HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-03893N
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JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and BRENDAN
KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
VS.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
99-3893 CIVIL
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE HOFFER, P.J.. HESS AND GUIDO J J
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2/ t day of November, 2000, the motion of the defendant for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT,
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
David A. Baric, Esquire
For the Defendant
Arn
, 'W14
Kev' A. Hess, J.
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JOFIN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and BRENDAN
KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
VS.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
99-3893 CIVIL
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE HOFFER, P.J.. HESS AND GUIDO, J.J.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The background of
this case is a neighborhood dispute between the parties. The instant action, sounding in slander,
arose from a telephone call made by the defendant to the Silver Spring Township Police
Department on November 4, 1998. When the defendant telephoned the police department, she
made a report to Detective Dale Sabadish in which she complained that the plaintiffs' dog was
relieving itself on her property. At the end of the conversation, the defendant offered the
following statement: "... the Knowles' teenage boy was the type to take a machine gun to
school and start shooting."
Plaintiffs claim that Brendan Knowles has, by virtue of this remark, suffered damage to
his reputation as well as humiliation and embarrassment. He also claims a loss of occupational
and educational opportunities to his financial detriment.1
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs aver that, in reality. Brendan enjoys a very good reputation. He achieved academic
distinction in high school and was active in various community service organizations. He has been attending Penn
State University since the fall of 1999.
99-3893 CIVIL
The complaint in this matter was filed on June 25, 1999. On July 13, 1999, the defendant
filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. Following oral argument, the Honorable
Edward E. Guido issued an opinion and order dated January 24, 2000, denying the defendant's
preliminary objections. In his opinion, Judge Guido dealt with the question of whether or not the
defendant's statement to Detective Sabadish was actionable. In doing so, he resorted to the test
provided in Braig v. Field Communications 310 Pa.Super. 569, 456 A.2d 1366 (1983) cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 970, 104 S.Ct. 2341, 80 L.Ed.2d 816 (1984). That decision adopted the
standard from the Restatement of Torts (2"a) Section 566 entitled "Expression of Opinion" and
established a distinction between pure statements of opinion and statements of opinion which
imply an allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. The latter is
known as the "mixed type" of expression of opinion.
While "mixed type" expressions of opinion are generally actionable in Pennsylvania,
pure expressions of opinion are not, according to the Superior Court's decision in Green v.
Mizner, 692 A.2d 169 (1997). As noted in Green, the difference between the two types of
opinions has to do with the effect of the statement on the recipient of the communication.
Concluding that the statement made by Ms.Bucher in this case was clearly of the mixed type,
Judge Guido went on to opine that "[I]f the policeman to whom the statement was made drew a
reasonable conclusion that the derogatory opinion of Plaintiff was based upon defamatory facts,
then the statement is actionable." At the time Judge Guido ruled on the demurrer, of course, the
record was silent with respect to this question as Detective Sabadish had not yet been deposed.
99-3893 CIVIL
The record, for the purpose of the disposition of this summaryjudgment motion, now
includes deposition of Detective Sabadish. In that deposition there are two portions of the
testimony that are directly relevant to the issue currently before the court.
MR. BARIC: What did you think of that statement
when you heard it?
DET. SABADISH: Not a whole lot, to be quite
honest with you.
Q Did you conclude this was a continuation of
the name calling that had taken place?
A Somewhat, yes.
Q Did you conclude from that statement that
Brendan Knowles actually owned a machine gun?
A No.
Q Did you conclude from that statement that
you should contact the Cumberland Valley High
School immediately?
A No.
Q Did you take any action to follow up on
that statement?
A. No, sir.
Q So does that comport, Detective, with your
understanding of that statement being nothing
more than a continuation of the name calling?
A I would agree with that, yes.
Q When that statement was made to you, did
you believe that there was anything known by Mrs.
Bucher behind that statement, so to speak?
A I did not think so
3
99-3893 CIVIL
(Id. at p. 31)
Q Did you say to yourself' at the time you
heard this statement that she must know something
about this person which she isn't telling me?
A No. 1 thought that if there was - if this was
a serious incident, it wouldn't have been in general
conversation. Especially if she's originally calling
me to tell me about a dog, 1 would think that
someone, a boy with a machine gun at the high
school would be the object of the complaint or the
phone call, not of the dog. Therefore, I just took
this with a grain of salt, if you will.
(Deposition of Detective Dale Sabadish, pp. 13-15)
MR. BARIC: Just one, Detective.
Without reference to using defamatory anywhere
in it, from your testimony, did you conclude that
there were no facts to back up the statement that
was made?
DET. SABADISH: I would say that there was no
facts. It might have been an opinion, that she
thinks this was the case. It was an opinion.
Q But you concluded that there were no facts
to back up that statement?
A That's correct.
It is clear from our review of Detective Sabadish's response that he, the recipient of the
communication, was not led to the conclusion that the statement was based upon undisclosed
defamatory facts. It would appear, therefore, that the statement is not actionable.
To reach a decision on the defendant's motion, however, this court must evaluate a grant
of summary judgment in accordance with the appropriate rules of civil procedure. Rule 1035.2
is directly applicable to the circumstances in this matter:
99-3893 CIVIL
After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within
such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any
party may move for summary judgment in whole
or in part as a matter of law
(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any
material fact as to a necessary element of the cause
of action or defense which could be established by
additional discovery or expert report, or
(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to
the motion, including the production of expert
reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden
of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of
facts essential to the cause of action or defense
which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
submitted to a jury.
Pa.R.C.P.1035.2.
We believe that this case is more appropriately governed by the provisions of paragraph
(2) above. The question is not whether there is a genuine issue of material fact but rather
whether the plaintiffs have presented a prima facie case. The distinction is important with
respect to the application of the so-called Nanty-Glo rule. This doctrine, which arises out of the
holding in Nanty_Glo v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 A. 523 (1932), stands for the
proposition that ordinarily the party moving for summary judgment may not rely solely upon its
own testimonial affidavits or depositions, or those of its own witnesses, to establish the
nonexistence of genuine issues of material fact. This rule, in turn, flows from our understanding
that questions of credibility are, in the final analysis, always for the jury.
In resolving the application of the Nanty-Glo rule to the instant matter, the holding of the
Superior Court in Dudley v U.S.X. Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 160, 606 A.2d 916 (1992) is helpful. In
Dudley, the court was asked to reverse the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to
99-3893 CIVIL
the defendants based on the deposition, testimony and affidavits of its witnesses. The court
faced the same argument that the plaintiffs here advance.
A review of these cases demonstrates that there is
an inherent 3-step process involved in determining
whether the Nanty-Glo rule applies to as to
preclude a grant of summary judgment. Initially, it
must be determined whether the plaintiff has
alleged facts sufficient to establish a prima facie
case. If so, the second step is to determine whether
there is any discrepancy as to any facts material to
the case. Finally, it must be determined whether,
in granting summary judgment, the trial court has
usurped improperly the role of the jury by
resolving any material issues of fact.
Id. at 168, 606 A.2d at 920.
In the Dudley case, summaryjudgment was granted in the case based upon the pleadings.
depositions of U.S.X. personnel and decedent's co-trespassers, among other things. The court
found it undisputed that the decedent, Orlando Dudley, was a trespasser on U.S.X.'s property,
that he and his companions had broken into the U.S.X. facility with the purpose of stealing
copper cable, that they decided to climb one of the electric transmission towers to steal copper
cable, and, in order to climb the tower, had to break a steel guard designed to prevent this sort of
trespass. Upon reaching a platform on the tower, Dudley contacted an energized wire and was
electrocuted and died. Based on these facts, the lower court and the Superior Court found that
U.S.X. breached no duty to Dudley and that summary judgment was warranted in their favor. In
reaching this conclusion, the court said:
If there are no material issues of fact in dispute,
and plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to
make out a prima facie case, as a matter of law,
then summary judgment may be granted properly.
Such was the result reached by our supreme court
99-3893 CIVIL
in Thomnson Coal Co v Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa.
198, 412 A.2d 466 (1979). When confronted with
appellant's argument that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment, in light of Bremmer,
supra, and Nanty-Glo,supra, the court concluded:
We have no credibility issue here. Assuming
everything that appellants argue is accepted
as pristine truth, appellants fail to make out
a prima facie case as a matter of law, not as a
matter of fact. Thompson Coal Co., 488 Pa. at
213-14, 512 A.2d at 474.
Dudley, at 169-170,606 A.2d 920.
Here, as in the Dudley case, the analysis must focus on the evidence viewed in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. As Judge Guido earlier observed, in order to establish a
prima facie case, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that Detective Sabadish concluded
that the defendant's statement was based on undisclosed defamatory facts. Detective Sabadish,
however, has testified to the opposite effect. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to summary
judgment.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2 to day of November, 2000, the motion of the defendant for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT,
Kev' i A. Hess, J.
99-3893 CIVIL
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
David A. Baric, Esquire
For the Defendant
Am
i
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and BRENDAN J.
KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs,
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
AND NOW, comes Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, by and through her attorneys,
O'BRIEN, BARIC & SCHERER, and files this Brief in Support of Preliminary Objections to
plaintiffs' complaint and sets forth the following:
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are the former neighbors of defendant Maribeth Bucher. The plaintiffs have
initiated several actions in this Court within the span of the last year, to wit: John Knowles et al.
v. Ken and Stacy Faulkner, C.C.P. Cumberland County No. 98-6328, John Knowles et at. v.
William C. Dunn, William S. Cook and James Hall, supervisors and zoning officer for Silver
Spring Township, C.C.P. Cumberland County No. 98-5432. Ken and Stacy Faulkner are
neighbors of the plaintiffs located in the same residential neighborhood in Silver Spring township
in which the plaintiffs still reside and Maribeth Bucher formerly reside.
Instantly, the plaintiffs contend that Maribeth Bucher slandered per se Brendan Knowles
when she was said to have said to a township police officer that "she thinks that the Knowles
teenage boy was the type to take a machine gun to school and start shooting." Exhibit "A"
to plaintiffs' complaint.
1
H. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is the statement ascribed to defendant capable of being termed
slander per se?
(Answer suggested in the negative.)
2. Absent slander per se, have the plaintiffs' stated a cause of action?
(Answer suggested in the negative.)
III. ARGUMENT
1. IS THE STATEMENT ASCRIBED TO THE DEFENDANT
CAPABLE OF BEING TERMED SLANDER PER SE?
1. Slander oer se requires a statement of fact involvine the alleeed commission
of a crime.
The general rule in Pennsylvania is that damages for defamation are not recoverable absent
proof of special damages incurred by the plaintiff. Solosko v. Paxton, 383 Pa. 419, 119 A.2d 230
(1956). An exception to this rule arises when the plaintiff contends that he has been slandered per
se. A plaintiff who pleads and proves slander per se need not prove special damages to recover.
Walker v. Grand Cent. Sanitation. Inc., 430 Pa. Super. 236, 634 A.2d 237 (1993). In order to
establish slander per se, the plaintiff must allege that the published statement imputed a criminal
offense, a loathsome disease, business misconduct or serious sexual offense. See, Halliday v.
Cienkowski, 333 Pa. 123, 3 A.2d 372 (1939).
Instantly, it would appear that the plaintiffs contend that the alleged statement imputed a
criminal offense. Whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning is a question of law for
the court to decide. Baker v. Lafayette College, 350 Pa. Super. 68, 504 A.2d 247 (1986).
It is apparent that the alleged statement does not contain a reference to a criminal act
allegedly perpetrated by Brendan Knowles. Consequently, slander per se does not exist as an
actionable claim.
2. Absent Slander Per Se, the Plaintiffs' have failed to state a cause of action.
In the seminal case of-Qertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323194 S. Ct.2997 (1974),
the United States Supreme Court concluded that statements of opinion, without more, are not
actionable. This decision has been relied upon by the appellate courts of Pennsylvania in
reviewing slander and libel claims. See, Baker, supra. The Superior Court has opined that
"Under Pennsylvania defamation law, only statements of fact can support an action for libel or
slander, not merely expressions of opinion." Elia v. Erie Insur Exhcana , 430 Pa. Super. 384, 634
A.2d 657, 658 (1993), See also, Walker, supra. Since truth is an absolute defense to a claim of
libel or slander, this distinction between statement of fact and opinion is critical because it would
be difficult if not impossible for a defendant to prove the truth of an opinion he or she held based
upon subjective determinations and impressions whereas a statement of putative fact may be
objectively proven.
Plaintiffs have attempted to assert a defamation claim based upon two assumptions which
simply don't hold: first, that the statement implicated Brendan Knowles as having committed a
criminal offense and two, that the statement was one of fact not opinion.
To state a cause of action for defamation, the complaint must contain averment of facts to
establish the following: (1) that the communication was defamatory; (2) that the defendant
published the communication; (3) that it applied to the plaintiff; (4) that the recipient understood
the defamatory meaning of the communication; (5) that the recipient understood that it was
.1
intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6) that the plaintiff suffered special harm as a result of the
publication; and (7) that the defendant abused a conditional privilege. See, Jaindl v Mohr, 432
Pa. Super. 220, 637 A.2d 1353 (1994).
No where in the complaint as filed by plaintiffs are there any allegations as to special harm
suffered by Brendan Knowles as a consequence of the purported statement.
Pennsylvania statutes provide for "conditional privileges" establishing instances where an
allegedly defamatory statement may be made without fear of reprisal. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8343 (b)(2).
The appellate courts have found that conditional privileges arise where there is some interest of
the publisher of the statement involved, some interest exists in the recipient to hear the
information or there is a recognized interest of the public. See, Chicarella v Passant, 343 Pa.
Super. 330, 494 A.2d 1109 (1985). A conditional privilege is stated in plaintiffs' complaint, i.e.,
the plaintiffs admit that Maribeth Bucher was communicating with a law enforcement officer and
no other individual. The Superior Court has opined that "where a conditional privilege is
evidenced, as here, in the plaintiff s complaint, the plaintiff will be nonsuited unless he can prove
abuse of the privilege." Chicarella, 343 Pa. Super. at p. 336, 494 A.2d at p. 1113.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing, Maribeth Bucher requests that the claim of plaintiffs be dismissed
with prejudice.
O'BRIEN BBA?RIC & SC R
4 David A. Baric, Esquire
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-6873
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September -S -7, 1999, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien,
Baric & Scherer, did serve the Brief Of Defendant In Support Of Preliminary Objections
by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
David A. Baric, Esquire
IAT.HA DAMS
&YOHE, P.C.
jjj ATTORNEYS AT LAW
POST OFFIGF BOX 825
HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17108-0825 ?
74, 1
µ'
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V. NO. 7 - ?d /J ?iw
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NOTICE TO DEFEND
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims
set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this
complaint and notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by
attorney and filing in writing with the court your defenses or objections to the claims set
forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed
without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the court without further
notice for any money claimed in the complaint or for any other claim or relief requested
by the plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU
DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE
THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL
HELP.
Cumberland County Bar Association
2 Liberty Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-3166
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
74,
`
v. NO. 99- 3 8 93 (t ,j
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW
COMPLAINT
AND NOW, come Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles and Brendan J.
Knowles, by and through their attorneys, Latsha Davis & Yohe, P.C., and bring this
cause of action against Defendant and aver the following:
1. Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles and Joanne Knowles, are adult individuals
residing at 12 Wheatland Drive, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055, and are the
parents of Brendan J. Knowles, who resides at the same address. Plaintiffs John E.
Knowles and Joanne Knowles assert claims in this action as guardians of and on behalf
of their child, Brendan J. Knowles. Plaintiff, Brendan J. Knowles (hereinafter "Brendan
Knowles" or collectively with John E. and Joanne Knowles "Plaintiffs'), is the child of
the aforementioned John E. and Joanne Knowles and resides with them under their
guardianship at 12 Wheatland Drive, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055.
2. Defendant, MariBeth Bucher (hereinafter "Defendant"), upon information
and belief, is an adult individual residing at 23 Skyline Drive, Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania 17055.
3. Plaintiff Brendan Knowles is a good, true, honest, and virtuous citizen of
Cumberland County and has, at all times, abided by and conducted himself in
accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
4. Plaintiff Brendan Knowles was known and respected as a person of good
name, credit, and reputation, by reason of which he gained the love, affection, goodwill,
and esteem of family, friends, classmates, neighbors, and diverse other good people of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
5. For the last several years and until June of 1999, Plaintiff Brendan
Knowles has been a student enrolled in the Cumberland Valley School District, where
he has achieved academic distinction as an honor student and will graduate on June 12,
1999.
