HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-2379 FX
STEWART D. McLAIN, and his wife
JENNIFER S. McLAIN,
IN THE COURTOF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
CNIL ACTION - LAW
v.
: NO. 01-2379 Civil Term
FLYING J INC. t/d/b/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFFS' PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM
BRIEF NARRATNE STATEMENT
This case involves a slip and fall accident that took place on January 29,2000 at
approximately 8:00 p.m. at Defendant's Truck Stop on the Carlisle Pike in Cumberland County.
Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, slipped and fell on "black ice" artificially created by Defendant, by
piling up snow by the driver's entrance to the truck stop. Defendant's manager testified that
Defendant owns, operates and maintains the truck stop and periodically inspects for icy
conditions and then spreads either salt, cinders, or stone aggregate over the icy areas. On the
particular evening in question, the artificially created condition was not treated in any fashion
prior to Plaintiff s accident.
Defendant's staff failed to do so even after being told to treat the area following
Plaintiffs accident.
DAMAGES
Plaintiff, Stewart McLain suffered a dislocated right kneecap that required two surgical
procedures. He lost time from work and his business as an independent truck driver. He could
no longer work as a truck driver as result of his injury. Stewart was 46 years old at the time of
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the accident. He was born on June 9, 1953. He obtained his GED in 1977 and received a
Certificate from Florida University in Jacksonville as an LPN in 1980. He served in the United
States Army and worked as a nurse until 1990 in a variety of hospitals in Florida. He started
driving truck part time in 1988 and eventually decided to become a full time truck driver in about
1996. He worked for various trucking companies and basically hauled luxury boats all over the
country. He started his own trucking company just a few months before the accident and bought
a tractor for $110,000. Stewart is a very large man and because of his knee injury and
consequent surgeries his orthopedic surgeon recommended that he not return to the truck driving
industry because of his difficulty in climbing into the tractor and onto truck loads. Stewart
therefore decided to sell his brand new tractor and he actually traded it in for $92,000 on a
$160,000 purchase of four used tractors. He then hired four drivers to operate the four used
trucks and this business ended miserably in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy was filed in 2000 and
discharged in 2001 with the bankruptcy estate still owes approximately $60,000 in unsecured
claims and administrative fees. Stewart's wife, Jennifer, contributed $40,000 from her father's
inheritance to help the family through this rough period. Stewart's medical bills and disability
benefits total another $60,000, for which an ERISA claim has been asserted.
Bankrupt and unable to drive truck, Stewart trained to be a real estate agent in
Jacksonville Beach, Florida only to discover that he was not a good salesman. He therefore
returned to his former occupation as a nurse at about the same time that Florida began its several
year record of severe hurricane seasons and then, of course, last year's devastation all over the
Gulf Coast. Stewart has worked as a provider of disaster relief and medical care all over the
Gulf Coast and presently continues to do so. All of the recognized Points for Charge regarding
personal injury damages will therefore be requested.
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POTENTIAL TRIAL WITNESSES
1. Stewart McLain will testify as a fact witness as to liability and damages.
2. Jennifer McLain will testify as a fact witness as to damages.
3. Dr. Paul Shirley will testify by way of video deposition as Mr. McLain's treating
orthopedic surgeon.
4. Anthony Walter Lucas may testify as a fact witness regarding liability as Defendant's
Truck Stop Manager.
5. Kevin Addington may testify as a fact witness as to liability as Defendant's
Cashier/Shift Manager.
6. Plaintiffs reserve the right to call any other witness identified in discovery or in
Defendant's Pretrial Memorandum.
7. Any records custodians to verify the authenticity of any medical record or bill.
8. Plaintiffs reserve the right to timely supplement this list of witnesses and call any
witnesses listed by Defendants.
EXHIBITS
1. All medical records and bills.
2. All lien letters regarding medical payments and disability payments.
3. All tax returns.
4. All business records.
5. All employment records.
6. All bankruptcy records.
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7. Any accident report (Defendant has to date denied the existence of any accident
report or witness statements.)
8. Deposition of Dr. Paul Shirley (transcript/video) including exhibits attached thereto.
9. Deposition Transcript of Anthony Walter Lucas or any part thereof.
10. All documents produced in discovery.
11. All out-of-pocket expenses.
12. All expenses for retraining and employment subsequent to the accident.
13. Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this exhibit list and utilize additional
exhibits at the time of trial and such exhibits identified and listed by Defendant.
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS
The video deposition of Dr. Paul Shirley was taken in preparation for trial and his
deposition transcript and videotape will be available for introduction as exhibits at trial.
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES
While the parties have entered into no pretrial stipulations, Plaintiffs suggest that the
parties can stipulate to the authenticity and admissibility of medical records and bills as they
relate to this accident.
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TRIAL LENGTH
Plaintiffs estimate that the trial of this case will require two days.
Respectfully submitted,
NA VI ~KY, OLSON & WIS
Date: Wil6 ( 6b
MichaelJ. vi
LD. No. 58 03
2040 Linglestown Road, SUIte
Harrisburg, P A 17110
717/541-9205
Counsel for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jessie K. Walsh, an employee of the law firm of Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski LLP, do
hereby certify that on this lOth day of October, 2006 served a true and correct copy of the
Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum upon all counsel of record via postage prepaid first class
United States mail addressed as follows:
David L. Cook, Esquire
Nixon Peabody, LLP
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, NY 14603
Counsel for Defendant
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
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STEWARTD. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs,
PRE-TRIAL
MEMORANDUM
- vs-
FL YINO J., INC., t/d/b/a!
FL YINO J. TRAVEL PLAZA,
CIVIL ACTION LAW
No.: 01-2379
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Flying J., Inc. ("Flying J") submits this Pre-trial Brief to provide an overview
of the factual and legal issues central to the claims of Plaintiffs Stewart D. McLain ("McLain")
and his spouse Jennifer S. McLain (collectively the "McLains"). The McLains filed suit against
Flying J in the Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania on April 23, 2000,
alleging negligence and loss of spousal consortium. The McLains' claims arise out of a
January 29,2000, incident in which McLain slipped and fell at a Flying J facility in Carlisle,
Pennsylvania ("Carlisle").
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Parties
The McLains are residents of Florida. McLain worked full-time as a tractor-trailer driver
from 1997 to January 29,2000. On January 11,1999, the McLains formed JS Delivery Systems,
Inc. ("JS Delivery"), a duly formed S Corporation with the McLains as sole shareholders. Flying
J is a Utah based corporation that is authorized to do business in the Commonwealth of
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Pennsylvania. Flying J operates a travel plaza at 1501 Harrisburg Pike, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
(the "Carlisle Facility").
Flvrnl! J's Carlisle Facilitv
The Carlisle Facility covers approximately twenty acres, a large portion of which is a
parking lot for tractor-trailers. In addition to the tractor-trailer parking lot, the Carlisle Facility's
travel plaza contains a fuel station, restaurant, store, and trucker's lounge. In January 2000
Flying J had a comprehensive snow removal program in place at the Carlisle Facility under the
direction of Anthony Lucas ("Lucas"), the Carlisle Facility General Manager. Lucas divided
snow removal responsibility into two areas, the parking lot and the travel plaza. Lucas
contracted with Michael Strohm ("Strohm") to remove snow and ice from the parking lot of the
Carlisle Facility. The Carlisle Facility staff was responsible for removing snow and ice from the
immediate vicinity of the travel plaza. Large stores of salt, sand, and gravel where kept at the
Carlisle Facility to facilitate snow and ice removal. The Carlisle Facility staff continuously
monitored the vicinity of the travel plaza and spread salt, sand, and gravel as soon as icy
conditions began to appear.
Due to the sheer size of the Carlisle Facility parking lot, Strohm would plow snow and
ice into large piles at the rear of the parking lot where there was a large drain. These snow piles
would often melt during the day, shedding water across the parking lot that would refreeze at
night. As a result, buckets of salt, sand, and gravel were kept at the travel plaza doors so that the
Carlisle Facility staff could easily remove ice from the surrounding area. When snow run-off
would refreeze on the Carlisle Facility parking lot the Carlisle Facility staff would spread salt,
sand, and gravel, and call Strohm to assist in the effort if necessary.
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Weather Conditions in January 2000
Carlisle received substantial snowfall in January 2000, with the most recent snowfall of
four inches on January 25,2000. Carlisle averaged temperatures well below freezing for a week
prior to McLain's fall. At the time of McClain's fall the snow from January 25, 2000, had been
removed from the parking 10 and a mixture of salt, sand, and gravel had been applied.
McLain's Fall
McLain arrived at the Carlisle Facility around 4:00 p.m. on January 28, 2000. McClain
was staying at the Carlisle Facility while he waited to pick up cargo in Lebanon, Pennsylvania.
After McClain arrived at the Carlisle Facility he stayed there continuously until his fall at
8:00 p.m. on January 29, 2000. During this time, he made frequent trips between his truck and
the travel plaza. Each time he went to and from the travel plaza he used the rear entrance to the
truckers lounge, located at the rear of the travel plaza. From his multiple travels between his
truck and the travel plaza, McLain was aware of generally slippery conditions in the area and
that temperatures were well below freezing.
Around 8:00 p.m. on January 29,2000, McClain left the travel plaza to return to his
truck. The only outer clothing that McLain was wearing was a t-shirt and a pair of shorts.
McLain exited the travel plaza through the rear door. When McLain stepped off the sidewalk
into the fire lane portion of the parking lot he took four to five steps and then slipped and fell,
injuring his knee. The area leading from the back door of the trucker's lounge to McClain's
truck was lit by an outdoor flood light mounted on a pole ten to fifteen feet away.
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ARGUMENT
I. FLYINGJ SATISFIED THE STANDARD OF CARE
Under Pennsylvania law, a land possessor, such as Flying J, is liable for the physical
harm caused to an invitee by a condition on the land if he:
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail
to protect themselves against it, and
( c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
McKenzie v. Cost Brothers. Inc., 487 Pac 303, 308 n.3 (Pa. 1979) (citing Restatement (Second)
of Torts 9 343 (1979)). This general rule is subject to two exceptions. First, there is no liability
"if it is reasonable for the [land] possessor to believe that the dangerous condition would be
obvious to and discovered by his invitee." Atkins v. Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh,
489 Pac 344, 352-53 (1980). Second, there is no liability under the "hills and ridges" doctrine
when there are "generally slippery conditions," Williams V. Shultz, 429 Pac 429, 432 (1968),
unless the invitee proves:
(a) that snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk in ridges or elevations
of such size and character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and constitute
a danger to pedestrians traveling thereon;
(b) that the property owner had notice, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such condition; and
( c) that it was the dangerous accumulation of snow and ice which caused the
plaintiff to fall.
Rinaldi v. Levine, 406 Pac 74,78-79 (1962). Otherwise, "to require that one's walks be always
free of ice and snow would be to impose an impossible burden in view of the climatic conditions
of this hemisphere." Morin v. Travelers Rest Motel. Inc., 704 A.2d 1085, 1087 (quoting Wentz
v. PennswoodApartments, 359 Pac Super. 1,5 (1986)).
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A. Flving J Exercised Reasonable Care by Removing all Known Snow and Ice Near
the Carlisle Facility.
McLain cannot show that Flying J engaged in actionable negligence because Flying J
exercised reasonable care to remove snow and ice from the Carlisle Facility. Under
Pennsylvania law, a land possessor is not liable for physical hann caused to an invitee by a
condition on his land ifhe exercises reasonable care to protect the invitee from the danger.
McKenzie, 487 Pa. at 308 n.3. Carlisle received over eight inches on snow in the two weeks
prior to McLain's fall, and over four inches of that snow fell on January 25,2000. Despite this
sustained snowfall, Strohm, Lucas, and the Carlisle Facility staff took appropriate measures to
remove snow and ice. After the January 25,2000, snowfall, Strohm plowed the snow and ice on
the parking lot into piles near a large drain located in the rear ofthe parking lot. The Carlisle
Facility staff removed snow and ice from the vicinity of the travel plaza and continually
monitored all entrances and exits, spreading salt, sand, and gravel as needed. Despite their best
efforts, it was inevitable that some slippery patches would exist during severe winter conditions.
The accumulated snow could not be trucked off site, and would inevitably melt in the day,
shedding water across the parking lot that would refreeze at night. To require Flying J to ensure
that no snow run-off refreezes over the parking lot of a twenty acre facility is simply
unreasonable and not required under the law of Pennsylvania. Morin, 704 A.2d at 1087.
B. McLain Failed to Exercise Caution by Knowingly Attempting to Cross an
Obvious Patch ofIce.
McLain cannot show that Flying J engaged in actionable negligence because McLain
knew, or should have known, of the ice that he slipped on. Under Pennsylvania law, a land
possessor is not liable for physical hann caused to an invitee by a condition on his land if the
danger is obvious or discoverable to the invitee. Atkins, 489 Pa. at 352-53. Before McLain's
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fall, he had been staying at the Carlisle Facility for two days, traveling back and forth between
bis truck and the travel plaza. McLain knew that there had been substantial snowfall in Carlisle
lUld that the large snow piles at the rear of the Carlisle Facility parking lot had been melting
during the day and shedding water across the parking lot. He also knew that, given the freezing
temperatures, which were the same both days, the water would refreeze at night. The area where
McLain fell was well lit and appeared wet. Any reasonable person would know, given the
freezing temperatures, that the area would be icy. McLain knew this as well. Atkins, 489 Pac at
352-53.
C. Flving J Did Not Allow Snow lUld Ice to Unreasonablv Obstruct Travel.
McLain cannot show that Flying J engaged in actionable negligence because Flying J did
not let snow and ice in the Carlisle Facility parking lot unreasonably obstruct travel. Rinaldi,
406 Pac at 78-79. Under Pennsylvania law, a land possessor is not liable for physical harm
caused to an invitee by a condition on his land when there are generally slippery conditions and
he does not allow them to become "ridges or elevations of such size and character as to
unreasonably obstruct travel." Id. The Carlisle area received a substantial amount of snow in
January 2000. Daytime sunshine on January 28 and 29, coupled with below freezing
temperatures, created a general condition across the Carlisle area in which snow would melt
during the day and refreeze at night. Id. As a result, generally slippery conditions existed
throughout the Carlisle area.
