.
A telephonic hearing conference was held on November 16, 2000, during which this
Honorable Court directed counsel to research the issue at hand and to submit Memoranda not
later than November 29,2000.
Discussion:
The statutory authority states:
~ 3302. Counseling
(a) Indignities. - Whenever indignities under section 3301(a)(6) (relating to
grounds for divorce) is the ground for divorce, the court shall require up to a maximum of three
counseling sessions where either of the parties requests it.
(b) Mutual consent. - Whenever mutual consent under section 3301 (c) is the
ground for divorce, the court shall require up to a maximum of three counseling sessions within
the 90 days following the commencement of the action where either ofthe parties requests it.
. .
" '1' ~"'''i!1r_.
-
""
~~;."
,
(c)IrretrievabIe breakdown. - Whenever the court orders a continuation period
as provided for irretrievable breakdown in section 330 I (d)(2), the court shall require up to a
maximum of three counseling sessions within the time period where either of the parties requests
it or may require such counseling where the parties have at least one child under 16 years of age.
The statute is clear in stating that the Court is compelled to order the marriage counseling
in the absence of case law interpreting the statute differently. The case law on this subject is very
limited.
However, the issue did arise in Liberto v. Liberto, 520 A.2d 458 (Pa.Super. 1987). A copy
of that case is attached for ease of reference. In that case, distinguishable from ours, husband and
wife were separatedfor three years, both parties had signed consent affidavits and the party
seeking counseling had previously rejected same. (emphasis added). In Liberto, the husband
requested counseling at the 201 (d) hearing. Given the procedural history, the Court determined
that the marriage was irretrievably broken, denied the request for counseling and issued a final
decree in divorce. At appeal, the final decree was affirmed. Judge Cavanaugh, in his concurring
opinion stated:
"I write separately to emphasize that the counseling provisions contained in the Divorce
Code are intended to be utilized whenever it appears that there is a reasonable prospect of
reconciliation between the parties and that such a determination should not be avoided
merely upon the testimony of one party that the marriage is irretrievably broken."
In the present case, husband does not feel that the marriage is irretrievably broken and is
hopeful that counseling will provide the means to preserve a marriage of almost thirty-years
duration. The parties had separated before and counseling was instrumental in bringing them
back together.
Conclusion;
In the absence of case law interpreting a statute differently, the clear language of the
statute is the prevailing authority. It is Husband's position that the Court is compelled to order
the counseling requested given the facts in the present case.
Respectfully submitted,
i~YD][~
Counsel for Defendant
458 Pa.
520 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES
Such motion shan be made fourteen (14)
ys after arraignment, unless the time
for 'ling is extended by the court. In
such m 'on the party must set forth the
fact that good faith effort to discuss
the requeste material has taken place
and proved uns cessful.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 305 A. ubsection B of Rule
305 addresses the issu of eyewitnesses.
It provides that:
,if the defendant files a mo 'on for pre-
trial discovery, the court may rder the
Commonwealth to allow the de dant's
attorney to inspect and copy or oto-
graph any of the following reque d
items, upon a showing that they are
tetial to the preparation of the defense,
and that the request is reasonable:
(a) the names and addresses of eye-
witnesses;
Pa.R.Crim.P. 305 B(2). Having failed to
file such a pretrial motion I cannot see that
appellant is entitled to any relief on t .
basis. I would affirm the lower co's
ruling on this issue.
Finally, appellant contends that
not have effective assistance of ounsel
prior to and in the course of trial. A claim
of ineffectiveness will not be su ined un-
less it is determined that, in lig t of all the
alternatives available to couns ,the strate-
gy actually employed was s unreasonable
that no competent attorn y would have
chosen it. Commonwea h v. Litzenber-
ger, 333 Pa.Super. 471, 2 A.2d 968 (1984).
Appellant's first claim f ineffectiveness is
that his counsel sho Id have obtained a
written statement om Goldia Elkin and
should have moved or leave to cross-exam.
ine her at trial w n her testimony was not
in accord with er prior oral statements.
