HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-03571F 'it
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ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99- 3,5'71 '
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
NOTICE
You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the
claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action
within twenty (20) days after this complaint and Notice are
served, by entering a written appearance personally or by
attorney and filing in writing with a court your defenses or
abjections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned
that if you fail to do so the case may proceed without you and a
judgment may be entered against you by the Court without further
iotice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other
;laim or relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money
)r property or other rights important to you.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU
NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE
ICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP.
Cumberland County Bar Association
2 Liberty Avenue
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-3166
LAW OFFICES
SNEL6AKER,
BRENNEMAN
a SPARE
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By: ?`?--
Attorneys for Plaintiff
II ?
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99- 23 y/ Y, /':
CIVIL ACTION -CIVIL ACTION EQUITY
COMPLAINT
Elizabeth J. Tindall, formerly Elizabeth J. Dickson, by her
attorneys, Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P. C. submits this
complaint against Defendants David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre
L. Dickson, his wife, and in support thereof states the
following:
BACKGROUND.
1. Plaintiff Elizabeth J. Tindall, formerly known as
Elizabeth J. Dickson, is an adult individual residing at 7 Falls
Glen Court, Parkton, Maryland.
2. Defendants David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L.
Dickson, his wife, are adult individuals residing at 2810 Myrtle
Drive, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
3. Plaintiff and Defendant David C. Dickson, III were
married on June 22, 1985.
4. Plaintiff and Defendant David C. Dickson, III were
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER,
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
divorced pursuant to a Judgment of Absolute Divorce ordered on
June 8, 1994 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
Maryland.
5. Plaintiff and Defendant David C. Dickson, III entered
u
into a voluntary Separation and Property settlement Agreement
(the "Agreement") dated June 8, 1994, a true and correct copy of
which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as
"Exhibit All.
6. Pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 11 of the Agreement,
Defendant David C. Dickson, III agreed to pay and was therefore
obligated to pay Plaintiff alimony in the amount of $1,900.00
each month commencing July 1, 1994 for as long as Defendant
David C. Dickson, III shall live, but under no circumstances for
more than twenty-nine years and eight months.
7. Pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 13A of the
Agreement, Defendant David C. Dickson, III agreed to execute a
confessed judgment promissory note (the "Note") in the principal
amount of $300,000.00 with interest at a rate of six percent
(6%) payable in 120 equal monthly installments of $3,330.62,
with the first payment due on or before August 1, 1994.
8. On or about October 11, 1994, Defendant David C.
Dickson, III executed the Note made reference to in Paragraph 7,
above, for benefit of the Plaintiff. A copy of said Note
is attahced hereto and incorporated by reference herein as
"Exhibit B".
9. Pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 13B of the
Agreement, Defendant David C. Dickson, III agreed to pay and was
therefore obligated to pay to Plaintiff $4,000.00 each month
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER, beginning July 1, 1994 through June 30, 1997.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE 11
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10. On or about August 4, 1994, Defendant David C.
Dickson, III, then a single man, became the sole owner of a
certain tract or parcel of ground consisting of 5.019 acres
located in Upper Allen Township, Cumberland county,
Pennsylvania, which tract or parcel is now commonly known as
2810 Myrtle Drive, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania and more fully
described in a Deed dated August 3, 1994 and recorded August 15,
1994 in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds for Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania in Deed Book 110, Page 236 (hereinafter the
"Premises").
11. On or about December 16, 1997, Plaintiff initiated a
legal action against Defendant David C. Dickson, III in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland docketed to No. 03-
C-97-11939 (the "Civil Action") by Complaint, initially seeking,
inter alia, compensatory damages of Defendant David C. Dickson,
III in an amount in excess of $122,000.00.
12. At the time of Plaintiff's initiation of the Civil
Action made reference to in Paragraph 11, above, Defendant David
C. Dickson, III was in arrears in payment of alimony to
Plaintiff pursuant to the Agreement.
13. At the time of the Plaintiff's initiation of the Civil
Action made reference to in Paragraph 11, above, Defendant David
C. Dickson, III was in arrears in payment of amounts due
Plaintiff under the Note.
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER. 14. At the time of Plaintiff's initiation of the Civil
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE Action made reference to in Paragraph 11, above, Defendant David
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C. Dickson, III was in arrears in payment of the $4,000.00
monthly payment made reference to in Paragraph 9, above.
15. At the time of Plaintiff's initiation of the Civil
Action made reference to in Paragraph 11, above, Defendant David
C. Dickson, III was in violation of the Agreement and was
indebted to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of $120,000.00.
16. On May 15, 1998, judgment was entered in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendant David C. Dickson, III in an
amount in excess of $37,000.00 in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County, Maryland, pursuant to a Complaint For
Confessed Judgment docketed to No. 03-C-98-04917 (the
"Judgment").
17. Subsequent to the initiation of the Civil Action and
entry of the Judgment, by Deed dated and recorded May 18, 1998
in the office of the Recorder of Deeds for Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania in Deed Book 177, Page 480, Defendant David C.
Dickson, III transferred and conveyed the Premises to Defendant
David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L. Dickson, his wife, as
tenants by the entireties, for a stated consideration of $1.00.
18. On April 6, 1999 a judgment was entered in the Civil
Action against Defendant David C. Dickson, III in the amount of
$277,772.08 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland.
19. On May 21, 1999, the judgment in the Civil Action as
made reference to in Paragraph 18, above, was transferred and
AW OFFICES
SNELSAKER. entered in this Court docketed to civil action number 99-3091.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
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1 II 1 1
COUNT I.
20. The averments of Paragraphs 1 through 19, inclusive of
this complaint, are incorporated by reference in this Paragraph
in their entirety.
21. Prior to the transfer and conveyance made reference to
in Paragraph 17, above, Defendant David C. Dickson, III was the
sole owner of the Premises.
22. Prior to the transfer and conveyance as made reference
to in Paragraph 17, above, Defendant David C. Dickson, III was
not paying his debts when they became due.
23. The transfer and conveyance of the Premises by
Defendant David C. Dickson, III to Defendant David C. Dickson,
III and Deirdre L. Dickson was made for inadequate or nominal
consideration, without fair consideration and/or without
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer.
24. The transfer and conveyance of the Premises as made
reference to in Paragraph 17, above, was made at the time when
Defendant David C. Dickson, III knew, believed and/or reasonably
should have believed that he would continue to incur debts
beyond his purported ability to pay.
25. The transfer and conveyance made reference to in
Paragraph 17, above, was made when Defendant David C. Dickson,
III was insolvent or as a result of such transfer and
LAW OFFICES II conveyance, Defendant David C. Dickson, III became insolvent.
SNELBAKER,
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court to order:
A. Avoidance of the transfer of the Premises at 2810
Myrtle Drive, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania from
Defendant David C. Dickson, III to Defendants
David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L. Dickson;
B. Attachment of the Premises at 2810 Myrtle Drive,
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania that has been
fraudulently transferred;
C. An injunction against further disposition,
including, but not limited to, the transfer and
encumbrance of the Premises at 2810 Myrtle Drive,
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania;
D. Defendant David C. Dickson, III individually or
Defendants David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L.
Dickson, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff's
counsel fees and costs of this action; and
E. Such other and further relief as the
circumstances require.
COUNT II.
26. The averments of Paragraphs 1 through 25, inclusive of
this Complaint, are incorporated by reference in this Paragraph
in their entirety.
27. The transfer and conveyance of the Premises made
reference to in Paragraph 17, above, was made with specific
knowledge by Defendant David C. Dickson, III of his continuing
monetary obligation to Plaintiff as set forth in the Agreement
and the Judgment that had been entered against him.
28. The transfer and conveyance of the Premises as made
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
arrears of his payment obligations to Plaintiff as set forth
reference to in Paragraph 17, above, was made with the specific
knowledge of Defendant David C. Dickson, III that he was in
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under the Agreement.
29. The transfer and conveyance of the Premises as made
reference to in Paragraph 17, above, was made with the specific
knowledge of Defendant David C. Dickson, III that legal action
had been initiated against him to collect upon the arrearages or
debt owed by him to Plaintiff.
30. The transfer and conveyance of the Premises as made
reference to in Paragraph 17, above, was made with the actual
intent to hinder., delay and/or defraud Plaintiff.
31. The transfer and conveyance of the Premises as made
LAW OFFICES
SNELOAXER.
BRENNEMAN
a SPARE
reference to in Paragraph 17, above, was made by Defendant David
C. Dickson, III for purposes of insulating the Premises from the
claim, attachment and/or lien arising from the debt owed by
Defendant David C. Dickson, III to Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court to order:
A. Avoidance of the transfer of the Premises at 2810
Myrtle Drive, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania from
Defendant David C. Dickson, III to Defendants
David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L. Dickson;
B. Attachment of the Premises at 2810 Myrtle Drive,
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania that has been
fraudulently transferred;
C. An injunction against further disposition,
including, but not limited to, the transfer and
encumbrance of the Premises at 2810 Myrtle Drive,
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania;
D. Defendant David C. Dickson, III individually or
Defendants David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L.
Dickson, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff's
counsel fees and costs of this action; and
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E. Such other and further relief as the
circumstances require.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By: 14A??
Keith O. Brenneman, Esqu re
44 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Date: June 11, 1999 Elizabeth J. Tindall
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
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VERIFICATION
I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Complaint
are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein
are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. 54904 relating
to unsworn falsification to authorities.
izab h J. Tinda , -formerly
' known s Elizabeth J. Dickson
Date: OU41W (li l f?9
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
a SPARE
VOLUNTARY SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
H
it
mglg ?.GR EEM=:NT is made this 84
day of June, 1994, by and
between 2:1:zabeth J. Dickson, (hereinafter referred to as
"Wife"), and David C. Dickson, III, (hereinafter referred to as
":husband" ) .
Explanation
The parties hereto were married by a religious ceremonyt
on June 22, 2.985 `_. San Jose, Ca'_==o_n'_a. No ch'_ldra
were born as a C_ _n-- S.a___ace.
d_ffereaces have arisen becweer. the parties and t-ev
now desire to enter into this Agreement -ursuan_ to th_
provisions of Sections 8-101 through 8-103, Subtitle i,
?vlly LAW, of the Annotated Code of Marv* and,
re^Oanizing the stain°_ or semarat_on bet'deen them and
a ?1St.1y- all m2_`.e_s to _e=pec__Je
personal and ProPe__v __,hts, duties and ob___-t_cns as
hereinafter set forth.
NOW, T::ER7-FORE, in consideration of the promises and the
mutua_ covenants of each of the parties, they do hereby mutually
agree with each other and for their respective heirs, personal
representatives and assigns as follows:
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1. The parties mutually and vo'_unz a_i_v separated on Apr__
002 wit.. the intent and purpose of end'inc the mar_:ace and
EXHIBIT.
40
t ..
. 1 -'_- EXHIBIT A
min UGrp YCS
they do hereby acknowledge an intent to live separate and apart
without cohab'itat'ion and in separate abodes. Neither part_r shall
compel nor attempt to compel "he other to live with him or her, Ir.
is -
and -f either party shall in any manner or form whatsoever molest
or trouble the other, nor compel, nor attempt to compel the other
to cohabit with him or her, and each shall be free of
interference, authority and control, direct or indirect, by the
other, as fully as if he or she were sole and unmarried, to the
extent permitted by law.
2. c Us _-nd A°_rebV ex^ressly acr°_es to waive any dyes
hereby waive and rel_nau-;s all claims to alimony, both pendehte
life and penman_nt, whether past, present or future, an
maintenance and support of any nature or kind whatsoever to whit.-
either may now or hereafter be entitled. The provisions of th'is'
paragraph shall not be subject to ar.y tour: modification.
3. Th Wife sh a'_ 1 retain as her scle and separate .roper=.,
a'_l of the =ern_t_re, furnishings and household a--oliances --.I her
possession at the time of the sicning of this Acreement, free
from any claim of the Husband, with the exception of those items
listed on Hxhi'n_t 1 attached hereto. Those items are in the
marital home, in Wife's possession, and Husband may remove them
from the marital home, by appointment, within 50 days of the
signing of this Agreement,..
?r=or to the execution of this Agreement, the parties have
.divided their bank accounts and each shall be entitled to retain
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as his/her sole and separate property, free from any claim of the
other; all savings accounts, checking accounts, ZRAs, pension and
profit sharing accounts, or p?l^dhS and certificates of daDOSit in
his/her poa,eassion
4. Husband and Wife were': jointly liable to The Sank of
Maryland for a loan used for the purchase of a Mooney airplane.
Husband has refinanced that loan removing Wife's name tie:e_-.
Husband and Wife were also jointly responsible for a loan with an,
a=proximate balance of $90,000.00 for the puchase o° tnei
Ch_rotzact__ =14n c located '°imoc_Sm, M°rv'-a::... Hus*zane has
rafinanced that loan and removed Wife's dame rrOm Same. Husband
and Wife are also jointly responsible for a mortgage on th-e-
marital home located at 7 Falls Glen Court, ?arkton, Maryland.