There is simply no evidence that Flying J let the snow and ice in the Carlisle Facility
parking lot accumulate to the point of becoming "ridges or elevations of such size and character
as to unreasonably obstruct travel." Rinaldi, 406 Pac at 78-79. The Carlisle Facility staff
regularly inspected the premises and kept buckets of salt, sand, and gravel near the travel plaza
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doors, using them to remove ice as soon as it was noticed. The inherent climate conditions of a
Pennsylvania winter make it impossible for McLain to show actionable negligence by Flying J
without satisfying the hills and ridges doctrine, which McLain cannot do because Flying J did
not aIlow snow or ice to accumulate in the Carlisle Facility parking lot to the point of becoming
"ridges or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably obstruct travel." Rinaldi, 406
Pa. at 78-79. Flying J took every reasonable action to remove snow and ice given the climatic
conditions. Mori!!, 704 A.2d 1087.
II. THE MCLAINS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE DAMAGES THEY SEEK
Flying J does not concede liability in any way. Nonetheless, a discussion of damages is
necessary. When a plaintiff in a negligence case establishes liability, damages are limited to
those that are the foreseeable, natural, and proximate consequences of defendant's negligent
act( s). Alleghenv v. Zimmerman, 95 Pa. 287, 295 (1880). Damages that are uncertain,
speculative, or do not directly flow from the negligent act(s) are not recoverable. Weinclass v.
Gibson, 304 Pa. 203,207-08 (1931); Drake v. Kielv, 93 Pa. 492, 488~89 (1879). If a plaintiff
contributes to the negligent act by failing to exercise ordinary and reasonable care any recovery
will be reduced by the portion of fault for which he is responsible. Stewart v. Motts, 539 Pa.
596,602 (1995). However, a plaintiff's contributory negligence will not bar recovery when his
negligence is not greater than the negligence of the defendant. Pa. Cons. Stat. ~ 7102(a) (2006).
In their Complaint the McLains request damages for the following: (1) McLain's physical
and mental pain and suffering; (2) McLain's medical treatment (past and future); (3) McLain's
lost wages; (4) the bankruptcy of JS Delivery; and (5) the McLains' loss of spousal consortium.
Complaint 'If'lf 20-27,29-30. While Flying J asserts that it is not liable for McLain's fall at the
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Carlisle Facility, ifliability is established McLain would only be entitled to recover as to the first
three classes of damages listed above.
A. McLain Cannot Recover Damages because He is Contributorily Negligent.
Any damages awarded to McLain should either be reduced or eliminated subject to Pa.
Cons. Stat. ~ 7102(a) (2006), because McLain is contributorily negligent for his fall at the
Carlisle Facility. McLain arrived at the Carlisle Facility in the middle of winter. He knew that
there had been substantial snowfall in the Carlisle area and that there were large snow piles in the
rear of the Carlisle Facility parking lot. Likewise, McLain knew that temperatures were below
freezing and that snow run-off had shed water across the Carlisle Facility parking lot.
McLain had full knowledge of the generally slippery conditions that existed in Carlisle
on January 29, 2000. While McLain may claim that he didn't know there was ice, such a claim
is without merit as the area was well lit, he was aware of the temperature, and he knew that snow
run-off had been shed across the parking lot during the day. Because the weather conditions
were identical the previous day he cannot now claim he was unaware of the generally slippery
conditions in the parking lot. When McLain exited the travel plaza he was only wearing at-shirt
and a pair of shorts. McLain was obviously cold, and in an effort to reach the warmth of his
truck he most likely hastily tried to cross a patch of ice.
B. Flving J is not Liable for the Bankruptcy of JS Delivery because the Company
was Near Bankruptcy when McLain Fell.
McLain is not entitled to recover damages for the bankruptcy of JS Delivery because the
bankruptcy was not caused by McLain's fall. Allegheny, 95 Pa. at 295. At the time of McLain's
fall, JS Delivery had been in existence for roughly one year. The 1999 tax filings for IS Delivery
show that the venture produced $16,667 dollars of income for the McLains and generated $8,946
of internal profits. JS Delivery was clearly a struggling venture that was not generating
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sufficient revenue to survive. McLain cannot successfully argue that his fall at the Carlisle
Facility caused JS Delivery to enter bankruptcy because JS Delivery was already on the brink of
bankruptcy on January 29,2000. To find otherwise would allow McLain to use his unfortunate
accident to obtain a windfall by claiming that Flying J is liable for the bankruptcy of JS Delivery.
Such a speculative claim is not supported under the law of Pennsylvania. Weinglass, 304 Pa. at
207-08.
C. McLain's Medical Liens are Irrelevant because FIving J is not Liable for his
Iniuries.
As a result of his medical bills, the bankruptcy of JS Delivery, and other expenses
allegedly incurred as a result of his fall at the Carlisle Facility, various liens have been entered
against McLain. These liens are irrelevant, unless and until liability is established, and the
McLains cannot establish that Flying J is liable for their injuries.
D. Jennifer McLain has not Lost the Aid of her Husband.
Jennifer McLain is not entitled to recover for loss of spousal consortium because there
are no facts to support her claim that she has lost her husbands aid, affection, companionship,
cooperation, or sexual relations. Tucker v. Phila. Daily News, 577 Pa. 598, 620 (2004). McLain
has fitlly recovered from any and all injuries sustained as a result of his fall at the Carlisle
Facility. McLain regularly works as many as 80-100 hours a week on his feet and has
considerably improved health.
POTENTIAL TRIAL WITNESSES
1. Anthony Lucas, Flying J truck stop manager at the time of Mr. McLain's fall.
2. Jack Baba, Flying J facility maintenance manager.
3. Stewart McLain
4. Jennifer McLain
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5. Dr. Paul Shirley, Mr. McLain's treating orthopedic surgeon.
6. Record's custodians if authenticity of records cannot be stipulated to.
POTENTIAL EXHffiITS
1. McLain medical records.
2. McLain tax returns.
3. McLain business records.
4. McLain employment records.
5. Flying J accident report.
6. Deposition of Dr. Paul Shirley.
7. Deposition of Stewart McLain
8. Deposition of Jennifer McLain.
9. All documents produced in discovery.
10. Flying J policies relative to snow and ice removal.
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
While the parties have diligently sought to settle this matter through mediation, a
satisfactory settlement was not reached and is not anticipated.
CONCLUSION
The facts that have been obtained through discovery that will be presented at trial show
that McLain's fall at the Carlisle Facility, as unfortunate as it was, was caused by his decision to
dart across an icy portion of the Carlisle Facility parking lot so that he could avoid on a cold
January night. McLain could have easily walked around the ice, but he did not. The Carlisle
Facility parking lot had been plowed and salted by Flying J after the most recent snowstorm.
The area around the travel plaza was kept free of snow and ice. While there were generally
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slippery conditions in Carlisle, the Carlisle Facility staff exercised reasonable care in removing
snow and ice from the premises and is not liable for McLain's injuries.
A land owner is not liable every time an invitee slips and falls on his property,
particularly during the winter. Slip-and- fall plaintiffs bear the significant burden of showing that
unsafe conditions existed. In the winter that burden is heightened. A reasonable person knows
to exercise caution when walking across snow and ice, and just because a fall takes place does
not mean that the land owner is liable. The McLains have failed to establish liability on the part
of Flying J. The hills and ridges doctrine, coupled with McLain's contributory negligence,
eliminates any possibility of liability on the part of Flying J. Likewise, McLain cannot now try
and put the burden of the JS Delivery bankruptcy on Flying J.
Respectfully submitted,
NIXON PEABODY LLP
By:
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Attorneys for Flying J., Inc.
Clinton Square
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, New York 14603-1051
Telephone: (585) 263-1000
Dated: Rochester, New York
October 13, 2006
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs,
NOTICE OF
SUBSTITUTION
OF COUNSEL
- vs-
FLYING J., INC., t/dlb/a/
FLYINGJ.TRAVELPLAZA
CNIL ACTION LAW
No.: 01-2379
Defendants. i
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that NIXON PEABODY LLP, 1300 Clinton Square, P.O.
Box 31051, Rochester, New York 14603-1051, be and hereby substituted for Marshall,
Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, 4200 Crum Mill Road, Suite B, Harrisburg, PA 17112,
as counsel of record for defendant FLYING J., INC., t/dlb/a FLYING J. TRAVEL PLAZA in the
above-captioned matter and that all pleadings, correspondence and other items in this matter
should be served upon Nixon Peabody LLP at the office and post office address below.
Dated: October 8, 2004
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER,
COLEMAN & GOGGIN
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4200 Crum Mill Road, Suite B
Harrisburg, PA 17112
Telephone: (717) 651-3500
R769832.1
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SO ORDERED:
JUDGE
R769832.1
NIXON PEABODY LLP
By:
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David L. Cook
Clinton Square
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, New York 14603-1051
Telephone: (585) 263-1000
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY. PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO.: 01-2379
FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a
FLYING 1. TRAVEL PLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I, Joanne M. Parr, an employee of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, do
hereby certify that on this \ 1~ day of October 2004, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document via United States First Class Mail, postage pre-paid as follows:
Michael Navitsky, Esquire
Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski, LLP
2040 Linglestown Rd., Ste. 303
Harrisburg, P A 17110
David 1. Cook, Esquire
Clinton Square
PO Box 31051
Rochester, NY 14603-1051
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Joanne . Parr
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OCT 1 5 200~'
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs, i
NOTICE OF
SUBSTITUTION
OF COUNSEL
- vs-
FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a/
FLYINGJ. TRAVEL PLAZA
CNIL ACTION LAW
No.: 01-2379
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that NIXON PEABODY LLP, 1300 Clinton Square, P.O.
Box 31051, Rochester, New York 14603-1051, be and hereby substituted for Marshall,
Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, 4200 Crum Mill Road, Suite B, Harrisburg, P A 17112,
as counsel of record for defendant FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a FLYING J. TRAVEL PLAZA in the
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above-captioned matter and that all pleadings, correspondence and other items in this matter
should be served upon Nixon Peabody LLP at the office and post office address below.
Dated: October 8, 2004
MARSHALL,DENNEHEY, WARNER,
COLEMAN & GOGGIN
(
cMahon
By:
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4200 Crum Mill Road, Suite B
Harrisburg, P A 17112
Telephone: (717) 651-3500
R769832.l
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SO ORDERED:
JUDGE
R769832.1
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NIXON PEABODY LLP
By:
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David 1. Cook
Clinton Square
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, New York 14603-1051
Telephone: (585) 263-1000
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY. PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO,: 01-2379
FLYING 1., INC., t/d/b/a
FLYING J. TRAVEL PLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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hereby certify that on this \~ day of October 2004, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document via United States First Class Mail, postage pre-paid as follows:
Michael Navitsky, Esquire
Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski, LLP
2040 Linglestown Rd., Ste. 303
Harrisburg, P A 1711 0
David L. Cook, Esquire
Clinton Square
POBox 31051
Rochester, NY 14603-1051
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
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Plaintiffs, I
NOTICE OF
SUBSTITUTION
OF COUNSEL
- vs-
FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a/
FLYING J. TRAVEL PLAZA
CNIL ACTION LAW
No.: 01-2379
Defendants. i
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that NIXON PEABODY LLP, 1300 Clinton Square, P.O.
Box 31051, Rochester, New York 14603-1051, be and hereby substituted for Marshall,
Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, 4200 Crum Mill Road, Suite B, Harrisburg, P A 17112,
as counsel of record for defendant FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a FLYING J. TRAVEL PLAZA in the
above-captioned matter and that all pleadings, correspondence and other items in this matter
should be served upon Nixon Peabody LLP at the office and post office address below.
Dated: October 8, 2004
MARSHALL, DENNElEIEY, WARNER,
COLEMAN & GOGGIN
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By:
4200 Crum Mill Road, Suite B
Harrisburg, P A 17112
Telephone: (717) 651-3500
R769832.l
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SO ORDERED:
JUDGE
}t769832.1
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NIXON PEABODY LLlP
By:
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David 1. Cook
Clinton Square
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, New York 14603-1051
Telephone: (585) 263-1000
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY. PENNSYLV AN1A
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO.: 01-2379
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I, Joanne M, Parr, an employee of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman &:Qog~, dJ'~
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hereby certify that on this \~ day of October 2004, I served a true and correct copy of
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a
FLYINGJ. TRAVEL PLAZA
Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
the foregoing document via United States First Class Mail, postage pre-paid as follows:
Michael Navitsky, Esquire
Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski, LLP
2040 Linglestown Rd., Ste. 303
Harrisburg, P A 17110
David 1. Cook, Esquire
Clinton Square
PO Box 31051
Rochester, NY 14603-1051
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Joanne " Parr
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OCT 1 5 2004 ~
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYL VANIA
STEWARTD. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
- vs-
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Defendants. I
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NOTICE OF
SUBSTITUTION
OF COUNSEL
FLYING J., INC., t/dlb/a/
FLYINGJ.TRAVELPLAZA
CNIL ACTION LAW
No.: 01-2379
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that NIXON PEABODY LLP, 1300 Clinton Square, P.O.
Box 31051, Rochester, New York 14603-1051, be and hereby substituted for Marshall,
Dennehey, Warner, Colenian & Goggin, 4200 Crum Mill Road, Suite B, Harrisburg, P A 17112,
as counsel of record for defendant FLYING J., INC., t/d/b/a FLYING J. TRAVEL PLAZA in the
above-captioned matter and that all pleadings, correspondence and other items in this matter
. should be served upon Nixon Peabody LLP at the office and post office address below.
Dated: October 8, 2004
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER,
. COLEMAN & GOGGIN
t~
Bv' .c--.