To bave conf ted Elkin about her incon-
sistent testim ny through the use of a writ-
ten stateme t after motioning to call her
for cross xamination, may wen have
proved . straus to appellant. While her
trial te . mony as given, conflicted with
that 0 appellant, her testimony tended
estab sh not only that no altercation oc
curred between appellant and Sheasley, bu
that they never even danced togethe. It is
impossible to determine how EI n would
have responded to the propos d cross-ex-
amination. The testimony y well have
cast a doubt over appel s entire case.
In light of this risk, I a e with the trial
court and I would not fi d counsel ineffec-
tive in this respect.
Appellant contend that counsel erred in
excusing the tave owner, Larry Boyer,
from testifying. oyer was subpoenaed to
testify by the efense, but requested per-
mission to Ie ve the trial and was allowed
to do so. Appellant also contends that
counsel as ineffective for failing to
present t tria! the testimony of other wit-
nesse who did testify at the post-trial mo-
'0 hearing. As I have already dis-
CII d, the testimony of Boyer and the
o e present at the tavern would have
. een umulative of the testimony actually
presen d. Their testimony would have es-
tablishe that they were unaware of any
incident at e tavern on the night in ques-
tion. Defen e testimony actually present-
ed at trial al ady attempted to establish
that no incident ccurred. As such I would
find that appella has failed to establish
any ineffective assi nee of counsel.
Because I believe ill imple assault con-
viction is supported by s . cient evidence
and appellant's other argn ents are with-
out merit, I would affirm ap lIant's judg
ment of sentence.
w
o ~KEVNUMBf:RSYSTEM
T
Joyce Elizabeth LIBERTO, Appellee,
v.
Samuel Albert LIBERTO, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 4, 1986.
Filed Jan. 23, 1987.
Wife filed complaint seeking divorce.
The Court of Common Pleas, Family Divi-
sion, Allegheny'
Wettick, J., gran
pealed. The Sup
burgh, 1986, W
record supported
trial court was nl
torily mandated
quested by hus
granting divorce;
decision "decree
Hdecision," was h
Affirmed.
Cavanaugh,
opinion in which ;
1. Divorce €'>12
Evidence, in I
ing "no fault" dh
that husband and
and apart for at 1<
marriage was irre
ing their separatic
not share same ht
not engage in seXI
trips or attend St
and reje~ted. marri
~ 201(d).
2. Divorce $>87.5
Trial court wa
statutorily mandai
requested by husl
granting divorce;
marriage was irret
xeasonable prospec
statute requiring Ct
strued in common;
~ 201(d)(2).
3. Divorce €'>184(1
Error in labeli
"decree of divorce,"
was harmless; fina
not entered until ar
1. 23 P.S. ~ 201(d).
2. Subsection 201(e) .
(e) It shall be lav
divorce where a ,
alleging that the m,
ken and 90 days ha'
filing of the comp
520 A.2d--12
LIBERTO v. LIBERTO
Cite as 520 A.2d458 (Pa.8uper. (987)
i together. It is
'w Elkin woulli
'po&ed cros.....,,,,
may well have
It'S entire ca&e.
,e with the triat
COllnset inefiec-
sion, AUegheny County, No. FD 82-04187,
Wettick, J., granted divorce. Husband ap-
peated. The Superior Court, No. 380 Pitts-
burgh, 1986, Wieand, J., held that: (1)
record supported trial court's findings; (2)
trial court was not required to order statu-
torily mandated marriage counseling re-
quested by husband as prerequisite to
granting divorce; and (3) error in labeling
decision "decree of divorce," rather than
"decision," was harmless.
Affirmed.
Cavanaugh, J., concurred and filed
opinion in which Johnson, J., joined.
,ounsel erred in .
" Larry Boyer;
3 sIlbpoensed: to
; requested pel" ,
.nd was "Uowed', .
contends. that
for failing to,.
ny of other wit-
,e post,trial mo.-
re already' <lis-
Boyer and. thll"
,ru would, have'
:timony actualfy'
r would havees-
maware of any
Ie night in q!les-
,ctuaUy present,
ted to establish
As such I would .
iled to establish
)f counsel.
