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Home My WebLink About01-04611ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S MEMORANDUM AND NOW comes the Plaintiff, ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR, by and though his Attorney Robert J. Mulderig and files exceptions to the Masters memorandum and states: 1. On November 13, 2003, the Master filed a memorandum in the above captioned case. 2. In his memorandum the Master did not answer the legal question presented in either the Plaintiffs or Defendant's rules to show cause or briefs. 3. The Master's decision is unsupported in law and in direct contravention of the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Mansell v. Mansell 490 U.S. 581 (1989). A copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein. 4. Under the Mansell case and Adams v Adams, 1999 PA Super 36; 725 A2nd 824, the definition of Disposable Military Retirement Pay is established by the Former Spouse Protection Act, 10 USCA § 1408 unless modified by mutual agreement of the parties. 5. The Defendant has agreed that there was no agreement between the parties. Wherefore, the Plaintiff requests the Court to sign the QDRO as presented by the Plaintiff. y ~~ Da e Respectfully Submitted, TURO LAW OFFICES ~~~'~~~' o~ulderig, Esqu~ir$~ 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff :~~~~ . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs Exceptions to the Master's Memorandum upon Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, and E. Robert Elicker, Esquire, by depositing same in the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the 14~h day of November, 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Lisa M. Greason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 E. Robert Elicker, II, Esquire Office of the Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 TORO LAW OFFICES r'" ~ ~ ° Robert J ulderig, Esquire 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff LexisNexis('1 M) Basic Case Law ~'c Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Page 1 of 1 S Service: Get by LEXSEE® Citation: 490 U.S. 581 490 U.S. 581, *; 109 S. Ct. 2023; 104 L. Ed. 2d 675; 1989 U. S. LEXIS 2605 MANSELL v. MANSELL No. 87-201 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 490 U.S. 581; 109 S. Ct. 2023; 104 L. Ed. 2d 675; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2605; 57 U.S.L.W. 4567; 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2521 January 10, 1989, Argued May 30, 1989, Decided PRIOR HIS`PORY: APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT. DYSPOSYTION: Reversed and remanded. SYLLABUS: In direct response to McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210. which held that federal law as it then existed completely pre-empted the application of state community property law to military retirement pay, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (Act), 10 U. S. C. § 1408 (1982 ed. and Supp. V), which authorizes state courts to treat as community property "disposable retired or retainer pay," § 1408(c)(1), specifically defining such pay to exclude, inter alia, any military retirement pay waived in order for the retiree to receive veterans' disability benefits, § 1408(a)(4)(B). The Act also creates a mechanism whereby the Federal Government will make direct community property payments of up to 50% of disposable retired or retainer pay to certain former spouses who present state-court orders granting such pay. Apre-McCarty property settlement agreement between appellant and appellee, who were divorced in a county Superior Court in California, a community property State, provided that appellant would pay appellee 50 percent of his total military retirement pay, including that portion of such pay which he had waived in order to receive military disability benefits. After the Act's passage, the Superior Court denied appellant's request to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision requiring him to share his total retirement pay with appellee. The State Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting appellant's contention that the Act precluded the lower court from treating as community property the military retirement pay appellant had waived to receive disability benefits. In so holding, the court relied on a State Supreme Court decision which reasoned that the Act did not limit a state court's ability to treat total military retirement pay as community property and to enforce a former spouse's rights to such pay through remedies other than direct Federal Government payments. Held: The Act does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. Ih light of § 1408(a)(4)(B)'s limiting language as to such waived pay, the Act's plain and precise language establishes that § 1408(c)(1) grants state courts the authority to treat only disposable retired pay, not total retired pay, as community property. Appellee's argument that the Act has no pre-emptive effect of its own and must be read as a garnishment statute designed solely to limit when the Federal Government will make direct payments to a Former spouse, and that, accordingly, § 1408(a)(4)(B) defines "disposable retired or retainer pay" only because payments under the statutory direct payment LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Lase Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult- Yage L of 1> mechanism are limited to amounts defined by that term, is flawed for two reasons. First, the argument completely ignores the fact that § 1408(c)(1) also uses the quoted phrase to limit specifically and plainly the extent to which state courts may treat military retirement pay as community property. Second, each of § 1408(c)'s other subsections imposes new substantive limits on state courts' power to divide military retirement pay, and it is unlikely that all of the section, except for § 1408(c)(1), was intended to pre-empt state law. Thus, the garnishment argument misplaces its reliance on the fact that the Act's saving clause expressly contemplates that a retiree will be liable for "other payments" in excess of those made under the direct payment mechanism, since that clause is more plausibly interpreted as serving the limited purpose of defeating any inference that the mechanism displaced state courts' authority to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism. Appellee's contention that giving effect to the plain and precise statutory language would thwart the Act`s obvious purposes of rejecting McCarty arid restoring to state courts their pre-McCarty authority is not supported by the legislative history, which, read as a whole, indicates that Congress intended both to create new benefits for former spouses and to place on state courts limits designed to protect military retirees. Pp. 587-594. COUNSEL: Douglas B. Cone argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Jim T. Elia. Dennis A. Cornell argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, and Deputy Solicitor General Merrill; and for the Retired Officers Association et al. by tan Horbaly. June Kazuko Inuzuka, Judith I. Avner, and Sa//y F. Goldfarb filed a brief for the Women's Equity Action League et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. ]URGES: Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, ]., joined, post, p. 595. OPYNIONBY: MARSHALL OPINION: [*583] JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. [lA] In this appeal, we decide whether state courts, consistent with the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U. S. C. & 1408 (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Former Spouses' Protection Act or Act), may treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. We hold that they may not. A Members of the Armed Forces who serve for a specified period, generally at least 20 years, may retire with retired pay, 10 U. S. C. 6 3911 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Army); § 6321 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Navy and Marine Corps); § 8911 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Air Force). The amount of retirement pay a veteran is eligible to receive is calculated according to the number of years served and the rank achieved. §§ 3926 and 3991 (Army); §§ 6325-6327 (Navy and Marine Corps); § 8929 (Air Force). Veterans who became disabled as a result of military service are eligible for disability benefits. 38 U. S. C. 4 LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Case Law Sc Jtatutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Page 3 of 15 310 (wartime disability); § 331 (peacetime disability). The amount of disability benefits a veteran is eligible to receive is calculated according to the seriousness of the disability and the degree to which the veteran's ability to earn a living has been impaired. §§ 314 and 355. In order to prevent double dipping, a military retiree may receive disability benefits only to the extent that he waives a corresponding amount of his military retirement pay. § 3105. n1 Because disability benefits are exempt from federal, state, and local taxation, § 3101(a), military retirees who waive their retirement pay in favor of disability benefits increase [*584] their after-tax income. Not surprisingly, waivers of retirement pay are common. --------------Footnotes--------------- nl For example, if a military retiree is eligible for $ 1500 a month in retirement pay and $ 500 a month in disability benefits, he must waive $ 500 of retirement pay before he can receive any disability benefits. ------------End Footnotes--------------[2] California, like several other States, treats property acquired during marriage as community property. When a couple divorces, a state court divides community property equally between the spouses white each spouse retains full ownership of any separate property. See Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800(a) (West 1983 and Supp. 1989). California treats military retirement payments as community property to the extent they derive from military service performed during the marriage. See, e. g., Casas v. Thompson 42 Cal. 3d 131 139. 720 P. 2d 921, 925 cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986 In McCarty v. Marty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981),. we held that the federal statutes then governing military retirement pay prevented state courts from treating military retirement pay as community property. We concluded that treating such pay as community property would do clear damage to important military personnel objectives. Id. , at 232-235. We reasoned that Congress intended that military retirement pay reach the veteran and no one else. Id., at 228. In reaching this conclusion, we relied particularly on Congress' refusal to pass legislation that would have allowed former spouses to garnish military retirement pay to satisfy property settlements. Id., at 228-232. Finally, noting the distressed plight of many former spouses of military members, we observed that Congress was free to change the statutory framework. Id„ at 235-236. [16] In direct response to McCarty, Congress enacted the Former Spouses' Protection Act, which authorizes state courts to treat "disposable retired or retainer pay" as community property. SO U. S. C. ~1408(c)(1). n2 "'Disposable retired or [*585] retainer pay"' is defined as "the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a military member is entitled," minus certain deductions. § 1408(a)(4) (1982 ed, and Supp. V). Among the amounts required to be deducted from total pay are any amounts waived in order to receive disability benefits. § 1408(a)(4)(B). n3 [1C] --------------Footnotes---------------n2 The language of the Act covers bothcommunity property and equitable distribution States, as does our decision today. Because this case concerns a community property State, for the sake of simplicity we refer to § 1408(c)(1) as authorizing state courts to treat "disposable retired or retainer pay" as community property. ,m~~ LexisNexts('1'M) J3asic Lase Law 8c Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 4 0l 15 n3 Also deducted from total military retirement pay are amounts: (a) owed by the military member to the United States; (b) required by law to be deducted from total pay, including employment taxes, and fines and forfeitures ordered by courts-martial; (c) properly deducted for federal, state, and local income taxes; (d) withheld pursuant to other provisions under the Internal Revenue Code; (e) equal to the amount of retired pay of a member retired for physical disability; and (f) deducted to create an annuity for the former spouse. 10 U. S. C. §§1408(a)(4)(A)-(F) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). ------------End Footnotes-------------- The Act also creates a payments mechanism under which the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse who presents, to the Secretary of the relevant military service, astate-court order granting her a portion of the military retiree's disposable retired or retainer pay. This direct payments mechanism is limited in two ways. § 1408(d). First, only a former spouse who was married to a military member "for a period of 10 years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or retainer pay," § 1408(d)(2), is eligible to receive direct community property payments. Second, the Federal Government will not make community property payments that exceed 50 percent of disposable retired or retainer pay. § 1408(e)(1). B Appellant Gerald E. Mansell and appellee Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years and are the parents of six children. Their marriage ended in 1979 with a divorce decree from the Merced County, California, Superior Court. At that time, Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a waiver of a portion of that pay, disability benefits. Mrs, Mansell and Major Mansell entered [*586] into a property settlement which provided, in part, that Major Mansell would pay Mrs. Mansell 50 percent of his total military retirement pay, including that portion of retirement pay waived so that Major Mansell could receive disability benefits. Civ, No. 55594 (May 29, 1979). In 1983, Major Mansell asked the Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision that required him to share his total retirement pay with Mrs. Mansell. The Superior Court denied Major Mansell's request without opinion. [3A] [4A] Major Mansell appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, arguing that both the Former Spouses' Protection Act and the anti-attachment clause that protects a veteran's receipt of disability benefits, 38 U. S. C. ~ 310i (a) (1982 ed, and Supp. IV), n4 precluded the Superior Court from treating military retirement pay that had been waived to receive disability benefits as community property. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of California in Casas v. Thomoson, suora, the Court of Appeal rejected that portion of Major Mansell's argument based on the Former Spouses' Protection Act. 5 Civ. No. F002872 (Jan. 30, 1987). n5 Casas held that after the passage of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, federal law no longer pre-empted [*587] state community property law as it applies to military retirement pay. The Casas court reasoned that the Act did not Limit a state court's ability to treat total military retirement pay as community property and to enforce a former spouse's rights to such pay through remedies other than direct payments from the Federal Government. 42 Cal. 3d, at 143-151 720 P 2d at 928-933 The Court of Appeal did not discuss the anti-attachment clause, 38 U. S. C. /i 3101(a), n6 The Supreme Court of California denied Major Mansell's petition for review. --------------Footnotes--------------- LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Case Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 5 of 15 n4 That clause provides that veterans' benefits "shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and ...shall be exempt from the claim[s] of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the [veteran]." 38 U. S. C. fi 3101(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). n5 In a supplemental brief, Mrs. Mansell argues that the doctrine of res judicata should have prevented this pre-McCarty property settlement from being reopened. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). The California Court of Appeal, however, decided that it was appropriate, under California law, to reopen the settlement and reach the federal question. 5 Civ. No. F002872 (Jan. 30, 1987). Whether the doctrine of res judicata, as applied in California, should have barred the reopening of pre-McCarty settlements is a matter of state law over which we have no jurisdiction. The federal question is therefore properly before us. n6 Because we decide that the Former Spouses' Protection Act precludes States from treating as community property retirement pay waived to receive veterans' disability benefits, we need not decide whether the anti-attachment clause, § 3101(a), independently protects such pay. See, e. g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987): Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 1950 . ------------End Footnotes--------------[36] [4B] We noted probable jurisdiction, 487 U.S. 1217 (1988) and now reverse. II [5] Because domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law, we have consistently recognized that Congress, when it passes general legislation, rarely intends to displace state authority in this area. See, e. g., Rose v. Rose 481 U.S. 619, 628 (1987; Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo. 439 U.S. 572 581 (1979). Thus we have held that we will not find pre-emption absent evidence that it is "'positively required by direct enactment."' Hisquierdo, supra, at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe 196 U.S. 68. 77 f1904)~ The instant case, however, presents one of those rare instances where Congress has directly and specifically legislated in the area of domestic relations. [6A] It is clear from both the language of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, see, e, g., § 1408 (c)(i), and its legislative history, see, e. g., H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, p. 165 (1982); S. Rep. No. 97-SOZ, pp. 1-3, 16 (1982), that Congress sought to change the legal landscape created by the McCarty decision. n7 [*588] Because pre-existing federal law, as construed by this Court, completely pre-empted the application of state community property law to military retirement pay, Congress could overcome the McCarty decision only by enacting an affirmative grant of authority giving the States the power to treat military retirement pay as community property. Cf. Midlantic Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (19861. --------------Footnotes--------------- n7 Congress also demonstrated its focus on McCarty when it chose June 25, 1981, the day before McCarty was decided, as the applicable date for some of the Act's provisions. 10 U. S. C. § 1408(c)(1); see also note following § 1408, Pub. L. 97-252, § 1006(b) (transition provisions). LexisNexis(1'M) Basic Lase Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Page 6 of 15 ------------End Footnotes-------------- The appellant and appellee differ sharply on the scope of Congress' modification of McCarty. Mrs. Mansell views the Former Spouses' Protection Act as a complete congressional rejection of McCarty's holding that state law is pre-empted; she reads the Act as restoring to state courts all pre-McCarty authority. Major Mansell, supported by the United States, argues that the Former Spouses' Protection Act is only a partial rejection of the McCarty rule that federal law pre-empts state law regarding military retirement pay. n8 --------------Footnotes--------------- n8 Although the United States has filed an amicus brief supporting Major Mansell, its initial amicus brief, filed before the Court noted jurisdiction, supported Mrs. Mansell. ------------End Footnotes--------------[1D] [7A] Where, as here, the question is one of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. See, e. g., Blum v. Stepson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (19842; Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v GTE Sylvania Inc 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Mrs. Mansell's argument faces a formidable obstacle in the language of the Former Spouses° Protection Act. Section 1408(c)(1) of the Act affirmatively grants state courts the power to divide military retirement pay, yet its language is both precise and limited. It provides that "a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay ...either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of [*589] such court." § 1408(c)(1). The Act's definitional section specifically defines the term "disposable retired or retainer pay" to exclude, inter a/ia, military retirement pay waived in order to receive veterans' disability payments. § 1408(a)(4)(B). n9 Thus, under the Act's plain and precise language, state courts have been granted the authority to treat disposable retired pay as community property; they have not been granted the authority to treat total retired pay as community property. --------------Footnotes--------------- n9 The statute provides in pertinent part: "'Disposable retired or retainer pay' means the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a member is entitled ...less amounts which -- "(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired or retainer pay of such member, including fines and forfeitures ordered by courts-martials, Federal employment taxes, and amounts waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38 [disability payments]." § 1408(a)(4)(B). ------------End Footnotes-------------- [lE] Mrs. Mansell attempts to overcome the limiting language contained in the definition, § 1408 (a)(4)(B), by reading the Act as a garnishment statute designed solely to set out the circumstances under which, pursuant to a court order, the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse. According to this view, § 1408(a)(4)(B) defines "[d] isposable retired or retainer pay" only because payments under the federal direct payments mechanism are limited to amounts defined by that term, LexisNexis('1M) Basic Lase Law 8c Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 7 oT 15 [8] The garnishment argument relies heavily on the Act's saving clause. That clause provides:"Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under [the direct payments mechanism]. Any such unsatisfied obligation [*590] of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under ... [the direct payments mechanism] has been paid." § 1408(e)(6) (emphasis added).Mrs. Mansell argues that, because the saving clause expressly contemplates "other payments" in excess of those made under the direct payments mechanism, the Act does not "attempt to tell the state courts what they may or may not do with the underlying property." Brief for Appellee 17. For the reasons discussed below, we find a different interpretation more plausible. In our view, the saving clause serves the limited purpose of defeating any inference that the federal direct payments mechanism displaced the authority of state courts to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism. Cf. Hisquierdo. 439 U.S., at 584 (to prohibit garnishment is to prohibit division of property); Wissner v. Wissner 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (same). (1F] First, the most serious flaw in the garnishment argument is that it completely ignores § 1408 (c)(1). Mrs. Mansell provides no explanation for the fact that the defined term -- "disposable retired or retainer pay" -- is used in § 1408(c)(1) to limit specifically and plainly the extent to which state courts may treat military retirement pay as community property. Second, the view that the Act is solely a garnishment statute and therefore not intended to pre-empt the authority of state courts is contradicted not only by § 1408(c)(1), but also by the other subsections of § 1408(c). Sections 1408(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) impose new substantive limits on state courts' power to divide military retirement pay. Section 1408(c) (2) prevents a former spouse from transferring, selling, or otherwise disposing of her community interest in the military retirement pay, n10 Section 1408(c)(3) provides that a [*591] state court cannot order a military member to retire so that the former spouse can immediately begin receiving her portion of military retirement pay. nll And § 1408(c)(4) prevents spouses from forum shopping for a State with favorable divorce laws. n12 Because each of these provisions pre-empts state law, the argument that the Act has no pre-emptive effect of its own must fail. n13 Significantly, Congress placed [*592] each of these substantive restrictions on state courts in the same section of the Act as § 1408(c)(1). We think it unlikely that every subsection of § 1408(c), except § 1408(c)(1), was intended to pre-empt state law. --------------Footnotes--------------- n10 The Senate Report expressly contemplates that § 1408(c)(2) will pre-empt state law. S. Rep. No. 97-502, p. 16 (1982). nll There was some concern expressed at the Senate hearings on the Act that state courts could direct a military member to retire. See, e. g., Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-133 (1982) (Sen. Exon); id., at 70-71 (veterans' group); id., at 184 (Air Force). Thus the Senate version of the bill contained § 1408(c)(3) in order to ensure that state courts did not have such power, S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 17, and at conference the House agreed to add the provision. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, p. 167 (1982). n12 A state court may not treat disposable retirement pay as community property unless it has jurisdiction over the military member by reason of (1) residence, other than by military assignment in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (2) domicile, or (3) consent. § 1408(c) Lexistvexts~ t Nil tsasic t;ase Law ~ Statutes I Search - 1 Result - rage 3 of 1~ {4). Although the Senate Committee had decided not to include any forum shopping restrictions, seeing "no need to limit the jurisdiction of the State courts by restricting the benefits afforded by this bill ...," S. Rep. No. 97-SOZ, supra, at 9, the House version of the bill contained the restrictions, and at conference, the Senate agreed to add them. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 167. n13 That Congress intended the substantive limits in § 1408(c)(1) to be, to some extent, distinct from the limits on the direct payments mechanism contained in § 1408(d) is demonstrated by the legislative compromise that resulted in the direct payments mechanism being available only to former spouses who had been married to the military retiree for 10 years or more. § 1408(d)(Z). Under the House version of the bill, military retirement pay could be treated as community property only if the couple had been married for SO years or more. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 165. The Senate Committee had considered, but rejected, such a provision. S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 9-11. The conferees agreed to remove the House restriction. Instead, they limited the federal direct payments mechanism to marriages that had lasted 10 years or more. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 166- 167. Under this compromise, state courts have been granted the authority to award a portion of disposable military retired pay to former spouses who were married to the military member for less than 10 years, but such former spouses may not take advantage of the direct payments mechanism. ------------End Footnotes-------------- DB] [9] In the face of such plain and precise statutory language, Mrs. Mansell faces a daunting standard. She cannot prevail without clear evidence that reading the language literally would thwart the obvious purposes of the Act. See, e. g., Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631 643 1978 The legislative history does not indicate the reason for Congress' decision to shelter from community property law that portion of military retirement pay waived to receive veterans' disability payments. n14 But the absence of legislative history on this decision is immaterial in light of the plain and precise language of the statute; Congress is not required to build a record in -the legislative history to defend its policy choices. --------------Footnotes--------------- n14 The only reference to the definitional section is contained in the Senate Report which states that the deductions from total retired pay, including retirement pay waived in favor of veterans' disability payments, "generally parallel those existing deductions which may be made from the pay of Federal employees and military personnel before such pay is subject to garnishment for alimony or child support payments under section 459 of the Social Security Act. (42 U. S. C. 659Z" S. Rep. No. 97-SOZ, supra, at 14. This statement, however, describes the defined term in § 1408(a)(4).Itis not helpful in determining why Congress chose to use the defined term -- "disposable retired or retainer pay" -- to limit state-court authority in § 1408(c)(1}. ------------End Footnotes-------------- [iG] [66] Because of the absence of evidence of specific intent in the legislative history, Mrs. Mansell resorts to arguments about the broad purposes of the Act. But this reliance is misplaced because, at this general level, there are statements that both contradict and support her LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Lase Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - 1 Result - Yage y of 15 arguments. Her argument that the Act contemplates no federal pre-emption is supported by statements in the Senate Report and the House Conference [*593] Report that the purpose of the Act is to overcome the McCarty decision and to restore power to the States. n15 But the Senate Report and the House Conference Report also contain statements indicating that Congress rejected the uncomplicated option of removing all federal pre-emption and returning unlimited authority to the States. n16 Indeed, a bill that would have eliminated all federal pre-emption d',ied in the Senate Committee. n17 Her argument that Congress primarily intended to protect former spouses is supported by evidence that Members of Congress were moved by, and responding to, the distressed economic plight of military wives after a divorce. n18 But the Senate Report and the House debates contain [*594] statements which reveal that Congress was concerned as well with protecting the interests of military members. n19 --------------Footnotes--------------- n15 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 1 ("The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the United States Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 1981 . The bill would accomplish this objective by permitting Federal, State, and certain other courts, consistent with the appropriate laws, to once again consider military retired pay when fixing the property rights between the parties to a divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal separation"). See also id., at 5 and 16; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 165. n16 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 165 ("The House amendment would permit disposable military retired pay to be considered as property in divorce settlements under certain specified conditions") (emphasis added); ibid. ("The House Amendment contained several provisions that would place restrictions on the division of retired pay"); S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 4 ("[Senate] 1814 imposes three distinct limits on the division or enforcement of court orders against military retired pay in divorce cases") (emphasis added). n17 Entitled "Nonpreemption of State law" the bill provided that "[f]or purposes of division of marital property of any member or former member of the armed forces upon dissolution of such member's marriage, the law of the State in which the dissolution of marriage proceeding was instituted shall be diapositive on all matters pertaining to the division of any retired, retirement, or retainer pay to which such member or former member is entitled or will become entitled." S. 1453, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). n18 The Senate Committee pointed out that "frequent change-of-station moves and the special pressures placed on the military spouse as a homemaker make it extremely difficult to pursue a career affording economic security, job skills and pension protection." S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 6. The language of the Act, and much of its legislative history, is written in gender neutral terms, and there is no doubt that the Act applies equally to both former husbands and former wives. But "it is quite evident from the legislative history that Congress acted largely in response to the plight of the military wife." Horkovich, Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act: Congress' Answer to McCarty v, McCarty Goes Beyond the Fundamental Question, 23 Air Force L. Rev. 287, 308 (1982-1983) (emphasis in original). n19 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 7 ("All agreed that some form of remedial legislation which is fair and equitable to both spouses was necessary to provide a solution to the McCarty decision"); see also id., at 11; nn. 10, il, 12, and 16, supra. ------------End Footnotes--------------[1H] [6C] LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Lase Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 1 U of 15 [10] Thus, the legislative history, read as a whole, indicates that Congress intended both to create new benefits for former spouses and to place limits on state courts designed to protect military retirees. Our task is to interpret the statute as best we can, not to second-guess the wisdom of the congressional policy choice. See, e. g., Rodriquez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 526 (1987 (per curiam) ("Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice"). Given Congress' mixed purposes, the legislative history does not clearly support Mrs. Mansell's view that giving effect to the plain and precise language of the statute would thwart the obvious purposes of the Act. [11) VJe realize that reading the statute literally may inflict economic harm on many former spouses. But we decline to misread the statute in order to reach a sympathetic result when such a reading requires us to do violence to the plain language of the statute and to ignore much of the legislative history. Congress chose the language that requires us to decide as we do, and Congress is free to change it. III [lI] For the reasons stated above, we hold that the Former Spouses' Protection Act does not grant state courts the [*595] power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. DISSEN7BY: O'CONNOR DYSSEN7: JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. Today the Court holds that the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (Former Spouses' Protection Act or Act) denies state courts the power to order in a divorce decree the division of military retirement pay unilaterally waived by a retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. The harsh reality of this holding is that former spouses like Gaye Mansell can, without their consent, be denied a fair share of their ex-spouse's military retirement pay simply because he elects to increase his after-tax income by converting a portion of that pay into disability benefits. On the Court's reading of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, Gaye Mansell will lose nearly 30 percent of the monthly retirement income she would otherwise have received as community property. I view the Court's holding as inconsistent with both the language and the purposes of the Act, and I respectfully dissent. The Court recognized in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210. 235 (1981 that "the plight of ap- ex-spouse of a retired service member is often a serious one." In holding that federal law precluded state courts from dividing nondisabi/ity military retired pay pursuant to state community property laws, McCarty concluded with an invitation to Congress to reexamine the issue. Congress promptly did so and enacted the Former Spouses' Protection Act. Today, despite overwhelming evidence that Congress intended to overrule McCarty completely, to after pre-existing federal military retirement law so as to eliminate the pre-emptive effect [*596] discovered in McCarty, and to restore to the States authority to issue divorce decrees affecting military retirement pay consistent with state law, the Court assumes that LexisNexis(1'M) Basic Lase Law 8c Statutes ~ Search- 1 Kesult- Yage 11 of 1~ Congress only partially rejected McCarty and that the States can apply their community property laws to military retirement pay only to the extent that the Former Spouses' Protection Act affirmatively grants them authority to do so. Ante, at 588. The McCarty decision, however, did not address retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits; nor did it identify any explicit statutory provision precluding the States from characterizing such waived retirement pay as community property. Thus, I reject the Court's central premise that the States are precluded by McCarty from characterizing as community property any retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits absent an affirmative grant.of authority in the Former Spouses' Protection Act. In my view, Congress intended, by enacting the Former Spouses' Protection Act, to eliminate the effect of McCarty 's pre-emption holding altogether and to return to the States their authority "to treat military pensions in the same manner as they treat other retirement benefits." S. Rep, No. 97-502, p. 10 (1982). See also id„ at 1 ("The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the United States Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981 The bill would accomplish this objective by permitting Federal, State, and certain other courts, consistent with the appropriate laws, to once again consider military retired pay when fixing the property rights between the parties to a divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal separation"); id., at 5 ("[T]he committee intends the legislation to restore the law to what it was when the courts were permitted to apply State divorce laws to military retired pay"); id., at 16 ("The provision is intended to remove the federal pre-emption found to exist by the United States Supreme Court and permit State and other courts of competent jurisdiction) to apply pertinent State or other laws in determining [*597] whether military retired or retainer pay should be divis[i]ble"); 128 Cong. Rec. 18314 (1982) ("The amendment simply returns to State courts the authority to treat military retired pay as it does other public arid private pensions") (remarks of Rep. Schroeder, bill sponsor). Family law is an area traditionally of state concern, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).,. and we have not found federal pre-emption of state authority in this area absent a determination that "Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted." Ibid. (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe. 196 U.S. 68 77 (1904, The Former Spouses' Protection Act does not "positively require" States to abandon their own law concerning the divisibility upon divorce of military retirement pay waived in order to obtain veterans' disability benefits. On the contrary, the whole thrust of the Act was to restore to the States their traditional authority in the area of domestic relations. Even beyond that restoration, Congress sought to provide greater federal assistance and protection to military spouses than existed before McCarty by creating a federal garnishment remedy in aid of state court community property awards. That, in fact, is the central purpose and preoccupation of the Act's complex statutory framework. The Former Spouses' Protection Act is primarily a remedial statute creating a mechanism whereby former spouses armed with state court orders may enlist the Federal Government to assist them in obtaining some of their property entitlements upon divorce. The federal garnishment remedy created by the Act is limited, but it serves as assistance and not, as the Court would have it, a hindrance to former spouses. Thus, the provision at 10 U. S. C. 5 1408(a)(4)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V) of the Act defining "[d]isposable retired or retainer pay" to exclude "amounts waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38," and its incorporation into § 1408(c)(1)'s community property provision, only limits the federal garnishment remedy created by the AcC. It does not limit the authority [*598] of States to characterize such waived retirement pay as community property under state law. This reading is reinforced by the legislative history, which indicates that "[t]he specific deductions that are to be made from the total monthly retired and retainer pay generally parallel those existing deductions which may be made from the pay of Federal employees and military personnel before such pay is subject to garnishment for alimony or child support payments under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U. S. C. 659" S. Rep. No. 97- LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Case Law 8i Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 1Z of 17 502, supra, at 14 (emphasis added). The Court finds that this statement "is not helpful in determining why Congress chose to use the defined term -- 'disposable retired or retainer pay' -- to limit state-court authority in § 1408(c)(1)." Ante, at 592, n. 14. True, it is singularly unhelpful in supporting the Court's view that § 1408(c)(1) denies state courts authority to characterize retirement pay waived in lieu of disability benefits as community property. By contrast, it is helpful in determining why Congress chose to use "disposable retired or retainer pay" as the term limiting state court authority to garnish military retirement pay. In light of the fact that disability benefits are exempt from garnishment in most cases, 38 U. S. C. § 3101 (a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), had Congress not excluded "amounts waived" in order to receive veterans' disability benefits from the federal garnishment remedy created by the Former Spouses' Protection Act it would have eviscerated the force of the anti-attachment provisions of § 3101(a). To take advahtage of the federal garnishment remedy, which provides for direct payment by the Government to former spouses in specified circumstances, former spouses must serve on the appropriate service Secretary court orders meeting certain requirements. In the case of a division of property, the court order must "specifically provid[e] for the payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired or retainer pay, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member." 10 U. S. C. § 1408(a)(2)(C) [*599] (1982 ed., Supp. V). It must contain certain information and be regular on its face. §§ 1408 (b)(1)(B), 1408(b)(1)(C), 1408(b)(1)(D), 1408(b)(2) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), The Act sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Secretary in making payments directly to former spouses. § 1408(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Finally, the Act places limits on the total amount of disposable retirement pay that may be paid by the Secretary to former spouses, §§ 1408 (e)(1), 1408(e)(4)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), and it clarifies the procedures to be followed in the event of multiple or conflicting court orders. §§ 1408(e)(2), 1408(e)(3)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Subsection 1408(c)(1) authorizes the application of this federal garnishment remedy to community property awards by providing that "a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member .. , either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court." (Emphasis added.) This provision should not be read to pre-dude States from characterizing retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits as community property but only to preclude the use of the federal direct payments mechanism to attach that waived pay. Nor do §§ 1408 (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) compel the conclusion that Congress intended to pre-empt States from characterizing gross military retirement pay as community property divisible upon divorce. Those three provisions indicate what States may "not'° do. That Congress explicitly restricted the authority of courts in certain specific respects, however, does not support the inference that § 1408(c)(1) -- an affirmative grant of power -- should be interpreted as precluding everything it does not grant. On the contrary, it supports the inference that Congress explicitly and directly precluded those matters it wished to pre-empt entirely, leaving the balance of responsibility in the area of domestic relations to the States. In this respect, the Court mischaracterizes Gaye Mansell's argument as insisting that "the Act contemplates no federal pre-emption...." [*600] Ante, at 592. Subsection 1408(c) has substantive effects on the power of state courts -- its first paragraph expands those powers ("a court may treat"); its remaining paragraphs restrict those powers ("this section does not create"; "[t]his section does not authorize"; "[a] court may not treat"). That States remain free to characterize waived portions of retirement pay as community property is unambiguously underscored by the broad language of the saving clause contained in the Act, § 1408(e)(6). That clause provides:"Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation ofa LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Case Law 8i Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 13 of 15 member maybe enforced by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1)' has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U. S. C. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) Chas been paid." (Emphasis added.)The Court explains that the saving clause "serves the limited purpose of defeating any inference that the federal direct payments mechanism displaced the authority of state courts to divide an,d garnish property not covered by the mechanism." Ante, at 590 (emphasis added). I agree. What I do not understand is how the Court. can read the Act's saving clause in this manner and yet conclude, without contradiction, that California may not characterize retirement pay waived for disability benefits as community property. All California seeks to do is "divide and garnish property not covered by the [federal direct payments] mechanism." Ibid. Specifically, California wishes to exercise its traditiona'I family [*601] law powers to divide as community property that portion of Major Mansell's retirement pay which he unilaterally';converted intd disability benefits, and use state-law garnishment remedies to attach the >value of Gaye Mansell's portion of this community property. That is precisely what § 1408(e)(6) saves to the States by "defeating" any contrary inference, ante, at 590, that the Act',has displaced; the State's authority to enforce its divorce decrees "by any means availa,bie under law other than the means provided under this section...." § 1408(e)(6). As the California Supreme Court so aptly put it, in the saving clause Congress emphasized that "the limitations on the service secretary's ability to reach the retiree's gross pay [are] not Co ae deemed a limitation on the state court's ability to define the community property interests at the time of dissolution." Casas v. Thompson. 