6. On Thursday, May 27,1999, Plaintiff Brendan Knowles was awarded The
Eagle Award of Distinction from the National Honor Society and also the Paul R. Eggert
Memorial Scholarship in recognition of his academic achievements.
Plaintiff Brendan Knowles is also engaged in various community service
organizations including, among others, an organization which is commonly referred to
as the U. S. Naval Sea Cadets wherein he trains for a possible future career in the United
47611.1 2
States Armed Forces; Plaintiff Brendan Knowles also provides community service to
charitable organizations and other persons in need.
8. As a result of his academic award and achievements, Plaintiff Brendan
Knowles has been accepted to matriculate to classes at Pennsylvania State University
beginning in the fall of 1999.
9. Defendant, intending to deprive Plaintiff Brendan Knowles of his good
name, credit, and reputation, and to bring him into disrepute among neighbors, fellow
students, and other members of the community, did on or about Wednesday,
November 4,1998, at approximately 4:50 p.m. by telephonic transmission, speak and
publish the following false and defamatory words to the Silver Spring Township Police
Department, by stating that the Knowles' teenage boy was the type to take a machine
gun to school and start shooting.
10. John and Toanne Knowles, the natural parents of Plaintiff Brendan
Knowles, have four children, the only teenage son of which is Plaintiff Brendan
Knowles.
11. Defendant, on or about Tuesday, November 4,1998, at approximately 4:50
p.m. called the Silver Spring Township Police Department for the purpose of filing a
complaint against the Knowles' dog, who was allegedly on or in a field then owned by
MariBeth Bucher and purportedly "pooping." See copy of the Complaint with the
Silver Spring Township Police Department attached as Exhibit "A."
47611.1 3
12. Plaintiff Brendan Knowles has never owned a machine gun, nor has he
ever taken a gun or other weapon to any school.
13. Plaintiff Brendan Knowles does not own, nor has he ever taken any
weapon, bomb, or firearm to school.
14. The words contained in the Silver Spring Township Police Department
Complaint uttered by Defendant were and are untrue, and were known by Defendant
to be untrue when uttered and published.
15. Defendant is a person of apparent responsibility whose position in life is
calculated to give credit to the utterances and charges made by her.
16. Defendant, as a former Township Supervisor, held such position of
responsibility and esteem with Township employees to give credit to her utterances and
charges made by her.
17. By reason of the above, Plaintiff Brendan Knowles has been greatly hurt
and injured in his good name, fame and reputation, and has been brought into disgrace
and disrepute among his peers, fellow students, the Cumberland Valley school
administration, and whoever since the speaking and publication of the false, scandalous
and defamatory words by Defendant, have suspected him of the alleged and purported
acts.
18. Defendant's statements are actual, per se, and slanderous, per se.
47611.1
19. The statements identified above were made by Defendant, MariBeth
Bucher, intentionally, willfully, and maliciously, and were made with knowledge of
their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.
20. As a direct and proximate result of the false, misleading, and malicious
statements of MariBeth Bucher to the Silver Spring Township Police Department,
Plaintiff Brendan Knowles has suffered and will continue to suffer various and
irreparable injury to his name and reputation.
21. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant, MariBeth
Bucher, Plaintiff Brendan Knowles suffered severe emotional distress, pain, anguish,
humiliation, and embarrassment, and various physical injuries resulting from the
emotional distress, including, but not limited to, sleeplessness and anxiety.
22. Solely as a result of the aforesaid injuries, Plaintiff Brendan Knowles has
been, and in the future may be, prevented from attending to usual and customary
activities, occupation or future educational studies to his financial detriment and loss.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles and Brendan J.
Knowles demand judgment against Defendant, MariBeth Bucher for an amount in
47641.1
excess of Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) together with punitive damages and
costs, interest and attorneys' fees, and therefore are not bound for compulsory
arbitration.
Respectfully submitted,
LATSHA DAVIS & YORE, P.C.
Dated: W a4s_ By 6," `?O
Glenn R. Davis, Esq.
Attorney I. D. No. 31040
P. O. Box 825
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0825
(717) 761-1880
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles,
Joanne Knowles and Brendan J. Knowles
47641.1 6
JUN'-17-99 04:14 PM IMPACT
ARCM 1L.RTWHR DPUIS K VOIG.P.C.
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C717) 761-2286
7177933422
1999.06-1e 16101
P.02
Y66e P.02/03
The undersigned'hereby verifies that the statements of fact in tike foregoing
Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I
understand that any false statements therein are subject to the penalties contained in 18
Pa. C. 9.6 4904, relating to unoworn falsification to authorities.
Dated:
ohn E, Knowles
SUM-17-99 04:13 PM IMPACT
n WNW 1LMTW4Q DW.-I9 6 IMHE.P.C.
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C717) 761-2206
7177963422 P.BI
199!.06-19 W al OCRs 111.03/03
The undersigned hereby verifies that the statements of fact in the foregoing
Complaint um true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. r
understand that any false Statements therein are subject to the pcnaities contained in 18
Pa. C. S, b 4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities.
Dated.-L-1 5
19 ?
I panne Knowles
VERIFICATION
I, Brendan Knowles, hereby acknowledge that I am the Plaintiff in the foregoing
action, that I have read the foregoing Complaint, that the facts stated therein are true
and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
I understand that any false statements herein are made subject to penalties of 8
Pa. C. S. § 4904„ relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
Dated:
Brendan Knowles
EXHIBIT A
DISPATCH/COMPLAINT
SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT
CO?LAINT NO. E$ OFFICEN GATE:
COMPLAINTANT's NAME TIMES 1/4/98 1650
MariBeth Bucher ADO+ESs
Wheatfield Dr. TELE""°"ENO.
LOCATION OF EVENT
I nnnni -I
Complainant also stated that she thinks that the Knowles teenage boy
was the type to take a machine gun to school and start shooting.
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JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
KNOWLES and BRENDAN J. CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs,
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL
V.
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this _ day of June, 2000, upon consideration of the Motion Of
Defendant For Summary Judgment said Motion is hereby granted.
BY THE COURT,
J.
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and BRENDAN J.
KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs,
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
MOTION OF DEFENDANT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOW, comes Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, by and through her attorneys, O'BRIEN,
BARIC & SCHERER, and files this Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1035.1
et seq. and, in support thereof, sets forth the following:
On or about June 25, 1999, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a Complaint.
2. The Complaint alleges that the Defendant defamed Brendan Knowles in a
conversation she had with the Silver Spring Township Police Department on November 4, 1998.
Complaint at p. 9.
3. Plaintiffs have appended to their Complaint at Exhibit A a copy of the
Dispatch/Complaint form wherein a Detective Sabadish of the Silver Spring Police Department
recorded his notes from the conversation he had with the Defendant. A copy of that exhibit is
appended hereto as Exhibit 1 and is incorporated.
4. Defendant filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Complaint and argument was
held on the preliminary objections.
5. This Court, Guido, J., issued an Opinion and Order regarding the Preliminary
Objections on January 24, 2000. A copy of the Opinion and Order of Court is appended hereto as
Exhibit 2 and is incorporated.
6. In the Opinion and Order of Court of January 24, 2000, this Court found that the
statement relied upon by Plaintiffs was not slanderous per se. Exhibit 2 at p.6.
In the Opinion and Order of Court of January 24, 2000, this Court found that the
statement relied upon by Plaintiffs would be actionable:
If the policeman to whom the statement was made drew a reasonable
conclusion that the derogatory opinion of Plaintiffwas based upon
defamatory facts, then the statement is actionable.
Exhibit 2 at p.4,5.
On April 17, 2000, Defendant deposed Detective Dale E. Sabadish of the Silver
Spring Police Department.
9. A copy of the transcript from the deposition of Detective Dale E. Sabadish is
appended hereto as Exhibit 3 and is incorporated. Detective Sabadish was the policeman with
whom the Defendant spoke.
10. Detective Sabadish testified that he did not conclude that the derogatory opinion
of the Plaintiff as expressed by the Defendant was based upon undisclosed defamatory facts. In
particular, Sabadish testified as follows:
Q:When that statement was made to you, did you believe that there was anything
known by Mrs. Bucher behind that statement, so to speak?
A: 1 did not think so.
Q: Did you say to yourself at the time you heard this statement that she must know
something about this person which she isn't telling me?
A: No. 1 thought that if there was--if this was a serious incident, it wouldn't have
been in general conversation. Especially if she's originally calling me to tell me about a dog, I
would think that someone, a boy with a machine gun at the high school would be the object of the
complaint or the phone call, not a dog. Therefore, 1 just took this with a grain of salt, if you will.
Dep. of D. Sabadish at pp. 14,15
Q: Without reference to using defamatory anywhere in it, from your testimony, did
you conclude that there were no facts to back up the statement that was made?
A: I would say that there was no facts. It might have been an opinion, that she
thinks this was the case. It was an opinion.
Q: But you concluded that there were no facts to back up that statement?
A: That's correct. Dep. of D. Sabdish at p. 31.
11. Whether a particular statement constitutes fact or opinion and is actionable is, in
the first instance, to be decided by the Court as a matter of law.
12. Plaintiffs' cannot support a claim of defamation.
WHEREFORE, based upon the pleadings of record, the prior Order of this Court and
deposition transcripts of record, Defendant requests that this Court grant the within Motion For
Summary Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
BR[EN, BARK?& SCHE R
David A. Baric, Esquire
ID#44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-6873
Attorney for Defendant
dab.dir/litigation/bucher/document/summary. jdg
VERIFICATION
I verify that statements made in the foregoing Motion Of Defendant For Summary
Judgment are true and correct. 1 understand that false statements herein are made subject to the
penalties of 18 C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
MARL H BUCHER
DATE: Ola 13 ??
DIS?ATCH/COIAPLAINT
SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT DOmPLAINT NO.
COMP
UINTANT'S NAME ADDflE55
MariBeth Sucher Wheatfield Dr
LOCATION I EVENT _
i n n i n q 14/98 165CM
- tho pplirP of th> inri Aant
Complainant also stated that she thinks that the Knowles teenage boy
was the type to take a machine gun to school and start shooting.
L? -
EXHIBIT 1
1'1
EXHIBIT a
5(e, lf rna A `
JOHN E. KNOWLES,
JOANNE KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
BEFORE HOFFER P i HESG GUIDO JJ
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this a y?'" day of JANUARY, 2000, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, Defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
are DENIED.
By the Court
Edward E. Guido, J.
Glen R. Davis, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
David A. Baric, Esquire
For the Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
:sld
EXHIBIT 2
In Tes6nr;:;y r,he^xi, I h
and the seal c( said Court
Thi?J...a?.....ldav /of.)
prCCRD
to sat my hand
lisle, Pa.
Prothonotary
JOHN E. KNOWLES,
JOANNE KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
IN RE• DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
On June 25, 1999, the Plaintiffs filed the above civil action seeking damages
against the Defendant on a cause of action sounding in slander. On July 13, 1999, the
Defendant filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. She requests that we
dismiss Plaintiff s complaint on the following grounds:
1) The alleged defamatory statement was an expression of opinion and is not
actionable.
2) The statement is subject to a conditional privilege.
3) The complaint fails to allege special damages which are necessary to support
an action for slander.
There were other issues raised in Defendant's preliminary objections. However,
these issues were not briefed and are deemed to have been abandoned pursuant to Local
Rule 210-7.
i
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
This action was commenced by Plaintiffs John E. Knowles and Joanne Knowles
on behalf of their minor son Brendan Knowles,' (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff' or
"Brendan"). Brendan has received numerous awards for his academic achievements?
He is active in several community service and charitable organizations a As a result of
his awards and achievements he was accepted as a student at the Pennsylvania State
University where he began attending classes in the fall of 1999.4
On November 4, 1998, the Defendant called the Silver Spring Township Police
Department to complain that the Plaintiffs' dog was loose and "pooping" on her
property.5 She also told the police that she "thinks that the Knowles teenage boy was the
type to take a machine gun to school and start shooting.i6
As a result of the above statement, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered damage to
his reputation,7 as well as humiliation and embarrassments He also alleges that he has
suffered financial detriment in the form of lost occupational and educational
opportunities.
The standard to be applied to preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
was succinctly stated by our Supreme Court as follows:
A demurrer can only be sustained where the complaint is clearly
insufficient to establish the pleader's right to relief. For the purpose of
Complaint paragraph 1.
Z Complaint paragraphs 5 and 6.
Complaint paragraph 7.
° Complaint paragraph 8.
5 Complaint Exhibit A.
s Complaint Exhibit A.
Complaint paragraph 17.
° Complaint paragraph 21,
° Complaint paragraph 22.
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
testing the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading a preliminary
objection in the nature of a demurrer admits as true all well-pleaded,
material, relevant facts, and every inference fairly deducible from those
facts.
Since the sustaining of a demurrer results in a denial of the pleader's claim
or a dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a
doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. (citations
omitted).
AUcgh=y o tY v omm?, 507 Pa. 360, 372 490 A.2d 402 (1985). Applying
the above standard to the case at bar, we cannot sustain the demurrer.
Statement Of Opinion.
It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that statements of opinion,
without more, are not actionable. Beckma_ n v. Dunn, 276 Pa. Super 527, 419 A.2d 583
(1980). However, there are certain circumstances where communicated opinions are
actionable. See limit! v. Field Commrtni atione, 310 Pa. Super 569, 456 A.2d 1366
(1983) cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970, 104 S.Ct. 2341, 80 L.Ed 2d 816 (1984). The Bl:aig
Court adopted the Restatement (Second) Torts § 566 which provides:
Expression of Opinion.
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an
opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.
456 A.2d 1372.10 The Court went on to quote at length from comment b to Section 566
which sets forth two types of expression of opinion. The relevant portions of the
comment as quoted in Daig are as follows:
There are two kinds of expressions of opinion. The simple expression of
opinion, or the pure type, occurs when the maker of the comment states
the facts on which he bases his opinion of the plaintiff and then expresses
10 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on Section 566 in Baker v Lafayette oll , 516 Pa. 291, 532
A.2d 399 (1987).
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
a comment as to the plaintiff's conduct, qualifications or character ....
The second kind of expression of opinion, or the mixed type, is one which,
while an opinion in form or context, is apparently based on facts regarding
the plaintiff or his conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or
assumed to exist by the parties to the communication. Here the expression
of the opinion gives rise to the inference that there are undisclosed facts
that justify the forming of the opinion expressed by the defendant...
456 A.2d 1372-1373.11
The pure type of opinion is never actionable but the mixed type may be. Q=
v. Mi ner, 692 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super 1997). The Si= court pointed out that a portion of
Comment c to Section 566 aptly summarizes the distinction as follows:
A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed
nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no
matter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how
derogatory it is. But an expression of opinion that is not based on
disclosed or assumed facts and therefore implies that there are undisclosed
facts on which the opinion is based, is treated differently. The difference
lies in the effect upon the recipient of the communication. In the first
case, the communication itself indicates to him that there is no defamatory
factual statement. In the second, it does not, and if the recipient draws the
reasonable conclusion that the derogatory opinion expressed to e
comment must have been based on undisclosed defamatory facts,, the
defendant is subject to liability.
692 A.2d 174.
It is clear from the allegations in the complaint that the statement in this case,
while clearly an expression of opinion, is of the mixed type. There were not any stated
or obviously assumed non-defamatory facts upon which the opinion was
based. It is clear that the opinion implies that there are undisclosed facts upon which it is
based. If the policeman to whom the statement was made drew a reasonable conclusion
that the derogatory opinion of Plaintiff was based upon defamatory facts, then the
11 In addition to the expression of facts upon which the opinion is based, the "pure" type of opinion can
exists where it is clear that both parties to the communication know the facts upon which the opinion is
based. Malia v. Monchak, 543 A.2d 184 (Pa. Commonwealth 1988).
4
•1 .'??? ?? r. ? ? -.-rte ??
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
statement is actionable. Therefore, we cannot sustain the demurrer on the basis of the
statement being merely an expression of opinion.
Conditional Privilege.
The Defendant points out that the alleged statement was made only to a law enforcement
officer. Therefore, she argues, the statement was conditionally privileged. She further
argues that it is Plaintiff's burden to prove that the privilege was abused. We do not
agree.
In the first instance, Plaintiff has alleged that the statement was made with the
knowledge of its falsity and for a malicious purpose. Furthermore, the burden is on the
Defendant to establish the existence of a privileged occasion. First Lehigh Bank v.