,pIe assault,con-
[fielent evidence
ments are with-
'ppellant's judg-
1. Divorce >8=>12
Evidence, in proceeding by wife seek-
ing "no fault" divorce, supported findings
that husband and wife had lived separate
and apart for at least three years and that
marriage was irretrievably broken; foUow-
ing their separation, husband and wife did
not share same home, did not cohabit, did
not engage in sexnal relations, did not take
trips or attend social functions together,
and reiectedlnarrla.g.e counseling, 23 P.S.
~ 201(d).
2. Divorce >8=>87.5
Trial court was not required to order
statutorily mandated marriage counseling
reqIlested by husband as prerequisite to
granting divorce; trial court found that
marriage was irretrievably broken with no
reasonable prospect of reconciliation, and
statute requiring counseling had to be con-
strued in commonsense manner. 23 P.S.
~. 201(dX2).
3. Divorce >8=>184(12)
Error in labeling divorce decision as
Hdecree of divorce," rather than Ildecision,"
was harmless; final decree in divorce was
not entered until aU issues raised posttrial
I. 23 P.S. ~ 201(d).
~
;TO, Appellee,
'0, Appellant.
nn&ylvania.
1986.
1987.
2; Subsection 201{c) provides:
(c) It shall be lawful for the court to grant a
divorce where a complaint has been filed
alleging that the marriage is irretrievably bro-
ken and 90 days have elapsed from the date of
filing of the complaint and an affidavit has
520 A.2d-12
seeking divorce.
,as, Family Divi-
Pa. 459
had been argued by counsel and decided by
the court. Rule& Civ.Proc., Rule 1920.-
52(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
Samuel P. Kamin, Pittsburgh, for appel-
lant.
Dennis J. Miller, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND and
JOHNSON, JJ.
WIEAND, Judge:
'rhis is an appeal from a final order
granting a divorce on the basis of Section
201(d) of the Divorce Code of 1980.1 In
granting the divorce, the court found that
the marriage had been irretrievably broken
and that the parties had lived separate and
apart for a period of at least three (3)
years. Husband-appellant contends on ap-
peal that the trial court erred by failing to
order counseling prior to entering a final
decree of divorce. He also avers that the
court erred by entering an initial "decree in
divorce," rather than a "decision" to which
he could file exceptions. We find no basis
for reversing and, therefore, affirm the
final decree of divorce.
Joyce Liberto, appellee, and Samuel Li-
berto, appellant, were married on August
17, 1968. Wife-appellee filed a complaint in
divorce on April 1, 1982 seeking a divorce
under Section 201(c) Z of the Divorce Code,
with ancillary claims for custody, child sup-
port, equitable distribution, alimony, coun-
sel fees and costs. An affidavit of consent
was filed by wife-appellee on March 25,
1983. Upon husband-appellant's failure to
file an affidavit of consent, as permitted by
Section 201(c), wife-appellee elected to pro-
ceed under Section 201(d)(1) of the Divorce
Code 3 and, on September 20, 1985, filed a
':
,
I
! 1
j
I
been filed by each of the parties evidencing
that each of the parties consents to the di.
vorce.
3. Subsection (d)(1) of ~ 201 prOvides:
(d)(l) It shan be lawful for the court to
grant a divorce where a party has filed a
complaint and an affidavit alleging that the
i
l
'I
,
460 Pa.
520 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES
new affidavit of consent. Husband-appel-
lant then filed a counter-affidavit in which,
inter alia, he "specifically request{ ed] the
court to order a 120 day continuance, pur.
suant to Section 201(d)(2),' during which
period the court should order marital coun.
seling."