Husband shal _ remain -on that mortgage. 3usband agrees that should
and to an-., of his business i^.tereSts for
there b be any deb= in regard
OACC e ' _an_a, suc.^. l:aD11-GV S'-a_- be the
sole reszons_bilzzv of Husband and he shall end°--mnl_v an-- hold
inc'_?ding
Wife bareness from same. Routine cr_ed_.. c-==-.A- debt, but
not limited to the following, shall be paid by Wife: Speigel - in
the aooroximate amount of $37.00, Montgomery Ward - in the
approximate amount of $535.00, Lerner's - in the agorcxir..aze
amount of $195.00, ?asion Bug - in the approximate amount o-
$205-00, Gantos - in the approximate amount of $530.00, Hecht's -
...
in the approximate. amount of $75.00•, J. C. ?enney - in the
apg,:oximate amount of $95.00, V_SA - in -he aporoxi.uate amount o--
$1,420.00, Citibank - in the approximate amount of 5'_,330.00,
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MasterCard - in the approximate amount Of $2,350.00. Any credit
card charges incurred by Husband during the past two (2) ye
_ as
shall be paid ty Husband. Otherwise, each ?arty shall be
=es?onsib le for his or her individual debts incurred. Neither
party w-411 contract in his or her own name or in the name of the
other any debt or debts, charges, or liabilities for whicli the
other or the other's estate shall be or may become liable, and
each hereby discharges the other from any debts whatsoever which
have been or may be contracted for their _ .. .. i•r_dua'
_ use aac
benefit, and each -tither covenants and t
agrees :,erea=ter to keen
the ..their, his her heirs, Personal, -
rS, ?- nOnc_ ____eSentat Vies c'- assigns,
lndemnlfle d from any llab_lit'e t d
-. S con - race or incurred by them
ind_vidu l v and from all actions, proce_ediny^s, claims, demands, -
acts and a xp?nses whatsoever in r°spe_ct thereto.
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Not -9 herein shall be deemed a waiver Of any ?ast or
=-t-r_ conduct o' either of the -+e --
mar-- s =..d nothing ..-:,e- n
conta.ned Shall be deemed to Prevent e_i_her of the ?a___e5 =31-11
maintaining a suit for partial or absolute- divorce against the
other in any COL'rt Of Competent jurisdiction. consistent with
the rules o_ oract_ce OL the COl:rt
granting a Judgmen..
t of
Absolute DSVOrCe, the _ertinent provisions of this Agreement
shall- be incorporated and' made a part of the juQgme^t, but not-
withstanding such incorporation, this Agreement shall not be
merged in suc judgment but shall in all respects survive the
:;same and be forever binding and conclusive -,pon the Parties.
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?. Husband shall be responsible for his own counsel fees
and in addition, shall be responsible for all court costs
incurred based Lemon yo-4aultlgrounds, including master's fees.
Husbind has agreed to purchase from Wolpoff and Company the
appraisal of his business interests which was performed by them,
for the sum of $24,075.00, and thereby will acquire a proprietary
interest in that appraisal and will have the services available
to him, if he desires, of Harvey D. Gold and of his appraisal,
-Or _Lture use. Husband will pay to the W'fe the difference-*
between the amount paid to Wolp off and $55,000.00 as partia'_•
reimbursement for ?7ife -
S prC_eSS_Cnal S2ry4C-S, Sa_•C sum bee
_..g
due at the time testimony is taken.
7. The Husband agrees to convey unto the Wife, for
consideration acknowlecged herein, as pa=t of the adjustment
between the martins c: their marita 1 ?rope==y -i,hts, by good and
airdeSA, --- ^_S --'h_ _ °- -e-e an? estate a-:,4 .11 ,
to the rop•erty kncwn as 7 ?al-'s Glen Court, ?arktor., Maryland
which they presently own as tenants by the entireties. The Wife
agrees to be responsible for the preparation of any and all
instruments necessary to accomplish this conveyance, and to be
responsible for the cost of same. 1rhe Wife agrees to assume and
be responsible for the payment of the ex'_siting mortgage debt
with ?NC Mortgage Corporation of America and toyindemnify and
hold the Husband harmless from any responsibility whatsoever with _
regard thereto. The balance, is any, in the expense or escrow
account now being maintained for the =avment of the t=axes and
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other expenses on the property known as 7 Falls Glen Court shall
be considered the property of Wife -or the purposes of this
Agreement. Henceforth,, Wife agrees to be responsible for a11_ real
w
estate taxes and insurances on said real property. In so long as
the Husband's name remains on the mortgage, Wife shall
satisfactorily prove to Husband, at his request, that said
property is adequately ir_sured for the purpose of protecting
Husband's obligations uncle: the above mentioned mortgage on the
property known as 7 Falls Glen Court. Wife agrees to maintai l!
c_re and casualty insurance on the property nanirg Husband asp
1css "ayee on the insurarc°, as as Husband's naiae is on the
mortgage. It is understood and a.-reed, however, that under no
circumstances shall Husband be entitled to any of the proceeecs
of the payment of any such policy, but that Husband's only right
and interest s:a_1 be to make certain that his liability for the
pavment o' the mortgage is recoc--:ed and protected in the event
or a^.v -n strance payments.
a• Each party is and shall remain the owner of a-, 1 stocks,
bonds, securities of any kind, specifically including, but not
limited to, the stocks the Husband owns in h:s various business
enterprises, bank accounts and pension inter=ests as are presently
in his or her na .e alone, =ree and clear Cf anv claim of t.^.e
other.
9. Wife is currently covered by a h_alch insurance :)o!-cv
provided by Husband's employer. H %sband agrees that he_ shale
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maintain Wife on that policy for a period of one year beginhing
July 1, 1994, Husband agrees, in all events, to may the cost of
Wife's health insurance for ,? single person policy up through
June 4 30, 1995, and thereafter, Husband agrees to cooperate in
maintaining that policy through COBRA benefits or otherwise,
however; Wife shall maintain that policy, if she so elects, at
her own expense. .f legislation is gassed and takes effect by
the Federal Government at any time within three years of July 1,
1994, that would require an employer to pay part of, or all of..
the cost of a basic health insurance policy for an emplovee, then'
that purpose, and f.-= that Purpose only, Wife shall be
_Cr cons- dered to be included in that statutory requirement and
Husba.n d shall pav to, or for the benefit of the Wi!e the minimum"
recui red amount to the insurance carrier as required by law, for
that three (3) year period.
_0. The '_985 .Mw and the 1990 ?orscne Carrara 4 spa-_
remai.-, the sole and separate Property of the Husband. HuSZand
shall. be responsible for the aavment o-- any.outstanding balance
obligations on said vehicles and he shall indemnifv and ho'ld Wife
harmless from any responsibility in regard thereto.
The 1990 Honda Prelude, presently title3 _n ]o-4n= names
shall be transferred to Wife. Husband agrees to execute whatever
documents are necessary, including.. a gift certificate, to
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accomplish same:- Wife shall be reponsible for the cost of this
_ransfar. Wife shall be responsible for paying any balance on
.said ' w_hicle and she shall indemnify and hold Husband :narmless
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rrom any =espons_ y whatsoe'_: in regard thereto. r.
Each party agrees to obtain their own vehicle insurance and
to accomplish same, satisfactgrily, no later than July 1, 1994.
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11. The Husband shall pay to the Wife as alimony, for so
long as he lives, but under no circumstance for more than 29
years and 8 months, commencing July 1, 1994, the sum of 511900.00
per month. This alimony shall survive the Husband's death,
subject to the provisions in Paragraph 12, and the Wife's
remarriage, but shall cease upon Wife's death. These payments and
:..tended by _-e parties, under al_ ci_c=stances, to be
deductible by Husband and to be income to the Wife. These
payments shall not be subject to modification, except under
circumstances otherwise stated herein, namely, that the amount
of alimony ($1,900,0.0), was established in cons _derdtion of the
pavme.^.ts of principa_ and interest due under a mor`=ace or deed
of :rust =ranted aga`-st the real pr perry Known as i :alts Ca_e^
Co'.._t, ?azkton, Marviand. The terms Of said --nortzaaa or deed
trust provide a level payment for the -__st five (5) years of the
mortgage and there are four (4) years and eight (8) months
ren;a_ning thereto. Thereafter, the mortgage is subject. to an
adj L'stable rate of interest not to exceed two percent (24) per
year, with a cap of twelve percent E124). The parties agree that
at the end of the :our (4) years eight (8) month's beginning July
1, 1994, should.the amoir of the mortgage payment of principal
and interest exceed $1,900.00, each of the narties will be
responsible for one-half of the increase in excess of $1,900.00
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and the Husband's one-half of that increase shall be the only
circumstance under which alimony may be modified and his increase
will be paid through_ addi•tiok4al alimony. The parties further
agree' that should such an increase occur, they may, at the mutual
agreement of both parties, refinance the loan. Should the
parties agree to refinance, each of the parties will pay one.,half
c: the costs of said refinancing including, but not limited to,
origination fees,'and legal or .._t'-e costs.
The parties further agree that the Wife has the right, a.>.
any time, at her sole option, to sell the property known as
:alts Glen Court, ?ar:{=0':, ?'lar. -ard and receive a_- „_ _ e ne
=roceeds of the sale, after payment of costs of the sale and any
mortgage attendant to the grope-`y, including, but not limited-
to, the. current mortgage. if Wife elects to the sell ^.e
property at any time.within the next twenty-nine (29) years and
'eight (8) months, and at t*,-- time o- that sale --he _mcunz
a--mono laymen^s has increased above ,900.00 because of cn
increase the -..terest payments the., in _n-at circumstance,
alimonv payments shall be reduced to the original $1,900.00 per
month for the balance of the twerty-nine (29) years and eight (8)
months.
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
,;Wife from refinancing the Mortgage
Falls Glen Court at any time, at her
,;the alimony shall be fixed at $1,90
i;twert_y-nine (29) years and eight (8)
12. Husband shall acquire,
on the
s,gle ex
0.00 for
months.
at his
property known as 7
Dense, in which event
the ramainder of the
sole expense, l-_e
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insurance policies issued by a life insurance combanv
satisfactory to i1'-'e, to p:ovida insurance coverage to guarantee
payment to Wife or the „sum•of 11,900.00 per month alimony for the
N
rema:',ing period in which such payments are due at the time of
the Husband's death, as well as the balance due from time to time .
on the confessed judgment promissory note in the amount of '-
$300,000.00 provided for in Paragraph 13A hereina=ter, should
Husband die before payment of the entire balance due on this
promissory note. For this purpose, the $1,900.00 per month
should be discounted by six percent (63) in determ-'ning present
..°J +ae of ob^ation '^e event of Husband' 3i >
' ?- S d ... s_..
iN NO ZF4RL'I 7'r4c I1VSU,2;&tC= PAYAIR.6 Ai- HUScAIJb'S Dcn-19 ,3c C,=SS 7;q?
W+-C-- agrees to approve any "A Rated" _asurance company, good
standing, as rated,bv A.M. Best Company, and as mutually agreed C
upon by the parties. It is expressiv understood that the payment R
due to the Wife under the several provisions of this Agreement jZ
V
shall all Cease uDOn Husbands death _nasmuch as the insurance
prcvlded here-n shall_ _av n_s V -n =111 t0 Wloer Cv_deG
hcweve_, `-..a_ =_ _here Zs not adequate insurance coverage to mars
Wife whole, then and only then, may W_--e claim aca_nst Husband's
estate for any amount due her.
13. Husband is the owner of stock in various coricrat_ons
and is a partner in certain partnerships. Wife hereby waives all
,her right title and interest in all of the Husband's business
interests and, should it be necessary in the
future for per to
execute instruments or documents necessary to e._ectuate t.._s
purpose, she agrees -o 'do so
-10-
in consideration therefore,
r .t;,
Husband agrees as follows:
A. The ?artier agree that, as partial settlement o= Wife's
claim to a share in the maritalk property, Husband shall execute a
con!tssed judgment promissory note in the principal amount of
$300,000.00 with interest at the rate of six percent (68),
payable in monthly installments of $3,330.62, with the first
installment due on or before August 1, 1994 and subsequent
installments due on the first day of each and every month
thereafter until 120 consecutive monthly installments have been
paid. (Attached hereto as °_xhibit 2 is an ammertiaationy
scheduler for this note) Husband shall have the right to prepay
the balance due on said note at any time. If Husband prepays tae
amount due on the note, he shay- be entitled to a discount on_
the unpaid principal balance ecual to six percent (6%). To
provide security to Wife for the payment of this noes, :usband'
agrees to provide to Wife a security interest in the shares of
the stocf of the Business know,-. as Yalic: C__ n_c Cf
7IL'sband warrants taat he owns all the outstanding shares of stocl-
and that such shares are not subject to any existing security
interest. Husband shall have the right to substitute collateral
' during the ten (10) years pavment of this note. Substitution
shall be with Wife's permission only, which shall not be
unreasonably withheld and shall not require additional
consideration.:.?,.yt. '
B. As a further consideration of the compromise between the
:.Parties regarding Wife's claim to her marital. share of ..usband's
;,business enterprises, Husband agrees. to cause :^.'_s various
- il -
. Z.
business enter?=ises t0 SllbCO. _rdCt wah Wife as a ('on3ultant
non-employee) for a period of three (3) years, beginning on July
n
1, 2.994 at a fee of $4.,000..00 Inver month to wife, plus the cost of
health insurance for Wife for the year commencing July 1, 1994
and ending June 30, 1995. The parties agree that, as an
additional consideration for the payment of Wife's marital
interest in Husband's businesses, should at any time within: the
next five '(5) years Husband sell anv one of those business
interests, including stock,
Elkton, Yalich Clinic of
Woodbridge, Husband shall pav
the sales at the time the sale
identified as Yalich Clinic of
Alexandria, or Yalich Clinic of;
from t:^.e net proceeds of each o_`
is made, the sun of $30,000.00 per
business, to wife as a consultation fee f0= services provided-
daring t:^.e course of negotiations of sale.