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4200 Crum Mill Road, Suite B
Harrisburg, PA 17112
Telephone: (717) 651-3500
R769832,1
-
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SO ORDERED:
JUDGE
R769832.l
'''''''''''1~' ,~
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NIXON PEABODY LLP
By:
4e//c;./
David 1. Cook
Clinton Square
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, New York 14603-1051
Telephone: (585) 263-1000
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY. PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO.: 01-2379
FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a
FLYING 1. TRAVEL PLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Joanne M. Parr, an employee of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, do
hereby certify that on this \~ day of October 2004, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document via United States First Class Mail, postage pre-paid as follows:
Michael Navitsky, Esquire
Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski, LLP
2040 Linglestown Rd., Ste. 303
Harrisburg, P A 17110
David 1. Cook, Esquire
Clinton Square
PO Box 31051
Rochester, NY 14603-1051
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Joanne ~. Parr
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Plaintiffs
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: CNIL ACTION - LAW
STEWART D. McLAIN, and his wife
JENNIFER S. McLAIN,
v.
: NO. o/-d)J79
CO\{cy~
FLYING J INC. t/dIb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
NOTICE
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth
in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Complaint and
Notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing
with the Court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that
if you fail to do so the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by
the Court without further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or
relief requested by the Plaintiff. Y Oil may lose money or property or other rights important to you.
YOU SHOULD TAKE TillS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO
NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE
OFFICE SETFORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP.
Cumberland County Bar Association
2 Liberty Avenue
Carlisle, P A 17013
(717) 249-3166
'~;"-~""'~-=-- ,~ -' ";,<--,-"",-:,' ',__o,_,~ _ ;'''(~'' ''''''.'1';,> '--'--r~'"~,--- c_" .< _
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STEWART D. McLAIN, and his wife
JENNIFER S. McLAIN,
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
: CNIL ACTION - LAW
v.
,:NO.
FLYING J INC. t/dIb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
NOTlCIA
Le han demandado a usted en la corte. Si usted quiere defenderse de estas demandas
expuestas en las paginas siquientes, usted tiene viente (20) dias de plazo al partir de la fecha de la
demanda y la notificacion. Usted debe presentar una apariencia escrita 0 en persona 0 por abogado
y archivar en la corte en forma escrita sus defensas 0 sus objectiones alas demandas en contra de su
persona. Sea avisado que si usted no se defiende, la corte tomara medidas y puede entrar una orden
contra usted sin previo aviso 0 notificacion y por cualquier queja 0 alivio que es pedido en la
peticion de demanda. Usted puede perder dinero 0 sus propiedades 0 otros derechos importantes
para usted.
LLEVE ESTA DEMANDA A UN ABODAGO INMEDIATAMENTA. SI NO TIENE
ABODAGO 0 SI NO TIENE EL DINERO SUFICIENTE DE P AGAR TAL SERVICIO, VA Y A
EN PERSONA 0 LLAME POR TELEFONO A LA OFICINA CUYA DIRECCION SE
ENCUENTRA ESCRITA ABAJO PARA AVERIGUAR DONDE SE PUEDE CONSEGUIR
ASISTENCIA LEGAL.
Cumberland County Bar Association
2 Liberty Avenue
Carlisle, P A 17013
(717) 249-3166
2
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STEWART D. McLAIN, and his wife
JENNIFER S. McLAIN,
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION - LAW
0/- ;l.:3 79 C;;xy -r.eM>'-
: NO.
FLYING J INC. t/dIb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMPLAINT
1. Plaintiffs, Stewart McLain and Jennifer McLain, are adult indiyiduals, husband
and wife, and currently reside at 2509 Independence Drive, Jacksonville Beach, Duval County,
Florida.
2. Defendant, Flying J Inc., trading and doing business as, Flying J Travel Plaza,
here in after Flying J Inc., is a corporation authorized to do and is doing business at 1501
Harrisburg Pike, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
3. Defendant, Flying J. Inc., owns, operates and maintains a truck stop business and
parking lot at 1501 Harrisburg Pike, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
4. The facts and occurrences hereinafter related took place on or about January 29,
2000, at approximately 8:00 p.m., on the aforesaid parking lot.
5. Plaintifflawfully parked his tractor-trailer in the parking lot owed by Defendant.
6. Plaintiff was an invitee and was lawfully using the facilities on the Defendant's
property.
7. At that time and place, Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, exited the drivers' lounge door
of Defendant's facilities to return to his tractor-trailer.
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8. The parking lot had "black ice" on it, so a slippery, dangerous condition existed.
9. Mr. McLain could not see the condition of the parking lot and was not aware of
this situation until after his accident.
10. No markings or signs of any kind were in place warning of the slippery and
dangerous condition of the parking lot, nor were there any verbal warnings of any kind conveyed
to Mr. McLain that would have alerted him to the danger. Furthermore, no salt, cinders,
aggregate or material was placed on the parking lot surface to increase traction and reduce the
slipping hazard.
11. The Defendant had a duty to maintain the parking lot in a safe condition.
12. The icy, slippery condition of the parking lot presented a dangerous condition
known to the Defendant, or which could have and should have been reasonably known to the
Defendant, which created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm suffered by the Plaintiff.
13. The Defendant had sufficient time prior to Mr. McLain's slip and fall to have
taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition that existed on the parking lot and
prevent the kind of injuries suffered by Mr. McLain, but Defendant failed to do so.
Appropriately removing the black ice from the parking lot, and placing sand, salt, cinders or
some other substance on the parking lot was necessary, but Defendant failed to do so.
14. The aforementioned slippery condition of the parking lot represented a condition
that existed for an adequate and sufficient time before Mr. McLain's slip and fall, which could
haYe and should had given the Defendant adequate time to correct the condition and wam Mr.
McLain of the condition.
15. As a result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff suffered abrasions, a right elbow
contusion, and a right patellar dislocation, which has required surgery and physical therapy.
4
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COUNT I
STEWART McLAIN v. FLYING J INC t/dIb/a FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA
16. Paragraphs 1 through 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint are incorporated herein as if set
forth by reference.
17. At all times releyant thereto, Defendant, Flying J Inc, through its agent and
employees, was in exclusive control ofthe parking lot and was responsible for the inspection and
maintenance ofthe parking lot, including snow and ice removal.
18. Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, was owed the highest duty of care by Defendant Flying
J Inc., to keep and maintain the parking lot in a safe condition for the benefit of patrons.
19. The aforementioned accident and resulting injuries sustained by Plaintiff, Stewart
McLain, are the direct and proximate result of negligent conduct of Defendant, Flying J Inc., and
its agents and employees, as follows:
a. failure to exercise the highest degree of care that a landowner owes to
business invites utilizing the premises for its intended purposes;
b. failure to properly maintain the premises by allowing an unsafe hazard in
the form of ice in an area used by business invites;
c. failure to inspect its premises to determine whether there were any
conditions that could pose a hazard to business invites;
d. failure to post adequate and proper warnings concerning the dangers posed
to business invites by the deceptive condition of the parking lot;
e. failure to post "Caution Icy Parking Lot," or similar signs to warn business
invites of potential danger;
f. failure to use any non-slip materials and to advise business invites of the
presence of ice;
g. failure to remove the unsafe condition from its premises;
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h. failure to place rock salt or other deicing agents on the parking lot;
1. failure to hire and properly train reasonably competent personnel to
supervise the area and regularly inspect the same; and
m. failure to hire a competent and responsible contractor for the removal of
snow and ice from the aforesaid parking lot.
20. As a result of the aforementioned slip and fall, Plaintiff, Stewart McLain,
sustained painful and severe injuries including, but not limited to, abrasions, to the right knee, a
right elbow contusion, and a right patellar dislocation, requiring surgery.
21. By reason of the aforesaid injuries sustained by Plaintiff, Stewart McLain,
incurred liability for medical treatment, medications, hospitalizations and similar miscellaneous
expenses in an effort to restore himself to health, and claim is made therefor.
22. Because of the nature of his injuries, Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, has been advised
and therefore avers that he may incur similar expenses in the future, and claim is made therefor.
23. As a result of the aforesaid injuries, Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, has undergone and
in the future will undergo great physical and mental suffering, great inconvenience in carrying
out his daily activities, loss oflife's pleasures and enjoyment, and claim is made therefor.
24. As a result of the aforesaid injuries, Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, has been and in the
future will be subject to great humiliation and embarrassment, and claim is made therefor.
25. As a result of the aforesaid injuries, Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, has sustained and
may in the future sustain work loss, loss of opportunity and a permanent diminution of his
earning power and capacity, including the loss of his business and associated expenses, and
claim is made therefor.
6
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26. Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, continues to be plagued by persistent pain, swelling,
and limitation and therefore avers that his injuries may be of permanent nature, causing residual
problems for the remainder of his lifetime, and claim is made therefor.
27. As a result of the aforesaid accident and injuries, Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, has
sustained scars which have resulted in a permanent disfigurement, and claim is made therefor.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, demands judgment against Defendants, Flying
J Inc. t/dIb/a Flying J Travel Plaza, in an amount in excess of Twenty-five Thousand ($25,000)
Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of jurisdictional amount requiring
compulsory arbitration.
COUNT II
JENNIFER McLAIN v. FL YlNG J lNC t/dIb/a FL YlNG J TRAVEL PLAZA
28. Paragraphs one through twenty-eight of this Complaint are incorporated herein by
reference.
29. By reason of the aforesaid injuries sustained by her husband, Plaintiff, Jennifer
McLain, was required to incur liability for medical treatments, specialized medical equipment,
medications, and similar miscellaneous expenses in an effort to restore her husband to health,
and may be required to incur similar expenses in the future and claim is made therefor.
30. By reason of the aforesaid injuries sustained by her husband, Plaintiff, Jennifer
McLain, has been deprived of the assistance, companionship, consortium, and society of her
husband and claim is made therefor.
7
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jennifer McLain, demands judgment against Defendant, Flying
J Inc., t/dIb/a Flying J Travel Plaza, in an amount in excess of Twenty-five Thousand ($25,000)
Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of jurisdictional amount requiring
compulsory arbitration.
Respectfully Submitted,
NA VITSKY, OLSON & WISNESKI LLP
D"oort c{!1 (JOb I
NV
MICHAE . NA VITS ESQUIRE
\
J.D. No.5 803
2040 Linglestown Road, Suite 303
Harrisburg, PA 17110
(717) 541-9205
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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VERIFICATION
I, Stewart D. McLain, do hereby swear or affirm that the facts set forth in the
foregoing Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and
belief. I understand that this Verification is made subject to the provisions of 18 Pa.
C.S.A. ~4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
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WITNESS
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VERIFICATION
I, Jennifer S. McLain, do hereby swear or affirm that the facts set forth in the
foregoing Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and
belief. I understand that this Verification is made subj ect to the provisions of 18 Pa.
C.S.A. ~4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities.
~ "MGL'
WITNESS
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Jennifer S. McLain
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SHERIFF'S RETURN - REGULAR
A
CASE NO: 2001-02379 P
,
.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
MCLAIN STEWART D ET AL
VS
FLYING J INC ET AL
DAVID MCKINNEY
, Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of
Cumbe~land County, Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according to law,
says, the within COMPLAINT & NOTICE
was served upon
FLYING J INC
the
DEFENDANT
, at 1508:00 HOURS, on the 25th day of April
, 2001
at 1501 HARRISBURG PIKE
CARLISLE, PA 17013
by handing to
ROGER LOCKBAUM ASSISTANT
MANAGER
a true and attested copy of COMPLAINT & NOTICE
together with
and at the same time directing His attention to the contents thereof.
Sheriff's Costs:
Docketing
Service
Affidavit
Surcharge
18.00
3.10
10.00
.00
.00
31.10
So ;;~~
R. Thomas Kline
04/26/2001
NAVITSKY OLSON & WISNESKI
Sworn and Subscribed to
me this 4l~
before
By: h~~~'
Deputy Sheri ro
day of
A.D.
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SHERIFF'S REtURN - REGULAR
^
CASE NO: 2001-02379 P
.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
MCLAIN STEWART D ET AL
VS
FLYING J INC ET AL
DAVID MCKINNEY
, Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of
Cumberland County,Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according to law,
says, the within COMPLAINT & NOTICE
was served upon
FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA
the
DEFENDANT
, at 1508:00 HOURS, on the 25th day of April
, 2001
at 1501 HARRISBURG PIKE
CARLISLE, PA 17013
by handing to
ROGER LOCKBAUM
a true and attested copy of COMPLAINT & NOTICE
together with
and at the same time directing His attention to the contents thereof.
Sheriff's Costs:
Docketing
Service
Affidavit
Surcharge
So Answers:
6.00
.00
1. 00
.00
.00
7.00
.~~~
R. Thomas Kline
04/26/2001
NAVITSKY OLSON & WISNESKI
Sworn and Subscribed to before
By:
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Deputy Sheriff
4-4 day of
me this
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO.: 01-2379
FLYING 1., INC., t/dIb/a
FLYINGJ.TRAVELPLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER OF DEFENDANT, FLYING J.. INC.,
TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
I. Admitted in part; denied in part. It is admitted only that Plaintiffs are who they
say they are. The remaining allegations of this paragraph are denied because Defendant, after
reasonable investigation and inquiry, lacks information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof, and accordingly proof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
2. Admitted.
3. Admitted in part; denied in part. It is admitted only that Defendant, Flying J. Inc.,
operates and maintains a truck stop business at 150 I Harrisburg Pike, Carlisle, Cumberland
County, P A. The remaining allegations of this paragraph are denied and proof thereof is
demanded at trial, ifrelevant.
4. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C,P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
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5. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P, 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant
6. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
7. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
8. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
9. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions oflaw
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
10. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions oflaw
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
11. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
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12. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant
13. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
14. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
15. Denied. The allegations set forth in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P. 1029 (e), and accordingly these allegations are denied and proof
thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
COUNT I: STEWART D. MCLAIN V. FLYING J., INC.
16. Defendant incorporates by reference its responses to paragraphs 1-15 above, as if
set forth at length herein.