42 Cal. 3d 131. 15'0 720 P.,2d 9Z1, 933, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986 In other words, while a former spouse may not rece;"ve community property payments that exceed 50 percent of a retiree's disposable reti,nement pay through the direct federal garnishment mechanism, § 1408(e)(1), a state cqurt is free to characterize gross retirement paylas community property depending on;Ghe law of its jurisdiction, and former spouses may pursue any other remedy "available uhder;'Law" to satisfy that interest. "Nothing" in the Former Spouses' Protection Act relieve's rpilltary retirees of liability under such law if they pdssess other assets equal to the value of the former spouse's share of the gross retirement, pay. Under the Court's reading of the Act as precluding the States from characterizing gross retirement pay as community property, a military retiree has the power unilaterally to convert Community property into separate property and increase his after-tax income, at the expense of his ex-spouse's financial security and property entitlements. To read the statute as permitting a military retiree to pocket 30 percent, 50 percent, even 80 percent of gross retirement pay by converting it into disability benefits and thereby to avoid his obligations [*602] under state community property law, however, is to distort beyond recognition and to thwart the main purpose of the statute, which is to recognize the sacrifices made Iby military Spouses and to protect their economic security in the face of a divorce. Women generally suffer a decline in their standard of living following a divorce. See Weitzma',n, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 11;81, 1251 (1981), Military wives face special difficulties because "frequent change-of-station moves and the special pressures placed on the (military spouse as a homemaker'make it extremely difficult to pursue a career affording economic security, job skills and pension protection." S, Rep. No, 97-502, at 6. The average military couple married for 20 years moves about 12 times, and military wives experience an unemployment rate more than double that of their civilian counterparts. Brief for Women's Equity Action League et al. as Amici Curiae SO-11. Retirement pay, moreover, is often the single most valuable asset acquired by military couples. Id., at 18. Indeed, the one clear theme that emerges from the legislative history of the Act is that Congress recognized the dire plight of many military wives after divorce and sought to protect their access to their exhusbands' military retirement pay. See S. Rep. No. 97-502, at 6; 128 Cong. Rec. 18318 (1982) ("[F]requent military moves often preclude spouses from pursuing their own careers and establishing economic independence. As a result, military spouses are frequently unable to vest in their own retirement plans or obtain health insurance coverage from a private =-~°°„,,, .,mac m LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Case Law Zsr Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 14 oY 15 employer. Military spouses who become divorced often lose all access to retirement and health benefits -- despite a 'career' devoted to the military") (remarks of Rep. Schumer), See also id., at 18315, 18316, 18317, 18320, 18323, 18328. Reading the Act as not precluding States from characterizing retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits as property divisible upon divorce is faithful to [*603] the clear remedial purposes of the statute in a way that the Courts interpretation is not. The conclusion that States may treat gross military retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce is not inconsistent with 38 U. 5 C. 6 3101(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V). This anti- attachment provision provides that veterans' disability benefits "shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." Gaye Mansell acknowledges, as she must, that § 3101(a) precludes her from garnishing under state law Major Mansell's veterans' disability benefits in satisfaction of her claim to a share of his gross military retirement pay, just as § 1408(c)(1) precludes her from invoking the federal direct payments mechanism in satisfaction of that claim. To recognize. that § 3101(a) protects the funds from a specific source, however, does not mean that § 3101(a) prevents Gaye Mansell from recovering her SO percent interest in Major Mansell's gross retirement pay out of any income or assets he may have other than his veterans' disability benefits. So long as those benefits themselves are protected, calculation of Gaye Man'sell's entitlement on the basis of Major Mansell's gross retirement pay does not constitute an "attachment" of his veterans' disability benefits. Section 3101(a) is designed to ensure',that the needs of disabled veterans and their families are met, see Rose v. Rose. 481 U.S. 619 634 (1987, without interference from creditors. That purpose is fulfilled so long as the benefits themselves are protected by the anti- attachment provision. In sum, under the Court's interpretation of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, the former spouses Congress sought to protect risk having their economic security severely undermined by a unilateral decision of their ex-spouses to waive retirement pay in lieu of disability benefits. It is inconceivable that Congress intended the broad remedial purposes of the statute to be thwarted in such a way. To be sure, as the Court notes, Congress sought to be "fair and equitable" to retired [*604] service members as well as to protect divorced spouses. Ante, at 593-594, and n. 19. Congress explicitly protected military members by limiting the percentage of disposable retirement pay subject to the federal garnishment remedy and by expressly providing that military members could not be forced to retire. See 10 U. S. C. §§ 1408(e)(1), 1408(e)(4}(B], 1408(c)(3). Moreover, a retiree is still advantaged by waiving retirement pay in lieu of disability benefits: the pay that is waived is not subject to the federal direct payments mechanism, and the former spouse must resort instead to the more cumbersome and costly process of seeking a state garnishment order against the value of that waived pay. See H. R. Rep. No. 98-700, pp. 4-5 (1984) (discussing difficulties faced by ex-spouses in obtaining state garnishment orders). Even these state processes cannot directly attach the military retiree's disability benefits for purposes of satisfying a community property division given the strictures of the anti-attachment provision of 38 U. S. C. ~ 3101 (a). There is no basis for concluding, however, that Congress sought to protect the interests of service members by allowing them unilaterally to deny their former spouses any opportunity to obtain a fair share of the couple's military retirement pay, It is now once again up to Congress to address the inequity created by the Court in situations such as this one. But because I believe that Congress has already expressed its intention that the States have the authority to characterize waived retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce, I dissent. REFERENCES: `Return To Full Text Opinion e Go to Supreme Court Brief( + Go to Oral Argument Transcript 15A Am Jur 2d, Community Property S0, 53; 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation 909, LexisNeXls(1 M) 13astc lase Law 1SC Jtatutes ~ Jearch - 1 Kesult - + Yage 1 J of 1 J 911; 54 Am Jur 2d, Military, and Civil Defense 170; 77 Am ]ur 2d, Veterans and Veterans' Laws 8 8A Am ]ur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Divorce and Separation, Form 505 3 Am Jur Proof of Facts 299, Community Property; 20 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 321, Status of Properly as Separate 10 lJSCS 1408 US L Ed Digest, States, Territories, and Possessions 43 Index to Annotations, Armed Forces; Community Property; Equitable Distribution; Pre- emption; Property Settlement; States Annotation References: Federal pre-emption of state authority over domestic relations. 70 L Ed 2d 895. Pension and retirement benefits as subject to award or division by court in settlement of property rights between spouses . 94 ALR3d 176. Employee retirement pension benefits as exempt from garnishment, attachment, levy, execution, or similar proceeding. 93 ALR3d 711, Divorce decree as estoppel or res judicata with respect of marital property rights. 22 ALR2d 724. Service: Get by LEXSEE® Citation: 490 U.S. 5St View: Full Datelfime: Thursday, October 23, 2003 - 12:39:02 PM EDT Products & Services I LexisNexis Bookstore I LexisNexis by Credit Card I Feedback I Sicn Off I Helo About LexisNexis I Terms and Conditions I Suooort Identifier Coovright O 2002 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. All rights reserved. .F~~~=h'-+p43 v ~ ~ '- + RUUJ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE RUSE TO SHOW CAUSE AND NOW, this ~~ day of , 2003, upon receipt of the Petition For Special Relief, a Rule to Show Ca is issued upon Defendant to show cause, if any she has, why the relief requested therein cannot be granted. This Rule is returnable ~_ days from service ~` BY THE COURT, ~i r,~l, ~/~~.r ' n/P~l ~rf " `~ ' ~ /~ '; ~~. ; 4~ ..,,, 'J~T~' 17 i ..>^aaa+.n-ssrex+nvapt g.,ae.~e~3mp:sra~~Fl,'e~~vwR~d.. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, :CIVIL ACTION -LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE Petition For Special Relief AND NOW comes the Plaintiff Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., by and through his counsel Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire and petitions the court to issue a rule to show cause why the attached ODRO should not be signed and states: 1. On June 3, 2003 the Plaintiff and Defendant and their respective counsel met for a settlement conference at the Divorce Masters office. As a result of that conference the parties entered into a settlement agreement which was signed the same day. The copy of said agreement is attached hereto and incorporated herein as exhibit one. 2. The settlement agreement states on page two the following: "the split will be accomplished through ODRO giving 50% to each party of the disposable military income." 3. On page three of said agreement it states "Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the ODRO and present it to the Defendants counsel for review within seven days of today's date." 4. Plaintiff's counsel prepared the attached QDRO and sent it to Lisa Greason, Esquire. 5. On June 9, 2003 Ms. Greason objected to first two paragraphs on page two of the ODRO. A copy of her letter is attached hereto and incorporated hereih as exhibit two. 6. On June 12, 2003 PlaintifFs council responded to Ms. treason's Letter. A copy of the response is attached hereto and incorporated herein as exhibit three. On June 19, 2003 Judge Hoffer of this Honorable Court signed a degree in divorce, divorcing the parties. 8. The parties' counsel have not been able to reach an agreement concerning the wording of the QDRO. 9. The Former Spouse Protection Act 10USCS § 1408(a)(4) that the term disposable retired pay means the total monthly retired pay to which ; member is entitled. Less amount which..."(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeiture of retired pay ordered by a Court Martial or as a result of the waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38 ..." A copy of the Act is attached thereto and incorporated herein as exhibit four. 10. The agreement in this case states that the Defendant is entitled to 50% of the disposable military income. This is what is defined in the Former Spouse Protection Act. 11. This Honorable Court, Judge Bayley presiding found in the case of Adams v. Adams which was subsequently appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania at 1999PA Supra36; 725a 2nd 824 that if the parties agree to a more restrictive reading of definition of eligible military retirement pay than the one recognized by the federal government the court will uphold such agreement. However in absence of such agreement Plaintiff feels that the definition in the Former Spouse Protection Act is binding on this Court. 12. A retiree account statement with a effective date of April 8, 2003 attached hereto and incorporated herein as exhibit five shows a gross pay of $4,079.00 a VA waiver of $104.00 and SBP cost of $265.41 leaving a taxable income of $3,709.59. 13. 50% of $3,709.59 is $1,854.80. 14. On the third page of the agreement signed by the parties it states until the ODRO goes into effect, the pension shall be continued to be paid to the wife's M&T checking account. She shall pay to the husband the difference between the pension payment to the account and the $1,854.80 which is her share." 15. It is clear based on the agreement signed by the parties on June 3, 2003 that the language in the ODRO clear reflects that agreement and the language proposed by Ms. `treason does not. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully request the Court issue a Rule to show Cause on the Defendant why the attached QDRO should not be signed. _~ZZ3 Date Respectfully Submitted TURD LAW OFFICES ~ la~f/~ Robert ulderig, Esgwre 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Petition For Special Relief are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. /~ -~~~~ Date t Arthur L. Bradshaw ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER WHEREAS, BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, hereinafter referred to as Former Spouse, and ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR, hereinafter referred to as Retiree, have entered into a comprehensive property settlement agreement dated June 3, 2004; and WHEREAS, as part of the settlement agreement Retiree agrees that the Former Spouse receive fifty (50%) percent of his U.S. Army Pension; and WHEREAS, counsel for Retiree and counsel for Former Spouse have acknowledged that this Qualified Domestic Relations Order is being made pursuant to the Domestic Relations Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as it relates to the provisions being made by the Former Spouse relating to her marital property rights; and WHEREAS, it is intended that this Order will qualify as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, as defined in Section 414(p)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the provisions hereof shall be administered and interpreted in conformity with the Code. Pursuant to Section 414(p)(2) of the Code, the following facts are hereby specified: 1. The Act to which this Order applies is the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982 2. The name of the Service member is ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., whose current mailing address is 1402 Bradley Drive, A-213 (Pheasant Run), Carlisle, PA 17013, and whose social security number is 532-52-7420. 3. The name and address of the alternate payee is BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW whose current mailing address is 1447 Hillcrest Ct., Apt. #303, Camp Hill, PA 17011-8022, and whose social security number is 532-54-8206. Military Retired/Retainer Pay. Former Spouse shall be awarded a monthly fifty percent share of the Retiree's U.S. Army Disposable Retired/Retainer pay. Set award shall be in accordance with and construed by the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982 (Public Law 97-252). . The sharing of Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay shall commence upon July 1, 2003 and shall continue until the death of either party. Pending the implementation of this Order by the Army Finance Service, the Retiree shall pay the Former Spouse's entitlement directly to the Former Spouse. Retiree shall elect the maximum Survivor's Benefit Plan annuity. Under the terms of the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act, the United States Army, as the paying authority is required to directly pay Former Spouse her monthly percentage share of Retiree's monthly disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because of the following. In the course of the parties' marriage, Retiree performed at least ten years of service credible in determining his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay. The parties were married on August 29, 1970 and were divorced on .Retiree began service credible and determined his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay with the United States Army in June 1971., has performed active duty until his retirement from active duty on July 1, 1995. Neither Retiree nor Former Spouse will do or cause to be done any act which will cause this provision to become null and void, and each party agrees that this will be the final Order pertaining to the division of the Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree and Former Spouse agree that the Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay is and shall be accruing as a result of his service in the United States Army and that the Military Retired/Retainer pay is marital property subject to equitable distribution by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Retiree and Former Spouse further agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is competent to divide the parties' marital property incident to their divorce pursuant to Section 301(c), of the Divorce Code. Retiree and Former Spouse finally agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hasjurisdiction overtheRetiree forthepurpose of dividing his disposable Military RetiredlRetainerpay because Retiree specifically consents to the Court's jurisdiction to divide his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree acknowledges and agrees that he has been afforded his rights under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.S. Appendix 501-591). The Court shall retain jurisdiction over Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay for as long as the parties both shall live. The Court shall also have the authority to make every just and equitable Order not inconsistent with the other provisions hereof. The Court shall also have the specific authority to make any Orders it deems just and equitable as a result of the income tax consequences which flow from the division and distribution of the Retired/Retainer pay. The Court shall also have continuing jurisdiction to make every Order reasonably necessary to implement and accomplish the direct payment to the Former Spouse by the United States Army of her percentage share of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay, including the right to advise the United States Army of the precise amount or percentage of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay to be payable to the Former Spouse. BY THE COURT: J. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff Vs. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01 - 4611 CIVIL IN DIVORCE THE MASTER: Today is Tuesday, June 3, 2003_ This is the date set for a conference with counsel and the parties. After negotiations, the Master has been advised that the parties have reached an agreement with respect to all of the outstanding economic issues. Present in the hearing room are the Plaintiff, Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., and .his counsel Robert J. Mulderig, and the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, and her counsel Lisa M. treason. A complaint in divorce was filed on August. 2, 2001, raising grounds for divorce of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. A counterclaim was filed on December 16, 2002, on behalf of the Defendant, raising economic. issues of equitable distribution, alimony, alimony pendente lice, and counsel fees and expenses. With respect to the grounds for divorce, the Master has received from the parties signed affidavits of consent and waivers of-notice of intention to request entry of divorce decree so that the divorce can concluded under Section 3301 (c) of the Domestic Relations Code. The affidavits and waivers will be filed by the Master's office with the Prothonotary. With respect to the settlement of the economic claims, counsel are going to place on the record an agreement in the presence of the parties at this time. The agreement as stated on the record will be considered the substantive agreement of the parties not subject to any changes or modifications except for correction of typographical errors made during the transcription. After the agreement has been transcribed, counsel and the parties have indicated they are going to return later today to review the draft for typographical errors, make any corrections as necessary, and then affix their signatures affirming the terms of settlement as set forth in the agreement. When the agreement has been completed, the Master will be provided two signed copies and the Master will then prepare an order vacating his appointment. Upon the Master's appointment being vacated counsel can file a praecipe transmitting the record to the Court requesting a final decree in divorce. Mr. Mulderig. MR. MULDERIG: 1. Husband is entitled to a military pension due to his service in the United States Army. The parties agree that they will split this pension in half to each party. The split will be accomplished through a QDRO giving 50°s to each party of the disposable military income. Husband also recognizes that he will carry the survivor benefit plan at the current level on the pension. He will continue the SBP at the maximum level and this SBP will be deducted from the gross pension prior to the 50/50 split. Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the QDRO and present it to Defendant's counsel for review within seven (7) days of today's date. Until the QDRO goes into effect, the pension shall continue to be paid into the wife's M&T checking account. She shall pay to the husband the difference between the pension payment to the account and the $1,854.80 which is her share. 2. The following accounts and assets shall be the property of husband: KEYCORP dividend reinvestment account; Pentagon Federal Credit Union account; PNC checking account, Acct. No. 50-8021-0931; L-3 .Communications Master savings account; The Old Line Life Insurance Company insurance policy; Army Mutual Aid Association insurance; 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT; Merrill Lynch account, 86Q-62059; 3. The following accounts and assets shall be the property of wife: Merrill Lynch account, 86Q-61966; American Funds account; PNC checking account, Acct. No. 50-0363-6058; PNC savings account; Liberty National Life Insurance Company policy; Time-share in Williamsburg, Virginia; RCI credits; 2001 PT Cruiser; M&T checking account. 4. There is an M&T savings account which shall be divided as follows: $14,353.26 thereof shall be the property of the husband; $42,210.78 shall be the property of the wife. 5. The husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $1,200.00 a month in alimony. Said alimony shall continue until one of the following events: The death of either party, the remarriage of the wife or the cohabitation of the wife with a member of the opposite sex. The alimony can be modified in accordance with the provisions iri the divorce code relating to changed circumstances of a continuous and substantial nature. 6. The military pension shall be considered a division of the marital property and not as part of the alimony. 7. Any title transfers that need to be accomplished to effectuate the terms of this agreement shall be done within ten (10) days. 8. All o£ the tangible personal property currently in the possession of the party shall be the property of that party. 9. The Defendant waives any claim to attorney fees, costs, and expenses, 10. Husband shall be responsible for paying the children's student loans. 11. Except as herein otherwise provided, each party may dispose of his or her property in any way and each party hereby waives and relinquishes any and all rights he or she may now have or hereafter acquire under the present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property or the estate of the other as a result of the marital relationship including without limitation, statutory allowance, widow's allowance, right of intestacy, right to take against the will of the other, and right to act as administrator or executor in the other's estate. Each will at the request of the other execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all instruments which may be necessary or advisable to carry into effect this mutual waiver and relinquishment of all such interest, rights, and claims. MR. MULDERIG: Colonel, you have heard the agreement that has been dictated today? Do you understand this agreement? MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: Do you have any questions relating to this agreement? MR. MR. knowingly, intellige~ MR. MR. all that you wish to MR. BRADSHAW: No. MULDERIG: Are you agreeing to this fitly and voluntarily? BRADSHAW: Yes. MULDERIG: And this agreement encompasses have to resolve this marriage? BRADSHALW: Yes. THE MASTER: Ms. Greason. MS. GREASON: Mrs. Bradshaw, you have heard the reading of the asset division? MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. MS. GREASON: And are you in agreement with the division as stated? MS. BRADSHAW: Yes. MS. GREASON: And you make this decision knowingly and -- off the record. (A discussion was held off the record.) MR. MULDERIG: Mrs. Bradshaw, you heard the agreement as it was dictated? MRS. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: Are you in agreement with that ...ter agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: I am. MR. MULDERIG: Did you understand the agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: Do you have any questions relating to that agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: No. MR. MULDERIG: Are you making this agreement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily? MRS. BRADSHAW: Yes. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement, that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to the methods and procedures of enforcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: Rob Mu er g Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. ' Att rney for Plaintiff isa M. 're n Attorne fo efenda Barbara Kay~Bradshaw y nt C~reasan .,G~r~tiv ~ fice Past p-(five Box 385 CarCisfe, PennsyCvareia i7o~3 Phone: fy:7) 24:-3030 ~qx: l7~7) zgl-3o40 .fJvlyreasonr~aoGcorre June 9, 2003 Robert J. Mulderig, F..squire Z$ South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 1?013 Re: Bradshaw v. Bradshaw Dear Bob: 1 have reviewed the C2DR0 tFtdt yuu have prepared in the above rnatttei. I will forward It onto my orient for her review. On page 2, replace the first two paragraphs with the following language: Disposable Military RetiredlRetalner pay as used herein means Retiree's gross Military Retin3d/Retainer pay less only those amounts deducted for the SurvWor Benefit Plan premium for the Former Spouse, ahd before any waiver for benefits reduced in lieu of Retiree's Military Retirement benefits; together with any costs of living increases or similar increases that occur or would have occurred but for the Retiree's acceptance of n,duced benefits after Retkement. The sharing of Disposable Military RetiredlRetainer pay shall commence upon July 1, 2003 and shah continue until the death of either party. If the amount payable directly from the Uniteed States Army Is or becomes less than the Former Spouse's entitlement, the Retiree shall pay the difference to the Former tapouse directly or through the Domestic Relations Office of Cumberland County. Pending the implementation to this Order ny the Aemy Finance Service, the Retiree shall pay the Fortner Spouse's entitlement directly to the Former Spouse. Retiree shall elect she maximum Survivor's t3enefit Plan annuity and the Supplemental Survivor Benefd Plan which will insure that the Former Spouse's coverage shall not drop below fifty five (55%) percent at the age of 62 and for the rest of the Former Spouse's life. The Retiree shall pay fifty five (55%) of the Survivor Benefk Plan and Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan premiums and the Former Spouse shall pay torty lore (45%) percent of said premiums. After Mrs. Bradshaw reviews the QDRO, I will contact you witl~r eny changes she may request In the meantime,rf you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. TO 39Vd 3~Ii~ Md~ NOStl3b9 Tupo Law Offices RON TURD, Esquire ROBERT J. MULDERIG, Esquire GALEN R. WALTZ, Esquire JAMES M. ROBINSON, Esquire DANIEL D. WORLEY, Esquire June 12, 2003 Lisa M. treason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 Via Mail and Fax Fax # 241-3040 www.TuroLaw.com 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 (717) 245-9688 (800) 562-9778 Fax (717) 245-2165 C~~G°~~ Re: Bradshaw v. Bradshaw Dear Lisa: I will not agree to the replacement of the two paragraphs you requested. The ODRO was drawn up to reflect the agreement signed by both parties. The language you are now requesting is a change to what was agreed upon. It is too late to argue over this matter. If you wanted such conditions incorporated in the ODRO you should have raised the issue at the Master's Office and we could have resolved it there. Sincerely, RJM/jah 06~ ui MULDERIGq re Rmulderig @Tu roLaw. com c.c. Art Bradshaw LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Case Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - lU Kesults - P'UlZM1;K SYVUSts Y... rage i of o Source: All Sources> Statutes & Regulations > United States Code Service -Titles 7 through 50 Terms: FORMER SPOUSE PROTECTION ACT (Edit Search) 10 USCS § 1408, UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE Copyright ©2003 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing (TM) companies All rights reserved *** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-30, APPROVED 5/29/03 *** TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW PART IY. PERSONNEL CHAPTER 7I. COMPUTATION OF RETIRED PAY 10 USCS § 1408 (2003) § 1408, Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders (a) Definitions. In this section: (1) The term "court" means-- {A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; {B) any court of the United States {as defined in section 451 of title 28) having competent jurisdiction; (C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country with which the United States has an agreement requiring the United States to honor any court order of such country; and (D) any administrative or judicial tribunal of a State competent to enter orders for support or maintenance (including a State agency administering a program under a State plan approved under part D of title IV of the Social Security Act [42 USCS §6 651 et seq.]), and, for purposes of this subparagraph, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. (2) The term "court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued decree), or a support order, as defined in section 453(p) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 653(p)), which-- (A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of that court; (B) provides for-- (i) payment of child support (as defined in section 459(1)(2) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659(1)(2))); (ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 459(1)(3) of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. 659(1)(3))); or (iii) division of property (including a division of community property); and (C) in the case of a division of property, specifically provides for the payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay, from the disposable retired pay of a member to the spouse or former spouse of that member. (3) The term "final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be taken or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a decree from which timely appeal has been taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals. (4) The term "disposable retired pay" means the total monthly retired pay to which a _ . ,, ~~,~ LexisNexis(1'M) }3asic Lase Law ~ Statutes ~ Jearcri - iv xesuiis - rviv~iix~ ~~ ~~~~ - ••• _ _a_ _ __ member is entitled less amounts which-- (A) are owed by that member to the United States for previous overpayments of retired pay and for recoupments required by law resulting from entitlement to retired pay; (B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by acourt-martial or as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; (C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title [SO USCS 65 1201 et seq.J, are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that chapter computed using the percentage of the member's disability on the date when the member was retired (or the date on which the member's name was placed on the temporary disability retired list); or (D) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title [10 USCS 56 1431 et seq.] to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order under this section. (5) The term "member" includes a former member entitled to retired pay under section 12731 of this title. (6) The term "spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date of a court order, was married to that member. (7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer pay. (b) Effective service of process. For the purposes of this section-- (1) service of a court order is effective if-- (A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated for receipt of service court orders under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i) or, if no agent has been so designated, the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by facsimile or electronic transmission or by mail; (B) the court order is regular on its face; (C) the court order or other documents served with the court order identify the member concerned and include, if possible, the social security number of such member; and (.D) the court order or other documents served with the court order certify that the rights of the member under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and (2) a court order is regular on its face if the order-- (A} is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; (B) is legal in form; and (C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice that it is issued without authority of law. (c) Authority for court to treat retired pay. as property of the member and spouse. (1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court. A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding to divide or partition any amount of retired pay of a member as the property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse if a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation (including a court ordered, ratified, or approved properly settlement incident to such decree) affecting the member and the member's spouse or former spouse (A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any amount of retired pay of the member as property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse. (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not create any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Payments by the Secretary concerned under subsection (d) to a spouse or former spouse with respect to a division of retired pay as the property of a member and the member's spouse under this subsection may not be treated as - ~F~-,~. LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Lase Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - 10 Kesults - N'UKM!/K SYUUSI~; Y... Yage 3 of 8 amounts received as retired pay for service in the uniformed services. (3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to effectuate any payment under this section. (4) A court may not treat the disposable retired pay of a member in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court. (d) Payments by Secretary concerned to (or for benefit of) spouse or former spouse. (1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order providing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of property, specifically providing for the payment of an amount of the disposable retired pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Secretary shall make payments (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable retired pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse (or for the benefit of such spouse or former spouse to a State disbursement unit established pursuant to section 4546 of the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 654b1 or other public payee designated by a State, in accordance with part D of title IV of the Social Security Act [42 USCS §§ 651 et seq,], as directed by court order, or as otherwise directed in accordance with such part D) in an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and alimony set forth in the court order and, with respect to a division of property, in the amount of disposable retired pay specifically provided for in the court order. In the case of a spouse or former spouse who, pursuant to section 408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. 608(a)[(3)](4)), assigns to a State the rights of the spouse or former spouse to receive support, the Secretary concerned may make the child support payments referred to in the preceding sentence to that State in amounts consistent with that assignment of rights. In the case of a member entitled to receive retired pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date of effective service. In the case of a member not entitled to receive retired pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which the member first becomes entitled to retired pay. (2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retijred pay, payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they include an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of the member as property of the member or property of the member and his spouse. (3) Payments under this section shall not be made more frequently than once each month, and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to vary normal pay and disbursement cycles for retired pay in order to comply with a court order. (4) Payments from the disposable retired pay of a member pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the date of the death of the member or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are being made, whichever occurs first. (5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of property (including a division of community property) in addition to an amount of child support or alimony or the payment of an amount of disposable retired pay as the result of the court's treatment of such pay under subsection (c) as property of the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable retired pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property upon effective service of a final court order of garnishment of such amount from such retired pay. (6) In the case of a court order for which effective service is made on the Secretary concerned on or after August 22, 1996, and which provides for payments from the disposable retired pay of a member to satisfy the amount of child support set forth in the order, the authority provided in paragraph (1) to make payments from the disposable retired pay of a LexisNexis(1'M) Basic Case Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - l U Kesults - N'UKMI~;K SYUU SY; Y... Yage 4 of K •, member to satisfy the amount of child support set forth in a court order shall apply to payment of any amount of child support arrearages set forth in that order as well as to amounts of child support that currently become due. (~) (A) The Secretary concerned may not accept service of a court order that is an out-of- State modification, or comply with the provisions of such a court order, unless the court issuing that order has jurisdiction in the manner specified in subsection (c)(4) over both the member and the spouse or former spouse involved. (B) A court order shall be considered to be an out-of-State modification for purposes of this paragraph if the order-- (i) modifies a previous court order under this section upon which payments under this subsection are based; and (ii) is issued by a court of a State other than the State of the court that issued the previous court order. (e) Limitations. (1) The total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable under all court orders pursuant to subsection (c) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired pay. (2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more than one former spouse the disposable retired pay of the member shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, first-served basis. Such court orders shall be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of that amount of disposable retired pay which remains after the satisfaction of all court orders which have been previously served. (3) (A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a month to the same spouse or former spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall-- (i) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired pay the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any such conflicting court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired pay which remains available for payment of such courts orders based on when such court orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); (ii) retain an amount of disposable retired pay that is equal to the lesser of-- (I) the difference between the largest amount required by any conflicting court order to be paid to the spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under clause (i); and (II) the amount of disposable retired pay which remains available for payment of any conflicting court order based on when such court order was effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and (iii) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount of that member's disposable retired pay (less any amount paid during such month pursuant to legal process served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659 and any amount paid during such month pursuant to court orders effectively served under this section, other than such conflicting court orders) minus-- (I) the amount of disposable retired pay paid under clause (i); and (II) the amount of disposable retired pay retained under clause (ii). (B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is provided with a court order which has been certified by the member and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being provided with such an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained amount in accordance with the order. (4) (A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this section and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 65~ both of which provide for payments during a month from the same member, satisfaction of such court orders and legal process from the retired pay of the member shall be on a first-come, LexisNexis('1'M) Basic (:ase Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - IU Kesults - YUKMI;K SYUUSI; Y... Yage 5 oY 8 first-served basis. Such court orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to such orders and legal process and which remain available in accordance with the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this paragraph during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal process which have been previously served. (B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. 