Cowen, 700 A.2d 498 (Pa.Super 1997). 12 Once the existence of the privilege is
established the burden then shifts to the Plaintiff to establish an abuse of that privilege.
Id. 13 Whether the privilege is abused is a question for the jury. Id. Under those
circumstances, it would not be appropriate to sustain the demurrer.
Failure to Plead Special Damages.
"It is a general rule that defamatory words are not actionable, absent proof of
special damage." Baird v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 274, 285 A.2d 166, 171
(1971). See also Solosko v. Paxton, 383 Pa. 419, 119 A.2d 230 (1956). 42 Pa. C.S.A. §
8343(a)(6). "Special damage" has been defined by our courts as "monetary or out-of-
" See also 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8343(b)(2).
'3 See also 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8343(a)(7).
5
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
pocket loss bome by the defamation." Walker v Grand Central Sanitation Inc., 430 Pa.
Super 236, 634 A.2d 237, 241 (1993).
There is an exception to the general rule. In cases of slander per se a Plaintiff
need not establish pecuniary or economic loss. Walker v. Grand Central Sanitation. Inc.,
supra, 634 A.2d 237, 242, He need only establish that his reputation was actually
affected by the slander or that he suffered personal humiliation. Id. See also Pelagatti v.
Cohen, 370 Pa.Super 422, 536 A.2d 1337 (1988). Plaintiff alleges that the statement at
issue is slanderous per se, We disagree.
Slander per se is limited to statements which impute a criminal offense, a
loathsome disease, business misconduct or serious sexual misconduct. Chicarella v.
Passau , 343 Pa.Super 330, 494 A.2d 1109, (1985).14 In the instant case, Defendant's
alleged statement does not fall into any of those categories. While the statement
expresses an opinion that Plaintiff is capable of committing a criminal offense, it does not
impute that he has committed such an offense. Nor is it reasonable to believe that the
unarticulated facts supporting the opinion impute a criminal offense to Plaintiff. The
statements were made to a police officer in a small township where the Plaintiff is a
young high school student. If he had murdered anyone, or committed any other such
crime, there would have been no need for the Defendant to point it out to the police. The
statement was clearly referring to her opinion as to his character or mindset and not to
any criminal offenses. 15
14 See also Restatement Tons (Second) § 570 which is referred to in Chicarclleo v. Passant, supra.
15 We have considered whether a mental illness which would allow someone to machine gun his classmates
might be considered a loathsome disease for purposes of slander per se. We are satisfied that it cannot.
Section 572 of the Restatement (Second) Torts defines the disease referred to in Section 570 as "an existing
venereal disease or other loathsome and communicable disease." (emphasis added). It is questionable
whether such a mental illness is a loathsome disease. However, there is no doubt that it is not
communicable.
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
However, even though the statement is not slanderous per se, Defendant's
demurrer must still be denied. The complaint clearly alleges that the Plaintiff has
sustained pecuniary loss in the form of lost occupational and educational opportunities.
If he is able to prove those special damages at trial, along with the abuse of a conditional
privilege and the officer's reasonable conclusion that Defendant's opinion was based
upon defamatory facts, he will be entitled to recover on his claim.
AND NOW, this 2ALH day of JANUARY, 2000, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, Defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
are DENIED.
By the Court,
/s/ Edward E. Guido
Edward E. Guido, J.
Glen R. Davis, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
David A. Baric, Esquire
For the Defendant
sld
7
.. ... .....? ?..?r ice... -- ...... - • v.. til •-.. :.
Dale E. Sabadish Multi-Pagc'M
Knowles v. Bucher ^ ^ r--\ cn n
r '
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 1
YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
AND BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
PLAINTIFFS
VS
i
MARIBETH BUCHER,
DEFENDANT
NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
DEPOSITION OF: DETECTIVE DALE E. SABADISH
TAKEN BY: DEFENDANT
BEFORE: DONNA L. CROSSAN, RPR
NOTARY PUBLIC
DATE: APRIL 17, 2000, 10:40 A.M:
PLACE: O'BRIEN BARIC & SCHERER
17 WEST SOUTH STREET
CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA
APPEARANCES:
LATSHA DAVIS & YOHE, P.C.
BY: GLENN R. DAVIS, ESQUIRE
FOR - PLAINTIFFS
O'BRIEN BARIC & SCHERER
BY: DAVID A. BARIC, ESQUIRE
FOR - DEFENDANTS
JAMES SMITH DURKIN & CONNELLY, LLP
BY: STEVEN A. STINE, ESQUIRE
FOR DETECTIVE DALE E. SABADISH
EXHIBIT 3
ELICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712
Dale E. Sabadish
11d..i6:_D.. _n+
v. Bucher
,Mann
e.9.
2 n'rnwn I Q 1 will be asking you a series of
3 Mn 1" mu n. a Isfl nwannr,on 2 questions, Detective. If at any time you don't
nr W. n.r,e 3.31 3 understand my question, please say so and I will
by W. o..,. 11 4 attempt to rephrase my question.
5 A Okay.
6 Q Obviously, in your position, you've
7 given testimony before, I'm sure?
s wunna 8 A Yes.
nn 1311 boom TIM
16 =1131r nu,mnnb P/Yil 9 Q So you're certainly aware that it's
„ 1- ftbp .. 3 10 very hard for the court reporter to take down a
13 ]- a.1,.m I....U9.uan M. ,t 11 nonoral answer like a nod of the head or anything
13 3- 01.w,cn mp,,,n[ . 12 else.
Page 4
11 13 A Yes, I am.
I6 14 Q Could you describe just briefly for me
16 15 your background in terms of your history with the
11 16 Silver Spring Police Department?
16 17 A My background consists of being
19 18 employed there for 15 years. I started out in 1985 as
20 19 a patrol officer. Approximately 1991, I was given the
31 20 title of detective and currently I would estimate that
i] 21 80 percent of my time with the police department
23 22 involves criminal investigations. The remaining 20
_, 23 percent would be dedicated to patrol duties.
rs 24 Q And in connection with your duties as a
25 detective, have you in the past few years become aware
Page 3
1 STIPULATION
2 It is hereby stipulated and agreed by
3 and between counsel for the respective parties that
4 reading, signing, sealing, certification, and filing
5 are hereby waived; and all objections except as to the
6 form of the question are reserved to the time of
7 trial.
8 DETECTIVE DALE E. SABADISH, called as a
9 witness, being swom, testified as follows:
10 EXAMINATION
11 BY MR. BARIC:
12 Q Good morning, Detective Sabadish. My
13 name is Dave Baric and I represent the defendant,
14 Maribeth Bucher, in an action that has been brought to
15 the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County.
16 (Copy of subpoena marked as Deposition
17 Exhibit No. 1.)
18 I will show you first what have marked
19 as Exhibit No. 1. This is a copy of a subpoena. Do
20 you recall receiving that subpoena?
A Yes, I do.
BY MR. BARIC:
Q You're appearing here today in response
to that subpoena. Is that correct?
A Yes, it is.
Page 5
1 of certain claims or incidents involving the following
2 parties? And for each party, I'd like you to respond
3 either yes or no; the Faulkners?
4 A Yes.
5 Q The Knowles?
6 A Yes.
7 Q The Buchers?
8 A Yes.
9 Q Could you describe for we generally
10 some of the information you've come to glean from any
I I dealings with any of those parties?
12 A I'm sorry, could you ask that again,
13 please?
14 Q Could you describe for me generally
15 what you recall without reviewing any records or
16 anything else in terms of those parties and their
17 interactions?
18 A From my recollection, of those three
19 parties mentioned, it was somewhat of a neighborhood
20 dispute.
21 Q Do you recall in particular any
22 substantive disputes or matters that were raised
23 between those parties?
24 A Yes.
25 Q What do you recall?
Page 2 - Page 5
FLICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712
Dale E. Sabadish
Knowles v. Bucher
Multi-Page"
I A Well, you tmcan specifically, what was Page 6
2 the dispute all about?
3 Q Sure.
4 A From MY recollection there was problems
5 dealing with one of the party having items on his or
6 her property that the other party didn't think were
7 appropriate for the neighborhood. There were also
8 problems with name calling, trespassing, dog
9 complaints, and that's about all I can -- driving
10 complaints.
I I Q Do you recall as you sit here today any
12 of the specific parties that were complainants in
13 those matters?
14 A At some point in time I think the
15 police department has considered one -- every one of
16 them as a complainant. At some point in time they
17 have had contact with -- direct contact with the
18 police department.
19 Q Were you aware or asked to -- let me
!0 rephrase that.
11 Were you ever asked to investigate a
2 fight or altercation that took place involving Brendan
3 Knowles at the Cumberland Valley High School?
4 A Yes, I was.
5 Q Do you recall what the substance was of
1 that matter?
2 A Not without reviewing the report again,
3 but I think that Brendan Knowles, I think, was the
4 victim of some sort of shove. I don't know if it was
5 actually a fight but possibly a shove by another
6 individual.
7 (Uniform Investigation Report marked as
e Deposition Exhibit No. 2.)
9 BY MR. BARIC:
10 Q I will show you what I've marked as
1 I Exhibit 2, which appears to be the first page of a
12 two-page uniform supplemental report form. If you'll
13 look at the entry that's dated 10/16/98, do you see
14 that?
15 A Yes.
16 Q And in particular, if I direct your
17 attention to the third --
18 MR. STINE: I believe the entry is
19 dated 10/8.
20 MR. BARIC: Io/8, correct. I'm sorry.
21 BY MR. BARIC:
'2 Q 10/8/98. I direct your attention to
.3 the second paragraph, and that has your signature at
4 the bottom. Correct?
5 A That is correct. ves
Page 7
I Q In dx! second Paragraph, Page 8
2 sentence indicates, "This feud started due to Mr.
3 Knowles having a business in a residential area.,,
4 Is that what you were referring to
5 earlier in terms of one patty having property or
6 materials on their property that other parties were
7 concerned about'?
8 A Yes.
9 Q And you then continue on, "This feud
10 has escalated into named calling between the families
I I and video and photography of one another."
12 Do you
13 that information? recall how you came to obtain
14 A From one of the three parties
15 mentioned.
16 Q Was it your conclusion at that point in
17 time that there was name calling taking place between
18 the families?
19 A I could only assume so at that point in
20 time.
21 MR. BARIC: We will mark this as
22 Exhibit 3.
23 (Dispatch/Complaint form marked as
24 Deposition Exhibit No. 3.)
25 BY MR. BARIC:
I Q Take a look at what has been marked as page 9
2 Exhibit 3, please.
3 A (Witness complies.)
4 Q Do you recall Mr. Knowles coming to you
5 and discussing certain matters with you on or about
6 August 2nd, 1998?
7 A Yes.
8 Q And let me just step back for
a moment.
9 Exhibit Number 2 was dated October 8, 1998. Correct?
10 A Yes.
11 Q And that would have been on or about
12 the time that document was prepared?
13 A Yes.
14 Q On Exhibit 3, if you'll look
15 MR. DAVIS: Attorney Baric, you gave me
16 a document which I marked as Exhibit 2, but it doesn't
17 appear to be the same exhibit.
18 MR. BARIC: Maybe I have the wrong copy
19 there. (Handing.)
Ge MR. DAVIS: Thank you.
21 BY MR. BARIC:
22 Q Looking at Exhibit 3, if you'll look at
23 the seventh line down, beginning with, "He then
24 informed me" -- do you see that?
25 A Yes.
-----------------
ELICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712 Page 6 - Page 9
Dale E. Sabadish '
Knowles v. Bucher Multi-Page
Page 10 Page 12
I Q -- "that he and his family were having 1 A Yes
2 problems." Do you recall what that related to? 2 Q Detective, the complaint that is the
3 A Problems involving the neighbors is
4 what he was referring to. 3 genesis of the instant case is attached to the
5 Q This was August of 1998. Correct? 4 complaint filed by the plaintiffs as Exhibit A. I'm
5 going to show you the actual com
laint with th
6 A Yes'
7 Q Apart from the documents that I've p
e
6 exhibit attached. (Handing.)
'
8 shown you presently, do you recall other instances 7 A Yes, I
m familiar with this.
9 where you spoke with any of the parties involved as 8 Q Do you recall taking that call from
9 Maribeth Bucher on November 4
1988?
10 Maribeth Bucher or John or Joanne Knowles? ,
10 A 1 do.
I I A Do I recall speaking to any of them? I I Q Do you have any independent
12 Q Yes.
13 A Yes 12 recollection of that conversation apart from the notes
.
14 Q What do you recall from any of those 13 contained on that report?
14 A No, just what's typed here.
15 conversations, just generally? I understand that
' 15 Q What do you recall being generally the
16 you
re not reviewing any documents that relate to 16 substance of the conversation?
17 those conversations. 17 A Maribeth Bucher had phoned the police
18 A Just that they had one -- or any of
19 them would happen to call in and report s
ecific 18 department on November 4th at approximately 4:50 in
h
p 19 t
e afternoon and wanted the police to be aware that
20 instances or they would come and visit the police 20 the Knowles's dog was on her property again
I won't
21 station and I would overhear some conversations, very .
21 say again because I can't say that prior to that I had
22 similar in nature to what we have already discussed 22 received calls. I can't say for sure that this is the
23 here about neighborhood problems and name calling and 23 first or second or subsequent time that this has
24 that sort of thing. 24 happened, but the complaint was that Bucher had called
25 Q By November of 1998, were you aware 25 in to inform the police that the Knowles's dog was on
Page I I
I that there were ongoing disputes between the Buchers Page 13
1 her property.
2 and the Knowles? 2 Q Apart from that dispatch complaint
3 A Yes. 3 document, are there any other records relating to that
4 Q By November of 1998, were you aware of
5 name calling occurring between the
arties? 4 conversation that you're aware of held by the police
d
p 5
epartment?
6 A I have never heard that myself. I can 6 A Of this particular date and time?
7 only assume that what the complainant was telling me 7 Q Yes.
8 was true, yes. 8 A Not to my knowledge, no.
9 Q By November of 1998, were you aware 9 Q I ask that you read the statement that
to that the Knowles claimed that the Bucher children had to has been circled at the bottom of that. Do you recall
I I been harassing the Knowles's children? I I recording that statement?
12 A Yes, that was part of the gist of the 12 A Yes, I do.
13 complaint. 13 Q Did you ask Mrs. Bucher why she made
14 Q By November of 1998, were you aware the 14 that statement?
15 Knowles contended that the Buchers were in violation 15 A No.
16 of certain township weed ordinances? 16 Q Did you conclude from hearing that
17 A I don't know if they were in violation 17 statement that the statement itself was based on
is of them. I didn't investigate any ordinances Ill undisclosed defamatory facts?
19 involving weeds, but I know that there had been some 1 9 MR. DAVIS: Objection to the form.
20 sort of or somewhat of a complaint or mention that 2 0 MR. STINE: Yes, I'm going to ask you
21 there were problems with the weeds or grasses. 2 1 to rephrase that and break it down into a few
22 Q By November of 1998, were you aware 2 2 questions.
23 that Brendan Knowles had been accused of an incident 2 3 BY MR. BARIC:
24 involving Keith Faulkner at the Cumberland Valley High 2 4 Q Did you conclude that that statement
25 School? z s must have been based on facts known by Mrs. Bucher?
Page 10 - Page 13
ELICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712
Dale E. Sabadish ' '
Knowles v. Bucher Mph-Page
Page 14
I Let me step back. You seem puzzled.
' Page 16
1 that is that defamation is generally described as a
2 A I
m not sure that 1 can --
3 Q What did you think of that statement 2 statement which would hold someone up to ridicule,
4 when you heard it? 3 scorn or contempt.
5 A Not a whole lot, to be quite honest 4 Now, based upon where this case is
5 postured presently, I have to use the word
6 with you.
7 Q Did you conclude this was a 6 "defamation" in asking you a question and if you
8 continuation of the name calling that had taken place? 7 understand that defamation generally again is
8 something that would hold someone up to ridicule
9 A Somewhat, yes.
10 Q Did you conclude from that statement ,
9 scom or contempt, I'm asking whether at the time you
I I that Brendan Knowles actually owned a machine gun? 10 received that statement you concluded that Mrs. Bucher
I I knew of facts which would be considered defamatory
12 A No. 12 regarding Brendan Knowles.
13 Q Did you conclude from that statement
14 that you should contact the Cumberland Valle
Hi
h 13 MR. DAVIS: Objection to the form of
14 th
y
g
15 School immediately? e question. That asks for a legal conclusion.
'
16 A NO 15 MR. BARIC: That
s okay.