17. Admitted.
18. Denied. The allegations of this paragraph constitute conclusions oflaw to which
no further responsive pleading is required, and accordingly the same are denied and proof thereof
is demanded at trial, if relevant.
19. Denied, Defendant, Flying J., Inc., specifically denies all allegations of
Negligence as set forth in this paragraph, together with its subparts (a) through (m). To the
contrary, at all times relevant to the material and well-pleaded allegations set forth in Plaintiffs'
3
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Complaint, Defendant acted with due care under the circumstances then and there prevailing.
Further, the allegations of this paragraph constitute conclusions oflaw which are deemed denied
within the meaning ofPa.R.C.P, 1029(e), and accordingly, proof thereof is demanded at trial, if
relevant.
20.-27. Denied. The allegations set forth in these paragraphs are denied III
accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e), and proof thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Flying J" Inc., demands judgment in its favor and against
Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, together with such other relief as this Court shall deem appropriate.
COUNT II: JENNIFER S. MCLAIN V. FLYING J., INC.
28. Defendant incorporates by reference its responses to paragraphs 1-27 above as if
set forth at length herein.
29.-30. Denied. The allegations set forth in these paragraphs constitute
conclusions of law within the meaning of Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e), and accordingly the same are
denied and proof thereof is demanded at trial, if relevant.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Flying J., Inc., demands judgment it its favor and against
Plaintiff, Jennifer McLain, together with such other relief as this Court shall deem appropriate.
NEW MATTER DIRECTED TO PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause of action as against Defendant upon which
relief may be granted as a matter oflaw,
4
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31. No act or omission on the part of Defendant was a substantial contributing factor
in bringing about Plaintiffs' injuries and/or damages, all such injuries and/or damages being
expressly denied.
32. Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause of action under the doctrine of Hills and
Ridges.
33. Plaintiffs' injuries and/or damages, if any, were caused in whole or in part by acts
and/or omissions on the part of persons and/or entities other than Defendant, Flying J., Inc., and
over which Flying 1., Inc. had neither control nor right of control.
34. Defendant reserves its right to raise one or more of those defenses reserved at
Pa.R.C.P. 1030,
35. Plaintiffs' claims may be barred and/or limited by the doctrines of rais judicata
and/or collateral estoppel.
36. The injuries and/or damages of Plaintiff, Stewart McLain, if any, were not caused
by any act or omission or any other liability producing conduct on the part of Defendant, Flying
1., Inc., but were the result of pre-existing medical conditions and/or injuries, and accordingly
Defendant is not responsible therefore.
The claims of Plaintiff, Jennifer S. McLain, being derivative in nature, are or may be
barred by such contributory or comparative negligence and/or assumption of the risk on the part
of Stewart D. McLain, as may be established at trial.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Flying 1., Inc., demands judgment in its favor and against
Plaintiffs, together with such other relief as this Court shall deem appropriate.
5
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Respectfully submitted,
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER,
COLE & IN
BY:
Tim J.
100 Pine Stre
P.O. Box 803
Harrisburg, P A 17l 08-0803
J.D. 52918
(717) 232-9323
Attorney for Defendant,
Flying J., Inc., t/dIb/a Flying J. Travel Plaza
6
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VERIFICATION
L Anthony Lucas, General Manager for Defendant, Flying J., Inc., t/dlb/a Flying J.
Travel Plaza in the above matter, verify that the facts set forth in the ANSWER WITH NEW
MA TIER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, are true to the beSI of my knowledge. information and
belief. If the above statements are not true, the deponent is subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.
4904 relating to unsworn ralsification to authorities.
DATE:
1JJ5-A\LIA\lITJM\l.LPG171355\SXV\20614\:!OOOO
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY. PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO.: 01-2379
FLYING 1., INC., t/dIb/a
FLYINGJ.TRAVELPLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Shonu V. McEchron, of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, do hereby
certify that on this ~day of May, 2001, served a copy of the foregoing document via First
Class United States mail, postage prepaid as follows:
TO:
Michael Navitsky, Esquire
Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski, LLP
2040 Linglestown Rd., Ste, 303
Harrisburg, PA 17110
(FOR PLAINTIFFS)
~~/
. V. MCECHRON
105_ A ILIABITlMILLPG\71339\SXV\20614150000
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWARTD. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CIVIL ACTION LAW
NO,: 01-2379
FLYING J., INC., tid/b/a
FLYINGJ. TRAVEL PLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
TO: Prothonotary - Cumberland County
Kindly enter the appearance of the undersigned on behalf of Defendant, Flying 1., Inc.,
t/d/b/a Flying J. Travel Plaza, in connection with the above-referenced case.
Respectfully submitted,
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER,
COLEM~&G
BY: fAi
Tim y 1 ahon, Esquire
100 Pine treet - 4th Fl.
P.O. Box 803
Harrisburg, P A 17108-0803
J.D. 52918
(717) 232-9323
Attorney for Defendant,
Flying 1., Inc., t/dIb/a Flying J. Travel Plaza
DATE:
105_ AILIABITJM\LLPG\71337ISXV\20614150000
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO.: 01-2379
FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a
FLYINGJ.TRAVELPLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Shonu V. McEchron, of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, do hereby
certify that on this L day of May, 2001, served a copy of the foregoing document via First
Class United States mail, postage prepaid as follows:
TO:
Michael Navitsky, Esquire
Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski, LLP
2040 Linglestown Rd., Ste. 303
Harrisburg, PA 17110
(FOR PLAINTIFFS)
105_ AILIABITJM\LLPG\71339ISXV\20614\50000
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STEWART D. McLAIN, and his wife
JENNIFER S. McLAIN,
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs'
CNIL ACTION - LAW
v.
NO. 01-2379 Civil Term
ORIGIN",'-
FLYING J INC. t/dIb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S NEW MATTER
Plaintiffs' Complaint states a cause of action against Defendant upon which relief may be
granted as a matter oflaw.
31. The allegations constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required.
To the extent that any response is required, said allegations are denied. Defendant's negligence
was a substantial contributing factor in bringing about Plaintiff s injuries and damages,
32. The allegations constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required.
To the extent that any response is required, said allegations are denied. The hills and ridges
doctrine does not apply to this case.
33. The allegations constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required.
To the extent that any response is required, said allegations are denied. Defendant's negligence
was a substantial contributing factor in bringing about Plaintiff s injuries and damages.
Defendant is responsible for the acts and/or omissions on the part of any other person and/or
entity that had control or right of control over the premise.
34. The allegations constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required.
To the extent that any response is required, said allegations are denied. Defendant reserves no
right to raise any defense other than those specifically raised in its Answer or New Matter.
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35. The allegations constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required.
To the extent that any response is required, said allegations are denied. The Doctrines of Res
Judicata and/or Collateral Estoppel do not apply to this case.
36. The allegations constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required.
To the extent that any response is required, said allegations are denied. Plaintiff, Stewart
McLain, was injured as a direct result of the Defendant's negligence. He suffered from no pre-
existing medical condition or injury in any way connected with the injuries and damages suffered
as a result ofthe Defendant's negligence.
Plaintiff, Jennifer S. McLain, having filed a loss of consortium claim, appropriately raises
such a claim, and the claim is not in any fashion barred by contributory negligence or reduced by
comparative negligence or eliminated by the Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk on the part of
Stewart McLain, as Stewart McLain was not contributorily negligent or comparatively negligent
or assumed the risk of any injury.
Respectfully submitted,
ISNESKI LLP
om, MrA1 J/}J I
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II! )
Michael .
J.D. No. 803
2040 Linglestown Ro d,
Harrisburg,PA 17110
717/541-9205
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
SS
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
I, MICHAEL 1. NA VITSKY, being duly sworn according to law, depose and say that I
am counsel for Plaintiffs, Stewart D. McLain and Jennifer S. McLain, and I am authorized to
make this affidavit on behalf of said Plaintiffs, and that the facts set forth in the foregoing
Response to New Matter are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and
belief, or are true and correct based on the information obtained from Plaintiffs.
Sworn and subscribed
before me this 315/- day of
YVlc4.j
,2001.
~e.~
Notary Public
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jessie K. Walsh, an employee of the law firm ofNavitsky, Olson & Wisneski LLP, do
hereby certify that on this 31 sl day of June, 200 I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendant's New Matter, upon all counsel of record via postage prepaid first class
United States mail addressed as follows:
Timothy J, McMahon, Esquire
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner,
Coleman & Goggin
100 Pine Street, Fourth Floor
P.O. Box 803
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0803
Counsel for Defendants
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Jessie K. Walsh
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO.: 01-2379
FLYING J., INC., tldIb/a
FLYINGJ. TRAVEL PLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
TO: Prothonotary - Cumberland County
Kindly enter the appearance of the undersigned on behalf of Defendant, Flying J., Inc.,
tldIb/a Flying J. Travel Plaza, in connection with the above-referenced case.
Respectfully submitted,
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER,
COLEMAN & GOG
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DATE: l \ \ \91D3
BY:
Jo e F.
M ha 1, De ehe, Warner,
Co eman & Goggin
4200 Crums Mill Road, Suite B
Harrisburg, PA 17112
(717) 651-3509
Attorney for Defendant,
Flying J., Inc., t/dIb/a Flying J, Travel Plaza
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
CNIL ACTION LAW
NO.: 01-2379
FLYING J., INC., t/dIb/a
FLYINGJ. TRAVEL PLAZA
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Ellen M. Palmer, an employee of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, do hereby certify
that on this ~ day of (\\J~~ 2003, I served a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing
document via United States First Class Mail, postage pre-paid as follows:
Michael Navitsky, Esquire
Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski, LLP
2040 Linglestown Rd., Ste. 303
Harrisburg, P A 1711 0
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D, MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER GRANTING
PRO HAC VICE
ADMISSION
- vs-
Case No.
01-2379
FLYING J, INC. t/dIb/a,
FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendant.
Defendant Flying J, Inc. ("Flying J"), by and through its attorneys, Nixon Peabody LLP,
having moved this Court for an Order admitting pro hac vice David L. Cook, Esq. of the law
firm Nixon Peabody LLP, for the purpose of appearing, participating and representing Flying J in
any pre-trial, trial, or post-trial proceedings before this Court in the above-captioned matter; and
Notice thereof having been given to all counselor parties of record, and the Court having
duly considered the moving papers, including the affidavit of Craig R. Tractenberg, Esq. and the
declaration of David L. Cook, Esq. submitted in support thereof:
NOW it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that David L. Cook, Esq. of the law firm
of Nixon Peabody LLP is hereby admitted to the Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania pro hac vice solely for the purpose of representing Flying J in the above-captioned
matter.
DATE: "/..t. '} I l.~d r
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs,
MOTION OF
ADMISSION
PRO HAC VICE FOR
DAVID L. COOK, ESQ.
- vs-
FLYING J, INC. t/dIb/a,
FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA,
Case No.
01-2379
Defendant.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the annexed affidavit of Craig Tractenberg, Esq., and
the accompanying declaration of David L. Cook, Esq., defendant Flying J, Inc. ("Flying J"), by its
attorneys Nixon Peabody LLP, moves this Court at the Cumberland County Courthouse, One
Courthouse Way, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, for an Order admitting David L. Cook, Esq. to practice
pro hac vice in these proceedings on behalf of defendant Flying J, pursuant to the Rules of Practice
of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania Bar
Admission Rule 301.
Dated: January '1-( ,2005
NIXON PEABODY LLP
BY:~ 7~.
Craig Tractenberg
f<< 1'3.:", :Sc~5Y6 96-
1818 Market Street
II th Floor
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-3647
Telephone: (215) 246-3520
Attorney for Defendant
R801801.2
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG
TRACTENBERG, ESQ.
IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR
PRO HAC VICE
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
- vs-
FL YlNG J, INC. t/dIb/a,
FL YlNG J TRAVEL PLAZA,
Case No.
, 01-2379
Defendant.
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA )
) ss.
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND )
CRAIG R. TRACTENBERG, an attorney duly licensed to practice in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, under penalty of peJjury affirms as follows:
1. I am a member of the law firm of Nixon Peabody LLP, which is counsel for
Defendant Flying J, Inc. ("Flying J") in the above-captioned action.
2. I submit this affidavit in support ofthe instant motion to admit David 1. Cook,
Esq. pro hac vice to represent Flying J. in the above-captioned action.
3. David L. Cook is a member of the law firm of Nixon Peabody LLP, Clinton
Square, P.O. Box 31051, Rochester, New York 14603. Mr. Cook is an attorney in good
standing and is admitted to practice law in New York State courts as well as before the United
States District Court for the Western District of New York, the United States District Court for
the Southem District of New York, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and
the United States Supreme Court.
R781922.2
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4. To my knowledge, Mr. Cook has never been disciplined by any Bar Association,
and there are no disciplinary proceedings pending against him.
5. The admission of Mr. Cook pro hac vice in this action on behalf of Flying J, Inc.
will assist in the presentation of issues for adjudication by this Court.
6. If admitted pro hac vice, said attorney will abide by all rules of this Court.
7. The Declaration of David 1. Cook, Esq. is attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference.
8. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully request that this Court grant the Motion
for pro hac vice admission of David 1. Cook and permit him to appear and speak in the
above-captioned matter in the same manner as attorneys of the Bar of this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
NIXON PEABODY LLP 6
/ ./}.,
By: /V~ ((
Craig Tractenberg
1818 Market Street
11th Floor
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-3647
Telephone: (215) 246-3520
Attorney for Defendant
N
Veronica Love-R.obinson, Notary Public
Phil~delphia, Philadelphia County
My commission expires July 7, 2008
R787922.2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <::[./ day of January 2005, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice with attached supporting papers
upon the following:
Michael Navitsky
Navitsky, Olson & Wisneski, LLP
2040 Linglestown Road, Ste 303
Harrisburg, P A 17110
by causing the same to be placed in properly addressed, postage pre-paid packaging and
depositing same in the United States Mail.