On February 18, 1986, a hearing was
held before the Honorable R. Stanton Wet.
tick, after which a decree in divorce was
entered on grounds of "irretrievable break-
down." Husband filed exceptions to this
decree on February 28, 1986 and filed a
motion to strike the divorce decree on
March 10, 1985. In his motion to strike the
divorce decree, Husband asserted that the
trial court had erred in not ordering coun-
seling under Section 202,' as he had re-
quested, and also that the court had erred
in entering a divorce decree rather than a
"decision" which stated the reasons for the
proposed divorce, as required by Pa.R.C.P.
1920.52. Following a hearing on these is-
sues, the court entered a final decree in
divorce. Husband appealed.
[1] "In the review of a divorce case, it
is the responsibility of this court to make a
de novo evaluation of the record and to
decide independently of the master and the
lower court whether a legal cause of action
in divorce exists." Jones v. Jones, 311
parties have lived separate and apart for a
period of at least three years, and that the
marriage is irretrievably broken, and:
0) the respondent does not deny the allega-
tions set forth in the affidavit; or
(ii) the respondent denies one or more of
the allegations set forth in the affidavit. but
after notice and hearing. the court determines
that the parties have lived separate and apart
for a period of at least three years and that
the marriage is irretrievably broken,
4. Section 201(d)(2) provides:
(2) If a hearing has been held pursuant to
paragraph (1)(il), and the court determines
that there is a reasonable prospect of reconcil-
iation, then the court shall continue the mat-
ter for a period of -not less than 90 days nor
more than 120 days, unless the parties agree
to a period in excess of 120 days. During
such period, the court shall require counsel-
ing as provided in section 202. If the parties
have not reconciled at the expiration of the
-
Pa.Super. 407, 409-411, 457 A.2d 951, 952
(1983). See: Sinha v. Sinha, 341 Pa.Su-
per. 440, 447, 491 A.2d 899, 902 (1985);
Thomas v. Thomas, 335 Pa.Super. 41, 45,
483 A.2d 945, 946 (1984); Remick v. Rem-
ick, 310 Pa.Super. 23, 28-29, 456 A.2d 163,
166 (1983); Keller v. Keller, 275 Pa.Super.
573, 576, 419 A.2d 49, 50 (1980). In the
instant case, the trial court held that the
evidence supported a grant of a unilateral
"no fault" divorce under Section 201(d) nf
the Divorce Code because (1) the parties
had lived "separate and apart" for at least
three (3) years; and (2) the marriage was
irretrievably broken. The record supports
the trial court's findings.
FolIowing their separation, the parties
did not share the same home, did not co-
habit, did not engage in sexual relations,
and did not take trips or attend social func-
tions together. The only contact between
the parties was in regard to the children.
The evidence revealed that neither party
had made any attempts to reconcile during
the period of separation, tI1at HusQawthad
previo]JsIyrejected marriage..cJ))l.ns~!iJlg,
and that Wife did not wish to engage in
counseling and unequivocalIy rejected any
possibility of reconciliation. The marriage
clearly was irretrievably broken.
time period and one party states under oath
that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the
court shall determine whether the marriage is
irretrievably broken, If the court determines
that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the
court shall grant the divorce. Otherwise, the
court shall deny the divorce.
s. Section 202 provides, in pertinent part;
(c) Whenever the court orders a continua-
tion period as provided in section 20l(d)(2),
the court shall require up to a maximum of
three counseling sessions within the time peri-
od where either of the parties requests it or
may require such counseling where we par-
ties have at least one child under 16 years of
age, .
(d) Whenever section 201(a)(6), (c) or (d) IS
the ground for divorce, the court shall upon
filing of the complaint, notify both parties of
the availability of counseling and upon re-
Quest, provide both parties a list of qualified
professionals who provide such services.
[2J We are as.
improper to gran
Section 201(d) wit
seling when a par
Judge Wettick sp
marriage was me
there was no reas
ciliation. In view
supported by the .
required to contir
(90) days at the
parties. Section
strued in a comm(
intended to prov
counseling where
iation existed. It
pel a court to eng
exercises, nor Wa!
spouse with the r
of a decree in div
Cf. Thomas v. Th
[3] Pa.R.C.P.l
contested action o.
shall enter a dec;,
reasons therefor. I>
tends that the tri,
lyby entering a "
than a "decision."
that even if the t
mislabeled, the er
band was neverth
motion for post-tr:
227.1-which he e.
tions-and a final
entered until all is
been argued by co
court.