.
17 Q Did you take any action to follow up on 16 MR. STINE: I think you've already
17 elicited the facts you need. The officer is in no
18 that statement? 18 position to decide what's defamatory or not.
19 A No, sir.
20 Q So does that comport, Detective, with 19 MR. BARIC: No, but I'm asking him to
20 adopt my definition for purposes of this question.
21 your understanding of that statement being nothing 21 MR. STINE: That's not for him to
22 more than a continuation of the name calling? 22 adopt.
23 A I would agree with that, yes. 23 MR. BARIC: That's how the law is
24 Q When that statement was made to you, 24 stated on this issue and I think I have used the word
25 did you believe that there was anything known by Mrs. 25 "defamatory" in terms of obtaining his understanding
Page 15
1 Bucher behind that statement, so to speak? Page 17
I of it.
2 A I did not think so. 2 MR. STINE: Do you want to rephrase the
3 Q Did you say to yourself at the time you 3 question? If you could simplify the question.
4 heard this statement that she must know something 4 BY MR. BARIC:
5 about this person which she isn't telling me? 5 Q Let me ask you this. When you obtained
6 A No. I thought that if there was -- if 6 that statement from Maribeth Bucher, did you conclude
7 this was a serious incident, it wouldn't have been in 7 that she must be aware of facts which would ridicule
8 general conversation. Especially if she's originally ,
8 scorn or contempt Brendan Knowles?
9 calling me to tell me about a dog, I would think that 9 MR. STINE: Same objection.
to someone, a boy with a machine gun at the high school 10 A I don't think I can speculate as far as
I1 would be the object of the complaint or the phone I I what she knew. 1 can only go by what's she's telling
12 call, not of the dog. Therefore, I just took this 12 me.
13 with a grain of salt, if you will. 13 BY MR. BARIC:
14 Q Did you relay that statement to anyone 14 Q And your conclusion, Detective, was
15 else? 15 that this was a continuation of the name calling?
16 A It was documented on the police report, 16 A I would say yes. Like I stated before,
17 not verbally. 17 I took this statement with a grain of salt. I didn't
18 Q You specifically didn't go to someone is take it seriously to the point that it deserved
I9 else and say, I want to tell you what this person just 19 further investigation or action by the police
20 said to me? You didn't take any step like that? 20 department.
21 A I don't specifically recall verbalizing 2 1 MR. BARIC: Thank you. I have nothing
22 it. Although, I may have. I'm not -- I don't recall 2 2 further at this time.
23 saying that. If I did, it was within the police 2 3 EXAMINATION
24 department, personnel only. 2 4 BY MR. DAVIS:
25 Q Let me offer a definition to you and 2 5 Q Detective Sabadish, I haven't had a
Page 14 - Page 17
FLICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712 -
Dale E. Sabadish
Mutti-P?onTM
v. Bucher
Page 18
1 chance to meet you, but my name is Glenn Davis, and I
2 just have a few questions.
3 When you took the report from Maribeth
4 Bucher on November 4th, 1998 --
5 MR. STINE: Which exhibit is that?
6 MR. DAVIS: I believe that was referred
7 to as Exhibit A to the complaint.
8 A I don't know that this was given an
9 exhibit number.
10 MR. BARK: No, I referred to it as
11 Exhibit A to the complaint filed in this case.
12 A Okay, I know which complaint you're
13 referring to, sir.
14 BY MR. DAVIS:
15 Q And I'm not sure if that was identified
16 whether that was a report which you had taken.
17 A Yes. It contains my initials and that
18 is my typing. I do recall the conversation with
19 Maribeth Bucher on that date.
20 Q Do you know whether this is the entire
21 report that was taken? I noticed on some of the other
22 exhibits that were introduced there was a signature
23 block at the bottom of the page. This doesn't appear
24 to have a signature block at the bottom.
25 A That's correct. This, to my knowledge,
Page 19
1 is the complete report. This is a dispatched
2 complaint. The other ones that do have a signature at
3 the bottom are what we call a uniform investigative
4 report that would -- the uniform investigative report
5 would require some sort of further follow-up with
6 possible criminal charger being brought in a case.
7 The dispatch report is just simply a conversation or a
8 documentation that an incident took place, not
9 necessarily that criminal charges are justified.
10 Q Do you recall if any follow-up was done
I I with regard to an investigation as a result of you
12 having taken this conversation with Maribeth Bucher?
13 A No, not by myself, only because I
14 didn't see that it was necessary.
15 Q Now, I believe you testified that you
16 don't recall having spoken with anyone outside of the
17 department with regard to this complaint?
18 A I don't recall any specific
19 conversations with anyone outside of the department.
20 Q Do you recall any specific
21 conversations with anyone within the department?
22 A In reference to this complaint?
Q Yes.
A I do recall one, quite sometime ago. I
couldn't even give you a date. The chief asked me to
Page 20
1 come into his office and he showed me this document or
2 this dispatched complaint that we're referring to
3 that's dated November 4th. And the only question the
4 chief asked me was Dale, do you remember this? And 1
5 said yes. And then he said, is this what she said?
6 And I said, Well, Chief, I wouldn't have put it there
7 if she didn't say it. I said, of course that's what
8 she said. And he said, that's all I wanted to know.
9 So that's the specific conversation regarding this.
10 Q When you indicate the chief, are we
I I referring to Chief Stcigleman?
12 A Yes. He was the chief then. Yes, it
13 was Stcigleman.
14 Q Do you have any other recollection of
15 why Chief Stcigleman was asking you that question on
16 that day?
17 A I think it was because that there
18 was -- and here again, this is all speculation and 1
19 can only speculate that it was because of the lawsuits
20 being filed against the township and against the
21 different parties involved here.
22 Q Detective Sabadish, how often have you
23 taken a complaint from an individual that calls and
24 indicates that, as you've phrased it here, she thinks
25 that a teen-agc boy was the type to take a machine gun
Page 21
1 to school and start shooting?
2 A How many times?
3 Q Yes.
4 A Arc you asking for a number?
5 Q Yes.
6 A I can't give you a number. There's
7 been other complaints that seem derogatory with other
8 parties involved, not in this circle, that I've heard
9 over the 18 years of being in the police profession.
10 But as far as numbers arc concerned, I can't give you
I I numbers.
12 Q When Maribeth Bucher referred to the
13 Knowles's teen-age boy, did you have an understanding
14 of who she was referring to?
15 A I had an understanding. I don't know
16 that I've ever met this young man.
17 Q Did you have any conversation with Ms.
18 Bucher at the time she made this statement with regard
19 to any type of obligation on her part to report the
20 facts as truthfully as she understood them in a
21 complaint?
22 A Could you ask that again, please?
23 Q Sure. Did you ask any follow-up
24 questions of Ms. Bucher to verify the accuracy of this
25 statement'?
Page 1 R -Page 21
ELICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712
We E. Sabadish
Knowles v. Bucher
I A No.
Multi-Pagers'
Page 22
2 Q Did you provide any warning or any
3 other type of statement with regard to Ms. Bucher at
4 the time she made this statement to, in essence, warn
5 her of the consequence of filing a false report with
6 the police?
7 MR. BARIC: 1 object to the form.
8 A No, I didn't think I had to do that.
9 BY MR. DAVIS:
1o Q it Ms. Bucher made this statement,
11 was it your understanding that she was making a
12 factual statement to the police?
13 MR. BARIC: 1 object to the form.
14 Which part are you referring to now? When you say
15 statement or complaint, are you referring to
16 everything on the form?
17 MR. DAVIS: With regard to the final
18 statement which is circled at the bottom of Exhibit A.
19 BY MR. DAVIS:
20 Q Did you understand that to be a factual
21 statement of Ms. Bucher?
22 A I don't think the statement, the way
23 it's written here, is factual to begin with. If 1
24 could just read it: "A complainant also stated that
25 she thinks that the Knowles's teen-age boy was the
I type to take a machine gun to school." Page 23
2 I don't think that there are any facts
3 there. Me understanding that wouldn't speculate that
4 she knows that he is that type. I didn't take it
5 seriously.
6 Q Just so 1 understand your statement,
7 then, at the time she made that statement, you felt
e that she wasn't making a factual assertion to the
9 police department?
Ic A I think she was telling me what she
11 thought, not necessarily that the fact of the matter
12 was that he -- I mean, if she would have told me she
13 had seen him walking up and down the street with a
14 shotgun or a machine gun and camouflage, I may have
15 taken her a little bit more seriously, but what she
16 said is just what's here. There's no more to it. And
17 no, I didn't take it seriously and I didn't think it
18 required any additional follow-up.
X19 If she would have been more specific in
20 how she knew this, that would have been documented as
21 well and maybe at that point, it would have deserved
22 some additional consideration. But like I said, I did
23 not -- I think that the idea of her calling the main
24 topic was to report that the dog was on her property
25 and just in casual conversation, site mentioned what's
Ityped here.
Page 24
2 Q Would it be typical for someone calling
3 the police in casual conversation to make a statement
4 of that nature?
5 MR. BARIC: I object to the form of the
6 question.
7 A As 1 said before, in my 18 years, I've
8 heard all kinds of stories. This is not unusual for
9 someone to say to me.
10 BY MR. DAVIS:
I I Q As a result of her having made that
12 statement, did you bring it to the attention of the
13 chief or anyone else in the police department?
14 A As you can see, there arc several
15 initials down on the bottom. This dispatch complaint
16 is typed and put -- and this particular one was typed
17 by myself and placed on a clipboard at the police
18 department. All the police officers are then required
19 to review the dispatched complaints so that they're up
20 to date to the current affairs within the township.
21 The initials that you see that almost looks somewhat
22 of a scribbling are the officers initials that read
23 that complaint.
24 So therefore, the police officers whose
25 initials arc on here, have reviewed that. Their
I initials are an indication that they have reviewed Page 25
2 that and there might even be other officers that read
3 this but did not initial it. So this has been brought
4 to the attention of the other police officers, yes,
5 without a doubt.
6 Q If we could just look at those
7 initials. There appear on my copy of Exhibit A to be
8 seven sets of initials.
9 A Yes.
10 Q Could you identify those initials?
I I A Some of them, yes.
12 Q If we start from the far left-hand
13 margin of that exhibit and take a look at that set of
w initials.
15 A Yes. That appears to me the initials
16 of Officer Potteiger, P-O-T-T-E-I-GE-R.
17 Q And if then we move in a rightward
18 direction from that, there appears to be initials that
19 could be S.S.
20 A That's actually E.S., and that's Edward
21 Shaffer, S-H-A-F-F-E-R.
22 Q And then if we go kind of in a
23 northerly direction from that there appear to be a set
24 of initials.
A Yes. Those are the initials of the
ELICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712 Page 22 - Page 25
Dale E. Sabadish
Multi-Pane'
v. tsucncr
Page 26
1 police secretary, Tracy Mullen, M-U-L-L-E-N.
2 Q And then again, working across the page
3 there are a set of initials immediately above the
4 exhibit sticker.
5 A Yes. That is the initials B.W.K.,
6 which is the initials of Officer Brian Kluck,
7 K-L-U-C-K.
8 Q Then there appear to be three sets of
9 initials almost in a line from the top of the page
to down. If we could start at the top of that.
11 A Sure. Those initials are L. H., and
12 that's another officer by the name of Leroy
13 Hippensteel, H-I-P-P-E-N-S-T-E-E-L.
14 Q And then there's the next set of
15 initials moving down that column, and that's rather
16 difficult to read.
17 A Yes, I can't make that out. I'm not
18 sure what that is.
19 Q And then there's a last set of initials
20 at the bottom of that page.
21 A Right. The last set which is more or
22 less down at the bottom right-hand comer of the page,
23 they are the initials G.R.S., which is the chief of
24 police, Gerald Steigleman, S-T-E-I-G-L-E-M-A-N.
25 Q Detective Sabadish, after the
Page 27
I dispatched complaint is posted, I think you said that
2 everyone has the ability to read it, and what happens
3 to the document after that?
4 A It remains there until, I'll say, the
5 beginning of the following month. After that they
6 take that particular piece of paper and put it in a
7 box. In this case it would be marked dispatcher
8 incident with the month November of '98. Or I believe
9 it's put in a file drawer and we keep them in a file
10 drawer and I think it's just incidents for 1998 and
I I then they, are placed in an orderly fashion from month
12 to month.
13 So I can only assume that since this is
14 only two years old, that -- or not even two years old,
15 that the original document is still on file at the
16 police department. How long the originals are kept,
17 I'm really not sure. Something is telling me seven
18 years, but I don't participate in the destruction of
19 documents, so I don't know.
20 Q Is there any particular record made to
21 any individual with regard to this report having been
22 filed? And by that I mean, is there a copy of this
23 placed in either Maribeth Bucher's file, if there's a
24 file with the police on Maribeth Bucher, or any
25 Knowles's family member files?
1 can only tell you that I do not keep
Page 28
2 a specific file. If someone else makes a copy of this
3 and places it in there, that could be if a file does
4 exist, but I'm not aware of any specific file dealing
5 with these individuals. 1 don't have any myself.
6 Q Are you aware of any similar complaints
7 being made with regard to Brendan Knowles by any other
8 township individuals?
9 A No.
10 Q Do you recall having read a complaint
11 filed by Tracy Faulkner of a similar nature?
12 A 1 may have read it. If it's not
13 anything we're not looking at right here, I'm not sure
14 1 know. Are we referring to any of the exhibits that
15 we already looked at? If there's something here that
16 you want to show me and ask me if 1 remember, I'll
17 gladly try and answer it that way. But 1 think that
18 everyone concerned, it was back and forth with
19 everyone. The specifics I don't recall unless I
20 actually dealt with it.
Q Detective Sabadish, you made a
statement, I believe, and I want to ask you one of the
previous questions. Do you recall in your 18 years
other type of defamatory statements? Do you consider
a statement of that nature defamatory?
1 MR. BARIC: I'm going to object. He
2 didn't say "defamatory."
3 MR. STINE: IT object as well.
4 A Am I still to answer the question?
5 MR. STINE: 1 think it should be
6 rephrased.
7 BY MR. DAVIS:
8 Q In your 18 years on the police force,
9 have you received what you consider defamatory
10 statements made by complainants?
I I MR. STINE: I'm still going to object.
12 MR. BARIC: That calls for a legal
13 conclusion. I'll enter into that objection.
14 BY MR. DAVIS:
15 Q Detective Sabadish, do you have
16 children?
17 A Yes.
18 Q Would you like a statement like this to
19 be taken --
MR. STINE: Objection. What's that
1 for?
MR. BARIC: Objection.
BY MR. DAVIS:
Q -- with regard to your children?
MR. BARIC: Objection.
Page 29
Page 26 - Page 29
ELICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712
Dalc E. Sabadish
Kuowles V. Bucher
I MR. STINE: Objection, no relevance
2 whatsoever.
Multi-Pagc""
Page 30
3 BY MR. DAVIS:
4 Q You may answer.
5 A Would I object to someone else saying
6 this about my child'?
7 Q Yes.
8 A I'd probably laugh and blow it off. I
9 mean, if there was truth to it, I might take it'
10 serious, but -- if I knew that it could be possible
11 that my kid was taking a gun to school, I definitely
12 would look into it, but I don't think I would be upset
13 about it. I would want to know if my kid was taking a
14 machine gun to school.
15 Q Did you make any further investigation
16 after having taken Ihis statement on November 4th,
17 1998 to make a determination as to the truthfulness of
18 that circled statement in the complaint?
19 MR. STINE: I think that's asked and
20 answered. He's already answered that question twice.
21 A I'll answer it again. I didn't think
!2 there was any truth to it. So therefore, I didn't
3 think it deserved any further investigation. I think
4 it was just an off-the-cuff type statement that was
5 made and that's the way I documented it and that's the
1 way I understood it to be. Page 31
2 MR. DAVIS: I have no further
3 questions.
% EXAMINATION
5 BY MR. BARIC:
Just one, Detective.
7 Without reference to using defamatory
8 anywhere in it, from your testimony, did you conclude
9 that there were no facts to back up the statement that
10 was made?
I I A I would say that there was no facts.
12 It might have been an opinion, that she thinks this
13 was the case. It was an opinion.
14 Q But you concluded that there were t10
15 facts to back up that statement?
16 A That's correct.
1JI 7 MR. BARIC: I have nothing further.
18 (The deposition concluded at 11:15 a.m.)
19
I STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA : SS.
