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HomeMy WebLinkAbout03-2060 YOU HA~ BEEN SUED IN COURT. IP YOU WISH TO DEFEND A~INST THE CLAIMS SET ~RTH IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES, YOU MUST T~E ACTION WITHIN ~NTY (20) DAYS A~ER THIS COMPLAINT AND NOTICE A~ SER~D, BY E~ERING A WRIT~N APPEA~CE PERSONALLY OR BY ~ A~OR~Y ~ FILING IN ~ITI~ WI~ ~E COURT YOUR DE~NSES ~ THE CLAIMS SET ~H AGAINST YOU. ~OU ARE WARNED OR OBJECTIONS T~T IF YOU FAIL ~ ~ SO ~E CASE ~Y P~EED WITHOUT YOU AND A JUDG~ ~Y BE ~RED AGAINST YOU BY T~ COURT W~THOUT ~RT~ER N~ICE ~R ~Y ~O~Y CLAI~D IM THE C~LAI~ OR~R ANY OT~ER CLAIM OR ~LZEF ~Q~STED SY ~E PLAI~IFF. YOU ~Y LOSE MONEY OR PROPERTY OR OTHER RIGHTS IMPORT~4T TO Y~. YOU SHOULD TAK~E THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO THE TELEPHONE OR THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. CLV~E~ COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 2 LIBERTY AVENUE CARLISLE PA 17013 717 249 3166 / JURY TRIAL DEMANDED -I- -3- 9 __Vt STANLEY BETHEA, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS, · NOi 2310 CV2000 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND PAUL TAGLIABUE, COMMISSIONER, . N.F.L., Defendant · CIVIL ACTION - LAW ORDER AND NOW THIS. ay of ~.Jaru~y, 2003, upon consideration of the Motion For Leave of Court submitted to the Court Administrator's Office in accordance with the order entered in this matter filed on July 16, 2001, Plaintiff is not required to o~ain our permission to file an action in Cumberland County. Plaintiff is only required to obtain our permission before filing an action against Defendants in either Dauphin County or in the United States District Court for the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania. However, Plaintiff is admonished to carefully scrutinize Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1023.1-1023.4, which provide for the imposition of severe sanctions for the filing of frivolous pleadings or motions. DISTRIBUTION: Stanley Bethea, 533 Curtin Street, Harrisburg, Pa. 17110 Charles Young, Esquire, 100 Pine Street, P.O. Box 1166, Harrisburg, Pa. 17108-1166 ' McNees Wallace & Nurick ¢ attorneys at law CHARLES YOUNG D~.ECTD~AL: (717) 237-5397 E-MAIL ADDRESS: CYOUNG~MWN.COM January 20,2003 Mr. Stanley Bethea 533 Curtin Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Re: Stanley Bethea v. National Football League C.P. Cumberland No. 03-33 Dear Mr. Bethea: I have recently become aware of your lawsuit against the National Football League, filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, at Civil Action No. 03-33. In that action, you allege that the National Football League is liable for negligence because it failed to advise you of the eligibility rules for trying out as a free agent for the Washington Redskins. Please be advised that you are acting in direct violation of Judge Lawrence Clark's Amended Order of July 16, 2001 {See enclosed). In his Order, Judge Clark states the following: (1) The PERMANENT INJUNCTION entered against the Defendant by the April 26, 2001 Order of this Court is CONTINUED. The Plaintiff IS HEREBY ENJOINED from filing a lawsuit against the above-captioned Defendants, their employees, or agents, in either state or federal court without prior leave of this Court. Judge Clark's Order applies to any action filed in Pennsylvania state court, and it bars any suit prior to obtaining leave of Court. You cannot avoid the injunction by filing in Cumberland County. I urge you to consult with Jim Rowland, the attorney who represented you at the hearing in front of Judge Clark. Your conduct is clearly barred by the Judge's Order. If you do not immediately discontinue your action, I will seek to have you sanctioned. That sanction could take the form of imprisonment or a monetary award. Furthermore, regardless'of Judge Clark's Order, the last action resulted in a judgment in the amount of $7,684.53 being entered against you. If you do not immediately withdraw your Complaint, the NFL will seek to collect that money. 100 PINE STREET · PO BOX 1166 · HARRISBURG, PA 17108-1166 · TEL: 717.232.8000 · FAX: 717.237.5300, WWW. MWN.COM COLUMBUS, OH · HAZELTON, PA · STATE COLLEGE, PA · WASHINGTON, DC Janua~ 20,2003 Page 2 I send you this letter as a courtesy. I expect your action to be dismissed IMMEDIATELY. If it is not, I will take appropriate action. Sincerely, CY/mca Enclosure cc/enc.' James H. Rowland, Jr., ESquire McNEEs V~L~ACE & NURIOK LLC ST.n~LEY BETHEA, Plaintiff VS. FOOTBALL LEAGUE Defendant IN T~IE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY, PE~rNSYLVA~aIIA CIVIL ACTION--LAW PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO PLAI~IFF'S COMPLAINT The National Football League, by and through its counsel, McNees, Wallace & Nurick, hereby makes the following Preliminary Objections to Plaintif=' ~ s Complaint: PRELIMINARY 0BJECTIO~ IN THE NATURE OF A DEMI/RRER TO COUNTS ! k~LD_ I! OF PLAINTIFF'S coMpr._n.!NT 1. As Plaintiff sets forth in Paragrapk 4 of his Complaint, in 1997, Plaintiff filed an action in Fe~era! Court against Defendant based upon the same factual ~!legations set forth in ~his Complaint. 2. A true and correct copy of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff in the Federal Court is attached hereto, made a part hereof, and marked Exhibit "A". 3. In the Federal action, Plaintiff moved to amend his Complaint to add claims for fraud and negligent misrepresenta- tion. A true and correct copy of that Motion to Amend is attached hereto, made a part hereof, and marked Exhibit "B". · As PlainTiff also states in Paragraph 4 of the Complain~, final jud~men~ was entered by the Middle Distric: Court in Plaintiff,s Federal Court action. A ~rue and correct copy of Judge Ca!dwell,s Order dated October 3I, 1997 is attached hereto, made a part hereof, and marked Exhibit "C". 5. As set forth in Judge Caldwell's Order (Exhibit before dismissin~ the case, Judge Caldwe!l granted Plaintiff,s 'Motion to Amend his Complaint' to add claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 6. In the Federal Court Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff,s Complaint, including the claims of age dzscrimination, frauJ: and n~ligent misrepresentation. 7. In the instant action, Plaintiff fails to set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted because his c!almg ~re barred by the doctrine of res judicata 8. That is, the parties to both actions are the same, Pla~ntiff,s claims are based upon the same factual background, ~nd the ultimate and controlling issues are identical. 9. S~cau~e ~iaintiff has already had an opportunity to appear and assert his rights in Federal Court, the instant action is barred by the doctrihe of res~judicata. WHEREFORE, Defendant National Football League, respectfully requests that Plaintiff,s Complaint be dismissed for ~e~al insufficiency. 2 ~'~ PRELIMINARY O~JE_CTION IN I~E NATURE OF A QEMURRER ,. , ' AS TO COUNTS ! ~$~D II OF PSAINT.!FF'S CCM. PLA!NT 10. rn Counts I and Ir of his Complaint, Plaintiff purports to allege a claim of "deliberate negligence". I!. Pennsylvania dces no~ recognize a tort of "deliberate negligence". 12. In the alternative, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for "de!iberate negligence" upon which relief can be granted. Wk'EREFORE, Defendant National Football League, respectfully requests tha'& Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed for le~a! insufficiency. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE NATURE OF A DE~.~JRRER TO COUNTS I AND I% OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 13. In Paragraph 5 of ~ p?~plaint. Plaintiff States that he was eligible for the NFL draf~ and appears to state that the draft procedures are attached as Exhibit ~A". Unfortunately, Plaintiff has attached only three (3) pages of the drafu procedures to the Complaint. 14. Because Plaintiff relies on a written document, the draft procedures, to establish that he was eligible for the draft, Defendant appropriately attaches a true and correct of the Eligibility Rules and Draft Procedures and refers to them. A true and correct copy of the Eligibility Rules and Draft Procedures are attached hereto, made a part hereof, and marked Exhibit 3 As Exhibit "D' establishes, the rule specify when a prospective football player is eligible to participate in the annual player draft. 16. A prospective player who plays college football generally is eligible for the draft in the year following the expiration of his college eligibi!i~y, and prospective players who dc not play cc!!e~e football are generally e!i~ibie To participate in the draf~ held four (4) years after they enter college. (Exhibit "D", ¶(1) and (4)). 17. If selected in the draft by an NFL member team, a prospective football player is placed on the rese~¢e lis~ of that team and, for a perio~ of time, or un~il released by the team, may negotiate and accept employmen~ O~!v with that team. 18. Prospective football players who are eii~ible for the draf~ but not selected are thereafter "free a~ents" and are free to seek and accep~ employment with any member team cf the National Football Leasue. 