6591 with respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of the amount of the retired pay payable to such member that is considered under section 462 of the Social Security Act 47 U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment that is payable by the United States. (5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders provides for the payment of an amount which exceeds the amount of disposable retired pay available for payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously served court orders or legal process previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659 provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. However, such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section by the payment to the spouse or former spouse of the maximum amount of disposable retired pay permitted under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). (6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted .under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 6591 in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid. (f) Immunity of officers and employees of United States. (1) The United States and any officer or employee of the United States shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from retired pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse pursuant to a court order that is regular on its face if such payment is made in accordance with this section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i). (2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to interrogatories shall not be subject under any law to any disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of, any disclosure of information made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories. (g) Notice to member of service of court order on Secretary concerned. A person receiving effective service of a court order under this section shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of such court order (together with a copy of such order) to the member affected by the court order at his last known address. (h) Benefits for dependents who are victims of abuse by members losing right to retired pay. (1) If, in the case of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in the manner applicable to a division of property) for the payment of an amount from the disposable retired pay of that member or former member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to an eligible spouse or former spouse of that member or former member, the Secretary concerned, beginning upon effective service of such court order, shalt pay that amount in accordance with this subsection to such spouse or former spouse, LexisNexis('1'M) basic Case Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - 10 Kesults - N'UKMr;K SY(JUSl; Y... Yage 6 oY K ' '. ~ •, (2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces is eligible to receive payment under this subsection if-- (A) the member or farmer member, while a member of the armed forces and after becoming eligible to be retired from the armed forces on the basis of years of service, has eligibility to receive retired pay terminated as a result of misconduct while a member involving abuse of a spouse or dependent child (as defined in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, by.the Secretary of Homeland Security); and (B) the spouse or former spouse-- (i) was the victim of the abuse and was married to the member or former member at the time of that abuse; or (ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a dependent child of the member or former member who was the victim of the abuse. (3) The amount certified by the Secretary concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that member or former member for the purposes of this subsection. (4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil action for the issuance of a court order in the case of that member or former member, the Secretary concerned shall determine and certify the amount of the monthly retired pay that the member or former member would have been entitled to receive as of the date of the certification-- (A) if the member or former member's eligibility for retired pay had not been terminated as described in paragraph (2)(A); and (B) if, in the case of a member or former member not in receipt of retired pay immediately before that termination of eligibility for retired pay, the member or former member had retired on the effective date of that termination of eligibility. (5) A court order under this subsection may provide that whenever retired pay is increased under section 1401a of this title (or any other provision of law), the amount payable under the court order to the spouse or former spouse of a member or former member described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same time by the percent by which the retired pay of the member or former member would have been increased if the member or former member were receiving retired pay. (6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall have no ownership interest in, or claim against, any amount payable under this section to a spouse or former spouse of the member or former member. (7) (A) If a former spouse receiving payments under this subsection with respect to a member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) marries again after such payments begin, the eligibility of the former spouse to receive further payments under this subsection shall terminate on the date of such marriage. (B) A person's eligibility to receive payments under this subsection that is terminated under subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall be resumed in the event of the termination of that marriage by the death of that person's spouse or by annulment or divorce. The resumption of payments shall begin as of the first day of the month in which that marriage is so terminated. The monthly amount of the payments shall be the amount that would have been paid if the continuity of the payments had not been interrupted by the marriage. (8) Payments in accordance with this subsection shall be made out of funds in the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund established by section 1461 of this title or, in the case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security for payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard. (9) (A) A spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), while receiving payments in accordance with this subsection, LexisNexis('I'M) J3asic Case Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - lU Kesults - N'UKMYK SY(JUSY; Y... Yage 7 oY 8 ~> shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use commissary and exchange stores, and to receive any other benefit that a spouse or a former spouse of a retired member of the armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis of being a spouse or former spouse, as the case may be, of a retired member of the armed forces in the same manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pay. (B) A dependent child of a member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) who was a member of the household of the member or former member at the time of the misconduct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use commissary and exchange stores, and to have other benefits provided to dependents of retired members of the armed forces in the same manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pay. (C) If a spouse or former spouse or a dependent child eligible or entitled to receive a particular benefit under this paragraph is eligible or entitled to receive that benefit under another provision of law, the eligibility or entitlement of, that spouse or former spouse or dependent child to such benefit shall be determined under such other provision of law instead of this paragraph. (10) (A) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of a member of the armed forces who has been sentenced by acourt-martial to receive a punishment that will terminate the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay if executed, the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay may, as determined by the Secretary concerned, be considered terminated effective upon the approval of that sentence by the person acting under section 860(c) of this title (article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice). (B) If each form of the punishment that would result in the termination of eligibility to receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside, or mitigated to a punishment that does not result in the termination of that eligibility, a payment of benefits to the eligible recipient under this subsection that is based on the punishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall cease. The cessation of payments shall be effective as of the first day of the first month following the month in which the Secretary concerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in writing that payment of the benefits will cease. The recipient may not be required to repay the benefits received before that effective date (except to the extent necessary to recoup any amount that was erroneous when paid). (11) In this subsection, the term "dependent child", with respect to a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legitimate child, including an adopted child or a stepchild of the member or former member, who-- (A) is under 18 years of age; (B) is incapable of self-support because of a mental or physical incapacity that existed before becoming 18 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for over one-half of the child's support; or (C) if enrolled in a full-time course of study in an institution of higher education recognized by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this subparagraph, is under 23 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for over one-half of the child's support. (i) Certification date. It is not necessary that the date of a certification of the authenticity or completeness of a copy of a court order for child support received by the Secretary concerned for the purposes of this section be recent in relation to the date of receipt by the Secretary. (j) Regulations. The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the administration of this section. (k) Relationship to other laws. In any case involving an order providing for payment of child support (as defined in section 459(1)(2) of the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 659(1)(2)]) by a member who has never been married to the other parent of the child, the provisions of this section shall not apply, and the case shall be subject to the provisions of section 459 of such Act [42 USC 659 . LextsNexts(1M) ~astc Lase Law Si Statutes ~ Search - tU Kesults - PQJ1tN1r;K JYUU~1; Y... rage a of a Source: All Sources > Statutes & Regulations > United States Code Service -Titles 1 through 50 Terms: FORMER SPOUSE PROTECTION ACT (Edit Search) View: Full Dateliime: Friday, July t 1, 2003 - 3:46:33 PM EDT Products & Services ~LexisNexis Bookstore ~LexisNexis by Credit Card Feedback ~ Sign Off ~ Help About LexisNezis ~ Terms and Conditions ~ Suooort Identifier Copyright ©2002 LexisNezis, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. All rights reserved. !, ;R,E~'~,RE~ ~ACCCk~i3d'Y ~A$N?#', ~ a , ~ , STATEMENT EFF£CTiVE DATE NEW PAY DUE AS OF SSN APR 08, 2003 MAY O1, 2003 532 52 7420 . .A >~-P: P. kPS;. ~.O:F: ::C ONE-A T~ ~ PLEASE REMEMBER TO NOTIFY DFAS IF YOUR ADDRESS CHANGES DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE US MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY PO BOX 7130 LONDON KY 40742-7 1 30 - COMMERCIAL [216) 522-5955 TOLL FREE 3 400-321-1080 TOLL FREE FAX 1-800-469-6559 COL ARTHUR ~L EiRADSHAW USA RET myPay 1447 HILLCREST CT AP7 303 hnps:llmyPay.dfaz.mil C A M P H I L L P A 17 0 1 1- 8 0 2 2 1-877-363-3677 ;..PA. ~'~- T'E .: D. ~ RIPT''d: N .',-~>:~, r:-' ,. ~,, ai „. ..: .N; p:,: `: .., ., :: .:,< .;.,.~.. ,. ..~. y ITEM OLD NEW ITEM OLD NEW GP.OSS PAY 4,079.00 4,079.00 FITW 235.11 235.11 6 VA WAIVER I 104.00 104.00 ALLOTMENTS/BONDS ]71.20 775,0 sBP Cosrs 265.41 265.41 TAXABLE JNCDME I+ 3,709.59 3,709.59 NET PAY 2,703.28 2,699.42 ,.,P:A~. MENT .ADD ~E SS ii.-. :4'.: ,. .;. 'EAvH TOi-.~ D `T:P;x~ .- RY~~S: ~.F: _.. ;.N: F:O RMA.T: PI ON ;:O.N:L ,. ~~ -. TAXABLE INCOME: 14,838.36 FEDERAL INCOME TAX WITHHELD: 940.1+4 DIRECT DEPOSIT FEDERAL WITHHOLDING STATUS: MARRIED TOTAL EXEMPTIONS: 05 FEDERAL INCOME TAX WITHHELD: 235.11 '. Y R - ' rE'N E F I :T',«P.: IC 5+.: ~.;:x .. . E ~;'ra;~ ,.iks . ':: ~.t • ,. t~ ~.<~ . _.. .,i -`,m . ., . ,.: ., SBP COVERAGE TYPE: SPOUSE ONLY ANNUITY BASE AMOUNT: 4,083.20 SPOUSE ONLY COST: 265.41 55% ANNUITY AMOUNT: 2,24$.76 Y AMOUNT: 0 1 P 4 N , 1949 ~ OUSE DOB AUG 2 THE ANNUITY PAYABLE {S 55% OF YOUR ANNUITY BASE AMOUNT UNTIL YOUR SPOUSE REACHES AGE 62. AT AGE 62, THE ANNUITY MAY BE REDUCED DUE TO SOCIAL SECURITY OFFSET, OR NDER THE TWD-TIER FORMULA. THAT REDUCTION MAY RESULT IN AN ANNUITY THAT RANGES BETWEEN U 3 T IA U I B I ~U T N N ~ AN N A 5 2 F U I FROM AS AND THE 50C SEC R TY BENEFITS WILL PROV D TOTAL PAYMENTS D SBP NUITY A D L THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF AT LEAST 55% OF YOUR BASE AMOUNT. THE ACTUAL ANNUITY PAYABLE fS DEPENDENT ON FACTORS IN EFFECT WHEN THE ANNUITY IS ESTABLISHED. DFAS-CL 72201748 (REV 03-01) ., ., ..:, CERTIFICATE OF SER\/ICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Petition for Special Relief upon Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, by d~ siting same in the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the f-~- day of ~~/ 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Lisa M. Greason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 TURO LAW OFFICES ~>~ A .,~%o//~ , Robert JGFGlulderig, Esq 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff ~ i ~ ~ ~~~ ' • e b r> ~..., _. _rl Y~' - 1' s ~.~ ~ ~: :<~ ~~~ -J __ th 1 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OFCUMBERLANDCOUNTY STATE OF PENNA. thur L. Bradshaw Plaintiff ~ ~ N O. 01-04611 VERSUS $arbara Kay Bradshaw Defendant DEGREE IN DIVORCE AND NOW, ~ ~ IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED THAT Arthur L. Bradshaw ,PLAINTIFF, AND Barbara Kay Bradshaw ,DEFENDANT, ARE DIVORCED FROM THE BONDS OF MATRIMONY. THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OF THE FOLLOWING CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED OF RECORD IN THIS ACTION FOR WHICH A FINAL ORDER HAS NOT YET BEEN ENTERED; PROTHONOTARY ~~~ j~~.-~, ~ ,s~,~., ter,' h~ ~-•-~'J ~~r7 ~~" `~ ,; ' 4 . .-. cs ~~~- ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE TO TRANSMIT RECORD TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Transmit the record, together with the following information to the court for entry of a Divorce Decree: 1. Ground for divorce: irretrievable breakdown under §3301(c) of the Divorce Code. 2. Date and manner of service of the complaint: Certified mail on August 3, 2001. 3. Date of execution of the Affidavit of Consent required by §3301 (c) of the Divorce Code. By Plaintiff: June 3, 2003 By Defendant: June 3, 2003 ~}. Related claims pending: None. 5. Date the Waiver of Notice in §3301 (c) divorce was filed with the Prothonotary: By Plaintiff: June 3, 2003 By Defendant: June 3, 2003 Robert derig, Esqu Attorne for Plaintiff (^~ r_° n`~ E - ... . _._ . . C ~~i.- C ~ _ J l' } t _ .. -~j T>~ ° ° :LI ~~ _t G-~/ ~i/~ ~~% ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01- r-I(nII CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS You have been sued in Court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case will proceed without you and a decree in divorce or annulment may be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for the divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at the First Floor, Cumberland County Courthouse, South Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, LAWYER'S FEES, OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 2 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)249-3166 r t j ill ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01- ~~I~ CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE COMIPLAINT IN DIVORCE 1. Plaintiff is Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., an adult individual, currently residing at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Defendant is Barbara Kay Bradshaw, an adult individual, currently residing at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. j 3. Plaintiff and Defendant are bonafide residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and have been so for at least six months immediately previous to the filing of this complaint. 4. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on August 29, 1970 in King County, Washington. 5. There have been no prior actions for divorce or annulment between the parties. 6. The Defendant is not a member of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, or its Allies. 7. The Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling and the right to request that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. Knowing this, the Plaintiff does not desire that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. 8. Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of the United States of America. 9. The parties have lived separate and apart since July 15, 2001 and continue to live separate and apart as of the date of this Complaint. 10. The parties' marriage is irretrievably broken. t 11. Plaintiff desires a divorce based upon the belief that Defendant will, after ninety days from the date of the filing of this Complaint, consent to this divorce. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests your Honorable Court to enter a decree in divorce. f'- ~~~~ Date Respectfully Submitted TURO LAW OFFICES -.:;:>. ~j_. G , Robert J. ulderig, Esquire 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff ~, c VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Divorce Complaint are true and '~ correct. I understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. /~ 3 ° ~ Dat Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. ~; ~ = .~ ~ ~~ ~.T ~- , -- ~~~ , ~ ~ l1 4 ~ U ` ~_' n~ ~-R 'v, e ~ ~ G __:-rte -, , -~ ~ ~` ~}. ' < - r i ~. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW,, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1. A Complaint in Divorce under §3301 (c) of the Divorce Code was filed on August 2, 2001. 2. The marriage of Plaintiff and Defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety (90) days have elapsed from the date of the filing of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of the final Decree in Divorce after service of Notice of Intention to request entry of the decree. I VERIFY THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE FOREGOING AFFIDAVIT ARE TRUE AND CORRECT. I UNDERSTAND THAT FALSE STATEMENTS HEREIN ARE MADE SUBJECT TO THE PENALTIES OF 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 RELATING TO UNSWORN FALSIFICATION TO AUTHORITIES. _~~_~ ~~~ Date G~/6/G~G{~!z ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR ~ ~ ~ G~ Ti is -9 ~_i' '° , n.; a . _~ _ ` r, _ --1 -- _ x ,-' ~. . ~ :a~`' ~ ;~ _ _3 W ... F ~ ti V~ ~~ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE WAIVER OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER 3301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. I VERIFY THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE FOREGOING AFFIDAVIT ARE TRUE AND CORRECT. I UNDERSTAND THAT FALSE STATEMENTS HEREIN ARE MADE SUBJECT TO THE PENALTIES OF 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 RELATING TO UNSWORN FALSIFICATION TO AUTHORITIES. J ~~-~ Date ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. ~ r~ C e-'= ' . ,, ` ~` Gi'. ... _.- i't_ ~ ~_ ._. ~ .~ .. ~ K ~~ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1. A complaint in divorce under § 3301 (c) of the Divorce Code was filed on A 2, 2001. 2. The marriage of plaintiff and defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety have elapsed from the date of the filing of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce. 4. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of pro lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand false statements are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § ~ relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: 3 2003 ~~,,` ARBARA K. ca - ~,;>^; ~ _ F~._ [. _°C~i ~+ .. _~ _~: ~n l'" ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. 4RA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0.01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE 1. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce without notice. '2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, ~ lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a divorce decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand false tatements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 relating to nsworn falsification to authorities. X003 ,,,~,~,..._~ ~ ,G~..---__ BARBARA K. BRADSHAW ` c, c~ ~ ~- r,: -~, ~„ zT - ~ Gw.. ~. i ~' _.. v K J ~~~ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR.: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. N0.01-4611 CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, October 27, 2003, the parties having appeared before the Court on their respective rules to show cause, each requesting a different form fora "Qualified Domestic Relations Order", and the Court being informed that the Master reduced to a typed agreement the positions of the parties on this issue, the Court refers the matter back to the Master for his interpretation of which QDRO best represents the agreement of the parties. Court requests the Master to furnish to the Court a short written opinion and a recommended Order within thirty days of today's date. .J. ~tobert Mulderig, Esquire For the Plaintiff ~isa M. treason, Esquire For the Defendant ~ ~~ R-~s to-a'1-Q3 f Robert Elicker II, Esquire L~' Divorce Master ) ~ ~~j b'iM{Al,~3NN3d £ I ~Z W~ f.. Z 130 ~;El ~~+~i:hJ`C]3"fJ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR Plaintiff v. BARBARA KP.Y BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE DEFENDANTS REPLY TO rn :fir AND NOW, comes the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, b~nd~hrh her v, attorney, Lisa M. treason, Esquire, and makes these replies to Plaintiff's exceptions to Master's Memorandum. 1. Admitted. 2. Denied. By way of further response, this Honorable Court sent this matter to the Master for his interpretatian of which ODRO best represents the agreement of the parties and to present an opinion to this Court. The Master's Memorandum fulfills this order. The Master's Memorandum reflects the QDRO as proposed by the Defendant. 3. Denied. The Master's decision is supported in law and is not a direction contravention of Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) as cited by opposing counsel. 4. Denied. !t is admitted that the Former Spouses Protection Act does give a definition of "disposable retired pay." However, Mansell does not require the states follow the federal definition. Further, Mansell and the Former Spouses Protection Act only limits the direct payments mechanism and is not intended to limit substantively what the court may order. 5. Neither admitted or denied. If this statement is correct, then a meeting of the minds never occurred and the parties have no agreement in which case this matter would be sent to the Divorce Master for a hearing on the matter. Since there is nn dispute as to the facts and assets, Defendant believes and therefore avers that the Master, upon hearing, would come to the same. conclusion he has already reached in his memorandum to the Court. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests this Honorable Court to deny Plaintiff's Exceptions and to sign the Defendant's QDRO which reads in accordance with the Master's Memorandum as the correct understanding of the parties agreement. Respectfu{ly Submitted, GREASON lAW OFFICE `. ~~~ ~ ,. Date Lisa M. treason, Esquire Post Office Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that 9 served a true and correct copy of the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Exceptions to Master's Memorandum upon Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire, by depositing same in the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the 25th day of November, 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Robert J. Mulderig 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 GREASON LAW OFFICE M. treason, E uire Post Office Box 38 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 iD #78269 OFFICE OF DIVORCE MASTER CUMBERLAND COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)240-6535 E. Robert Elicker, II Divorce Master Traci Jo Colyer Office Manager/Reporter TO: The Honorable George E. Hoffer, President Judge FROM: E. Robert Elicker, II, Divorce Master~~ DATE: Thursday, November 13, 2003 RE: Arthur L. Bradshaw vs. Barbara Kay Bradshaw No. Ol - 4611 Civil In Divorce West Shore 697-0371 Ext. 6535 Attached please find memorandum pursuant to your order of October 27, 2003. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S MEMORANDUM AND NOW comes the Plaintiff, ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR, by and though his Attorney Robert J. Mulderig and files exceptions to the Master's memorandum and states: 1. On November 13, 2003, the Master filed a memorandum in the above captioned case. 2. In his memorandum the Master did not answer the legal question presented in either the Plaintiffs or Defendant's rules to show cause or briefs. 3. The Master's decision is unsupported in law and in direct contravention of the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Mansell v. Mansell 490 U.S. 581 (1989). A copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein. 4. Under the Mansell case and Adams v Adams. 1999 PA Super 36; 725 A2nd 824, the definition of Disposable Military Retirement Pay is established by the Former Spouse Protection Act, 10 USCA § 1408 unless modified by mutual agreement of the parties. 5. The Defendant has agreed that there was no agreement between the parties., Wherefore, the Plaintiff requests the Court to sign the QDRO as presented by the Plaintiff. ~ D cJ Da e Respectfully Submitted, TURD LAW OFFICES Robert J. ~lulderig, Esqulr~ 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs Exceptions to the Master's Memorandum upon Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, and E. Robert Elicker, Esquire, by depositing same in the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the 14~" day of November, 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Lisa M. Greason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 E. Robert Elicker, II, Esquire Office of the Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 TURD LAW OFFICES Rob`~~Id~e 9 4 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff LexisNexis('1 M) Basic Lase Law c~ Jtatutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 1 of 15 Service: Get by LEXSEE® Citation: 490 U.S. 581 490 U.S. 581, *; 109 S. Ct. 2023; I04 L. Ed. 2d 675; 1989 U. S. LEXIS 2605 MANSELL v. MANSELL No. 87-201 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 490 U.S. 581; 109 S. Ct. 2023; 104 L. Ed. 2d 675; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2605; 57 U.S.L. W. 4567; SO Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2521 January 10, 1989, Argued May 30, 1989, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT. DISPOSYTYON: Reversed and remanded. SYLLABUS: In direct response to McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, which held that federal law as it then existed completely pre-empted the application of state community property law to military retirement pay, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (Act), 10 U. S. C. X1408 (1982 ed. and Supp. V), which authorizes state courts to treat as community property "disposable retired or retainer pay," § 1408(c)(1), specifically defining such pay to exclude, inter aiia, any military retirement pay waived in order for the retiree to receive veterans' disability benefits, § 1408(a)(4)(B). The Act also creates a mechanism whereby the Federal Government will make direct community property payments of up to 50% of disposable retired or retainer pay to certain former spouses who present state-court orders granting such pay. Apre-McCarty property settlement agreement between appellant and appellee, who were divorced in a county Superior Court in California, a community property State, provided that appellant would pay appellee 50 percent of his total military retirement pay, including that portion of such pay which he had waived in order to receive military disability benefits. After the Act's passage, the Superior Court denied appellant's request to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision requiring him to share his total retirement pay with appellee. The State Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting appellant's contention that the Act precluded the lower court from treating as community property the military retirement pay appellant had waived to receive disability benefits. In so holding, the court relied on a State Supreme Court decision which reasoned that the Act did not limit a state court's ability to treat total military retirement pay as community property and to enforce a former spouse's rights to such pay through remedies other than direct Federal Government payments. He/d: The Act does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. Ih light of § 1408(a)(4)(B)°s limiting language as to such waived pay, the Act's plain and precise language establishes that § 1408(c)(1) grants state courts the authority to treat only disposable retired pay, not total retired pay, as community property. Appellee's argument that the Act has no pre-emptive effect of its own and must be read as a garnishment statute designed solely to limit when the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse, and that, accordingly, § 1405(a)(4)(B) defines "disposable retired or retainer pay" only because payments under the statutory direct payment LexisNexis('1'M) J3asic Case Law ~c Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage Z oT 1 ~ mechanism are limited to amounts defined by that term, is flawed for two reasons. First, the argument completely ignores the fact that § 1408(c)(1) also uses the quoted phrase to limit specifically and plainly the extent to which state courts may treat military retirement pay as community property. Second, each of § 1408(c)'s other subsections imposes new substantive limits on state courts' power to divide military retirement pay, and it is unlikely that all of the section, except for § 1408(c](1), was intended to pre-empt state law. Thus, the garnishment argument misplaces its reliance on the fact that the Act's saving clause expressly contemplates that a retiree will be liable for "other payments" in excess of those made under the direct payment mechanism, since that clause is more plausibly interpreted as serving the limited purpose of defeating any inference that the mechanism displaced state courts' authority to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism. Appeilee's contention that giving effect to the plain and precise statutory language would thwart the Act's obvious purposes of rejecting McCarty and restoring to state courts their pre-McCarty authority is not supported by the legislative history, which, read as a whole, indicates that Congress intended both to create new benefits for former spouses and to place on state courts limits designed to protect military retirees. Pp. 587-594. COUNSEL: Douglas 8. Cone argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Jim T. Elia. Dennis A. Cornell argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, and Deputy Solicitor General Merrill; and for the Retired Officers Association et al. by Jan Horbaly. June Kazuko Inuzuka, Judith I. Avner, and Sally F. Goldfarb filed a brief for the Women's Equity Action League et ai. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 7UDGES: Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. O'Connor, ]., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 595. OPYNIONBY: MARSHALL OPINION: [*583] JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. [lA] In this appeal, we decide whether state courts, consistent with the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, SO U. S. C. $ 1408 (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Former Spouses' Protection Act or Act), may treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. We hold that they may not. A Members of the Armed Forces who serve for a specified period, generally at least 20 years, may retire with retired pay. 10 U. S. C. 5 3911 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp, V) (Army); § 6321 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Navy and Marine Corps); § 8911 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Air Force). The amount of retirement pay a veteran is eligible to receive is calculated according to the number of years served and the rank achieved. §§ 3926 and 3991 (Army); §§ 6325-6327 (Navy and Marine Corps); § 8929 (Air Force). Veterans who became disabled as a result of military service are eligible for disability benefits. 38 U. 5. C. 6 LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Lase Law Xc Statutes ~ Seazch - 1 Kesult - Yage 3 of 15 310 (wartime disability); § 331 (peacetime disability). The amount of disability benefits a veteran is eligible to receive is calculated according to the seriousness of the disability and the degree to which the veteran's ability to earn a living has been impaired. §§ 314 and 355, In order to prevent double dipping, a military retiree may receive disability benefits only to the extent that he waives a corresponding amount of his military retirement pay. § 3105. nl Because disability benefits are exempt from federal, state, and local taxation, § 3101(a), military retirees who waive their retirement pay in favor of disability benefits increase [*584] their after-tax income. Not surprisingly, waivers of retirement pay are common. --------------Footnotes--------------- ni For example, if a military retiree is eligible for $ 1500 a month in retirement pay and $ 500 a month in disability benefits, he must waive $ 500 of retirement pay before he can receive any disability benefits. ------------End Footnotes--------------[2] California, like several other States, treats property acquired during marriage as community property. When a couple divorces, a state court divides community property equally between the spouses while each spouse retains full ownership of any separate property. See Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800(a) (West 1983 and Supp. 1989). California treats military retirement payments as community property to the extent they derive from military service performed during the marriage. See, e. g,, Casas v. Thompson, 42 Cal. 3d 131, 139, 720 P. 2d 921, 925,_ cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986 In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981 we held that the federal statutes then governing military retirement pay prevented state courts from treating military retirement pay as community property. We concluded that treating such pay as community property would do clear damage to important military personnel objectives. Id. , at 232-235. We reasoned that Congress intended that military retirement pay reach the veteran and no one else. Id.. at 228. In reaching this conclusion, we relied particularly on Congress' refusal to pass legislation that would have allowed former spouses to garnish military retirement pay to satisfy property settlements. Id., at 228-232. Finally, noting the distressed plight of many former spouses of military members, we observed that Congress was free to change the statutory framework. Id.~at 235-236. [1B] In direct response to McCarty, Congress enacted the Former Spouses' Protection Act, which authorizes state courts to treat "disposable retired or retainer pay" as community property. 10 U. S. C. 6 1408(c)(1). n2 "'Disposable retired or [*585] retainer pay"' is defined as "the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a military member is entitled," minus certain deductions. § 1408(a)(4) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Among the amounts required to be deducted from total pay are any amounts waived in order to receive disability benefits. § 1408(a)(4)(B). n3 [1C] --------------Footnotes---------------n2 The language of theACtcovers bothcommunity property and equitable distribution States, as does our decision today. Because this case concerns a community property State, for the sake of simplicity we refer to § 1408(c)(1) as authorizing state courts to treat °'disposable retired or retainer pay" as community property. LexisNexis(1'M) Basic Lase Law Xc Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Page 4 of r 5 n3 Also deducted from total military retirement pay are amounts: (a) owed by the military member to the United States; (b) required by law to be deducted from total pay, including employment taxes, and fines and forreitures ordered by courts-martial; (c) properly deducted for federal, state, and local income taxes; (d) withheld pursuant to other provisions under the Internal Revenue Code; (e) equal to the amount of retired pay of a member retired for physical disability; and (f) deducted to create an annuity for the former spouse. 10 U. S. C. 1408(a)(4)(A)-(F) (1982 ed, and Supp. V). ------------End Footnotes-------------- The Act also creates a payments mechanism under which the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse who presents, to the Secretary of the relevant military service, astate-court order granting her a portion of the military retiree's disposable retired or retainer pay. This direct payments mechanism is limited in two ways. § 1408(d). First, only a former spouse who was married to a military member "for a period of 10 years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or retainer pay," § 1408(d)(2), is eligible to receive direct community property payments. Second, the Federal Government will not make community property payments that exceed 50 percent of disposable retired or retainer pay. § 1408(e)(1). B Appellant Gerald E. Mansell and appellee Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years and are the parents of six children. Their marriage ended in 1979 with a divorce decree from the Merced County, California, Superior Court. At that time, Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a waiver of a portion of that pay, disability benefits. Mrs. Mansell and Major Mansell entered [*586] into a property settlement which provided, in part, that Major Mansell would pay Mrs. Mansell 50 percent of his total military retirement pay, including that portion of retirement pay waived so that Major Mansell could receive disability benefits. Civ. No. 55594 (May 29, 1979). In 1983, Major Mansell asked the Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision that required him to share his total retirement pay with Mrs. Mansell. The Superior Court denied Major Mansell's request without opinion. [3A] [4A] Major Mansell appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, arguing that both the Former Spouses' Protection Act and the anti-attachment clause that protects a veteran's receipt of disability benefits, 38 U. S. C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), n4 precluded the Superior Court from treating military retirement pay that had been waived to receive disability benefits as community property. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of California in Casas v. Thompson, supra the Court of Appeal rejected that portion of Major Mansell's argument based on the Former Spouses' Protection Act. 5 Civ. No. F002872 (Jan. 30, 1987), n5 Casas held that after the passage of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, federal law no longer pre-empted [*587] state community property law as it applies to military retirement pay. The Casas court reasoned that the Act did not limit a state court's ability to treat total military retirement pay as community property and to enforce a former spouse's rights to such pay through remedies other than direct payments from the Federal Government. 42 CaI. 3d. at 143-151 720 P. 2d, at 928-933. The Court of Appeal did not discuss the anti-attachment clause, 38 U. S. C. 5 3101(a). n6 The Supreme Court of California denied Major Manseil's petition for review. --------------Footnotes--------------- LexisNexis('1'M) J3asic Lase Law 8c Statutes ~ Search - 1 Result - Yage 5 of 15 n4 That clause provides that veterans' benefits "shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and ...shall be exempt from the claim[s] of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the [veteran]." 38 U. S. C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). n5 In a supplemental brief, Mrs. Mansell argues that the doctrine of res judicata should have prevented this pre-McCarty property settlement from being reopened. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (19811. The California C rt of AppeaN, however, decided that it was appropriate, under California law, to re pen the settlement and reach the federal question. 5 Civ. No. F002872 (Jan. 30, 1987). Whe her the doctrine of res judicata, as applied in California, should have barred the reop Wing of pre-McCarty settlements is a matter of state law over which we have no jurisdiction. The federal question is therefore properly before us. n6 Because we decide that the Former pouses' Protection Act precludes States from treating as community property retirement pay aived to receive veterans' disability benefits, we need not decide whether the anti-attac ment clause, § 3101(a), independently protects such pay. See, 2. g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 1987 Wisner v. Wisner, 338 U.S. 655 1950 . ------------EndFootnotes--- [46] ---------[36] We noted probable jurisdiction, and now reverse. II [5] Because domestic relations are preemie recognized that Congress, when it pas: authority in this area. See, e. g., Rose Hisquierdo. 439 U.S. 572 581 (1979 absent evidence that it is "'positively re 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe 196 presents one of those rare instances w the area of domestic relations. fitly matters of state law, we have consistently general legislation, rarely intends to displace state 4ose 481 U.S. 619, 628 (1987)• Hisauierdo v. us we have held that we will not find pre-emption fired by direct enactment."' Hisauierdo, supra, at 3. 68 77 (1904)). The instant case, however, e Congress has directly and specifically legislated in [6A] It is clear from both the language of tF (c)(1), and its legislative history, see, Rep. No. 97-502, pp. 1-3, 16 (1982), created by the McCarty decision. n7 [' by this Court, completely pre-empted military retirement pay, Congress coul affirmative grant of authority giving th community property, Cf. Midlantic Nat Protection. 474 U. S. 494 501 1986,)_ Former Spouses' Protection Act, see, e. g., ~ 1408 g., H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, p. 165 (1982); S. at Congress sought to change the legal landscape 88] Because pre-existing federal law, as construed e application of state community property law to overcome the McCarty decision only by enacting an States the power to treat military retirement pay a: --------------Footnotes----~---------- n7 Congress also demonstrated its focus on McCarty when it chose June 25, 1981, the day before McCarty was decided, as the applicable date for some of the Act's provisions. 10 U. S. C. 1408(c)(1); see also note following § 1408, Pub. L. 97-252, § 1006(b) (transition provisions). ,,,,~ LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Lase Law Xa Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesuit- t'age 6 of 35 ------------End Footnotes-------------- The appellant and appellee differ sharply on the scope of Congress' modification of McCarty. Mrs. Mansell views the Former Spouses' Protection Act as a complete congressional rejection of McCarty's holding that state law is pre-empted; she reads the Act as restoring to state courts ail pre-McCarty authority. Major Mansell, supported by the United States, argues that the Former Spouses' Protection Act is only a partial rejection of the McCarty rule that federal law pre-empts state law regarding military retirement pay. n8 --------------Footnotes--------------- n8 Although the United States has filed an amicus brief supporting Major Mansell, its initial amicus brief, filed before the Court noted jurisdiction, supported Mrs. Mansell. ------------End Footnotes--------------[1D] [7A] Where, as here, the question is one of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. See, e. g., Blum v. Stepson 465 U.S. 886. 896 (1984); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 447 U.S. 102 108 (1980). Mrs. Mansell's argument faces a formidable obstacle in the language of the Former Spouses' Protection Act. Section 1408(c)(1) of the Act affirmatively grants state courts the power to divide military retirement pay, yet its language is both precise and limited. It provides that "a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay ...either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of [*589] such court." § 1408(c)(1). The Act's definitional section specifically defines the term "disposable retired or retainer pay" to exclude, inter alia, military retirement pay waived in order to receive veterans' disability payments. § 1408(a)(4)(B). n9 Thus, under the Act's plain and precise language, state courts have been granted the authority to treat disposable retired pay as community property; they have not been granted the authority to treat total retired pay as community property. --------------Footnotes--------------- n9 The statute provides in pertinent part: "'Disposable retired or retainer pay' means the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a member is entitled ...less amounts which -- "(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired or retainer pay of such member, including fines and forfeitures ordered by courts-martials, Federal employment taxes, and amounts waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38 [disability payments]." § 1408(a)(4)(B). ------------End Footnotes-------------- [lE] Mrs. Mansell attempts to overcome the limiting language contained in the definition, § 1408 (a)(4)(B), by reading the Act as a garnishment statute designed solely to set out the circumstances under which, pursuant to a court order, the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse. According to this view, § 1408(a)(4)(B) defines "[d] isposabie retired or retainer pay" only because payments under the federal direct payments mechanism are limited to amounts defined by that term. LexisNexis('1'M) Basic Lase Law 8c Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 7 of 15 [8] The garnishment argument relies heavily on the Act's saving clause. That clause provides:"Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under [the direct payments mechanism]. Any such unsatisfied obligation [*590] of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under ... [the direct payments mechanism] has been paid." § 1408(e)(6) (emphasis added).Mrs. Mansell argues that, because the saving clause expressly contemplates "other payments" in excess of those made under the direct payments mechanism, the Act does not "attempt to tell the state courts what they may or may not do with the underlying property." Brief for Appellee 17. For the reasons discussed below, we find a different interpretation more plausible. In our view, the saving clause serves the limited purpose of defeating any', inference that the federal direct payments mechanism displaced the authority of state courts to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism. Cf. Hisauierdo, 439 U. S., at 584 (to prohibit garnishment is to prohibit division of property); Wissner v. Wissner 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (same). [1F] First, the most serious flaw in the garnishment argument is that it completely ignores § 1408 (c){S). Mrs. Mansell provides no explanation for the fact that the defined term -- "d'+sposable retired or retainer pay" -- is used in § 1408(c)(1) to limit specifically and plainly the extent to which state courts may treat military retirement pay as community property. Second, the view that the Act is solely a garnishment statute and therefore not intended to pre-empt the authority of state courts is contradicted not only by § 1408(c)(1), but also by the other subsections of § 1408(c). Sections 1408(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) impose new substantive limits on state courts' power to divide military retirement pay. Section 1408(c) (2) prevents a former spouse from transferring, selling, or otherwise disposing of her community interest in the military retirement pay. n10 Section 1408(c)(3) provides that a [*591] state court cannot order a military member to retire so that the former spouse can immediately begin receiving her portion of military retirement pay. nli And § 1408(c)(4) prevents spouses from forum shopping for a State with favorable divorce laws. n12 Because each of these provisions pre-empts state law, the argument that the Act has no pre-emptive effect of its own must fail. n13 Significantly, Congress placed [*1592] each of these substantive restrictions on state courts in the same section of the Act as § 1408(c)(1). We think it unlikely that every subsection of § 1408(c), except § 1408(c)(1), was intended to pre-empt state law. --------------Footnotes--------------- n10 The Senate Report expressly contemplates that § 1408(c)(2) will pre-empt state law. 5. Rep. No. 97-502, p. 16 (1982). nll There was some concern expressed at the Senate hearings on the Act that state courts could direct a military member to retire. See, e. g., Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 132-133 (1982) (Sen. Exon); id., at 70-71 (veterans' group); id., at 184 (Air Force). Thus the Senate version of the bill contained § 1408(c)(3) in order to ensure that state courts did not have such power, S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 17, and at conference the House agreed to add the provision. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, p. 167 (1982). n12 A state court may not treat disposable retirement pay as community property unless it has jurisdiction over the military member by reason of (1) residence, other than by military assignment in the territorial jurisdiction of the courC, (2) domicile, or (3) consent, § 1408(c) LexlsNexis(1 Nl) tsasic Lase Law nc statutes I Jeazch - 1 Kesult - Yage x o1 15 (4). Although the Senate Committee had decided not to include any forum shopping restrictions, seeing "no need to limit the jurisdiction of the State courts by restricting the benefits afforded by this bill ...," S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 9, the House version of the bill contained the restrictions, and at conference, the Senate agreed to add them. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 167. n13 That Congress intended the substantive limits in § 1408(c)(1) to be, to some extent, distinct from the limits on the direct payments mechanism contained in § 1408(d) is demonstrated by the legislative compromise that resulted in the direct payments mechanism being available only to former spouses who had been married to the military retiree for 10 years or more. § 1408(d)(2). Under the House version of the bill, military retirement pay could be treated as community property only if the couple had been married for 10 years or more. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 165. The Senate Committee had considered, but rejected, such a provision. S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 9-11. The conferees agreed to remove the House restriction. Instead, they limited the federal direct payments mechanism to marriages that had lasted 10 years or more. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 166- 167. Under this compromise, state courts have been granted the authority to award a portion of disposable military retired pay to former spouses who were married to the military member for less than SO years, but such former spouses may not take advantage of the direct payments mechanism. ------------End Footnotes-------------- C7B] C9] In the face of such plain and precise statutory language, Mrs. Mansell faces a daunting Standard. She cannot prevail without clear evidence that reading the language literally would Chwart the obvious purposes of the Act. See, e. g., Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 .S. 631, 643 (1978). The legislative history does not indicate the reason for Congress' decision to shelter from community property law that portion of military retirement pay waived to receive veterans' disability payments. n14 But the absence of legislative history on this decision is immaterial in light of the plain and precise language of the statute; Congress is not required to build a record in the legislative history to defend its policy choices. --------------Footnotes--------------- n14 The only reference to the definitional section is contained in the Senate Report which states that the deductions from total retired pay, including retirement pay waived in favor of veterans' disability payments, "generally parallel those existing deductions which may be made from the pay of Federal employees and military personnel before such pay is subject to garnishment for alimony or child support payments uhder section 459 of the Socia! Security Act. 142 U. S. C. 659" S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 14. This statement, however, describes the defined term in § 1408(a)(4). It is not helpful in determining why Congress those to use the defined term -- "disposable retired or retainer pay" -- to limit state-court authority in § 1408(c)(1), ------------End Footnotes-------------- [1G] [6B] Because of the absence of evidence of specific intent in the legislative history, Mrs. Mansell resorts to arguments about the broad purposes of the Act. But this reliance is misplaced because, at this general level, there are statements that both contradict and support her LexisNexis(1'M) Basic Lase Law 8i Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage y of 15 arguments. Her argument that the Act contemplates no federal pre-emption is supported by statements in the Senate Report and the House Conference [*593] Report that the purpose of the Act is to overcome the McCarty decision and to restore power to the States. n15 But the Senate Report and the House Conference Report also contain statements indicating that Congress rejected the uncomplicated option of removing all federal pre-emption and returning unlimited authority to the States. n16 Indeed, a bill that would have eliminated all federal pre-emption died in the Senate Committee. n17 Her argument that Congress primarily intended to protecC former spouses is supported by evidence that Members of Congress were moved by, and responding to, the distressed economic plight of military wives after a divorce. n18 But the Senate Report and the House debates contain [*594] statements which reveal that Congress was concerned as well with protecting the interests of military members. n19 --------------Footnotes--------------- n15 See, e, g., S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 1 ("The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the United States Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 1981 . The bill would accomplish this objective by permitting Federal, State, and certain other courts, consistent with the appropriate laws, to once again consider military retired pay when fixing the property rights between the parties to a divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal separation"). See also id., at 5 and 16; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 165. n16 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 165 ("The House amendment would permit disposable military retired pay to be considered as property in divorce settlements under certain specified conditions") (emphasis added); ibid. ("The House Amendment contained several provisions that would place restrictions on the division of retired pay"); S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 4 ("[Senate] 1814 imposes three distinct limits on the division or enforcement of court orders against military retired pay in divorce cases") (emphasis added). n17 EnCitled "Nonpreemption of State law" the bill provided that "[f]or purposes of division of marital property of any member or former member of the armed forces upon dissolution of such member's marriage, the law of the State in which the dissolution of marriage proceeding was instituted shall be diapositive on ail matters pertaining to the division of any retired, retirement, or retainer pay to which such member or former member is entitled or will become entitled." S. 1453, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). n18 The Senate Committee pointed out that "frequent change-of-station moves and the special pressures placed on the military spouse as a homemaker make it extremely difficult to pursue a career affording economic security, job skills and pension protection." S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 6. The language of the Act, and much of its legislative history, is written in gender neutral terms, and there is no doubt that the Act applies equally to both former husbands and former wives. But "it is quite evident from the legislative history that Congress acted largely in response to the plight of the military wife." Horkovich, Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act: Congress' Answer to McCarty v. McCarty Goes Beyond the Fundamental Question, 23 Air Force L. Rev. 287, 308 (1982-1983) (emphasis in original). n19 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 7 ("All agreed that some form of remedial legislation which is fair and equitable to both spouses was necessary to provide a solution to the McCarty decision"); see also id., at 11; nn. 10, 11, 12, and 16, supra. ------------End Footnotes--------------[1H] [6C] ',~Si LexisNexis('1'M) Basic case Law Xi Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Page 10 of 15 [10] Thus, the legislative history, read as a whole, indicates that Congress intended both to create new benefits for former spouses and to place limits on state courts designed to protect military retirees. Our task is to interpret the statute as best we can, not to second-guess the wisdom of the congressional policy choice. See, e. g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522,_ 526 (1987) (per curiam) ("Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice"). Given Congress' mixed purposes, the legislative history does not clearly support Mrs. Mansell's view that giving effect to the plain and precise language of the statute would thwart the obvious purposes of the Act. [11] We realize that reading the statute literally may inflict economic harm on many former spouses. But we decline to misread the statute in order to reach a sympathetic result when such a reading requires us to do violence to the plain language of the statute and to ignore much of the legislative history. Congress chose the language that requires us to decide as we do, and Congress is free to change it. III (lI] For the reasons stated above, we hold that the Former Spouses° Protection Act does not grant state courts the [*595] power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. DISSENTBY: O'CONNOR DISSENT: JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. Today the Court holds that the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (Former Spouses' Protection Act or Act) denies state courts the power to order in a divorce decree the division of military retirement pay unilaterally waived by a retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. The harsh reality of this holding is that former spouses like Gaye Mansell can, without their consent, be denied a fair share of their ex-spouse's military retirement pay simply because he elects to increase his after-tax income by converting a portion of that pay into disability benefits. On the Court's reading of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, Gaye Mansell will lose nearly 30 percent of the monthly retirement income she would otherwise have received as community property. I view the Court's holding as inconsistent with both the language and the purposes of the Act, and I respectfully dissent. The Court recognized in McCarty v. McCartX~453 U.S. 210 235 (1981)1 that "the plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service member is often a serious one." In holding that federal law precluded state courts from dividing nondisabi/ity military retired pay pursuant to state community property laws, McCarty concluded with an invitation to Congress to reexamine the issue. Congress promptly did so and enacted the Former Spouses' Protection Act. Today, despite overwhelming evidence that Congress intended to overrule McCarty completely, to alter pre-existing federal military retirement law so as to eliminate the pre-emptive effect [*596] discovered in McCarty, and to restore to the States authority to issue divorce decrees affecting military retirement pay consistent with state law, the Court assumes that 1,exis.Nexis('1'M) ldasic Lase L,aw c~ Statutes ~ Search - 1 1Zesult - Page t d of k ~ Congress only partially rejected McCarty and that the States can apply their community property laws to military retirement pay only to the extent that the Former Spouses' Protection Act affirmatively grants them authority to do so. Ante, at 588. The McCarty decision, however, did not address retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits; nor did it identify any explicit statutory provision precluding the States from characterizing such waived retirement pay as community property. Thus, I reject the Court's central premise that the States are precluded by McCarty from characterizing as community property any retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits absent an affirmative grant of authority in the Former Spouses' Protection Act. In my view, Congress intended, by enacting the Former Spouses' Protection Act, to eliminate the effect of McCarty 's pre-emption holding altogether and to return to the States their authority "to treat military pensions in the same manner as they treat other retirement benefits." S. Rep. No. 97-502, p. 10 (1982). See also id., at 1 ("The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the United States Supreme Court decision in McCart~v. May, 453 U S 210 (1981 The bill would accomplish this objective by permitting Federal, State, and certain other courts, consistent with the appropriate laws, to once again consider military retired pay when fixing the property rights between the parties to a divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal separation"); id., at 5 ("[T]he committee intends the legislation to restore the law to what it was when the courts were permitted to apply State divorce laws to military retired pay"); id., at 16 ("The provision is intended to remove the federal pre-emption found to exist by the United States Supreme Court and permit State and other courts of competent jurisdiction to apply pertinent State or other laws in determining [*597] whether military retired or retainer pay should be divis[i]ble"); 128 Cong. Rec. 18314 (1982) ("The amendment simply returns to State courts the authority to treat military retired pay as it does other public and private pensions") (remarks of Rep. Schroeder, bill sponsor). Family law is an area traditionally of state concern, Hisquierdo v. Hisauierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) and we have not found federal pre-emption of state authority in this area absent a determination that "Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted." Ibid. (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 77 (1904 The Former Spouses' Protection Act does not "positively require" States to abandon their own law concerning the divisibility upon divorce of military retirement pay waived in order to obtain veterans' disability benefits. On the contrary, the whole thrust of the Act was to restore to the States their traditional authority in the area of domestic relations. Even beyond that restoration, Congress sought to provide greater federal assistance and protection to military spouses than existed before McCarty by creating a federal garnishment remedy in aid of state court community property awards. That, in fact, is the central purpose and preoccupation of the Act's complex statutory framework. The Former Spouses' Protection Act is primarily a remedial statute creating a mechanism whereby former spouses armed with state court orders may enlist the Federal Government to assist them in obtaining some of their property entitlements upon divorce. The federal garnishment remedy created by the Act is limited, but it serves as assistance and not, as the Court would have it, a hindrance to former spouses. Thus, the provision at 10 U. S. C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V) of the Act defining "[d]isposable retired or retainer pay" to exclude "amounts waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38," and its incorporation into § 1408(c)(1)'s community property provision, only limits the federal garnishment remedy created by the Act. It does not limit the authority (*598] of States to characterize such waived retirement pay as community property under state law. This reading is reinforced by the legislative history, which indicates that "[t]he specific deductions that are to be made from the total monthly retired and retainer pay generally parallel those existing deductions which may be made from the pay of Federal employees and military personnel before such pay is subject to garnishment for alimony or child support payments under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U. 5. C 659" S. Rep. No. 97- LexisNexis('1'M) Basic C;a5e Law Xa Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage IZ of 15 502, supra, at 14 (emphasis added). The Court finds that this statement "is not helpful in determining why Congress chose to use the defined term -- 'disposable retired or retainer pay' -- to limit state-court authority in § 1408(c)(1)." Ante, at 592, n. 14. True, it is singularly unhelpful in supporting the Court's view that § 1408(c)(1) denies state courts authority to characterize retirement pay waived in lieu of disability benefits as community property. By contrast, it is helpful in determining why Congress chose to use "disposable retired or retainer pay" as the term Limiting state court authority to garnish military retirement pay. In light of the fact that disability benefits are exempt from garnishment in most cases, 38 U. S. C~ 3101 (a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), had Congress not excluded "amounts waived" in order to receive veterans' disability benefits from the federal garnishment remedy created by the Former Spouses' Protection Act it would have eviscerated the force of the anti-attachment provisions of § 3101(a). To take advantage of the federal garnishment remedy, which provides for direct payment by the Government to former spouses in specified circumstances, former spouses must serve on the appropriate service Secretary court orders meeting certain requirements. In the case of a division of property, the court order must "specifically provid[e] for the payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired or retainer pay, from the disposable retired. or retainer pay of a member." SO U. S. C. § 1408(a)(2)(C) [*599] (1982 ed., Supp. V). IC must contain certain information and be regular on its face. §§ 1408 (b)(1)(B), 1408(b)(1)(C), 1408(b)(1)(D), 1408(b){2) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), The Act sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Secretary in making payments directly to former spouses. § 1408(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Finally, the Act places limits on the total amount of disposable retirement pay that may be paid by the Secretary to former spouses, §§ 1408 (e)(1), 1408(e)(4)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), and it clarifies the procedures to be followed in the event of multiple or conflicting court orders. §§ 1408(e)(2), 1408(e)(3)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Subsection 1408(c)(1) authorizes the application of this federal garnishment remedy to community property awards by providing that "a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member ...either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court." (Emphasis added.) This provision should not be read to pre-c/ude States from characterizing retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits as community property but only to preclude the use of the federal direct payments mechanism to attach that waived pay. Nor do §§ 1408 (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) compel the conclusion that Congress intended to pre-empt States from characterizing gross military retirement pay as community property divisible upon divorce. Those three provisions indicate what States may "not" do. That Congress explicitly restricted the authority of courts in certain specific respects, however, does not support the inference that § 1408(c)(1) -- an affirmative grant of power -- should be interpreted as precluding everything it does not grant. On the contrary, it supports the inference that Congress explicitly and directly precluded those matters it wished to pre-empt entirely, leaving the balance of responsibility in the area of domestic relations to the States. In this respect, the Court mischaracterizes Gaye Mansell's argument as insisting that "the Act contemplates no federal pre-emption...." [*600] Ante, at 592. Subsection 1408(c) has substantive effects on the power of state courts -- its first paragraph expands those powers ("a court may treat"); its remaining paragraphs restrict those powers ("this section does not create"; "[t]his section does not authorize"; "[a] court may not treat"). That States remain free to characterize waived portions of retirement pay as community property is unambiguously underscored by the broad language of the saving clause contained in the Act, § 1408(e)(6). That clause provides:"Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subpi3ragraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a LexisNexis('1M) Basic Lase Law ~ Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - Yage 13 of 15 member may be enforced by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U. S. C. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid." (Emphasis added.)The Court explains that the saving clause "serves the limited purpose of defeating any inference that the federal direct payments mechanism displaced the authority of state courts to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism." Ante, at 590 (emphasis added). I agree. What I do not understand is how the Court can read the Act's saving clause in this manner and yet conclude, without contradiction, that California may not characterize retirement pay waived for disability benefits as community property. All California seeks to do is "divide and garnish property not covered by the [federal direct payments] mechanism." Ibid. Specifically, California wishes to exercise its traditional family [*601] law powers to divide as community property that portion of Major Mansell's retirement pay which he unilaterally converted into disability benefits, and use state-law garnishment remedies to attach the value of Gaye Mansell's portion of this community property. That is precisely what § 1408(e)(6) saves to the States by "defeating" any contrary inference, ante, at 590, that the Act has displaced the State's authority to enforce its divorce decrees "by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section...." § 1408(e)(6). As the California Supreme Court so aptly put it, in the saving clause Congress emphasized that "the limitations on the service secretary's ability to reach the retiree's gross pay [are] not to be deemed a limitation on the state court's ability to define the community property interests at the time of dissolution." Casas v. Thompson, 42 Cal. 3d 131. 150. 720 P. 2d 921. 933 cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986 In other words, while a former spouse may not receive community property payments that exceed 50 percent of a retiree's disposable retirement pay through the direct federal garnishment mechanism, § 1408(e)(1), a state court is free to characterize gross retirement pay as community property depending on the law of its jurisdiction, and former spouses may pursue any other remedy "available under law" to satisfy that interest. "Nothing" in the Former Spouses' Protection Act relieves military retirees of liability under such law if they possess other assets equal to the value of the former spouse's share of the gross retirement pay. Under the Court's reading of the Act as precluding the States from characterizing gross retirement pay as community property, a military retiree has the power unilaterally to convert community property into separate property and increase his after-tax income, at the expense of his ex-spouse's financial security and property entitlements. To read the statute as permitting a military retiree to pocket 30 percent, 50 percent, even 80 percent of gross retirement pay by converting it into disability benefits and thereby to avoid his obligations [*602] under state community property law, however, is to distort beyond recognition and to thwart the main purpose of the statute, which is to recognize the sacrifices made by military spouses and to protect their economic security in the face of a divorce. Women generally suffer a decline in their standard of living following a divorce. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1251 (1981). Military wives face special difficulties because "frequent change-of-station moves and the special pressures placed on the military spouse as a homemaker make it extremely difficult to pursue a career affording economic security, job skills and pension protection." S. Rep. No. 97-502, at 6. The average military couple married for 20 years moves about 12 times, and military wives experience an unemployment rate more than double that of their civilian counterparts. Brief for Women's Equity Action League et al. as Amici Curiae 30-i1. Retirement pay, moreover, is often the single most valuable asset acquired by military couples. Id., at 18. Indeed, the one clear theme that emerges from the legislative history of the Act is that Congress recognized the dire plight of many military wives after divorce and sought to protect their access to their exhusbands' military retirement pay. See S. Rep. No. 97-502, at 6; 128 Cong. Rec. 18318 (1982) ("[F]requent military moves often preclude spouses from pursuing their own careers and establishing economic independence. As a result, military spouses are frequently unable to vest in their own retirement plans or obtain health insurance coverage from a private LexisNexis('1'M) J3asic Lase Law Xz Statutes ~ Search - 1 Kesult - fl age 14 of 15 employer. Military spouses who become divorced often lose ail access to retirement and health benefits -- despite a 'career' devoted to the military") (remarks of Rep. Schumer). See also id., at 18315, 18316, 18317, 18320, 18323, 18328. Reading the Act as not precluding States from characterizing retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits as property divisible upon divorce is faithful to [*603] the clear remedial purposes of the statute in a way that the Court's interpretation is not. The conclusion that States may treat gross military retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce is not inconsistent with 38 U. S. C. 6 3101(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V). This anti- attachment provision provides that veterans' disability benefits "shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." Gaye Mansell acknowledges, as she must, that § 3101(a) precludes her from garnishing under state law Major Mansell's veterans' disability benefits in satisfaction of her claim to a share of his gross military retirement pay, just as § 1408(c)(1) precludes her from invoking the federal direct payments mechanism in satisfaction of that claim. To recognize that § 3101(a) protects the funds from a specific source, however, does not mean that § 3101(a) prevents Gaye Mansell from recovering her 50 percent interest in Major Mansell's gross retirement pay out of any income or assets he may have other than his veterans' disability benefits. So long as those benefits themselves are protected, calculation of Gaye Mansell's entitlement on the basis of Major Mansell's gross retirement pay does not constitute an "attachment" of his veterans' disability benefits, Section 3101(a) is designed to ensure that the needs of disabled veterans and their families are met, see Rose v. Rose. 481 U.S. 619, 634 (1987) without interference from creditors. That purpose is fulfilled so long as the benefits themselves are protected by the anti- attachment provision. In sum, under the Court°s interpretation of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, the former spouses Congress sought to protect risk having their economic security severely undermined by a unilateral decision of their ex-spouses to waive retirement pay in lieu of disability benefits. It is inconceivable that Congress intended the broad remedial purposes of the statute to be thwarted in such a way. To be sure, as the Court notes, Congress sought to be "fair and equitable" to retired [*604] service members as well as to protect divorced spouses. Ante, at 593-594, and n. 19. Congress explicitly protected military members by limiting the percentage of disposable retirement pay subject to the federal garnishment remedy and by expressly providing that military members could not be forced to retire. See 10 U. S. C. §§ 1408(e)(1), 1408(e)(4)(B), 1408(c)(3). Moreover, a retiree is still advantaged by waiving retirement pay in lieu of disability benefits: the pay that is waived is not subject to the federal direct payments mechanism, and the former spouse must resort instead to the more cumbersome and costly process of seeking a state garnishment order against the value of that waived pay. See H. R. Rep. No. 98-700, pp. 4-5 (1984) (discussing difficulties faced by ex-spouses in obtaining state garnishment orders). Even these state processes cannot directly attach the military retiree's disability benefits for purposes of satisfying a community property division given the strictures of the anti-attachment provision of 38 U. S. C. fi 3101 (a). There is no basis for concluding, however, that Congress sought to protect the interests of service members by allowing them unilaterally to deny their former spouses any opportunity to obtain a fair share of the couple's military retirement pay. It is now once again up to Congress to address the inequity created by the Court in situations such as this one. But because I believe that Congress has already expressed its intention that the States have the authority to characterize waived retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce, I dissent. REFERENCES: + Return To Full Text Opinion + Go to Supreme Court Brief(s~ + Go to Oral Aroument Transcript 15A Am Jur 2d, Community Property 10, 53; 24 Am ]ur 2d, Divorce and Separation 909, LexzsNexzs(dM) tsaszc Vase Law ~ Jtatutes ~ Jearch - d Kesult- Page dJ of 1J 911; 54 Am Jur 2d, Military, and Civil Defense 170; 77 Am Jur 2d, Veterans and Veterans' Laws 8 8A Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Divorce and Separation, Form 505 3 Am Jur Proof of Facts 299, Community Property; ZO Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 321, Status of Property as Separate 10 USCS 1408 US L Ed Digest, States, Territories, and Possessions 43 Index to Annotations, Armed Forces; Community Property; Equitable Distribution; Pre- emption; Property Settlement; States Annotation References: Federal pre-emption of state authority over domestic relations. 70 L Ed 2d 895. Pension and retirement benefits as subject to award or division by court in settlement of property rights between spouses . 94 ALR3d 176. Employee retirement pension benefits as exempt from garnishment, attachment, levy, execution, or similar proceeding. 93 ALR3d 711. Divorce decree as estoppel or res judicata with respect of marital property rights. 22 ALR2d 724. Service: Get by LEXSEE® Citation: 490 U.S. 581 View: Full Date/Time: Thursday, October 23, 2003 - 12:39:02 PM EDT Products & Services ILexisNexis Bookstore ILexisNexis by Credit Card Feedback ~ Sian Off ~ Helo About LexisNexis ~ Terms and Conditions I Suooort Identifier Copyright ©2002 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. All rights reserved. 4 -. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff vs. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW • N~•01-4611 CIVIL 19 IN DIVORCE BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant STATUS SHEET ACTIVITIES: ~"1n ~ r j~ ~L,In,~ s"l~.-r 1 fl -~ I-"~~ ~, i'yl a~°~~a~, ,~~,.. ~_ ~ , . ~, ~~~~~~ ta.~r~ o~ ~-(~«~-- ,~ V ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. NO. 01 - 4611 CIVIL BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN DIVORCE TO: Robert J. Mulderig Attorney for Plaintiff Lisa M. Greason Attorney for Defendant DATE: Wednesday, July 3, 2002 CERTIFICATION I certify that discovery is complete as to the claims for which the Master has been appointed. OR IF DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE: (a) Outline what information is required that is not complete in order to prepare the case for trial and indicate whether there are any outstanding interrogatories or discovery motions. -~ (b) Provide approximate date when discovery will be complete and indicate what action is being taken to complete discovery. DATE COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF ( ) COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT ( ) NOTE: PRETRIAL DIRECTIVES WILL NOT BE ISSUED FOR THE FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS UNTIL COUNSEL HAVE CERTIFIED THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, OR OTHERWISE AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. AFTER RECEIVING THIS DOCUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL OR A PARTY TO THE ACTION, IF NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, INDICATING THAT DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE, THE DIRECTIVE FOR FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. HOWEVER, IF BOTH COUNSEL, OR A PARTY NOT REPRESENTED, CERTIFY THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, A DIRECTIVE TO FILE PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY. THE CERTIFICATION DOCUMENT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE MASTER'S OFFICE WITHIN TWO (2) WEEKS OF THE DATE SHOWN ON THE DOCUMENT. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff VS. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant T0: Robert J. Mulderig Lisa M. treason IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW N0. 01 - 4611 CIVIL IN DIVORCE Counsel for Plaintiff Counsel for Defendant A conference has been scheduled at the Office of the Divorce Master, 9 North Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the 6th day of November, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. Very truly yours, Date of Notice: 10/28/03 E. Robert Elicker, II Divorce Master ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff vs. . BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. O1 - 4611 CIVIL IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 5 ~ day of , 2003, the parties and counsel having entere into an agreement and stipulation resolving the economic issues on June 3, 2003, the date set for a four-party conference, the agreement and stipulation having been transcribed, and subsequently signed by the parties and counsel, the appointment of the Master is vacated and counsel can conclude the proceedings by the filing of a praecipe to transmit the record with the affidavits of consent of the parties so that a final decree in divorce can be entered. BY THE COURT, cc: ~obert J. Mulderig Attorney for Plaintiff ~f,isa M. Greason Attorney for Defendant Geor e H r, P. C°~~~ ,:~:. HlNEJA U,Sn!N~:~ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Vs. NO. O1 - 4611 CIVIL BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, lefendant IN DIVORCE THE MASTER: Today is Tuesday, June 3, 2003. This is the date set for a conference with counsel and the parties. After negotiations, the Master has been advised that the parties have reached an agreement with respect to all of the outstanding economic issues. Present in the hearing room are the Plaintiff, Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., and his counsel Robert J. Mulderig, and the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, and her counsel Lisa M. treason. A complaint in divorce was filed on August 2, 2001, raising grounds for divorce of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. A counterclaim was filed on December 16, 2002, on behalf of the Defendant, raising economic issues of equitable distribution, alimony, alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees and expenses. With respect to the grounds for divorce, the Master has received from the parties signed affidavits of consent and waivers of notice of intention to request entry of divorce decree so that the divorce can concluded under Section 3301 (c) of the Domestic Relations Code. The affidavits and waivers will be filed by the Master's office with the ~ ~~ ..-° - Prothonotary. With respect to the settlement of the economic claims, counsel are going to place on the record an agreement in the presence of the parties at this time. The agreement as stated on the record will be considered the substantive agreement of the parties not subject to any changes or modifications except for correction of typographical errors made during the transcription. After the agreement has been transcribed, counsel and the parties have indicated they are going to return later today to review the draft for typographical errors, make any corrections as necessary, and then affix their signatures affirming the terms o~ settlement as set forth in the agreement. When the agreement has been completed, the Master will be provided two signed copies and the Master will then prepare an order vacating his appointment. Upon the Master's appointment being vacated counsel can file a praecipe transmitting the record to the Court requesting a final decree in divorce. Mr. Mulderig. MR. MULDERIG: 1. Husband is entitled to a military pension due to his service in the United States Army. The parties agree that they will split this pension in half to each party. The split will be accomplished through a QDRO giving 50% to each party of the disposable military income. Husband also recognizes that he will carry the survivor benefit plan at the current level on the pension. He will continue the SBP at the maximum level and this SBP will be .:u . deducted from the gross pension prior to the 50/50 split. Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the QDRO and present it to Defendant's counsel for review within seven (7) days of today's date. Until the QDRO goes into effect, the pension shall continue to be paid into the wife's M&T checking account. She shall pay to the husband the difference between the pension payment to the account and the $1,854.80 which is her share. 2. The following accounts and assets shall be the property of husband: KEYCORP dividend reinvestment account; Pentagon Federal Credit Union account; PNC checking account, Acct. No. 50-8021-0931; L-3 Communications Master savings account; The Old Line Life Insurance Company insurance policy; Army Mutual Aid Association insurance; 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT; Merrill Lynch account, 86Q-62059; 3. The following accounts and assets shall be the property of wife: Merrill Lynch account, 86Q-61966; American Funds account; PNC checking account, Acct. No. 50-0363-6058; PNC savings account; Liberty National Life Insurance Company policy; Time-share in Williamsburg, Virginia; RCI credits; 2001 PT Cruiser; M&T checking account. 4. There is an M&T savings account which shall be divided as follows: $14,353.26 thereof shall be the property of the husband; $42,210.78 shall be the property of the wife. 5. The husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $1,200.00 a month in alimony. Said alimony shall continue until one of the following events: The death of either party, the remarriage of the wife or the cohabitation of the wife with a member of the opposite sex. The alimony can be modified in accordance with the provisions in the divorce code relating to changed circumstances of a continuous and substantial nature. 6. The military pension shall be considered a division of the marital property and not as part of the alimony. 7. Any title transfers that need to be accomplished to effectuate the terms of this agreement shall be done within ten (10) days. 8. All of the tangible personal property currently in the possession of the party shall be the property of that party. 9. The Defendant waives any claim to attorney fees, costs, and expenses. 10. Husband shall be responsible for paying the children's student loans. 11. Except as herein otherwise provided, each party may dispose of his or her property in any way and each party hereby waives and relinquishes any and all rights he or she may now have or hereafter acquire under the present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property or the estate of the other as a result of the marital relationship including without limitation, statutory allowance, widow's allowance, right of intestacy, right to take against the will of the other, and right to act as administrator or executor in the other's estate. Each will at the request of the other execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all instruments which may be necessary or advisable to carry into effect this mutual waiver and relinquishment of all such interest, rights, and claims. MR. MULDERIG: Colonel, you have heard the agreement that has been dictated today? Do you understand this agreement? MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: Do you have any questions relating to this agreement? MR. BRADSHAW: No. MR. MULDERIG: Are you agreeing to this knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily? MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: And this agreement encompasses all that you wish to have to resolve this marriage? MR. BRADSHALW: Yes. THE MASTER: Ms. Greason. MS. GREASON: Mrs. Bradshaw, you have heard the reading of the asset division? MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. MS. GREASON: And are you in agreement with the division as stated? MS. BRADSHAW: Yes. MS. GREASON: And you make this decision , knowingly and -- off the record. (A discussion was held off the record.) MR. MULDERIG: Mrs. Bradshaw, you heard the agreement as it was dictated? MRS. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: Are you in agreement with that _:., agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: I am. MR. MULDERIG: Did you understand the agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: Do you have any questions relating to that agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: No. MR. MULDERIG: Are you making this agreement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily? MRS. BRADSHAW: Yes. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement, that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to the methods and procedures of enforcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: 1 ~' ~ 3 ~~ Robert M de i Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr.. Attorn for Plai iff ~~ i ,'' visa M. Gre 'on ~~ ~~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~-- ~, Barbara Kay B adshaw Attorney fo Defendant 11 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER WHEREAS, BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW hereinafter referred to as Former Spouse, and ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., hereinafter referred to as Retiree, have entered into a comprehensive property settlement agreement dated June 3, 2003; and WHEREAS, as part of the settlement agreement Retiree agrees that the Former Spouse receive fifty (50%) percent of his U.S. Army Pension that was earned from the date of marriage August 29, 1970 until the mutually agreed date of termination of entitlement June 19, 2003; and WHEREAS, counsel for Retiree and counsel for Former Spouse have acknowledged that this Qualified Domestic Relations Order is being made pursuant to the Domestic Relations Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as it relates to the provisions being made by the Former Spouse relating to her marital property rights; and WHEREAS, it is intended that this Order will qualify as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, as defined in Section 414(p)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the provisions hereof shall be administered and interpreted in conformity with the Code. Pursuant to Section 414(p)(2) of the Code, the following facts are hereby specified: 1. The Act to which this Order applies is the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982. 2. The name of the Service member is ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., whose current mailing address is 1402 Bradley Drive, A-213 (Pheasant Run), Carlisle, PA 17013, and whose social security number is 532-52-7420. ~, 1 3. The name and address of the alternate payee is BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW who's current mailing address is 1447 Hillcrest Ct., Apt #303, Camp Hill, PA 17011-8022 and whose social security number is 532-54-8206. Military Retired/Retainer Pay. Former Spouse shall be awarded a monthly percentage share of her Retiree's U.S. Army Retired/Retainer pay upon Retiree's retirement from the United States Army. Set award shall be in accordance with and construed by the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982 (Public Law 97-252) and the following stipulations by the parties. Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay as used herein means Retiree's gross Military Retired/Retainer pay less only those amounts deducted for the Survivor Benefit Plan premium for the Former Spouse, and before any waiver for benefits reduced in lieu of Retiree's Military Retirement benefits, together with any costs of living increases or similar increases that occur or would have occurred but for the Retiree's acceptance of reduced benefits after Retirement. The sharing of Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay shall commence upon July 1, 2003 and shall continue until the death of either party. If the amount payable directly from the United States Army is or becomes less than the Former Spouse's entitlement, the Retiree shall pay the difference to the Former Spouse directly or through the Domestic Relations Office of Cumberland County. Pending the implementation to this Order by the Army Finance Service, the Retiree shall pay the Former Spouse's entitlement directly to the Former Spouse. Retiree shall elect the maximum Survivor's Benefit Plan annuity and the Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan which will insure that the Former Spouse's coverage shall not drop below fifty five (55%) percent at the age of 62 and for the rest of the Former Spouse's life. The Retiree shall pay fifty (50%) of the Survivor Benefit Plan and Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan premiums and the Former Spouse shall pay fifty (50%) percent of said premiums. Under the terms of the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act, the United States Army, as the paying authority is required to directly pay Former Spouse her monthly percentage share of Retiree's monthly disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because of the following. In the course of the parties' marriage, Retiree formed at least ten years of service credible and determining his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay. The parties were married on August 29, 1970 and were divorced on June 19, 2003. Retiree began service credible and determined his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay with the United States Army in June 1971, has performed active duty of 24.1 years service until his retirement from active duty on July 1, 1995. Neither Retiree nor Former Spouse will do or cause to be done any act which will cause this provision to become null and void, and each party agrees that this will be the final Order pertaining to the division of the Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree and Former Spouse agree that the Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay is and shall be accruing as a result of his service in the United States Army and that the Military Retired/Retainer pay is marital property subject to equitable distribution by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Retiree and Former Spouse further agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is competent to divide the parties' marital property incident to their divorce pursuant to Section 201(c), of the Divorce Code. Retiree and Former Spouse finally agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over the Retiree for the purpose of dividing his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because Retiree specifically consents to the Court's jurisdiction to divide his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree acknowledges and agrees that he has been afforded his rights under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.S. Appendix 501-591). The Court shall retain jurisdiction over Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay for as long as the parties both shall live. The Court shall also have the authority to make every just and equitable Order not inconsistent with the other provisions hereof. The Court shall also have the specific authority to make any Orders it deems just and equitable as a result of the income tax consequences which flow from the division and distribution of the Retired/Retainer pay. The Court shall also have continuing jurisdiction to make every Order reasonably necessary to implement and accomplish the direct payment to the Former Spouse by the United States Army of her percentage share of Retiree's disposable Military .4 Retired/Retainer pay, including the right to advise the United States Army of the precise amount or percentage of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay to be payable to the Former Spouse. BY THE COURT: GEORGE E. HOPPER, P.J. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.O1-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S NEW MATTER 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. Admitted. 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted. It is admitted that Former Spouses' Protection Act forms the legal definition of disposable retired pay. It is further admitted that this defmition was not agreed to by the parties. It is the position of the plaintiff that under the Adams v. Adams case, 1999 PaSupra 36, 1725 A.2 1824, and Ledenduski v. Ledenduski, 120 Dauphin 305 (2001), the definition of retired Military pay in the Former Spouses' Protection Act is the definition of retired pay unless a deviation is agreed upon by the parties. No deviation was agreed to by the parties in this case. 10. Admitted in part/Denied in part. It is admitted that the agreements states that the defendant is entitled to 50% of the disposable military income. It is also agreed that the agreement states the parties agree that they will split this pension in half to each party. This pension again refers back to the disposable military income. It is denied that the agreement states that only the SBP is to be deducted prior to the 50/50 split. Furthermore the agreement state that the wife's share shall be $1,854.80. That amount is 50% percent after deduction of both SBP and the VA waiver. 11. Denied. See paragraph nine be $1,854.80. That amount is 50% percent after deduction of both SBP and the VA waiver. 11. Denied. See paragraph nine 12. Admitted. 13. Admitted. 14. Admitted. 15. Denied in part/Admitted in part. It is denied that the agreement is not clear as to what language and definition should be reflected in the QDRO. Except for the agreement by the parties, the statute controls. It is admitted that the definition of what constituted Military pension was never discussed at the conference. However if defendant's counsel wished to depart from the law by agreement it was her obligation to raise such departure. 16. Answers 1-15 are hereby incorporated as if set forth in the entirety herein. 17. It is admitted that plaintiff's counsel was involved in the Adams v. Adams case, cited in the petition. It is further admitted that plaintiff's counsel recognized the language as requested by the defendant's counsel after the agreement was made. However is denied that plaintiff's counsel was able to discern what was in defendant's counsel mind during the negotiation at the Master's Office since she never brought up this point. 18. It is denied that plaintiff's counsel knew or should of known that defendant's would request the language in the QDRO since she never raised the issue during negotiations. Plaintiff s counsel was well aware of the law in this matter. 19. Admitted. However plaintiff s counsel also states that when he drafted the QDRO in the Adams case it was to fulfill an agreement that explicitly expanded on the defmition as used in the Former Spouse Protection Act. Plaintiff s counsel has drafted QDRO's in many cases having various terms tailored specifically to those cases and does not feel having drawn a document specific to a case he is bound to draw every other document with the exact same language. 20. Denied. The draft QDRO from the Adams case was never discussed in the present case prior to the agreement. Since it is defendant's counsel who seeks the departure from current law which can only be done by mutual agreement, it was her duty to raise this issue during negotiations. She is trying to rectify, after the agreement, for her omission prior to the agreement. 21. Denied. It was not plaintiff who desired to depart from the law but defendant. Therefore it is defendant who had the duty of raising any changes from codified law. 22. Plaintiff has no knowledge to answer this allegation. It is denied that plaintiff counsel ever gave any hint that he was interested in changing the law. 23. Admitted It was unnecessary to state in the agreement that which occurs by operation of law. 24. Denied. If defendant's counsel had raised the issue plaintiff's counsel would have immediately recognized the distinction between the two QDRO's and would have agreed or not agreed to her departure from the law. WHEREFORE, plaintiff request that is honorable court sign a QDRO as attached in his original Petition for Special Relief. A final copy is attached hereto. Respectfully Submitted TURO LAW OFFICES _----,-° Robert J. ulderig, Esqu 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0.01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER WHEREAS, BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, hereinafter referred to as Former Spouse, and ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR, hereinafter referred to as Retiree, have entered into a comprehensive property settlement agreement dated June 3, 2004; and WHEREAS, as part of the settlement agreement Retiree agrees that the Former Spouse receive fifty (50%) percent of his U.S. Army Pension; and WHEREAS, counsel for Retiree and counsel for Former Spouse have acknowledged that this Qualified Domestic Relations Order is being made pursuant to the Domestic Relations Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as it relates to the provisions being made by the Former Spouse relating to her marital property rights; and WHEREAS, it is intended that this Order will qualify as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, as defined in Section 414(p)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the provisions hereof shall be administered and interpreted in eohformity with the Code. Pursuant to Section 414(p)(2) of the Code, the following facts are hereby specified: 1. The Act to which this Order applies is the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982 2. The name of the Service member is ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., whose current mailing address is 1402 Bradley Drive, A-213 (Pheasant Run), Carlisle, PA 17013, and whose social security number is 532-52-7420. 3. The name and address of the alternate payee is BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW whose current mailing address is 1447 Hillcrest Ct., Apt. #303, Camp Hill, PA 17011-8022, and whose social security number is 532-54-8206. Military Retired/Retainer Pay. Former Spouse shall be awarded a monthly fifty percent share of the Retiree's U.S. Army Disposable Retired/Retainer pay. Said award shall be in accordance with and construed by the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982 (Public Law 97-252). . The sharing of Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay shall commence upon July 1, 2003 and shall continue until the death of either party. Pending the implementation of this Order by the Army Finance Service, the Retiree shall pay the Former Spouse's entitlement directly to the Former Spouse. Retiree shall elect the maximum Survivor's Benefit Plan annuity. Under the terms of the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act, the United States Army, as the paying authority is required to directly pay Former Spouse her monthly percentage share of Retiree's monthly disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because of the following. In the course of the parties' marriage, Retiree performed at leastten years of service credible in determining his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay. The parties were married on August 29, 1970 and were divorced on June 19, 2003. Retiree began service credible and determined his eligibilityfor Retired/Retainer paywith the United States Army in June 1971, has performed active duty until his retirement from active duty on July 1, 1995. Neither Retiree nor Former Spouse will do or cause to be done any act which will cause this provision to become null and void, and each party agrees that this will be the final Order pertaining to the division of the Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree and Former Spouse agree that the Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay is and shall be accruing as a result of his service in the United States Army and that the Military Retired/Retainer pay is marital property subject to equitable distribution by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Retiree and Former Spouse further agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is competent to divide the parties' marital property incident to their divorce pursuant to Section 301(c), of the Divorce Code. Retiree and Former Spouse finally agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has jurisdiction overthe Retiree for the purpose of dividing his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because Retiree specifically consents to the Court's jurisdiction to divide his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree acknowledges and agrees that he has been afforded his rights under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.S. Appendix 501-591). The Court shall retain jurisdiction over Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer payfor as long as the parties both shall live. The Court shall also have the authority to make every just and equitable Order not inconsistent with the other provisions hereof. The Court shall also have the specific authority to make any Orders it deems just and equitable as a result of the income tax consequences which flow from the division and distribution of the Retired/Retainer pay. The Court shall also have continuing jurisdiction to make every Order reasonably necessary to implement and accomplish the direct payment to the Former Spouse by the United States Army of her percentage share of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay, including the right to advise the United States Army of the precise amount or percentage of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay to be payable to the Former Spouse. BY THE COURT: GEORGE E. HOPPER, P.J. JOEL E. LEVENDUSKI, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff :DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. LAURA A. LEVENDUSKI, Defendant : NO. 357 S 1998 OPINION Defendant Laura Levenduski (hereinafter "Mrs. Levenduski") and Plaintiff Joel Levenduski (hereinafter "Mr. Levenduski") were married on May 31, 1980 and divorced on Mazch 23, 1999. The parties are the pazents of three children, Nicholas, born April 12, 1981; Renee, born February 23, 1983; and Matthew, bom December 20, 1991. Since December 9, 1997, Nicholas and Renee have resided with Mr. Levenduski and Matthew has resided with Mrs. Levenduski. On March 10, 1999, the parties executed a Property Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") which both believed would resolve all issues pertaining to the divorce. At the time, the parties were represented by counsel. Presently before this court is Mrs. Levenduski's Petition For Enforcement And Contempt Of Property Settlement Agreement. She azgues that her former husband has violated several provisions of their Agreement, including those dealing with child support, life insurance and the division of Mr. Levenduski's pension. This court's analysis of her azguments and the relevant law is set forth below. rn _ t:=~ Mrs. Levenduski's main contention pertains to Pazagraph 10 of the Agreement which states in pertinent part: - ~EB 0 2 2001 i h2rvuy ce,*lil`y that l!e foregeio0 is a ~' true and c~rraci cop;; w•t iha original ~' ftlad. Prothonotary 10. PENSION AND RE'T'IREMENT Wife will receive thirty (30%) of husband's military retirement. Husband agrees to apply for retirement no later that June 30, 1999.... Wife further waives the military survivor benefit plan. The United States Code defines "disposable retired pay" in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1408, as the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less amounts which...(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result o£..a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under Title 5 or Title 38. 10 USCS § 1048(A)(4)(B). Testimony at the hearing revealed that Mr. Levenduski began receiving military pension of $2,406 in August of 1999. However, Mrs. Levenduski did not begin receiving her 30% share until September of 1999. Therefore, this court finds that Mrs. Levenduski is entitled to be reimbursed by her former husband for August of 1999 in the amount of $721.80, plus interest. Subsequently, Mr. Levenduski applied for and was approved for veteran's disability compensation. Those payments, which started in July of 2000, are offset against his military retirement benefits and aze tax-free. Accordingly, Mr. Levenduski maintains that the disability benefit is a separate benefit that Mrs. Levenduski is not entitled to. He further argues that the terms of the Agreement are clear and unambiguous. The parties agreed that Mrs. Levenduski would receive 30% of Mr. Levenduski's military pay, not an actual monetary amount, no matter what dollar figure Mrs. Levenduski contemplated at the time of the Agreement's execution. Mrs. Levenduski counters that she knew nothing of her former husband's intention to apply for disability benefits. She maintains that prior to the time the parties executed the Agreement, an appraisal had been conducted regarding Mr. Levenduski's pension. Mrs. Levenduski further maintains that she expected to receive an amount certain and she relied on that dollar figure. She contends that based on her reliance, she gave up her right to the imposition of alimony in this action. Finally, she azgues that since Mr. Levenduski did not apply for disability until after their Agreement and after the commencement of his military retirement, Mr. Levenduski should be held to his contractual commitment, pursuant to the expectation of the parties at the time. Mrs. Levenduski cites an unpublished Cumberland County Opinion, issued on February 17, 1994 by the Honorable Edgaz B. Bayley in support of her position. She maintains that the facts in that case, Adams v. Adams. 2205 Civil 1987 (Comb. Co., Febnuary 17, 1994), are identical to the facts in the case sub judice. This court disagrees. In Adams, the wife was to receive a designated portion of her husband's retirement (46%). The provision in that property settlement agreement dealing with wife's apportionment of her husband's "disposable retirement pay" was specifically defined more restrictively as follows: All military retirement benefits to which Husband is entitled reduced only by the survivor benefit plan premium if any for Wife and before anv waiver for benefits received in lieu of Husband's military retirement benefits, together with any cost-of-living increases or similar increases that occur after retirement. Adams, at p. 3 (emphasis in the original). After execution of the agreement, husband received an offset from his militazy retirement pay for disability benefits subsequently received by him. Judge Bayley found the intent of the parties cleaz. Based on the specific language of their property settlement agreement, Judge Bayley required husband to pay the full amount of military retirement pay to his ex-wife as calculated under the agreement without deductions for the veteran's disability benefit. Adams, at p. 4-5. Husband did not appeal from this determination. Several years later, Mr. Adams attempted to again reduce his wife's portion of his retirement. This time, Mr. Adams accepted a federal civil service position, which, like disability, operated to reduce his spouse's monthly pension benefit due to a federally mandated pay-cap ordered for dual government compensation of military retirees. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Adams v. Adams, 725 A.2d 824 (Pa.Super. 1999), affirmed the lower court's ruling that Mr. Adams reimburse his wife the difference due between what she should receive pursuant to the terms of their property settlement agreement and what she received after her husband's deduction due to the civil service employment. The Superior Court explained: The trial court noted in its opinion that it previously had determined in the divorce action that the parties had agreed to a more restrictive definition than that made by the federal government. They did so without regazd to the federal govemmenf s requirement that a reduction in Husband's military retirement pay was a preconditiion to receipt of veteran's disability benefits. The trial court applied',, the same reasoning to deny Husband a reduction in retirement, pay owed to Wife to reflect the reduction in his pension benefits reginred to meet+the pay-cap imposed for dual government compensation of military retirees. Indeed, the trial court noted Husband voluntarily elected to reduce his pension payments rather than his current salary. Adams, 725 A.2d at 827. The Superior Court went on to reject Mr. Adam's latter argument and found that the trial court's conclusion was supported by the record. The Court further discussed: Husband agreed to a more restrictive definition of eligible military retirement pay than the one recognized by the federal government. He promised not to make a waiver or accept any offset of his pension eligibility other than the amount deducted to fund one-half the survivor's benefit plan insurance. Consequently, the trial court correctly decided Husband is bound to this mutually agreed upon and more restrictive definition of "eligible" disposable retirement pay. He agreed to pay based on that definition without regazd to unilateral subsequent waivers or offsets he initiated that the federal government then deducted to make its calculation of his eligible monthly military retirement pay. Husband is bound under the agreement to the terms as defined in the agreement. Adams, 725 A.2d at 828. This court finds that it is this more restrictive definition of military retirement pay as found in the property settlement agreement in the Adams case that distinguishes the result from the instant case. In the Levenduski's Agreement, there is no restrictive definition or limiting language as to what offsets that which Mr. Levenduski is entitled to receive as pension money. Mr. Levenduski agreed to provide 30% of his military retirement pay to his wife, subject to the application of the federal law that controls the distribution and administration of his pension. To read a more restrictive definition as to what constitutes his military retirement pay with that which appeazs in their Agreement is impemussible. Unfortunately for Mrs. Levenduski, the drafters of the Agreement should have considered such a result when creating an instrument intended to protect her future interest in her husband's retirement pay. Therefore, this court declines to improperly consider the intent of the parties at the time of the Agreement's execution. Of further note, the United States Supreme Court in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989), has interpreted the applicable provision of the U.S. Code holding that the USFSPA does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce militazy retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 595. In addressing the potential unfairness in such a rationale, Justice Marshall explained: We realize that reading the statute literally may inflict economic harm on many former spouses. But we decline to misread the statute in order to reach a sympathetic result when such a reading requires us to do violence to the plain language of the statute and to ignore much of the legislative history. Congress chose the language that requires us to decide as we do, and Congress is free to change it. Id. Two more issues are raised with regard to Mrs. Levenduski's Petition, including proof of beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy and reimbursement for child support. This court finds that although Mr. Levenduski demonstrated at the hearing in this case that he had in fact obtained a life insurance policy with a face amount of $50,000, he has yet to designate Mrs. Levenduski as the beneficiary or provide proof of the same. This court orders that proof of such designation be provided to Mrs. Levenduski within twenty (20) days from the date of this Opinion and Order. Finally, Mrs. Levenduski is requesting child support and babysitting expenses incurred during 1999. Pazagraph 11 of the Agreement provides that Mr. Levenduski agrees to pay $600 in child support for Matthew directly to Mrs. Levenduski through December 31, 1999 and one-half the babysitting costs for Matthew during that summer. The Agreement also provided that neither party could apply for a modification of that amount until January 1, 2000. Evidence revealed that upon petition filed by Mr. Levenduski, in October of 1999, Dauphin County Domestic Relations entered an Order requiring him to pay $134.32 per month to Mrs. Levenduski. Presently, Mrs. Levenduski requests the difference between the amount she should have received under the Agreement and the amount she actually received based on the Domestic Relations Order from September of 1999 through December of 1999, or $1,862.72. Further, she asks for $400 representing half of the babysitting expenses for Matthew during the Summer of 1999. Since neither party presented proof that the amounts at issue were factored into the Domestic Relations Order, this court fmds that Mrs. Levenduski is entitled to those amounts covered by their Agreement. Therefore, the total due Mrs. Levenduski toward the support of Matthew is $2, 262.72. Accordingly, the following is entered: JOEL E. LEVENDUSKI, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. LAURA A. LEVENDUSKI, Defendant NO. 357 S 1998 ORDER AND NOW, this ~°'`~-day of February, 2001, the following is hereby ordered with respect to Defendant Laura Levenduski's Petition For Enforcement And Contempt Of Property Settlement Agreement: 1. Defendant's request for reimbursement of pension money not received as a result of plaintiff s receipt of disability compensation is DENIED. 2. Defendant's request for reimbursement of $721.80 plus interest representing pension money not received for August of 1999 is GRANTED. 3. Defendant's request for reimbursement of $2,262.72 representing babysitting costs not received for the Summer of 1999 and child support not received from September of 1999 through December of 1999 is GRANTED. 4. Counsel fees are not Distribution: Madeline R. Kau&nan, Esq., Four Greenwood Squaze, Ste. 200, Bensalem, PA 19020 Max J. Smith, Jr., Esq., POB 650, Hershey, PA 17033 -~- VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's New Matter are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. ,:1/ Q3 Date obert J. derig, Esqui~~~ Turo Law ffices CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's New Matter upon Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, by depositing same in the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the ~ day of i~uGas7` , 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Lisa M. Greason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 TURO LAW OFFICES ~ ~ j ~ .~ Robert Mul erig, Es 28 Sou h Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff r {?_ g' ~Y `~._ ~:- C~.i } ~^ ~t ~~.3 ~ y '7 J C / , n ~.1' ~h yr ' I I' ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE RDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~ day of , 2003, based upon the issues raised in Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs tion to Make Rule Absolute, it is hereby I~~ ordered that: 1. Argument shall be held on ~ C°,~ ~ ~ 7, 2003 in CourtYoom # ~ of the Cumberland County Courthouse;/~' ; ,3 ~ ~-G~'1 f 2. Plaintiff shall submit a brief in this matter in accordance with Local R.C.P. 210.6 due twelve (12) days prior to oral argument; 3. Defendant shall submit a brief in this matter in accordance with Local R.C.P. 210.6 due five (5) days prior to oral argument. t J. Mulderig, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff M. treason, Esquire Attorney for Defendant ~~s 09~25~a3 BY THE COURT, ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff III v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO MAKE RULE ABSOLUTE AND NOW, comes the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, by and through her attorney, Lisa M. treason, Esquire, and makes these Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Motion to Make Rule Absolute. 1. plaintiff's Motion to Make Rule Absolute, signed September 10, 2003 does not accurately reflect Defendant's position on this matter. ~ 2. There is no dispute that the parties did not agree on the definition of "disposable retired pay" in the settlement agreement. 3. There is a dispute as to whether the definition appearing in "The Former Spouses Protection Act" is binding in the absence of such agreement. 4. There is a dispute as to the meaning of the "disposable retired pay." Plaintiff i5 trying to have "The Former Spouses Protection Act" apply when he failed to ask for that at the agreement conference. 5. "The Former Spouses Protection Act", at no time, is even mentioned in the agreement. 6. The separation agreement specifically states only the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) shall be deducted from the military retirement rip or to a 50/50 split between the parties. Plaintiff is now trying to incorporate other deductions not specifically asked for. 7. It is well known authority, that any ambiguity in the definitions or language shall be construed against the writer, which was the Plaintiff's counsel. 8. Plaintiff's counsel inappropriately attached authority on his Motion for Rule to Show Cause and in his Answer to. Defendant's Motion for Rule to Show Cause. These are improper forums for authority. 9. Defendant's counsel has not been given the opportunity to present authority,. evidence or argument to this Honorable Court. 10. Plaintiffs Motion fails to include a paragraph of Defendant's nonoccurrence and response to this Motion. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests this Honorable Court to deny Plaintiff's Motion to Make Rule Absolute and to permit argument either orally or by briefs in this matter. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE ~JI~~D~ Date Post Office Box 3 Carlisle, PA 1701 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 uire CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Make Rule Absolute upon Robert J. Muiderig, Esquire, byldgpositing same in the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the $$ day of September, 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Robert J. Mulderig 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 GREASON LAW OFFICE Lisa M. treason, E: Post Office Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 I~ ' '' ~ ~~ ', - ' ~» ~- a (~~ r:, -; =; _ ; c J'^ `i7 ~~ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff II v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE Motion To Make Rule Absolute AND NOW, comes the Movant, Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., by and through his attorney, Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire, and makes this Motion To Make Rule Absolute. 1. On July 17, 2003 a Petition for Special Relief was filed on behalf of Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. in the above caption case. 2. On July 21, 2003 A Rule to Show Cause was issued upon Defendant. 3. On August 12, 2003, Defendant filed a response with new matter. 4. On August 14, 2003 A Rule to Show Cause was issued upon Plaintiff. 5. On August 15, 2003, Plaintiff filed a response. 6. There is no dispute between the parties that there were no agreements to use the language that Defendant's counsel now desires. 7. The only issue in contention is whether the definition of "disposable retired pay" as stated in "The Former Spouse Protection Act" is binding in the absence of an agreement of the parties. This is purely a question of law. 8. RCP 206.7(b) states that if the pleadings raise no dispute of material fact, the Court on petition of the plaintiff will rule based on the pleadings. THEREFORE, Movant requests this Honorable Court to make the July 21. 2003 Rule to Show Cause absolute and Sign the ODRO attached to Plaintiffs August 15, 2003 Response. /o ~ Date Respectfully Submitted TURD LAW OFFICES Robert J. Ic3erig, Esquire`) 28 South itt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff CERTIFICATE.OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Motion To Make Rule Absolute upon Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, by depositing same ' the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the ~~ day of 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Lisa M. Greason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 TURO LAW OFFICES r RoberlJ. M erig, Esquire 28 South Pi Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff 4rJ l__ ~~' _. (s'i (! ~ f _.__ i- i. ' f } 1. ~:~ ~'_ !n ~_. r~ es l ~~~ ~,r' r :~ t, t~J ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AND NOW, this ~ day of 2003, upon receipt of the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Petition fo pecial Relief, a Rule to Show Cause is issued upon Plaintiff to show cause, if any he has, why the relief requested therein cannot be granted. This Rule is returnable ~ days from service BY THE COURT, O~ ~-~g6~ a ~~~ J . .. R , Hii~;`;1<<<,SI~11~~d ry iir ifll':r~ ('t ,-..:'ICJ _+i:~i~~`~iir +t./ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW :CIVIL ACTION -LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO PLEAD TO: Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. C/o Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire 28 S. Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 You are hereby notified to file a written response to the enclosed New Matter within twenty (20) days from service hereof or a judgment may be entered against you. Respectfully Submitted GREASON LAW OFFICE -X1_(33 Date (/Lisa M. treason, Es uire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 Attorney for Respondent ,.; P..._.__. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF AND NOW COMES Barbara Kay Bradshaw, by and through her attorney, Lisa M. treason, Esquire and responds to Plaintiff's Petitioner for Special Relief and answers as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. Admitted. 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that the Former Spouses' Protection Act does provide a definition for disposable retired pay as summarized in this paragraph and in full in exhibit four, however, it is denied that this definition of disposable retired pay was agreed to by the parties. 10.Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that the agreement states that Defendant is entitled to 50% of the disposable military income. By way of further answer, the agreement states "the parties agree that they will split this pension in half to each party" and further states only the SBP is to be deducted prior to the 50/50 split. It is denied that this agreement incorporated the definition of disposable military income in the Former Spouses' Protection Act. 11.Admitted in part, denied in part. The first sentence of the pleading is admitted. Defendant is not in the position to admit or deny what the Plaintiff feels. By way of further answer, Defendant disagrees that the absence of which definition the ,., parties agreed to, that it defaults to the Former Spouses' Protection Act. No definitions were agreed to at the time of the conference. Further, Plaintiff knew or should have known that Defendant would only agree to the language as proposed by the Defendant. 12. Admitted. 13.Admitted. 14. Admitted. 15. Denied. The Agreement is not clear as to what language and definitions should be reflected in the QDRO. By way of further answer, the Agreement only reflected generally that there would be a QDRO to delineate the split in the military retirement. The terms of the ODRO were never discussed during the conference atthe-Divorce Master's Office. Further, if Plaintiffs counsel wished to have the definitions of the Former Spouses' Protection Act as the controlling definitions, he should have discussed that at the conference. NEW MATTER 16. Paragraphs 1-15 are hereby incorporated as if set forth in their totality herein. 17. Plaintiff's counsel was aware of the language as requested by Defendant's counsel due to his involvement in the Adams v. Adams case cited in his Petition. 18. Plaintiffs counsel knew or should have known that Defendant's counsel would request that language in the QDRO. 19. Defendant's counsel's draft QDRO is a copy from the Adams case that was drafted by Plaintiff. 20. Given Plaintiffs counsel's knowledge of Defendant's Counsel's use of the draft ODRO, Plaintiff's counsel should not be permitted to purposely omit his request for definitions different then those in his draft QDRO during the conference in order to benefit later from such omission. 21. Had Plaintiffs counsel wished to use the definitions in the Former Spouses' Protection Act, he should have said so at the conference. 22. Defendant's counsel did not request different definitions during the conference since it was believed that Plaintiff's counsel would use his own draft ODRO and all language included therein. ',~'+ "I 2...._ . 11 23. Plaintiff only stated that the cost of the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) would be deducted from gross military pension before the 50/50 split. At no time did Plaintiff state in the agreement that other deductions would be made to the gross military pension before the 50/50 split occurred. 24.The only way to have avoided this issue would have been to read the entire QDRO into the record at the conference, at which time, any change in the definitions from the draft QDRO to the Former Spouses' Protection Act by Plaintiff's counsel would have been discovered and not agreed to. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court deny Plaintiff's Petition and to issue a rule on Plaintiff to show cause as to why the language in the draft ODRO should not be signed. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE ~-11-03 Date Lisa PN. treason, Esquir Post Office Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 ~~ a_ 11 1 VERIFICATION I, Lisa M. treason, Esquire, attorney for the Defendant herein, have sufficient knowledge of the facts contained in this Response and New Matter and verify that the statements made in the foregoing Response and New Matter are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, based upon information received from the Defendant. I understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. A verification executed by the Plaintiff will be filed of record as soon as it becomes available. ~'- if--D3 Date ISA . GREASON, Esqui r,~, ~ , ,. _ ._. . c'' o s.:. ,.... -:. n ~ '. ' i _. o, ~_ -_ 2=^ -- ; _._ r ~.> ° r~i ... ~~ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. Ol - 4611 CIVIL BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN DIVORCE CONFERENCE WITH COUNSEL AND THE PARTIES TO: Robert J. Mulderig Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr Counsel for Plaintiff Plaintiff Lisa M. Greason Barbara Kay Bradshaw Counsel for Defendant Defendant A conference has been scheduled at the Office of the Divorce Master, 9 North Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the 3rd day of June 2003, at 9:00 a.m., with counsel and the parties to discuss the outstanding economic issues to determine if there is a basis of settlement of claims. If issues remain after the conference, a hearing will be scheduled at another date. Very truly yours, Date of Notice: E. Robert Elicker, II May 27, 2003 Divorce Master 1 Cn ~ wf~~ZTD~3m m m n-{-In(~m ~. ~.n~ N o (AnpC~'--o < ~s.-.~ rr~ ~ `yJJxx~~ ~~2°c J ~ ~ N = ~ y w ~j o N N N O O O O O O W W W fA Efl EA to ifl E9 to EA EA to N JOOf fW0 ON1N SOD W O OD U+ (7~ V ~I V O A O ~ t0 -~ d> O A O O O V W W W A A N A O o f n N N N B O A O O i N V Oo N O A A J OD W V N W &1 EA &i to fA Hi fA ifl to •J N N O ~ W W t0 W O W O s W~ Of O i i0 OD OD IV CD ~I W O D) ~ N 0/ O W E 10 OA01J (O W NA fl1 O+O (O V W 00 V OOOOOOD X00 fA ffl 7 fA 2 fA t0 W N W f0 W N N ? A O Of i U N V (n pD -~ O J W fA EA fA 69 Hi fA l fA 1 ~_ N W I N ~ W O O W V V N O O f JI O i f 0 A l 0 O D V OD A A N A OD N ~ A A O V . p V O G W f T A W N -~ DOSS G D I ~ n m e ? ~ 3 ~ r~ d ~ n o m m W v ~> > m >• a c~ Z~ y N N y o m m m~ o~ O C D U1 ` 7 C I N ~ 61 ~ W ^ y 2 3 N ? ~ n ~ ~ f Efl Efl fA EA &) n C (O J O W N N O O O O O O O o IV O O O O ~ O ffl fA Lfl ffl to .do y fD N s •O OD 01 O W N d A V O 01 IV d OD A O W O O D7 O O O O O ()t C N O O (fl O -~ O to rn ~n vi D ~ ~ o ~ ~ c o ~ y t0 V fli OD p. fn (T O A Q O O O O t~ O O O ~ Q C ffl to Hi W _ O N ~ ~ (t~ fT N ~ O N N fl7 O O O O O O O O O N ~ n ~ ~ ~ Z Z o Q n O ~ ~ N ° r' N ~ ~ N D (( ~~ ~ ~ W j O S r J ~~ 1 m m o N ~ m a m m N N A A 'C J j ~ N N ,d. O O ~ ~ W W fn to Z O Z W V W N .Z1 N N D r D m - l o 'o m m k ~ t 2 A V O 01 O O to 69 i W V O A W N W N J N N YEAR Arthur Emplo er Barbara Em toyer 2000 $ 66,104.00 MPRI $ 3,780.OD $ 8,035.D0 Eastern Univ $ 3,780.00 Consultant $ 41,800.00 military retirement 2001 $ 68,600.00 MPRI $ 5,705.74 $ 8,820.00 Eastern Univ $ (279.00) author $ 42,804.00 military retirement 2002 $ 66,419.00 MPRI $ 5,239.00 Probe $ 6,800.00 Eastern Univ $ (1,400.00) author $ 43,899.00 military retirement $ 1,242.00 consultant TOTAL $ 358,303.00 $ 13,045.74 Average $ 119,434.33 $ 4,348.58 See attached for prior years' totals Proposed Income division Arthur Barbara $ 22,000.00 1/2 military ODRO $ 22,000.00 1/2 military ODRO $ 68,000.00 MPRI $ 19,000.00 PROBE $ 2,511.00 ave consultant ($9.50 x 40 hrs x 50 wks $ 7,885.00 ave EU $ (839.50 ave author $ (24,OD0.00) Alimony $ 24,000.00 Alimony Totals $ 76,396.00 $ 64,160.50 Monthly $ 6,366.33 $ 5,346.71 ~,~V~ Help Us Keep Four Earnings Record t~ccurate You, your employer acid Social Security share responsibility for the accuracy of your earnings record. Since you began working, we recorded yuur reported earnings under your name and Social Security number. We have updated yuur record each time your employer (vr you, if you're self-employed) reported your earnings. Remember, it's yuur earnings, not the amount of taxes you paid or the number of credits you've earned, Ural determine yourbene6t amount. When we figure that amount, we base it on your average earnings over your lifetime. If our records are wrong, yuu may not receive all the benefits to which you are entitled. 4 Review this chart carefully using your own records to make sure our information is correct and that we've recorded each year you worked. You're the only person who can look at the earnings chart and know whether it is complete. Some or all of your earnings from last year may nut be shown on your Statement. It could be that we were still processing last year's earnings reports when yuur STulenrenl was prepared. Your complete earnings for last year will be shown on next year's S[afemen[. Note: If yuu wvrked for more Limn one employer during any year, or if yuu had both earnings and self-employment income, we combined yuur earnings for the year. 4 There's a limit on the amount of eamin¢s on which you pay Social Seceeity taxes each year. The limit increases yearly. Only the maximum taxable amount will appear on your earnings chart. (For Medicare taxes, the maximum earnings amount began rising in ].991. Since 1.994, all of your earnings are taxed for Medicare.) 4 Call us right away at 1-8UU-772-1213 (7 a.m. - 7 p.m if any earnings fur years before last year are shown incorrectly. If possible, have your W-2 or tax return for those years handy. (!f you live outside the U.S., follow the directions at the bottom of Page 4.) Your Earnings Record at a Glance Your Tweed Your "razed Years You Social Senirih• hledicse ~i'orked Earnings Earnings Me dicare began 19(15 $ 95 iu 1966 19f,6 982 $ 98L 1967 2.217 L.217 1968 835 33> 1969 861 861 1970 29`2 293 1971 3.148 ;3,148 19T2 6.588 6,588 1973 8,370 8,370 1974 10,389 10.389 1975 12.681 12,681 1976 14,090 14,090 197 / 15.096 lu.U96 1178 1(1.320 16.320 1979 17.644 17,(144 1980 19,386 19.386 1981 '22.579 2'1,579 198E 'Lii.8~3 26.863 1983 L8,548 L8,548 1984 30,387 30,387 1985 32,(171 32.671 198f> .',4,034 34.034 1987 35.932 3593'L 1988 40,407 40.407 1989 43,737 43.137 Years You i&>rked 7"eor l:ieed Social Security Eamiugs Your ~r.~<ed ~tedic:ue Eamiugs' 1990 $ 4(1.39(1 $ 4(1.39(1 1991 49.129 49.129 1992 51.350 51,850 1993 57.600 58.457 1994 6QG0U (14,267 1995 56.005 56.005 1996 5581 5.581 1997 58,544 58.544 1998 (18.400 69,299 1999 5L.GUO 82,(199 2000 7(1.200 84,639 Totals over your working career. Estimated taxes for Socia! Security: Estiuralzd taxes paid for Medicare: You paid: $60.506 You paid: $14,349 Your employers paid: $61.658 Your employers paid: $14,349 Note: If you are self-employed, you pay the total tax on your net eandngs. iiiiiun~muiiiwmu~umi ....., / ' ~Q~~ iJ.~ 3m~~~ Y aIl~ ~ra~~l;Q~$ ~~®~ ~°C~~'~L~ , You, your employer and Social Security share when your Statement was prepared. Your complete responsibility for the accuracy of your earnings record. earnings for last year will be shown on next yeaz's Since you began working, we recorded your reported Statement. Note: If you worked for more than eamings under your name and Social Security number. one employer during any year, or if you had both We have updated your record each time your employer earnings and self-employment income, we combined (or you, if you're self-employed) reported your earnings. your eamings for the year. Remember, it's your eamings, not the amount of taxes you paid or the number of credits you've earned, that ®Theae's a lianit on the amotmt of earnbmgs oa wLid- determine your benefit amount When we figure that yon pay Social iq* tames each year. The limit amount, we base it on your average eamings over your increases yearly. Only the maximum taxable amount lifetime. If our records are wrong, you may not receive will appear on your eamings chart (For Medicaze all the benefits to which you are znfitled. taxes, the maximum eamings amount began rising 7 Review this chart carrfnH~y using your own records in 1991. Sincz 1994, all of your earnings are taxed for to make sure our information is correct and that Medicare.) we've recorded each year you worked. You re the only person who can look at the eamings chart and know • Call as right away at 1-800-772-1213 (7 a.m. - 7 p.m. whether it is complete. if any eamings for years before last year are shown Some or all of your eamings from last year may not inc;nrrectly. If possible, have your W-2 or tax return be shown on your Statement. It could be that we for those years handy. (If you live outride the U.S., were Still processing last year's eamings reports follow the directions at the bottom of Page 4.) Yom Earnings Rewrd at a Glance Your Taxed Your Taxed Yeazs You Social Security Medicare worked Earnings Eanungs 1969 $ 594 $ 594 1970 570 570 1971 0 0 1972 0 0 1973 0 0 1974 0 0 1975 0 0 1976 0 0 1977 0 0 1978 0 0 1979 0 0 1980 0 0 1981 0 0 1982 0 0 1983 0 0 19$4 0 0 1985 0 0 1986 0 0 1987 0 0 1988 0 0 1989 0 0 Your Taxed Your Taxed Yeazs You Social Security Medicaze worked Eazn+^gs Earnings 1990 $ 0 $ 0 1991 0 0 1992 3,879 3,879 1993 5,441 5,441 1994 1,142 1,142 1995 0 0 1996 0 0 1997 1,232 1,232 1998 1,600 1,600 1999 10.480 10,480 2000 3,780 3,780 ~~ Totals over your wonting career. Estimated taxes for Social Security: Estimated taxes paid for Medicare: You paid: $2,400 You paid: $553 Your employers paid: $1,105 Your employers paid: $251 Note: If you a:e self-employed, you pay the total tax on your net earn9rcgs. el PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION REM VALUE AT DOS HUSBAND WIFE MILRARY PENSION $ 3,709.59 $ 1,854.80 $ 1,854.80 Husband's grass income:. $ 77.749.92 Wifes gross income potential: $ 32,886.00 KEYCORP Dividend Reinvestment $ 132.83 $ 132.e3 Acct 3005577024/3000557025 Merrill Lynch ' Wrfe's acct: 86Q-61966 $ 20,075.75 8 20,075.75 Husband's acct: 860-62059 $ 23,405.57 $ 23,405.57 American Funds $ 1,203.31 $ 1,203.31 Pentagon Federal Credit Union $ 7,416.11 $ 7,416.11 Account Number: 405308-01-6 INCREASE FROM PENSION ALLOTMENT Balance PNC Checking Account $ 3,513.90 $ 3,513.90 Account Number: 50-8021-0931 PNC Checking Account $ 2,000.00 $ 2,000.00 Account Number: 50-0363-6058 FROM SALE OF HOUSE PNC Savings Account $ 13,071.84 $ 13,071.84 Account Number: 50-0365-8417 FROM SALE OF HOUSE M8T Checking Account $ 5,419.87 $ 5,419.87 Account Number: 00000001144308 including proceeds from sale Mhouse M8T SaVing Account $ 56,564.114 $ 18,035.56 $ 38,528.48 Account Number: 15004200939485 FROM SALE OF HOUSE AND PENSION ALLOTMENT LESS INCOME TAX L-3 Communications Master Savings $ 23,000.00 $ 23,000.00 Liberty National Life Insurance Go $ 2,953.00 8 2,953.00 Policy Number A5101349 Insured: Barbara K. Bradshaw $25,000 Whole Life Cash Surrender Value: Unknown The Old Line Life Insurance Co. of $ 6,746.59 $ 6,746.59 Insured: Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. Policy Number 1381912 $so,ooD Army Muluel Aid Association $ 8,480.21 $ 8,480.21 Number T-55089XOL Time Share: Williamsburg, VA. $ 2,000.00 $ 2,000.00 Art Collection: $ - $ - 8 - 2001 PT Cmiser(Wife's) $ 14,500.00 $ 14,500.00 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT (Husb $ 3,175.00 $ 3,175.00 TOTAL ASSETS $ 190,705.02 $ 93,905.77 $ 96,799.25 LIABILITIES Children's student loans. $ 14,706.39 $ 14,706.39 TOTAL $ 175,998.63 $ 79,199.38 $ 96,799.25 55-45 SPLIT $ 96,799.25 $ 79,199.38 ~~3 I ~~~ [~ ~ ~ D )~ ~; ~~~- ~ l ~-~ ~~ 5~ ~ 7 ~v/ ~a~~,~~ ~..3 ~ `~ ~ ~ ~, Z,~i ~A~~4 ~~ PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION ITEM VALUE AT OOS HUSBAND MILffARY PENSION $ 3,709.59 1854.785 Husband's gross inwme:. $ 77,749.92 Wife's gross income gotenfial: KEYCORP Dividend Reinvestment 8 132.93 $ 732.83 Acct 3005577024/3000557025 Merrill Lynch Wife's acct: 860-61966 $ 31,714.00 Husband's acct: B6QE2059 $ 36,837.00 $ 36,837.00 American Funds $ 1,203.31 Pentagon Federal Cretlit Union $ 7,416.11 $ 7,416.11 Account Number: 405308-01-6 INCREASE FROM PENSION ALLOTMENT Balance PNC Checkng Account $ 3,513.90 $ 3,513.90 Awount Number: 50-6021-0931 PNC Checkkg Account $ 2,000A0 Accoum Number: 50-0363-6058 FROM SALE OF HOUSE PNC Savings Acwun[ $ 13,071.84 Acwunt Number: 50-0365-8417 FROM SALE OF HOUSE M&T Checking Acwunt $ 5,419.87 Account Number: 00000007144308 including proceeds from sale of house M&T Saving Account $ 56,564.04 $ 27,776.41 Account Number: 75004200939485 FROM SALE OF HOUSE AND PENSION ALLOTMENfi LESS INCOME TAX L~ Communications Master Savings $ 23,000.00 $ 23,000.00 WIFE 1654.785 $ 32,888.00 $ 37,774.00 $ 1,203.31 $ 2,000.00 $ 13,071.84 $ 5,419.87 $ 28,787.64 Liberty National Life Insurance Co 71 77 Policy Number A5101349 Insured: Barbara K. Bradshaw $25,000 Whole Life Cash Surrender Value: Unknown The Old Line Life Insuranw Co. of $6,746.59 $6,746.59 Insured: Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. Policy Number 1381912 $50,000 Army MuNal Aid Asswiation $ 8,480.21 $ 8,480.21 Number T-55089XOL Time Share: Williamsburg, VA. $ 2,000.00 $ z,w0.o0 Art COllectlon: $ 7,500.00 $ 3,750.00 $ 3,750.00 2001 PT Cruiser (Vllife's) $ 20,000.00 $ 20,000.00 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT (Husb $ 5,000.00 $ 5,000.00 TOTAL ASSETS $ 230,599.70 $ 122,653.05 $ 107,946.66 LIABILITIES Children's student loans. $ 14,708.39 $ 14,706.39 TOTAL $ 215,693.31 $ 107,946.68 $ 107,846.66 50-50 SPLIT $ 107,948.68 ARTICLE tll - SALARSES SECTlPN A -SALARY SCHEDULES CARLl5LK AREA SCHdOL DtST R1C7 SALARY SCHEDULE ' 2903-2004 Step B 624 M M60 t $32,808 534,802 $35.460 $38,402 2 534,030 $35,740 530,604 $39,806 . 