2 COUNTY OF YORK
Page 32
4 1, Donna L. Crossan, a Reporter
5 Notary-Public, authorized to administer oaths within
6 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and take depositions
7 in the trial of causes, do hereby certify that the
8 foregoing is the testimony Of DETECTIVE DALE SABADISH.
9 1 further certify that before that taking of
10 said deposition, the witness was duly sworn; that the
11 questions and answers were taken down stenographically
12 by said reporter Donna Crossan, a Reporter
13 Notary-Public approved and agreed to, and afterwards
14 reduced to typewriting under the direction of the said
15 Reporter.
16 I further certify that the proceedings and
17 evidence contained fully and accurately in the notes
18 by me on the within deposition, and that this copy is
19 a correct transcript of the same to the best of my
20 ability.
21 In testimony whereof, I have hereunto
22 subscribed my hand this Iat day of May, 2000.
23
24 My WINIIIAIOII CMPIRt:
25 July 13, 2000
ELICKER & ASSOCIATES REPORTING 800-840-9179 633-5712 Page 30 - Page 32
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. xt trnvr F c
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
I? Defendant
N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
SUBPOENA TO ATTEND AND TESTIFY
TO: Detective Dale E. Sabadish
Silver Spring Township Police Department
6475 Carlisle Pike
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055
You are ordered by the Court to come to the Law Office of O'Brien, Baric &
Scherer, 17 West South Street, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania,
17013, on Monday, April 17, 2000 at 10:00 a.m., to testify on behalf of Defendant
in the above case, and to remain until excused.
2. And bring with you any and all documents of or pertaining to any claims,
complaints or communications made to the Silver Spring Township Police
Department by John Knowles, Joanne Knowles, Brendan Knowles and/or
Maribeth Bucher.
If you fail to attend or to produce the documents or things required by this subpoena, you
may be subject to the sanctions authorized by Rule 234.5 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure, including but not limited to costs, attorney fees and imprisonment.
REQUESTED BY A PARTY/ATTORNEY IN COMPLIANCE WITH Pa.R.C.P. No. 234.2(a):
NAME: David A. Baric, Esquire
ADDRESS: 17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
TELEPHONE: (717) 249-6873
SUPREME COURT 1159: 44853
BY THE COURT:
psi l',z? • ,E' ?./?,a
Prothonotary/Clerk, ivil Division
DATE: Q&;Z -may
el Deputy
SEAL OF THE COURT: tt d.
DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
UNIFORM INVESTIGATION REPC
HARASSMENT
(summary)
PA STATUTE
PaCC 2709(a) (1)
J V J / lllwl` W
a VICTIM •RACE
Keith Faulkner
O.NOAU AOORUS: CITT•STAT PN01
8 Wheatland Dr,
IaILOCAa AOOAE3S
Mechanicsburg, PA
7a IUWPLOYER.SCNGOL
10. SEX
It. AOE
795-6355
7055
OATS
A . r_ -----I----- -- I-?---? -
oLN: 25823877 SX.AGE 1SJ.RACE N.SEX 3].AOORESS
3 ren,q J, K
WARRANT IS SUED w
-?-j11.ARNESTEO ISI. OAT!2 BI1 W
Y93 CI NO DATE ?- Ip YES O NO j SS. JUVENIL! 60. ARREST RE.
0--00 YES O NO p YES p N0
ACTION TAKEN p OISNI]S8D MO. OA YR.
p NANOLCD IN DEPT, ANO RCLlASED O TO JUVENILE COURT
UST ANDIO[NTIPY ADORIeeu vin..... ....__._____. STATUS: me. ne.U
On 10/8/98 at 1647 hrs. the reporting officer received a phone call from
Stacey Faulkner. She related that her son was involved in an altercation
with Brendan Knowles at the High School this 'AM.
Mrs. Faulkner related that the problem between her son and Brendan Knowles
is a result in a neighborhood arguement involving the Knowles, the FaulknerE F
and the Buchers. This feud started due to Mr. Knowles having a business in
a residential area and the fact that his vending machines were seen from the
street. This feud has escalated into name calling between the families and
video and photography of one another.
Mrs. Faulkner related that she and her family are freightened by the Knowles
This morning her son was<accosted- by the Knowles boy. Mrs. Faulkner related
that she isn't sure what she wants done. She does want the police to tell
the Knowles that this contact at school (and elsewhere) will not be tolerate 11
and that the Knowles boy should stay away from the Faulkner boy.
Mrs. Faulkner then asked if the police could do anything about the incident.
I told Mrs. Faulkner that I would have to talk to her son directly in order
to asertain a detailed account of the incident so that a determination of
whether a criminal charge could or should be brought against anyone in this ;....
incident. She understood. I gave her the office phone number as well as
the Cumberland County Dispatch Center. She related that her son would be
calling me shortly.
r,
?.E.Sabadish I 2405 I
PAGE -1 OF -9 PAGES 10
Signature a.QZPARTNENr eT.RevlcwcGer LL..
DISPATCH/COMPLAINT
SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT
Y(NICE[
IaY CLYC<
ra. a.c[
aYCICCT
autaunaY
i. aru aa. uual
aNtwlwa wOrIM
On the above
with Chief S
n. I i
,[. M - .1.
him that
Chief
He then asked me to
his name
t1C[ .<V<C
tarru ur
au[r.u
1125 hrs.
<aun u.r
cL[u [<
+ L /j
DEPOSITION
y EXHIBIT
requested to-speak
s not working at the
a message for the Chief to c,_?1 him. I did this. At 1131 hrs. Mr. Knoles
called back and -sled me if I was offic I told him that I wa a d
hp amleaA
_ _ _ ? IGIIIC
for him as well He then informed me that he and his family were having
nrnhl IT ..
to the PD with his famil to speak with me about what was going on. I told
him that I ..would be her and that I would wait for him At approx 1145 hrs
Mr.& Mrs. Knoles arrived at the PD with their three children Krist Ste ha
and Kelly. Mr. Knoles related that he was icing out of town and wanted to
sneak with Chief Steigleman He said that he was leaving today, and since
the Chief was unavailable. he wanted to explain the recent happenings at and
around his h°' He said rha1 ti° ••^..,.a b back home on Wednesday While
t i t e additional problems. He said that the
Ai,chers -nd the n arts seem to know when he's away and that the problems
hIIP he is gone Ile related that he was concerned for
his wife and children during his absence. The latest occurrances are small
-.a=3yon marks on their vinyl siding that couldn't have been made by children
due to the to -tion of the marks (i a above too of sliding door) Someone
had sera gh d the phrase "Your House Sucks" on the concrete front porch.
These incidents must have occurred during late night or early morning hours,
or while the Knoles are awa . The family (to include the children) are
continually being harassed while they are outside The Knoles mentioned
that Staci ralkner vells vugarit and bscenities at the children to in-
tnnrh of Fn^tri -- -' -`•••.` 1Q1nuer, _
ng Jack AsseC St h is hii he i i g his
(over) 4 ?,j
CERTIFICATE OF ERVICE
1 hereby certify that on June / 3 , 2000, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien, Baric &
Scherer, did serve the Motion Of Defendant For Summary Judgment, by first class U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
David A. Baric, Esquire
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PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT
(Must be typewritten and sutmitted in duplicate)
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY:
Please list the within matter for the next Argument Court.
CAPTION OF CASE
(entire caption must be stated in full)
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE. KNOWLES
AND BRENDAN J. KNOWLES
VS.
MARIBETH BUCHER
(Plaintiff)
(Defendant)
No. 99-3893 Civil 19 99
1. State matter to be argued (i.e., plaintiff's motion for new trial, defendant's
demurrer to complaint, etc.):
Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Complaint
2. Identify counsel who will argue case:
(a) for plaintiff:
Address:
(b) for defendant:
Address:
Glenn R. Davis
°. 0. Box 825
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0825
David A. Baric
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
3. I will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has
been listed for argument.
4. Argument Court Date: October 13, 1999
Dated: 8/27/99
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J.KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Please enter my appearance on behalf of the Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, in the above-
captioned matter.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: ?O
O'BRIEN, BARIC & SCHERER
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David A. Baric, Esquire
I.D. # 44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-6873
Attorney for Defendant, Maribeth Bucher
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July ;;- , 1999, 1, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien, Baric &
Scherer, did serve the Praecipe for Entry of Appearance, by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to
the party listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
David A. Baric, Esquire
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JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs,
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
NO, 99-3893 CIVIL
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
NOTICE TO PLEAD
TO: Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
You are hereby notified that you have twenty (20) days in which to plead to the enclosed
Preliminary Objections or a Default Judgment may be entered against you.
O'BRIEN, BARIC & SCHERER
Date: 7 !3 ?/
David A. Baric, Esquire
I.D. #44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-6873
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs,
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
AND NOW, comes Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, by and through her attorneys, O'BRIEN,
BARIC & SCHERER, and files the within Preliminary Objections and, in support thereof, sets forth
the following:
Plaintiffs are the natural parents of Brendan Knowles and Brendan Knowles. (Compl.
at para. 1).
2. The plaintiffs appear to aver that Maribeth Bucher slandered Brendan Knowles
through a conversation Maribeth Bucher had with the Silver Spring Township Police Department.
(Compl. at para. 9).
3. The alleged defamatory statement relied upon by plaintiffs is as set forth on Exhibit
"A" to the complaint and reads: "Complainant also stated that she thinks that the Knowles
teenage boy was the type to take a machine gun to school and start shooting."
4. No other purported statements are referenced in the complaint as being a basis for the
action.
5. The complaint does not contain any specific heading denoting the type of action being
brought, however, it would appear to sound in slander.
6. The plaintiffs conclude that the "statements" are "actual, per se, and slanderous, per
se." (Compl. at para. 18).
L FAILURE OF COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO LAW OR RULE OF
COURT
7. Defendant incorporates paragraphs one through six as though set forth at length.
8. Under the law of the Commonwealth, only statements of fact can support an action
for libel or slander, not merely expressions of opinion.
9. The statement relied upon by plaintiffs is an expression of an opinion and not a
statement of fact. The statement is a subjective opinion and could only reasonably imply the existence
of other subjective opinions.
to. Plaintiffs complaint fails to conform to the law of the Commonwealth and fails to state
a cause of action for which relief may be granted.
it. A complaint for defamation must identify exactly to whom allegedly defamatory
statements were made.
12. Plaintiffs have failed to identify the individual at the Silver Spring Police department
who allegedly heard or received the defamatory statement ascribed to the Defendant.
13. Pa.R.C.P 1020 (a) requires that each cause of action and any special damage related
thereto shall be stated in a separate count containing a demand for relief.
14. Plaintiffs have failed to state and identify the cause of action being asserted and special
damages as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1020(a).
15. Slander per se arises only where the spoken and published words impute a criminal
offense, a loathsome disease, business misconduct or serious sexual offense.
16. The alleged statement does not impute a criminal offense, a loathsome disease,
business misconduct or serious sexual offense to the plaintiff, Brendan Knowles.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, requests that the complaint be dismissed with
prejudice and she be awarded her costs, expenses and attorney fees.
H. DEMURRER
17. Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs one through sixteen as though set
forth at length.
18. Even accepting as true the purported statement made by Defendant, the statement is
an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact.
19. A claim of slander may not be premised upon a statement of opinion as opposed to
a statement of fact.
20. Slander per se does not arise from the alleged statement made by the defendant.
21. The plaintiffs have failed to allege actual damages as having been incurred.
22. The purported statement made to a police officer is a privileged communication.
23. Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts which would overcome the privileged nature of
the purported statement.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, requests that the complaint be dismissed with
prejudice and she be awarded her costs, expenses and attorney fees.
Respectfully submitted,
O'BRIEN, BARIC & S RER
David A. Baric, Esquire
1D#44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-6873
VERIFICATION
I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Preliminary Objections are true and correct
to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are
made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
David A. Baric, Esquire
DATED: 7 ??
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiff's,
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July /3 , 1999, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien, Baric &
Scherer, did serve the Preliminary Objections, by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the party
listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
David A. Baric, Esquire
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ATTORNEYS ATLAW LAW
POS I OErIGE Box 825
HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17108-0825
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V. NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
AND NOW, come Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles and Brendan J.
Knowles, by and through their attorneys, Latsha Davis & Yohe, P.C., and file this
Answer and in support thereof state as follows:
1. Denied as stated. Plaintiffs John E. Knowles and Joanne Knowles are the
natural parents of Plaintiff Brendan J. Knowles.
2. The averment of this paragraph attempts to paraphrase Paragraph No. 9
of the Complaint, which document speaks for itself.
3. The averment of this paragraph attempts to paraphrase Paragraph No. 9
of the Complaint, which document speaks for itself.
4. Admitted.
5. Denied. The Complaint specifically states that a civil action has been
brought against Defendant.
l
6. The averment of this paragraph attempts to paraphrase Paragraph No. 18
of the Complaint, which document speaks for itself.
I. Failure Of Complaint To Conform To Law Or Rule Of Court
7. No responsive pleading is required to this paragraph.
8. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
9. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
10. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
11. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
12. Denied. The statement which is referenced and identified by Exhibit "A"
to the Complaint specifically identifies that Officer Steigleman received and reported
the defamatory statement of Defendant Bucher.
13. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
14. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
15. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
4`1177.1
16. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
II. Demurrer
17. No responsive pleading is required to this paragraph.
18. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required. To the extent that a responsive pleading is
required, the averment is denied. Defendant Bucher's statement to the police was made
with malice with the intention of causing Plaintiff Brendan J. Knowles harm. Moreover,
her statement, especially in light of her past position as a township supervisor and
employer of the police, was made with the purpose of improperly influencing their
opinion of Plaintiff Brendan J. Knowles.
19. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
20. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
21. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
22. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
23. The averments of this paragraph purport to be conclusions of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
49177.1
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles and Brendan J.
Knowles, respectfully request that the Preliminary Objections be dismissed and that
Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, be directed to answer the Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
LATSHA DAVIS & YOHE, P.C.
By Glenn R. Davis, Esq.
Attorney I. D. No. 31040
P. O. Box 825
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0825
(717) 761-1880
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles,
Joanne Knowles and Brendan J. Knowles
49177.1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Answer to Defendant's Preliminary Objections was served via first-class
United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
David A. Baric, Esq.
O'Brien Baric & Scherer
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Dated: l 2
Glenn R. Davis
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
AND NOW, COMES, the Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles and
Brendan J. Knowles, by and through their attorneys, Latsha Davis & Yohe, P.C., and
files this brief in opposition to Defendant's preliminary objections.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter was commenced by the filing of a complaint on June 25, 1999,
alleging defamation. On or about July 13,1999, Defendant filed preliminary objections
which are the subject of the instant brief.
II. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are the former neighbors of Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, who, .tpon
information and belief moved from the marital residence of her then husband, Robert
W. Bucher, in the time period of fall/winter 1998.
Bucher, a former supervisor of Silver Spring Township, along with her then
husband, became the defendant in a weeds ordinance prosecution by Silver Spring
Township in October/ November 1998 on a complaint by the Knowleses. One day prior
to the scheduled hearing on that matter, Defendant Bucher called the Silver Spring
Township Police Department to inform them that the Plaintiffs' dog, a Brittany spaniel,
was in her field "pooping." See Complaint, Exh. "A."
At the end of Bucher's criminal report to the Silver Spring Township Police
Department, she gratuitously stated that the "Knowles teenage boy was the type to take
a machine gun to school and start shooting." It is that statement which is the subject of
the instant complaint.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiffs Did Not Limit Their Complaint
To Only Slander Per Se.
In its Complaint Plaintiffs did not limit themselves to slander per se; this theory
was merely one of many relied upon by Plaintiffs. It should be clear from the
Complaint that Plaintiffs were also alleging actual slander as well as slander per se see
Complaint, Para. 2). In addition, Plaintiffs met their burden for pleading defamation, as
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains averments that (1) the communication was defamatory;
(2) the communication pertained to the Plaintiff Brendan Knowles; (3) the
communication was published by Defendant to a third-party, Detective Dale E.
Sabadish ("Sabadish") of the Silver Spring Township Police Department; (4) the third-
party understood that the communication pertained to the Plaintiff Brendan Knowles
50876.1 2
and that the communication had defamatory meaning; and (5) the communication
resulted in Plaintiffs' injury. See Tuman v. Genesis Assoc. 894 F.Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa.
1995); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343(a).
B. Defendant's Defamatory Statement Was Not Opinion
And As Such Plaintiffs Have Stated A Cause Of Action.