//
R787922.2
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWART D. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
Plaintiffs,
DECLARATION OF
DAVID L. COOK, ESQ.
- vs-
Case No.
01-2379
FLYING J, INC. t/d/b/a,
FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendant.
DAVID L. COOK, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. Imake this affidavit in support of the pending motion for an order, pursuant to the
Rules of Practice of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania and
Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rule 301, admitting me pro hac vice.in order to appear in this
action as counsel of record for Defendant Flying J, Inc. ("Flying J") in the above-captioned
action.
2. I am a member in good standing of the Bar of the State of New York and I am
admitted to practice law in New York State courts as well as before the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York, the United States District Court for the Southem
District of New York, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the United
States Supreme Court.
3. I am a member of the firm Nixon Peabody LLP, Clinton Square, Rochester,
New York 14603, telephone number 585-263-1381.
4. I have never been disciplined by any Bar Association, and there are no
disciplinary proceedings pending against me.
R787922.<
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5. Nixon Peabody LLP acts as Flying J's counsel and represents Flying J. in
connection with the aforementioned action. Accordingly, Flying J. has requested that I appear as
defense counsel in this action.
WHEREFORE, I respectfully request that I be admitted pro hac vice in this action to
represent Flying J, the defendant herein.
R787922.2
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DEBORAH J. $EXTON
NOTARY PUBLICA Slate of New YoIII
R~I.lratton ..: 01SE5033813
Quellfied In MonrOe Cou!1lY
Certllicete Filed In Monro.e COil!lJr,
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SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
ROCHESTER, NEW YORK
I, JO ANN M. WAHL, Clerk of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, State of New
York, do hereby certify that
DA VID L. COOK
was duly admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at
law in all courts of this state by this Court, on June 23,1988,
and appears in good standing upon the roll of attorneys and
counselors, and other records, in this office and has registered
with the administrative office of the Courts as required by
Judiciary Law 9468-a.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have
hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of this Court, at the City of
Rochester, January 12,2005.
tlJLY'n. (I )aJJ-
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STEWART D. McLAIN and
JENNIFER S. McLAIN, his wife,
Plaintiffs
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
CNIL ACTION - LAW
01-2379 CIVIL
FLYING J INC. t/dlb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
IN RE: STATUS CONFERENCE
ORDER
AND NOW, this
<f' day of February, 2005, following conference with
counsel in Chambers, it is ordered and directed that:
1. All discovery in this case shall be completed on or before July 15, 2005.
2. The Prothonotary is ordered and directed to list this case for the trial term
commencing September 19,2005. Counsel for the plaintiffs will verify the listing not later
than August 1,2005.
BY THE COURT,
~hael J. Navitsky, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
~id 1. Cook, Esquire
For the Defendants
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Stewart D. McLain and Jennifer S. McLain, his
wife
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
Flying J Inc. t/dlb/a Flying J Travel Plaza
: NO. 01-2379 CIVIL TERM
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, August 24, 2005, by agreement of counsel, the above captioned case
is stricken from the September 19, 2005 trial term. Counsel is directed to relist the case when
ready.
BY~
George E. Hoffer, P.J.
Michael J. Navitsky, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Court Administrator
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David 1. Cook, Esquire
For the Defendant
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PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR TRIAL
(Must be typewritten and submitted in duplicate)
TO THE POOTHOIDI'ARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNI'Y
. OR1Gq\N&'\~~
Please list the following case:
(Check one)
x
for JURY trial at the next tenn of civil court.
for trial without a jury.
CAPTION OF CASE
(entire caption must be stated in full)
(check one)
stewart D. ~in, and ms wife,
Jennifer s. ~in,
(X
Civil Action - Law
Appeal from Arbitration
(other)
(Plaintiff)
vs.
Flying J Inc., t/d/b/a
Flying J Travel Plaza
The trial list will be called on
mui Auqust 22,n2006
Trials COllIreIlce on september 18, 2006
(Defendant)
Pretrials will be held on August 30, 2006
(Briefs are due 5 days before pretrials.)
(The party listing this case for trial shall
provide forthwith a copy of the praecipe to
all counsel, pursuant to local Rule 214.1.)
vs.
No. 01-2379 Civil
~
Indicate the attomey who will try case for the party who files this praecipe: i
Micbael J. Navitsky, Esquire 2040 LinglestowIl Rd., Ste 30311I Harrisburg, PA 17110
,
Indicate trial counsel for other parties if known:
David L. Cook, Esquire, P.O. Box: 31051 RoChester, NY 14603, Counsel for Defendant
This case is ready for trial.
Signed:
re
Date: May 2, 2006
Attomey for: Plaintiffs
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STEWART D. McLAIN, and his wife
JENNIFER S. McLAIN,
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
CNIL ACTION - LAW
v.
: NO. 01-2379 Civil Term
FLYING J INC. t/dIb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jessie K. Walsh, an employee of the law firm ofNavitsky, Olson & Wisneski LLP, do
hereby certifY that on this 2nd day of May, 2006 served a true and correct copy of the Praecipe to
List Case for Trial upon all counsel of record via postage prepaid first class United States mail
addressed as follows:
David 1. Cook, Esquire
Nixon Peabody, LLP
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, NY 14603
Counsel for Defendant
J~ 7L;~
Jessie K. Walsh
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Stewart D. McLain, and His Wife Jennifer S.
McLain
. : 1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
Flying J., Inc., t/dIb/a Flying J Travel Plaza
: NO, 01-2379 CIVIL TERM
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, August 29, 2006, by agreement of counsel, the above captioned case
is continued from the September 18, 2006 trial term. Counsel are requested to relist the caSe for
trial at such time as they deem appropriate.
By the Court,
We
J. esley Oler,
Michael 1. Navitsky, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
David 1. Cook, Esquire
For the Defendant
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PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR TRIAL
:ORIG~Jc.
(Must be typewritten and submitted in duplicate)
TO THE POOTHONJTARY OF CUMBERIlIND COUNI'Y
Please list the following case:
(Check one)
(X ) for JURY trial at the next tenn of civil court.
for trial without a jury.
---~-------------------------------------
CAPTION OF CASE
(entire caption must be stated in full)
(check one)
steuart D. MClain, and his wife,
Jennifer: S. Mclain,
( X ) Civil Action - Law
Appeal from Arbitration
(other)
( Plaintiff)
vs.
Hying 9' Inc., t/d/b/a
Flying J Travel Plaza
The trial list will be called on
October 10, 2006
Trials corrmence on November 6, 2006
(Defendant)
Pretrials will be held on Oct. 18. 2006
(Briefs are due 5 days before pretrials.)
vs.
(The party listing this case for trial shall
provide forthwith a copy of the praecipe to
all counsel, pursuant to local Rule 214.1.)
No.01-2379 Civil
H
Indicate the attorney who will try case for the party who files this praecipe:
Michael J. Navitsky, Esq., 2040 Li.nglestown Rd., ste_ 303, Harrisbu:r:g, PA 17110
Indicate trial counsel for other parties if known:
Darid L. Cook, Esq,:, PJO. Box 31051, RoChester, NY 14603 - for Defendant
This case is ready for trial.
Signed:
(
Print Narre:
Date:
Sept. 11, 2006
Attorney for:
Plaintiffs
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STEWART D. McLAIN, and his wife
JENNIFER S. McLAIN,
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
CNIL ACTION - LAW
v.
: NO. 01-2379 Civil Term
FLYING J INC. t/dIb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jessie K. Walsh, an employee of the law fIrm ofNavitsky, Olson & Wisneski LLP, do
hereby certify that on this Ilo/day of September, 2006 served a true and correct copy of the
Praecipe to List Case for Trial upon all counsel of record via postage prepaid first class United
States mail addressed as follows:
David 1. Cook, Esquire
Nixon Peabody, LLP
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, NY 14603
Counsel for Defendant
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Jessie K. Walsh
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STEWART D. McLAIN and
JENNIFER S. McLAIN, his wife,
Plaintiffs
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
vs,
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
01-2379 CIVIL
FLYING J INC. t/dlb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
IN RE: PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
Present at a pretrial conference held October 19,2006, was Michael J. Navitsky,
Esquire, attorney for the plaintiffs. Counsel for the defendant, Flying J, David 1. Cook,
Esquire, and Terence 1. Robinson, Esquire, participated by telephone. A petition for the
participation ofMr. Robinson pro hoc vice is pending.
This case involves a slip and fall accident that took place on January 29,2000, at
approximately 8:00 p.m. at the defendant's truck stop in Cumberland County. The plaintiff
slipped and fell on "black ice" which had been created when piles of snow had melted and
refrozen.
Counsel for the plaintiff has objected to the testimony of maintenance manager Jack
Baba, contending that he had not been identified as a witness until very recently, It appears,
however, that Mr. Baba was mentioned as having been the maintenance manager in the
deposition of Anthony Lucas, held on September 24,2001.
Jury selection in this case will occur on November 6, 2006, The trial of the case will
commence on November 9, 2006. The trial is not expected to last more than two days.
October 19, 2006
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For the Plaintiffs
David L. Cook, Esquire
For the Defendants
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Jury Listfor Trial W4!ek Bel(inninl( November 6, 2006
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144 Jurors selected.
Juror Numbers 1 to 144 selected.
JUROR # NAME OCCUPATION
001 KIBLER, DONALD W. Consultant
002 HARTLINE, JAMES Cost Analyst
003 DLUZESKI, lEE C. laborer
004 DEIBLER, PAMELA K. learning Support Assistant
005 ELLIS, TIMOTHY J Marketing Manager
006 STAKEM, HOllY CTII
007 BARRETTE, MICHAEL Sales
008 RUTZ, DOUGLAS E. Unknown
009 JOHNSON, KAREN E. Custodian
010 EPPLEY, DAVID L Delivery Manager
011 BECK, RITA Teacher
012 FOX, EDWARD A. Retired
013 ROBINSON, MARIE Not Given
014 WISER, BRIAN Unknown
015 STOYER, DEBORAH L Sales Rep
016 HUTCHISON, JOHN Retired
017 BARBOUR, FRANCES C. Retired
018 CORNETT, DAVID M. Engineer Supervisor
019 NYE, JANICE D. Secretary
020 BRANTNER, JUDITH B. Supportive Service Coordinator
021 PllC, lESTER JOHN Pharmacy Tech
022 HINSON, ANGELITA T. Unknown
023 WISER, RAY E General Mech
024 SAMUEL, MOHAN Case Review Specialist
025 SAYLOR, WilLIAM T. IIi Corporate Tax Officer
026 GETZ, SUSAN Contract Specialist
027 FOX, PAUL Unknown
028 MIElO, KATHLEEN ANN Clerk
029 GARDNER, PAULA K. Medical Technologist
030 TURNAGE, DENNIS l Director
031 MillHOUSE, ANGELA Sales Clerk
032 BOWERMASTER, JAY Unknown
033 PINCI, JOSEPH A Unknown
034 SCHMICK, BRANDY E. LPN Charge Nurse
035 CADY, MARGARET B. Retired
Tuesday, October 24, 2006 . Pagel of 4
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JUROR # NAME OCCUPATION
036 HECKARD, DARLENE Admin Assistant
037 BOTTOMS, JERRY E. Unknown
038 BANGOUP, VIRGINIA L. Order Processor II
039 COY, CHRISTY H. Retired
040 HOLTZAPPLE, THOMAS Accounting Associate
041 GRUVER, lOIS E. Management Assistant
042 FRIEDMAN, ALVIN E. Owner
043 MALINAK. TIMOTHY A PA House of Reps
044 BRUNSKI, MARY Substitute Teacher
045 SHIRLEY, JAMES D. Unknown
046 ANTHONY, JENNIFER M. Secretary
047 FAIRCHilD, TAMMY L. Unknown
048 ROWE, LISA l YNN Elem Teacher
049 CRIDER, FRANCES Chargeback Investigator
050 NAilOR, BRUCE K JR Retired
051 DRAWBAUGH, WilLIAM B. Structural Engineer
052 WOOLUMS, MICHAEL P. IT Specialist
053 CALAMAN, SANDRA K Manager
054 MEALS, ROSEMARY Accounting Clerk/Phone Operator
055 YEAGLE, DONALD P. REV Pastor
056 HEETER, KATHRYN D. Product Line Manager
057 lUPFER, WARREN B. JR. Maintenance
058 MillER, SPENCER Retired
059 SNYDER, GUY C, Systems Analyst
060 NEELY, DORIS R. Homemaker
061 FERGUSON, JOAN A Partner
062 GROVE, JOHN Retired
063 HEFElFINGER, R. FRED Unknown
064 SCHMIDT, DELIA ANN M. Homemaker
065 WOLFE, WilLIAM Construction Manager
066 RAYMOND, MARIBETH Unknown
067 ENYEART, BRANDI Manager
068 BENDER, REBECCA A Dietary Clerk
069 CASSEL, ROBERT C., JR. Manager
070 CHATEAUVERT, JAMES J. Sign Crew
071 DIEHL, DARIN laborer
072 BENTLEY, CAREY REV. Unknown
073 SIPE, NANCY JANE laborer
074 GRENOBLE, ADA L. Admin Assistant
075 REED, MYLES M. Retired
076 BRITT, MICHAEL F. Vice President
077 WILBUR. VIRGINIA R. Admin Assistant
078 Hill, WANDA MAC Coordinator
Tuesday, October 24, 2006 Page2of4
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JUROR # NANlE OCCUPATION
079 WOLFE, SHARI Letter Carrier
080 MALICK, MARY A. Retired
081 MINER, ELLEN Retired
082 SHENK, LINDA K Retired
083 CENTOLA, MARY Librarian
084 JONES, VERA F, Homemaker
085 KOHLHAAS, DEREK C. UndelWriter
086 STELTZER, JACK LEROY Retired
087 RANGER,DARLENE Medical Assistant
088 ZORKIC, MARIJA Unknown
089 CONFAIR, EVELYN M Retired
090 AMSLEY, LINDA D. Director
091 MIKOLATCZAK, GREGORY V. Sales Manager
092 WEVODAU, MELINDA R Unknown
093 GRAINDA, ROSE Retired
094 ROSKO, JEAN T. Clerk
095 RUNK, STEVEN Programmer
096 HOUCK, WENDY S. Support Specialist
097 HOLLINGER, SAMUEL Lab Tech
098 SHINDEL, JACK Unknown
099 KEENE, RICHARD Unknown
100 ABRAMS, BETH Not Given
101 CAMPBELL, KARLENE E Retired
102 ANDERSON, KENNETH C. Retired
103 DOWNEY, DENNIS F. Project Manager
104 LAUDERBAUGH, DOROTHY Retired
105 WILLlAMSON,DENISEB. Paralegal
106 NEWCOMER, JESSE CARL V Not Given
107 MACK, CHERYL A. Preschool Teacher
108 OSBORN, TRACIE E RN
109 KELSO, SHARON M. Unknown
11.0 TITUS, MITCHELL A. Unknown
111 RYNARD, KATHERINE Rental Agent
112 SCHERTZER, JEFF T. Unknown
113 GIBNEY, RANDY K. Credit Analyst
114 TELFORD, ROBERT Unknown
115 HURLEY, FAYE Retired
116 MARTINEZ, JOSEPHINE A. Filing Clerk
117 METZGER, GREGORY B. Not Given
118 AMON, BRADLEY SCOTT Battery Specialist
119 JUMPER, ERMA F. Unknown
120 HARDER, CLAIR EUGENE Unknown
121 ANDERSON, MICHAEL R Driver
Tuesday, October 24, 2006 Page 3 of4
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JUROR #
NAME
OCCUPATION
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
YOUNG, BRENDA M.