19. Because Plaintiff entered college in the early 1970's, (Comp!aint, ¶9) he would have been eligible for one of the annual drafts conducted in the mid-1970's. .. 20. In 1997, when Plaintiff alleges he applied for the draft, he was actually a "free agent" and was free to seek employment wi~h any member team in the National Football League directly. .. - 4 ~'~--.~ 21 For these .reasons, it is clear that P!aintiff''s Co !aint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. WH. EREFORE, Defendant National Football League, respectfully requests that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed for legal insufficiency. ~r r~rNARv OBJECTION IN T~E NA_~E OF A ~.~Tr~R== ~/VD ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO STRIKE 22. In his Complaint, Plaintiff requests relief in the Rature of punitive damages. 23. PlaiEtiff fails to state any claim upon which relief in the nature of punitive dDmages can be granted. WHEREFORE, Defendant National Foo~ba!l League, respectfully re.cuests that the Court dismiss, with prejudice, Plai~tiff's claim for punitive damages or, in the alternative, that the Court strike from the Complaint said prayers for relief for punitive damages. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION TO STRIKE 24. In his Complaint, Plaintiff requests damages "in excess of Twenty Million ($20,000,000.00) Dollars." 25. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021(b), provides "that any pleading demanding relief for unliquidated damages shall not claim any specific sum" (emphasis added). Plaintiff's Complaint which requests damages in e~Cess Of Twenty Million ($20,000,000.00) Dollars should be stricken. ~- 5 WHEREFORE, Defendant National Foocba!! Lea,cue, respecCful!y requests ~ha~ ~kis Court s~rike Plain~f's_~ claim for damages in excess of Twenty Million ($20,000,000.00) Dollars. Respectfully submitted, McNEES, WA~LLACE & NURICK ~lizabe~n A/! ~cu~er~y Matthew B. ~oyer I.D. No. 79269 100 Pine S~ree~ P.O. Box 1166 Harrisburg, PA !7108-1!~g (717) 232-8000 A~Corneys for Defendant Date: October 19, 1998 STANLEY BETHEA~ : Plaintiff : V. : NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and : PAUL TAGLIABUE~ COMMISSIONER~ : N.F.L.~ : Defendants : BEFORE: Clark~ J. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY~ PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 2310 S 2000 OPTNION AND ORDER The Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea civil Complaint in the above captioned In that Complaint, Bethea asserts a Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count separate claim for Punitive Damages (Count Il)2. asserted as a Fesult of the National Football (Bethea), matter claim I)~, and filed a pro se on June 1, 2000. for Intentional also raises a Both Counts are League's (NFL) The Plaintiff also claims the NFL is liable under principles of respondeat superior/vicarious liability, but this claim is made within the introductory language of the Complaint, rather than within an individual Count. 2 We should note that a claim for punitive damages is not a cause of action, and should not be plead in a separate count as if it were. As stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, "[i]f no cause of action exists, then no independent action exists for a claim of punitive damage since punitive damages is only an element of damages. To this extent, punitive damages must, by necessity, be related to the injury- producing cause of action." Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97, 101, 555 A.2d 800, 802 (1989)(emphasis in original)(citing Rhodes v. Heberling, 306 Pa. Super. 35,451 A.2d 1378 (1982)). See also Todd v. Bumquist, 116 Dauph. 383 (1996), and Majid v. Vartan, 114 Dauph. 351 (1994). alleged failure to list Bethea's name among the football players eligible for the NFL's 1999 player draft. The Complaint also attempts to state other issues under the heading "New Matter (Res Judicata)". We first note that New Matter is reserved for responsive pleadings, rather than as a major component of an original Compla±nt. In both Counts that Bethea puts forward under this heading, he simply details two of his prior proceedings: one before the United States District Court (CV-97-1032, M.D. Pa), infra; and, one of the actions brought in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas (4250-S- 1998), infra. Amazingly, Bethea notes in this section of his Complaint that both of these cases received final judgments, yet Bethea somehow continues to believe this justifies, in some manner, his pursuit for legal relief, Unfortunately, this pro se civil action is the latest in a very long list of pro se civil actions instituted by Bethea. A cursory review of the Prothonotary's docket of Dauphin County reveals at least twelve (12) prior pro se civil actions. The Clerk's docket for the United States District Court for the 'Middle District of Pennsylvania reveals another eleven (11) such 2 pro se actions. See Footnote Nos. 10 & 11 herein for a listing of those other pro se actions. The NFL Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter on June 27, 2000. The Defendants' New Matter raises three (3) Counts based on res judicata. In Count Z of the Defendants' New Matter, the NFL notes that Bethea previously brought a similar claim in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Bethea v. National Football Leaque (amended caption), M.D. Pa, Civil Action No. 1: CV-97-1032, appeal dismissed, 149 F.3d 1163 (3rd Cir. 1998). Bethea in±t±ally alleged age discrimination in that case, and he was later allowed to amend the Complaint to include claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. These claims arose from the alleged failure of the NFL to list Bethea for the 1997 draft, and the Honorable W±lLiam W. Caldwell ultimately granted the NFL's Motion for Summary Judgment by Order dated October 31, 1997. In Count II of the Defendants' New Matter, the NFL details the first civil action brought by Bethea in the Dauphin County 'Court of Common Pleas. Bethea v. National Football League, 3 Dauph. Co., Civil Action No. 4250-S-1998. The Honorable Jeannine Turgeon granted the Preliminary Objections filed by the NFL, and dismissed that action, with prejudice, by Order dated March 5, 1999. That action also arose from the NFL's alleged failure to list Bethea for the very same 1997 draft. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Judge Turgeon's decision. Bethea v. National Football League, 1999 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3464, No. 496 MDA 1999 (Pa. Super. Oct. 5, 1999). As Count III of the Defendants' New Matter indicates, Bethea then proceeded to file yet another action in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. Bethea v. National Football League, Dauph. Co., Civil Action No. 5022-S-1999. In that action, Bethea claimed the NFL was liable to him for emotional distress and' vicarious liability. The Honorable Richard A. Lewis signed an Order on June 23, 2000 that discontinued that action, with prejudice. Again, Bethea claimed the NFL was liable to him because it failed to list him with other eligible players for the 1999 player draft. In the instant matter, on June 30, 2000, Bethea filed 'Preliminary Objections to the Defendants' Answer and New Matter wherein he claimed res judicata did not apply (even though he himself plead that very same matter in his original Complaint). The Honorable Todd A. Hoover dismissed the Preliminary Objections on August 29, 2000, and directed Bethea to file an Answer to Defendants' New Matter. Bethea filed a Reply to Defendants' New Matter on September 12, 2000 that simply detailed the previously adjudicated cases, and then referenced a separate cause of action for harassment, which Bethea claimed is outside of the applicat±on of res judicata. The Defendants, in the meantime, f±led a Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction Barring Further Lawsuits Against the Defendants without Pr±or Leave of Court, with a Memorandum of Law in Support, on August 3, 2000. Bethea responded by filing a Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Permanent Injunction, and Protective Order, claiming the motions filed by the Defendants were procedurally incorrect, and they lacked merit. The Defendants ask this Court to dismiss the immediate action, and also request that Bethea be required to receive 'ieave from the Court before filing any lawsuits in ~'~e future against the NFL, which would include Defendants who are privies of the NFL. 5 Bethea also filed a Motion to Compel Discovery on July 11, 2000. The Defendants responded by filing a Motion for a Protective Order on Auuust 3, 2000. The Honorable Todd A. Hoover uranted the Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order, and stayed all discovery in the case pending the resolution of the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction. Incredibly, Bethea filed a Certificate of Readiness to have the case listed for trial, and, at the same time, served the Defendants with Final Interrogatories on February 12, 2001.3 Not only did the service of Interrogatories upon the Defendants apparently violate Judge Hoover's Order, but this was also a blatant violation of Local Rule 215.1(1), which states' "THE CERTIFICATE OF READINESS CONFIRMS THAT ALL DISCOVERY IN THE CASE HAS BEEN COMPLETED, THAT ALL NECESSARY PARTIES AND WITNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE, THAT SERIOUS SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED, AND THAT THE CASE IS READY IN ALL RESPECTS FOR TRIAL." Dauphin County Local Rules of Court, 215.1(1).4 Prior to this, Bethea also filed a Certificate of Readiness on November 27, 2000, but this Court struck the case from the January 2001 trial list due to the outstanding Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction. 