Defendant claims that her statement to the Silver Spring Township Police
Department that the Plaintiff Brendan Knowles was "the type to take a machine gun to
school and start shooting" was only an opinion, and that therefore Plaintiffs have not
stated a cause of action. It is highly illogical to believe that Defendant, as a former
supervisor of Silver Spring Township, called the township police department in order
to opine about possible criminal behavior. Moreover, her former position as a township
supervisor was intended to and did give credit to the utterances and charges made by
her. However, even assuming arguendo that her statement was an opinion, Plaintiffs
have still stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
Defendant is correct in her assertion that the United States Supreme Court has
concluded that statements of opinion, without more, are not actionable. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch. Inc 418 U.S. 323,340 (1974). It is also true that the Pennsylvania
Superior Court has stated the same. See Elia v. Erie Insur. E430 Pa. Super. 384,
634 A.2d 657, 658 (1993). However, Defendant fails to realize and therefore represent to
this Court that the Pennsylvania Superior Court has also stated that a statement of
opinion can be defamatory and actionable "if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." See Braig v. Field Communications, 310
50876.1
Pa. Super. 569, 580, 456 A.2d 1366,1372-73 (1983) (adopting § 566 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts). This "mixed-type" of opinion is one which, "while an opinion in
form or context, is apparently based on facts regarding the plaintiff or his conduct that
have not been stated by the defendant or assumed to exist by the parties to the
communication." Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566). In her statement to
the police department, Defendant did not express an opinion based on disclosed or
assumed nondefamatory facts, which is the "pure" expression of opinion that is
absolutely privileged. See id. Instead, her statement implied the assertion of the
existence of undisclosed facts about the Plaintiff Brendan Knowles that must be
defamatory in character to justify the opinion. See id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 566, cmt. c); see also Beckman v. Dunn. 276 Pa. Super. 527,419 A.2d 583,587
(1980). Therefore, even if Defendant claims that her statement was merely an opinion,
Plaintiffs have still stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
C. Defendant's Claim Of Privilege Does Not
Apply To Her Statements.
Defendant also claims that if her statement is defamatory, then the statement is
not actionable because it was made subject to a privilege. See Chicarella v. Passant. 343
Pa. Super. 330, 337,494 A.2d 1109, 1112-13 (1985). Defendant appears to base this
argument on the fact that she was speaking to a police officer. However, in order for
the privilege to apply, the communications must be made on a proper occasion, from a
proper motive, in a proper manner, and based upon reasonable cause. See id. In the
instant case, Defendant's statement was obviously not made from a proper motive or
50876.1
based upon reasonable cause. First, Defendant called the Silver Spring Police
Department to report that Plaintiffs' dog was "pooping" on her property; she then
offered the statement that Plaintiff Brendan Knowles was the type of boy "to take a
machine gun to school and start shooting." This gratuitous statement did not arise from
a proper motive. Second, Defendant did not base her statement upon reasonable cause;
Plaintiff Brendan Knowles has never owned nor has he ever taken a machine gun,
weapon, bomb or firearm to school. Moreover, Defendant knows little of Plaintiff
Brendan Knowles' personal character to even be able to comment on his manners let
alone know his taking a machine gun to school. Therefore, it is highly suspect that she
could have based her statement upon "reasonable cause."
Even assuming arguendo that a conditional privilege applies to this statement,
Defendant has abused that privilege. The publication of her statement was (1) actuated
by malice or negligence; (2) made for a purpose other than that for which the privilege
is given; and (3) includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose. See Beckman v. Dunn. 276 Pa. Super. 527, 537, 419
A.2d 587,588 (1980). Defendant's purpose in making the phone call to the Silver Spring
Police Department was to report the Plaintiffs' dog "pooping" in her yard. Defendant's
calculated and gratuitous statement regarding Plaintiff Brendan Knowles contains
defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose of reporting the dog, and it was made with actual malice to harm the
reputation of Plaintiff Brendan Knowles. Defendant made this statement at a time
when she knew or calculated recent events in the national news had made police ultra
5087fi.1
sensitive to such claims. Her defamatory statement was calculated by her to result in
the waste of valuable police investigatory resources and to do harm to the reputation of
Plaintiff Brendan Knowles. Therefore, even if a conditional privilege existed, Defendant
abused such a privilege.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary objections of Defendant, Maribeth
Bucher, should be denied and she should be directed to file an answer within twenty
(20) days.
Respectfully submitted,
LATSHA DAVIS & YOHE, P.C.
Dated: r':? By- GQ?"
Glenn R. Davis, Esq.
Attorney I. D. No. 31040
P. O. Box 825
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0825
(717) 761-1880
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles,
Joanne Knowles and Brendan J. Knowles
50876.1 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendant's Preliminary Objections was
served via first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
David A. Baric, Esq.
O'Brien Baric & Scherer
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Dated: 10 0?Q9 CC-LQcdO
Glenn R. Davis
SHERIFF'S RETURN - REGULAR
CASE NO: 1999-03893 P
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
KNOWLES JOHN E ET AL
VS.
BUCHER MARIBETH
SHANNON SUNDAY , Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of
CUMBERLAND County, Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according
to law, says, the within NOTICE AND COMPLAINT was served
upon BUCHER MARIBETH the
defendant, at 10:07 HOURS, on the 1st day of July
1999 at 23 SKYLINE DRIVE
MECHANICSBURG, PA 17055 CUMBERLAND
County, Pennsylvania, by handing to MARIBETH BUCHER
a true and attested copy of the NOTICE AND COMPLAINT
and at the same time directing Her attention to the contents thereof.
Sheriff's Costs: So answers:
Docketing
Service
Affidavit 18.00
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Surcharge 8.00 R`I omas xli e,?5 eri
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Sworn and subscribed to before me
this ,Z,...et day of
19-Q,7 A.D./
rocnonotary
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
NOTICE TO PLEAD
TO: Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
You are hereby notified that you have twenty (20) days in which to plead to the enclosed
Answer And New Matter Of Defendant or a Default Judgment may be entered against you.
Date:
4:0':BRIEN, SARI CHERER
David A. Banc, Esquire
I.D. #44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-6873
sal
?a.s
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs,
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL
ANSWER AND NEW MATTER OF DEFENDANT
AND NOW, comes defendant, Maribeth Bucher, by and through her attorneys, O'BRIEN,
BARIC & SCHERER, and files this Answer and New Matter and, in support thereof, sets forth
the following:
I. After reasonable investigation, Maribeth Bucher is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of to these averments and they are, therefore,
denied.
2• Admitted.
3. Denied. To the contrary, upon information and belief, Brendan Knowles did
assault another individual while a student in the Cumberland Valley School District.
4. Denied. Maribeth Bucher incorporates here answer to paragraph 3.
5. After reasonable investigation, Maribeth Bucher is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these averments and they are, therefore,
denied.
6. After reasonable investigation, Maribeth Bucher is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these averments and they are, therefore,
denied.
After reasonable investigation, Maribeth Bucher is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these averments and they are, therefore,
denied.
8. After reasonable investigation, Maribeth Bucher is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these averments and they are, therefore,
denied.
9. To the extent that these averments constitute conclusions of law, no response is
required. To the extent a response may be required, it is admitted that Maribeth Bucher spoke
with Detective Sabadish of the Silver Spring Township Police Department on or about November
4, 1998. The remaining averments are denied. By way of additional answer, Maribeth Bucher
never intended to place Plaintiff into "disrepute' amongst neighbors, fellow students or other
members of the community.
10. After reasonable investigation, Maribeth Bucher is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these averments and they are, therefore,
denied.
11. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that on or about November 4,
1998, Maribeth Bucher had a conversation with Detective Sabadish of the Silver Spring Police
department. It is further admitted that, at least in part, during that conversation, Maribeth Bucher
reported to Detective Sabadish that the dog of the Plaintiffs was on her property excreting. To
the extent these averments attempt to characterize the entire conversation, the averments are
denied.
12. After reasonable investigation, Maribeth Bucher is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these averments and they are, therefore,
denied.
13. After reasonable investigation, Maribeth Bucher is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these averments and they are, therefore,
denied.
14. Denied. By way of further answer, the plaintiff's dog was excreting onto the
property of Maribeth Bucher. Moreover, Maribeth Bucher was aware of facts and/or information
from which she formed an opinion regarding the mental characteristics and/or violent propensities
of plaintiff, Brendan Knowles, and actions of Brendan Knowles' guardians which were of concem
to Maribeth Bucher.
15. Maribeth Bucher denies the allegations as set forth only because they don't make
sense and are so vague and ambiguous as to not be decipherable for purposes of fact pleading.
16. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Maribeth Bucher was, at
one point in time, a Supervisor for Silver Spring Township. The remaining averments are denied
as they reflect allegations of the state of mind of other individuals which could not possibly be
answered by Maribeth Bucher.
17. Denied. By way of further answer, Maribeth Bucher took no step, action or
initiative which could possibly have brought Brendan Knowles' name before his peers, fellow
students, administrators at the Cumberland Valley School District or otherwise. It is denied that
any action of Maribeth Bucher has caused Brendan Knowles any compensable injury or caused
him to be "suspected" of alleged or purported acts.
18. Denied. To the extent these averments constitute conclusions of law, no response
is required. By way of further answer, the alleged statements are not actionable as slander per se.
19. Denied. To the contrary, Maribeth Bucher offered to Detective Sabadish only
Maribeth Bucher's opinion regarding Brendan Knowles based upon actions and activities
undertaken by Brendan Knowles and his guardians prior to November 4, 1998.
20. Denied. It is denied that Maribeth Bucher made any "false, misleading, and
malicious statements". It is further denied that any act of Maribeth Bucher has caused Brendan
Knowles to suffer any compensable damage or which could reasonably be expected to occur
concerning his name and/or reputation.
21. Denied. To the extent these averments constitute conclusions of law, no response
is required. To the extent a response may be required, it is denied that any action of Maribeth
Bucher was the direct or proximate result of any injuries to Brendan Knowles and, further, it is
denied that Brendan Knowles has been damaged, injured or otherwise harmed.
22. Denied. By way of further answer, Brendan Knowles has not been prevented from
any educational and/or occupational opportunities by any act of Maribeth Bucher.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, respectfully requests that judgment be
entered in her favor and against Plaintiffs together with costs and expenses of this action.
NEW MATTER
23. Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a cause of action.
24. Plaintiff has incurred no injury or damage.
25. If the plaintiff has been injured or damaged, said injury or damage was not
proximately or directly caused by any act of Maribeth Bucher.
26. The alleged statement as presented by Plaintiffs' is a statement of opinion for
which a cause of action in slander will not lie.
27. No reasonable person could have assumed the existence of nondisclosed
defamatory facts from the statement allegedly made by Maribeth Bucher.
28. Any statements made by Maribeth Bucher to Detective Sabadish were fair
comment.
29. Maribeth Bucher was justified in making statements to Detective Sabadish.
30. Any statements made by Maribeth Bucher to Detective Sabadish were privileged
as statements made by a citizen to a police officer.
31. John Knowles was found to have been in violation of the zoning ordinances of
Silver Spring Township for operating a business at his residence on Wheatland Drive.
32. John Knowles did, thereafter, set about upon a course to harass, intimidate and
injure all present and past neighbors on Wheatland Drive whom, he apparently has concluded, had
anything to do with the zoning issues raised for his residence.
33. John Knowles, Joanne Knowles and their children have initiated a host of lawsuits
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County against neighbors, former neighbors and
the township of Silver Spring.
34. Prior to November 4, 1998, Maribeth Bucher was aware that Brendan Knowles
had attacked another minor, Keith Faulkner, at school.
35. Prior to November 4, 1998, Maribeth Bucher was aware that Brendan Knowles
had harassed and intimidated Maribeth Bucher's daughters.
36. Maribeth Bucher was aware that John Knowles had come to her former residence
when she was not present and he had verbally intimidated her daughters.
37. Prior to November 4, 1998, John Knowles accused Maribeth Bucher's daughters
of allegedly harassing Christy Knowles which led to an investigation by the Silver Spring police
department with no finding of any such harassment or chargeable offense having occurred.
38. Upon information and belief, Brendan Knowles has entered into a course of study
at Pennsylvania State University.
39. Brendan Knowles is no longer a minor.
40. The statement allegedly made by Maribeth Bucher was not communicated by her
to any peers of Brendan Knowles, any member of the Cumberland Valley school administration or
fellow students of Brendan Knowles.
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that judgment be entered in her favor and against
plaintiff's together with costs and expenses.
Respectfully submitted,
O'BRIEN,BBARIC SCHERER
,
David A. Baric, Esquire
I.D. # 44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-6873
dab.di r/litigatioNbucher/docu men t/answer.new
VERIFICATION
I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Answer and New Matter of Defendant are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 1 understand that false
statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904, relating to unsworn
falsification to authorities.
Mar th Bucher
DATED: 2 I? rV
CERTIFICATE 017 SERVICE
I hereby certify that on Februa /Y ' /
February , 2000, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien,
Baric & Scherer, did serve the Answer and New Matter of Defendant , by first class U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
David A. Baric, Esquire
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V. NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO NEW MATTER
AND NOW, comes Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles and Brendan J.
Knowles, by and through their attorneys, LATSHA DAVIS & YOHE, P.C., and file this
Answer to New Matter, and as such provide as follows:
23. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
24. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required. To the extent that a response is deemed
necessary, Plaintiff, Brendan J. Knowles, specifically denies that he has not incurred
injuries or damages as a result of Defendant's negligence and willful misconduct.
25. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required. To the extent that a response is deemed
necessary, it is specifically denied that Plaintiff, Brendan J. Knowles', injuries and
L
damages were not proximately caused by the negligence and willful misconduct of
Defendant.
26. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
27. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
28. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
29. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
30. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
31. Admitted.
32. Denied. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff John E. Knowles has ever
attempted to injure "all present and past neighbors on Wheatland Drive. "
33. Denied as stated. The identified parties are involved in one (1) lawsuit in
the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County. Answering Plaintiffs are otherwise
unable to address the meaning of a "host" of lawsuits.
34. Denied. After reasonable investigation Plaintiffs are without knowledge
or information to form a belief as to the truth of the averment of Defendant. By way of
further answer, Plaintiff Brendan J. Knowles and Keith Faulkner were involved in an
altercation while attending school.
55124.1
2
35. Denied. After reasonable investigation Plaintiffs are without knowledge
or information to form a belief as to the truth of the averment of Defendant. By way of
further answer, Plaintiff Brendan J. Knowles has never harassed and intimidated
Defendant's daughters.
36. Denied. After reasonable investigation Plaintiffs are without knowledge
or information to form a belief as to the truth of the averment of Defendant. By way of
further answer, Plaintiff John E. Knowles has never gone to Defendant's residence and
verbally intimidated Defendant's daughters. Moreover, Defendant specifically states
she was not present.
37. The averments in this paragraph constitute a characterization of written
documents, which written documents speak for themselves.
38. Admitted.
39. Admitted.
40. Denied. It is specifically denied that the statement that Defendant made
to Detective Sabadish was not also communicated by Defendant to "any peers of
Plaintiff Brendan J. Knowles, any member of the Cumberland Valley school
administration, or fellow students of Brendan Knowles." To the contrary, upon
information and belief, Defendant did convey as such to Plaintiff, Brendan J. Knowles',
peers, fellow students, and members of Cumberland Valley's school administration.
55124.1
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor and against Defendant,
as well as attorneys fees and costs.
Respectfully submitted,
LATSHA DAVIS & YOHE, P.C.
Dated: By:
Glenn R. Davis
Attorney I.D. No. 31040
Chadwick O. Bogar
Attorney I.D. No. 83755
P. O. Box 825
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0825
Attorney for Plaintiff, John E. Knowles,
Joanne Knowles and Brendan J. Knowles
55124.1
MAR-16-00 04:30 PM IMPACT
i
FROM IlnTM 1AVIS 6 YOW.P.c.
7177955422
P.01
(717) 761.2296 1900 03-16 16W2 0199 P.06/07
VERMCAT1oN
The undersigned hereby veti4es that the statements of fact in the foregoing are
true and eorr#ct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. T understand that
any false statements therein are subject to the penalties contained in 1S Pe. C. S. § 4904,
telsting to unswom falsification to authorities,
??++ 7 gowles
1?