3 $35.17A 536.890 537,748 $40,750 4 836,310 $38.033 $]$.881 $41,894 5 $37,452 ~ $39,177 540.035 $43,037 0 $30,005 540.321 $4T.T79 $4A,181 7 539,749 $47,465, $42.323 545.325 8 $40.693 $42,609 543,487 $46,469 4 $A2,037 543,783 $44.611 $87,613 10 S43.t87 $44,897 $45,755 548,758 11 $44,325 546,Q41 548.698 549,902 i2 $45,469 $47,184 $48.042 551,045 13 $46.612 548.328 549,786 552,189 ~ 7d $4'7,758 $49,472 $50.330 $53.333 15 540,900 550,616 S51,a i{ $5{,a7T ~~ 18 $50.044 551,700 $52.018 $55.82f 17 $51,1$8 552,904 $53.762 $56.785 18 552.332 $54.048 554.908 SS?,909 t9 $53.575 555,191 556,049 559.053 . 20 554,020 556,335 557,193 500,796 Note: See l:ompdction SteR Placement Pago 4 ARl'1CLE 111 -SALARIES SEC170N A -SALARY SCHEDULES CARLFSLE AREA SCWdOL DIST RICT SAL ARY SCW£DULH 2DO3-29oa . Step B 824 M M60 i $32.886 $34,802 $35.460 $38,482 2 $34,030 $35,T4D S3D,6D4 539,806 3 535.174 538,890 537,748 840,750 4 538,3t8 538.033 $30.891 $45,094 5 (37,462' 539,577 $40,035 543,037 6 538,805 540.325 545.178 544,181 7 $39,743 $45,465, $42.323 $45.325 B 540,893 $42,609 543,46? $46,469 ' 9 542,037 543,753 544,677 $47,673 18 543.185 544,897 $45,758 549,758 51 $44,325 548,04". $46.898 $49,902 52 545,469 547,564 $48.042 551,045 13 $48.612 $40.928 549,788 $52,589 54 $47,756 549,472 550.330 $53.333 13 (40.900 $50,616 557,474 554 A77 15 $50.044 557,780 $82.818 $55.821 17 551,788 (52,804 $53.762 556.7$5 18 (52.332 554.048 554,908 857,909 t9 $53.476 555,197 (56,049 $59.053 20 554,$20 856,335 551,193 $D0,'196 9 Note: See Campaetiort Step Alacement Pago 4 `~' ~ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS• CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. O1 - 4611 CIVIL BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN DIVORCE CONFERENCE WITH COUNSEL AND THE PARTIES TO: Robert J. Mulderig Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr Counsel for Plaintiff Plaintiff Lisa M. Greason Barbara Kay Bradshaw Counsel for Defendant Defendant A conference has been scheduled at the Office of the Divorce Master, 9 North Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the 27th day of May 2003, at 9:00 a.m., with counsel and the parties to discuss the outstanding economic issues to determine if there is a basis of settlement of claims. If issues remain after the conference, a hearing will be scheduled at another date. Very truly yours, Date of Notice: E. Robert Elicker, II April 24, 2003 Divorce Master OFFICE OF DIVORCE MASTER CUMBERLAND COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)240-6535 E. Robert Elicker, 11 Divorce Master Traci Jo Colyer Office Manager/Reporter West Shore 697-0371 Ext. 6535 December 17, 2002 Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire TURD LAW OFFICES Noble Mansion 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Lisa M. Greason Attorney at Law 155 South Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 RE: Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. vs. Barbara Kay Bradshaw No. O 1 - 4611 Civil In Divorce Dear Mr. Mulderig and Ms. Greason: Mr. Bradshaw has filed a claim for equitable distribution in a complaint (I assume an amended complaint) on December 12, 2002. Inasmuch as an economic issue has been raised, I am going to proceed with a directive for pretrial statements. I am also going to assume that discovery is complete and that there will be no outstanding discovery issues to resolve at the time of the pre-hearing conference. Further, I assume that the parties have either been separated for a period in excess of two years or will consent to the divorce. The original complaint in divorce was filed on August 2, 2001, raising grounds for divorce of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. No other economic claims except equitable distribution as previously noted were filed in the action. In accordance with P.R.C.P. 1920.33(b) I am directing each counsel to file a pretrial statement on or before Friday, January 17, 2003. Upon receipt of the pretrial statements, I will immediately schedule a pre- Mr. Mulderig and Ms. treason, Attorneys at Law 17 December 2002 Pale 2 hearing conference with counsel to discuss the issues and, if necessary, schedule a hearing. Very truly yours, E. Robert Elicker, II Divorce Master NOTE: Sanctions for failure to file the pretrial statements are set forth in subdivision (c) and (d) of Rule 1920.33. THE ORIGINAL PRETRIAL STATEMENT SHOULD BE FILED IN THE MASTER'S OFFICE AND A COPY SENT DIRECTLY TO OPPOSING COUNSEL. FAILURE TO FILE PRETRIAL STATEMENTS AS DIRECTED BY THE MASTER MAY RESULT IN THE MASTER'S APPOINTMENT BEING VACATED. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, Plaintiff VS. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. O1 - 4611 CIVIL IN DIVORCE NOTICE OF PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE TO: Robert J. Mulderig Lisa M. Greason Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendant A pre-hearing conference has been scheduled at the Office of the Divorce Master, 9 North Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the 23rd day of April 2003, at 1:30 p.m., at which time we will review the pre-trial statements previously filed by counsel, define issues, identify witnesses, explore the possibility of settlement and, if necessary, schedule a hearing. very truly yours, Date of Notice: 2/10/03 E. Robert Elicker, II Divorce Master ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 2001-4611 CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW :CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE Defendant NOTICE TO DEFEND NOTICE TO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS. You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a decree in divorce or annulment may be entered against you by the Court. A judgment may also be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you including custody or visitation of your children. When the grounds for the divorce are indignities or irretrievably breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at Cumberland County Courthouse, One Courthouse Square, Carlisle, PA 17013, (717) 240-6195. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF PROPERYT, LAWYER'S FEES OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLIAM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO, OR TELEPHONE, .THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Lawyer Referral Service 4 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 717-249-3166 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2001-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE AND COUNTERCLAIM AND NOW HERECOMES Barbara Kay Bradshaw, the Defendant, by and through her attorney, Lisa M. treason, Esquire and respectfully submits this Answer to Complaint in Divorce and Counterclaims as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge to response as to Plaintiff's desires and what he has been advised of. 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted. 10. It is denied that the marriage is irretrievably broken. 11. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge to response as to Plaintiffs desires and beliefs. COUNTERCLAIM I REQUEST FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT, ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE AND ALIMONY UNDER SECTIONS 3701 (A) AND 3702 OF THE DIVORCE COED 12. Defendant is unable to sustain herself during the pendency of the divorce action. 13. Defendant lacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable means and is unable to support herself through appropriate employment in accordance with the standard of living established during the marriage. 14. Defendant requires reasonable support to adequately maintain herself in accordance with the standard of living established during the marriage. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests the Court to enter an award of spousal support or Alimony Pendente Lite until final hearing and thereupon to enter an award of Alimony in her favor pursuant to Sections 3701(a) and 3702 of the Divorce Code. COUNTERCLAIM II REQUEST FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 3502(D) OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS CODE 15. Plaintiff and defendant have acquired marital property as defined by the Divorce Code, which is subject to equitable distribution pursuant to Section 3502(a) of the Divorce Code. 16. Plaintiff and Defendant have been unable to agree as to the equitable division of said property as of the date of filing of this Answer and Counterclaim. 17. The parties may enter into a written agreement with regard to real and personal property and debt division. In the event that the parties execute such an agreement, Plaintiff desires that such written agreement be approved by the Court and incorporated, but not merged, in any divorce decree dissolving the marriage between the parties. 18. If the parties are unable to agree as to the equitable division of said property, Defendant requests that this Court equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties. ,, WHEREFORE, if a written settlement agreement is reached between the parties prior to the time of the hearing on this Complaint, Plaintiff respectfully requests that pursuant to the Sections 3104(a)(1) and (3) and 3323(b) of the Divorce Code, the Court approve and incorporate, but not merge, such agreement in the final divorce decree. If an agreement cannot be reached between the parties, defendant respectfully requests that this Court enter an order of equitable distribution of marital property pursuant to Section 3502 (a) of the Divorce Code. COUNTERCLAIM III REQUEST FOR COUNSEL FEES. COSTS AND EXPENSES UNDER SECTIONS 3104(a)(1) AND 3323(b) AND 3702 OF THE DIVORCE CODE 19. Defendant has engaged the services of Lisa M. treason, Esquire to represent her in this action. 20. Defendant is unable to pay her counsel fees, costs and expenses, and Plaintiff is more able to pay them. 21. Reserving the right to apply to the Court for temporary counsel fees, costs and expenses prior to final hearing, Defendant requests that, after final hearing, the Court orders Plaintiff to pay Defendant's reasonable counsel fees, costs and expenses. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that, pursuant to Sections 3104(a)(1), 3323(b) and 3702 of the Divorce Code, the Court enter an Order directing Plaintiff to pay Defendant's reasonable counsel fees, costs and expenses. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE Date ~is M. Grea on, E ui e~ P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim are '. true and correct. 1 understand that false statements herein are made subject to the ~' penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. ' fiil~- ~ 3 2O0Y Date BARBARA K. BRAD HAW ~a~ . e e ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ~ CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2001-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL I, Lisa M. treason, Esquire, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that I mailed a copy of the Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim filed in this matter by first class mail, postage prepaid on Defendant at the following: Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff 28 S. Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 ~alr~ lay- Date Lisa M. Grea n, qui e P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 ~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~~ ,.., ~, c~ c. ~y /, . ,. j ~- ;,..~ s~ ~u ~_. ,. _~, -; ~~ C~reason aGa~w Off ice P.O. Box 38g CarCisCe, PennsyCvania i7oi3 PFione: (7i7) 2qi-3o3o ,~"ax: (7i7) z4i-3o4o L.T~iGreasonC~aoGcom December 16, 2002 E. Robert Flicker, II, Esquire Office of the Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire 28 S. Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Re: Bradshaw v. Bradshaw 2001 - 4611 Cumberland County Dear Gentlemen: As per Mr. Flicker's letter of November 27, 2002, please find enclosed a copy of the Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim in the above referenced action. As far as discovery is concerned, we are still missing the following items: 1. Arthur's statements of income from his military retirement, his current full time civilian position and his income as a Pre-Paid Legal sales associate. 2. Full accounting of all of the student loans for the children (in which Arthur co- signed and requested said loans be paid from marital assets). 3. Present market value documented by a dealership of art prints in Arthur's possession. 4. Present market value from a certified appraiser for timeshare. With the above items, discovery would be complete. Mrs. Bradshaw does not wish to postpone this any further. Mr. Bradshaw has been delinquent in getting these requested items to us. We believe this is a matter of control on the part of Mr. Bradshaw. Since the Divorce Master's office is scheduling a few months in advance, we would request that this matter be scheduled as soon as possible. The remaining items listed above can be produced between now and at least 30 days prior to the scheduled hearing. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, L~i~~ LISA M. G AS ,ESQUIRE cc: Barbara Bradshaw ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 2001-4611 CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW :CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE Defendant NOTICE TO DEFEND NOTICE TO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS. You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action, You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a decree in divorce or annulment may be entered against you by the Court. A judgment may also be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the plaintiff. You may lose money or properly or other rights important to you including custody or visitation of your children. When the grounds for the divorce are indignities or irretrievably breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at Cumberland County Courthouse, One Courthouse Square, Carlisle, PA 17013, (717) 240-6195. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF PROPERYT, LAWYER'S FEES OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAAM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO, OR TELEPHONE, THt= OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Lawyer Referral Service 4 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 c, r~ :-> 717-249-3166 ~ ~ ~' , _ ' z- -- ~i v~,_r ~~ % ` ~- i/.~ .»~ t ~ - - r. ~t": C ., Jrn G "~~ i ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2001-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE AND COUNTERCLAIM AND NOW HERECOMES Barbara Kay Bradshaw, the Defendant, by and through her attorney, Lisa M. treason, Esquire and respectfully submits this Answer to Complaint in Divorce and Counterclaims as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge to response as to Plaintiff's desires and what he has been advised of. 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted. 10. It is denied that the marriage is irretrievably broken. 11. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge to response as to Plaintiff's desires and beliefs. COUNTERCLAIM I REQUEST FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE AND ALIMONY UNDER SECTIONS 3701 (A) AND 3702 OF THE DIVORCE COED 12. Defendant is unable to sustain herself during the pendency of the divorce action. 13. Defendant lacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable means and is unable to support herself through appropriate employment in accordance with the standard of living established during the marriage. 14. Defendant requires reasonable support to adequately maintain herself in accordance with the standard of Living established during the marriage. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests the Court to enter an award of spousal support or Alimony Pendente Lite until final hearing and thereupon to enter an award of Alimony in her favor pursuant to Sections 3701 (a) and 3702 of the Divorce Code. COUNTERCLAIM II REQUEST FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 3502(D) OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS CODE 15. Plaintiff and defendant have acquired marital property as defined by the Divorce Code, which is subject to equitable distribution pursuant to Section 3502(a) of the Divorce Code. 16. Plaintiff and Defendant have been unable to agree as to the equitable division of said property as of the date of filing of this Answer and Counterclaim. 17. The parties may enter into a written agreement with regard to real and personal property and debt division. In the event that the parties execute. such an agreement, Plaintiff desires that such written agreement be approved' by the Court and incorporated, but not merged, in any divorce decree dissolving the marriage between the parties. 18. If the parties are unable to agree as to the equitable division of said property, Defendant requests that this Court equitably divide, distribute or assign the ~, marital property between the parties. ', WHEREFORE, if a written settlement agreement is reached between the parties prior to the time of the hearing on this Complaint, Plaintiff respectfully requests that pursuant to the Sections 3104(a)(1) and (3) and 3323(b) of the Divorce Code, the Court approve and incorporate, but not merge, such agreement in the final divorce decree. If an agreement cannot be reached between the parties, defendant respectfully requests that this Court enter an order of equitable distribution of marital property pursuant to Section 3502 (a) of the Divorce Code. COUNTERCLAIM III REQUEST FOR COUNSEL FEES COSTS AND EXPENSES UNDER SECTIONS 3104(a)(1) AND 3323(b) AND 3702 OF THE DIVORCE CODE 19. Defendant has engaged the services of Lisa M. treason, Esquire to represent her in this action. 20. .Defendant is unable to pay her counsel fees, costs and expenses, and Plaintiff is more able to pay them. 21. Reserving the right to apply to the Court for temporary counsel fees, costs and expenses prior to final hearing, Defendant requests that, after final hearing, the Court orders Plaintiff to pay Defendant's reasonable counsel fees, costs and expenses. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that, pursuant to Sections 3104(a)(1), 3323(b} and 3702 of the Divorce Code, the Court enter an Order directing Plaintiff to pay Defendant's reasonable counsel fees, costs and expenses. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE ;~,~ Date ~~= `Lis M. Grea on, E~qui e P.O. Box 385 = Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. ~~ v /3 zap%z-- Date~/ BARBARA K. BRAD HAW ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2001-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL I, Lisa M. treason, Esquire, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that I mailed a copy of the Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim filed in this matter by first class mail, postage prepaid on Defendant at the following: Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff 28 S. Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 ^~ f/ / ~~ r . - Date L%' Lisa M. Grea n, qui e P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 1 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS You have been sued in Court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case will proceed without you and a decree in divorce or annulment may be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for the divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at the First Floor, Cumberland County Courthouse, South Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, LAWYER'S FEES, OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 2 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)249-3166 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE 1. Plaintiff is Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., an adult individual, currently residing at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Defendant is Barbara Kay Bradshaw, an adult individual, currently residing at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Plaintiff and Defendant are bonafide residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and have been so for at least six months immediately previous to the filing of this complaint. 4. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on August 29, 1970 in King County, Washington. 5. There have been no prior actions for divorce or annulment between the parties. 6. The Defendant is not a member of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, or its Allies. 7. The Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling and the.., right to request that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. Knowing this, the Plaintiff does not desire that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. 8. Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of the United States of America. 9. The parties have lived separate and apart since July 15, 2001 and ~ continue to live separate and apart as of the date of this Complaint. 10. The parties' marriage is irretrievably broken. 11, Plaintiff desires a divorce based upon the belief that Defendant will, after ninety days from the date of the filing of this Complaint, consent to this divorce. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests your Honorable Court to enter a decree in divorce. COUNT II EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 12. Paragraphs 1 through 11 are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in their full text. 13. Plaintiff and Defendant are joint owners of various items of personal property, furniture and household furnishings acquired during their marriage, which are subject to equitable distribution. 14. Plaintiff and Defendant have incurred debts and obligations during their marriage, which are subject to equitable distribution. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests your Honorable Court to enter a decree equitably dividing the parties' property and equitably apportioning the debts incurred by the parties. 1a~~~o .L Date Respectfully Submitted TURD LAW OFFICES ~~~~. Robert J Mulderig, Esquire 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff VERIFICATION I, Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire, attorney for the Plaintiff herein, have sufficient knowledge of the facts contained in this Amended Divorce Complaint and verify that the statements made in the foregoing Amended Divorce Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, based upon information received from the Plaintiff. I understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. A verification executed by the Plaintiff will be filed of record as soon as it becomes available. ~~ ~ ~~ ' Dat Robert ul erig, Es ui e CERTIFICATE OF SERi/ICE I I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Amended Divorce' Complaint upon Lisa Greason, Esquire, and Robert Elicker, Esquire by depositing same i the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the ~ ~ day of ~ , 2002, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Lisa M. Greason, Esquire Greason Law Office 50 East High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 E. Robert Elicker, II, Esquire Office of the Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 TURD LAW OFFICES ~ ~l'/Op obert Mulderig, Esq 28 Sou Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff ` L i ~„- ~} ~ ~ iay r", _ ~. G ` `~~ ~! 6A ~ J V l "~ r ~~ ~~ ~. i f r ~_~ OFFICE OF DIVORCE MASTER CUMBERLAND COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)240-6535 E. Robert Elicker, 11 Divorce Master West Shore 697-0371 Ext. 6535 Traci Jo Colyer Office ManagerlReporter November 27, 2002 Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire Lisa M. treason TURD LAW OFFICES Attorney at Law Noble Manison 155 South Hanover Street 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Carlisle, PA 17013 RE: Arthur L. Bradshaw vs. Barbara Kay Bradshaw No. O1 - 4611 Civil In Divorce Dear Mr. Mulderig and Ms. treason: Mr. Mulderig has certified that discovery is complete; Ms. treason indicated that "discovery is as complete as can be expected." I am not certain how I interpret Ms. treason's view of the status of discovery. However, I assume that the marital assets have been valued and that we have, in particular, a determination of how we are going to handle the military pension. A complaint in divorce was filed on August 2, 2001, raising grounds for divorce of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. No economic claims were raised in the complaint. Inasmuch as neither party has raised economic claims in the pleadings by counterclaim, amended complaint or petition, this case is not ready to proceed before me on economic issues. If there is an issue with respect to grounds for divorce, please advise, although no fault grounds have been raised and there is no indication the parties will sign affidavits of consent. Mr. Mulderig and Ms. treason, Attorneys at Law 27 November 2002 P If no economic claims are raised or no issues with respect to grounds for divorce are involved, I will prepare an order vacating my appointment within two weeks of the date of this letter. Very truly yours, E. Robert Elicker, II Divorce Master ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF MASTER Plaintiff, Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., moves the Court to appoint a Master with respect to the following claims: divorce, alimony, alimony pendente lite, distribution of property, counsel fees, costs and expenses and in support of the motion states: 1. Discovery is complete as to the claims for which the appointment of a Master is requested. 2. The Defendant has appeared in the action personally by her attorney, Lisa treason, Esquire. 3. The statutory ground for divorce is 3301(c). 4. The action is contested with respect to the following claims: divorce, equitable distribution, alimony and counsel fees. 5. The action involves/does not involve complex issues of law or fact. 6. The hearing is expected to take one days. 7. Additional information, if any, relevant to the Motion: Respectfully Submitted ~a®v Date TURD LAW OFFICES Robe . Mulderiy, Es ire 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for n C~ u ~4~~,~ ~.° _. ~TI~?"I _..~ L~ .A_ G. ~ K fi 5~., ..._. l~. `= RJ C_.. "~ Ms ORDER APPOINTING MASTER AND NOW, this ~ day of , 2002, E. Robert Elicker, Il, Esquire, is appointed Master with respect th following claims: divorce, alimony, alimony pendente lite, distribution of property, counsel fees, costs and expenses. BY THE COURT, 6 `^~ 'S p ~. .. ~,fl~<rrt~,~ ~vra~ri ,~ ?lt7l~ _" x ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. N0. 01 - 4611 CIVIL BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN DIVORCE TO: Robert J. Mulderig Attorney for Plaintiff Lisa M. Greason Attorney for Defendant DATE: Wednesday, July 3, 2002 CERTIFICATION I certify that discovery is complete as to the claims for which the Master has been appointed. OR IF DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE: (a) Outline what information is required that is not complete in order to prepare the case for trial and indicate whether there are any outstanding interrogatories or discovery motions. ib) Provide approximate date when discovery will be complete and indicate what action is being taken to complete discovery. ~~~ DATE COUNSEL OR PLAINTIF (_Z~r COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT ( ) NOTE: PRETRIAL DIRECTIVES WILL NOT BE ISSUED FOR THE FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS UNTIL COUNSEL HAVE CERTIFIED THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, OR OTHERWISE AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. AFTER RECEIVING THIS DOCUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL OR A PARTY TO THE ACTION, IF NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, INDICATING THAT DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE, THE DIRECTIVE FOR FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. HOWEVER, IF BOTH COUNSEL, OR A PARTY IQOT REPRESENTED, CERTIFY THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, A DIRECTIVE TO FILE PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY. THE CERTIFICATION DOCUMENT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE MASTER'S OFFICE WITHIN TWO (2) WEEKS OF THE DATE SHOWN ON THE DOCUMENT. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS You have been sued in Court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action. You are roamed that if you fail to do so, the case will proceed without you and a decree in divorce or annulment may be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for the divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at the First Floor, Cumberland County Courthouse, South Hanover Stree#, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, LAWYER'S FEES, OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 2 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)249-3166 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0.01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE 1 Plaintiff is Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., an adult individual, currently residing at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Defendant is Barbara Kay Bradshaw, an adult individual, currently residing at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Plaintiff and Defiendant are bonafide residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and have been so for at least six months immediately previous to the filing of this complaint. 4. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on August 29, 1970 in King County, Washington. 5. There have been no prior actions for divorce or annulment between the parties. 6. The Defendant is not a member of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, or its Allies. 7. The Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling and the right to request that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. Knowing this, the Plaintiff does not desire that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. 8. Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of the United States of America. 9. The parties have lived separate and apart since July 15, 2001 and i continue to live separate and apart as of the date of this Complaint. 10. The parties' marriage is irretrievably broken. ~. ~~~~~, 11. Plaintiff desires a divorce based upon the belief that Defendant will, after ninety days from the date of the filing of this Complaint, conserot to this divorce. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests your Honorable Court to enter a decree in divorce. COUNT II EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 12. Paragraphs 1 through 11 are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in their full text. 13. Plaintiff and Defendant are joint owners of various items of personal property, furniture and household furnishings acquired during their marriage, which are subject to equitable distribution. 14. Plaintiff and Defendant have incurred debts and obligations during their marriage, which are subject to equitable distribution. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests your Honorable Court to enter a decree equitably dividing the parties' property and equitably apportioning the debts incurred by the parties. la f ~~ -v Date Respectfully Submitted TURD LAW OFFICES ~~~7`~`Z`"""vsl~ . Robert J. Muldeng, Esquire 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff VERIFICATION I, Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire, attorney for the Plaintiff herein, have sufficien knowledge of the facts contained in this Amended Divorce Complaint and verify that the statements made in the foregoing Amended Divorce Complaint are true and correct tc the best of my knowledge, based upon information received from the Plaintiff. understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. A verification executed by the Plaintiff will be filed of record as soon as it becomes available. ~~ ~ t' l Dat Robert ul erig, Es ui e > ~~.~fl~„ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Amended Divorce Complaint upon Lisa Greason, Esquire, and Robert Elicker, Esquire by depositing same i the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the i~ ~ day of ~ ~, ~, 2002, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Lisa M. Greason, Esquire Greason Law Office 50 East High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 E. Robert Elicker, II, Esquire Office of the Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 TURO LAW OFFICES r obert Mulderig, EsgGide 28 Sou Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff ,- ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 01- ~~ j+ CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, :CIVIL ACTION -LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I served a true and correct copy of the Divorce Complaint filed in the above captioned case upon Barbara Kay Bradshaw, by certified mail, return receipt requested on August 3, 2001 addressed to: Barbara Kay Bradshaw 1364 Kuhn Road Boiling Springs, PA 17007 and did thereafter receive same as evidenced by the attached Post Office receipt card dated August 4, 2001. I VERIFY THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE FOREGOING AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION AND BELIEF, I UNDERSTAND THAT FALSE STATEMENTS HEREIN MADE ARE SUBJECT TO THE PENALTIES OF 18 PA.C.S. SECTION 4904 RELATING TO UNSWORN FALSIFICATION TO AUTHORITIES. TURD LAW OFFICES ,~ ~ Date e n _,~ ~ Robert J. ~fil'ulderig, Esq 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff ,. c ' ' == °~~~: R,,, ,~, o z_~_ E CQ ~^ , t - l ~ G ~ _ __, ;. ; ~ `= ~ :~.a ~~r i .~ ~ -~ cn -~' _c ~^"'a a3'~~uE°~zn~G~$klra.~m~ira sw-.+"~LNVa~~ A'a _ ,. N W m O e~ E `o LL a F ~._._- ----- Z 452 476 238 US Postal Service Receipt for Certified Mail No Insurance Coverage Provided. Do not ucw fnr Irocmunnn~r sago ic..., .,..,___, t 2~~A K. l2At~lA &N rob tl C ~~ P Ogi~Stgt & Z1 ~I ~Y, r PH i~- off Postage f Certified Fee /\ ll Spedal Delivery Fee ResMcted Delivery Fee 3 . ao Retum Receipt Shovdng to Whom & Dete Delivered _ fleWm Recept9hox4g toWhpn, Dale, & Oddresseek Address TOTAL Postage & Fees PosMark or Dete ~u6uST 3,2001 p. ,! lfENUER: .. I also wish to repeive the follow io complete eems~i pnNor z for additional services. .. _ ing services (for an extra fee): Gpmplete items 3, 46, and 4b. ,. fa Pant Your name anp atltlress on the reveree of this form so that we can retumghis wrd tc ydu. 1. ^ A ~ ddres5 O;Atlech this form to the front of the mailpiece, or on the back if space does not permit.. : • - Re_s_tricted Delivery o Wdte'Retum Receipt Requested'on the mailpi$cebelow the snide number. -4 The Retum Receipt will show to whom me amcle:H•as delivered and the date deliveretl. . ArtiGe Addressed to: 4a. Article Nurgber ~ ~;~~'~ ;~ . ~r~-~rr~w Z Asa 4~ c~ za8 '~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ YJ i~_. 4b. Service Type F--1-1 ^ Registered ertified q7;7\ f 1 r~/' ~~i~5~ ~~ ^ Express Mail Insured (rim LI V I 17-M`l- alum Receipt for Merchandise ^ COD t / W 7 .Date of Delivery fee is paid) i 1984 S W c7 c~ C -, =. . <Y 'C7 CA za* .._.. ' -. mrr-~ z:s ~ - T~ ~ r . ~ .~ ~ ~ . __ ~Ll :.l l : ~ C ~ -- = r ~'C .. '~ s~ C.`P -G ~~ ~'~ ~aaa?x. cnreus~.ws~~ ~:Fx'3~`xwq=R+?axxce - -, v_ _.._ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF SAID COURT: Please enter the appearance of Lisa M. treason, Esquire, on behalf of the Defendant in the above-captioned case. ~- ~-c,~ Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE Date C/Lisa M. (3'rea~ Esquire 155 S. Hano er Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 C~ c:> c -- -. <_, 'a ci_ ~,~ --- -. _ ~~r ~ r - ~ "' ~ -°- _ v C r' .. i -c .-. ..s e treason aGa~w 0 f f ice P.O. Box 385 Phone: (7i7) 241-3030 • CarCisCe, PennsyCvania i7oi3 gax: (7i7) 2qi-3o4o L.7KGreasonC~aoGcom November 25, 2002 E. Robert Elicker, II, Esquire Office of the Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Re: Bradshaw v. Bradshaw 2001 - 4611 Cumberland County Dear Mr. Elicker: At this time, discovery is as complete as can be expected. This case involves the typical division of assets as well as the division of a military pension. The hearing is expected to take at least four hours. We would request a hearing date be set in this matter. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, LISA cc: Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire Barbara Bradshaw C~reason aGa~v offi P.O. Box 385 Ptione: (7i7) 24i-3o3o e • CarCisCe, PennsyCvan%a 17oi3 ~'ax: (717) 241-3040 L.9vtGreasonC~aoLcom February 3, 2003 E. Robert Elicker, II, Esquire Office of the Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Re: Bradshaw v. Bradshaw 2001 -4611 Cumberland County Dear Mr. Elicker: Please find enclosed the Defendant's Pre-Trial Statement. There are a few outstanding items of discovery that need to be provided by the Plaintiff. These items are marked in bold print. It is anticipated that Plaintiff will provide these items as soon as possible. Please schedule a hearing in this matter as your earliest convenience. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. IRE cc: Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire Barbara Bradshaw M ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO RULE 1920.33(8) 1. PERSONAL DATA: A. Husband's Date of Birth: 3/2/49 B. Wife's Date of Birth: 8/20/49 C. Date of Marriage: 8/29/70 D. Date of Separation: 7/15/01 E. Number of Children: 3 F. Number of Children Under Eighteen: 0 2. LIST OF MARITAL ASSETS: A. Marital Residence: 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, PA. Net proceeds from sale: $82,167.26 (included below in savings accounts). B. Investments 1) KeyCorp Dividend Reinvestment Acct No. 3005577024/3000557025 Current Value: $132.83 3/20/02 (024) $163.76 (Andrew's Account) 3/20/02 (025) $137.98 2) Merrill Lynch Wife's Account: 860-61966 Current value: $20,075.75 DOS value: $31,714.00 Husband's Account: 860-62059 Current value: $23,405.57 DOS value: $36,837.00 3) Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. Husband has at least one current client. Y 4) American Funds. Wife's Account Current value: $988.13 DOS value: (end 2001) $1,203.31 5) Pentagon Federal Credit Union Joint Account Account No: 405308-01-6 Current value: $7,416.11 (what caused increase?) DOS value: $ 869.78 6) PNC Checking Account Joint Account Current value: $1,742.07 (what caused decrease?) 3/22/02 value: $10,827.90 10/24/02 value:$6,185.23 DOS value: (need proof -Husband has DOS info) 7) PNC Checking Account Wife's Account: 50-0363-6058 Current value: 5,713.26 **Not in existence at DOS. Wife opened account on 9/01 with $100.00. $2,000.00 from sale of home was placed in this account and is still there. 8) PNC Savings Account Wife's Account: 50-0365-8417 Current value: 13,071.84 **Not in existence at DOS. Wife opened account on 9/01. $13,000.00 from sale of home was placed in this account and is still there. 9) M&T Checking Account Joint Account: 00000001144308 Current value: $3,916.60 DOS value: (need proof -Husband has DOS info) r z 10) M&T Savings Account Joint Account: 15004200939485 Current value: $60,164.18 DOS value: (need proof -Husband has DOS info) 11) L-3 Communications Master Savings Plan Joint Account: #BWNFXTG Current value: $39,516.10 DOS value: $23,000.00 C. Insurance: 1) Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (listed at Veterans Group Life Insurance) Term Insurance on Husband $ (need proof and amount -Husband has this information) Is Wife covered on this policy? No cash surrender value 2) Mass Mutual Policy No. 8,211,311 Term insurance on Husband $125,000.00 No cash surrender value 3) Liberty National Life Ins. Policy No. A5101349 Whole life insurance on Wife $25,000 Cash surrender value: Husband has this information) 4) Old Line Life Insurance Co. Policy No. 1381912 Whole Life on Husband $50,000.00 Cash surrender value: $6,746.59 Husband has this information) (need proof and (need proof and 5) AAA Life Insurance Co. Policy No. ADP93 Term Insurance on Husband and Wife $150,000.00 No cash surrender value 6) Continental Casualty Co. (PNC Bank) Certificate No. ID77989108 Term Insurance on Husband $1,000.00 No cash surrender value 7) Life Insurance Co of North America (NRA) Term insurance on Husband $2,500.00 No cash surrender value 8) USAA Group Insurance Trust Cert. No. 69M-0102964 Term Insurance on Husband $1,000.00 No cash surrender value 9) Fortis Benefits Insurance Co. (Pentagon FCU) Policy NO. ID697454231 Term insurance on Husband $21,000.00 No cash surrender value 10) Armed Forces Insurance Exchange Acct # 0254718 Personal Property Insurance No cash surrender value 11) Army Mutual Aid Association Number T-55089XOL Whole life on Husband Coverage: (need proof and amount Husl has this information) Cash Surrender value at DOS: $8,480.21 (need proof amount Husband has this information) Current Cash surrender value: $9,454.81 (need proof amount Husband has this information) T 12) Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company 4850 Street Road Trevose, PA 17049 1-800-373-5927 Effective: 1-13-97 Policy No. A9123 Family Financial Group Insurance Trust Term Insurance on Husband and Wife for $70,000.00 No cash surrender value **This was missing from Husband's statement D. United States Army Military Pension: $43,899.12 per year ($4,079. gross per month). E. Time Share: Williamsburg, VA Value as of 7/1995: $17,100. See attached deed Current value: $17,100.00 RCI credits: (need proof and Husband has this information) F. Art Collection 1) In Wife's possession: $5,200.00 (need proof and detailed list) 2) In Husband's possession: $8,480.21 (need proof and detailed list) NOTE: Some of the art prints were gifts to the Husband and Wife. These prints should not be listed as marital assets and the amounts above will change based on that. G. 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT (Husband's) Purchase price: $16,811.40 Current value: $5,000.00 H. 2001 PT Cruiser (Wife's) Purchase price: $20,910.00 Current value: $15,000.00 3. EXPERTS TESTIFYING: No experts will be called to testify. 4. ALL OTHER TESTIMONY BY WITNESSES: No other witnesses will called to testify. e ,~ 5. EXHIBITS: A. Deed for time share B. HUD1 Settlement Sheet from sale of marital home C. Pay stubs for Husband (Husband to provide) D. Pay stubs for Wife E. Proof of values listed (Husband to provide where indicated) F. Other G. Other 6. GROSS INCOME OF THE PARTIES: A. Husband's Gross Income: $82,500.00 (need proof and breakdown from all sources) B. Wife's Gross Income: 2002 total $5,239.25. Currently $9.50 per hour at approximately 40 hours per week. No benefits. 7. ANY DISPUTED ITEMS: All amounts listed as needing proof and details. 8. MARTIAL DEBTS: Children's Student Loans: $14,706.39 (need pi and details since all loans are in the children and Husband's name, in Wife name) 9. PROPOSED RESOLUTION: A. All marital property shall be divided as previously agreed (each party took what household items they desired except for what is specifically listed in this statement.) B. Wife shall receive via ODRO 50% of Husband's disposable military retirement income. C. Husband to pay attorney fees and costs for Husband and Wife D. Husband to maintain Survivor Benefit Plan for benefit of Wife. E. Husband to pay for Wife's education in the amount of $16,000.00. F. Husband to pay Wife permanent alimony in the amount of $1,200.00 per month. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE a-~-~>~ Date Lisa M. Grea on, E re Post Office Box 38 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 Contract No. 26-9423711 Sales Price: 17,100.00 aHgserv This Instrument Prepared by: FAIRFtELD COMMUNITIES, [NC. Naw aarorE Little Rock, Arkansas FAIRFIELD WILLIAMSBURG AT KINGSGATE A Virginia Time-Share Estate Project DEED OF CONVEYANCE AND AFFIDAVIT THIS DEED and Affidavit, made this 12th day of July , 19 95 , by and between Fairfield Communities, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, as beneficial owner, hereinafter either the "Grantor" or "Party of the First Part", Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, A Virginia corporation, hereinatter the "Party of the Second Pact", nominee for Fairfield Communities, Inc., under the termg of a Tile Clearing Agreement dated January 27, 1983, as amended and restated, and WI`'~'NESSE-TH: That the Grantor, in consideration of Ten IIotiars ($10A0),and other- good and valuable consideration to it in hand paid by the Grantees, the receipt of which is hereby aofvrLwledged, has bargained sold, and by these presents, does grant, bargain, seB and convey unto the aforesaid Grantees, as tenants, by'the entireties with the rights of survivorship as a[ common law, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. on [he firs[ Saturday uporitwhich-ttie preceeding.time-share estate terminates until 4:00 o'clock p.m. on the Saturday upon which the succeeding tune-shape.es[ate,c`ommences, the following described time-share estate at that certain real estate time-share project known as Fairfield. ~illiamsbur'g at Kingsgate, York County, V+rginia, to wit: All that certain ~ - time-shar~z estate week numbe 51 in time-share estate unit number l0l in time-share estate building number LS - in Fairfield Williamsburg at IGngsga[e Time-Share Project -Phase Four as such time-share estate is defined in the "Project and Time-Share Instrument for Faut'ield Williamsburg at Kingspate" dated March 21, 1990, recorded March 27, 199p, in the Clerk'.