4 As will be discussed infra, the Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive notice of Judge Hoover's August 16, 2000 Order until February 2001. This Court observes, however, that this allegation is ' irrelevant when the application of Local Rule 215.1 (1) is considered. On February 7, 2001, the Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Case from the February Argument Court list. By Order dated February 8, 2001, this Court removed the case from the February Argument Court list, and ordered that the case not be re-listed for Argument Court until the Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction is resolved. This Court also issued an Order on February 13, 2001 scheduling a hearing on March 26, 2001, at which hearing the Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction would be considered, as well as Bethea's Motion to Amend the Complaint, which was filed on August 7, 2000. The Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Case from the Trial List and to Sanction the Plaintiff on February 16, 2001.s As a result of this Motion, and Bethea's actions on February 12, 2001, this Court amended the Order of February 13, 2001 by Order dated February 20, 2001. The Amended Order stated that the hearing scheduled for March 26, 2001 would also include arguments from the Plaintiff as to why sanctions The Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendants' Motion to Strike the Case from the Trial List and Sanction the Plaintiff on February 20, 2001. Bethea asserts within that Reply that this Court informed him during the October 2000 Argument Court that Pennsylvania did not have a Permanent Injunction. However, it is the common procedure for this Court to transcribe the arguments presented to it during Argument Court sessions. A review of that transcript from the October 12, 2001 argument court session clearly indicates that, at n_qo time, did this Court inform the Plaintiff in this manner. See Notes of Arguments, October 12, 2001, pp. 1-8. This provides further illustration of the Plaintiff's determination to continue a frivolous action, and his unwillingness to accept that his cause of action has previously been adjudicated. 7 should not be ±mposed upon h±m for h±s act±ons of February 12, 2001. Bethea then w±thdrew h±s Mot±on for Leave to F±rst Amend the Compla±nt on February 20, 2001. However, on March 19, 2001, Bethea aga±n f±led a Mot±on for Leave to f±le a F±rst Amended Compla±nt, and s±multaneously f±led a F±rst Amended Compla±nt. On the same date, Bethea f±led a Praec±pe to l±st the Mot±on to Amend for Argument Court ±n Apr±l 2001. On March 21, 2001, the Defendants f±led a Mot±on to Str±ke the Case from the Argument L±st, and requested that the Pla±nt±ff aga±n be sanct±oned for v±olat±ng the February 8, 2001 Order of th±s Court. On March 21, 2001, th±s Court ±ssued a Rule upon the Pla±nt±ff to show cause why he should not be sanct±oned for v±olat±ng the February 8, 2001 Order. The Rule was made returnable at the March 26, 2001 hear±ng. The Pla±nt±ff, however, fa±led to appear for the hear±ng on March 26, 2001. The Court ±s very sat±sf±ed, from statements made dur±ng that hear±rig by Defense counsel, that Bethea had not±ce of the hear±ng through telephone conversat±ons that took place between 'Defendants' counsel and Bethea wh±ch spec±f±cally referenced the hearlng, and from the fact that the Plaintiff lncluded a copy of thls Court's Order of February 20, 2001 in hls Supplemental Reproduced Record, whlch was flled on March 7, 2001. The Order of February 20, 2001 clearly states that a hearlng was scheduled for March 26, 2001. Following the hearing of March 26, 2001, the Defendants flled a Petltion for the Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Aprll 2, 2001. The Defendants request that this Court award them attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,684.53, whlch ls seventy-five percent (754) of the total amount of fees and costs clalmed. As a result, the Court issued a Rule upon the Plaintiff on Apr11 3, 2001 to show cause why such Pet±tlon should not be granted. The De~endants f11ed a Brlef in Support of the Petitlon for the Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Aprll 9, 2001. The Pla±nt±ff flled a Brlef in Response to Defendants' Pet±tlon for the Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on April 11, 2000. In light of this extensive procedural background, this Court will now consider the following: the Plaintiff's Motion 'for Leave to First Amend the Complaint; the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction Barring Further Lawsuits; the requests by the Defendants regarding sanctions; the Motions by the Defendants to strike the case from the trial and Argument Court lists; the Defendants' Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs; and two (2) other motions fiied by the Plaintiff shortly before publication of this Opinion. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT We will first address the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint. Bethea's March 19, 2001 Motion appears to propose slight changes to the language contained in the Complaint for the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and respondeat superior/vicarious liability. Initially, it is important to note that these claimed causes of action were also raised in, and were the basis of, the 1999 Dauphin County case listed above, which the Honorable Richard A. Lewis dismissed with prejudice, on June 23, 2000 (5022 S 1999). Due to the application of res judicata principles that will be discussed more fully below, the be den±ed.6 Motion to Flrst Amend the Complaint must DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT We Judgment. will Motion for Summary now discuss the Defendants' Summary judgment may be entered' [a]fter the relevant pleadings are closed, such time as not to unreas°nably delay trlal. whenever there ls no genulne lssue of any materlal fact as to a necessary but wlthin 6. In order to make the record as comprehensive as possible, the Court will also address the Plaintiff's Motion to First Amend the Complaint that was withdrawn on February 20, 2001. That Motion appeared to make a reference to a cause of action for harassment. A factually deficient reference to a harassment claim was also made by the Plaintiff in his September 12, 2000 Reply to Defendants' New Matter, and the Plaintiff also referenced such a cause of action at oral argument on October 12, 2000. In several filings, Bethea has included copies of a letter allegedly written to him by the NFL which contained the following three (3) lines: NFL Stanley Bethea Go Enter The Golf Tournament Plaintiff's Complaint, June 1, 2000, Exhibit D. Although the Plaintiff included a photocopy of the envelope the letter was allegedly sent in, which bears the NFL logo and return address, the letter itself contains no letterhead or signature which connects it to the NFL organization. Furthermore, this Court notes that this case is a civil action at law. The case law is quite clear that Pennsylvania courts do not recognize a ehril cause of action for harassment. As stated in Michelfelder v. Bensalem Twp. Sch. Dist., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9173, *4 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2000), "Pennsylvania has criminalized harassment but has not provided a private civil cause of action for harassment per se." See also Funderburg v. Gangl, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4875, '13 (E.D. Pa. April 12, 1995). As a result of these considerations, there is no civil cause of action for harassment which can be recognized by this Court. However, even if there were such a cause of action for harassment, nothing pled by Bethea would support such a claim. Indeed, if anyone has a claim for harassment in this matter, it would be the Defendants. element of the cause of act±on or defense wh±ch could be establ±shed by add±t±onal d±scovery or expert report, or ±f, after the complet±on of d±scovery relevant to the mot±on, ±nclud±ng the product±on of expert reports, an adverse party who w±ll hear the burden of proof at tr±al has fa±led to produce ev±dence of facts essent±al to the cause of act±on or defense wh±ch ±n a jury tr±al would requ±re the ±ssues to be subm±tted to a jury. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2, 42 Pa.C.S.A. The burden ±s on the mov±ng party to establ±sh that there are no genu±ne ±ssues of mater±al fact and ±t ±s ent±tled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Butterf±eld v. G±untol±, 670 A.2d 646, 651, 448 Pa. Super. 1 (1995). In add±t±on, the record must be v±ewed ±n the l±ght most favorable to the non- mov±ng party and all doubts must be resolved aga±nst the mov±ng party.. Id. at 650. The Defendants argue that they are ent±tled to summary judgment based on the doctr±ne of res judicata, wh±ch "bars any future su±t between the same part±es . . on the same cause of act±on", after there has been a f±nal val±d judgment by a court of competent jut±sd±ct±on. Stevenson v. S±lverman, 208 A.2d 786, 788, 417 Pa. 187, 190 (1965)(c±tat±ons om±tted). As deta±led above, the Pla±nt±ff has ±n±t±ated three (3) pr±or lawsu±ts based on the NFL's alleged fa±lure to l±st h±m on a draft l±st.7 The Un±ted States D±str±ct Court for the D±ddle D±str±ct of Pennsylvan±a prev±ously rendered a f±nal val±d judgment, as d±d the Dauph±n County Court of Common Pleas, on these ±ssues. As the underly±ng cause of act±on rema±ns the same ±n the ±nstant lawsu±t, th±s Court ±s obi±gated, as a matter of law, to grant the Defendants' Dot±on for Summary Judgment ±n accordance w±th the doctr±ne of res judicata. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvan±a has clearly stated that four (4) cond±t±ons must be met ±n order for res judicata to preva±l: "1) Ident±ty ±n the th±ng sued upon; 2) Ident±ty of the cause of act±on; 3) Ident±ty of person and part±es to the act±on; and 4) Ident±ty of the qual±ty or capac±ty of the 7. This is an appropriate time to reemphasize the language in the March 5, 1999 Memorandum Opinion of the Honorable Jeannine Turgeon, which stated that the NFL has no obligation to list Bethea with draft eligible players. The NFL is entitled to some discretion in running its operations, and while Bethea is permitted to file for special permission to be listed as draft eligible under the rules of the NFL, there is nothing within those rules that state such special permission MUST be granted. Indeed, Bethea is in a better bargaining position as a free agent, in that he can shop his alleged exceptional athletic talents to any of the teams within the NFL, rather than having the rights to his services controlled by one (1) team should he be drafted. part±es su±ng or sued." Stevenson, supra,' at 787.-788. F±rst, all of the prev±ous lawsu±ts, along w±th the ±nstant act±on, ar±se because the NFL d±d not l±st Bethea w±th other el±g±ble players for the draft, and Bethea sought damages as a result. Sn short, Bethea Ks now seek±ng monetary compensat±on for not be±ng placed on the player draft'l±st, just as he was ±n the prev±ous act±ons. Second, the cla±ms made by the Pla±nt±ff ±n the var±ous lawsu±ts, wh±le semant±cally character±zed somewhat d±fferently, all ar±se from the same essent±al cla±med cause of act±on, to w±t' the NFL's fa±lure to l±st Bethea for the player draft. Th±rd, the part±es to the act±ors are v±rtually the same. Bethea ±s the Pla±nt±ff ±n each lawsu±t, and the NFL Ks the pr±mary Defendant.8 F±nally, there ks also an ±dent±ty of qual±ty or capac±ty ±n all ±nstances, as Bethea has '±n±t±ated each of the lawsu±ts 8. Although the Plaintiff might argue that Mr. Tagliabue was not named in all of the lawsuits, it is well settled that res judicata Principles apply to privies of the parties to a lawsuit, and Mr. Tagliabue would certainly qualify as a privy to the NFL, which is the primary Defendant in each action. See Stevenson, supra, at 788. as an individual allegedly harmed by the NFL. As such, the four (4) conditions necessary to trigger the application of res judicata are clearly met, and thls Court ls requlred to honor the prlor adjudication of the Un±ted States Dlstrlct Court for the Mlddle Dlstr±ct of Pennsylvania, and those of the Dauphln County Court of Common Pleas. must be remembered that "[t]he essent±al lnqulry ls whether the ultlmate and controlling issues have been declded in a prlor proceeding in which the present partles had an opportunity to appear and assert thelr rights." Schultz v. Clty of Philadelphia, 460 A.2d 833, 835, 314 Pa. Super. 194, 199 (1983)(citation omitted). Thls Court flnds that the controlling lssues have been declded previously, lnasmuch as all of the Plaintiff's lawsults agalnst the NFL have centered on the NFL's ~-~iure to l±st the Plaintiff wlth draft ellglble players. Therefore, the Defendants' Motlon for Summary Judgment ls ~ranted, as they are entitled to such as a matter of law, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION Th±s Court must next cons±den the Defendants' Mot±on for a Permanent Znjunct±on Barr±ng Pla±nt~Tf from F±l±ng Su±t Aga±nst the Defendants W±thout Pr±or Leave of 6ourt. It ±s overwhe~m±ngZy c~ear to th±s Court that Bethea ±s determ±ned to seek some form of re~±ef from the NFL, on account of h±s apparent percept±ons of some wrong done to h±m. Th±s ±s ev±denced by the four (4) act±ons that Bethea has f±led aga±nst the NFL based on the same cause(s) of act±on. The f±rst three (3) have a~ready rece±ved a va~±d f±na~ judgment, beg±nn±ng w±th the f±rst act±on f±~ed ±n the Federal D±str±ct Court, and d±sm±ssed by Judge Caldwel~ ±n 1997. Fo~low±ng the most recent hear±ng before th±s Court on March 26, 2001, ±t ±s a~so qu±te clear that the Defendants are ent±tled to the Permanent Injunct±on. It should be c~early understood that th±s ±njunct±on ±s not ±ntended to depr±ve the P~a±nt±ff of access to the courts, but, rather, to protect the Defendants aga±nst repeated, vexat±ous ~±t±gat±on based on the same, prev±ously adjud±cated cause(s) of act±on. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clearly stated that "a court has power to enjoin repeated frivolous actions by 'pertinacious litigants' and such injunctions were known to common law," accompanied but, however, "their entry must at by findings and analysis sufficient meaningful review." least be to allow Tilli v. Copobianco, 466 A.2d 1334, 1335, 448 (1983)(citing Gordon v. United States Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977)). 502 Pa. 447, Department of Furthermore, we are likewise mindful that "[a]bsent adequate findings and analysis such an injunction improperly impinges on Art. I, §11 of the Pennsylvan±a Constitution." Tilli at 1335. This Court is confident that the reviews of the prior adjudications above, coupled with the March 26, 2001 hearing, and the findings and analysis contained herein, provide compelling justification for the issuance of a Permanent Injunction w~thout impinging upon the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiff. The multiple filings made by the Plaintiff based on the same cause(s) of action certainly indicate an unyielding litigant, who seems to be ..u_n.~_i_~_l_.&_.o.g_.._o_[._.~_.n.~able to conform to the rule of law. Pursuant to this finding, the Plaintiff is directed to comply with the accompanying Order should he feel compelled to file any future laws'uits against the Defendants. The Court would also like to advise the Plaintiff at this time that his legal documents submitted in the various legal proceedings to this point have been woefully deficient. The Plaintiff is reminded that he is entitled to no greater leniency based on his pro se status. TQerefore, any future legal documents must conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and the Dauphin County Local Rules of Court. If the Plaintiff is incapable of doing this, he is encouraged to retain legal counsel to advise him in these matters. further cautioned that any violation of this Permanent The Plaintiff is Injunction will subject him to contempt proceedings which may result in further sanctions, including possible imprisonment. In a time of ever-increasing court activity, no court can afford to waste valuable judicial resources and time evaluating frivolous and/or previously adjudicated claims. At this time, the Court finds it appropriate to discuss the rather unusual equity-based issue in this case, The Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint as a civil action at law. Thereafter, the Defendants sought an equitable remedy in the form of an injunction. While the case law clearly supports the issuance of a Permanent Injunction to deter litigants from filing vexatious' lawsuits, this Court was unwilling to grant such an equitable remedy in an action at law without first affording the Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on