BRUENING, MARK B.
PANTALONI, JOHN L.
CUBBAGE. MATTHEW F.
KERN, DONALD G.
DIMELER, DAVID L.
BANJAK, CAROLYN
ROBINSON, TRACEY
LASKOWSKI, XENIA
LONG, TIMOTHY S.
ROYER, MARIAN
BRITCHER, JOHN C. JR.
WARD, JACQUELINE M.
HOOVER, KAY L
HODGE, MATTHEW T.
BAIR, ROBERT W.
HANS, PETER E.
NELSON, DEBRA A
LEBO, LORA J.
SOUDERS, LISA M.
KWON, E. HOON
WALKER(VECERO), ROSEMARY D.
OCAMB, JANICE
End of Jury List, 144 Jurors selected.
Tuesday, October 24, 2006
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Retired
Regional Manager
Environmental Specialist
Admin
Programmer Analyst
BPO
Teacher's Aide
Unknown
Data Entry/Cashier
Unknown
Retired
Store Manager
General Merchandise Associate
Finance Admin
Unknown
Unknown
Parole Agent
Admin Assistant
Unknown
Unknown
Shipping Associate
Retired
Provider Automation Consultant
Page 4 0[4
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Page 1 of!
7.00 (Civ)
'-
OWNER OF LAND (DUTY OF CARE-GENERALLY)
PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.1
-~---
The standard or level of care owed by an owner of land to a person who entered the land
depends on whether the person who entered was an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.2
7.01A (Civ)
OWNER OF LAND (INVITEE, PUBLIC INVITEE, AND BUSINESS
VISITOR DEFINED)
An invitee can be a public invitee or a business visitor.
A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the
public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose
directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the owner of the land.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.3
7.02A (Civ) OWNER OF LAND (DUTY OF CARE OWED TO INVITEES
GENERALLY)
;::;::n owner of land is required to use reasonable care in the maintenance and use of the
land, and to protect invitees from foreseeable harm. An owner of land is also required to inspect
the premises and to discover dangerous conditions. An owner of land is liable for harm caused
to invitees by a condition on the land if:
1. the owner knows or by using reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it inyolyes an unreasonable risk of harm,
and
2. the owner should expect that the invitees will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
3. the owner fails to use reasonable care to protect the invitees against the
danger.
An owner of land is liable to invitees for any harm that the owner should have
anticipated, regardless of whether the danger is known or ObViOUS.J
4
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.4
7.03 (Civ) OWNER'S OF CARE
(DEF COND1T~~ IN ABUTTING PUBLIC
S WALK} V H
One in possession of land is required to maintai the abutting public sidewalks in a
reasonably safe condition to prevent or eliminate any hazardous or unsafe condition that, upon
all the circumstances involved, would be an unreasonable risk of harm to pedestrians properly
using walks.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.5
7.10 (Civ)
OF
AND
CARE
OTHERS
OWNER OF LAND (DUTY
TO ADJOINING LAND OWNf~
OUTSIDE OF THE PROPERTY) vv \ 'H-
One who owns land in a developed or residential area has a duty to make reasonable
inspections of the property, and to correct any conditions unreasonably dangerous to others that
could be discovered by the use of reasonable care and that could be made reasonably safe by
repair or otherwise.
Therefore, if you find that the location of the defendant's property was in a developed or
residential area, and that the plaintiff was caused harm by a dangerous condition on the
defendant's property, and that the defendant by using reasonable care could haye discovered the
defect and the risk arising from it and could have made it reasonably safe by repair or otherwise,
you may find the defendant liable for the resulting damage.
6
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.6
OWNER OF LAND (DUTY OF CARE)
Where a specific, localized, isolated patch of ice exists, it is comparatively easy for a
property owner to take the necessary steps to alleviate the condition, while at the same time
considerably more difficult for the pedestrian to ayoid it even exercising the utmost care.
Williams v. Shultz, 429 Pa. 429, 240 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1968).
9;
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.7
3.00 (Civ)
ISSUES IN THE CASE
The plaintiff claims he was injured by the negligent conduct of the defendant. The
plaintiff has the burden of proving his claims.
The issues for you to decide, in accordance with the law as I give it to you are:
1. Was the defendant negligent?
2. Was the defendant's conduct a factual cause in bringing about injury to the
plaintiff?
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.8
3.01 (Civ)
NEGLIGENCE-DEFINITION
The legal term "negligence," otherwise known as carelessness, is the absence of ordinary
care that a reasonably prudent person would use in the circumstances presented here. Negligent
conduct may consist either of an act or a failure to act when there is a duty to do so. In other
words, negligence is the failure to do something that a reasonably careful person would do, or
doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do, in light of all the surrounding
circumstances established by the evidence in this case. It is for you to determine how a
reasonably careful person would act in those circumstances.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.9
3.15 (Civ)
FACTUAL CAUSE
The plaintiff must prove to you that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff s
damages. This is referred to as "factual cause." The question is: "Was the defendant's negligent
conduct a factual callse in bringing about the plaintiff's damages?"
Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the
conduct. An act is a factual cause of an outcome if, in the absence of the act, the outcome would
not have occurred.
In order for conduct of a party to be a factual cause, the conduct must not be fanciful or
imaginary, but must have played a real role in causing the injury. Therefore, in determining
factual cause, you must decide whether the negligent conduct of the defendant was more than an
insignificant factor in bringing about any harm to the plaintiff. Under Pennsylvania law, conduct
can be found to be a contributing factor if the action or omission alleged to have caused the harm
was an actual, real factor, not a negligible, imaginary, or fanciful factor, or a factor having no
connection or only an insignificant connection with the injury. However, factual cause does not
mean it is the only, primary, or even the most important factor in causing the injury. A cause
may be found to be a factual cause as long as it contributes to the injury in a way that is not
minimal or insignificant.
To be a contributing factor, the defendant's conduct need not be the only factor. The fact
that some other cause concurs with the negligence of the defendant in producing an injury does
not relieve the defendant from liability as long as his own negligence is a factual cause of the
illJury.
Remember, a factual cause is an actual, real factor, although the result may be unusual or
unexpected. A factual cause cannot be an imaginary or fanciful factor having no connection or
only an insignificant connection with the injury. Although a factual cause cannot be minimal or
insignificant with regard to the injury, it can be relatively minor in relation to other factors and
need not be quantified as being either considerable or large.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 10
6.00 (Civ)
DAMAGES
If you find that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, you must then fmd an amount of
money damages you believe will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for all the
physical and financial injury he has sustained as a result of the occurrence. The amount you
award today must compensate the plaintiff completely for damage sustained in the past, as well
as damage the plaintiff will sustain in the future.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 11
6.03 (Civ)
PREEXISTING CONDITION OR INJURY l
Damages should be awarded for all injuries caused by the accident even if:
I. the injuries caused by the accident were more severe than could have been
foreseen because ofthe plaintiff's prior physical condition; or
2. a preexisting medical condition was aggravated by the accident.
If you find that the plaintiff did have a preexisting condition that was aggravated by the
defendant's negligence, the defendant is responsible for any aggrayation caused by the accident.
I remind you that the defendant can be held responsible only for those injuries or the
aggravation of a prior injury or condition that you find was factually caused by the accident.
12
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1-1 r l'
PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 12
6.05 (Civ)
OTHER CONTRIBUTING CAUSES \
The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for all injuries that the defendant's negligence
was a factual cause in producing. The defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause of the
injuries; other causes may have contributed to producing the final result. The fact that some other
factor may have been a contributing cause of an injury does not relieve a defendant of liability,
unless you find that such other cause would have produced the injury complained of
independently of his negligence. Even though prior conditions or concurrent causes may have
contributed to an injury, if the defendant's negligence was a factual cause in producing the
injury, the defendant is liable for the full amount of damages sustained, without any
apportionment or diminution for the other conditions or causes.
13
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 13
6.07 (Civ)
PAST LOST EARNINGS AND LOST EARNINGS CAPACITY
The plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the amount of earnings that he has lost up
to the time of the trial as a result of his injuries. This amount is the difference between what he
could have earned but for the harm and less any sum he actually earned in any employment. It is
not essential to recovery that the plaintiff should have been employed at the time of the accident,
but his opportunities for employment are relevant in determining the amount he could have
earned.
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14
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 14
6.09 (Civ)
PAST AND FUTURE-NONECONOMIC lLOSS
The plaintiff has made a claim for a damage award for past and for future noneconomic
loss. There are four items that make up a damage award for noneconomic loss, both past and
future: (1) pain and suffering; (2) embarrassment and humiliation~ (3) loss of ability to enjoy the
pleasures oflife; and (4) . . e. -,~, . ." .. (;,/.Q~ -
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First, the plaintiffmusthave experienced pain and suffering in order to be able to claim
damage awards for past noneconomic loss and for future noneconomic loss. You are instructed
that the plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for all physical pain, mental
anguish, discomfort, inconvenience, and distress that you find he has endured from the time of
the injury until today and that the plaintiff is also entitled to be fairly and adequately
compensated for all physical pain, mental anguish, discomfort, inconvenience, and distress you
find he will endure in the future as a result of his injuries.
Second, the plaintiff must have experienced embarrassment and humiliation in order to
claim noneconomic loss. The plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for
such embarrassment and humiliation as you believe he has endured and will continue to endure
in the future as a result of his injuries.
Third, the plaintiff must suffer loss of enjoyment of life. The plaintiff is entitled to be
fairly and adequately compensated for the loss of his ability to enjoy any of the pleasures of life
as a result of the injuries from the time of the injuries until today and to be fairly and adequately
compensated for the loss of his ability to enjoy any of the pleasures oflife in the future as a result
of his injuries.
Fourth, there must be disfigurement. The disfigurement that the plaintiff has sustained is
a separate item of damages recognized by the law. Therefore, in addition to any sums you award
for pain and suffering, for embarrassment and humiliation, and for loss of enjoyment of life, the
plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for the disfigurement he has suffered
from the time of the injury to the present and that he will continue to suffer during the future
duration of his life.
ill considering the plaintiff's claims for damage awards for past and future noneconomic
loss, you will consider the following factors: (1) the age of the plaintiff; (2) the severity of the
injuries; (3) whether the injuries are temporary or permanent; (4) the extent to which the injuries
affect the ability of the plaintiff to perform basic activities of daily living and other activities in
which the plaintiff previously engaged; (5) the duration and nature of medical treatment; (6) the
duration and extent of the physical pain and mental anguish that the plaintiff has experienced in
the past and will experience in the future; (7) the health and physical condition of the plaintiff
prior to the injuries; and (8) in the case of disfigurement, the nature of the disfigurement and the
consequences for the plaintiff.
15
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 15
6.10 (Civ)
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
The plaintiff's spouse is entitled to be compensated for the past, present, and future loss
of the injured party's services to her and the past, present, and future loss of companionship of
her spouse. Consortium claims are losses arising out of the marital relationship. Consortium is
the marital fellowship of a husband and a wife and includes the company, society, cooperation,
affection, and aid of the other in the marital relationship. Such claims include a loss of support,
comfort, and assistance, the loss of association, and companionship, and the loss of ability to
engage in sexual relations.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 16
6.12 (Civ)
INCIDENTAL COSTS
ill addition to the costs of medical care, the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for all
other incidental costs incurred as a result of the accident, or that you find will be incurred in the
future. These expenses may include:
(1) Expenses that the Plaintiff incurred for the retention of additional help in
the business;
(2) Cost of transportation, food, lodging and other incidental expenses
incurred in seeking medical treatment, such as out-of-pocket expenses;
(3) llterest on loans to pay bills;
(4) Transportation to give comfort to the injured Plaintiff;
(5) Household help during the period of convalescence;
(6) Cost of telephone calls, food, lodging and transportation for the
accompanying spouse and travel related expenses;
(7) And such miscellaneous expenses as Plaintiffs were permitted to offer into
evidence during this trial.
17
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 17
6.21 (Civ)
DAMAGES-LIFE EXPECTANCY
If you fmd that the plaintiff's injuries will continue beyond today, you must determine
the life expectancy of the plaintiff. According to statistics compiled by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, the average life expectancy of all persons of the
plaintiffs age at the time of accident, sex, and race was 32 years. This figure is offered to you
only as a guide, and you are not bound to accept it if you believe that the plaintiff would have
lived longer or less than the average individual in his category. ill reaching this decision, you are
to consider the plaintiff s health prior to the accident, his manner of living, his personal habits,
and other factors that may have affected the duration of his life.