14. Eac party acknowledges that he or she has been
rep=esented ov an atto=nev or his or her cho__°_, ..n.. ea..' -__...._
acknowledges that. this agreement is entered into voIur._a_._y and
With full disclosure and is not the result of any duress or undue
influence. The marties further acknowledge that each has had the
ounortunity for exhaustive discovery and that ea.h party is
sat'_sfied that their attorney and other professional advisors
have obtained all of the necessary information requisite for them
to enter into this Agreement.
15. Sn ru=t er COns_d2=at_on of th°- -O OVis_ons .:jade 4
this Agreement, and, except as otherwise specifically. provided in
-12-
i nzs Agreement, the parties'. for, themselves and tine -r
respeC,tive
C1e1rSr ?ersOR21 re_cre_sentatives and assigns, do hereby aatnally
release, waive, surrelder -and d? assign unto the other, his .
or her
heirs`, personal representatives and assigns, all claims, demands,
accounts and causes of action which either of them may have
against the other or against his or her property whether arising
out of the marriage or otherwise
including but not limited.
to
any claim arising under Md. Code, Family Law, Sections 8-2ol
through 8-213, any amendments thereto, any claim against the
other or acainst his or her ?roper-y, by virtue of anv future;
C:7an- 1R t.^.° residence or dOS_C_L° O_ °1LC:°r of the '•J'__.e5, O-
any future_ chance in the status of any -zroperty of either of the
parties, and anv claim against the other or against his or her-
property by virtue of any f-tare change i n any law of this or any
other state subseque.,t to the execution cf this Agreemen-'
concerning na==tal ri- is or property _=g^ts whether said change
results from lecislat_ve enactment _ ;uci"ial pronounce-=-- a
' _hey d0 h_:'9'-.V _l._t:1er :SlC=1a11V celoaSE, waive, Su1're:^. ^.e: and
assign to the other, his or her h°_'_
. r5, ?°_rsCnal re?re!senta--bes,
and assigns all the right, title, interest and claim which said
parties might now have or which thev may her=after have as the
husband, wife, widower, widow or next of kin, successor or
otherwise, in and to any property, real or personal, that either
of said parties may own or may hereafter acquire, or in respect
to which either of said parties has or may hereafter have any
title, claim or zn_e_es,., dire"... or iRdlreCt, _..c!Uding
any rights of dower,'-communtty or marital property, statutory
-13-
i
i
thirds, halves, or legal snares' and widow's or widower's rights,
or to participate in any way in the enjoyment or distributia;. o
any of the real or personal?I estate of which the other may be
possissed at the time of his or her death, or any right to
receive any legal right or interest whatsoever therein, including
the right to administer upon the estate of the one so dying.,
15. The parties for themselves and their respective
heirs, personal representatives and assigns, do mutually agree to
join in or execute any instrument and to do any other act •o-
tn_ne that may be necessary or _ roper to carry into effect zr.v
part of this Agreement.
16. The parties mutually agree that in entering into t:;is
Agreement each has read and acknowledged that he and she fu11w
understands the Agreement and intends the Agreement to _fully
settle an d de_e_m_ne a i `^_;- `• S-p°ctV2 r _
_ , _ O . _ _ _
and
ob'__gatior.s growing out of or incident to their marr_ag Eac:.
aci:nowledges that he or she has a right to "be represented by an
attorney off his or her choice and each further acknowledges that
the Agreement is being entered into voluntarily and is not the
result of any duress or undue influence.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed, sealed and
acknowledged this Agreem' nt in triplicate, each of which shall
constitute an original.
-1.4-
WITNESS:
STATE OF MARYLAND, CITY/COUNTY OF TO W=T:
I EREBY CERTIFY that on this ..? day o? June, 1994
before me, a Notary Public of the State of Maryland, persona-'1%.e
amneared Elizabeth J. Dickson, and she made oath in due form .o:•
law that the matters and facts set forth in the z:are;oinc
Agreement, either as recitals or as agreements, are true and
correct as therein stated; and she 7.._ther acknowl,eCced the.
atoreccing agreement to be her act.
AS WITNESS my hand and Notar` 1 Seal.
IVOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Exp_r°_5:
STATE OF MARYLAND, CI ^Y/COLivTY OF W-'-
rEREBY CERTIcY ""at: on Ln4 ?av of June, 199'
- 6.1 before m°_, a Notary Public of the State o-- Maryland, personally
appeared David C. Dickson, III, and he made oath in due form c°
law that the matters and facts set forth in the aforecoing
Agreement, either as recitals or as agreements, are rue and
__°d
correct as thereon stated; and he further acknowl t e
aforegoing Agreement to be his act.
AS WITNESS my hand and Notar'al Seal.
XNOTYZY-PUBLIC
My Commission Expires: l'v2RU 7 990
l u0C •? -
-_5-
PROMISSORY NOTE
$300,000.00
Baltimore, Maryland
ct )"? !1 , 1994
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, David C. Dickson, III, (the "MAKER")
promises to pay to the order of Elizabeth J. Dickson (the
"HOLDER"), the principal sum of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars
($300,000.00), with interest on the unpaid principal balance from
the date of this Note, until paid, at the rate of six percent (68)
per annum. Principal and interest shall be payable at 7 Glen Falls
Court, Parkton, Maryland or at such other place as the HOLDER may
designate by notice to the MAKER, in consecutive monthly
installments of Three Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Dollars and
Sixty Three Cents ($3,330.63), on the first day of each month
beginning August 1, 1994. Such consecutive monthly installments
shall continue until the entire indebtedness, evidenced by this
Note is fully paid, except that any remaining indebtedness if not
sooner paid, shall be due and payable in full on July 1, 2004.
1. Optional Prepayment. The MAKER may prepay this Note in
whole or in part at any time or from time to time without penalty,
premium or additional interest. The amount of any such prepayment
shall be applied first against any accrued, unpaid interest
hereunder, and thereafter against the unpaid principal amount
hereof.
2. Acceleration Upon Failure to Cure Default. If any
monthly installment is not made when due hereunder, the HOLDER
shall provide written notice of default to the MAKER. If the MAKER
shall fail to cure such default within ten (10) working days of
receipt of the HOLDER'S written notice, then the HOLDER may, in the
HOLDER'S sole and absolute discretion, and without further notice
or demand, to the MAKER, declare the entire unpaid balance of
principal and accrued interest immediately due and payable.
3. Confession of Judgment. Upon default as provided in
Section 2 hereof, the MAKER authorizes any attorney admitted to
practice before any court of record in the United States to confess
judgment on behalf of the MAKER and against the MAKER in the full
amount due on this Note, plus reasonable attorney's fees.
4. Expenses of Collection. Should this Note be referred
to an attorney for collection, and judgment confessed as provided
in Section 3 hereof, the MAKER shall pay all of the HOLDER'S
reasonable costs and expenses resulting from such confession of
judgment.
5. Extension of Maturity. MAKER agrees that the maturity
of this Note, or any payment due hereunder, may be extended at any
time or from time to time by the HOLDER without releasing,
discharging, or affecting the liability of the MAKER.
Page 1 of 3 EXHIBIT B
6. Waiver. No waiver of any power, privilege, right or
remedy (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Rights") hereunder
shall be effective unless in writing. No delay on the part of the
HOLDER in exercising any Rights hereunder, shall operate as a
waiver thereof, and no single or partial exericise of any such
Rights (including the acceptance of late payments by the HOLDER)
shall preclude other or further exercise thereof, or the exercise
of any other Rights. Waiver by the HOLDER of any default by the
MAKER shall not constitute a waiver of any subsequent defaults, but
shall be restricted to the default so waived.
7. Choice of Law. This Note shall be governed, construed
and enforced accordance with the laws of the State of Maryland
without regard to principles of conflicts of laws.
8. Invalidit of An Part. If any provision or part of
any provision o this Note, or t e application thereof to any facts
or circumstances, shall for any reason be held invalid, illegal, or
unenf orc able in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or
unenf orc eability shall not affect any other provisions or the
remaining part of any effective provisions of the Note , or the
application of any provisions hereof to other facts or
circumstances, and this Note shall be construed as if such invalid,
illegal, or unenforceable provision or part. thereof had nevc:: buun
contained herein, but only to the eytent of its invalidity,
illegality, or inenforceability.
9. Discount. In the event the MAKER prepays this Note in
whole or in part, prior to the maturity date, then the unpaid
balance of principal paid, plus any accrued interest due as of date
of prepayment, shall be discounted by six percent (6$) and the
MAKER shall pay the HOLDER the sum equal to the unpaid principal
plus accrued interest less six percent (6`f) of the then unpaid
principal plus accrued interest.
10. Notice. All notices, requests and demands upon the
respective parties hereto shall be deemed to have been given or
made when delivered against hand receipt or if transmitted by
United States certified mail, postage pre-paid, return receipt
requested, and addressed as follows:
If to HOLDER: Elizabeth J. Dickson
7 Falls Glen Court
Parkton, Maryland 21120
with a copy to: James B. Carson, Esquire
The S.lavir_ Building, Second Floor
3700 East Northern Parkway
Baltimore, Maryland 21206
Page 2 of 3
Fif to MAKER: David C. Dickson, III
Yalich Clinic
30 East Padonia Road
Suite 502
Timonium, Maryland 21093
With a Copy to: Thomas E. Webb, Esquire
Heaver Plaza, Suite 401
1301 York Road
Lutherville, Maryland 21093
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned MAKER hereby executes
this Promissory Note as of the date first above written.
WITNESS:
Page 3 of 3
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ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99- 3S7I
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
PRAECIPE FOR LIS PENDENS
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Please index the above captioned action in equity as a lis
pendens against the following real property:
ALL THAT CERTAIN parcel or tract of land with
improvements thereon as more fully described in the
deed dated and recorded May 18, 1998 in the office of
the Recorder of Deeds in and for Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania, in Deed Book 177, Page 480.
LFW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
6 SPARE
which property noted above is purportedly owned by the
Defendants in the above captioned action. I hereby certify that
this action affects title to or other interest in the above
described real property.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEEMAN 6, SPARE, P. C.
By: r'f 4 14vw 1
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
Supreme Ct. ID #47077
44 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Date: June 11, 1999 Elizabeth J. Tindall
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4 SHERIFF'S RETURN - REGULAR
CASE NO: 1999-03571 P
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
TINDALL ELIZABETH J
VS.
DICKSON DAVID C III ET AL
HAROLD WEARY , Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of
CUMBERLAND County, Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according
to law, says, the within NOTICE AND COMPLAINT IN was served
upon DICKSON DAVID C, III the
defendant, at 12:40 HOURS, on the 21st day of June
1999 at 2810 MYRTLE DRIVE
MECHANICSBURG, PA 17055 ,CUMBERLAND
County, Pennsylvania, by handing to DAVID C. DICKSON, III
a true and attested copy of the NOTICE AND COMPLAINT IN
together with EQUITY PLTFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES,
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
and at the same time directing His attention to the contents thereof.
Sheriff's Costs: So answers:
Docketing 18.00
Service 8.06
Affidavit .00
Surcharge 8.00 K I omas i e, 5 ri 14
b06/22BAKER, BRENNEMAN, SPARE
ep eri
Sworn and subscribe o before me
this 1.,7-,..4 day o:
19? A. D. ?-Fr6fh no ry i
CASE NO: 1999-03571 P
SHERIFF'S RETURN - REGULAR
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
TINDALL ELIZABETH J
VS.
DICKSON DAVID C III ET AL
HAROLD WEARY , Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of
CUMBERLAND County, Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according
to law, says, the within NOTICE AND COMPLAINT IN was served
upon DICKSON DEIRDRE L the
defendant, at 12:40 HOURS, on the 21st day of June
1999 at 2810 MYRTLE DRIVE
MECHANICSBURG, PA 17055 CUMBERLAND
County, Pennsylvania, by handing to DAVID C. DICKSON (HUSBAND)
a true and attested copy of the NOTICE AND COMPLAINT IN
together with EQUITY, PLTFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES,
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
and at the same time directing His attention to the contents thereof.
Sheriff's Costs: So answers-
Docketing 6.00
Service .00 2
Affidavit .00
Surcharge 8.00 $$ R-I omas ine, S eri
006/22/1999' BRENNEMAN & SPARE
by
ep S .Q/iL?l
Sworn and subscribed to before me
this dc2, 4 day of
19 41 A. D.
ro i
II,,,
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, formerly known as
ELIZABETH J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V. NO. 99-3571
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and DEIRDRE L.
DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants: CIVILACTION -EQUITY
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
Defendants, through their attorneys, hereby raise the following Preliminary Objections to
Plaintiff's Complaint:
Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Demurrer
for Failure to Allege Lack of Adequate Remedy At Law
1. Rule 1019(a) of Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the material facts on
which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form,
Rule 1028(a)(1) of Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure permits Preliminary Objections
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a Complaint, Rule 1028(a)(4) permits
Preliminary Objections which question the legal sufficiency ofa pleading, and Rule 1028(a)(2)
of Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure permits Preliminary Objections for failure of a
pleading to conform to law or rule of court.
2. Plaintiff brought the above action in equity.
3. Plaintiff fails to allege that she lacks adequate remedy at law, which is a prerequisite to
invoking the Court's equitable jurisdiction.
4. Plaintiff alleges, in Count I that she seeks to avoid the transfer of certain premises.
5. Pennsylvania's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides a legal remedy to avoid transfers
of real property.
6. Plaintiff alleges that she obtained judgment against Defendant David Dickson based upon a
promissory note.
7. Pennsylvania law provides a legal remedy for actions based upon a contract.
9. Plaintiff seeks, in Count 11, to avoid the transfer of certain real property and alleges that
Defendant David Dickson transferred certain real property with intent to hinder or delay or
defraud Plaintiff.
9. Pennsylvania law provides a legal remedy for actions based upon fraud or fraudulent transfer.
10. This Honorable Court does not have equitable jurisdiction of Plaintiffs claims because
Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law as to each of Plaintiffs claims.
11. Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which refief can be granted because Plaintiff
has failed to allege all elements necessary to invoke the Court's equitable jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint in its entirety.
Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Demurrer for
Failure of a Pleading to Conform to Law or Rule of Court
12. The preceding paragraphs ofDefendants' Preliminary Objections are hereby incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
13. Rule 1019(a) of Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the material facts on
-2-
which a cause ofaction or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form, and
Rule 1028(a)(4) permits Preliminary Objections challenging the legal sufficiencyofa pleading.
14. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts giving rise to any cause of action against Defendant
Deirdre L. Dickson.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint in its entirety as to Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson.
Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Motion to Strike Count I
Of Plaintiffs Complaint for Failure of a Pleading to Conform to
Law or Rule of Court
15. The preceding paragraphs of Defendants' Preliminary Objections are hereby incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
16. Plaintiffhas failed to allege all elements necessary to invoke the Court's equitable jurisdiction.
17. Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and Cumberland County Local Rules require
Plaintiff to include an allegation that the amount Plaintiff seeks exceeds the amount specified
by Local Rules as requiring mandatory arbitration of Plaintiff's Claims.
18. Plaintiff has failed to include such allegation in Count 1.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court strike Count 1 of
Plaintiff's Complaint.
Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Motion to Strike Count II
of Plaintiffs Complaint for Failure of a Pleading to Conform to
Law or Rule of Court
19. The preceding paragraphs of Defendants' Preliminary Objections are hereby incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
-3-
20. Plaintiffhas failed to allege all elements necessary to invoke the Court's equitable jurisdiction.
21. Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and Cumberland County Local Rules require
Plaintiffto include an allegation that the amount Plaintiff seeks exceeds the amount specified
by Local Rules as requiring mandatory arbitration of Plaintiffs Claims.
22. Plaintiff has failed to include such allegation in Count 11.
23. Plaintiff has alleged, in 130, of Count II, that Defendant David Dickson's conduct was
fraudulent.
24. Rule 1019(b) requires that Plaintiff plead averments of fraud with particularity.
25. Plaintiff has failed to do so.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court strike Count II of
Plaintiffs Complaint.
Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs Demand for Attorney's Fees
26. The preceding paragraphs of Defendants' Preliminary Objections are hereby incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
27. As stated previously, Plaintiffhas failed to allege all elements necessary to invoke this Court's
equitable jurisdiction and has adequate remedy at law
28. Plaintiffs Complaint requests, in both Count I and Count II, an award of attorney's fees.
29. Attorney's fees are not available at law, except where specifically provided by statute.
30. Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees is improper, and is not a remedy available to her.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court strike Plaintiffs
request for attorney's fees.
-4-
Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Motion to Strike
Certain Paragraphs of Plaintiffs Complaint
31. The preceding paragraphs of Defendants' Preliminary Objections are hereby incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
32. Plaintiff alleges in 19, that pursuant to the terms of an agreement, David Dickson, III was
obligated to pay Plaintiff $4,000 per month beginning July 1, 1994 through June 30, 1997.
33. Plaintiff has failed to allege the fact that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County has ruled that
David Dickson did not and does not owe Plaintiff $4,000.00 per month for the stated period.
34. Plaintiff alleges, in 114, that David Dickson is in arrears in payments of $4,000.00 per month
owed to Plaintiff, but fails to allege that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County has ruled that
David Dickson does not owe Plaintiff said monies.
35. Plaintiff alleges, in 115, that David Dickson was in violation of the agreement requiring
payment of $4,000.00 per month and that such arrears totaled more than $120,000.00 but
fails to allege that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County has ruled that David Dickson does
not owe Plaintiff said monies.
36. Plaintiff alleges, in $16, that she obtained judgment against Defendant David Dickson in an
amount in excess of $37,000.00.
37. Plaintiff fails to include the fact that the referenced judgment was subsequently stricken.
38. Rule 1019(a) requires Plaintiff to allege all material facts upon which her cause of action is
based.
39. Rule 1028(a)(2) permits Preliminary Objection for failure ofa pleading to conform to law or
rule of court, or for inclusion of impertinent or scandalous matter.
-5-
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully requests that this Honorable Court strike paragraph
16 of Plaintiffs Complaint.
Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Motion for More Specific Pleading
40. The preceding paragraphs of Defendants' Preliminary Objections are hereby incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
41. Plaintiffmakes various allegations that Defendant David Dickson was failing to pay his debts
when due (122), knew or should have known that he would incur debt beyond his ability to
pay (124), and is insolvent (125).
42. Insolvency is a legal term of art with specific meaning under various statutes, and is an
essential element of pleading various causes of action.
43. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant David Dickson has failed to pay a debt to Plaintiff, and
fails to allege any other debts which David Dickson has failed to pay.
44. Defendants are unable to respond or prepare to defend this action without more specific
information regarding Plaintiff's allegations of Mr. Dickson's insolvency or failure to pay
debt.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court order Plaintiff to
file a more specific pleading as to Plaintiffs allegations of Mr. Dickson's alleged insolvency.
-6-
Respectfully Submitted,
IRA H. WEINSTOCK, P.C.
800 North Second Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102
Phone: 717-238-1657
By: _4524 N . 6 1 tiJ FU^
IRA H. WEINSTOCK
-7-
VERIFICATION
I verify that the statements contained in the attached Preliminary Objections are true and
correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 1 understand that false statements
contained herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. §4904 relating to unworn
falsification to authorities.
Dated: to/30' Q r)
VERIFICATION
I verify that the statements contained in the attached Preliminary Objections are true and
correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. I understand that false statements
contained herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. §4904 relating to unworn
falsification to authorities.
Dated: G13oJ9G
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Ira H. Weinstock, Esquire, hereby certify that on the date stated below I served the attached
Preliminary Objections upon the person named below, at the stated address, by first class postage paid
United States Mail.
Kenneth O. Brenneman, Esquire
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE
44 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
J, t-1• ".J7"L
IRA H. WEINSTOCK
Dated: '71-7 /9 9
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PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT
(Must be typewritten and submitted in chiplicate)
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY:
Please list the within matter for the next Argument Court.
CAPTION OF CASE
(entire caption must be stated in full)
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, formerly. known
as ELIZABETH J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
n Pn
(Plaintiff)
Al r
VS.
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DAVID C. DICKSON, III and DEIRDRE
L
DICKSON
his wife
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Defendants s4 N ow
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(Defendant)
No. 99-3571 Civil
19
1. State matter to be argued (i.e., plaintiff's motion for new trial, defendant's
demurrer to complaint, etc.):
Defendants' Preliminary Objections
2. Identify counsel who will argue case:
(a) for plaintiff: Keith O. Brenneman
Address: Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P.C.
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg PA 17055
(b) for defendant: Ira H. Weinstock
Address: 800 N. Second Street
Harrisburg PA 17102
3. I will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has
been listed for art;,,,Pnt.
4. Argument Court Date: August 11, 1999
Wfi Aauv?-?
Dated: July 8?,. 1999 Attorney for Plaintiff
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, formerly
known as ELIZABETH J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff,
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON,
Defendants.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
No. 99 - 3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of , 1999, upon
consideration of Defendants' Motion for Enlargement of Time and Continuance, it is hereby ordered
that Defendant is granted a twenty (20) day extension in which to file a brief in support of
Defendants' Preliminary Objections and the oral argument scheduled for August 11, 1999, is
continued until
BY THE COURT:
J.
40 UW1
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, formerly
known as ELIZABETH J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff,
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON,
Defendants.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
No. 99 - 3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
DLi UN_.,DANTS' Iy OnOPLFOR F.NLARG'EMENZOETIMli -AND C'-ONTIN iANCF.
AND NOW, the Defendants, by and through their attorneys, IRA H. WEINSTOCK,
P.C. respectfully move for an enlargement of time in which to file a brief in support of its
Preliminary Objections and to continue the oral argument scheduled for August 11, 1999, and in
support thereof aver the following:
1. On or about July 8, 1999, Defendants, David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L.
Dickson, his wife, filed preliminary objections to Plaintiffs Complaint alleging the following:
a) Preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer for failure
to allege lack of adequate remedy at law;
b) Preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer for failure
of a pleading to conform to law or rule of court;
C) Preliminary objection in the nature of a motion to strike
Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint for failure of a pleading to
conform to law or rule of court;
d) Preliminary objection in the nature of a motion to strike
Count II of Plaintiffs Complaint for failure of a pleading to
conform to law or rule of court;
e) Preliminary objection in the nature of a motion to strike
Plaintiff s demand for attorney's fees;
)
?0
Preliminary objection in the nature of a motion to strike
certain paragraphs of Plaintiff's Complaint; and
g) Preliminary objection in the nature of a motion for more
specific pleading.
2. Oral argument on Defendants' preliminary objections is scheduled for August
11, 1999, with a brief in support of Defendants' Preliminary Objections due twelve (12) days prior.
Defendants' counsel, Wendy D. Bowie, has been unavoidably and
unanticipatedly detained at a National Labor Relations Board hearing in Baltimore, Maryland since
Thursday, July 29, 1999.
4. Also, Defendants' counsel is scheduled to appear at a hearing in the case of
Madr4kowskiv._Madrzykowski, No. 277 S 1999 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland
County on August 11, 1999.
5. Plaintiffs counsel has been consulted and objects to the enlargement of time
and/or continuance of the oral argument scheduled for August 11, 1999.
6. Defendant does not believe Plaintiff would be prejudiced by an enlargement
of time and/or continuance of the oral argument.
WHEREFORE, Defendants' counsel respectfully requests that the Court grant the
twenty (20) day enlargement of time to file a brief in support of Defendants' Preliminary Objections
and continue the oral argument scheduled for August 11, 1999 until the next available oral argument
date.
Respectfully submitted,
IRA H. WEINSTOCK, P.C.
800 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Phone: (717) 238-1657
By: tut"k azg AO I' / Qa 6 ,?
WENDI D. BOWIE
CERTIFICATE_OF SERVICE
AND NOW, this 2nd__ day of August__ _, 1999, I, Wendy D. Bowie, Esquire,
attorney for the Defendants hereby certify that I served the within DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME AND CONTINUANCE on this day by depositing the same in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, in the post office at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, addressed to:
Via First Class Mail:
Kenneth O. Brenneman, Esquire
44 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
By:___ ?, Dl?iw lJ °'w?
WENDY BOWIE
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SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN 8 SPARE
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
4q WEST MAIN STREET
MECHANICSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17055
RICHARD C. SNELBAKER P. O. BOX 31B
KEITH O. BRENNEMAN 71J.69JB526 FACSIMILE VIA 697.7681
PHILIP H. SPARE
August 3, 1999
Richard Pierce, Court Administrator
Cumberland County Courthouse
1 Court House Square
Carlisle, PA 17013
RE: Tindall v. Dickson, et us.
No. 99-3571 Equity
Dear Mr. Pierce:
Please note my representation of Elizabeth Tindall, the Plaintiff in the above case.
I am in receipt of a motion filed by Defendants' counsel seeking an enlargement
of time to file a brief in support of preliminary objections to Plaintiff's Complaint and
also seeking a continuance of the argument on the preliminary objections scheduled for
August 11, 1999.
The motion correctly indicates that I have indicated that I do riot approve of an
extension of time for the filing of a brief or a continuance of the scheduled argument.