the matter. In short, although it is well established that the equity side of the court is always open, Pa.R.C.P. No. 1502, and "equitable relief is available to prevent a multiplicity of lawsuits," Luitweiler v. Northchester Corporation, 319 A.2d 899, 902, 456 Pa, 530, 533 (1974), this Court opted to delay consideration of the exercise of the equity powers we have in an action at law, so as to provide the Plaintiff with his constitutional rights of due process (hearing) before maki~g___an~. decision on the same.9 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated, '[t]he power of the courts to issue injunctions should be exercised with great caution and only where the reason and necessity therefore are clearly established.' Rick v. Cramp, 357 Pa. 83, 91, 53 A.2d 84, 88-89 (1947)(citations omitted). While it is undisputed that Bethea has participated in several oral arguments before the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, there is no evidence that he was ever afforded an opportunity for an official hearing on the issue of the appropriateness of the injunctive relief sought by the Defendants. In light of such cautionary language, and because there does not appear to be any case law on point dealing with the granting of an equitable remedy in a civil action at law of this precise nature, and further because the Plaintiff had not received a hearing to this point, the Court found itself to be constitutionally compelled to provide the Plaintiff with the opportunity to be heard prior to considering whether or not to issue a Permanent Injunction. Although the Plaintiff chose not to take advantage of that opportunity, and indeed failed to appear, or otherwise be represented at such hearing, the Court is now satisfied that the granting of a Permanent Injunction is warranted, and, in fact, necessary to abate future abuse by the Plaintiff of the judicial resources of this Commonwealth, including the Federal Courts sitting herein. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing Lyons v. Importers and Traders' Nat. Bank, 214 Pa. 428, 434, 63 A. 827, 829 (1906), stated that '[t]he obvious ground of the jurisdiction of courts of equity in cases of this sort is to suppress useless litigation and to prevent a multiplicity of suits.' Trees v. Glenn, 319 Pa. 487, 495, 181 A. 579, 582 (1935). That Court also pointed to the language of Mr. Justice Story in his work entitled Equity Jurisprudence, in which he stated, 'the power has in many instances been recognized at law as resting on the very circumstances that without such interposition the party can do nothing but repeatedly resort to law; and when suits have proceeded to such an extent as to become vexatious, for that very reason the jurisdiction of a court of equity attaches.' Id. The Court also notes that it is fully within our power to require the Plaintiff to seek the leave of this Court prior to filing suit in a Federal Court as well as our Court. As stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania' [i]n such a case it may restrain a party from prosecuting a subsequent suit in another jurisdiction, whether the objects of the two suits are the same or not, if the effect of the second suit is to withdraw from the court first acquiring jurisdiction a part of the subject-matter of the first suit. When an injunction is granted for this purpose, it is in no just sense a prohibition to those courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction. It is not addressed to them and does not even assume to interfere with them. The process is directed only to the parties'. It neither assumes any superiority over the court in which the proceedings are had, nor denies its jurisdiction. Trees v. Glenn., 319 Pa. 487, 491, 181 A. 579, 580 (1935). The time has come where this Court is obligated to. prevent the Plaintiff from further burdening this, or any other court, by filing a lawsuit that has previously been litigated. Plaintiff appears to be unwilling to acknowiedge that he has repeatedly abused the civil process. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8351. '~t is obvious from the instant line of cases naming the NFL as a Defendant, and from various other suits filed by the Plaintiff in Dauphln County~°, and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,~ that the Court is faced with to These are the known pro se civil actions instituted in Dauphin County by the Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea: Stanley Bethea v. Advance Security, 258 S 1994 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. Global Safety, et al., 420 S 1994 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. Broad Street Market, 1470 S 1994 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. Harrisburg Hospital, 2056 S 1994 (dismissed by Judge Jeannine Turgeon as frivolous); Stanley Bethea v. Harrisburg Hospital, 2290 S 1994 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. New Cumberland Army Depot, 409 S 1995 (transferred to U.S. District Court); Stanley Bethea v. Barry B. Moore, M.D., 1174 S 1995 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. Setco, 1504 S 1995 (dismissed by Judge Richard A. Lewis as frivolous and legally deficient); In Re: Change of Name of Stanley Bethea, 2060 S 1995 (dismissed by Judge Todd A. Hoover as frivolous - as noted in this Opinion, Footnote 11 herein); Stanley Bethea v. Harrisburg Area Community College, 2468 S 1995 (dismissed by Senior Judge William W. Lipsitt as frivolous); Stanley Bethea v. National Football League, 4250 S 1998 (dismissed on resjudicata grounds by Judge Jearmine Turgeon, Superior Court appeal affirmed - as previously noted in this Opinion); Stanley Bethea v. National Football League, et al., 5022 S 1999 (discontinued by Judge Richard A. Lewis, with prejudice - as previously noted in this Opinion). n These are the known pro se civil actions instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, by the Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea: Stanley Bethea v. Employment Standards, et. al., 93 CV 1089 (dismissed by Judge Sylvia H. Rambo as frivolous); Stanley Bethea v. Global Safety, 94 CV 293 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell under 42 USC 1983); Stanley Bethea v. Setco, 94 CV 555 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell); Stanley Bethea v. Defense Distribution Region East, et. al.; 95 CV 250 (discontinued by Bethea); Stanley Bethea v. Hamilton Health Center, Inc., 96 CV 1825 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell as frivolous); Stanley Bethea v. Hamilton Health Centers, Inc., 96 CV 2086 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell for failure to state a claim); Stanley Bethea v. Hamilton Health Center, Inc., 97 CV 145 (dismissed by Judge William W. noth±ng short of a vexat±ous burden±ng the courts of Dauph±n Court w±th prev±ously l±t±gated best.~2 l±t±gant, County and SU±tS, or' SANCTIONS who Ks ±ntent on the Federal D±strict quest±onable ones, at As because 'Order, Order the the on of ment±oned above, the Defendants requested sanct±ons the Pla±nt±ff v±olated Judge Hoover's August 16, 2000 and s±multaneously v±olated Local Rule 215,1(1), That spec±f±cally stayed a~ d±scovery pend±ng'resolut±on of Mot±on for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunct±on, yet Pla±nt±ff served F±nal Interrogator±es upon the Defendants February 12, 2001, In afford±ng the Defendant every benef±t the doubt ±n th±s matter, ±nc~ud±ng h±s most recent Caldwell for failure to state a claim); Stanley Bethea v. World League 97 CV 1032 (Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment granted by Judge William W. Caldwell - as previously noted in this Opinion); Stanley Bethea v. Players Association, N.F.L., 98 CV 723 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell for failure to state a claim); Stanley Bethea v. Bronstein-Jefferies Professional Association, 98 CV 1088 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell for failure to state a claim); Stanley Bethea v. Players Association, N.F.L., 98 CV 1267 (dismissed by Judge William W. Caldwell for failure to state a claim). Another example of the Plaintiff's apparent mindset in filing these suits is exemplified by his 1995 Change of Name Petition. In that Petition, the Plaintiff attempted to change his name to "World Saviour [sic]" (No. 2060-S-1995), and claimed therein that he (Bethea) was the only one who could provide peace in the Middle East. See Petition for Name Change, May 16, 1995. The Honorable Todd A. Hoover, by Memorandum and Order dated June 5, 1995, dismissed the Petition as frivolous after discovering that the Honorable John C. Dowling denied the same request in 1991 CNo. 4852-S-1990). 