18
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Instruction 1
Burden of Proof '---.
Pa. SSJI (Civ) 5.50 (2005)
In civil cases such as this one, the plaintiff has the burden of proving those contentions that
entitle him to relief.
When a party has the burden of proof on a particular issue, the party's contention on that issue
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence establishes a contention
by a preponderance of the evidence if you are persuaded that it is more probably accurate and
true than not.
To put it another way, think, if you will, of an ordinary balance scale, with a pan on each side.
Onto one side of the scale, place all of the evidence favorable to the plaintiff; onto the other,
place all of the evidence favorable to the defendant. If, after considering the comparable weight
of the evidence, you feel that the scales tip, ever so slightly or to the slightest degree, in favor of
the plaintiff, your verdict must be for the plaintiff. If the scales tip in favor of the defendant, or
are equally balanced, your verdict must be for the defendant.
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the following propositions: (1) that the
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in removing snow and ice from its facility, and (2)
that the defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care caused the plaintiffs' injuries. If, after
considering all of the evidence, you feel persuaded that these propositions are more probably true
than not true, your verdict must be for the plaintiff. Otherwise, your verdict should be for the
defendant.
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Instruction 2
Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
Pa. SSJI (Civ) 5.07 (2005)
Evidence may either be direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is direct
proof of a fact, such as testimony by a witness about what that witness personally saw, heard, or
did. Circumstantial evidence is proof of one or more facts from which you could find another
fact. You should consider both kinds of evidence. The law makes no distinction between the
weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is for you to decide how much
weight to give to any evidence. You may decide the case solely based on circumstantial
evidence.
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10171951.1
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Instruction 3
Issues in the Case
Pa. SSJI (Civ) 3.00 (2005)
The plaintiff claims that he was harmed by the negligent conduct of the defendant. The plaintiff
has the burden of proving his claims.
The defendant denies the plaintiff's claims and asserts that the plaintiff was negligent and the
plaintiffs own negligence was the cause of his injuries. The defendant has the burden of proving
that the plaintiff was negligent.
The issues for you to decide, in accordance with the law as I give it to you are:
1. Was the defendant negligent?
2. Did the defendant's negligent conduct cause his injuries?
3. Was the plaintiff negligent?
c 1,..-'
4. Did the plaintiffs negligent conduct cause the defendants' injuries?
10171951.1
- 5 -
Instruction 4
N egligence---,Definition
Pa. SSJI (Civ) 3.01 (2005)
The legal term "negligence," otherwise known as carelessness, is the absenc~ of ordinary care
that a reasonably prudent person would use in the circumstances presented here. Negligent
conduct may consist either of an act or a failure to act when there is a duty to do so. In other
words, negligence is the failure to do something that a reasonably careful person would do, or
doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do, in light of all the surrounding
circumstances established by the evidence in this case. It is for you to determine how a
reasonably careful person would act in those circumstances.
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Instruction 5
Owner of Land-Duty of Care Owed to Invitee Generally
Pa. SSJI 7.02A (2005)
An owner ofland is required to use reasonable care in the maintenance and use of the land, and
to protect invitees from foreseeable harm. An owner of land is also required to inspect the
premises and to discover dangerous conditions. An owner of land is liable for harm caused to
invitees by a condition on the land if:
1. The owner knows or by using reasonable care would discover the condition, and should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm, and
2. The owner should expect that the invitees will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and
3. The owner fails to use reasonable care to protect the invitees against the danger.
An owner ofland is liable to invitees for any har~~he owner should have anticipated,
regardless of whether the danger is known or obvious
While an owner of land is required to exercise reasonable care in removing snow and ice from
his premises, he or she is not required to keep the premises completely free of snow and ice at all
times. The standard is the exercise of reasonable care. Otherwise, to "require that one's walks be
always free of ice and snow would be to impose an impossible burden in view of the climatic
conditions of this hemisphere." Morin v. Travelers Rest Motel. Inc., 704 A.2d 1085, 1087
(Quoting Wentz v. Pennswood Apartments, 359 Pa. Super. 1,5 (1986)).
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Instruction 6
Contributory Negligence
Pa. SSJI (Civ) 3.21 (2005)
If you find for the plaintiff, you must then determine whether the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. Contributory negligence is negligence on the part of a plaintiff that is a cause of the
plaintiffs injury. The burden is not on the plaintiff to prove his freedom from contributory
negligence. The defendant has the burden of proving contributory negligence by a fair
preponderance of the credible evidence. You must determine whether the defendant has proven
that the plaintiff, under all the circumstances present, failed to use reasonable care for his own
protection.
Even if you find that the plaintiff was negligent, you must also determine whether the defendant
has proven that the plaintiffs conduct was a cause in bringing about the plaintiffs injury. If the
defendant has not sustained that burden of proof, then the defense of contributory negligence has
not been made.
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Instruction 7
Damages
Pa. SSJI 6.00 (2005)
If you find that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, you must then find an amount of money
damages you believe will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for all the physical and
financial injury he has sustained as a result of the occurrence. The amount you award today must
compensate the plaintiff completely for damage sustained in the past, as well as damage the
plaintiff will sustain in the future.
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Instruction 8
Loss of Consortium
Pa. SJJI 6.10 (2005)
The plaintiffs spouse is entitled to be compensated for the past, present, and future loss of the
injured party's services to her and the past, present, and future loss of companionship of her
spouse. Consortium claims are losses arising out of the marital relationship. Consortium is the
marital fellowship of a husband and a wife and includes the company, society, cooperation,
affection, and aid of the other in the marital relationship. Such claims include a loss of support,
comfort, and assistance, the loss of association, and companionship, and the loss of ability to
engage in sexual relations.
1017195l.I
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Instruction 9
Verdict Directing Summary
Pa. SSJI (Civ) 3.23 (2005)
You will now retire to consider all of the evidence received in this trial in light of the various
factors I have presented to you and apply the law as I have given it to the facts as found by you.
If you find that the defendant was negligent, and that the defendant's conduct was a factual cause
of the harm to the plaintiff, your verdict must be in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
However, if you find that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that his negligence was a
factual cause of his own injury, and that his negligence was greater than that of the defendant,
your verdict must be for the defendant.
If you find that the defendant was not negligent, or that his negligence was not a factual cause in
bringing about harm to the plaintiff, your verdict must be for the defendant.
If your verdict is in favor of the plaintiff, you must then determine what damage the plaintiff was
and will be caused to suffer by reason of the defendant's negligence and return a verdict for the
plaintiff in that amount
~~
10171951.1
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STEWART D. MCLAIN, and his
wife, JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
PLAINTIFFS
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
V.
FLYING J, INC., tld/b/a
FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA,
DEFENDANT
01-2379 CIVIL TERM
VERDICT
QUESTION 1:
Do you find that defendant was negligent?
YES
NO
~
If you answer "Yes," proceed to Question 2. If you answer "No," plaintiff
cannot recover and you should not answer any further questions and should return to
the courtroom.
QUESTION 2:
Was the negligence of defendant a factual cause in bringing about harm to
plaintiff?
YES
NO
If you answer "Yes," proceed to Question 3. If you answer "No," plaintiff
cannot recover and you should not answer any further questions and should return to
the courtroom.
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Q.UESTION 3:
Was plaintiff contributorily negligent?
YES
NO
If you answer "No," proceed to Question 6.
If you answer "Yes," proceed to Question 4.
Q.UESTION 4:
Was the contributory negligence a factual cause in bringing about harm to
plaintiff?
YES
NO
If you answer "No," proceed to Question 6.
If you answer "Yes," proceed to Question 5.
jlUESTION 5:
If you have answered "Yes" to questions 1, 2, 3, and 4, then answer the
following:
Taking the combined causal negligence that was a factual cause in bringing
about plaintiff's harm as 100 percent, what percentage of that causal negligence is
attributable to the defendant, and what percentage was attributable to plaintiff?
PERCENTAGE OF CAUSAL NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO
DEFENDANT
%
PERCENTAGE OF CAUSAL NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO
PLAINTIFF
%
TOTAL
100%
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If you have found plaintiffs percentage of negligence to be greater than 50
percent, plaintiff cannot recover damages from defendant, and you should not
answer any further questions and should return to the courtroom. If you have found
plaintiff's percentage of causal negligence to be 50 percent or less, proceed to
Question 6.
QUESTION 6:
State the amount of compensatory damages you find plaintiff, Stewart D.
McLain sustained as a result of the causal negligence of defendant without reduction
for the percentage of causal negligence, if any, that you have attributed to plaintiff.
MEDICAL EXPENSES S
INCIDENTAL EXPENSES S
LOST INCOME S
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES S
TOTAL $
QUESTION 7:
If you have awarded compensatory damages to plaintiff in Question 6, state
the total amount of damages for loss of consortium that you find Jennifer S. McLain
sustained as a result of the causal negligence of defendant.
TOTAL S
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23 WISER, RAY E
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3 25 SAYLOR, WILLIAMT. III
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5 31 MILLHOUSE, ANGELA
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7 26 GETZ,$USAN
8 14 vv15CR, Bf<lr\:N
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!1 20 BRANTNER, JUDITH B.
~2 >~ l-fI:1rTC~li'D, V.^RLENE
13 10 EPPLEY, DAVID L. .
.H- 17 BlJ?gOT~, FF A ~TrIi'S C.
[5 19 NYE, JANICE D..
16 28 MIELO, KATIfLEEN ANN
i7 6 STAKEM,HOLLY
i 8 18 CORNETT, DAVID M.
.,
\9 2 HARTLINE, JAMES
-- ::;iJ 28 I!i\l>lcorw, YIRCINltt"
21 30 TURNAGE, DENNIS L
22 9 JOHNSON, KAREN E:
~. 1 RmLER, DGJJ~\LD IN.
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Monday, November 06, 2006
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Page 1 of!
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Jury Panel for Courtroom No.
Juror II
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2
3
4
~
6
9
10
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,.14
~ 117
~ '15"
.18
"19
20
17 ~1
23
A ~14
25
26
28
A 29
30
31
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38
\? go
Name
IaBLER,D6NALDW. -I? jJ1Afi.~
HARTLINE, JAMES
nT TThEs;KI, LEi! C.
~mbEK, F ruvl.t.LA ~.
ELU:5, 'ffMCl'fIIYJ
STAKEM,HOLLY
JOHNSON, KAREN E.
EPPLEY, DAVID L
D~ ?r, "R7~^..
R9PlI'TC"'l15f,lVJ.J-ll<IE
'\\~ER, IIRIAW
CrEta.!,-, Uh1::SVl.'<..t-U"1 L.
Df\.KtsUU1<', .l:'RANCEt:l c.
CORNEIT, DAVID M.
NYE, JANICE D.
BRANTNER, JUDITII B-
PILC, U:GfER Jor IN - f( ",-w'21-
WISER, RAY E
3~Ivr"lJtiL, J.V1U.H.1\l'\l
SAYLOR, WILUAMT. ill
GETZ, SUSAN
MIELO, KATHLEEN ANN
Ct...RDtJER, PJ....,:U'"~^... K.
TIJRNAGE, DENNIS L
MILLHOUSE, ANGELA
130~~~R1\.IAgfER., JliY
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COY, 0 IP.ROTY II. - t? MWl't('
30
'Total number of jurors going to the courtroom:
Monday, November 06, 2006
/
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Page 1 ofl
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STEW ART D. McLAIN and
JENNIFER S. McLAIN, his wife,
Plaintiffs
AlED-OFFICE
OF iHE PROTHONOTARY
200& OCT 20 AM 1\: 13
IN THE <OOM!38RQlf.I(J~ PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAfilID1~tJ'mt~, PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
01-2379 CIVIL
FLYING J INC. t1d/b/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
IN RE: PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
Present at a pretrial conference held October 19,2006, was Michael J. Navitsky,
Esquire, attorney for the plaintiffs. Counsel for the defendant, Flying J, David 1. Cook,
Esquire, and Terence 1. Robinson, Esquire, participated by telephone. A petition for the
participation ofMr. Robinson pro hoc vice is pending.
This case involves a slip and fall accident that took place on January 29, 2000, at
approximately 8:00 p.m. at the defendant's truck stop in Cumberland County. The plaintiff
slipped and fell on "black ice" which had been created when piles of snow had melted and
refrozen.
Counsel for the plaintiff has objected to the testimony of maintenance manager Jack
Baba, contending that he had not been identified as a witness until very recently. It appears,
however, that Mr. Baba was mentioned as having been the maintenance manager in the
deposition of Anthony Lucas, held on September 24, 200!.
Jury selection in this case will occur on November 6, 2006. The trial of the case will
commence on November 9, 2006. The trial is not expected to last more than two days.
October 19,2006
-At
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Michael J. Navitsky, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
David 1. Cook, Esquire
F or the Defendants
Court Administrator
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STEWART D. McLAIN, and his wife
JENNIFER S. McLAIN,
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
[OJI(JINAL
v.
: NO. 01-2379 Civil Term
FLYING J INC. tJdIb/a FLYING J
TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED POINTS FOR CHARGE
AND NOW, into Court, through undersigned counsel comes the Plaintiffs, Stewart D.
McLain and Jennifer S. McLain, and respectfully request that the Court instruct the Jury with the
proposed Points for Charge, along with the Court's standard instructions in a civil case involving
negligence and personal injury damages.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: (II &( 0[,
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.1
7.00 (Civ)
OWNER OF LAND (DUTY OF CARE-GENERALLY)
The standard or level of care owed by an owner of land to a person who entered the land
depends on whether the person who entered was an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.
2
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.2
7.01A (Civ)
OWNER OF LAND (INVITEE, PUBLIC INVITEE, AND BUSINESS
VISITOR DEFINED)
An invitee can be a public invitee or a business visitor.