The final decree
JOHNSON, J., .
also the concurrin
CAVANAUGH, J.
CAVANAUGH
,
opinion.
CAVANAUGH,
I concur in the
lIlajority since I
created in the co
that the parties' m
A.2d 951, 952
4, 341 Pa.Su-
", 902 (1985);
Super. 41, 45
.mick v. Rem~
456 A.2d 163
,
275 Pa.Super.
1980). In the
held that the
)f a unilateral
'tion 201(d) of
1) the parties.
t" for at least
marriage was:
'cord supports
n, the parties
le, did not co-
xual relations,
nd social tunc-
,ntact between,
J the children,
neither party
lMnci1e during
tIIusban<!...!1ad
;,e,_ .cQ_u.n_~!=!~llimi
1 to engage in
y rejected any
The marriage
.ken.
;tates under oath:
lably broken, the
~r the marriam:_ is-
Court determines
{ably broken; the
:. Otherwise. the
.inent part;
rders a continua-
"'clion 201(d)(2),
o a maximum of
:hin the time peri-
ies requests it or
19 where the par-
llnder 16 years of
:.)(6). (c) or (d) is
t:ourt shall upon
fy both parties of
ng and upon re-
a list of qualified
uch services.
--
..
~
~ ...." -~:,
..........
HOUSEHOLDER v. KENSINGTON MFG. CO.
Cite as 520 A..2d 461 (Pa.Super. (987)
[2] We are asked nevertheless to hold it
improper to grant a divorce pursuant to
Section 201(d) without first ordering coun-
seling when a party requests it. However,
Judge Wettick specifically found that the
marriage was irretrievably broken and that
there was no reasonable prosped of recon-
ciliation. In view of this finding, which is
supported by the record, the court was not
. required to continue the aetion for ninety
(90) days at the request of one of the
parties. Section 20I(d)(2) must he con-
strued in a common sense manner. It was
intended to provide additional time and
counseling where the possibility of reconcil-
iation existed. It was not intended to com-
pel a court to engage in futile and useless
exercises, nor was it intended to provide a
spouse with the means to delay the entry
of a decree in divorce for no good reason.
Cf. Thomas v. Thomas, supra.
[3] Pa.R.C.P. 1920.52(a) directs that in a
contested action of divorce, "the trial jndge
shall enter a decision which shall state the
reasons therefor." Husband-appellant con-
tends that the trial court erred procedural-
ly by entering a "decree of divorce" rather
than a udecision." We' conclude, however,
that even if the trial court's decision was
mislabeled, the error was harmless. Hus-
band was nevertheless permitted to file a
motion for post-trial relief under Pa.R.C.P.
227.1-which he erroneously labeled excep-
tions-and a final decree in divorce was not
entered until all issues raised post-trial had
been argued by counsel and decided by the
court.
The final decree is affJ1"lIled.
JOHNSON, J., joins this opinion and
also the concurring opinion by
CAVANAUGH, J.
CAVANAUGH, J., files a concurring
opinion.
CAVANAUGH, Judge, concurring:
I ooncur in the result aehieved by the
majority since I believe that the record
created in the court below demonstrates
that the parties' marriage was irretrievahly
Pa. 461
broken. I write separately to emphasize
that the counseling provisions contained in
the Divorce Code are intended to be utilized
whenever it appears that there is a reason.
able prospect of reconciliation between the
parties and that such a determination
should not be avoided merely upon the
testimony of one party that the marriage is
irretrievably broken. One party may not
effectively nullify the counseling provisions
through a simple recitation that in his or
her belief the marriage is irretrievably bro-
ken.