What the motion does not indicate is that the day after Defendants filed preliminary
objections to Plaintiff's Complaint - July 9, 1999 - I listed the objections for argument
and served notice of that listing upon Ira Weinstock. It also fails to indicate that Ira
Weinstock, not attorney Wendy Bowie who made the request for the enlargement and
continuance, is or was not available to either submit a brief or argue the matter before the
Court. Mr. Weinstock and not Ms. Bowie was the attorney on behalf of the Defendants
who signed and served the preliminary objections.
I am not unmindful that scheduling conflicts do arise. I take exception to a
request like the one submitted by Defendants' counsel when counsel has had ample
opportunity to prepare a brief yet waits four days after Defendants' brief was due to raise
a scheduling conflict in apparent justification for delaying resolution of their objections.
.t
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN 8 SPARE
Thank you for your consideration.
Yo 15' Y,
Keith O. Brenneman
CC: Ira Weinstock, Esquire
Wendy Bowie, Esquire
AUG- 6-99 FRI 2:35 PM IRA H WEINSTOCK P C FAX NO. 7172386691 P. I
L%W OFFICES
I>i H. w1wnvST0Cx9 PC.
SOrre 100
e0o N. SEOOND STREET
IRA H. WEINg7009 1-L amseuR0, PENN3v?auNIA 17102 FAX: (717) 238.6691
WENDY D. Bamc AR w CODE 717 d1 Addree?:
JA.ION M. We1NSTOCK TELEPHONE: 238-1667 E.M
M,einetoeil Addroeo.net
JOHN f3. E)ouoHrFtrY -owl FAX INFORMATION SHEET
TO: Court Administrator
FROM: Wendy Dullea 130wie, Esquire
DATE: August 6, 1999
RE: Tindall v. Dickson, Docket No. 99-3571
YOUR FAXNUMBER: (717) 240-6462
OuRFAXNuM8ER: (717) 238-6691 ?f
NUMBEROFPAGE:SINCLUDINGCOVERPAGE: 3r 1
IF YOU DO NOT RECI WE ALLOFTHE PAGES INDICATED PLEASE CALL (717) 238.1657.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or need additional inforinalion.
CONFIDENTIAL
TnE INFDRMA'I'ION i3ema RANSMITTEO BY THIS FACSMID.F. is CONSIDERED AITORNEY•CUENT OR ATTORNEY WORK-
PRODUCT PRNB.EOED AND CONFIDENTIAL AND IS INTENDED ONLY F'ORTHE USE OF THE INDIVIDUA1.01t ENTRY NAMED. IF
THE READER OF TIDS MESSAGE IS NOT'1'HE DTFENDED RECIPIENT, OR THE EMPLOYEE Olt AORNT RESPONSmLE TO Immit
RTOIIIE INILNDEDRIMPLEN'r. YOU SHOULD BEAW ARFTI[AT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, DISCLOSURE, COPYING
ORUSE OFTIIE CON'rFNTS OFTItiS TRANSMISSION IS STRICTLY PROIHB]TED. IF'YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNR:A110N
IN ERROR PLEASE WMED1ATBLY NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE, ANn RETURN THE ORIOIIAI. MESSAGE TO US AT TH1: ABOVE
ADDitussvlAU.S.MAIL. THANKYOU
AUG- 6-99 FRI 2:36 PM IRA H WEINSTOCK P C FAX NO. 7172386691 P.
2
L..w OFFICES
IIiA H. WEINST0C71C, 13-'C-
SUITE 100
BOO N. SECOND STREET
HARRISBURG. PENNsY4vAN1A 17102 {-Ax: t717f 238.OGOI
1RA f{, H7e1N9TC]C.K ?^ ?_
WENDY D. 13owrE AFk w Gone: 717
JASON M. WeiNSTOCK '11:LzetiONE: 238-16.57 E-Mail Addre:
weinatoclc®redru ae.net
JoIM 13. DOUGHFRTY S
August 6, 1999
Richard Pierce, Court Administrator
Cumberland County Courthouse
I Court House Square
Carlisle, PA 17013
Re: TindafY A Aickson
Docket No. 99-3571
Dear Mr. Pierce:
I represent the Defendants in the above captioned matter. On August 3,1999, my office filed
a petition to extend the time for me to file a brief in support of preliminary objections which had been
previously filed. The petition also requested that the argument regarding those preliminary
objections, which is currently scheduled for August 11, 1999, be postponed due to a scheduling
conflict. During this time, I was in Baltimore, in hrLRB hearings which extended far beyond the
parties' expectations as to the number of days the hearings would take. I therefore requested that
my office file to petition to extend the due date for the brief, and to notify the Court of the conflict
in my schedule on the I I d'. Upon my return from Baltimore, I found that opposing counsel had
written to the Court opposing the rescheduling ofthe argument, basically because the petition did not
allege that Mr. Weinstock, attorney ofrecord, was unavailable. Mr. Weinstock assigned the (natter
to me, for preparation of the brief, and argument because he was unavailable, though he did not
realize that I also had a conflict on the 11". Our office is a small office and there are no other
attorneys available who could cover this matter. In addition, now have an additional problem which
has arisen, and which will make it impossible to attend the hearing on the 110. Approximately one
year ago I underwent extensive neck surgery. The extended hearings in Baltimore precipitated a flare
up of pain and numbness in my neck and arms which is not responding to treatment, including.
prednisone,steroid Injections into myneck, andoral demerolforpain. My physician has ordered me
off work and on bed rest for one week. I have attached a copy of my physician's note.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that you grant the petition to allow additional tune to file
a brief is support of the preliminary objections, and grant try request to reschedule argument of this
matter.
Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation in this matter.
AUG- 6-99 FRI _2: 36 PM
IRA H WEINSTOCK P C
Letter to Mehard Pierce, Court Administrator
August 6, 1999
Page 2
linclosure
Via facsinfdo only
FAX NO. 7172386691
Very truly yours,
WBNDY DuLLEA BOWIE
P. 3
cc: Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
08/04/99 17:87 FAX 717 Bea 3079
i
3'.
1
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.d f699B61LIL 'ON M O 4 MISER H V81 Wd 9E:Z 18d 66-9 wIV
HFX EV1LLE
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
FORMERLY KNOWN AS
ELIZABETH J. DICKSON
PLAINTIFF
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III AND
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife
DEFENDANTS
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
99-3574 EQUITY
BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND HESS J
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 1'D day of August, 1999, the preliminary
objections of defendants to plaintiffs complaint, ARE DISMISSED.
By the
Keith Brenneman, Esquire
For Plaintiff
Wendy Dulles Bowie, Esquire
For Defendants
Edgar B.
:sea
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U1Q-
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Formerly known as . CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ELIZABETH J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff . CIVIL ACTION -EQUITY
VS. : 99-3571 EQUITY
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON,
His wife,
Defendants
IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
ORDER
AND NOW, this Z S? day of October, 1999, it is ordered and directed that
counsel for the plaintiff be given the opportunity to review all financial documents of David C.
Dickson, III which were previously made available to counsel for the plaintiff in an action
pending in the state of Maryland with leave to Pennsylvania counsel for the plaintiff to copy
pertinent documents at his cost.
The defendant, Deirdre L. Dickson, is ordered and directed to respond to the motion for
production of documents by making available any and all documents requested in said motion
which bear upon her financial condition on or about the date of her marriage to David C.
Dickson III, May 18, 1998.
BY THE COURT,
Kevin .Hess, J.
cg 'I'' Chi !':1I^ ll!
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
d /o/3L?99,
Wendy E. Bowie, Esquire
For the Defendants
Am
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
CERTIFICATE
PREREQUISITE TO SERVICE OF A SUBPOENA
PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
As a prerequisite to service of a subpoena for documents
and things pursuant to Rule 4009.22, Plaintiff Elizabeth J.
Tindall, by her attorneys, Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P. C.
certifies that:
(1) a notice of intent to serve the subpoena with a copy
of the subpoena attached thereto was mailed or delivered to each
party at least twenty days prior to the date on which the
subpoena is sought to be served;
(2) a copy of the notice of intent, including the proposed
subpoena, is attached to this certificate;
(3) no objection to the subpoena has been received; and
(4) the subpoena which will be served is identical to the
LAW OFFICES
s NELEIAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
I
subpoena which is attached to the notice of intent to serve the
subpoena.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By: ?6v't'?
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elizabeth J. Tindall
Date: September 21, 1999
WW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
-2-
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
NOTICE
TO: Wendy D. Bowie, Esquire
Ira H. Weinstock, Esquire
Suite 100
800 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Plaintiff intends to serve a subpoena identical to the one
that is attached to this notice. You have twenty (20) days from
the date listed below in which to file of record and serve upon
the undersigned an objection to the subpoena. If no objection
is made, the subpoena may be served.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By:
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elizabeth J. Tindall
LRW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
a SPARE
Date: August 27, 1999
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
formerly known as ELIZABETH CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff No, 99- 3S r/
V. CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
TO: PNC Mortgage Corp. Of America
Within twenty (20) days after service of this subpoena, you
are ordered by the Court to produce the following documents or
things:
1. Any and all loan applications, commitment letters,
!.! V I I I p.l !(.
11111 VIII MnN
a '?1'n 111
closing documents, notes, mortgages, security agreements,
financial information, appraisals and documentation of any kind
relating, referring or pertaining in any way to David C.
Dickson, III and the loans made to him by PNC Bank, N. A. which
were assigned to PNC Mortgage Corp. of America October 3, 1995
as noted in Cumberland County Misc. Book 505, Page 291 and as
modified by agreement dated October 3, 1995 and recorded in
Cumberland County Misc. Book 505, Page 292.
You may deliver or mail legible copies of the documents or
produce things requested by this subpoena, together with the
certificate of compliance, to the party making this request at
the address listed below. You have the right to seek in advance
the reasonable cost of preparing the copies or producing the
things sought.
If you fail to produce the documents or things required by
this subpoena within twenty (20) days after its service, the
party serving this subpoena may seek a court order compelling
you to comply with it.
This subpoena was issued at the request of the following
person:
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
PA Supreme Court ID #47077
Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P. C.
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY THE COURT:
uw OFFICES
SNELBAKER•
BRENNEMAN
a SPARE
DATE:
(Seal of the Court)
),-
(Prothonotary)
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ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
CERTIFICATE
PREREQUISITE TO SERVICE OF A SUBPOENA
PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
As a prerequisite to service of a subpoena for documents
and things pursuant to Rule 4009.22, Plaintiff Elizabeth J.
Tindall, by her attorneys, Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P. C.
certifies that:
(1) a notice of intent to serve the subpoena with a copy
of the subpoena attached thereto was mailed or delivered to each
party at least twenty days prior to the date on which the
subpoena is sought to be served;
(2) a copy of the notice of intent, including the proposed
subpoena, is attached to this certificate;
(3) no objection to the subpoena has been received; and
(4) the subpoena which will be served is identical to the
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
subpoena which is attached to the notice of intent to serve the
subpoena.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By: IAW,44??
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elizabeth J. Tindall
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
Date: September 21, 1999
-2-
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
NOTICE
TO: Wendy D. Bowie, Esquire
Ira H. Weinstock, Esquire
Suite 100
800 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Plaintiff intends to serve a subpoena identical to the one
that is attached to this notice. You have twenty (20) days from
the date listed below in which to file of record and serve upon
the undersigned an objection to the subpoena. If no objection
is made, the subpoena may be served.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By: 4mov??
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elizabeth J. Tindall
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
a SPARE
Date: August 27, 1999
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
TO: PNC Bank, N. A.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99- 35"r f
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
Within twenty (20) days after service of this subpoena, you
are ordered by the Court to produce the following documents or
things:
1. Any and all loan applications, commitment letters,
LAW OFFCCB
SNELBAKER,
13RENNLMAN
& SPARE
closing documents, notes, mortgages, security agreements,
financial information, appraisals and documentation of any kind
relating, referring or pertaining in any way to David C.
Dickson, III and the loans made to him by PNC Bank, N. A.
evidenced by (1) a mortgage dated and recorded January 19, 1995
in the office of the Recorder of Deeds in and for Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania in Mortgage Book 1249, Page 159 secured by
property located at 2810 Myrtle Drive, Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania; (2) an open-end mortgage dated March 16, 1995 and
recorded May 24, 1995 in Cumberland County Mortgage Book 1255,
Page 1061 and secured by the above referenced property; and (3)
a mortgage or mortgage modification dated April 29, 1996 and
recorded in Cumberland County Mortgage Book 519, Page 943.
You may deliver or mail legible copies of the documents or
produce things requested by this subpoena, together with the
certificate of compliance, to the party making this request at
the address listed below. You have the right to seek in advance
the reasonable cost of preparing the copies or producing the
things sought.
If you fail to produce the documents or things required by
this subpoena within twenty (20) days after its service, the
party serving this subpoena may seek a court order compelling
you to comply with it.
This subpoena was issued at the request of the following
person:
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
PA Supreme Court ID #47077
Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P. C.
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for plaintiff
BY THE COURT:
DATE: (Protho t ry)
(Seal of the Court)
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER,
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
-2-
Q7 nl
4: U
LL c'
4
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u
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U
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
CERTIFICATE
PREREQUISITE TO SERVICE OF A SUBPOENA
PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
As a prerequisite to service of a subpoena for documents
and things pursuant to Rule 4009.22, Plaintiff Elizabeth J.