A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the
public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose
directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the owner of the land.
3
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.3
OWNER OF LAN]) (DUTY OF CARE OWED TO INVITEES
GENERALLY)
An owner of land is required to use reasonable care in the maintenance and use of the
land, and to protect invitees from foreseeable harm. An owner of land is also required to inspect
the premises and to discover dangerous conditions. An owner of land is liable for harm caused
to invitees by a condition on the land if:
1. the owner knows or by using reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm,
and
7.02A (Civ)
2. the owner should expect that the invitees will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
3. the owner fails to use reasonable care to protect the invitees against the
danger.
An owner of land is liable to invitees for any harm that the owner should have
anticipated, regardless of whether the danger is known or obvious.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.4
7.03 (Civ)
OWNER'S DUTY OF CARE
(DEFECT OR UNSAFE CONDITION IN ABUTTING PUBLIC
SIDEWALK)
One in possession of land is required to maintain the abutting public sidewalks in a
reasonably safe condition to prevent or eliminate any hazardous or unsafe condition that, upon
all the circumstances involved, would be an unreasonable risk of harm to pedestrians properly
using walks.
5
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.5
7.10 (Civ)
OWNER OF LAND
TO ADJOINING LAND
OUTSIDE OF THE PROPERTY)
(DUTY
OWNER,
OF
AND
CARE
OTHERS
One who owns land in a developed or residential area has a duty to make reasonable
inspections of the property, and to correct any conditions unreasonably dangerous to others that
could be discovered by the use of reasonable care and that could be made reasonably safe by
repair or otherwise.
Therefore, if you fmd that the location of the defendant's property was in a developed or
residential area, and that the plaintiff was caused harm by a dangerous condition on the
defendant's property, and that the defendant by using reasonable care could have discovered the
defect and the risk arising from it and could have made it reasonably safe by repair or otherwise,
you may find the defendant liable for the resulting damage.
6
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.6
OWNER OF LAND (DUTY OF CARE)
Where a specific, localized, isolated patch. of ice exists, it is comparatively easy for a
property owner to take the necessary steps to alleviate the condition, while at the same time
considerably more difficult for the pedestrian to avoid it even exercising the utmost care.
Williams v. Shultz, 429 Pa. 429, 240 A.2d 812 (pa. 1968).
7
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.7
3.00 (Civ)
ISSUES IN THE CASE
The plaintiff claims he was injured by the negligent conduct of the defendant. The
plaintiff has the burden of proving his claims.
The issues for you to decide, in accordance with the law as I give it to you are:
I. Was the defendant negligent?
2. Was the defendant's conduct a factual cause in bringing about injury to the
plaintiff?
8
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.8
3.01 (Civ)
NEGLIGENCE-DEFINITION
The legal term "negligence," otherwise known as carelessness, is the absence of ordinary
care that a reasonably prudent person would use in the circumstances presented here. Negligent
conduct may consist either of an act or a failure to act when there is a duty to do so. ill other
words, negligence is the failure to do something that a reasonably careful person would do, or
doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do, in light of all the surrounding
circumstances established by the evidence in this case. It is for you to determine how a
reasonably careful person would act in those circumstances.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO.9
3.15 (Civ)
FACTUAL CAUSE
The plaintiff must prove to you that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's
damages. This is referred to as "factual cause." The question is: "Was the defendant's negligent
conduct a factual cause in bringing about the plaintiffs damages?"
Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the
conduct. An act is a factual cause of an outcome if, in the absence of the act, the outcome would
not have occurred.
ill order for conduct of a party to be a factual cause, the conduct must not be fanciful or
imaginary, but must have played a real role in causing the injury. Therefore, in determining
factual cause, you must decide whether the negligent conduct of the defendant was more than an
insignificant factor in bringing about any harm to the plaintiff. Under Pennsylvania law, conduct
can be found to be a contributing factor ifthe action or omission alleged to have caused the harm
was an actual, real factor, not a negligible, imaginary, or fanciful factor, or a factor having no
connection or only an insignificant connection with the injury. However, factual cause does not
mean it is the only, primary, or even the most important factor in causing the injury. A cause
may be found to be a factual cause as long as it contributes to the injury in a way that is not
minimal or insignificant.
To be a contributing factor, the defendant's conduct need not be the only factor. The fact
that some other cause concurs with the negligence of the defendant in producing an injury does
not relieve the defendant from liability as long as his own negligence is a factual cause of the
mJury.
Remember, a factual cause is an actual, real factor, although the result may be unusual or
unexpected. A factual cause cannot be an imaginary or fanciful factor having no connection or
only an insignificant connection with the injury. Although a factual cause cannot be minimal or
insignificant with regard to the injury, it can be relatively minor in relation to other factors and
need not be quantified as being either considerable or large.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 10
6.00 (Civ)
DAMAGES
If you find that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, you must then find an amount of
money damages you believe will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for all the
physical and financial injury he has sustained as a result of the occurrence. The amount you
award today must compensate the plaintiff completely for damage sustained in the past, as well
as damage the plaintiff will sustain in the future.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 11
6.03 (Civ)
PREEXISTING CONDITION OR INJURY
Damages should be awarded for all injuries caused by the accident even if:
1. the injuries caused by the accident were more severe than could have been
foreseen because ofthe plaintiffs prior physical condition; or
2. a preexisting medical condition was aggravated by the accident.
If you find that the plaintiff did have a preexisting condition that was aggravated by the
defendant's negligence, the defendant is responsible for any aggravation caused by the accident.
I remind you that the defendant can be held responsible only for those injuries or the
aggravation of a prior injury or condition that you find was factually caused by the accident.
12
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 12
6.05 (Civ)
OTHER CONTRIBUTING CAUSES
The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for all injuries that the defendant's negligence
was a factual cause in producing. The defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause of the
injuries; other causes may have contributed to producing the final result. The fact that some other
factor may have been a contributing cause of an injury does not relieve a defendant of liability,
unless you fmd that such other cause would have produced the injury complained of
independently of his negligence. Even though prior conditions or concurrent causes may have
contributed to an injury, if the defendant's negligence was a factual cause in producing the
injury, the defendant is liable for the full amount of damages sustained, without any
apportionment or diminution for the other conditions or causes.
13
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 13
6.07 (Civ)
PAST LOST EARNINGS AND LOST EARNINGS CAPACITY
The plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the amount of earnings that he has lost up
to the time of the trial as a result of his injuries. This amount is the difference between what he
could have earned but for the harm and less any sum he actually earned in any employment. It is
not essential to recovery that the plaintiff should have been employed at the time of the accident,
but his opportunities for employment are relevant in determining the amount he could have
earned.
14
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 14
6.09 (Civ)
PAST AND FUTURE-NONECONOMIC LOSS
The plaintiff has made a claim for a damage award for past and for future noneconomic
loss. There are four items that make up a damage award for noneconomic loss, both past and
future: (1) pain and suffering; (2) embarrassment and humiliation; (3) loss of ability to enjoy the
pleasures oflife; and (4) disfigurement.
First, the plaintiff must have experienced pain and suffering in order to be able to claim
damage awards for past noneconomic loss and for future noneconomic loss. You are instructed
that the plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for all physical pain, mental
anguish, discomfort, inconvenience, and distress that you find he has endured from the time of
the injury until today and that the plaintiff is also entitled to be fairly and adequately
compensated for all physical pain, mental anguish, discomfort, inconvenience, and distress you
find he will endure in the future as a result of his injuries.
Second, the plaintiff must have experienced embarrassment and humiliation in order to
claim noneconomic loss. The plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for
such embarrassment and humiliation as you believe he has endured and will continue to endure
in the future as a result of his injuries.
Third, the plaintiff must suffer loss of enjoyment of life. The plaintiff is entitled to be
fairly and adequately compensated for the loss of his ability to enjoy any of the pleasures of life
as a result of the injuries from the time of the injuries until today and to be fairly and adequately
compensated for the loss of his ability to enjoy any of the pleasures oflife in the future as a result
of his injuries.
Fourth, there must be disfigurement. The disfigurement that the plaintiff has sustained is
a separate item of damages recognized by the law. Therefore, in addition to any sums you award
for pain and suffering, for embarrassment and humiliation, and for loss of enjoyment of life, the
plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for the disfigurement he has suffered
from the timll of the injury to the present and that he will continue to suffer during the future
duration of his life.
ill considering the plaintiffs claims for damage awards for past and future noneconomic
loss, you will consider the following factors: (1) the age of the plaintiff; (2) the severity of the
injuries; (3) whether the injuries are temporary or permanent; (4) the extent to which the injuries
affect the ability of the plaintiff to perform basic activities of daily living and other activities in
which the plaintiff previously engaged; (5) the duration and nature of medical treatment; (6) the
duration and extent of the physical pain and mental anguish that the plaintiff has experienced in
the past and will experience in the future; (7) the health and physical condition of the plaintiff
prior to the injuries; and (8) in the case of disfigurement, the nature of the disfigurement and the
consequences for the plaintiff.
15
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 15
6.10 (Civ)
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
The plaintiffs spouse is entitled to be compensated for the past, present, and future loss
of the injured party's services to her and the past, present, and future loss of companionship of
her spouse. Consortium claims are losses arising out of the marital relationship. Consortium is
the marital fellowship of a husband and a wife and includes the company, society, cooperation,
affection, and aid of the other in the marital relationship. Such claims include a loss of support,
comfort, and assistance, the loss of association, and companionship, and the loss of ability to
engage in sexual relations.
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 16
6.12 (Civ)
INCIDENTAL COSTS
ill addition to the costs of medical care, the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for all
other incidental costs incurred as a result of the accident, or that you find will be incurred in the
future. These expenses may include:
(1) Expenses that the Plaintiff incurred for the retention of additional help in
the business;
(2) Cost of transportation, food, lodging and other incidental expenses
incurred in seeking medical treatment, such as out-of-pocket expenses;
(3) illterest on loans to pay bills;
(4) Transportation to give comfort to the injured Plaintiff;
(5) Household help during the period of convalescence;
(6) Cost of telephone calls, food, lodging and transportation for the
accompanying spouse and travel related expenses;
(7) And such miscellaneous expenses as Plaintiffs were permitted to offer into
evidence during this trial.
17
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PLAINTIFFS' POINTS FOR CHARGE NO. 17
6.21 (Civ)
DAMAGES-LIFE EXPECTANCY
If you find that the plaintiff's injuries will continue beyond today, you must determine
the life expectancy of the plaintiff. According to statistics compiled by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, the average life expectancy of all persons of the
plaintiff's age at the time of accident, sex, and race was 32 years. This figure is offered to you
only as a guide, and you are not bound to accept it if you believe that the plaintiff would have
lived longer or less than the average individual in his category. ill reaching this decision, you are
to consider the plaintiff s health prior to the accident, his manner of living, his personal habits,
and other factors that may have affected the duration of his life.
18
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
STEWARTD. MCLAIN AND
JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
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CIVIL ACTION LAW
No.: 01-2379
- vs-
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE OF
SUBSEQUENT
REMEDIAL
MEASURES
FLYING 1., INC., tJd/b/a!
FLYING 1. TRAVEL PLAZA,
Defendant, Flying 1., Inc. ("Flying J"), hereby moves the Court to prohibit Plaintiff,
Stewart D. McLain ("McLain"), from testifying that he heard Kevin Addington ("Addington")
order Flying J employees to spread salt and sand. On January 29, 2000, McLain fell and injured
himself at a Flying J facility in Carlisle, Pennsylvania (the "Carlisle Facility"). At the time,
Addington was the night manager on duty at the Carlisle Facility. Upon information and belief,
Flying J believes that McLain will testify that shortly after his fall he heard Addington tell other
unidentified Flying J employees to spread some salt and sand so that no one else would get hurt
(the "alleged statement"). (Stewart McLain Dep. 76:5-9, Sept. 24, 2001 ("Exhibit A'').)
McLain seeks to admit the alleged statement to show that Flying J's negligence created
slippery conditions at the Carlisle Facility, as evidenced by Addington feeling the need to make
the alleged statement. However, salt and sand was spread in the area where McLain fell, per the
policy of Flying J to regularly monitor conditions and spread salt and sand whenever slippery
conditions occur. Anthony Lucas, the General Manager of the Carlisle Facility in January 2000
will testify that he inspected the accident site on January 31, 2000, and that there was salt:and
sand in the area. (Anthony Lucas Dep. II :14-12:3, Sept. 24, 2001) ("Exhibit B").) Therefore,
10181026.1
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any attempt to admit the alleged statement violates Pa.R.E. 407 regarding subsequent remedial
measures. "When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken
which, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove that the party who took the measures was
negligent or engaged in culpable conduct." Pa.R.E. 407. While Defendants may argue that the
alleged statement does not assert that salt and sand were spread, and that they are therefore not
seeking to introduce subsequent remedial measures, the fact is that salt and sand was spread on
the area. (Lucas Dep. II :14-12:3.) Therefore, Pa.R.E. 407 applies, and Flying J requests that the
Court preclude McLain from testifYing regarding the alleged statement.
Respectfully submitted,
NIXON PEABODY LLP
By: ~,{d
David 1. Cook
Terence 1. Robinson Jr.
Attorneys for Flying J, Inc.
Clinton Square
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, New York 14603-1051
Telephone: (585) 263-1000
Dated: Rochester, New York
November L, 2006
10181026.1
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STEWART D. MCLAIN, and his
wife, JENNIFER S. MCLAIN,
PLAINTIFFS
V.
FLYING J, INC., Ud/b/a
FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA,
DEFENDANT
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
01-2379 CIVIL TERM
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 6th day of November, 2006, Terence L. Robinson, Jr., Esquire, is
admitted pro hac vice in this case.
~chael J. Navitsky, Esquire
2040 Linglestown Road
Suite 303
Harrisburg, PA 17110
For Plaintiffs
..,e5avid L. Cook, Esquire
Clinton Square
P.O. Box 31051
Rochester, NY 14603-1051
For Defendant
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