The record before us contains far more
than the mere assertion by one party of
irretrievahle breakdown. Rather the evi-
dentiary hearing condncted by the lower
court establishes that the entire course of
dealing between the parties since August
1982 contained little or no efforts by either
party to preserve the marriage.
The unilateral termination of a marriage
without the benefit of counselling is not a
step to be undertaken lightly by the courts.
It is only upon a complete record, such as
that present in this ease, that a determina-
tion of irretrievable breakdown should be
made and counseling not be required.
JOHNSON, J., joins this concurring
opinion.
w
o ~ J(fY MIIMaiR svmM
T
Leona HOUSEHOLDER, Appellant,
v.
KENSINGTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, Appellee.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued June 25, 1986.
Filed Jan. 20, 1987.
Employee who was allegedly dis-
charged from at-will position for nonjob-re-
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. lS~INGER
'J';'''' ",d\'
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Camp Hill Offices: 717.975.2840jvoice . 717.975.3924jfax
Marysville Offices: 717.957.3474jvoice. 717.957.2316jfax
December 1, 2000
The Honorable Judge Edward E. Guido
Cumberland County Courthouse
One Courthouse Square
Carlisle, PA 17013
fJLPy
Re: Molin v. Molin (No. 00-5994)
Dear Judge Guido:
To refresh your memory, this is the case where the Defendant
Husband requested marital counseling. Plaintiff opposes that
request because she has a Protection From Abuse Order against
Defendant. You postponed the previously scheduled hearing and
rescinded a prior Order that directed counseling to allow time
for counsel to file memorandum in support of our respective
positions. I did not file. a memorandum because I could find no
definitive legal authority to support our position.
I am in receipt of the Defendant's Amended Memorandum which
cites Liberto v. Liberto, 520 A.2d 458 (Pa. Super. 1987). In
Liberto, the Superior Court held that the trial court was not
required to order the statutorily mandated marriage counseling
requested by husband where the record showed that there was no
realistic possibility of reconciliation. Id. at 460, 461. I am
aware of this case and, clearly, it supports my client's
position. However, as an officer of the court, I feel that it is
my obligation to inform Your Honor as to why I did not file a
memorandum based on Liberto.
The Liberto case was decided in 1987, before the most recent
revisions to the Divorce Code in 1990. The sections under review
in the Liberto case were 201(d) (2) and 202 which were as follows:
201(d) (2) If a hearing has been held
pursuant to paragraph (1) (ii), and the court
determines that there is a reasonable
prospect of reconciliation, then the court
shall.continue the matter. . . [d]uring such
period, the court shall require counseling as
provided in .section 202. . ..
Attorneys at Law
28 North Thirty-Second Street. Camp Hill, PA 17011
400 South State Road · Marysville, PA 17053
'"~',' """-,~ . '~""<,, ..~ -. -" .-'..'--,,,--, . ,-,- '," ;oo-~"""\~,.;;.;,:,~~,-;c-,~,.:..-,,,~,,~,, 0, ,:
202(c) Whenever the court orders a
continuation period as provided in section
201 (d) (2), the court shall require up to a
maximum of three counseling sessions. .
Since the Liberto decision, the Divorce Code has been
updated and no longer contains the provisions of 201(d) (2)
relating to counseling when there is a reasonable prospect of
reconciliation. The counseling provision today is found in ~3302
and reads:
3302(a) Indignities.-Whenever indignities
under section 3301(a) (6) (relating to grounds
for divorce) is the ground for divorce, the
court shall require up to a maximum of three
counseling sessions where either of the
parties requests it.
(c) Irretrievable breakdown.-Whenever the
court orders a continuation period as
provided for irretrievable breakdown in
section 3301 (d) (2), the court shall require
up to a maximum of three counseling sessions
The revised statute eliminates the requirement that a
possibility of reconciliation exist before a court must order
marital counseling. I am of the opinion that the reasoning of
the Liberto case should still apply. A party should not be
permitted to delay the divorce proceedings by requesting marital
counseling when there is no indication at all that counseling
would aid in preserving the marriage. However, I could not
ethically file a memorandum based on Liberto when I was aware of
the change in the statutory authority which, effectively,
nullifies the holding of Liberto.