Tindall, by her attorneys, Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P. C.
certifies that:
(1) a notice of intent to serve the subpoena with a copy
of the subpoena attached thereto was mailed or delivered to each
party at least twenty days prior to the date on which the
subpoena is sought to be served;
(2) a copy of the notice of intent, including the proposed
subpoena, is attached to this certificate;
(3) no objection to the subpoena has been received; and
(4) the subpoena which will be served is identical to the
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER,
13RENNEMAN
& SPARE
subpoena which is attached to the notice of intent to serve the
subpoena.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By: A41-v?
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elizabeth J. Tindall
Date: September 21, 1999
"W OFFICES
SNELBAKER,
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
-2-
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
I
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
NOTICE
TO: Wendy D. Bowie, Esquire
Ira H. Weinstock, Esquire
Suite 100
800 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Plaintiff intends to serve a subpoena identical to the one
that is attached to this notice. You have twenty (20) days from
the date listed below in which to file of record and serve upon
the undersigned an objection to the subpoena. If no objection
is made, the subpoena may be served.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By: I A tw`_
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elizabeth J. Tindall
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER,
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
Date: August 27, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON, Plaintiff
V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife, Defendants
SUBPOENA TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS OR THINGS
FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
TO: Mellon Mortgage Company
(Name of Person or Entity)
Within twenty (20) days after service of this subpoena, you are ordered by the court to produce the following
documents or things:
See attached Exhibit A incorporated by reference herein.
at the Law Offices of Snelbaker, Brenneman b Spare, P.C.
44 W. McEtil Street, gss)
You may deliver or mail legible copies of the documents or produce things requested by this subpoena, together
with the certificate of compliance, to the party making this request at the address listed above.You have the right
to seek in advance the reasonable cost of preparing the copies or producing the things sought.
If you fail to produce the documents or things required by this subpoena within twenty (20) days after its service,
the party serving this subpoena may seek a court order compelling you to comply with it.
THIS SUBPOENA WAS ISSUED AT THE REQUEST OF THE FOLLOWING PERSON
Name Keith O. :.Brenneman
Address: 44 Wt. Main Street
Mechanicsburg PA 17055
Telephone: (717) 697-8528
Supreme Cou rt ID If 47077
Attorney For: Plaintiff
Date: :Y4 4l f 1999
Seal of the Court
BY THE COU
Prothonotary/Irk, ?'I Division
Deputy
CIVIL ACTION _ EQUITY
File No. 99-3571 Equity
!Pff
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
1 V.
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife, e
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3571
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
EXHIBIT A
Any and all loan applications and supporting application
documentation submitted by David C. Dickson, III, also known and
identified as David C. Dickson, either alone or with another or
others, any and all debt, asset, wage and income information
pertaining to David C. Dickson, III (David C. Dickson) and any
and all loan documentation, credit reports, commitment letters,
appraisals, financial documentation and files pertaining,
relating or in any way concerning David C. Dickson, David C.
Dickson, III and/or loan No. 5810106384. For purposes of
further identification, the address of David C. Dickson, III,
also known as David C. Dickson, is 2810 Myrtle Drive,
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
C7
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, --rr.-xrly known as
ELIZABETH J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
V. : NO. 99-3571
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and DEIRDRE L.
DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants : CIVIL ACTION -EQUITY
ANSWER
1. Admitted.
2. Admitted.
3. Admitted.
4. Admitted.
5. Admitted in part, Denied in part. Defendants admit that Elizabeth Tindall and David Dickson
entered into a property settlement agreement, but deny that the copy attached to Plaintiffs
Complaint is a true and correct copy. The copy attached to the Complaint served upon
Defendants is not entirely legible and the beginning sentences of most pages are cut o$
therefore, Defendants are unable to confirm that the copy attached to Plaintiffs Complaint
is a true and correct copy.
6. Denied as stated. The terms of the agreement speak for themselves, and the copy attached
to Plaintiffs Complaint is not entirely legible. Defendants deny that David C. Dickson, III,
was obligated to pay Plaintiff alimony in the amount of $1,900.00 each month commencing
July 1, 1994 for as long as Defendant David C. Dickson, III, shall live, but under no
circumstances for more that twenty-nine years and eight months.
7. Denied as stated. The terns of the agreement speak for themselves, and the copy attached
to Plaintiffs Complaint is not entirely legible.
8. Defendants admit that Defendant David C. Dickson, Ill, executed a promissory note.
9. Denied. Defendants deny that David C. Dickson, III, was obligated to pay to Plaintiff
$4,000.00 each month beginning July I, 1994 through June 30, 1997. Maryland courts have
already ruled that Defendant David C. Dickson, III, is not obligated to pay these sums to
Plaintiff.
10. Admitted.
11. Denied as stated. Defendants believe that Plaintiff instituted action in November of 1997.
Defendants deny that Defendant David C. Dickson, III, was indebted to Plaintiff in an amount
in excess of $122,000.00.
12. Denied. As stated previously, the Maryland courts have already determined that Defendant
David C. Dickson, III, did not owe a portion of the amounts claimed by Plaintiff.
13. Denied as stated. Any obligation Defendant David C. Dickson, III, may have owed to
Plaintiff was in dispute, and at no time relevant to the issued raised in Plaintiffs Complaint,
was David C. Dickson, III, in arrears by more that 9%ofthe disputed amounts. Furthermore,
Defendant David C. Dickson, III, has already paid to, or on behalf of Plaintiff, or conveyed
to Plaintiff amounts in excess of $600,000.00.
14. Denied. The Maryland courts have determined that Defendant David C. Dickson, III, was
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not obligated to pay Plaintiff $4,000.00 per month.
15. Denied. Defendants deny that David C. Dickson, III, was in violation of the Agreement and
was indebted to Plaintiff in an amount in excess of$120,000.00. The subject ofwhat, if any,
amounts were owed to Plaintiff by Defendant David C. Dickson, III, was in litigation in
Maryland both before and after Plaintiff filed the referenced Complaint, and Maryland courts
have ruled that Mr. Dickson did not owe various amounts to Plaintiff which are part of the
amounts stated in Plaintiffs present complaint.
16. Admitted in part, Denied in part. The judgment mentioned in Plaintiffs Complaint was
stricken by Maryland courts, accordingly, Plaintiff was not obligated to pay Plaintiff
$37,000.00.
17. Defendants admit that the property was conveyed on or about May 18, 1998, but deny the
implication that the transfer occurred at a time when there was a valid judgment against
Defendant David C. Dickson.
18. Admitted.
19. Admitted.
COUNTI
20. The responses contained in Paragraphs I through 19, inclusive, are hereby incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
21. Admitted.
22. Denied. Defendant David C. Dickson, III, denies that he was not paying his debts when they
became due, and avers that he was paying his valid debts when due.
-3-
23. Denied. Said conveyance was made as a result of the marriage of Defendant David C.
Dickson, III and Deirdre Dickson. Defendant Deirdre Dickson incurred financial obligations
as a result of the transfer.
24. Denied. Defendants deny that David C. Dickson, III, has, on or since the conveyance of the
property, incurred any valid debts beyond his ability to pay.
25. Defendants deny that David C. Dickson, III, was or became insolvent as a result of the
transfer.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter judgment
in their favor, and against Plaintiff.
COUNT 11
26. The responses contained in Paragraphs I through 25, inclusive, are hereby incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
27. Denied. At the time of said conveyance David C. Dickson, III, did not have any valid
judgments in place against him. Defendant David C. Dickson, III, was aware that the
$37,000.00 judgment had been or would be stricken as a matter of law, and had been so
advised by his attorney. Any monetary obligation Defendant David C. Dickson, III, owed to
Plaintiff was in dispute, and in litigation in Maryland. Furthermore, at the time of said
transfer, Defendant David C. Dickson, III, had substantially no equity in the property, which
was the subject of a substantial mortgage.
28. Denied. As stated previously, any payment obligation was the subject of litigation in
Maryland, and Maryland courts have determined that certain amounts claimed by Plaintiff
-4-
were not owed to her by Defendant David C. Dickson. Defendant David C. Dickson, III, to
the best of his recollection, believes that he had cured any arrears in alimony payments to
Plaintiff at the time of said conveyance.
29. Denied. As stated previously, the judgment in question was stricken. At the time of the
conveyance of the property, Defendant David C. Dickson, 111, did not know or believe that
he owed a valid debt to Plaintiff.
30. Defendants deny that the conveyance of the property was made with intent to hinder, delay
and/or defraud Plaintiff. At the time of the conveyance, David C. Dickson, III, had
substantially no equity in the property which was encumbered by a substantial mortgage.
31. Denied. Defendants deny that David C. Dickson, III, intended to insulate the premises from
claim, attachment, or lien by Plaintiff. At the time of the conveyance, Defendant David C.
Dickson, III, did not believe that he owed a valid and unpaid debt to Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter judgment
in their favor and against Plaintiff.
Respectfully Submitted,
IRA H. WEINSTOCK, P.C.
800 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Phone: 717-238-1657
By: J, ? 0J, mov, dio
WENDY D LEA BOWIE
-5-
VERIFICATION
1 verify that the statements contained in the attached Answer are true and correct to the best
of my knowledge, information, and belief. 1 understand that false statements contained herein are
made subject to the Penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. §4904 relating to unswom falsification to authorities.
AVID C. KSON, III
Dated:
VERIFICATION
I verify that the statements contained in the attached Answer are true and correct to the best
of my knowledge, information, and belief. I understand that false statements contained herein are
made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. §490
21199
Dated:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1, Wendy Dullea Bowie, Esquire, hereby certify that on the date stated below, I served the
attached Answer upon the person named below, at the stated address, by first class postage paid
United States mail.
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
SNELLBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE
44 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
Dated: August 27, 1999
ENDY ULLEA BOWIE ?
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1 Thursday, October 7, 1999 - Tindal v. Dickson
2 Motion to Compel
3
4 THE COURT: I see some middle ground here.
5 I face a couple of choices here. I can simply agree with
6 Ms. Bowie that it is overbroad, that asking her stuff from
7 94, 195 and 196 is not discoverable. And that would be the
8 easy way out for me. I would really rather not do that if
9 we can move this forward a bit.
10 I like your idea that you get access to the
11 stuff that was given to her in Maryland, and that she make
12 her financial situation on the day she was married to this
13 man known to the plaintiff. I don't think that's too much
14 to ask. I will probably fashion an order something along
15 that line.
16 MS. BOWIE: Your Honor, if I may, it would
17 seem to me to make more sense if you will -- well, let me
18 back up. I am not sure I am real clear on exactly what Mr.
19 Brenneman wants in terms of the documents the plaintiff
20 already has. It would seem to me the starting place would
21 be for plaintiff to have her attorney in Maryland forward
22 what he has got and then see if there is anything else
23 that's needed.
24 THE COURT: Okay. That's another approach.
25 That's another approach to think about. Anything else I
1
1 ought to think about?
2 MS. BOWIE: They spent some sixteen hours
3 tabbing documents and copying.
4 MR. BRENNEMAN: Your Honor, that, I believe,
5 puts me at a disadvantage. If I get what he thought was
6 relevant to what he was doing in Maryland, it is impossible
7 for me to know what is relevant to me that he didn't think
8 was relevant and I don't have. So I am put into a position
9 of having to identify things that I don't even know
10 existed. If I see the accountant's documents that were
11 produced in whole to the attorney down in Maryland, I think
12 I am in a better position to comb through that and find out
13 what's relevant to me.
14 THE COURT: Okay. And how do I direct that
15 logistically?
16 MR. BRENNEMAN: Well, I guess technically I
17 need at some point, if he doesn't produce it voluntarily at
18 the request of the defendant's counsel, I forget the
19 process exactly, but come in here and maybe down in the
20 court there and get a subpoena to produce those records
21 through the court in Maryland. If there is nothing to
22 hide, if there is nothing that has not already been seen
23 before, I don't know why it wouldn't be a problem for me to
24 see copies of those and have them produced.
25 THE COURT: Well, she has already said she
2
1 is happy to have you do that. You are saying you want to
2 go beyond that and make sure that you are not bound by what
3 the Maryland lawyer thought was relevant?
4 MR. BRENNEMAN: My understanding was that --
5 you commented on me saying what the Maryland attorney
6 received. I am trying to distinguish that from what he
7 reviewed.
8 THE COURT: Seeing what he saw and seeing
9 what he reviewed -- what he copied, are two different
10 things.
11 MS. BOWIE: He must have copied everything.
12 MR. BRENNEMAN: Judge, I may be able to help
13 the court, if I may, on the issue of the financial
14 information for the spouse. I am more interested in -- I
15 would like to have a snapshot of her wealth on the date of
16 marriage. Before that I am most interested in any
17 conveyances by him to her without consideration. Her
18 wealth at that time -- unless she had dumped everything
19 right before she got married, I don't think is terribly
20 important to what I would like to prove.
21 MS. BOWIE: But, Your Honor, that, as I
22 said, can be gotten at by inquiring into conveyances from
23 him to her rather than fishing through her financial
24 records.
25 MR. BRENNEMAN: I don't want to see her
3
1 financial records before her date of marriage. If the
2 Judge is going to permit me to see that snapshot on her
3 date of marriage.