MAR-16-00 04:30 PM IMPACT
i
PROM IMSWA DAVI9 8 YOK.P.c. (717) 761.2296
VE mcAnoN
7177955422
P.01
190003.16 16it12 0199 P,06/07
The undersigned hereby verifies that the statements of fact in the foregoing are
true and correct to the beat of my knowledge, information and belief. t understand that
any false statements therein are subject to the penalties contained in 18 Pa. C. S. § 4904,
relating b) unworn falsification to authorities.
Dated:
T ""` 7 owles
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Plaintiff's Answer To New Matter was served via first-class United States
mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
David A. Baric, Esq.
O'Brien Baric & Scherer
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Dated: 7 0
Chadwick O. Bogar
Cl
C
i.
L ?
IaTSHa Davis
&YOHE, P.C. ?, .
ATTORNEYS AT LAW \
POST OFRCT. Box 825
HARIUSRURO, PT.NNSYLVANIA 17108-0825 _
I
t
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V. NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
RULE TO SHOW CAUSEQ
AND NOW, this ; -V4 day of M ""rte 2000, upon
consideration of the foregoing motion, it is hereby ORDERED that:
A rule is issued upon the defendant to show cause why the movant is not
entitled to the relief requested;
2. The Defendant shall file an Answer to Plaintiff's Motion To Determine
Sufficiency Of Objections by I ay , 2000;
3. The Motion shall be decided under Pa. R.C.P. No. 206.7; and
4. Notice of the Entry of this Order shall be provided to all parties by the
movant.
BY THE CO T
J• ,
x.00
rc r... ... 40Y
J
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V. NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of 2000, upon
consideration of Plaintiff's Motion To Determine Sufficiency Of Objections it is hereby
ORDERED and DECREED that said Motion is GRANTED.
Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff's possession full and complete responses to
Plaintiff's Request For Admissions by close of business on
2000. Defendant is further cautioned that failure to comply with this Order will result
in further sanctions, including, but not limited to, attorney's fees for filing subsequent
motions, and a prohibition against presenting evidence on her behalf, upon application
to the Court.
BY THE COURT
J.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V. NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
MOTION TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENCY OF OBIECTIONS
PURSUANT TO PA. R.C.P. 4014(C)
AND NOW, come Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles, and Brendan J.
Knowles, by and through their attorneys, LATSHA DAVIS & YOHE, P.C., and present
this Motion and aver and follows:
On or about September 8,1999, Plaintiffs propounded upon Defendant
Request for Admissions under Pa. R.C.P. 4014. A true and correct copy is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A."
2. On or about September 28, 1999, Defendant propounded upon Plaintiffs
answers and objections to their Request for Admissions. A true and correct copy is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
3. Plaintiffs' Request for Admission No. 2 reads: "Admit that during the
November 4, 1998, complaint conversation with Detective Dale E. Sabadish you stated
that the Knowleses' teenage boy was the type to take a machine gun to school and start
shooting."
4. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 2 reads: "Objection.
This request is vague, ambiguous and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. By way of additional response, what is a 'complaint
conversation'?"
5. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 2 is insufficient.
Contrary to Defendant's assertion, Admission No. 2 is not vague or ambiguous.
Actually, the question could not be any more clear. A specific date is given, a specific
conversation is referenced, the parties to the conversation are specifically identified, and
what Plaintiffs believe was said during the conversation is specifically set forth.
Moreover, in response to Admissions Nos. 1 and 4, Defendant specifically admitted to
having a telephone conversation with Detective Sabadish on November 4, 1998, at
approximately 4:50 p.m. Additionally, Defendant's contention that she is unaware
"what ... a 'complaint conversation"' is ironic in light of the fact that she admitted, in
responding to Admission No. 4, that "during the November 4, 1998, complaint
conversation with Detective Dale E. Sabadish you complained that the Knowleses' dog
was in your field 'pooping."' Defendant's remaining objections are inapplicable.
6. Plaintiffs' Request for Admission No. 3 reads: "Admit that you discussed
the context of your conversation as set forth in Paragraph No. 2 [i.e., Request for
Admission No. 21 with Mrs. Anastasia Faulkner."
55042.1
Defendant's Answer to Request Admission No. 3 reads: "Objection. This
request does not relate to relevant evidence in this matter nor is it reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in violation of Pa. R.C.P. 4014(x). "
8. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 3 is insufficient. It is
horn book law that to maintain a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant conveyed the allegedly defamatory statement to a third
person. Therefore, whether Defendant conveyed to her neighbor and friend, Mrs.
Anastasia Faulkner, that Plaintiff Brendan J. Knowles was "the type to take a machine
gun to school and start shooting" is highly relevant to these proceedings. Defendant's
remaining objections are inapplicable.
9. Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 5 reads: "Admit that the field in
which you allege the Knowleses' dog was'pooping' was the subject of a township weed
ordinance prosecution against you for failure to mow the vegetation which had grown
to a length in violation of the township ordinance."
10. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 5 reads: "Objection.
This request does not relate to relevant evidence in this matter nor is it reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in violation of Pa.R.C.P."
11. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 5 is insufficient.
Defendant's motivation behind calling the police on November 4,1998, is clearly
relevant to these proceedings. The purpose of Admission No. 5 is to establish that
Defendant called the police and made the above-quoted defamatory statement about
Plaintiff Brendan J. Knowles because she was attempting to retaliate against the
55042.1
Plaintiffs for having notified the township that Defendant was in violation of the weed
ordinance. If Plaintiffs establish that Defendant's defamatory statement was motivated
by malice or vengeance, they would be entitled to punitive damages. Defendant's
remaining objections are inapplicable.
12. Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 6 reads: "Admit that you had not
mowed the vegetation in the field at the time of the alleged incident concerning the
Knowleses' dog which you were reporting on November 4,1998."
13. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 6 reads: "Objection.
This request does not relate to relevant evidence in this matter nor is it reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in violation of Pa. R.C.P.
4014(a)."
14. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 6 is insufficient. The
purpose of this admission, as well as Admission No. 7, is to show that Defendant's
telephone call to the police was a mere pretext for her true motivation, which was to
retaliate against the Knowles family for having informed the township that Defendant's
field was in violation of the weed ordinance. Once again, the purpose of this admission
is to show that Defendant's phone call to the police was motivated by malice, thereby
entitling the Plaintiffs to punitive damages. Defendant's remaining objections are
inapplicable.
15. Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 7 reads: "Admit that you were not
within 200 yards of the dog while the alleged incident of 'pooping' was occurring."
55042.1
16. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 7 reads: "Objection.
This request does not relate to relevant evidence in this matter nor is it reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in violation of Pa. R.C.P.
4014(a)."
17. Defendant's Answer to Request for Admission No. 7 is insufficient. The
purpose of this admission, like Admission No. 7, is to show that Defendant's motivation
for calling the police on the day in question was malicious. If Plaintiffs prove this
through direct and/or circumstantial evidence, they would be entitled to punitive
damages. Defendant's remaining objections are inapplicable.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Honorable Court to enter an
Order requiring Defendant to provide sufficient responses to Request for Admissions
Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7, within ten (10) days of the receipt of the Order.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: 3,/\q ?2,-,n
55012.1
LATSHA DAVIS & YOHE, P.C.
Glenn R. Davis
Attorney I.D. No. 31040
Chadwick O. Bogar
Attorney I.D. No. 83755
P. O. Box 825
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0825
Attorney for Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles,
Joanne Knowles and Brendan J. Knowles
EXHIBIT "A"
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA SEP 2 9 19gg
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
ANSWERS AND OBJECTIONS TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION
NOW, comes Defendant, Maribeth Bucher, by and through her attorneys, O'BRIEN,
BARIC & SCHERER, and files the within answers and objections to the Request for Admission
propounded by plaintiffs:
1. Admitted.
2. Objection. This request is vague, ambiguous and not reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. By way of additional response, what is a "complaint
conversation"?
3. Objection. This request is vague, ambiguous and not reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. By way of additional response, what is the "context" as
referred to and what is a "complaint conversation"?
4. Admitted.
5. Objection. This request does not relate to relevant evidence in this matter nor is it
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in violation of Pa.RC.P.
4014 (a).
L
6. Objection. This request does not relate to relevant evidence in this matter nor is it
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in violation of Pa.R.C.P.
4014 (a).
7. Objection. This request does not relate to relevant evidence in this matter nor is it
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in violation of Pa.R.C.P.
4014 (a).
8. Denied.
9. Denied.
10. Not applicable. Defendant incorporates by reference the answers to request nos. 8
and 9.
11. Admitted only that Defendant was not present when Joanne Knowles perpetrated
these acts. The remaining averments are denied.
12. Admitted only that District Justice Placey so found. It is denied that this finding
was correct or supported by the evidence or law.
13. Denied as stated. It is admitted only that on June 2, 1998, Maribeth Bucher
telephoned the Silver Spring Township Police . The remaining averments are denied.
Respectfully submitted,
ABRIEN , BARIC & SC R
David A. Baric, Esquire
I.D. # 44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-6873
VERIFICATION
I verify that statements made in the foregoing Answers and Objections to
Request for Admission are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein
are made subject to the penalties of 18 PA. C.S. Section 4904, relating to unswom
falsification to authorities.
`Wa it 6cg-, Sut• ka,
MARIBETH BUCHER
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 28, 1999, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien, Baric
& Scherer, did serve the Answers and Objections To Request For Admissions, by first class U.S.
mail, postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
?V?c? (I "
David A. Baric, Esquire
EXHIBIT "B"
I ¦
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOT NrLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. I:.NOINIES,
Plaintiffs
?•, NO. 99-389-3
CIVIL ACTION - LAIN'
MAP.IBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRLAL DE1 UVNDED
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS UNDER PA. R.C.P. NO. 4014
TO: Maribeth Bucher
c/o David A. Baric, Esq.
O'Brien Baric & Scherer
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
You are hereby requested to admit, for purposes of this action only, pursuant to
Pa. R.C.P. No. 4014, the following:
1. Admit that on November 4,199S, at approximately 4:30 p.m., you placed a
telephone call or otherwise communicated with Silver Spring Township Police
Department, speaking %vith Detective Dale E. Sabadish.
3. Admit that during the November 4, 1995, complaint conversation with
Detective Dale E. Sabadish you stated that the Knowleses' teenage boy was the type to
take a machine gun to school and start shooting.
3. Admit that you discussed the context of your complaint conversation as
set forth in Paragraph No. 2 with Mrs. Anastasia Faulkner.
4. Admit that during the November 4,199S, complaint conversation with
Detective Dale E. Sabadish you complained that the l nowleses' dog was in your field
"pooping."
5. Admit that the field in which you allege the Knowleses' dog was
"pooping" was the subject of a township weed ordinance prosecution against you for
failure to mow the vegetation which had grown to a length in violation of the township
ordinance.
6. Admit that you had not moved the vegetation in the field at the time of
the alleged incident concerning the Knowleses' dog which you were reporting on
November 4, 1998.
7. Admit that you were not within 300 yards of the dog while the alleged
incident of "pooping" was occurring.
S. Admit that you were the typist and/or author of the letter dated
December 12,1997, attached as Exhibit "A."
9. Admit that you signed the name which appears on the letter of December
12, 1997, which is attached as Exhibit "A."
10. Admit that you were not specifically authorized to sign the name which
appears on the letter of December 12,1997, attached as Exhibit "A."
11. Admit that you were not present and have no firsthand knowledge of the
events which are addressed in the letter of December 12,1997, attached as Exhibit "A."
50146.1 3
12. Admit that on or about November 5. 1995, District Justice Placey found
you and/or Dr. Robert W. Bucher, Jr., to be in violation of the trnynship weed control
ordinance.
13. Admit that on June 2,199S, you telephoned Silver Sn:in? Township police
and requested that charges be filed for trespass against iohn Knowles, alleging that he
had been on your property even though you had not seen him on your property.
You are directed to file an answer to this request Ln compliance with Pa. R.C.P.
No. 4014(b) within thirty (30) days after service of this request upon you.
LATSHA DA\'IS & 1'OHE. P.C.
Dated: Q/A_
Bye `cs l
Glenn 1. Davis, Esq.
Attorney I. D. No. 31040
P. O. Boa S25
Harrisburg, PA 1710S-0825
(717) 761-1880
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Tohn E. Knowles,
Joanne Knowles and Brendan J. Knowles
Sm4s.1
December 12, 1997
5:acev.
On December 8, !997 1 was decorating my house for Christmas. I was
hanging wTeaU:s on U,e pillars on U,e sides of my driveway, tallj;rg to Stacc%
1 aulkner as she sat in her car. .4611 of a sudden, wiU,out r
PrJVJCa ion my imitation or prJp
next door neigr,SJ . Joanne Knowles drove over to my e?.
S!oCked S:yce\ 5 car her %v! SJ zhe could not leave and proceeded to
harass So-11 m>self and 5:.acey Faulkner. When I asked her to leave, she
Sesame mre abusive avid she then stared to attack my professio &
abillies in a defarnato.y way. Joanne Knowles had a!so been previo:s!%
spreading de" ,atop' s_.ernen's about me. I once again told her tc Icavc.
She then drove her %an around U,e u,l-de-sac by my driveway. sopped oncc
again, then proceeded to verbally hats my two young daughters i IT and iii
a!so withoa; provocaUJ;:. as they had said nothing to her.
I have written ties s:a:ement free;)- and accurately as I wi:nessed it
nober? Lk duct's J:. ^i ?. .I '
/,7
1 `.
'J
Cr f' 2,S200
- C..
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Sufficiency of Objections was served via first-
class United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
David A. Baric, Esq.
O'Brien Baric & Scherer
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Dated: / 0(> lN?a C?f• c(?
Deborah A. Peterson
e,jQ
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7
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V I:.L ,? '1 99
1-? Wi
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Lair Offices
OBRIEN, /JAR/C & SCHERER
17 II'est .South .Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
Robert L. O'Brien
David A. Boric
Michael A. Scherer
Honorable Edward E. Guido
Cumberland County Courthouse
One Courthouse Square
Carlisle, Penn 'vani
s vBuo. 99-3893 Civil Term
Dear Judge Guido
April 19, 2000
(717) 249-6873
Pax (717) 249-5755
E-mail: obs(a.)abslaw.com
direct: dharic(alobslaw.com
Enclosed find a copy of a Rule To Show Cause issued by you on March 22, 2000.
Plaintiffs sought more specific responses to their Request For Admissions Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7.
Enclosed find a copy of the Supplemental Answers To Request For Admissions wherein
we are providing responses to requests nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7.
I would respectfully suggest that the Motion of Plaintiffs To Determine Sufficiency of
Objections has been rendered moot.
Very truly yours,
DAB/jl
Enc.
cc: Glenn Davis, Esquire
File
O'BRIEN, BARIC & SCHERER
(Awi X41.
David A. Baric, Esquire
dab.di r4 itigation/bucher/letters/gui do.l i r
&,YaHE, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
POST OFFICE BOX 82S
F' IARRISBURO,PENNSYLVANIA 17108-0825
XTnT4 E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
AND NOW, this
RULE TO SHOW CAUSEQ
;I; day of 2000, upon
consideration of the foregoing motion, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. A rule is issued upon the defendant to show cause why the movant is not
entitled to the relief requested;
2. The Defendant shall file an Answer to Plaintiff's Motion To Determine
Sufficiency Of Objections by /" ay 2000;
3. The Motion shall be decided under Pa. R.C.P. No. 206.7; and
4. Notice of the Entry of this Order shall be provided to all parties by the
movant.
BY THE CO T
J.
Ir. 7es'imony
seal eP Sun l'.! 'f; 6! L'I ?, hd.
as Y 4 o..
NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ry
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
r
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
2. Denied as stated. To the contrary, Maribeth Bucher recalls making the statement
of opinion as noted by Detective Sabadish on the complaint/dispatch form.
3. Denied.
5. Denied as stated. It is admitted that the Buchers received a notice of violation
from the township regarding a weed ordinance and paid a fine relating thereto. As of November
4, 1998, the property had been mowed.
6. Denied.
7. Denied.
Respectfully submitted,
O'BRIEN, BA?RIC & ERER
David A. Baric, Esquire
I.D. # 44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-6873
dab.dirllitigation/bucher/document/supplemental. ans
VERIFICATION
I verify that statements made in the foregoing Supplemental Answers and
Objections to Request for Admission are true and correct. I understand that false
statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 C.S. Section 4904, relating to
unsworn falsification to authorities.
MARIBETH BUCHER
DATE: 7 % o-v
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April /Ii , 2000, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of OBrien, Baric &
Scherer, did serve the Supplemental Answers To Request For Admissions, by first class U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
David A. Baric, Esquire
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
2. Denied as stated. To the contrary, Maribeth Bucher recalls making the statement
of opinion as noted by Detective Sabadish on the complaint/dispatch form.