23 assert±ons concern±ng late rece±pt of Judge Hoover's Order of August 16, 2000, th±s Court w±ll only cons±der the v±olat±on of Local Rule 215.1(1) for the purposes of th±s part±cular act±on of th±s case. As a result, th±s Court w±ll sanct±on the Pla±nt±ff ±n the amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) for that conduct. On February 8, 2001, th±s Court also clearly ordered that th±s case NOT be re-l±sted for Argument Court pend±ng resolut±on of the Mot±on for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunct±on. Nevertheless, the Pla±nt±ff f±led a Praec±pe on March 19, 2001 to l±st h±s Mot±on to F±rst Amend the Compla±nt for the Apr±l 2001 Argument Court. The Court w±ll also sanct±on the Pla±hr±fl an add±t±onal Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) for that v±olat±on.~3 On the advent of publ±sh±ng th±s Op±n±on, Apr±l 20, 2001, Bethea once aga±n f±led a Pet±t±on For The LS±C] Mot±on for Leave to F±rst Amend the Compla±nt. In th±s recent l±t±g±ous render±ng from Bethea, he asserts that h±s present cause of This Court would like to note that we chose only to impose monetary sanctions.upon the Plaintiff as a result of the instant contemptuous conduct. The Court did so in lieu of initiating contempt . proceedings. We will likely not avoid contempt proceedings in the future if there should be further : violations of our orders! 24 act±on ±s for ±ntent±onal ±nfl±ct±on of emot±onal d±stress.~4 As a result of the determ±nat±ons set forth here±n, the Court d±d not requ±re the Defendants to f±le a response to that Pet±t±on. Furthermore, because th±s Court granted the Defendants' Mot±on for Summary Judgment, there ±s no need to cons±der the ±nstant Petition,~ And of even more current v±ntage, on Apr±l 23, 2001, Bethea f±led another plead±ng wh±ch he capt±oned "Pla±nt±ff's Mot±on To Str±ke The Defendant"s [s±c] Request For Sanct±on Stat±ng Pla±nt±ff's Flagrant D±sregard Of Local Rule 215.1(1) and FEES AND the should Order COSTS." (Emphasis and errors in original). Zn that Motlon, Plaintiff clalms the Defendants' request for sanctions be strlcken because Bethea dld not recelve Judge Hoover's of August 16, 2000, wh±ch stayed all discovery, unt11 February, 2001.~6 The Plaintiff falls to reallze, however, that Unfortunately, we are again required to note that Bethea's latest assertion of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was one of the causes of action that was dismissed, with prejudice, by the Order of Judge Lewis, dated June 23, 2000. We also note that Bethea instituted the present civil action on June 1, 2000, before the prior action was even resolved by Judge Lewis. is The Court would like to note that the Plaintiff avoided sanctions for this action only because he did not list the case for Argument Court. Otherwise, this Court would not have hesitated to sanction the Plaintiff again for violating a Court Order. Bethea claims in this Motion that the Dauphin County Prothonotary, Stephen E. Farina, withheld the Order of August 16, 2000, attributing this to the allegation "that Mr. Stephen E. Farina was biased toward [sic] the Plaintiff." Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Defendant"s [sic] Request for Sanction stating 25 his reception of Judge Hoover's Order, regardless occurred, is completely independent of his blatant Local Rule 215.1(1). The Court willingly concedes the previous Orders referenced Local Rule 215.1(1). Since the initiate this civil action in a pro se Plaintiff has chosen to of when it violation of that none of capacity, he is, nevertheless, fully responsible to acquaint himself with, and abide by, the Local Rules of Court. As stated above, the Plaintiff is being sanctioned for filing a Certificate of Readiness to have the case listed for trial, while simultaneously serving the Defendants with Final Interrogatories, on February Certificate of Readiness is an Court that ALL discovery has been 12, 2001. The filing of the unequivocal certification to the service of interrogatories at that Certificate constituted a misrepresentation to violation of Local Rule 215.1 (1) will not be completed. Given Bethea's same time, the filing of the the Court. This overlooked due to the Plaintiff's alleged late reception of Judge Hoover's Order, Plaintiff's Flagrant Disregard of Local Rule 215.1(1) and FEES AND COSTS, April 23, 2001, p.1. This Court can only interpret this to mean that Bethea thinks Mr. Farina is biased against him. Regardless, Bethea offers nothing beyond this allegation to substantiate this claim, such as the envelope it was contained in with the date of its mailing, or any other thing evidencing when it was actually received. · Without more, this Court is left with no choice but to view this assertion as merely another attempt by ' Bethea to further his own interests, much as he did when he falsely claimed that this Court informed him that Pennsylvania did not have a Permanent Injunction. See Footnote No. 5, supra. especially in llght of the fact that such an Order would have had no influence over the violation. In short, even if thls Court were to accept' the Plaintiff's clalm that he dld not recelve the August 2000 Order unt11 February 2001, that st111 would fall to justify bls service of interrogatories at the same tlme he was certifying the case as ready for trial. The lnstant case has already been removed from the Aprll 2001 Argument Court list pursuant to this Court's Order of February 8, 2001, and the case was aIso removed from the Apr11 clvll trial ilst by Amended Order of th±s Court on Aprli 16, 2001. DEFENDANTS' MOT/ON FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES & COSTS Thls Court also flnds that the Defendants are entltled to the award of attorneys' fees and costs for the 11t±gatlon that they have been subjected to by the bad falth and vexatious conduct of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has failed to accept the fact that he has no legal recourse because the NFL has chosen not to list hlm as a draft ellglble player. Moreover, 27 the Plaintiff has chosen to ignore the prior decisions of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, as well as the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §2503 lists the following among those entitled to receive reasonable counsel fees: (7) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter. (9) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees because the conduct of another party in commencing the matter or otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith. There can be little doubt that the Plaintiff exercised bad faith in initiating this present lawsuit - the fourth naming these Defendants. This lawsult has served only to further harass and annoy the Defendants in this matter and, therefore, this Court finds that such vexatious conduct on behalf of the Plaintiff warrants the issuance of an award of attorneys' fees and costs. The Plaintiff merely argues in his Brief that such fees and costs should not be awarded because the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Leave to First Amend his Complaint. This response by 28 the PZa±nt±ff does noth±ng to just±fy the ±n±t±at±on of four lawsu±ts aga±nst the Defendants for essent±ally the same cause(s) of act±on. The Pla±nt±ff further cla±ms that, "Intent±onal Infl±ct±on of Emot±onal D±stress has not been heard ±n State or Federal Court." Pla±nt±ff's Bt±el ±n Response to ~efendants' Pet±t±on for the Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Apr±l 11, 2001, p.1. However, once aga±n, th±s statement ±gnores the case that was d±sm±ssed w±th prejud±ce by Judge Lew±s ±n 2000. Th±s s±tuat±on offers yet another example of the Pla±nt±ff's unw±ll±ngness and/or ±nab±l±ty to accept the rule of law on th±s cause(s) of act±on. Accord±ngly, th±s Count enters the follow±ng' 29 STANLEY BETHEA~ Plaintiff NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and PAUL TAGLTABUE~ COMMISSIONER, N.L.F., Defendants AMENDED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW ORDER This Court issued an Order in the above captioned matter on April 26, 2001, which ENJOINED the Pla±nt±ff from f±l±ng suit against the Defendants. This Amended Order is int~en,ded to clar±fy and affirm that April 26, 2001 Order, and directs the Plaintiff on how to proceed with further f±l±ngs naming the Defendants, subject to the terms and conditions of that original Order and this Amended Order, as follows: (1) The PERMANENT INJUNCTION entered against the Defendant by the Apr±l 26, 2001 Order of this Court ±s CONTINUED, The Plaint±fl IS HEREBY ENJOINED from fil±ng a' lawsu±t aga±nst the above-captioned Defendants, their employees, or agents, in either state or federal court without prior l'eave of this Court. Furthermore, the Pla±ntiff IS HEREBY ENJOINED from f±l±ng any petitions, motions or other plead±rigs, whatsoever, regarding the above-capt±oned case aga±nst the Defendants, the±r empl~ye.es, or agents, ±n either state or federal court w±thout prior leave of this Court. The Pla±ntiff is specifically rem±nded that this Court GRANTED the Defendant's Uotion for Summary Judgment in the April 26, 2001 Order. As such, the case docketed at 2310 S 2000 rece±ved a FINAL ADJUDICATION from