4 THE COURT: Whatever would reflect her
5 financial status when she married him. Well, I would have
6 hoped that we could have cut through this and made some
7 sort of resolution. If you want me to order stuff, I will.
8 But orders of court are generally unsatisfactory to both
9 sides. I am talking you through this with the hope of
10 giving you an eye of what I would inevitably order.
11 MR. BRENNEMAN: Judge, I don't think we can
12 agree for the simple reason that our clients see this so
13 differently.
14 THE COURT: I agree.
15 MR. BRENNEMAN: That I am going to need an
16 order.
17 THE COURT: I agree. I hear you. What
18 would be the order that you would request with respect to
19 the information that's in the possession of his accountant
20 in Maryland? How would you phrase that?
21 MR. BRENNEMAN: Provided that the
22 defendant's counsel agrees that those documents will be
23 made available, that those documents be made available to
24 me at the expense of the copying costs. And we are talking
25 about those financial documents that the defendant claims
4
1 were all the financial documents I requested that were
2 reviewed by the attorney in Maryland.
3 THE COURT: That could be a lot of copying.
4 MR. BRENNEMAN: Judge, I know that. And I
5 may have to weigh -- if they are willing to copy them all,
6 I assume they are willing to let me see them. And I may
7 weigh the advantage of going down there and sitting and
8 going through them as opposed to footing a bill if it is
9 less expensive for me to go.
10 THE COURT: You just told me that you two
11 weren't in a position to agree to anything. So I would
12 order that, and the parties would say, well, that's what
13 Judge Hess directed.
14 MS. BOWIE: As a practical matter, Your
15 Honor, Mr. Brennan has subpoenaed certain bank records
16 after receiving my responses to the discovery requests
17 indicating that my client had no documents. We have not
18 objected to that.
19 THE COURT: Well, and if one lawyer in
20 Maryland has already seen all of these things, it seems to
21 me that another lawyer here in Pennsylvania looking and
22 seeing the same thing is not going to do him any prejudice,
23 particularly since he is willing to copy the documents.
24 Okay. And with respect to this snapshot of her financial
25 condition at the time of marriage, what sort of things are
5
1 you looking at there? Any of the documents requested in
2 your request which would bear upon her financial condition
3 on...
4 MR. BRENNEMAN: I believe it is May 18,
5 1998.
6 THE COURT: May 18th, 1998. Okay.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
6
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Formerly known as CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ELIZABETH J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
Vs. : 99-3571 EQUITY
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON,
His wife,
Defendants
IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13-? day of September, 1999, a brief argument on the
plaintiffs motion to compel is set for Thursday, October 7, 1999, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom
Number 4, Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, PA.
BY THE COURT,
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Wendy E. Bowie, Esquire
For the Defendants
rn"A 9/13
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I
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
formerly known as ELIZABETH CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff NO. 99-3571
V. CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of , 1999 upon
consideration of the Motion to Compel by the Plaintiff, a Rule
is hereby issued upon Defendants to show cause, if any they
should have, why the relief requested by the Plaintiff in the
Motion to Compel should not be granted.
RULE RETURNABLE within twenty (20) days of service of the
Motion and a copy of this Order upon Defendants' counsel.
BY THE COURT:
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
f I • ? e .
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
formerly known as ELIZABETH CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff NO. 99-3571
V. CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants
MOTION TO COMPEL VERIFIED AND COMPLETE RESPONSES
VD TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS IN RESPONSE TO nT.ATMMTOV/
Plaintiff Elizabeth J. Tindall, by her attorneys
,
Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P. C. submits this Motion to
Compel and in support thereof states the following:
1. This action, which was commenced by Complaint filed
June 11, 1999, seeks, inter alia, to avoid a transfer of real
• estate by Defendant David C. Dickson, III to Defendant David C.
Dickson, III and his wife, Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson, which
transfer was evidenced by a deed dated and recorded May 18, 1998
in the office of the Recorder of Deeds for Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania in Deed Book 117, Page 480.
2. The Complaint in this action raises two claims or
counts against Defendant David C. Dickson, III for actions which
constitute violations of the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act_
3. The complaint in this action was served u
on th
LAW OFFjcrs p
e
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN Defendants on June 21, 1999, at which time a co
py of Plaintiff's
& SPARE
First Request For Production of Documents was served upon
I II 1
Defendants. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff's First
Request For Production of Documents (the "Request") is attached
hereto and incorporated by reference herein as "Exhibit All.
4. On July 26, 1999 Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's
Request For Production of Documents (the "Response") was served
upon Plaintiff's counsel. A true and correct copy of
Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Request For Production of
Documents is attached hereto and incorporated by reference
herein as "Exhibit B"
5. In the nineteen separate requests for categories of
documents in Plaintiff's First Request For Production of
Documents, fifteen requests were for categories of documents
pertaining to assets, transfer of assets, debts, financial
information and the deed for the real estate that was
transferred by 'afendant David C. Dickson, III.
6. Defendants interposed objections to each category of
documents and neither identified nor provided a single document
in response to the Request.
7. Defendants' Response was neither signed nor verified by
Defendants as required by Pa.R.C.P. 4009.12(d).
8. Defendants' Response fails to identify any documents or
things produced or made available pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
4009.12(b)(1).
Law OFFICES 9. Defendants' Response fails to identify all documents or
SNELBAKER.
6&SPAREN things not produced with reasonable particularity in association
-2-
t It
with the basis for non-production as required by Pa.R.C.P.
4009.12(b)(2).
10. Defendants improperly objected to producing documents
on the basis that such documents were not within their
"possession or control" when such documents are believed to be
available directly by Defendants through such sources as their
lenders, banks and accountants.
11. Defendants' Response interposes multiple form
objections for each category of documents for purposes of
obfuscating a reasonable and truthful response.
12. Defendants' Response sets forth numerous claims of
attorney-client privilege yet provides no response by which this
Court can evaluate such a claim as requested in Paragraph 2 of
the Instructions section of Plaintiff's Request.
13. Defendants' response is vexatious and has been
interposed for purposes of delay.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a Rule
upon the Defendants to show cause if any they should have why an
Order should not be issued requiring the Defendants to:
(a) sign and verify, under oath, an answer to Plaintiff's
First Request For Production of Documents;
(b) identify all documents in Defendants' possession and
control responsive to Plaintiff's Request;
(c) identify all documents with reasonable particularity
to which Defendants have objection to producing;
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER,
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE II
-3
( ? II ? ? J
(d) identify all documents in accordance with Paragraph 2
of the Instructions section of the Request that
Defendants claim are subject to attorney-client
privilege;
(e) attend a hearing before this court to take testimony
from Defendants as to the availability or existence of
documents requested by Plaintiff; and
(f) pay all Plaintiff's attorney's fees associated with
this Motion and further efforts taken to obtain
documents from Defendants.
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
LAW OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
By: d2A???
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
44 W. Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Date: it. fill Elizabeth J. Tindall
-4-
I ? II 1 i
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99- 3 571
V. CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and
DEIRDRE L. DICKSON, his wife, :
Defendants
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS_ DIRECTED TO DEFENDANTS
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff
TO: David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L. Dickson, Defendants
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4009.1, et
seq., Plaintiff Elizabeth J. Tindall requests that Defendants
David C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L. Dickson produce and permit
Plaintiff to inspect and copy each of the documents specified
below. The documents should be made available for inspection
and copying during regular business hours at the offices of
Plaintiff's attorneys, Snelbaker, Brenneman & Spare, P. C., 44
W. Main Street, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, or at such other
place as may be mutually agreeable to the parties, within thirty
(30) days of the service of this Request.
Defendants shall also serve a written response to this
I.. OF1l1 l:i
SNELBAV I R.
BRENNEMAN
& SPAIn
Request For Production of Documents within thirty (30) days of
said service.
EXHIBIT A
I I II
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Produce all documents known or reasonably available to
you. This means that you are required to produce all documents
in the possession, custody, or control of you, your attorneys,
accountants, investigators, representatives, agents, employees,
servants, contractors, consultants, associates, or any others
acting on your behalf or under your direction or control or
their attorneys or agents.
2. If you claim that the attorney-client privilege or any
other privilege or reason for withholding documents is
applicable to any document requested, please state as to each
document:
(a) the subject matter of the document;
(b) the name of the writer, sender, or initiator of the
original and each copy of the document;
(c) the names of the recipients, addressees, or persons to
whom the original or any copy of the document was
sent;
(d) each person who has ever had possession, custody or
control of the original or any copy of the document;
(e) the date of the original and each copy of the
document, if any, or an estimate of its date;
(f) a statement of the basis of the claim of privilege;
and
L.W 11{1-.
SfI r LBA r I'R.
BRENNL. MAN
Ck SPAOIF:
(g) sufficient further information concerning the document
and the circumstances surrounding the document to
explain the claim of privilege and to allow a court to
adjudicate the propriety of your claim of privilege.
-2-
3. If you assert privilege as to a portion of any category
of documents or things requested, produce the remainder of that
category as to which you do not assert a privilege. If you
assert privilege as to any portion of a document or thing
requested, produce the portion as to which you do not assert a
privilege.
4. This Request shall be deemed to be continuing. Between
the time of your response and the time of trial, if you obtain,
secure or gain control over any documents requested herein; then
you shall promptly furnish Plaintiff's attorneys with same in
accordance with the direction herein.
DEFINITIONS
The words "document" or "documents" as herein used include,
but are not limited, to any written or graphic matter of any
kind whatsoever, however produced or reproduced, any
electronically or magnetically recorded matter of any kind or
character, however produced or reproduced, and any other matter
concerning the recording of data or information upon any
tangible thing by any means, including, but not limited to, the
original, non-identical copy, rough or final draft of the
following (regardless of however or by whomever prepared,
produced or reproduced) : books, records, reports, memoranda,
LAW OF111T.9
SN"BAVER, notes, letters, telegrams, diaries, calendar or diary entries,
e"ENNIMAN
& SPAIIE
-3-
schedules, maps, graphs, contracts, studies, analyses,
instructions, photographs, tape-recordings, computer tapes,
computer disks or diskettes, telex or fax transmissions,
correspondence, messages, CD-ROM, drawings, forms and work paper
or any other thing in which any matter is memorialized.
"You" or "your" as used herein means the party or parties
to whom this Request is directed, his, her or their agents,
employees, accountants, attorneys or any person, firm or entity
acting on behalf of or at the request of said party or parties.
"Defendant" and "Defendants" shall mean and refer to David
C. Dickson, III and Deirdre L. Dickson, both jointly and
severally, his, her and/or their agents, employees, accountants,
attorneys or any other person, firm or entity acting on behalf
of or at the request of either or both David C. Dickson, III and
Deirdre L. Dickson.
"Plaintiff" as used herein means Elizabeth J. Tindall, her
agents, employees, accountants, attorneys or any person, firm or
entity acting on behalf of or at the request of Elizabeth J.
Tindall.
"Myrtle Drive Residence" shall mean and refer to the
residential dwelling and/or real property upon which it is
LAW OFFY:I'i
SNELBACI:R.
BRENNLMAN
& SPA111!
located commonly identified and known as 2810 Myrtle Drive,
Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
DOCUMENTS TO BE PRODUCED
1. A photostatic copy or like reproduction of all
statements made by any party or any witness concerning this
lawsuit or its subject matter pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 4003.4.
2. Any and all documents, reports, notes, memoranda,
summaries and/or records of any kind relating to any and all
interviews of any and all parties and witnesses or individuals
made by any Defendant in this action, any adjuster, insurer, or
any other agent, employee or representative of the party to whom
this request is directed, other than their attorneys.
3. Any and all expert reports prepared by any expert
engaged by the party to whom this request is directed, who will
be called to testify at the trial of this case. This request is
inclusive of any and all reports prepared by said experts during
the course of the engagement by the Defendants dealing with any
factual issue involving the case and any and all facts and data
which have been reviewed by said expert and any and all opinions
which he/she has rendered.
4. Any and all documents containing the name(s) or
LAW OFI I.
SNCLBAI I:R.
BRENN: MAN
@ SPAIn.
address(es), either home or business, of any and all individuals
contacted as potential witnesses in this case.
5. Any and all deeds, whether or not recorded, whether or
not executed and whether or not in draft or final form
-5-
concerning, making reference to or relating to the Myrtle Drive
Residence prepared from January 1, 1994 to present.
6. Any and all written requests or applications,
preliminary and/or final, made, prepared, completed or submitted
by Defendants, either individually or jointly, for any loan of
money or funds from any source between January 1, 1994 and
present.
7. To the extent not requested in the previous paragraph,
any and all documents submitted by Defendants, either
individually or jointly, to any bank, mortgage company, lender,
person or entity necessary or required to be submitted as a
condition of requesting or obtaining any loan of money or funds
from any source from January 1, 1994 to present.
8. Any and all financial statements of income, assets,
expenses and/or debts of Defendants, either individually or
jointly, whether or not audited, prepared from January 1, 1994
to present.
9. Any and all notes, mortgages, agreements and/or
documents that concern, make reference to or relate in any way
to the financing of the purchase of the Myrtle Drive Residence
or the construction of the residential dwelling which is part of
LAW °"' "s the Myrtle Drive Residence.