=- Of;i:,e of the Circuit Court of York County, Virgr'ma, in Deed Book 578 at Page 164, as mapp be amended; and as such unit is depicted en plat entitled "Plat showing Phase LV, Section [L of Fairfield Williamsburg at Kingsga[e Timeshare Project"dated May -28, 1992 and last revised April 28, 1993, recorded in Plat Book 11 at Page 614. The time-share estate hereby conveyed is to be succeeded forthwith by a successor of other such estates in consecutive and chronological order, revolving among the other estate weeks described in the aforesaid Project and Time-Share Instrument in order annually, i[ being the intent of this instn:ment that each estate shall be considered a separate estate held separately and independently by the respective owners thereof for and during the period of time assigned to each in such Project and Time-Share Instrument, sajd' time-share estate being succeeded 6y the next in unending successron until 4:00 o'clock p.m. on the firsf Sarurday in the yea? 2030: ~as'of dthich date Bard time-share estate shall terminate, unless extended in the manner provided by said Projec[and Time-ShareInstrumen[ as executed or as amended. TOGETHER with a vested remainder over, on the firs[ Ss~[tirday in'tlre year 2030 a[ 4:00 o'clock p.m. Eastern Standard Time, in fee simple absolute as a tenant in commo~r with all ocher time"=share owners in the aforesard time-shaze unit, as allowed and provided by Article XIV, of [he afDresaid Pto)ect and Tia}eShare Instrument. The time of such remainder over may be amended however, as, provided by the ter`ms'o$sr;cSr Prb~ecf and Time-Share Instrument as originally executed or as subsequently amended. ~'~ - - - BEING as to Phase Four and the time-share unit aritl;~lSuiPding afRrzsaid~ of which it is a part, a portion of the same real estate conveyed unto Fairfield Communities, Inc. by Warranty;,.D'e~ed:fiom W:},1:'Burruss, and wife, Sharon C. Burruss, Grantor, dsted March 21, 1990, recorded March 27, 1990 in the C~Ierk;,Qt~ice'of the Grcuit Court of York CounTy, Virginia, in Deed Book 578 at Page 163. This conveyance is made subject to covenants, restrictiops~aitd easements of record applicable to and legally binding upon the land hereby conveyed. The streets, yards, walkways, and all real estate within ~each"pfia§e; less alt. tune-share estates therein, as shown on Plat retative to each phase, will, no later than the termination df the~Developer ContF'ol-Period, (as that teen is defimed in the Project and Time-Share Instrument and the Virginia Real Es)9te TimeSb'are Ac[) be~Owned of record by The Fairfield Kingsga[e Property Owners Association, Inc., a Virginia NtinsuJek~Corporation,;'--gild w'lll not, at such time, belong to Grantor. (' , As to such streets, yards, walkways, etc., Grantor anp Party of the Second Par[ make no warranties or representations whatsoever. 4 f This conveyance is subject [o and by accepting this~eed CherGran[ees ~do' hereby agree to assume and(or abide by [he following: 'o,'. },``~.. _. -'" . - - 1. Taxes for the current year and subsequent years,'•,a ~ _,'r?n `:'•' ~; ~' ' 2- Conditions, restrictions, lunitafions, reservations, easehtents,~an$ other matters of record in the Clerk's Of&ce of the Circuit Court of York County, Virginia; and 3. The Project and Tune-Share instrument as originally executed and, if applicable, [he Faushaze Vacation Plan Use Management Trust Agreement and Use Restriction as might be amended from time to time. The Grantor covenants that i[ is seized of the time-share estate hereby conveyed and has the right [o convey [he same unto the Grantees in fee simple; that it has done no act to encumber said Time•Share estate; that the Grantees shall have quiet possession of said time-share estate, free from encumbrances; and that it, [he said Grantor, will execute such further assurance of the title as may be requisite. The Pazty of the Second Part does hereby transfer, convey, and quitclam unto the said grantees and their successors and assigns forever, all of its rights, title and interest, equity and estate in and to the time-share estate hereby conveyed. Page I ro.m: wioo~s us. In execu5ng this Deed and Affidavit, Ro err E Bland ,Attomey-in-Fact for said Pazty of the Second Part, who being first duty sworn, makes oath and says hereby; hat she has not, at the time of executing this Deed and At£davit, pursuant to a power of attorney given by Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, A Virginia corporauon, recorded on June 14, 1995 in Deed Book 849, Page 224 in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court for the County of York, Virginia, received actual knowledge or actual notice of the revocation or termination of said power of attomey. The plural number as used herein shag equally include the singulaz and vice versa. The masculine or feminine gender as used herein shall egwally include the neuter. IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, Grantor has caused its name to be signed by its duly authorized officers [n execufing this Deed, Grantor hereby authorizes and requests Party of the Second Part by its Attorney-in-Fact [o execute this Deed for the purpose of conveying legal title to the above described time-shaze estate. _ FAIRFIELD COMMUNITIES, INC. CORPORATE SEAL •++••°0°°t°'••~ • '•••+('jQM~'?U/~ ••o• Grantor ATT ST: ; Wr ~~ F ~~ ~ By: y _ G - ~~~7 Vice President Asst t Secretary ~ d. L ,C7v LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE .•w ¢1969 °•° CORPO omine~~ •• °• o (,~~o•°a Attomey-in-Fact STATE OF ARKANSAS ) _ ) SS. - COUNTY OF PULASKI ) I, the undersigned Notary Public, in and for the jurisdiction aforesaid;.do hereby certify that Robert E Bland and Kimberly R Thompson Vice President and Assistant Secretary respectively of Fairfield Communities, Inc., whose names are signed as such to the foregoing Deed and Af6davi[ bearing date of the 12th day of .h~jy -, 19 ~, - have each acknowledged the same before me in my_jurisdiction aforesaid. - Given under my hand this 12th • •°_!~11, ofVf~ My Commission Expires: °Q~•" ~ot •.'~.`0.`A R Y 02/02!97 `'m ._.. Notarial Seal ~Jt.BL`cj V STATE OF ARKANBAS ) •• ° e COUNTY OF PULASKI ) °••.~ Wes` ~•+ 19 95 ~fazgazet Wilson Notary Public Subscribed and sworn to by Robert E gland ,Attorney-in-Fact for Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, nominee, that his/her statements made herein are true and correct to the best of his/her knowledge and belief; that (s)he has signed the foregoing Deed and Affidavit, bearing the date of the 12th day of .7ngy - , 19 95 ,and has acknowtedged the same before me in mye14on aforesaid. Given under my hand this My Commission Expires: ~ ~1 (~T A •7 } 02/02!97 \7 JjUBy`G Notarial Seat _ _ VIRGINIA: County of York to-wit ~•v, 19 95 lA'lazgaret W$son Notary Public In the Clerk's Offce of the Circuit Court for flea .~iuTt~°of York, the day of 19 .This deed was presented with the certificate annexed and admitted to record a[ o'clock ` .M. The taxes imposed by Sect. 58.54 and 58.54.1 of the Code of Va. have been paid, STATE TAX S RETURN THIS DEED TO: Francis T. Eck, Attomey at Law 16 South Second Street Richmond, VA 23219 1-(804)-788-4457 LOCAL TAX 5 SELLER'S TAX E Teate: Nanty B. Kane, Clerk By: Deputy Berk Paoa ~ ~' _ OMB N0.2502-0265 7r `>p: B. TYPE OF LOAN: D E LOPMENT 1.~FHA 2. FmHA 3. XQCONV. UNINS. 4.QVA 5. CONV. INS. EV U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN 6. FILE NUMBER: ~ 7. LOAN NUMBER: SETTLEMENT STATEMENT g. MORTGAGE INS CASE NUMBER: C. NOTE: This form is /umished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the setttement agent are_shown. Items marked (POCJ" were paid outside the closing; they are shown here for informations! purposes and are not inGuded rn the totals. 1.0 3!98 (STUAftT.PFOlSTUART Ut58923)' D. NAME AND ADDRESS OF BORROWER: Darcy J. Stuart ~ E. NAME AND ADDRESS OF SELLER: Arthur~!Bradshaw, Jr. Barbara K. Bradshaw F. NAME AND ADDRESS OF LENDER: Washington Savings Bank 4201 Mitchellville Road, Suite 300 Bowie, MD 20716 G. PROPERTY LOCATION: H. SETTLEMENT AGENT: 23-2015480 I. SETTLEMENT DATE: 1364 Kuhn Road Residential Commercial Abstract, Inc. Boiling Springs, PA 17007 ~ October 5, 2001 PLACE OF SETTLEMENT 3631 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 ':. Y:` .-BO, RO. -- TRANSACTION K- MARY OF SFLLER'ST ANSACTI N 101. Contract Sales Price 238,000.00 401. Contract Sales Price 238 000.00 102. Personal Pro 402. Personal Pro e 103. Settlement Cha es to Borrower Line 1400 11,334.74 403. 1O4. 404. 105. 405. v n ~i ~ 106. Cily/TOwn Taxes to 406. Ci !town Taxes to 107. County Taxes 10/06/01 to 01/01/02 114.12 407. Coun Taxes - 10/06/01 to 01!01/02 114.12 108. School Tax ~ 10/06/01 to 07/01/02 1,487.36 408. School Tax 10/06/01 to 07/01/02 1,487.36 109. Sewer 10/06/01 to 01/01/02 201.42 409. Sewer 10/06/01 to 01/01/02 - 201.42 110. 410. 111. 411. 12. 412. '20. GROSS AMOUNT DUE FROM BORROWER 251,137.64 420. GROSS AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER 239,802.90 '00. AMOUNTS' ~ AW:BY OR IN BEHALF OF BORROWER: 500. REOUCTION5 IN AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER: 01. De osit or.eamest mone 5,000.00 501. Excess De osit See Instructions 02, Princi al Amount of New Loans 190,400.00 502. Settlement Cha es to Seller Line 1400 19,351.81 03. ExisOn loans taken sub'ed to ~ 503. Existln loans taken sub'ect to 04. 2nd Mort a e 12,600.00 504. Payoff of first Mortgage to Mortgage Service Cente 114,696.39 D5. ~ 505. Pa ff of second Mort a e to Penta on Federal Cred 23,587.44 O6. 506. )7. 507. De osR disb. as seeds )8. 508. )9. 509. Adjustments or Items Unnaid ev Seller Ad"ustments For ems Un aid 8 e /er 10. Gity/TOwn Taxes to 510. Ci /Town Taxes to ' 1. Count Taxes to 511. Coun Taxes to 2. School lax to 512. School Tax - to 3. 513. 4. 514. 5. 515. 6. 516. Z 517. 6. 518. g. 519. 7. TOTAL PAID BYfFOR 80RR0 WER 206,04)0.00 1. CASH AT SETTLEMENT FROM/TO BORROWER: I. Gross Amount Due From Borrower (Line 120 251,137.64 ?. 4ess Amount Paid B' IForBorrower (Line 220) ( 208,000.00) 520. FOTAL REDUCTION AMOUNT DUE SELLER 600. CASH A SETTLEMENT TO/FROM SEL ER: 601. Gross Amount Due To Seller Line 420 602. Less Reductions Due Seller (Line 520) ( 157,635.64 239 802.90 157,635.64 !. CASH X FROMJ ( TO J BORROWER 43,137.64 603. CASH (X 70 J ( FROM J SELLER 82,167.26 HUD-1 (3A8) RESPA, HBa3052 na/n0/nh oFT CCIIFI~ CTATFMFNT 1 1 CORRECTED lif checked) PAYER'S name, street address, city, state, and ZIP code 1 Grpzz dlztribution OMB No. 1545-0119 Distributions From Defense Finance antl Accounting Service US MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY $ 83899. 12 Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or PO BOX 7730 2a Taxable ameanr Profit-Sharing Plans, LONDON KY 40742-7130 $ 43899.12 2002 IRAs, Insurance PAYEft'S Federal identification number RECIPIENT'S identiticatien number 26 Total ~ Contracts, etc. disidbutian 34-0727612 532-52-7420 4 Feaaral inooma tax wannela 7 oiattibecion ooda COPY 2 RECIPIENT'S name, address and ZIP code $ ' File this coPY 2822.73 7 aul state with 9 Vaur percenage of total distribution , y city, Or laoal income tax ARTHUR L BRADSHAW idaoma tax to wti ie 71 Statb/Payer's state return, when 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 t e nom er required. CAMP HILL PA 1 701 7-8022 $ ____________ ___________ RETIRED 010102-123102 rm rr' 1u88_M ro-c<i ~dpa,~me~~, ~~ .ne ~~va ~,y-~n,~~~~a~ ~.~.e~~.e ....~.. Cut Here 01/23/03 RETSSU ED STATEMENT nCORRECTED (if checked) PAYER'S name, streer address, nty, state, and ZIP code 1 Gross distribution OMB No. 1545-0119 Distributions From Defense Finance and Accounting Service 43899 12 $ i i i US MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY ons, Annu t es, Pens PO BOX 7130 2a Taxable ameum Retirement or LONDON KY 40742-7130 Prof it-Sharing Plans, $ 43899.12 2002 IRAs, Insurance PAYER'S Federal idemilication number RECIPIENT'S identification number 26 Total ~ Contracts, etc. disvibutiea 34-0727612 532-52-7420 4 Federal io ma +ax wi,nnold ' ]Distribution aoda ' Copy B RECIPIENT S name, address and ZIP code $ 2822.73 7 Report this 9 Your percentage of total distribution incom¢ on your Federal tax return, ARTHUR L eRADSHAW to sea+e ~ e tax lea°m n State/Payera state If shin form shows Federal maome 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 »-irnne number tax witnneld m CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 _ $ Box 4, attaan tnia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ coPY to Your return. $ This information is being furnished to the Internal Revenue Service RETIRED 010102-123102 °~^ IV09-rf m->u Uepanment of tna Veasury-Internal Revenue >erNee Cut Here 01/23/03 REISSUED STATEMENT I I CORRECTED (if checked) PAYEft'S na e, street aadrezz, airy, state, and ZIP code i Gross distribmion OMB No. 1545-Or19 Defense Finance and Accounting Service 43899.12 Distributions From US MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY $ Pensions, Annuities, PO 80X 7130 2a Taxable a um Retirement or LONDON KY 40742-7130 43899. 12 2002 Profit-Sharing Plans, $ IRAs, insurance PAYER'S Federal identification number RECIPIENT'S identification number 26 Total ~ DOntraCtS, etc. distribution 34-0727612 532-52-7420 4 Federal income tax .hnnela 7 Dindbmion coda C RECIPIENT'S name, address and ZIP code opy C For ReCipient'S $ 2822.73 7 Records 9 Your percentage of total distribution ~ This InEarmaiun is being furnished ARTHUR L BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 to sleM1M1e~laaome tax .n tt Statbee Payer's state to the Internal f ^am Revenue ser~;ae. CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 8 ____________ $ ___________ Keep this copy !or your seconds. RETIRED 010102-123102 Fnrm Knee-e NCOAAUTO CALL VI-800-321-1080 IF VOU HAVE A vepa¢ment of me lreasury-internal Reyenu¢ Service n o 0 y 3 v m NC w G '~ ~ N O ~ ~ O ~ ~ .s chi % O m a 1'9 1 < ~ 8..7 m G `2 N O p~ o ~ f^~i, O m a 3 0 N w 0 N Z n m N 0 Q ~% ~ w !row ~7 m m m ~ m v m a m o o O ~y H ~ °- L~ N (n W rp N ° ~roa ~° w° t~cwo ° cn j N m m ."7 H .A 'S7 m N m bJ H ~A H `~ I m 'c 's ~ ro ~ toN I y ~y rn H m u ~ N w LTJ n m H m a .`C O `.1; .A ` -' O c H 3 ~ ~ (J~ m y H W H ~ c'~ i~ Z N~ H l0 w i rn~ C C ~ m~ o b7'y a o 0 m t ' x w a t' N = F-~ C 7 N ~ ' ~7 ~ lO_ / ' N O a 0.~ ~ y b\ `A y W C O o .o 'JJ ~ bl ~ ~ N N 'X1 v I N c n r0 C'7 = 3 O 'Jy L'TJ o m ~~ w a ~ . N7 CT1 m H m . ~ N ' N ~ ~ 9 f-` O H n v C] ~ U1 ,c7 a O O ~ N H i-C m Y H ~7 C'J O N ~ H ~ w L~7 b RI ~ ~ w H C N r u m d ~ n~ m ~„~ W x H N m ~% Z W a ~-+ H l9y H . m H ! N ° C'7 ~ ~ O m V Z O ~ N 0 UI flA~ ~~ O ~3 m ~m l J Q A -+ iJ tO V N lJ _ ~ ^ ' o a o ~ o ~ a -' 0 m~ a C w ~ ~ n w m N r ~ d ~ ~ m N [J (~ s N d i F om ^ _ ~ c ° O 'o '~ w H '~ o ~ i W _ w ~ w Cn c CIS `° [n 3 _ i ~'y ~ ~ N = W~ N ~' W N W ~ Ng O9 @ l0 ~O l0 y ~' 3 ~• o N N N ~ CTi CP U~ m r y oN 6 m_onN tf ~ n+N 6 m enN Yl O ~p q A N - ~ O m D - ~ m OJ o m m o F-' ° w ~ ° °, - ° m m 3 Olm a m m m w w ~ ° ~° n x ti °' x _ o O ~ F m ~ ~ x m o ~ ~ m ° W ~- V1 ~ _. CJ ~ w ~ N s o~ ~ ~ m J m j I~'~Z t0 n ~ Q O 3 Hw ~-1 W O P.R.o.B.E. 1 0 3 E BARBAPSi K BRADSHAW 12/27/2002 YTD 1447 HILLCREST COURT Hourly Rate 1 {72@$9.50) 684.00 5,239.25 P_PT 303 Federal Withholding -7b.00 -587.00 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 Social Security Employee -42.40 -324:83 Medicare Employee -9.92 -75 97 532-54-8206 PA -Withholding -19.15 . -146.70 LOCAL TAX 2 -2.00 -16.00 P R O B E 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 12/08/2002 - 12/21/2002 534.53 p.R.0.8.E. BARBARA K BRADSFIA W 10 3 ~ 1447 6i1LLCRESI' COURT' A Hourly Rate 1 (40.00@$4 50} 1/10/2003 YTD PT 303 . Federal Withholdin 380.00 380.00 CAMP HII,L.1'A 17011 g Social Security Employee -30.00 -30.00 532-54-8206 Medicare Employee -23.56 "> 51 -23.56 51 -5 PA- Withholdine . . PA -Unemployment Em lo ee -10.64 -10.64 PROBE p y LOCAL TAX 2 -0.08 -0.08 834CriMRFRrATvDSTU~F~ OPT_Steeltnn -2.00 -2.00 SUITE 201/202 _+. O 00 _lt_t 00 LEBANON. PA 17042 12/22/2002 - 01/04/2003 Pay Period 29821 P.R.O.B.E. - BARBARA K BRADSr-rAw 10 41 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT Hourly Rate I (80.00@$4 50) 1/24/2003 yTD 303 CAMP HILL, PA 1701 ! . Federal Withholding 7b0.00 -87 00 1,140.00 -117 00 Social Security Employee . . 532-54-8206 Medicare Employee -47.12 -11 02 -70.68 -1653 PA -Withholding . PROBE PA -Unemployment Employee -2128 -0 I S -31.92 834 CUMBERLAND STRGF.T LOCAL TAX 2 OPT-Steelton . -2.00 -0.23 -4.00 SUITE 201/202 0.00 -10.00 LEBANON, PA 17042 01/05/2003 - 01/18(2003 pay Period 541.43 92" P.R.O.$.E. 11/15/2002 YTD BARBARA K BRADSHAW 00 760 3,111.25 1447 HILLCREST COURT Hourly Rate 1 (80@$9.50) . -87 00 -348"00 APT 303 Federal Withholding . -47 12 -192.90 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 Social Security Employee . 11 -45 Medicare Employee -11.02 . -87 12 532-54-8206 PA - Withholding -21.28 00 -2 " -10.00 LOCAL TAX 2 . P ROB E 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 10/27/2002 - 11(09/2002 591.58 P.R.os.E. 10 3 3 BARBARA K BRADSHAW 11/29/2002 YTD 1447 HILLCREST COURT Hourly Rate 1 (80@$9.50) 760.00 3,871.25 APT 303 Federal Withholding -87.00 -435.00 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 Social Security Employee -47"12 -240"02 Medicare Employee -11.02 -56.13 532-54-8206 PA - Withholding -21"28 -108.40 LOCAL TAX 2 -2.00 -12.00 P R O B E 834 CUC4BERLANU STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17092 11/10/2002 - 11/23/2002 591.58 ...._,- 1 ~ 3 4 ; P.R.o.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAW 12/13/2002 YTD 1497 HILLCREST COURT Hourly Rate 1 (72@$9.50) 684.00 4,555.25 APT 303 Federal Withholding -76.00 -511.00 CAMP HILL, PA 170ll Social Security Employee -42.41 -282.43 Medicare Employee -9.92 -66.05 532-54-8206 PA - Withholding -19"15 -127.55 LOCAL TAX 2 -2.00 -14.00 P R O B E 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 11/24!2002 - 12/07/2002 534"52 P.R.O.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAW 10/4/2002 1447 HILLCREST COURT Hourly Rate 1 (80@$9.50) 760.00 APT 303 Federal Withholding -87.00 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 Social Security Employee -47.12 Medicare Employee -11.02 532-54-8206 PA - Withholding -21.28 LOCAL TAX 2 -2.00 P R O B E 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 09/15/2002 - 09/28/2002 591.58 P.R.O.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAW 10/18/2002 1447 HILLCREST COURT Hourly Rate i (80@$9.50) 760.00 P_PT 303 Federal Withholding -87.00 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 Social Security Employee -47.12 Medicare Employee -11.02 532-54-8206 PA - Withholding -21.28 LOCAL TAX 2 -2.00 P R O B E 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201{202 LEBANON, PA 17042 09/29/2002 - 10/12/2002 591.58 P.R.O.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAw 10/31/2002 1447 HILLCREST COURT Hourly Fate 1 (80@$9.50) 760.00 APT 303 Federal Withholding -87.00 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 Social Security Employee -47.12 Medicare Employee -11.02 532-54-8206 PA - Withholding -21.28 LCCAL TAX 2 -2.00 P R O B E 834 COMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 92: YTD 831.25 -s7.oo -51.54 -12.05 -23.28 -4.00 92~ YTD 1,591.25 -174.00 -98.66 -23.07 -44.56 -6.00 926 YTD 2,351.25 -261.00 -145.78 -34.09 -65.84 -8.00 10/13/2002 - 10/"26/2002 591.58 rcnmro u, o;vH ro '~ mcw w ;~ro~ ,'n z Q] H vs 21 N. 3 y a 'jJ O r ro er z~~o c w y ~ o c ~ x o x a~ in 'z N 3 b7 I H W H ~ ' - o p m r r H c~ ~ N r r x ro\~ o - n ~ ~ o ~ ro M ~ HNZ ~ m ~ ~ O y d o H cn m ~ n x N y O O (b p r c ~ t7 H ~ [>7 y y 0 0 N N O N N O O N CO O rro,'~mx O ~ m~ O ~ ~ 1 F'~ N~ Ft r ~m~ E w H~ y N- n x~`Dma a' t~ ~ rt N F ~ ~ (p Q. H Y- H F-~ o ct '..5 `C. `C --~ ~ ~ J fD CJ '~ !u7 Hm o ~o ~~ m u, m o N O 1 I 1 I J\ N N H s H N O O O O~ n N O O O W N Cn N I I I I v N N H ~U- H • K O O O. n N y O O W N (f~ ~ N O OD '' €r - r3T1 ~°a~:-~~ ~~-~w~ ~'~"" leas-End Statepnet~t rave ~ or z ~k ___ _ _.. __ __- _ _ v -January "1 -December Sl; 2002 ro a~x z&o Nortolk VA 23501-256D CB&T CUST FOR BARBARA K BRADSHAW/SEP 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 leer Your financial adviser HERVEY MINL INVESTORS SERVICES, INC. C/O W SHORE OFFICE CTR 214 SENATE AVE STE 303 CANIP HILL PA 17011-2336 IIIIIIIII/IIIOIII IIII III IIIII IIIII IIIII IIIII IIIII III II IIf 1I IlI Best wishes for the New 's'ear This statementshows all account activity forZO02, so please keep it for your tax records. Lei our wehsite help meke this tax season a little easier Go to the Tax Center at americanfunds.cam for your tax-related needs; seven years of account history, duplicate statements and tax forms, average cast information, onr interactive Tax Guide, and mare. S111T1iTD.ary .................................................................... CB&T COST FOR ~.:Rni:~a '.~ ^uT2AL`STii; w j.id'ii The New Econonry Furtd-A The Income Fund of America-A Total l~or more account information it Call your financial adviser s Automated information and services Website -- americanfunds.com American Funds Line"' - 800/325-3590 ~ Personal assistance - 8 a.m. - 8 p.m. Eastern time M-F Shareholder Services - 8001421-Oi80 ................................................................................................................................................... Fund Accoun[ Type nt Slreres held Sbere pace Account value nurnLer nurnbel fund as of 7L37 as of 17/37 as of ]7/37 Your investment portfolio ............................................................................. ® Growth -_: Egwty-income 14 598%0184 grow[h 38.531 $13.54 $527.71 06 59870184 equity-income 32.503 $74.35 $466.42 $988.13 About the die cfirt~rt at left 52.80% Each slice of the pie chart represents a type offund. A slice stands 4?.2D% for one fund ormore, depending on your parricularAmerican Funds holdings. The legend to the right of the Ale shows [he percentage of each slice; in other words, how much you own of each type offund. Year-to-date dividends and capital gains Fund ............. ._ ............. ..._.__.... .... nurnb~ ......._. _. _..... _......... ... e1.. _....... CB&T CUST FOR 19nnltantt a x I~RnvsFllnw/s>Er The New Economy Fund-A 14' The Income Fund of America-A O6 ..._...........L .... Account ..............._................._......................... Short-term _.......................... Long-term nurnber ........_ ...............L..... Dividends capital gains .__._..... _...._........._... .._.............._... ....... _._.. capital gains ......... .. _...... I 59870184 ~ $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 59870184 $24.87 $0.00 $0.69 Total $2A.87 $8.00 $0.69 ,:,,; . , ~ - _ ,_, _ Yeas-End Statement Pages 2 of 3 ~. «~ - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - .. - January 1 - llccember 31, 2002 American Funds is required io provide the value of your IRA to the Internal Revenue Service. Transactions for ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ cIIx~•r oust rota BARBArtA K IIItA7)SriAIC'/SEP The Mew Economy Fund -Class A Fund number t4 Recount number 59870784 Dividends and capital gains reinvested Shares this Rode date Desrsiption Dollar amount Share price transaction Share balance No activity this period 12/31/02 Ending share balance 38.531 The Income Fund of America -Class A Fund number O6 Account number 59870184 Dividends and capital yains reinvested Shares this Trade dete 9escnprion Dollaramount Share price transaction Share balance 01/01/02 3eyinning share balance 31.491 D~r15!OZ income Dividend 0.20 $6.30 $16.16 0.390 31.881 06/14/02 Income Dividend 0.20 $6.3E $15.49 0.412 32.293 09/1 s/02 income Dividend 0.20 $6.46 $14.23 0.454 32.74? 12/13/02 ;ncome Dividend 0,175 $5.73 $14.20 0.4D4 33.151 12/13/02 Capital Gain 0.021 $0.69 $i4.20 0.049 33.200 12/20/02 2003 Annual Fee -$10.00 $14.35 -0.697 32.503 12/31/02 'ending share balance 32.503 Beginning with the December payment The fund"s quarterly dividend decreased 2.5 cents to 17.5 cents per share in response m continued de clines in interest ra tee. To add to your investment Make check payable to CB&T or Capital Ban;r and Vast Company. Please write ynuraccount number on your check. Da not send cash. Capital Bank and Trust Company PO Box 2560 Norfolk VA 23501-2560 Ir~lrlu~~nlrlrl~uuullu~ililrlullullior'Irull:uil~uB CB&T COST FOR Ifnivesringinanewfund,pleaseobtaina BAP,BARA K BRADSHAW/SEP prospectus from your financial adviser or our website. Fund Account Investment Tax year Fund number number amount /IRAOnIy) The New Economy Fyud a...._ _......._.._._. ..... I'~............ _. 59870184 $ .......................... .................. _.._ The Income f-unJ of America: A ....................... ..... 06............. .. 59o701F4 $ _......................... ............._........... Check total $ ooooaooo II I I II I II I II it tvui~g t~cc:c~unL ~Zatemel~t c s~t,k, ~l~~~AI~K Primary account n.unber. 50-0365-8417 Page 1 of 1 For the pereod 10/01/2002 to 12/31/2002 BARBARA K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 CAMP HILL PA 17011-6022 Number of enclosures: 0 $ For 24hour customer service or a+rrent rates: Call 9-888-PNC-BANK Moving? Please contact us at 7-888-PNC-BANK ® Write to: Customer Service PO Box 609 Pittsburgh PA 75230-9738 ~ Visit us at www.pncbank.com TDD terminal: t-800-531-9648 For hcarm~ unynired clients only C Ranh tvoukt like to es[encL to yriu and yom' family our best wishes fvr a ta~oc9derful f~tolidiy season. Thank you for your mess, and for making ?00~ a success! F1ere's to a it«puy, healthy and prosperous ne9ti yem- together. Ivings Account Summary Barbara K Bradshaw punt number: 50-0365-8477 Account Link ~ number: 0532548206 lance Summary Beginning Depasiis and Checks and other Ending Galante other atltliLOns deductions balance 13,u5556 13..8 .00 13,0 i L8=1. Brest Summary Annual Percentage Yield Earned (APYE) 0: t0% 94 13,003.57 't 3.?3 posits and Other Additions Amount Descri phon 31 i99 Interest Payment 90 =1.-1I inlet ist Yaymem 31 :,.36 Ilttcrest Po.yment ily Balanoe Detai6 balance Dare Balance Date oalance 07 ]5,055 ,v 70,i 31 13,063 ~c ilj ;0 13,06i.9G Number of days Averag_ collected Interest 'earned In interest period balance for APYE this period As of 12/37, a total of $57.75 in interest was earned this yezr. There were 3 Deposits and Other Additions totaling $13.28. Dale Balance I?-S1 7S,Oi1.84 FORM953fl Basic Checking Account Statement ~. PNCBA PNC Bank For the peeiod 12/07!2002 to 01/08/2003 BARBARA K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 Primary account numher: 50-0363-6058 Page t of 1 Number of enclosures: 0 $ For 24hour customer service or current rates: Call 1-888-PNC-BANK Moving? Please contact us at 1-888-PNC-BANE ® Write to: Customer Service PO Sox 6D9 Pittsburgh PA 15230-9738 Visit us at www.pncbank.com TDD terminal: 9-800-539-1648 For hearing impaired climb drily Basic Checking Account Summary Barbara K Bradshaw Account number: 50-0363-6058 Account Link ® number: 0532548206 Balance Summary Please see the Activity Detail section for Beginning Deposits and Checks and other Ending additional information. balance other additions tled uciions balance 5,062.21 1,219.05 563.00 5,713.26 Average monthly Charges balance and fees 5,413.16 .00 Transaction Summary Checks paid/ Bank card/POS Account Information Teller withdrawals transactions assistance calls transactions 3 0 0 2 Total ATM PNC Bank MAC Other MAG ATM Other AT1d transactions ATM transactions transactions transactions 0 0 0 0 Activity Detail Deposits and Other Additions There were 2 Deposits and Other Additiol Date Amount Description totaling $1.219.05. 1?/19 634.52 Deposit Reference No. 02/076293 01/03 (134-59 Deposit Reference No. 024903039 Checks Check Date Reference Check Date Reference number Amount paid number number Amount paid number 106 C,0.00 12/09 o22aos'zas 109 * 418.00 Ol/08 0?22o7s8s 107 60.00 12/23 0?657742t * Gary in check sequence ~ There were 3 checks listed totaling $568.00 Daily Balance Detail Date Balance Date Balance Date Balance 12/07 5,0622'1 12/19 3,686.73 01/03 5 ,713.26 12j 09 5,002.21 12/23 5,626.73 , _ W Ir " ~_ .-__- 6~ -_ v "Y'2i dYiJCJi«EGei.G LL3t4alFL4 d UNDERwRIT3EN B4' U;~ia~~ Fidelity Li#e ?nssarance CamPany ~§§ereal ca?3ed t?te Campa;3y} CtYlCaga, llli rl al5 At4m'srtistrative Otdice: X850 Street Raaei o revase, PennsySvarYia t~J&8 SCHEDULE ATTACHEDTfl: M8U5248 EFFECTIVE DATE: 0"i.'I3/97 INSURED: Mr, Arthur L Bradshar~ ~r ?3b4 Kuha~ Rd Boiling Sprin, PA 17Pr0'' PREMIUM: P~tCLttBEB IN Mi]lvTHLY PREMIUM FACE AMOUNT s~a,o~o FAMILY COVERAGE: SPOUSE BENEFIT AT Stt°/, OF INSURED'S FACE AMOUNT; CHILD BENEFIT AT 1d% OF iNSURED'S FACE ArAOUNT. AT T;t~RE OF ACCIDENT: 3F THERE €S NO SPOUSE tNSURED, THE CHILD BENEFIT AN?OUNT IS INCREASED 25%, TO A PhAX?h4UieA ~S,~Ot7 BEfvEFiT; 6E THERE A42E NO CHILDREN !NSURED, THE SPOUSE BENEFi31kMOUNT: iS INCREASED 20°/,. ?F Nt3 SPOUSE OR CHILDREN REMAIN ?NSCiRED, THE MAIN ?NSURED MUST NOTIFY THE COMPANY IM3vtEDIATEIY. ALL BENEF@TS REDUCE 8Y SO%, ON T4?E PNSURED'S 8TH B?RTHDAY. P er,~,ium ,`or t1Ya `n~s~ P~,.o months or ccr; crave is paid by The ~Sq Card, the group sponscr. Sb396 - - ib6459< - ©'_ - - JZ - U0116 - - B5~ - SEAT BELT BENEFIT RiDEP. ifthe ai;ove premiwTi is paid o,. or before?r:e Efieciive Dare o'fhis P.ider, =.twiif be in fiorce.7he renaw2l premium for?his Rider is to be paid in he saoYa way anti ai ?ire same time as file pren;iurn (oryour CerPiFicate. The ina'ured ar.d each family memL~er covered urYder the Cenifica?e wilt also ha covered by this Rider unless excluded by endOrSemenY SEATcSELT BENEFIT For Accidental Oeaih as the r;aull cii a.ccidrnti~i! Bodily li;;Ur'y ~'uo 1o a _.==-nci tv?otor V~~hide Aa:ideM whle; wearinu a Seal Belt -~s drasnad tx;low wt; will ;Yay IPn~ aniowrt shown on ~ihe Rider Scixxtule. Accidenta! Beath means deaih wi;~cFl resuRs dire,.fiy Irc>m an Aca:oenfai Bodily !njury and indepentienfly of ail ether causes ar~d may trot De caused oy o. an:fr,bu?ed'.o by sickness nr tiisease_ GeaitY mus? occur ~,v'ithin 120 days firor,: the da?e of the Accsd2nla! Bc,7Hy 'niury Acddental Botfily InJury means oniq hodiiy injury susPained as a resi,lt c° an acciden? which occurs while coverage is in force _as ?c Y=e Covere:f Person, The iniury must result Directly from ?hat accident and independent;y cif a;1 ether causes Land RAotor Vefi'tcie AccSdent n,eY+ns Accidental Cea!h from an Accide;;ial Bodily Iniury to a Covered Person as a rosull oI a eoliisior.. wre:c'.;my or ex,~loslon of ;~ sand Motor Vnhic!c in ~FrfYic.h She Covt;red Person is riding or' drivinci ihai cruses visible damage. fofhe; Land Motor Vehicia. 7ind ic::ves rt in r dil(e rent candi?ion ih~Yn before ih(' aY r,;t(IC (1t Land NVatar Ve?2icPa iiic.in~, :;nil inrlurfr~.:i i..n; ,;ih~~ol i~nt~:rtr Iri>;~.~rngY~i aulumobilr ^ alatinn w.~t;~.~n a rnofor 1 [ i I~r ~n Lin ) _r a: ~ rY ~ mlu.,,i ~<_c n :~~~ f Irud: ail _ is:~~l i p~ iaty ai 2 [7117 Ix;Y,nrls nr Icti ; Aland Motor h~ hu I~ UUr.,, noI me ~r -ru a<< _ n - ; :i n ~Y?~~~<, ~I~ li .,-~cr ,~ ,i I~ foi hn~ t;i v~.n i;y ;i ~:<a~~.red Person Paid fo ~~-~=_ vii, i~-nVcl~~ , r<~ 'r <rlhe ui oil[ ua:;~, I,~,rI ~~1ro!i ny non~n.~~i n;; nd w~hi~.ln ;;nri nny vt•hicltr not pr,nr I!~.~liy u,'•.ign~~rl an:. !i,'.o ~.,~~•c+. 4~s", r;~ n~~: Un pribht i(r.~dti Form i-5[13H Page t •" ~_., i51 i3NEw * ~ a C£RTiF7CATE SCf-tEDULE POLICYHOLDER: FAMILY FINANCIAL GROUP 3NSUP.ANCE TRUST - GROUP POLICY NUMBER: A91230- - _ - -- - - - - - CERTIFICATE NUMBER: M805248 -_ - _ - MONTHLY PREM{UM; 510.21 - EFFECTIVEDATE: 01/13/97 -__ _ - - -- -- -- - - -_ -- - °- ENSURED: Mr. Ar'Ehur L Bradshaw Jr 1364 Kuhn Rd Bei ling Sprin, PA 17007 - - fNSURED FAMILY fv4EMB£RS - _ __ _ a --- Spouse Name: Barbara K Bradshau_ ~ -- - Covered Chiidren: YES - -- - - ~ - - ~~ - -- BENEFfTAMOUNTFOR insured's Famftyceveraga' ACCIDENTAL DEATt-i BY: Coverage' ~ -Spnase' Eadh Child COMMON CARRIER X350,000 $175,000 `E 35.000 MOTOR VEHICLE/PEDESTREAN S 30,006 ~ S~ 15,000- -- $ --3.000 - RLL ETHER RCCIDENTS ~- ~ ~ --$ 30,000 - ~ 5 ?5,000 5 3.000 - BENEFf7 AMOUNT FOR For lass of any Far loss of any __ ACCIDENTAL 63SMEPb9BERAv9ENT: - [wo or more members: -- - an=` member: 1 CU° ° of the SC°~o of the Acc~deniai Dea?h Benefi? Accideniai Ceaih Benefit F'remSUm for the !frst 'wo nwni?i> of cac~erage is pas;; 6y Tne Gi~~1 Card. the grcup sponsUr ' @ENFF!~i S +NILL BE P.EDUCED"B" iPN- -OW 7Y~JE IF+SUi<ED~S A`)7H FiIP.TFiDAY - UNDER FAP•AfL! COVERAGE ~~TfA1E CF ACC!UENT .F THERE :S NC SPOUSE INSUREC, THE DEATH; DISMEM1,IBE°.MENT CCVERAGE At~40UP:1". EXCEPT FGR COT.iMON CARRIER ACCIDENTS. POR _ EACFt CHILD 15 INCREASED25"~ TO A MAXIP~7L'~~1 OF ~5.0(JC FUR ACTOR VEHICLE AND ALL OTHER AcclDEiars. _ _ IF THERE ARE NC CH?LCRE!V INSURED, THE-SPOUSE'S DEATH/D+S?J!E~ViBERMEFJT COVEPAGE P.MOUNT, EXCEPT FOP, CCM1.1P.1:1N_CARRIER ACCIDE*l7S. 1S INCREASED 20°'0 - _ - IF NC SPOUSE GR CHILDREN RL-G1A:PJ WSURED THE J.'IAiN _INSUREU C.4 L'S7 NUTIF'Y THE COMPANY Rvi M1AEDIATE L`f - " - - '-- ~ nr. it . , .m Form 1~12af;[ a ~ i.. u. ,,:u r. ~~ :m. Paye 5 ~+230C y 4 .3 ~^d_ PHONE(71~ 612-3200 ox 888-508-2525 Fnx(717)612-3250 February 6, 2002 DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY CAPITAL REGION CAMPUS 1007 MUMMA ROAD • WORMLEYSBURG, PA • 17043 To Whom It May Concern: The Duquesne University Master of Arts in Corporate Communication degree consists of 36 credits. The cost presently per credit is $395.00. That means that at today's tuition prices it would cost $14, 220 to finish the degree; however, there will probably be a 5% increase in tuition beginning in the fall of 2002, which will then bring the cost of the degree to $14, 931 approximately. In addition there is a cost for textbooks, which runs about $50.00 per course or $600.00. The only other fees are the cost to take the Graduate Record Exam at about $100.00. If I can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact me at (717) 612-3201. Sincerely, ~ U Evelyn J. McClay Coordinator of the Capital Region Education for the Mind, the Heart, and the Soul Tlie,E~stern College Fast-'crack MBA--Management Program Application Fee (non-refundable) Tuition Deposit (non-refundable) ~ (Tuition per credit = $595; includes the cost of a computer) _ $ $ 35.00 500.00 Program Costs Credit@ Books Tui ' Fees Term One Prindples of Continuous Edugtion (MNGT 500) 1 $ ~ 65.00 $ 595.00 $ - Founda0ons -Ward. Power Point 0 $ 60.00 $ - $ - Management Communication (MNGT 550) 3 $ 130.00 $ 1.785.00 $ 30.00 Introduction to New Venture Project 0 $ 130.00 $ - $ - Issues in Management (MNGT 510) 2 $ 95.00 $ 1,190.D0 $ 30.00 Foundations - StatisOcs 0 $ 30.OD $ - $ - Research Design (MNGT 520) 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 30.00 Foundations -Economics 0 $ 30.00 $ - $ - Executive Seminar (MNGT 630) D.5 $ 30.00 $ 297.50 $ 30.00 Total Tuition for Terrn One 9.5 $ 5,652.50 Total Books for Term One $ 700.00 Total Fees for Term One $ 120.00 Less Tuition Deposit Already Paid $ (500.00) TOTAL COSTS FOR TERM ONE $ 5,972.50 Term Two Stretegic Thinking (MNG7541) 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 30.00 Foundations -Excel 0 $ 30.00 $ - $ - Founda0ons- AccounOng 0 $ 130.00 $ - $ - Financial Thinking 1 (MNGT 531) 3 $ - $ 1,785.00 $ 30.00 Business Ethics (MNGT 560) 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 30.00 Executive Seminar (MNGT 630) 0.5 $ 30.00 $ 297.50 $ 30.00 Total Tuition for Term Two 9.5 $ 5,652.50 Total Books for Term Two $ 450.00 Total Fees for Tenn Two $ 120.00 TOTAL COSTS FOR TERM TWO $ 6,222.50 Term Three Strategic Thinking II (MNGT 542) 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 30.00 _ QuanGta0ve Decision Making (MNGT 650) 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 30.00 Leadership (MNGT 600j 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 30.00 Executive Seminar (MNGT 630) 0.5 $ 30.00 $ 297.50 $ 30.00 Total Tuition for Term Three ~ 9.5 $ 5,652.50 Total Books for Term Three $ 420.00 Total Fees for Term Three $ 120.00 TOTAL COSTS FOR TERM THREE $ 6,192.50 Term Four Founda0ons -Finance 0 $ 130.00 $ - $ - Financial Thinking II (MNGT 532) 4 $ - $ 2,380.00 $ 61.25 Business Policy Capstone (MNGT 660) 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 61.25 New Venture Project (MNGT 690) 3 $ - $ 1,785.00 $ 61.25 Executive Seminar (MNGT 630) 0.5 $ 30.00 $ 297.5D $ 61.25 Total Tuition for Term Four 10.5 $ 6,247.50 Total Books for Tenn Four $ 290.00 Total Fees for Tenn Four $ 245.00 TOTAL COSTS FOR TERM FOUR $ 6,782.50 trend Total Tuition 39 $ 23,205.00 Grand Total Books $ 1,860.00 trend Total Fees ~ ~ $ 605.00 Grand Total Costs for Entire Program $ 25 670.00 i Effective for groups starting 7/1/2001 - 6/30/2002 rnvnu ~tror t ~~ 8 (7 ~,_ - ,_~? :..4 J Sb '~ ; f^~ 1 -_ /~i ~ 4 [ii __ (a. ~ 'L..1 _) ...r.~ ~~~ ci_ -..'i .it . _ ~_~~ _~ ll i C~:1 -L ARTHUR L, BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant 1. i,~~,~~ IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO RULE 1920.33(B) Personal Data: A. Husband's Date of Birth: March 2, 1949 B. Wife's Date of Birth: August 20, 1949 C. Date of Marriage: August 29, 1970 D. Date of Separation: July 15, 2001 E. Number of Children: Three F. Number of Children Under Eighteen: 0 2. List of Marital Assets: A. Marital residence at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Pennsylvania. Net Proceeds from Sale: $82,167.26 (included in savings accounts below) B. KEYCORP Dividend Reinvestment Acct 3005577024/3000557025 1-800-539-7216 www. us. com putershare. com Computershare Investor Services PO Box 6294 Carol Stream, IL 60197-6294 Current value: $132.00 C. Merrill Lynch 11951 Freedom Drive Reston, VA 20190 Agent: Robert Moran RobertHMoranJrC~ml. com (703) 464-8802 Wife's acct: 86Q-61966 - $20,075.75 Husband's acct: 86Q-62059 - $23,405.57 D. Pre-Paid Legal Services,lnc. Associate No. 532527420 No current or future income. E. American Funds PO Box 2560 Norfolk, VA 23501-2560 MML Investors Services, Inc c/o West Shore Office Ctr Camp Hill 17011-2336 1-800-325-3590 Advisor: Robert Hervey Wife's account Current value: unknown F. Pentagon Federal Credit Union Box 1432 Alexandria, VA 22313-2032 1-800-247-5626 Account Number: 405308-01-6 PFC Control # 00083334 PFCU E.I.N. 53-0197038 Balance 7/15/01- 869.78 1/15/03 - $7.416.11 G. PNC Checking Account Carlisle, PA 17013 Account Number: 50-8021-0931 Current Balance: $1,742.07 H. PNC Checking Account Camp Hill, PA 17011 Account Number: 50-0363-6058 Wife's Account Current Balance unknown PNC Savings Account Camp Hill, PA 17011 Account Number: 50-0365-8417 Wife's account Balance unknown J. MftT Checking Account Carlisle, PA 17013 Account Number: 00000001144308 Current Balance: $3,916.60 K. M8T Saving Account Carlisle, PA 17013 Account Number: 15004200939485 Current Balance: $60,164.18 L. L-3 Communications Master Savings Plan (MPRI Investment Retirement Ptan) #BWNFXTG ENV#MG008616 MG37716 A 1-800-354-7125 Balance as of 7/15/01: $23,000.00 Current Balance: $39,516.10 K. Insurance in effect: 1. Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Veteran's Life Insurance Department of Veteran's Affairs Office of Servicemembers' Group Insurance PO Box 964 Newark, NJ 07101-0964 1-800-419-1473 Term Insurance 2. Mass Mutual Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. 1295 State Street Springfield, MA 011110-0001 $125,000 Policy Number 8,211,311 No Cash Surrender Value 3. Liberty National Life Insurance Co Poticy Number A5101349 PO Box 2612 Birmingham, AL Insured: Barbara K. Bradshaw $25,000 Whole Life Policy Number A5101349 Cash Surrender Value: Unknown 4. The Old Line Life Insurance Co. of America 707 North Eleventh Street PO Box 401 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 (414)271-2820 Insured: Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. Policy Number 1381912 $50,000 Cash Surrender Value: $6,746.59 5. AAA Life Insurance Co. Administrative Office PO Box 96 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440-0096 1-800-624-1661 $150,000 Certificate No 897-0906732 Policy No ADP93 Term Insurance 6. Continental Casualty Co. PO Box 3020 San Carlos, CA 94070 1-800-252-2148 $1,000 (through PNC Bank) Certificate No: ID77989108 Term Insurance 7. Life Insurance Company of North America C/o National Rifle Association Endorsed Insurance Programs PO Box 22108 Santa Barbara, CA 93121 $2,500 (through NRA) Official Member No 000030648669 Term Insurance 8. USAA Group Insurance Trust USAA Life Insurance Company PO Box 96 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440-0096 1-888-517-1376 $1,000 (through USAA) Certificate No 69M-0102964 Term Insurance 9. Fortis Benefits Insurance Co 200 Powell Place Brentwood, TN 37027 ID697454231 $21,000 (through Pentagon Federal Credit Union) Term Insurance 10. Armed Forces Insurance Exchange PO Box 7300 Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027 Account# 0254718 1-800-255-6792 billinQC~afi.orQ Personal Property Insurance 12. Army Mutual Aid Association c/o Secretary Army Mutual Aid Association Fort Myer, VA 22211 (703) 526-1621 Number T-55089XOL Cash Surrender Value as of 7/15/01: $8, 480.21 Current Cash Surrender Value: $ 9,454.81 L. US Army Military Pension: M: Time Share: Williamsburg, VA. - $2,000.00 N: Art Collection: 1. In Wife's possession: $5,200.00 2. In Husband's Possession: $8,480.21 0: 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT (Husband's) $5,000.00 ', P: 2001 PT Cruiser (Wife's) $15,000.00 3. Experts TestifyinQ: No experts will be called to testify. 4. All Other Testimony by Witnesses: No other witnesses will be called to testify. 5. Exhibits: None known at this time. 6. Gross Income of the Parties: Husband's gross income: $82,500.00 Wife's gross income: Unknown 8. Any Disputed Items: Unknown 9. Marital Debts: Children's student loans. $14,706.39 10: Proposed Resolution: A: All Student loans for the children shall be paid off. B: All marital Property shall be divided equally: C: Wife shall receive via QDRO 50% of Husband's disposable military retirement income. D: Each party shall be responsible for his/her own counsel fees. Respectfully Submitted, TURO LAW OFFICES Date Robert . Mulderig, squire 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff OMB NO. 2502-0265 ~r ~Ar B. TYPE OF LOAN: LOPMENT 1.QFHA 2.~FmHA 3. QX CONV. UNINS. 4.QVA 5.QCONV. INS. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVE 6. FILE NUMBER: 7. LOAN NUMBER: T 1 P z R SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 8. MORTGAGE INS CASE NUMBER: C. NOTE: This /orm is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by tho settlement agent a2 shown. Items marked [POC]" were paid outs/de the closing; they are shown here for informational purposes and are not included rn the totals. 1.0 3/90 (sTUART.PFD/sTUART 0156923) D. NAME AND ADDRESS OF BORROWER: Dany J. Stuart ~ E. NAME AND ADDRESS OF SELLER: Arthur~!!Bradshaw, Jc Barbara K. Bradshaw F. NAME AND ADDRESS OF LENDER: Washington Savings Bank 4201 Mitchellville Road, Suite 300 - Bowie, MD 20716 G. PROPERTY LOCATION: 1364 Kuhn Road Boiling Springs, PA 17007 -SUM'' ARYOPBORROWER'STRAN H. SETTLEMENT AGENT: 23-2015480 I. SETTLEMENT DATE: Residential Commercial Abstract, Inc. ~ October 5, 2001 PLACE OF SETTLEMENT 3631 North Front Street Harrisburg. PA 17110 SACTlON K. SUMMARY OF SELLER'S TRANSACTION 101. Contract Sales Price 238,000.00 401. Contract Sales Price 238,000.00 102. Personal Peo- a 402. Personal Pro e 103. Settlement Char es to Borrower Line 1400 11,334.74 403. 104. 404. 105. 405. I rin vn A ll in 106. Ci !town-Taxes to 406. Ci /Town Taxes to 107. Coun Taxes 10/06/01 to 01/01/02 114.12 407. Coun Taxes 10/06/01 to 01/01/02 114.12 108. School Tax ~ 7D/06101 [0 07/01!02 1,487.36 408. School Tax 10/06/01 to 07/01/02 1 487.36 109. Sewer 10/06!01 to 01/01/02 201.42 409. Sewer 10/O6/Ot to 01/01/02 201.42 110. 410. 111. 41 t. 112. 412. 120. GROSS AMOUNT DUE FROM BORROWER 251,137.64 420. GROSS AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER 239.802.90 200.-AMOUNT PAlO: BY OR IN BEHALF OF BORROWER: 500. REDUCTIONS 1N AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER: 201. De osit or eame5t mone 5,000.00 501. Excess De osit See Instructions 202. Princi -al Amount df New Loans 190,400.00 502. Settlement Cha es to Seller Line 1400 - 19,351.81 203. Existin loans taken sub'ect to ~ 503. Existin loans taken sub'ect to 204. 2nd Mort a e 12,600.00 504. Payoff of first Mortgage to Mortgage Service Cente 114,696.39 205. - 505. Pa off of second Mort a e to Penta on Federal Cred 23,587.44 206. 506. 207. 507. De osit disb, as roceeds 208. 508. 209. 509. A "ustments For Items n aid 8 e/ler Ad-ustments or Items Un aid B Seller 210. Ci /iown Taxes to 510. Ci !Town Taxes to 211. Coun Taxes to 511. Coun Taxes to 212. School Tax to 512. School Tax ~ to 213. 513. 214. 514. 215. 515. 216. 516. _ 217. 517. 218. 518. 219. 220. TOTAL FA7D,BY/FOR BORROWER 300. &, ~ HAT 9ETFL MINT FROM/TO~ BORROWER: 208,000.00 519. 520. TOTAL REDUCTION AMOUNT DUE SELLER 157,635.64 600. CASH AT SETTLEMENT TO/FROM SELLER: 301. Gloss Amount Due From Borrower ~ Line 120 251,137.64 601. Gross Amount Due To Seller Line 420 239,802.90 302. Less Amount-Paid By/For Borrower (Line 220) ( 208,000.00) 602. Less Reductions Due Seller (Line 520) ( 157,635.64 303. CASH (X FROM) ( TO) BORROWER 43,137.64 603. 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'o a m ~i 'o"+„ R ~.e o~ ° ~~ oo m ~m 0.0.15 m0^y mQ pro °yA ~9QC mm m`3O ~ m^ m.Ni 5' ~ m ~ .Vxi a~ ~ a0'w ~o~ 5'q 5'w 0•~» ~~p, Oo n w c o ~' .Fi o ~iy ow C y d N. y ~ ~ ~ h 5. o m o~~ o. OropQ ~AM ~^ c "c ~ »z• 7 L9bL-fLOLL Vd 3'1SIlaVO f LZ d a0 A314V~19 Zt16L ar M\fliSOVaa l a[IFLL~'1!q 08~ val ar MvHsat-ae ~ ~JflHl.atl oar lsno s ~sdd-Iw N~~o mw °' ti~ o~C. g.0y aq A „ 0• e o yn05•~. m5w QO.~. ' wG~m6~ 7'mA~o' ~q"G'~• ~~~ ,zzzz sx3. 5 agozn'a 1gR5.~ ~' w o^m~° ° p o ~cwr''.ITooaw °c nco y c ~ ~'Sw mm~ '°~N~~o m t~ q ~'°~C~w. °°a `~ w ~~a~~° ~~~ o. 5. [' a~ao c~~„ °' S' ~ 5'„ r tl~ ~ '-~ .°c. o' o ° w am ~. ... m M ~. a +~' ~ ° ~ G. ~' w^ wmr ° m a ~N w v ~~J ~ a y ~ G ~~.$ w a ~ Td y H !° m .-. Sao v a hR~, a ~ °'«B ~ a 0 ~ ~ o w .e ti :~ ^n^' \J ~- _ i ~. _ 'i - 41`I!w%~~1~TmNRM"°•=°.IA-NI -IIR~ w ~ n w. JRN-15-2003 10 38 MERRILL LYNCH P.02i18 U `~ u a ~~ W L O R ~ -~"W7 W .~a~ ~~~ }~~ O N 0 Q a C 7 O V Q }. ~' a ~y A (Cqa ~ gp a 1~ym N ~'o~ ~m~ad v~=ay W ~~1C2 O 'a I.T~ LL~m. O ~ M m Y €'' 7 y E u ~', E N O~ ~C y re °w° r ;r m M ~. C ro d Q O 0 v R 0 w m A~ in^ ~z° dd $ m8 .Q C~ ~ 0 QyC w ~~ ~~ = ~ o s ~ ~ 00 Nm m M m~ h h in mm m m y ri N W m W w h s1 b 1e e ro n m N r ' ~ ~ n ~ c i d y O m O O ry p ~ NW h h me ~+ M M ® ® ~, ?~~ 7 ~N~A R Q ~y o c w as7~~ 7 m Cmm v ~- ~' ~ O ~_WEpLO°c~ Cm m~~Wm p Lei 7Om O.C~~a$r~tl.1 ~Oli'Ayy~ a U (Q.1 f9V~W~QQ~ JujWd 2 /+a mra. aCm~N OW r~pp p}i~w~n u~ LL~o r w ~. ,„ o ha~n E mr . . E~ c^ N V' y o i .i J C n do .W ® ~oMm E ~~ .. ,n .n y o m '' F G A V C '~ a e e LL w ,Eq a e a G0 ^ m=a C ~ C P N m~ s ~~d e ~~~ ors Z y C O ~ y~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ 0 0 1tl m 9 G~ #~O~u~ m4 'W~~cQ'~ E~ y ~ ~ C~~ ~ p O m~@ a L W~~ mr N C~y•N ID m W W W O W~Q, L~G4a ~ L ~ ~ e~ ~ ®W 'Smm ~ a _ ~ T d ® JJ ~ ~ p ma~~,~$ f n ~ y W W dJ po.m mir Y rIL ~~~Em a gCW~=~ Y~~O0O OEE~ Eo Q'0. ~ c .@ O.~`~r ~~ } W Z JAN-15-2003 10:38 MERRILL LYNCH 0 0 N a CF~' O N M m a p a r~ W a i m J a r LL L .T y 0 k V V N g~ a'3o mo No ® !n O h h O No ~o a a ~~~~ g t~i _IiO N 6 ~ b D ° +. r'9 ~ ~ N W } V W a ~Q C W 0 O M m ~~W E~~ Way ~ ~ $~ A y O w pC ~~~ o F ~ N m O h E ~ b W~~ 9 W h tea` u`~ N 0 ° 4 w ~{~.1 _ ~ N ~(~~ 4 V ~ r ~~~ ~~m a e ~~ ~ m EO C h N vt h E E ~ ~ ~o i h n ~ N b j > N h Q gd d~ `°~ ~~~ q ~.{~~ =~ a m C ~t G C ~ 9 d ~~ ~ 77 Cm U ~c ia «•e oc3a o z ~ _d u 0 C V N 0 a M N .tea e ~ ° u '" Q M ti C w m O 0 0 P.03i18 m 0 Z h c N Q~ e ~~ ~O E~ ~~ 0 a z Q m Y2 N O m~ ~ a"O N K W N a SRN-15-2003 10 38 MERRILY LYNCH P.04i18 F D O ~~ -~ 4~ S m .I F~ K a m LL C 9 }~ b w- m Ee°u ~as ~c^ ~~~ ~ J _~~ E"WW w~~, E~ r ~~a W ~~~ YQ ~Um /O '~n ~. ~ N ~~~ a a U 9 41 ~. 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M ~7~ ~ ~aC . ~' w m m~ m v~ ffiE .#, ~ z A- 4 ~0.. ~~ a `~ C~~ n~ m a 9 ~m_ mm ~ O " m~7 ~ W ~ ~C ~ EWm ~ a .