My associate has done extensive research into the
legislative history of the 1990 Divorce Code in an effort to
discover why the language regarding reconciliation was
eliminated. No remarks were made on the Senate or House floor in
reference to that particular section. The bill was referred to
the Judiciary Committee and no legislative report was issued that
would give any guidance as to the legislative intent with regard
to the particular section at issue here. The driving force
behind the new legislation was the Family Law Section of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association. Even if I could find a member of
the drafting committee to give a reason for the change, I could
not legitimately argue that that was, in fact, the legislative
intent because members of the Bar Association are not
legislators.
""'_c"
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Although I do not believe the legislature intended to
require counseling in a case where one spouse has a PFA against
the other spouse, aside from common sense, I do not have any
authority for that position. Obviously, there is no possibility
of reconciliation for these parties. I am baffled as to how the
Defendant can assert that the marriage is not irretrievably
broken when he consented to a PFA that prohibits him from having
any contact with the Plaintiff for eighteen months.
Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.
Please advise if you wish to reschedule a hearing.
Very truly yours,
'------ffi~ ~....
Mary A. Etter Disslnger
Attorney at Law
MAED:klk
cc: Carol Molin
Lindsay Dare Baird, Esquire
File: 3-00-565
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
v
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: NO. 2000 - 5994 CIVIL ACTION
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
: IN DIVORCE
PRAECIPE
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Please enter the appearance of Broujos 8r Gilroy, P.c. on behalf of William H. Molin, III
in the above matter and please withdraw the appearance of Lindsay D. Baird, Esquire as
attorney for the Defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
Date:
"3 0
C1UrJ
Hubert X. Gilroy, E
Broujos 8r Gilroy, P.
Date: /c1 ..l? . tfi)
~()
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(Yhdsay D. B d, Esquire
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYL VANIA
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVIL
IN DIVORCE
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this Ii" day of JI\,. .......t..,
, 2000, upon presentation
and consideration of the within Petition, it is hereby ordered and directed that the
Plaintiff, Carol M. Molin, shall attend three counseling sessions with her Husband, the
Defendant, William H. Molin, III, with a counselor to be selected either mutually by the
parties or by the Defendant. Defendant shall be responsible for the costs associated
with counseling.
J.
975-~~i<J
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F!LED--OFr-1CE
V".c, r~,,-'7' J''I\''-lT'RY
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVIL
IN DIVORCE
PETITION FOR COUNSELING
AND NOW, comes the Defendant, William H. Molin, III, by and through his
counsel of record, Lindsay Dare Baird, Esquire, and petitions the Court as follows:
1. Your Petitioner is the above-named Defendant, William H. Molin, III, an
adult individual currently residing at 408 Arlington Road, Camp Hill, Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania.
2. Your Respondent is the above-named Plaintiff, Carol M. Molin, an adult
individual currently residing at 1077 Unit 1, Lancaster Boulevard, Mechanicsburg,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
3. The parties were married on February 27, 1971, in Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania.
4. Plaintiff initiated a divorce action under Sections 3301 (a)(6) and (c) of the
Divorce Code requesting a Fault and "no fault" Divorce, filing said Complaint on August
30, 2000.
5. Plaintiff has alleged in the divorce complaint that the marriage is
irretrievably broken.
6. Petitioner believes that the parties' marriage is not irretrievably broken and
that if the Respondent is obligated to attend marriage counseling with the Petitioner, the
parties' marital difficulties can easily be resolved.
7. Petitioner is willing to accept responsibility for scheduling counseling
"
~~
~ __~;;;/l'",
sessions and also willing to accept the financial responsibility for costs associated with
Ihe marital counseling sessions.