SNELBN'I-R.
BRENNI MAN
& SPANS
-6-
10. Any and all notes, mortgages, agreements and/or
documents that concern, make reference to or relate in any way
to any home equity loans, lines of credit or secured or
unsecured loans which Defendants, either individually or
jointly, received or for which request was made by Defendants
between January 1, 1994 and present.
11. Any and all documents that concern, make reference to
or relate in any way to the consideration paid by Defendant
Deidre L. Dickson to Defendant David C. Dickson, III for
conveyance or transfer of the Myrtle Drive Residence as
evidenced by the Deed recorded in Cumberland County Deed Book
177, Page 480.
12. Any and all documents that concern, make reference to
or in any way relate to any property, asset or value exchanged
for the transfer or conveyance of the Myrtle Drive Residence as
evidenced by the Deed recorded in Cumberland County Deed Book
177, Page 480.
13. Any and all memoranda, titles, deeds, bills of sale,
LAW OFFICCS
SNLLBAF.I:R.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
papers and/or documents pertaining, relating or in any way
evidencing or making reference to the transfer, gift, sale
and/or exchange of any property or assets, real, personal and/or
mixed, tangible or intangible, by Defendant David C. Dickson,
III to any person, firm or entity, including Defendant Deirdre
-7-
L. Dickson, from January 1, 1994 to present.
14. Any prenuptial or antenuptial agreement between
Defendant David C. Dickson, III and Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson
and/or any agreement or contract or documents that concern, make
reference to or in any way relate to the rights of either or
both Defendants to property, assets or debts acquired by either
or both Defendants before and during marriage.
15. Any and all lists, inventories or compilations of any
inventory, equipment, goods, furniture, furnishings,
automobiles, boats, jewelry and personal property of any kind
owned by Defendant David C. Dickson, III, alone or jointly with
another or others, created or prepared from January 1, 1994 to
present.
16. Any and all bank statements, cancelled checks and
investment statements pertaining to any accounts titled in the
name of Defendant David C. Dickson, III, whether alone or
jointly with another or others, from January 1, 1994 to present.
17. Any and all bonds, stock or share certificates,
certificates of deposit, debentures, notes and other security
instruments in which Defendant David C. Dickson, III had or has
any interest alone or jointly with another or others from
L.. OFF"acs II January 1, 1994 to present.
SNCLSAHER.
BRENNLMAN
!k SPADE
-8-
18. The federal income tax returns of both Defendants,
whether same have been filed individually or jointly, together
with all schedules and amendments thereto, for the years 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998.
19. Any and all appraisals of the myrtle Drive Residence.
20. To the extent not requested in the previous
paragraphs, any and all documents that relate, make reference to
or evidence personal, real and/or mixed property and assets,
tangible or intangible, owned by Defendant David C. Dickson, III
or in which Defendant David C. Dickson, III has or had any
interest, alone or jointly with another or others, from January
1, 1994 to present.
21. To the extent not requested in the previous
paragraphs, any and all documents that set forth the value of
any assets or property, real, personal or mixed, tangible or
intangible, in which Defendant David C. Dickson, III had or has
any interest alone or jointly with another or others, from
January 1, 1994 to present.
22. To the extent not requested in the previous
L.A OFF.'.,:,
SNELBAKCR.
BBENNEMAN
& SPAFIC
paragraphs, any and all documents that refer, relate to or in
any way concern debt owed by Defendant David C. Dickson, III,
either alone or jointly with another or others, from January 1,
1994 to present.
-9-
23. Any and all documents transmitted or delivered by any
means whatever by Defendant David C. Dickson, III to any
I
accountant who provided any services to or for Defendant David
C. Dickson, III and or who was engaged to prepare or did prepare
any federal income tax return for Defendant David C. Dickson,
III from January 1, 1994 to present.
SNELBA1KE'R, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
By.
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
Supreme Ct. ID #47077
44 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Date: June 11, 1999 Elizabeth J. Tindall
LAW OFFICCS
SNF.LOAVER.
BRENNL!AAN
$ SPADE
-10-
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL, formerly known as
ELIZABETH J. DICKSON,
Plaintiff :
V. : NO. 99-3571
DAVID C. DICKSON, III and DEIRDRE L.
DICKSON, his wife,
Defendants : CIVIL ACTION -EQUITY
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
DOCUMENTS TO BE PRODUCED
V 1. A photostatic copy or like reproduction of all statements made by any party or any
witness concerning this lawsuit or its subject matter pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule ofCivil Procedure
4003.4.
RESPONSE: Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents responsive to
this request.
2. Any and all documents, reports, notes, memoranda, summaries and/or records of any
kind relating to any and all interviews of any and all parties and witnesses or individuals made by any
Defendant in this action, any adjuster, insurer, or any other agent, employee or representative of the
party to whom this request is directed, other than their attorneys.
RESPONSE: Defendants are not in possession or control ol'any documents responsive to
this request.
EXHIBIT B
3. Any and all expert reports prepared by any expert engaged by the party to whom this
request is directed, who will be called to testify at the trial of this case. This request is inclusive of
any and all reports prepared by said experts during the course of the engagement by the Defendants
dealing with any factual issue involving the case and any and all facts and data which have been
reviewed by said expert and any and all opinions which he/she has rendered.
RESPONSE: Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents responsive to
this request.
4. Anyand all documents containing the name(s) oraddress(es), either home or business,
of any and all individuals contacted as potential witnesses in this case.
RESPONSE: Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents responsive to
this request.
5. Any and all deeds, whether or not recorded, whether or not executed and whether or
not in draft or fmal form concerning, making reference to or relating to the Myrtle Drive Residence
prepared from January 1, 1994 to present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson, is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth
-2-
in Pennsylvania's Rules ofCivil Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable
investigation by Mrs. Dickson. Defendants also object because to the best of their
information and belief, Plaintiff is already in possession or control of all documents, not
privileged, responsive to this request and the request is therefore sought in bad faith, to cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden, or expense, on Defendants.
Notwithstanding the foregoing objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any
documents, not privileged or protected by attomey-client or attorney work product privilege,
which are responsive to this request.
6. Any and all written requests or applications, preliminary or final, made, prepared,
completed or submitted by Defendants, either individually or jointly, for any loan of money or funds
from any source between January 1, 1994 and present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
-3-
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making ofan unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
7. To the extent not requested in the previous paragraph, any and all documents
submitted by Defendants, either individually or jointly, to any bank, mortgage company, lender,
person or entity necessary or required to be submitted as a condition o f requesting or obtaining any
loan of money or funds liom any source from January 1, 1994 to present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
-4-
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding; the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
g. Any and all financial statements of income, assets, expenses and/or debts of
Defendants, either individually or jointly, whether or not audited, prepared from January 1, 1994 to
present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request onthc basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to (his Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation. nor likely to lead to evidence
-5-
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules ofCivil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
9. Any and all notes, mortgages, agreements and/or documents that concern, make
reference to or relate in any way to the financing of the purchase of the Myrtle Drive Residence or
the construction of the residential dwelling which is part of the Myrtle Drive Residence.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson.
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
-6-
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscoveryas set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules ofCivil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
10. Any and all notes, mortgages, agreements and/or documents that concern, make
reference to or relate in any way to any home equity loans, lines of credit or secured or unsecured
loans which Defendants, either individually or jointly, received or for which request was made by
Defendants between January 1, 1994 and present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
-7-
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscovery asset forth in Pennsylvania's Rules ofCivil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
11. Any and all documents that concern, make reference to or relate in any way to the
consideration paid by Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson to Defendant David C. Dickson, III for
conveyance or transfer of the Myrtle Drive Residence as evidenced by the Deed recorded in
Cumberland County Deed Book 177, Page 480.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
-8-
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscoveryas set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules ofCivil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
12. Any and all documents that concern, make reference to or in any way relate to any
property, asset or value exchanged for the transfer or conveyance of the Myrtle Drive Residence as
evidenced by the Deed recorded in Cumberland County Deed Book 177, Page 480.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscovery asset forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
13. Any and all memoranda, titles, deeds, bills ofsale, papers and/or documents pertaining,
relating or in any way evidencing or making reference to the transfer, gift, sale and/or exchange of ?
any property or assets, real, personal and/or mixed, tangible or intangible, by Defendant David C.
Dickson, III to any person, firm or entity, including Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson, from January 1,
1994 to present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
- Io-
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants.
14. Any prenuptial or antenuptial agreement between Defendant David C, Dickson, III
and Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson and/or any agreement or contract or documents that concern,
make reference to or in any way relate to the rights of either or both Defendants to property, assets
or debts acquired by either or both Defendants before and during marriage.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
15. Any and all lists, inventories or compilations of any inventory, equipment, goods,
furniture, furnishings, automobiles, boats, jewelry and personal property of any kind owned by
Defendant David C. Dickson, 111, alone or jointly with another or others, created or prepared from
January 1, 1994 to present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any wrongdoing by
Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way indebted to Plaintiff.
Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope and
time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence relevant to
the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson, is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set
forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable
investigation by Mrs. Dickson. Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it
is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to
lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require the
making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing objection,
12-
Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged, which are responsive
to this request.
16. Any and all bank statements, cancelled checks and investment statements pertaining
to any accounts titled in the name of Defendant David C. Dickson, Ill, whether alone or jointly with
another or others, from January 1, 1994 to present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules ofCivil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
- 13 -
which are responsive to this request.
17. Anyandallbonds, stock orshare certificates,certifiicatesofdeposit,debentures, notes
and other security instruments in which Defendant David C. Dickson, III had or has any interest alone
or jointly with another or others from January 1, 1994 to present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
-14-
18. 'rhe federal income tax returns of both Defendants, whether same have been filed
individually or jointly, together with all schedules and amendments thereto, for the years 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997 and 1998.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
19. Any and all appraisals of the Myrtle Drive Residence.
-15-
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
20. To the extent not requested in the previous paragraphs, any and all documents that
relate, make reference to or evidence personal, real and/or mixed property and assets, tangible or
intangible, owned by Defendant David C. Dickson, III or in which Defendant David C. Dickson. III
has or had any interest, alone or jointly with another or others, from January 1, 1994 to present.
-16-
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in had faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
21. To the extent not requested in the previous paragraphs, any and all documents that
set forth the value of any assets or property, real, personal or mixed, tangible or intangible, in which
Defendant David C. Dickson, III had or has any interest alone or jointly with another or others, from
January 1, 1994 to present.
- 17-
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
23. Any and all documents transmitted or delivered by any means whatever by Defendant
David C. Dickson, III to any accountant who provided any services to or for Defendant David C.
Dickson, III and/or who was engaged to prepare or did prepare any federal income tax return for
Defendant David C. Dickson, III from January 1, 1994 to present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis thatMaintill'
- 19-
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
-20-
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
has not instituted any litigation against Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson alleging any
wrongdoing by Deirdre L. Dickson, nor alleging that Deirdre L. Dickson is in any way
indebted to Plaintiff. Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that
it is overly broad in scope and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor
likely to lead to evidence relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Mrs. Dickson,
is beyond the permissible scope of discovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil
Procedure, and would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by Mrs. Dickson.
Defendants jointly further object to this Request on the basis that it is overly broad in scope
and time, is not relevant to any issues in the pending litigation, nor likely to lead to evidence
relevant to the pending litigation, is sought in bad faith, would cause unreasonable annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense on Defendants, is beyond the permissible
scope ofdiscovery as set forth in Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, and would require
the making of an unreasonable investigation by Defendants. Notwithstanding the foregoing
objection, Defendants are not in possession or control of any documents, not privileged,
which are responsive to this request.
22. To the extent not requested in the previous paragraphs, any and all documents that
refer, relate to or in any way concern debt owed by Defendant David C. Dickson, 111, either alone or
jointly with another or others, from January 1, 1994 to present.
RESPONSE: Defendant Deirdre L. Dickson objects to this Request on the basis that Plaintiff
_1g_
Respectfully Submitted,
IRA H. WEINS'rOCK, P.C.
800 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Phone: 717-238-1657
By: J-L' / (.
IRA H. WEINSTOCK
By:
WENDY ULLEA BOWIE
21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Wendy Dullea Bowie, Esquire, hereby certify that on the date stated below, I served the
attached DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS upon the person named below, at the stated address, by first class postage paid
United States mail.
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE
44 West Main Street
P.O. Box 318
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
WEN D LLLEA BOWIE ?-
Dated: July 26, 1999
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, KEITH O. BRENNEMAN, ESQUIRE, hereby certify that I have,
on the below date, caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to Compel to be served upon the person and in
the manner indicated below:
FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE PREPAID ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS:
Wendy D. Bowie, Esquire
Ira H. Weinstock, Esquire
Suite 100
800 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17102
"W OFFICES
SNELBAKER.
BRENNEMAN
& SPARE
Date: 441ft "3 f
199q
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
SNELBAKER, BRENNEMAN & SPARE, P. C.
44 West Main Street
P. O. Box 318
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
(717) 697-8528
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elizabeth J. Tindall
Or
T
I r7`. u.)
L-I :Jl (j