~= m _ m ~- F ~~r g E ~ 5 ~ W~~ - ~~~ ~ N a~ 'Q' ~ `o m LLl F ~ ~ ~ ¢K~ M ma q~q z H N oHU vri O ~f~]~ Q m °m ^J ~a e ~~~ ~ ~ ~~E o tea, ~ z 4 •- O a a ~ E ~ e °a r o Fmz 9 w w a ~~ 'Jw µ ~ ~ ro m R ++ ~ C a a d ~ ~ `mom SSE f "~ E°` '~~ ~ ~ ~E ~~®88 ~~ a b~~`m ~ mmyF2 ri ~WEEa O Y ~p a 'G~~~ w w' ~~~mm d ~N ~ m vrwEa ~ 9 3 aa}7 u ~~a77 ~ B W~ H~ g 3 VWV~~ N O ~„ ~~ 2®W E~ ~ W W q $' °oM Z~~Cjn ~ii to 9 w w ~ 5~ e~ W y ~c~E'F yW ~ h y ~ ~ ~ Q ~ ~$ti~~ O m LL W m g a z° ~~ ~~ 0 o r` ~o m~ E~ ~~ 0 a a JRN-15-2003 10 39 a` w m U r .A m A i~ F a 1"'~ MERRIL w .?~ c ~a o~ ~d 0 c a ~ o q^N C R m m ~~, R' H K m LL o e 0 0 n M m a~ b b h a r n N N a o 0 14~n aQ°oof°n`°oo EL7 ~+H~~m~rH~~Et W h +, C IO~Yy z ~~ O ® "''''dddddd0 .7 a9 ((W,7~77 ® 1A O SJw H-~ ca7~L~7h ~ ~ ~ O.-I ~ oy CJ G ~ ~~~a~~~~4~an o ~~¢ o ~ ~ N a Ej ~a ~ U~ W V N ~' W ch ,y ~ )b P ~ ~+uuwa alb a wu :~ w H £~~w~~'zu~~~w~u~ c ~ N rl Y1 e1 [~ M i m W w ~ m m a b y ~ a' H a° q U a GGG ~ h A w 1E 01 m m 01 O o 0 0 0 ~` h t+ P h O b O O O m 0 E E U H P.06i18 m Z ~o ~d a w aA N A O ~~ E,,. N £~ 0 O W~ ma0 K w Vl W a f JRN-15-2993 10 39 MERRILL LYNCH P.07i18 ~I V M a S 0 0 ~ ~ O m A O ~ ri O O O O o M 0 N 'w0 0 b m .a ~ d N V~ N C d N O ~ m 0 a z 6 O m J Q L d y V ~'"C 0 O~ ~E o~ ~I H 0 O m L b V m x N ~ ~ k O µµ~a~ a a W rW~ rVa~l rN~ E U ~ F~++a~ Ltl IK IX PI,~~ ~ Zj rr ~ ~ ~ .4 { g CQGN~N WHR MN x P ~ ~ 3 ~ P ~a G~ D p Seem xxax ~ = c ~ .o o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ' ~ V - N ~ ~ £ £ ~ C. £ £ H LL" ~ a ~ a ~ LL m m o o N N a T 0 0 I ~ N N I u ~ ~ W b 'Cf N ~ ~ ~ q u N ~ Q U ~ ~' a ro a m ro m m ~aa~~a v v, ~w ~ v ~p tp ~o m Ol N b N O O O O O N N N F o F P h n F F o e e o 0 0 0 w m o fi. ~ o m vs ~ ~ h N fi Q 5 .I F ~ N A in yr ~^, K a QN W Y~ ~ P1 FI a a s a m 4q N O a ap O ~ F O h N O M NQO N O m0 N H Gl m q as Z un .~ u ~,w u Uy ~ ~ W '(1 O H O b b NHLI ..~ o °NO n , e o OHO F W N ~' ~ rr? m 0 0 oa oN e N N W a. 5 .i o Imo e G ~N a '~ N N A ,q5v O 01 U bG mu 7v .w al ~~ro ~C~m m ~a,~ L C~M w ,~ I ~u~ 0 2 d~ ro 8~ z G. ~ O ~F m N 0 0 w ~ m00 ~ ~ W LLI d 0 0 ° b o cv b ° m p o } m N % v+ ut F U '~ H 1~ a 4 J 7 O m LL ro y W V a ti o N p o ~ m O O w f!} } Nr H Z N ~~ ~ ~s mo A ~mQ ~ N G U m ~ o N °' m a ~ A -•+ U m A C c b M _ ~ o a ~ G ~ u~ ~ m am°~6 C ~ a { y ti O () ¢ W W JRN-15-20073 10 39 MERRILL LYNCH P.99i18 a a ~,, ~;a r ~ LON ~ Y h ~ ~LI -W; ~ ~~2 ~~ >~~ r 0 N N A e i= a ~ C~J O S ' V (o] o' ~~od Q ~sxi~ ~Iw ~ ~~ e7 ~o~~ ~~ ~~ 0 a ~ o~m a u~.~Y a q~~~~ HYC=N LLm~X I~fO Cmr~m ~ ~ n. b N L m C' ® ~" E N E E N d u e rn M C N ~ a 'mCo D 0 1~ al W QI m ro L m ~ H f z m o~dE ~, a + e D e ~ '6' ~ c W m D G9 LL~p o ~ e^ N h N ~ m ~ -I . n h n N m n H Q ti n 0 ~p # ~ N t - A E m 0 r r E w ~^ ~ .pi .7 ei O q 0 a ui p vi 0 o m v, N Ot cry N m v~ m n N M 1~1 a~i m ~ ~ G ~~ ~~~ V ®L~ W~ R a~0)~O W ~~r~ .7 mm g r ~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~A LL ~m~na-i C E~Ep~ayi~c ~`mm o mO4'o~v~~:~~Ct ~m w UUC7U ~lu~00 ,,,1 rA U°S^ 2 W m e °a ~'o m .r ~ u~°:m~ ,~mmui ~n 6Yo ti .' mam ae n m N •ior- m tlI M ~ O ~ J Y c hxa E 4O vNi uai ~ rl In ~ o n ~ h m E~~ qmo t,m ~~Z '~ ~ of W E _LH ~~m z }} s Ce ors z t~m ~m m o d lEp ~ a Cffi__ti e 9` ~s~~~E ~~ ~$c~°~ v ~mDm"~ O r a~ ~~ B°~ ~ ~a P m~c +nm U~ 4 c i . 'g der C ~ ~ m m "d`s=-- ~~ ~ e ~~ W A . a ^ sm c~~~ yW N d~' T ~~ J ~ } ~ m ~ j ~ T ~ 'E=~-O °~ ~ oYy ~Ea I~ N ~ w W i moN W 7 G r2 ~ 9 W y Q ,'~m° 'E~ LL I b~~~•E ® ` ~'c ~ n ~ o ~ 5,~~, ~ $ i M N 'C7 m ~ 69 ~~=~ ~N9 JRN-15-2003 10 39 E C7 --~ ~1 I+a MERRILL LYNCH 0 O `' N l0 4" N '~. 0 !4 v N VII V m pq~ E LL ~ V m Y 0 C ~ d E a m N p m N N ~~ C a"rs O wo No ~ mo n '~' r o y No O a ~ .i N m h m~ _Ea® ~S3o W m Te N 0 d N 0 c Gip ~ b ~s • ~~®E r.9 ~40 0 0 n m y y tl1 ~ C ~e ~ 6 a 'O ~ ~ '~ m ~~ f m ~! ~} °~ "° m 7 ~ 109 ~ ~~ r. O ~ h d W N ° 4 w V C 9ooa HUm a v ~.~. N aom U ~Vm v~ ~ a e r a O h h M N Wt ~a - t` m m in ~ ~ G 0 a O d v N N P.10i18 N a o Q O ~ E: ,~ u le V o .i G g z m cm ~~ Q m a ~`A aQe ~r a sm L6 Y W pp~h W aN W W W ~ C N OC ~ ~ a ~ ~ m ~ ~ O a6 ~ O1so a ~im oU mC0 e m 5mo atiQ" O m°~ C gc~ia Q o z ~ JAN-15-2003 10 40 MERRILL LYNCH P.11i18 J a a m QR~ 4 K Q m LL C 9 ~~~ ~~E 9 I N C ~~ W v~ 1~aN ~a~ ?~~ E~~ W~ ~M w~6' W .~ wr N C Fyn r 4 4r m ~ U aim ~~ N C O 7 6 .~ d D h W 0 m IM O .~ w 1m M C 4T 4G I N ~ ~ .~ ~ e In to ~ m e ~ V ~ ,y n m M m O~ N 411 N A N ~ h 1"1 4n 'c n 9 V}~ ToaE ~cu ~aS 9 ~~Y aM m ~~~ 9 r E'~' W~' w N a l t il O i N ~ ~ S 1n C m a 'I 1n N ~~ 4 ~ ID r n u N O N d N ~.4±~ ! VW b to C 4p ei y q ~O O lC NVm m a b W ~', O ~ .Z C ~ O h m ~i W ~ , G t+~ NN a N r01 ~ ~ ~ G 6 7 V U T o O C o o O o O \ 1D \ N \ N ~ rl C N O O O w m O O q O ~~~ n7 V H "O R qq E S h 5 D H ~ a a A W ~~jj W~ a U ~ H ~ ~ I~-1 a ~'~. I „ ~; ILp~ O C ~ D. V ~ r7 ~ ~ N ~ ~ ~ w' ~ o ~a~77 a ~ O 7 i # M s t t M ~ ~ ~ r i .i u1 O w ' O a aQR 44 zzz zz If1 4T W m ~ 111 N d' ~a m ai a a .a '1 .-I .1 N M .t w ti W ~ ~ ~ 9 C 7 V' N~f~ NQ' ~zz 4-z ~ W Q W ~ i . a e D ~+ ~ .a 9 ~ O ~ K ~ a c LL 7 M O ~C 40 W i l~ L~ b O~ N u} N m ~ ~ !P o1 ~ m o N ~ .S Z ~ ON ~rn O a aaa~ ~~~ W a~ ~y a ~y{~77~' ~FU [~HO1 ~ ~ W /~^ ~ ~ ~ ~ U ~ ~ ~i 'e (~Tp+~ pTp W W ~1"1 kkk~~~ vx OQiH R~m~ ~.] £ £ " ~ ~ O M IA 6 lL f i1 ~ m nl N N N N W m g O ~m ~~ ~~ as ~r N P D pm^ W 4G G ~ °"P7 W N W Uql J a JRN-15-2003 10 40 MERRI LL LYNCH ~ O I I a I c S V v a ~~E v N ECCC,~ ~Q C c ~ W m a w mm a Np"w Nw +~3, ~ Uv ~ +' If1 b '"' Fmo m eU ~ ~~~ ~~W E n~ ,0 ~ w° e m ® ~ N N ~ c m a ~ ^ by b M ~ M ~~~ h W~7 N N ~p~ M ~ r~ ~~ ~ v ~ w~` E'E C vNi ~~ HO. O c ~1 ~'4 W 9 0 ~m ~ LL w ZEN ~ w..w spa ~ ~ a w n ~p MU ~~ W u s c~ w Mr~pp 9 n n . N~a 4 a t ~ ~9}~ ~ O ~] Phi ~ C ~ E '_ o O "~" ~ E rJ. V V.. ~ LL 4' ~ r~E ~ ~' g~ a W ~ _~~ C ~~ ~ n~ ~ ~ m N E_Yy m~ 9_G d~`J~ ~~ y y E' r E c ~jb~y .Q w ~ W ~ ~ 9 ~ ~ O~y~r y wry ~ F~g a Aa W ~ ~ c'W ~ ~ G d '~` @ S S ~~~~ W ~ ~ G N F 7 2di WJ E~ ~ m y'+• • ~~§zC~J w ~ Y ~ -~ cS ~ ~ ii ~ee ¢ W F`~~~m m m y, m 'E LL d al U W m Cf C a y =~ o~ u O a a C D m W P.12i18 M m 0 0 n w ~ ~ A N po a~ ~~~yr [Fy ~~77 W 4 p] ~ R F ~ HSNSy 4444a ~~~~ ~ uu H ~~~a~ N fi S s z m ~~ ~~ 8~ ~~ mQ N~ a 1~ yay W N ~A P F U a 5 ~ N W a ~c m 0 0 ~ ~ O p + +sY.. JAN-15-2003 10 40 F F a a ~~ MERRILL LYNCH P.13i18 a N N o o d~ O f~l V o m a O O O O 4 O q ~i O H 8 d d tSQpo~po V '° H~~®~~~ .. C ~ ~ ~ a S ~ ~ ~~ a ~ m g ro ~ ~ ~ ~ c n w d iwaww zww ~~~~,~Qm a ~ ~~~a~a~~~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ a H a @ ° ° z ~ z ~ ~ a Cz ~ vie ,we +w ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ca gu ~ a mu m(y~~ ~ ~ ® a a U £ V W ~ ~ p ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ S N I~ s 9 r 8 ~ j" ~ ~ M M O O fl N mmo0 i i .i .i ~ m^ p,p v ~~ ~~ 41!'~ 0 ~-+ ro ~ ~.' a u c o S > y U ~y ~ O ~ ~ ~ E+ J Cl 'tl 'C ri &'C .i (~ C A O}F A 1 A ~ l a d ~ ~ a ' C A O U O 7 1 ~p p y y~ p j 4 j Y f ~ W n yy ,p y p W N ' ~ ~ V ~ . W W [l~ l a p °~ °i ~c u+.emmm gnu O O O O O N N N \\\\\\ \\ O O h h h h h h h h O O O P O O P G 4 JRN-15-2~a3 10 40 MERRI D m O a n V a' a S a .iw N ih N C d 9 7 n o N o N +/~ V a m u 4 ~' C y ~Z gam; 3 f~ E R Q o C m ~ ¢Y F. m 0 M m ~ h m ti ~ ~ p li 2 ~ ~' F c ~ C W `" Z C N C '~ q £ u Q a a ~5 + Z F O 6 m C 4 m o p o m yr ' ~ i N N d~ f .~m ~~~ N tR C N iq pOd~ N~~ a p m O N p p O dl O \ N O w Nq0 N O m m O ~ M O ~ } ~ X M v W r q a ~ ~ U.q M L ~w4 ~u al Nvo ., m v ° ~ ~ ~ c i O n O ~ O O N ~ O O N O o ono 0 a 0 ~ tin. m o •T~+ } yr b m N x W f. a p 00 O N O N H m w° a Erio ~ M O ~ ~N p 0~ O . 6 ~ M y O A N 'i O~ ~ mq C~ p y O U p m rv+ H ~ ~ A ~~ b G ~ U a,i e b CA ~ro~ ~`~ m' N 8 b G C p C ~ c~ 0 U Q ?~ u P.14/18 m 6 Z Q~ ¢~ C7 Q aS ~O mw N O 0 ay~ °p1~~ ? d W b 4 W W JRN-15-2003 10 41 MERRILL LYNCH Customer Account Info Preparud fur: BRADSHaW, BARBARA K Selected AcCOUnts: 86Q-67966, 86Q-62059 Data as of: Ot /14/2003 COB By Account - 86Q-61966 l3alapCe3 P.15i18 6d3~M®rriu6ynch Net Value: 21,380.74 CMA: p,Op Margin Balance: 0.00 CMA Other: 0,00 Cash Balance: 0.50 CMA ISA: 353.43 Annuities: 0.00 CBA: 0,00 Insurance: 0.00 ReadYAssetFunds: 0.00 MFA: OAO RetirementResarves: 0.00 # of Unpriced Securities: D Other Money Funds: 0.00 Option Securities: N Tune ofAxount: Cash Cash Signal Code: Margin Ipformatipn LMV; 0.00 Requirement: 0.00 SMV: 0.00 T-Galt: O.OD Equity: 0.00 Maint. Call: p,p0 SMA: 0.00 FME: 0.00 SMA Chan7;e: 0,00 Margin Signal Code: Purchasintt Power: 0.00 Dividend Usage Code: 0 Other Balances Previous Xeaz Irrierest: 0.00 Aoeuwulated Dividends: 0.00 Current Year Corm: 0.00 Mazp.,in Int MTD: 0.00 Prev Year Contr: 800.00 Interest Rate: 0.00 Cash Activity as of COB: 0.50 A/R Fee: 0.00 Last Deposit Dace: 01/09/2003 Overdraft Amt: 000 Set DAte (Last Trd ActiviN): 01/13/2003 TEFRA Form Code: 0 TransfetFrom/T'o: 79583484 TransferBffDate: 02/29/2000 Transfer Out Date: Close Out Dete: Year $od Values l2/3li2ooz: zo,o72.91 12/31/2001: 30,231.89 12/29!2000: 36,765.28 Report created at tI15l03 70:04;13 AM 1af2 7AN-15-2003 10:41_ MERRILL LYNCH Cu~tc~mer Account Info Prepared for: BRAQSHAW, BAR6ARA K Selected AccDUnts: 86Q-b196b, Sb~62059 Data as Of; 01!14/Z003 COB _ ~~~~}7 P. 16/18 IBAlM01'tiQ~~C~I By Account - 86Q-61966 Security Symtrol Rating Money Accounts ML BANK USA RASP IIAXX Stocks & Related AOL TII74E WARNER INC AOL C-2-9 JDS UNIPHAS& CORD )DSU C-3A WORLDCOMINGMCIGROUP MCWEQ WORLDCOM INC-WORLDCOM GR WCOEQ Mutual Funfla ML FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH B MBFGX bn- FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH n MbFGX Quantity COB Price Mkt Value 353.4300 .1.000 353.43 115.0000 15.350 1,765.25 50.0000 3.280 164.00 4.0000 0.265 1.06 100.0000 _0.182 1810 4755340 12.430 5,910.89 987.8030 13.330 13,167.41 Report created at: 1 /15103 10:04:13 AM 2 0£ 2 JRN-15-2003 10:41 MERRILL LYNCH P.17i18 Customer Account Info ~~"~~~"~" Prepazed for: BRADSt1AW, BARBARA K Selected Accounts: 86Q-61966, 8611.62059 Data as of> 07 /14/2003 LOB By Account - 86Q-61966 Bahwees Net Value: 21,380.74 CMA: 0.00 Margin Balance: 0.00 CMA Other: 0.00 Cash Balance: 0.50 CMA ISA: 353.43 Annuities: 0.00 CBA: 0.00 Insurance: 0.00 Ready Asset Funds: 0.00 MFA: 0.00 Retirement Reserves: 0.00 # of Unprieed Securities: 0 Other Money Funds: 0.00 Option Securities: N Type Of Account: Cash Cash SiApal Code: Margin Informatioq I MV: 0.00 Requirement: 0.00 SMV: 0.00 T-Call: 0.00 Bquity: 0.00 Maiut. Call: 0.00 SMA: ~ 0.00 FME: 0.00 SMA Chau~;e: 0.00 Margin Sipazal Code: Purchasiue Power: 0.00 Dividend Usage Code: p Other Balances Previous Year Interest: 0.00 Accumulated bividends: 0.00 Current Year Comr; 0.00 Margin Int MTD: O,Op Prev Year Contr: 800.00 Interest Rate: 0.00 Cash Activity as of COB: 0.50 A/R Fee: p,pp last Deposit Date: 01/09!2003 Overdraft Amt: 0.00 Set Date fLast Trd AcSvikvl: 0 111 312 0 03 Tl?FRA Form Code: p Transfer Fra~m/To: 79583484 Trausfer Eff Date: 02/29!2000 Transfer Out Date: Close Out Date; Year End Values 12/3I/2002: 20,072.91 12/31/2001: 30,231.89 12129/2000: 36,765.28 REpOft CfeatCd a[: 1/15/03 10:08:35 AM tort JAN-15-2003 10:41 MERRILL LYNCH _ P.18/1E Customer Account Info `~°"`~r~''p°c'` Prepared fOY: BRAOStIAW, BARBARA K Selected Accounts: 86Q-61966, 86Q•621159 ~afa as of: o1l74/20Q3 COB By Accou°t - 86Q-61966 Security Money Accouats ML BANK USA RASP Stocks & Related AOL TIME WARNER INC IDS UNLPIiASE CORP WORLDCOM INC-MCI GROUP WORLDCOM INC-WORLDCOM GR Mutual Fuuds ML FUNDAMENTAL. GROWTH S ML I'UNDAMENTAL GROWTIi D Symbol Rating Quantity COB Price Mkt Value TIAY7C 353.4300 1.000 353.43 AOL C 2-9 l 15.0000 15.350 I,76525 JDSU G3-9 50.0000 3.280 164.00 MCWEO 4.0000 0265 1.06 wcos0 100.0000 o.ISZ ls.2o MBFGX 475.5340 12.430 5,910.89 MDFGX 987.8030 ]3.330 13,167.4I TOTPL P. 16 Report created at: 1 /15/03 10:08:35 AM 2 of 2 Fidelity NetBenefits Page 1 of 1 Market Update Accounts Site Highl DJIA ° t • The Gradual Desc e L-3 COMMUNICATIONS Rates: A Timeline * 8, 730 ` ~`I" 8, 700 Investment Nav Change Balance • Empowered Estat 8,670 FIDELITY MIP II CL 3 $1.00 +$0.00 $36,471.61 • Know the Facts B~ 'I 8,640 L-3 STOCK FUND $23.68 -$0.04 $3,044.49 Borrow - 8,610 l • Annual Review: H Total Market Value $39,516.10 Your Financial Pla u 1 3 1:45 PM ET 1f3I2003 DJIA 8,723.11 127.80 SPX 923.06 ~ 13.13 NetBenefits balances as of: 01/08/2003 Portfolio' NASDA01,434.53 33.51 Balances and prices are subject to nightly account updates. Use Fidelity Portfo Terms of use ®BigCharts.com Copyright ©1996-2003 FMR Corp. All rights reserved. to help you create a Important legal information reaching all your fin[ Fidelity's Commitment to Privacy Fidelity Portfr AA=1 DC=154 HW=5 IA=1 Personal In • 529 college saviro now even better. • Find out how you for additional Fide by consolidating ~ with us. Emolove~ hops://workplaceservices402.fidelity.com/netbenefits/integratedservices/HomePageServlet 01/09/2003 TIMESHAI RESALE Charles Davis IPMB 297 768 7/Z - ~ MoMioMlo Avenue Wllllamabnrg, hr=lnla 23185 757-870-6878 July 10, 2002 Art Bradshaw 1402 Bradley Drive, A-213 Carlisle, PA 17013 Dear Mr. Bradshaw: Thank you for your inquiry. What follows is our standard, seller, information package. If you want to sell, list now for the year 2002 season. We perform, as hun- dreds of our clients, your former fellow owners, will attest. You pay not one penny un- less we perform. We sold almost 100% of our 1997 listings, 81% of our 19981istings, 100% of our 19991iatinga, 100% of our 2000 listings and 100% of our 2001 listings. Everything else being equal, the earlier you list with us the higher you are in our sales inventory heirarchy and the sooner your interval will sell. Williamsburg timeshare re- sale prices continue to slowly decline. Your timeshare is almost certainly worth more now than it will be worth later. Do you want to sell your Williamsburg timeshare? Timeshare Resale Williams- burg will resell approximately 100 intervals this year. Will yours be among them? Whatever the reason: don't use it, don't like it, tired of increasing maintenance fees, ill- ness, divorce, death, feel it has not lived up to expectations, you now, finally, can get out from under it and those annual maintenance fees! Timeshare Resale Williamsburg has the expertise and marketing/sales skills to sell your timeshare, but you should act now to assure your place in our year 2002 in- ventory. There is no up front liatinft fee. The enclosed information will get you started. Call ua right away if you are ready to sell; if not ready to sell, we suggest you save this information for a time when you may be. >y, Char es avie Timeshare Resale Williamsburg makes selling your timesbare a reality. .~, HOW TO SELL YOUR TIMESHARE Q, What/who is Timeshaze Resale Williamsburg, and what aze its qualifications? A. TIMESHARE RESALE WILLIAMSBURG is a five yeaz old, fully licensed, Virginia, real estate brokerage company dedicated to one purpose: to resell Williamsburg timeshare ownership for people like you. Its annual sales are approximately $ 750,000. It is modeled after very successful resale companies founded in the past ten years in Hawaii. We think you will agree that this type of company is much needed and long over due in Williamsburg. That a legitimate resale broker exists in the Williamsburg market is a big benefit to Williamsburg timeshare owners. Most markets do not have a legitimate resale broker, and timeshazes owned in those markets are very difficult to resell due to the lack of a legitimate reseller. Timeshare Resale Williamsburg is independent; it is not affiliated in any way with any developer. It is dedicated to good old American free enterprise and competition that allows you to compete with the resale of your timeshare against developers. Developers hate us; you will love us. The principal real estate broker and owner is Charles Davis. It is he, under Virginia law, who represents you. Davis has an extensive, 33 yeaz, real estate background almost exclusively in resort land, hotel and timeshaze development, management and sales in Virginia, North Cazolina, Maryland, Vermont, Arizona and Hawaii. He has never had a complaint of any type in any state filed against him. Raised and educated in Virginia, he knows Williamsburg and the Williamsburg timeshaze mazket where he once worked; yet, he spent the recent decade in the Hawaii timeshare industry and a year or more in each of the other market areas. He is currently licensed to sell real estate in four states, three at the broker level. He has sold over 84 'lmt lion dollazs of resort real estate, has won many industry awazds, and managed, in one capacity or another, three of the timeshare industry's top resorts: PAHIO (Kauai); Cliffs Resort (Kauai); Kahana Falls (Maui). Additionally, he has personally sold timeshare ownership to more than 1,600 people in Virginia, North Carolina, Vermont, Arizona and Hawaii projects and counts the first Resort Condominiums International (RCI) owner as his client. He also was involved in the development and syndication of four, oceanfront, Virginia Beach hotels, two of which are now timeshared. He KNOWS the timeshare industry from the perspective of developer, manager, marketer, salesman and client/owner and, additionally, competing hotel developer. Many in the timeshare industry consider him unique because he has worn so many hats for so many years over such a broad geographic azea and, consequently, sees the industry so cleazly. Q, How can I resell my timeshare? A. There aze four ways: For sale b owner: This rarely works for many reasons, the major one being lack of effective marketing. To be effective, tazeet marketing should be used. This type of marketing is disproportionately expensive to your sale price and requires a lot of your time and attention. Additional hurdles are: not knowing how to negotiate and handle" a prospective timeshare buyer, not knowing real estate law and having suitable contracts, not knowing how to get a sale closed, not being able to meet prospective buyers, etc. Generally, if you cannot sell it to your family and friends, you are not going to sell it. Lfst with a residential real estate broker: This rarely works if you can get a residential broker to take the listing at all. Why? Timeshare is one of many real estate niche markets not fully understood by the typical residential or even commercial real estate agent, not because they couldn't fully understand it, but because their business orientation is elsewhere. We've sold many "regular" real estate agents timeshare and both they and we know their limitations when it comes to timeshaze. Frankly, a timeshaze listing is seen by many agents to be possible competition to the sale of a much more expensive, and profitable to the agent, piece of resort real estate. List with your uroiect's resale program: This rarely works because most projects don't offer a resale program because the project is developer controlled and the developer es owners reselling because every resale prevents a sale of a high profit, developer owned week. Developers have long resisted helping their owners resell. In fact they try to prevent you from reselling. After more than two decades of "stone walling" this issue, some developers today offer "resale programs" which are nothing more than an attempt to get you to list and tie up your listing for as long as possible to keep you from competing against developer owned and offered weeks. No matter what the developer's sales people tell you, don't believ@ the project resale program is going to sell your timeshare. It is not in their best financial interest to sell your timeshare. Additionally, don't list with a resale company recommended by the developer's sales people. More often than not the developer has prearranged deals with up-front fee, usually national, resale companies. They refer you to these companies with glowing recommendations that they will get you "top dollaz", etc. In reality these referrals are always designed to accomplish three things: 1. Keep you thinking your timeshare is worth more than it is actually worth which keeps you from raising hell with the developer and may actually get you to consider buying more from the developer 2. Get your timeshare listed with a resale company in such a way as to far remove it from competition with the developer's ongoing sales room 3. Make money for the referring sales person who often gets akick-back of about one-fourth of any up front listing fee. List with a national resale como~ny: Unfortunately the latest scam effecting timeshare owners is the national resale company. It is bad enough that timeshare sales rooms may have sold you a bill of goods going into timeshare ownership. It is bad enough that you will lose thousands of dollars invested in the timeshare. Now, national resale companies pick your pocket again as you try to get out of the ownership. This is a disgrace. Many of these companies carry national real estate trade names, and it is perfectly obvious that many national real estate franchisors don't caze about anything other than monthly franchise fees. They obviously aze not policing the ethics of the franchisees. These companies while purporting to be resellers are actually only interested in collecting up-front fees, often as high as $500, and doing little or nothing to try to sell your timeshare. In the highly unlikely event that they sell your timeshare they also charge a commission. They run token advertisements in a few national publications to legally protect themselves and backup the claim that they are trying to sell your timeshare when in fact they aze doing nothing. They collect millions of dollars in listing fees each year from gullible often desperate timeshare owners. These are often only telephone 'boiler rooms". The "sucker's bait" is telling timeshare owners what they want to hear: that the company can sell their timeshares for close to or more than what they paid for them. In twenty-eight years Charles Davis knows of only one case in which an owner sold a timeshare for more than what was originally paid. Owners are gradually catching on to this resale scam in part due to several national television shows exposing the scams. However, the scams seem to be growing with new twists being used to disguise up-front fees such as "an international bank buying U.S. timeshares", "appraisal fees", "rental program try before they buy" pitches, etc. THE BOTTOM LINE: if you have to pay one nennv up front for anything it is very probably a scam. Timeshare Resale Williamsburg is contacted frequently by Williamsburg owners who have been conned between one and three times and lost between $500 and $1,500. Perhaps an even greater loss than the up-front money has been th@ lost sales/market time they could have had with Timeshare Resale Williamsburg. The lost time has meant in many instances a year or more of additionally lost maintenance fees, etc. Developers and their sales people want you to list with these national companies because your listing disappears into a 'black hole" and will not be competing directly against the developer in Williamsburg as it will if listed with Timeshare Resale Williamsburg. Your listing might as well be on the planet Pluto. -2- :<« I~.^st with Timeshaze Resale Williamsburft: It is definitely in our best interest to sell yQuT rimeshare and to sell it as quickly ac possible. That is the only way we make money because we work only on a commission basis and have no conflict of interest because all we sell are Williamsburg timeshaze resales. We are in Williamsbure competine with your timeshaze directly against the developers' sales roo s. We know exac how, through expensive local media, to tazget and reach the Williamsburg timeshare buyer, and we have the expertise to turn the developer's new buyer into your buyer. The proof is in the recommendations of our hundreds of clients and the fact that we sell almost 100% of out properly priced listings each year. Q. Who does Timeshare Resale Williamsburg represent? A. The Seller. Q• Who pays you and how? A. Xou, the seller, pay by commission but only for a consummated sale. You have NO out of pocket expense; we collect at least enough down payment to cover commission and closing cost. Q• Ao you charge an up front listing fee? A. N0. Unlike most timeshare resellers, Timeshaze Resale Williamsburg charges only a commission for a consummated sale. If we don't sell your timeshare, we don't make money. We are paid for performance only, and that is how it should be. NEVER PAY AN UP FRONT FEE OF ANY TYPE. t!Ue, at Timeshare Resale Williamsburg, are so confident we can sell your timeshare that we wank only on a "commission when eazned" basis. Q. How much do you charge? A. Fifteen percent of the selling price or $2,000, which ever is greater. Typically, you will pay 52,000 for the sale of your Williamsburg interval. You, the seller, should be awaze that Tlmeshare Resale Williamsburg incurs lazge marketing and operating expenses as well as many hours of time in face to face interviews with buyers to successfully sell your timeshare, which in the field of real estate is a relatively low priced product. Last year our advertising alone cost almost $690 per sale made, and Timeshare Resale Williamsburg has significant other operating expenses. Q• 17o you require a listing agreement and for how long? A. Timeshare Resale Williamsburg requires a listing agreement that gives it the exclusive right to sell your timeshare for 360 days. Provided you list on reasonable terms, your timeshare should sell much sooner than 360 days would imply; however, because of the great number of variables involved and the marketing expenses involved, Timeshare Resale Williamsburg requires your 360 day commitment. Q. Can I modify your listing agreement before signing? A. No. Timeshare Resale Williamsburg can only exist by selling a large volume of listings and to do that we cannot deal with many variables other than project, type unit, calendar week owned, frequency of usage (every-year vs. every-other-yeaz), non-lockout vs. lockout unit, price and financing terms. We have learned to "KISS": "Reap It Simple Stupid" and believe it is in your interest to do likewise. Q• Since you have many listings for sale, how do you determine which listing to sell first? A. Timeshare Resale Wtlliamsburg has a strict policy of offering the buyer the -3- lowest price/ best terms listing for the project, unit type and calendar week of ownership the buyer wants. In the event your listing price and terms aze identical to another listing, we wllt offer the earliest dated listing. So, it is important that you cazefully consider listing price and terms, and list as soon as possible. In our computer, listings are coded without names to prevent any favoritism. Call us to discuss what your price and terms should be for the quickest possible sale. We believe we can resell only one or two hundred listings a year in the Williamsburg market; therefore, if you want your timeshaze sold, list immediately. Q• What price should I ask? A. This depends on many variables such as project, type unit, etc. Generally speaking, your price will have to be competitive with prices being offered by your fellow owners. Buyers do exactly what you do as a buyer: they seek out the lowest price. Competition between timeshare owners for the limited number of resale timeshare buyers is intense and results in listings to sell that are priced significantly lower than what owners paid in sales rooms. Generally speaking you are going to lose more than half the price you paid. Any person that tells you otherwise is not telling you the truth and is telling you what you want to hear in order to sucker you into either buying more or trying to get you to pay an up front fisting fee of some type (see page 2 "List with a national resale company"). You are not going to escape losing money. Developer sales room prices and what you paid an what you expect and what you need aze irrelevant Please do not give us your project's current sates room prices. We know what they are. They are irrelevant because the salesroom prices aze based on lies, deceit and a false picture of demand and supply. The timeshare resale market is purely a natural supply versus demand market. In order to sell, timeshare sales rooms create a fictitious picture of the timeshare market to convince a prospective buyer that the price is a good d@ai and that the timeshaze will hold its value. You may have already discovered timeshare ownership, while technically real estate, is more like owning an automobile in that it is faz from an "equity" investment. Between 42% and 58% of your original purchase price was marketing and sales expense! You are not going Lo recover that expense. You probably don't bat an eye when selling your $20,000 car for $5,000 five to seven years later. Long ago you accepted depreciation and marketing /sales load as the price you pay to have a car. Similazly, to successfully resell your timeshaze you must accept the depreciation. A good way to look at it is that you got better, larger, vacation lodging for less money while you owned the timeshare just as you got better, more economical and convenient transportation while you owned the car. Of course, most timeshare developer sales room pitches at least allude to later, high, resale value. If you bought into that idea, don't feel badly; you've got a lot (millions) of company some of which would surprise you in their normal business acumen and success. You may want to read the "Wall Street journal", "Kiplinger" or "Forbes" magazine articles in recent years on the subject of timeshare resale prices; we can provide them. Currently, even top of the line Hawaii project intervals resell for $4,000 to $8,000 or about one-fourth to one-third of current Hawaii developer prices. Pricing fs beyond the scope of this brochare. Please call us to discuss what your listing rice should be; however, you ultimately set the price. Timeshare Resale Williamsburg does not set the price. Timeshare resale prices have been going down in recent years primarily due to the average age of your fellow owners going up and more timeshares being developed and sold in the world in general and specifically in Williamsburg. The increasing age of the Williamsburg owner group has resulted in more owners wanting to sell for all the obvious reasons related to age such as estate clean-up, death, illness, inability to travel, etc. The increasing developer generated supply in Williamsburg and globally has meant more resale offerings from this enlarging owner base. These trends have resulted in a significant downward pricing trend. Charles Davis feels that resale prices will continue to decline but more slowly than in recent years. However, it is probable that you will get more money now for your - 4- timeshare than in the future. If you aze not going to use it, sell it and recover what you can, and put that money to work in something else. Q. What terms should I offer? A. In the east two ~azs we have not had a sin¢le financed transaction. All our sales have been cash sales; however, we are leaving this financing information section in this document because we feel it may become important in the future. Without a doubt, the most important term other than low price is financing. Banks do not make timeshaze resale purchaser loans. You must make it easy for some buyers to get into the deal. How many automobiles would be sold without easy financing terms? Your competition is not just other owners wanting to resell. Your competition are also Williamsburg timeshaze developers currently running huge mazketing/sales operations that, among other things, offer easy terms. While prior to two years a¢o over ninety aercent of Timeshare Resale Williamsbur¢ sales were all cash and in the past two years all sales have been for cash, to be on the safe side, you should offer terms so as not to lose a sale in the event the buyer is cash short. You should not think of your seller financing negatively. It is a positive to you in a number of ways, in addition to getting the timeshare sold. Experience has taught that buyers appreciate the fact that they are saving thousands of dollars on price and teens over what they would have paid a developer, and, after having made a relatively large down payment of several thousand doliazs or more, not one has defaulted. Financine is beyond the scone of this brochure. Please call us to discuss currently what terms you should offer if any. Q. What information, under Virginia law, must I furnish to the buyer? A. Basically, you must provide "full disclosure" to the buyer and so must Timeshaze Resale Williamsburg. The simplest way to go about this is to furnish the buyer everything you have on the project and your interval ownership. Under the Virginia Real Estate Time-Share Act, Virginia Code Section 55-380, you are required to furnish the buyer a Certificate of Resale for which your owners association will charge the fifty dollar maximum preparation fee allowed by Virginia law. Timeshare Resale Williamsburg and the closing attorney wilt advise you as to how and when to apply for the certificate. Q. How long will it take to sell my timeshare? A. Assuming you've been realistic with your price and terms and are competitive with other listings, it will take six months or less, and you should not be surprised at a sale within one month. However, remember that you must be an early listing to gain~riority. Remember that price sells! Q. Who will "close" the sale? A. Timeshare Resale Williamsburg has arranged a closing attorney "package" with the prominent Virginia Firm of Dinsmore, Evans and Bryant. This firm does a large number of real estate closings and is very knowledgeable on closing Williamsburg timeshares. There is less ume for "buyer remorse" if a contract closes quickly. The speed with which this firm will close and the "package' price cannot be beaten, and it is to your advantage to use this firm's "package". Experience has taught us that seller insistence upon payment of full closing costs by the buyer can kill a sale; therefore, you are strongly urged to list with aseller/buyer split of closing costs. The cost to you wiiI be approximately S I50. Q. How long will it take to get my money after a sales contract is signed? A. Closing will usually take place within three to five weeks following a contract. Dinsmore, Evans and Bryant will send your share of the sale proceeds directly to you after closing. By law the closing attorney must disperse funds to you within 72 hours following recordation. In Virginia recordation is the actual closing date. -5- Q. Will you sum up what I have to do to sell? A. 1. Simply call us with your questions and to determine price and terms. 2. Complete and sign (with your spouse even if your spouse was not a signatory when you originally purchased) the enclosed listing agreement and return it to Timeshare Resale Williamsburg. Copies of your timeshare ownership documents such as your deed, original purchase agreement and title insurance cover page are not required but very helpful. 3. Keen as informed of any changes in your ownership such as weeks used, banked weeks, maintenance fees paid or not paid, etc. 4. Sit back, and let Timeshare Resale Williamsburg do the rest. -6- ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S MEMORANDUM AND NOW, comes the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, by and through her attorney, Lisa M. treason, Esquire, and makes these replies to Plaintiffs exceptions to Master's Memorandum. 1. Admitted. 2. Denied. By way of further response, this Honorable Court sent this matter to the Master for his interpretation of which QDRO best represents the agreement of the parties and to present an opinion to this Court. The Master's Memorandum fulfills this order. The Master's Memorandum reflects the ODRO as proposed by the Defendant. 3. Denied. The Master's decision is supported in law and is not a direction contravention of Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) as cited by opposing counsel. 4. Denied. It is admitted that the Former Spouses Protection Act does give a definition of "disposable retired pay." However, Mansell does not require the states follow the federal definition. Further, Mansell and the Former Spouses Protection Act only limits the direct payments mechanism and is not intended to limit substantively what the court may order. 5. Neither admitted or denied. If this statement is correct, then a meeting of the minds never occurred and the parties have no agreement in which case this matter would be sent to the Divorce Master for a hearing on the matter. Since there is no dispute as to the facts and assets, Defendant believes and therefore avers that the Master, upon hearing, would come to the same conclusion he has already reached in his memorandum to the Court. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests this Honorable Court to deny Plaintiff's Exceptions and to sign the Defendant's QDRO which reads in accordance with the Master's Memorandum as the correct understanding of the parties agreement. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE ~-~~lc~ Date Lisa . treason, Esquire Post Office Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 ., _. CERTIFICATE OF SER~/ICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Exceptions to Master's Memorandum upon Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire, by depositing same iri the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the 25th day of November, 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Robert J. Mulderig 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 GREASON LAW OFFICE Lisa . treason, Esquire Post Office Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-3030 ID #78269 ~~r m c~ ~ i a, ~K.~~ y ~ w ~~ w i9.y=a~v' W F p~-.'t!Sdac a.k=-0t9F.grvIMF'+??P.kA~'YMNHke~9 .. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION-LAW IN DIVORCE IN RE: Qualified Domestic Relations Order Hoffer, P.J.; Facts Before the Court is the matter regarding the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) for the plaintiff, Arthur L. Bradshaw, and the defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw. Both parties and their respective counsel met on June 3, 2003 for a settlement conference at the Divorce Master's office. At this conference; the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which was signed the same day. The settlement agreement provides that the "split will be accomplished through QDRO giving fifty percent to each party of the disposable military income." The agreement further states, "Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the QDRO and present it to the Defendant's counsel for review within seven days of today's date." Counsel for plaintiff prepared a QDRO and sent it to the defendant's counsel. The defendant's counsel objected to the first two paragraphs on page two of the proposed QDRO, and replaced the two paragraphs with other language. On June 19, 2003, the Court signed a decree in divorce, divorcing the parties. .- The parties have been unsuccessful in reaching an agreement concerning the wording of the ODRO. As each party has proposed its own version of the ODRO, the issue in this case is whether the proposed language of the ODRO conforms to the written agreement signed by both parties at the Divorce Masters office on June 3, 2003. Discussion The settlement agreement states that "the split will be accomplished through QDRO giving 50% to each party of the disposable military income." The plaintiff provided a ODRO stating that 50% of his pension, less the survivor benefit plan deduction, be paid to wife. Wife wanted to include additional language in the ODRO using the definition of "Disposable Retirement Pay." The defendant argues that the request for change did not alter the agreement of the parties as reached in the Divorce Master's office, although the defendant concedes that the language which she is requesting was not even discussed, let alone agreed to. As such, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's QDRO contains language that does not conform to the written agreement signed by the parties at the Master's office. The plaintiff also argues that the defendant's proposed language is a departure from the language of the written agreement because it changes the definition of "Disposable Retired/Retainer pay. 2 Congress passed the Former Spouse Protection Act' which defines disposable retired pay as the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled, less amounts which "...(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeiture of retired pay ordered by a Court Martial or as a result of the waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38." In the Cumberland County Common Pleas Court, the Honorable Judge Bayley, in the case of Adams v. Adams,2 found that if the parties agree to a more restrictive reading of definition of eligible military retirement pay than the one recognized by the federal government, the Court will uphold the agreement of the parties. However, in the present case, defendant concedes that there was not an agreement. Therefore, when there is an absence of such agreement, the language of the statute is controlling.3 The other matters raised by the defendant are simply speculation on what would have been the result had the issue been raised and negotiated Conclusion The definition of Disposable Military Retirement Pay is established by the Former Spouse Protection Act, unless modified by mutual agreement of the ' 10 USCA §1408. 2 This case was subsequently appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. See 1999 PA Super 36. ' See Mansell v. Mansell. 490 U.S. 581 (1989) and Levenduski v. Levenducski, 120 Dauphin 305 (2001). 3 parties. The defendant has agreed that there was no agreement between the parties. As such, the language of the plaintiff's proposed QDRO is accepted. March 22, 2004 ~bert J. Mulderig, Esquire Turo Law Offices 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 For the Plaintiff Asa M. treason, Esquire PO Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 For the Defendant By the Court, p3 ~ 4 ARTHUR L: BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff v. BARBARA IG4Y BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUTNY, PENNSYLVANiA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION-LAW IN DIVORCE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER AND NOW, March 22, 2004, WHEREAS, BARBARA IWY BRADSHAW, hereinafter referred to as Former Spouse, and ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR, hereinafter referred to as Retiree, have entered into a comprehensive property settlement agreement dated June 3, 2004; and WHEREAS, as part of the settlement agreement Retiree agrees that the Former Spouse receive fifty (50%) percent of his U.S. Army Pension; and WHEREAS, counsel for Retiree and counsel for Former Spouse have acknowledged that this Qualified Domestic Relations Order is being made pursuant to the Domestic Relations Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as it relates to the provisions being made by the Former Spouse relating to her marital property rights; and WHEREAS, it is intended that this Order will qualify as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, as defined in Section 414(p)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of J 19$6 and the provisions hereof shall be administered and interpreted in conformity with the Code. Pursuant to Section 414(p)(2) of the Code, the following facts are hereby specified: 1. The Act to which this Order applies is the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982. 2. The name of the Service member is ARTHUR L. BRADSAHW, JR., whose current mailing address is 1402 Bradley Drive, A-213 (Pheasant Run), Carlisle, PA 17013, and whose social security number is 532-52-7420. 3. The name and address of the alternate payee is BARBARA IG4Y BRADSHAW, whose current mailing address is 1447 Hillcrest Ct., Apt. #303, Camp Hill, PA 17011-8022, and whose social security number is 532-54-8206. Military Retired/Retainer Pay. Former Spouse shall be awarded a monthly fifty percent share of the Retiree's U.S. Army Disposable Retired/Retainer pay. Said award shall be in accordance with and construed by the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982 (Public Law 97-252). The sharing of Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay shall commence upon July 1, 2003 and shall continue until the death of either party. Pending the implementation of this Order by the Army Finance Service, the Retiree shall pay the Former Spouse's entitlement directly to the Former Spouse. Retiree shall elect the maximum Survivor's Benefit Plan annuity. 2 B Under the terms of the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act, the United States Army, as the paying authority is required to directly pay Former Spouse her monthly percentage share of Retiree's monthly disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because of the following. In the course of the parties' marriage, Retiree performed at least ten years of service credible in determining his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay. The parties were married on August 29, 1970 and were divorced on June 19, 2003. Retiree began service credible and determined his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay with the United States Army in June 1971, has performed active duty until his retirement from active duty on July 1, 1995. Neither Retiree nor Former Spouse will do or cause to be done any act which will cause this provision to become null and void, and each party agrees that this will be the final Order pertaining to the division of the Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree and Former Spouse agree that the Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay is and shall be accruing as a result of his service in the United States Army and that the Military Retired/Retainer pay is martial property subject to equitable distribution by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Retiree and Former Spouse further agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is competent to divide the parties' marital property incident to their divorce pursuant to Section 301 (c) of the Divorce Code. Retiree and Former Spouse finally agree that 3 J the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, has jurisdiction over the Retiree for the purpose of dividing his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because Retiree specifically consents to the Court's jurisdiction to divide his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree acknowledges and agrees that he has been afforded his rights under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.S. Appendix 501-591). The Court shall retain jurisdiction over Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay for as long as the parties both shall live. The Court shall also have the authority to make every just and equitable Order not inconsistent with the other provisions hereof. The Court shall also have the specific authority to make any Orders it deems just and equitable as a result of the income tax consequences which flow from the division and distribution of the Retired/Retainer pay. The Court shall also have continuing jurisdiction to make every Order reasonably necessary to implement and accomplish the direct payment to the Former Spouse by the United States Army of her percentage share of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay, including the right to advise the United States Army of the precise amount or percentage of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay to be payable to the Former Spouse. By the court, e o er, P.J 4 4 ~~Pl~ ~ of ~~~~G,(/ ~~ml, ~C2, ~~`~ ,, <