8. Opposing counsel, Marry Etter Dissinger, Esquire, has been provided with
a copy of this Petition contemporaneously with its filing.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner requests your Honorable Court to order the
Respondent to attend marital counseling sessions with the Petitioner with Jeff
Verrecchio, located at 355 N. 21 st Street - Suite 206, Camp Hill, PA 17011 as
their counselor of Petitioner's selection with the Petitioner accepting responsibility for
the financial costs associated with the aforesaid counseling.
Respectfully submitted,
, ~' ---,
. ~
-AV" :1.11t'L..",
I verify that to the best of my Irnowledge and belief, the statements made in the
foregoing document are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are
made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.!i4904 relating to unsworn falsification to
authorities.
k-~~f-:rH/
William H. Molm., I
DefendantlPetitioner
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WilLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVil ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVil
IN DIVORCE
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this ~ ~ day of ~
, 2000, upon presentation
and consideration of the within Amended Petition, it is hereby ordered and directed that
the Plaintiff, Carol M. Molin, shall attend three counseling sessions with her Husband,
the Defendant, William H. Molin, III, with a counselor to be selected either mutually by
the parties or by the Defendant. Defendant shall be responsible for the costs
associated with counseling.
BY THE COURT,
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!.RIjE COpy FROM RECORD
In I ,,::;nmOilY whei'oof, I herfH:nlo Sill my hand
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WILLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVIL
: IN DIVORCE
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this t ~ dayof~
, 2000, upon presentation
and consideration of the within Amended Petition, it is hereby ordered and directed that
the Plaintiff, Carol M. Molin, shall attend three counseling sessions with her Husband,
the Defendant, William H. Molin, III, with a counselor to be selected either mutually by
the parties or by the Defendant. Defendant shall be responsible for the costs
associated with counseling.
BY THE COURT,
J.
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CAROL M. MOLIN,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
WilLIAM H. MOLIN, III,
Defendant
CIVil ACTION
NO. 00-5994 CIVil
IN DIVORCE
AMENDED PETITION FOR COUNSELING
AND NOW, comes the Defendant, William H. Molin, III, by and through his
counsel of record, Lindsay Dare Baird, Esquire, and petitions the Court as follows:
1. Your Petitioner is the above-named Defendant, William H. Molin, III, an
adult individual currently residing at 408 Arlington Road, Camp Hill, Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania.
2. Your Respondent is the above-named Plaintiff, Carol M. Molin, an adult
individual currently residing at 1077 Unit 1, Lancaster Boulevard, Mechanicsburg,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
3. The parties were married on February 27, 1971, in Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania.
4. A Protection From Abuse order was entered by the Honorable George E.
Hoffer, PJ, on August 10, 2000 in favor of the Plaintiff with the Defendant's consent.
5. Plaintiff initiated a divorce action under Sections 3301 (a)(6) and (c) of the
Divorce Code requesting a Fault and "no fault" Divorce, filing said Complaint on August
30, 2000.
6. Plaintiff has alleged in the divorce complaint that the marriage is
irretrievably broken.
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7. Petitioner believes that the parties' marriage is not irretrievably broken and
that if the Respondent is obligated to attend marriage counseling with the Petitioner, the
parties' marital difficulties can easily be resolved.
8. Petitioner is willing to accept responsibility for scheduling counseling
sessions and also willing to accept the financial responsibility for costs associated with
the marital counseling sessions.
9. Opposing counsel, Mary Etter Dissinger, Esquire, has been provided with
a copy of this Petition contemporaneously with its filing.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner requests your Honorable Court to order the
Respondent to attend marital counseling sessions with the Petitioner. Said counselling
is to be with Jeff Verrecchio, located at 355 N. 21 st Street - Suite 206, Camp Hill, PA
17011 as the counselor of Petitioner's selection, with the Petitioner accepting
responsibility for the financial costs associated with the aforesaid counseling.
Respectfully submitted,
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I verify that to the best of my Imowledge and belief, the statements made in the
foregoing document are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are
made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.~4904 relating to unsworn falsification to
authorities.
k~4~~7ZT
William H. Nloli , .
Defendant/Petitioner
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