3. Denied.
5. Denied as stated. It is admitted that the Buchers received a notice of violation
from the township regarding a weed ordinance and paid a fine relating thereto. As of November
4, 1998, the property had been mowed.
6. Denied.
Denied.
Respectfully submitted,
O'BRIEN, BAR[C & ERER
David A. Baric, Esquire
I.D. # 44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-6873
dab.d i r/litigation/bucher/document/su pplemental.ans
VERIFICATION
I verify that statements made in the foregoing Supplemental Answers and
Objections to Request for Admission are true and correct. I understand that false
statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 C.S. Section 4904, relating to
unsworn falsification to authorities.
-VViOA be71 C? uC e,A
MARIBETH BUCHER
DATE: ? 1 dD
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April /i , 2000, I, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien, Baric &
Scherer, did serve the Supplemental Answers To Request For Admissions, by first class U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
David A. Baric, Esquire
I
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE
KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
PRAECIPE TO ENTER EXHIBIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Please enter the attached letter as an Exhibit in Support Of Defendants Motion For
Summary Judgment filed in this matter on June 14, 2000.
Respectfully submitted,
O'BRIEN, BARIRI?C & SCHERER
David A. Baric, Esquire
I.D. # 44853
17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-6873
dab.di rflitigation/bucher/documents/cxhibit.pra
Lim Offices
O'BRIEN, BARIC & SCHERER
17 {Vest South Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
Robert L. O'Brien
David A. Boric
.1lichael.4. Scherer
(717) 249-6873
Fax (717) 249-5755
E-mail: obs@obslaw.com
direct: dbaric@obslaw.com
December 6. 1999
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis and Yohe
4720 Old Gettysburg Road, Suite 101
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055
RE:
Dear Mr. Davis:
Knowles v. Bucher
My client will not be available to be deposed in the above matter until the end of January
or early February, 2000.
I will produce Ms. Bucher for deposition here at my office at a mutually convenient time.
Please provide me with your availability.
Very truly yours,
DAB/jl
cc: aribeth Bucher
File
O'BRIEN, BARI SCHERER
?V
David A. Baric, Esquire
d ab. d i rA iti gation/bucher/letters/davit.it r
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 27, 2000, 1, David A. Baric, Esquire, of O'Brien, Baric
& Scherer, did serve the Praecipe To Enter Exhibit In Support Of Motion For Summary
Judgment, by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the party listed below, as follows:
Glenn R. Davis, Esquire
Latsha, Davis & Yohe, P.C.
P.O. Box 825
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0825
L Z-? I (I
David A. Baric, Esquire
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V. NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of , Defendant, Maribeth Burcher's, motion for
summary judgment is denied.
BY THE COURT
J.
58270.1
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN E. KNOWLES, JOANNE KNOWLES
and BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V. NO. 99-3893
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND NOW, COME Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles and Brendan J.
Knowles, by and through their attorneys, LATSHA DAVIS & YOHE, P.C., and file this
response to Defendant, Maribeth Bucher's, Motion for Summary Judgment, and as
such, present as follows:
1. Admitted.
2. Denied. The averments of this paragraph attempt to paraphrase
Paragraph No. 9 of the Complaint, which document speaks for itself.
3. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a characterization of
written documents, which written documents speak for themselves.
4. Admitted.
58271).1
5. Admitted. By way of further answer, this Court in its Opinion and Order
dated January 24, 2000, dismissed Defendant's Preliminary Objections in their entirety.
6. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a characterization of a
written document, which written document speaks for itself.
Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a characterization of a
written document, which written document speaks for itself.
8. Admitted.
9. Admitted.
10. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a characterization of a
written document, which written document speaks for itself.
11. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required. To the extent that an affirmative response is
required, Defendant's contention that whether a statement constitutes fact or opinion is
to be determined by the Court is not only inconsistent with this Court's Order and
Opinion, it is in direct contrast with Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3.
12. Denied. The averments of this paragraph constitute a conclusion of law to
which no responsive pleading is required.
WHEREFORE, based upon Defendant, Maribeth Bucher's, failure to buttress her
motion for summary judgment with facts of record other than oral testimony and the
allegations set forth in the pleadings, Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles, Joanne Knowles and
58270.1
Brendan J. Knowles', respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny Defendant's
motion.
LATSHA DAVIS & YORE, P.C.
Dated: 1 / I ( Zmoo By ,
Glenn R. Davis, Esq.
Attorney I. D. No. 31040
Chadwick O. Bogar
Attorney I.D. No. 83755
P. O. Box 825
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0825
(717) 761-1880
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, John E. Knowles,
Joanne Knowles and Brendan J. Knowles
58:70.1 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was served via first-
class United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
David A. Baric, Esq.
O'Brien Baric & Scherer
17 West South Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Dated: -7 1 ZcaO
Chadwick O. Bogar
5x270.1
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JOHN E. KNOWLES,
JOANNE KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
IN RE& DIRFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this a y101 day of JANUARY, 2000, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, Defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
are DENIED.
By the Caurt
Glen R. Davis, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
David A. Baric, Esquire
For the Defendant
Edward E. Guido, J.
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JOHN E. KNOWLES,
JOANNE KNOWLES and
BRENDAN J. KNOWLES,
Plaintiffs
V.
MARIBETH BUCHER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 99-3893 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
IN RE, DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
On June 25, 1999, the Plaintiffs filed the above civil action seeking damages
against the Defendant on a cause of action sounding in slander. On July 13, 1999, the
Defendant filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. She requests that we
dismiss Plaintiff s complaint on the following grounds:
1) The alleged defamatory statement was an expression of opinion and is not
actionable.
2) The statement is subject to a conditional privilege.
3) The complaint fails to allege special damages which are necessary to support
an action for slander.
There were other issues raised in Defendant's preliminary objections. However,
these issues were not briefed and are deemed to have been abandoned pursuant to Local
Rule 210-7.
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
This action was commenced by Plaintiffs John E. Knowles and Joanne Knowles
on behalf of their minor son Brendan Knowles,' (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff' or
"Brendan"). Brendan has received numerous awards for his academic achievements.2
Fie is active in several community service and charitable organizations.3 As a result of
his awards and achievements he was accepted as a student at the Pennsylvania State
University where he began attending classes in the fall of 1999."
On November 4, 1998, the Defendant called the Silver Spring Township Police
Department to complain that the Plaintiffs' dog was loose and "pooping" on her
property.5 She also told the police that she "thinks that the Knowles teenage boy was the
type to take a machine gun to school and start shooting .,,6
As a result of the above statement, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered damage to
his reputation,' as well as humiliation and embarrassment." He also alleges that he has
suffered financial detriment in the form of lost occupational and educational
opportunities.v
The standard to be applied to preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
was succinctly stated by our Supreme Court as follows:
A demurrer can only be sustained where the complaint is clearly
insufficient to establish the pleader's right to relief. For the purpose of
Complaint paragraph 1.
Complaint paragraphs 5 and 6.
' Complaint paragraph 7.
a Complaint paragraph 8.
6 Complaint Exhibit A.
6 Complaint Exhibit A.
r Complaint paragraph 17.
"Complaint paragraph 21.
v Complaint paragraph 22.
2
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
testing the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading a preliminary
objection in the nature of a demurrer admits as true all well-pleaded,
material, relevant facts, and every inference fairly deducible from those
facts.
Since the sustaining of a demurrer results in a denial of the pleader's claim
or a dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a
doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. (citations
omitted).
Allegheny County v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 372 490 A.2d 402 (1985). Applying
the above standard to the case at bar, we cannot sustain the demurrer.
Statement Of Opinion.
It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that statements of opinion,
without more, are not actionable. Beckman v. Dunn, 276 Pa. Super 527, 419 A.2d 583
(1980). However, there are certain circumstances where communicated opinions are
actionable. See Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super 569, 456 A.2d 1366
(1983) cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970, 104 S.Ct. 2341, 80 L.Ed 2d 816 (1984). The Blaig
Court adopted the Restatement (Second) Torts § 566 which provides:
Expression of Opinion.
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an
opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.
456 A.2d 1372.10 The Court went on to quote at length from comment b to Section 566
which sets forth two types of expression of opinion. The relevant portions of the
comment as quoted in Btalg are as follows:
There are two kinds of expressions of opinion. The simple expression of
opinion, or the pure type, occurs when the maker of the comment states
the facts on which he bases his opinion of the plaintiff and then expresses
m The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on Section 566 in Baker v Lafayette College, 516 Pa. 291, 532
A.2d 399 (1987).
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
a comment as to the plaintiffs conduct, qualifications or character ....
The second kind of expression of opinion, or the mixed type, is one which,
while an opinion in form or context, is apparently based on facts regarding
the plaintiff or his conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or
assumed to exist by the parties to the communication. Here the expression
of the opinion gives rise to the inference that there are undisclosed facts
that justify the forming of the opinion expressed by the defendant...
456 A.2d 1372-1373.11
The pure type of opinion is never actionable but the mixed type may be. Green
v. Mizner, 692 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super 1997). The Green court pointed out that a portion of
Comment c to Section 566 aptly summarizes the distinction as follows:
A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed
nondefamatorv facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no
matter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how
derogatory it is. But an expression of opinion that is not based on
disclosed or assumed facts and therefore implies that there are undisclosed
facts on which the opinion is based, is treated differently. The difference
lies in the effect upon the recipient of the communication. In the first
case, the communication itself indicates to him that there is no defamatory
factual statement. In the second, it does not, and if the recipient draws the
reasonable conclusion that the derogatory opinion expressed in the
comment must have been based on undisclosed defamatory facts, the
defendant is subject to liability.
692 A.2d 174.
It is clear from the allegations in the complaint that the statement in this case,
while clearly an expression of opinion, is of the mixed type. There were not any stated
or obviously assumed non-defamatory facts upon which the opinion was
based. It is clear that the opinion implies that there are undisclosed facts upon which it is
based. If the policeman to whom the statement was made drew a reasonable conclusion
that the derogatory opinion of Plaintiff was based upon defamatory facts, then the
" In addition to the expression of facts upon which the opinion is based, the "pure" type of opinion can
exists where it is clear that both parties to the communication know the facts upon which the opinion is
based. Malia v. Monchak, 543 A.2d 184 (Pa. Commonwealth 1988).
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
statement is actionable. Therefore, we cannot sustain the demurrer on the basis of the
statement being merely an expression of opinion.
Conditional Privilege.
The Defendant points out that the alleged statement was made only to a law enforcement
officer. Therefore, she argues, the statement was conditionally privileged. She further
argues that it is Plaintiffs burden to prove that the privilege was abused. We do not
agree.
In the first instance, Plaintiff has alleged that the statement was made with the
knowledge of its falsity and for a malicious purpose. Furthermore, the burden is on the
Defendant to establish the existence of a privileged occasion. First Lehigh Bank v.
Cowen, 700 A.2d 498 (Pa.Super 1997). 12 Once the existence of the privilege is
established the burden then shifts to the Plaintiff to establish an abuse of that privilege.
Id. 13 Whether the privilege is abused is a question for the jury. Id. Under those
circumstances, it would not be appropriate to sustain the demurrer.
Failure to Plead Special Damages.
"It is a general rule that defamatory words are not actionable, absent proof of
special damage." Baird v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 274, 285 A.2d 166, 171
(1971). See also Solosko v. Paxton, 383 Pa. 419, 119 A.2d 230 (1956). 42 Pa. C.S.A. §
8343(x)(6). "Special damage" has been defined by our courts as "monetary or out-of-
See also 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8343(b)(2).
' See also 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8343(x)(7).
5
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
pocket loss borne by the defamation." Walker v 'rand cl]lml Sanitation- Inc., 430 Pa.
Super 236, 634 A.2d 237, 241 (1993).
There is an exception to the general rule. In cases of slander per se a Plaintiff
need not establish pecuniary or economic loss. Walker v. Grand Central Sanitation. Inc.,
supra, 634 A.2d 237, 242. Fie need only establish that his reputation was actually
affected by the slander or that he suffered personal humiliation. Id. See also PelaEatti v.
Cohen, 370 Pa.Super 422, 536 A.2d 1337 (1988). Plaintiff alleges that the statement at
issue is slanderous per se. We disagree.
Slander per se is limited to statements which impute a criminal offense, a
loathsome disease, business misconduct or serious sexual misconduct. Chicarella v.
Passant, 343 Pa.Super 330, 494 A.2d 1109, (1985).14 In the instant case, Defendant's
alleged statement does not fall into any of those categories. While the statement
expresses an opinion that Plaintiff is capable of committing a criminal offense, it does not
impute that he has committed such an offense. Nor is it reasonable to believe that the
unarticulated facts supporting the opinion impute a criminal offense to Plaintiff. The
statements were made to a police officer in a small township where the Plaintiff is a
young high school student. If he had murdered anyone, or committed any other such
crime, there would have been no need for the Defendant to point it out to the police. The
statement was clearly referring to her opinion as to his character or mindset and not to
any criminal offenses.15
14 See also Restatement Torts (Second) 4 570 which is referred to in Chicarelle_ oant, supra.
is We have considered whether a mental illness which would allow someone to machine gun his classmates
might be considered a loathsome disease for purposes of slander per se. We are satisfied that it cannot.
Section 572 of the Restatement (Second) Torts defines the disease referred to in Section 570 as "an existing
venereal disease or other loathsome and communicable disease." (emphasis added). It is questionable
whether such a mental illness is a loathsome disease. However, there is no doubt that it is not
communicable.
99-3893 CIVIL TERM
However, even though the statement is not slanderous per se, Defendant's
demurrer must still be denied. The complaint clearly alleges that the Plaintiff has
sustained pecuniary loss in the form of lost occupational and educational opportunities.
If he is able to prove those special damages at trial, along with the abuse of a conditional
privilege and the officer's reasonable conclusion that Defendant's opinion was based
upon defamatory facts, he will be entitled to recover on his claim.
AND NOW, this 2412 day of JANUARY, 2000, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, Defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
are DENIED.
By the Court,
(s/ Edward Guido
Edward E. Guido, J.
Glen R. Davis, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
David A. Baric, Esquire
For the Defendant
:sld
PYS510 Cumberland County Prothonotary's Office Page 1
Civi l Case Inquiry
1999-03893 KNOWLES JOHN E ET AL (vs) BUCHER MARIBETH
Reference No..: Filed........: 6/25/1999
Case Ty e.....: COMPLAINT
N Time.........: 3:51
Judgme
...... : .00 Execution Date 0/00/0000
Judge Assigned: Jury Trial....
Disposed Desc.: Disosed Date. 0/00/0000
------------ Case Comments ---- --------- Higher Crt 1.:
Higher Crt 2.:
******************************** ************************************************
General Index Attorney Info
KNOWLES JOHN E PLAINTIFF DAVIS GLENN R
12 WHEATLAND DRIVE
MECHANICSBURG PA 17055
KNOWLES JOANNE PLAINTIFF DAVIS GLENN R
12 WHEEATLAND DRIVE
MECHANICSBURG PA 17055
KNOWLES BRENDAN J PLAINTIFF DAVIS GLENN R
12 WHEATLAND DRIVE
MECHANICSBURG PA 17055
BUCHER MARIBETH DEFENDANT BARIC DAVID A
23 SKYLINE DRIVE
MECHANICSBURG PA 17055
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* Date Entries
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V6/25/1999 COMPLAINT - CIVIL ACTION FIRST ENTRY - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
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v 7/02/1999 SHERIFF'S RETURN FILED
Litigant.: BUCHER MARIBETH
SERVED : 7/01/99 COMPL
Costs....: $30.96 Pd By: LATSHA, DAVIS & YOHE 07/02/1999
-------------------------------------------------------------------
y 7/08/1999 PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FOR DEFT BY DAVID A BARIC ESQ
-------------------------------------------------------------------
`'7/13/1999 PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------------------
V 8/03/1999 ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------------------
8/30/1999 PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT BY GLENN R DAVIS ESQ
DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO COMPLAINT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - LAST ENTRY - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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* Escrow Information
* Fees & Debits Be Bal P mts/Ad' End Bat
COMPLAINT 35.00 35.00 .00
TAX ON CMPLT 50 .50 .00
SETTLEMENT 5.00 5.00 .00
JCP FEE 5.00
--------------- 5.00
--------- --- .00
--------
45.50
45.50 -
.00
********************************************************************************
* End of Case Information
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