this Court, and any further motions or pleadings filed by the Plaintiff, undec that docket, will be considered to be prima facia frivolous and vexatious conduct by the Plaintiff. This Amended Order, however, does not apply to the filing of a TIMELY Notice of Appeal from this Court to the Pennsylvania Superior Court or documents solely in furtherance of such appeal, nor does this Amended Order apply to lawsuits involving different Defendants; and (2) Should the Plaintiff feel compelled to file a separate lawsuit against the above named Defendants, their employees, or agents, in either state or federal court, the Plaintiff MUST seek the leave of this Court by filing a petition with the DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, for review by staff attorneys of 'that office, and subsequent approval of the Court Administrator BEFORE any such lawsult can ultimately be flled with the DAUPHIN COUNTY PROTHONOTARY'S OFFICE. In order to obtain the leave of this Court, the Plaintiff must.show, through 2 a deta±Led Legal wr±t±ng attached to the sald pet±t±on, that the new Lawsu±t: (a) can surv±ve a mot±on for judgment on the pZead±ngs; (b) ±s not barred by pr±nc±pLes of ±ssue precLus±on (coLlateraL estoppeL) or cLa±m precLus±on (res judicata); (c) ±s not repet±t±ve and not ±n v±oLat±on of any court order; and (d) compL±es ±n aLL other respects w±th the PennsyZvan±a RuLes of C±v±L Procedure and the Dauph±n County Local RuLes of Court. ShouLd the PLa±hr±fl sat±sly the requ±rements of th±s Amended Order for f±L±ng a NEW Lawsu±t aga±nst the above named Defendants, the±r employees, or agents, the DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR w±ll so ±nd±cate by attach±ng a 'S±gned wr±t±ng to the face of the CompLa±nt, then forward±rig the ¢ompLa±.nt to the DAUPHIN COUNTY PROTHONOTARY'S OFFICE for f±L±ng; and (3) The Pla±nt±ff is further dlrected to attach a copy of th±s Amended Order to the face of any petit±on for the leave of this Court prlor to flllng such petltion with the DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE; and (4) The Court further ORDERS the Prothonotary not to accept for flllng any CompLaint, motion, pet±tlon, memorandum, or any other legal document from the Pla±ntlff, StanLey Bethea, agalnst the above named Defendants, thelr employees, or agents, wlthout the approval of the DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S 3 OFFICE, as deta±ted above, and FURTHER ORDERS the Prothonotary to d±ssem±nate the contents of th±s Amended Order to the ent±re staff of h±s Off±ce; and (5) The Court ORDERS the Prothonotary to f±le and enter ±nto the docket th±s Amended Order, and FURTHER ORDERS the Prothonotary to forward a cert±f±ed copy of th±s Amended Order to the Clerk of Court for the Un±ted States D±str±ct Court for the M±ddle D±str±ct of Pennsylvan±a; and (6) The forego±ng prov±s±ons of th±s Injunct±on SHALL NOT be appi±cabie to any such c±v±i act±on f±ied on behaif of Pia±nt±ff, Staniey Bethea, by an attorney who ks duiy i±censed to pract±ce iaw ±n th±s Commonweaith; prov±ded, however, that any attorney undertak±ng such representat±on of the Pia±nt±ff ±n such matters shaiI be profess±onaiiy respons±bie for any f±I±ngs; and (7) Shouid the Pia±nt±ff V±oiate th±S Amended 'Order, he faces the d±St±nct poss±b±i±ty of be±ng charged w±th ±nd±rect cr±m±naI ,contempt, and ±f found to be gu±ity of same, may be pun±shed by a f±ne and/or ±mpr±sonment, as prov±ded by' iaw; and 4 (8) Additionally, should the Piaint±ff vlolate' th±s Amended Order, he faces the poss±b±l±ty of being charged w~th civ±l contempt,-and if found .guilty of same, may be punished as provided by ~aw, wh±ch array of sanctions may ±nclude and or a~ of the follow±ng: Conf±nement, Pun±t±ve Damages, and Spec±al Damages (±nclud±ng attorney's fees, expenses and costs for any respond±ng party in such matters); and (9) Inasmuch as th±s Court has a~ready granted the Defendants Mot±on for Summary Judgment in our prev±ous Order of Apr±l 26, 2001, the Plaint±ff's instant Motion for Leave to ~±Ze a F±rst Amended Complaint, f±led on June 12, 2001, IS HEREBY DENIED; and (10) The Dauphin County Sheriff shall immediately effect Order upon the Plaintiff, Stanley Bethea, personal, 1n-hand, servlce of a certified copy of this Amended JUL 1 6 200 BY THE COURT: July 16, 2001 I hereby ce,tiff./t~,at the foregoing is ~ true and tort, oct ~,~py~f t~ original fi, ,J. /\ Lawrence F. Ciark, Jr., jUdge 5 DISTRIBUTION: EI±zabeth A. aaguschak, Esqu±re, 100 P±ne Street, P.O. Box 1166, Harr±sburg, PA 17108-1166 Charies T. Young, Esqu±re, 100 P±ne Street, P.O. Box 1166; Harr±sburg, PA 17108-1166 Staniey Bethea, 533 Curt±n Street, Harr±sburg, PA 17110 Deborah Freeman, Esqu±re, Deputy Court Adm±n±strator Stephen E. Far±na, Prothonotary James H. Rowland, Jr., Esqu±re, 812-A North 17th Street, Harr±sburg, PA 17103 Cierk of Court, U.S.D.C. for a.D. of PA 6 H STANLEY BETHEA, Plaintiff NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and PAUL TAGLIABUE, Defendants : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : No. 03-2060 Civil Term : . : CIVIL ACTION - LAW . PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS Defendants National Football League and Paul Tagliabue (collectively the "NFL"), by and through their attorneys McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, hereby file these Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff's Complaint. In support thereof, the NFL states the following: THE PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS 1. Plaintiff Stanley Bethea, an adult male in his mid-50's, asserts that he traveled to the Washington Redskins' training camp on August 1, 2001, to try out for the team. He claims that a staff member told him that he needed permission to be able to try out for the team. (Complaint, ¶8). 2. Plaintiff has filed suit against the NFL, asserting a claim of negligence based on the NFL's alleged failure to inform Plaintiff of the eligibility rules and/or need for a contract in order to try out as a free agent for an NFL football team. (Complaint, ~7). PRELIMINARY OBJECTION #1: DEMURRER 3. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Under the circumstances described in Plaintiff's Complaint, there can be no claim for negligence or any other cause of action. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION #2 RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 4. On the face of the Complaint, and from the attached exhibits, it is readily apparent that Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. Moreover, it is clear that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, who - without any basis whatsoever - has repeatedly sued the NFL, the Washington Redskins, and others. 5. Plaintiff's claims were litigated in Bethea v. Washin.qton Redskins, Cumberland Co. No. 02-0572. By Opinion and Order dated November 18, 2002, Judge Edgar Bailey granted the Washington Redskins' Preliminary Objections and dismissed Plaintiff's action. Plaintiff's present claims are barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. 6. Plaintiff's claims were litigated in Bethea v. National Football Lea.que and Paul Ta.qliabue, Dauphin Co. No. 2310 S 2000. By Order and Opinion dated July 16, 2001 (and attached to Plaintiff's Complaint at Exhibit "B"), Judge Lawrence Clark granted summary judgment in favor of the NFL, sanctioned Plaintiff, awarded the NFL attorneys' fees, and issued a permanent injunction barring Plaintiff (who lives in Harrisburg) from filing suit in either Dauphin County or the Middle District. 7. Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, who has filed suit in Cumberland County in order to avoid the bar of the permanent injunction. In the Opinion and Order attached as Exhibit "B" to the Complaint, Judge Clark recites the docket numbers of over 20 different lawsuits, which Plaintiff has filed. (Exhibit "B," Opinion, at pp. 22-23 n.10-12). To counsel's knowledge, Plaintiff has sued the NFL on at least 5 prior occasions. Plaintiff's claims have been resolved against him. This suit is barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. 2 WHEREFORE, the Defendants National Football League and Paul Tagliabue respectfully request that the Court (1) grant these Preliminary Objections, (2) dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice, and (3) due to the frivolous nature of Plaintiffs action, award attorneys' fees and costs in favor of the NFL and against Plaintiff. McNEES/V~/ALLACE & NURICK LLC Charles T. You~fg, Jr.. ' ~ Attorney I.D. No. 80680 100 Pine Street P.O. Box 1166 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166 Phone: (717) 237-5397 Fax: (717) 237-5300 Attorneys for Defendant National Football League Dated: May ~ , 2003 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by U.S. first-class mail upon the following: Stanley Bethea 533 Curtin Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Dated: May ~'~, 2003 Counsel for Defendants McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC attorneys at law CHARLES YOUNG D~RECT D~AL: (717) 237-5397 E-MAIL ADDRESS: CYOUNG~MWN,COM January 20, 2003 Mr. Stanley Bethea 533 Curtin Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Re: Stanley Bethea v. National Football League C.P. Cumberland No. 03-33 Dear Mr. Bethea: I have recently become aware of your lawsuit against the National Football League, filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, at Civil Action No. 03-33. In that action, you allege that the National Football League is liable for negligence because it failed to advise you of the eligibility rules for trying out as a free agent for the Washington Redskins. Please be advised that you are acting in direct violation of Judge Lawrence Clark's Amended Order of July 16, 2001 {See enclosed). In his Order, Judge Clark states the following: (1) The PERMANENT INJUNCTION entered against the Defendant by the April 26, 2001 Order of this Court is CONTINUED. The Plaintiff IS HEREBY ENJOINED from filing a lawsuit against the above-captioned Defendants, their employees, or agents, in either state or federal court without prior leave of this Court. Judge Clark's Order applies to any action filed in Pennsylvania state court, and it bars any suit prior to obtaining leave of Court. You cannot avoid the injunction by filing in Cumberland County. I urge you to consult with Jim Rowland, the attorney who represented you at the hearing in front of Judge Clark. Your conduct is clearly barred by the Judge's Order. If you do not immediately discontinue your action, I will seek to have you sanctioned. That sanction could take the form of imprisonment or a monetary award. Furthermore, regardless of Judge Clark's Order, the last action resulted in a judgment in the amount of $7,684.53 being entered against you. If you do not immediately withdraw your Complaint, the NFL will seek to collect that money. 100 PiNE STREET ° PO Box 1166 · HARRISBURG, PA 17108-1166 · TEL: 717.232.8000 · FAX: 717.237.5300 · WWW.MWN.COM COLUMBUS, OH · HAZELTON, PA · STATE COLLEGE, PA · WASHINGTON, DC January 20, 2003 Page 2 I send you this letter as a courtesy. I expect your action to be dismissed IMMEDIATELY. If it is not, I will take appropriate action. Sincerely, CY/mca Enclosure cc/enc.: James H. Rowland, Jr., Esquire STANLEY BETHEA, Plaintiff : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS, : NO. 2310CV2000 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND PAUL TAGLIABUE, COMMISSIONER, N.F.L., Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW ORDER AND NOW THIS day of ~m~,~, 2003, upon consideration of the Motion For Leave of Court submitted to the Court Administrator's Office in accordance with the order entered in this matter filed on July 16, 2001, Plaintiff is not required to obtain our permission to file an action in Cumberland County. Plaintiff is only required to obtain our permission before filing an action against Defendants in either Dauphin County or in the United States District Court for the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania. However, Plaintiff is admonished to carefully scrutinize Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1023.1-1023.4, which provide for the imposition of severe sanctions for the filing of frivolous pleadings or motions. ~~~,BY THE RT: DiS'i'Ri'BUTION: Stanley Bethea, 533 Curtin Street, Harrisburg, Pa. 17110 Charles Young, Esquire, 100 Pine Street, P.O. Box 1166, Harrisburg, Pa. 17108-1166 -'" C_.~V_x.t_n"t t4 "'~ 44,~G, p,g' / ? #9 STANLEY BETHEA, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF ' CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PAUL TAGLIABUE, COMMISSIONER, DEFENDANT ' 03-2060 CIVIL TERM ORDER OFCOURT AND NOW, this J ~o day of June, 2003, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff may file an amended complaint within twenty (20) days of this date? By the~ Cod~ ~Stanley Bethea, Pro se 533 Curtin Street ..~\ Harrisburg, PA 17110 ~Charles T. Young, Jr., Esquire 100 Pine Street P.O. Box 1166 ~ Harrisburg, PA 17108 For Defendant :sal ~ This resolution renders plaintiff's preliminary objections to defendant's preliminary objections moot. This is the only amended complaint that plaintiff will be allowed to file in this case. STANLEY BETHEA, Plaintiff NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and PAUL TAGLIABUE, Defendants : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : No. 03-2060 Civil Term ., : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED COMPLAINT Defendants National Football League and Paul Tagliabue (collectively the "NFL"), by and through their attorneys McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, hereby file these PreLiminary Objections to the PLaintiff's Amended Complaint. In support thereof, the NFL states the following: THE PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS 1. Plaintiff Stanley Bethea, an adult male in his mid-50's, asserts that he traveled to the Washington Redskins' training camp on August 1, 2001, to try out for the team. He claims that a staff member told him that he needed permission to be able to try out for the team. (Amended Complaint, ¶4). 2. Plaintiff has filed suit against the NFL, asserting a claim of negligence based on the NFL's alleged failure to inform Plaintiff of the eligibility rules and/or need for a contract in order to try out as a free agent for an NFL football team. (Amended Complaint, ¶2-3). PRELIMINARY OBJECTION #1: DEMURRER 3. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Under the circumstances described in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, there can be no claim for negligence or any other cause of action. 4. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Under the circumstances described in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, there can be no claim for breach of fiduciary duty or any other cause of action. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION #2 RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 5. From the exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint (and original Complaint), it is readily apparent that Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. Moreover, it is clear that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, who - without any basis whatsoever - has repeatedly sued the NFL, the Washington Redskins, and others. 6. Plaintiffs claims were litigated in Bethea v. Washin.qton Redskins, Cumberland Co. No. 02-0572. By Opinion and Order dated November 18, 2002, Judge Edgar Bailey granted the Washington Redskins' Preliminary Objections and dismissed Plaintiffs action. Plaintiffs present claims are barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. 7. Plaintiffs claims were litigated in Bethea v. National Football League and Paul Ta.qliabue, Dauphin Co. No. 2310 $ 2000. By Order and Opinion dated July 16, 2001 (and attached to Plaintiffs original Complaint at Exhibit "B"), Judge Lawrence Clark granted summary judgment in favor of the NFL, sanctioned Plaintiff, awarded the NFL 2 attorneys' fees, and issued a permanent injunction barring Plaintiff (who lives in Harrisburg) from filing suit in either Dauphin County or the Middle District. 8. Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, who has filed suit in Cumberland County in order to avoid the bar of the permanent injunction. In the Opinion and Order attached as Exhibit "B" to the original ComPlaint, Judge Clark recites the docket numbers of over 20 different lawsuits, which Plaintiff has filed. (Exhibit "B" to original Complaint, Opinion, at pp. 22-23 n.10-12). To counsel's knowledge, Plaintiff has sued the NFL on at least 5 prior occasions. Plaintiff's claims have been resolved against him. This suit is barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppeL. WHEREFORE, the Defendants National Football League and Paul Tagliabue respectfully request that the Court (1) grant these Preliminary Objections, (2) dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with prejudice, and (3) due to the frivolous nature of Plaintiff's action, award attorneys' fees and costs in favor of the NFL and against Plaintiff. McNEE,~W/~,LLACE & NURICK LLC By / ~ Chades T. You~, Jr. ,~i, Attorney I.D. ~. 80680- 100 Pine Street P.O. Box 1166 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166 Phone: (717) 237-5397 Fax: (717) 237-5300 Attorneys for Defendant National Football League Dated: June 20, 2003 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by U.S. first-class mail upon the following: Stanley Bethea 533 Curtin Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Dated: June ~O, 2003 ~o~un,/j ,' Charles T. Yo g, J,~/d~ .~ ' Counsel for Defer~dants STANLEY BETHEA, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. Defendant : N.F.L. PRAECIPE TO D!SCONT!NUE TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Pursuant to Pa.~,~ discontinued, 229; Kindly mark the above action Sincerely,