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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-06348. d s S?,F" } p7 s {a Y f s . ( ., , ? ? .. , t r ?1]Y4 w n h F I 1?4411 Y 1? 0 717 S ?? y s 1 r ,s a .2 t u . a f ff ? ? j i °A i S Yt Y c7* S``Y Z .1 ? ?s ?3 4 1 ?" ` .4 f ?, 3r g A NV t m Yy u r5 } Ali 9 ? Y '"x r 4k? .?t? ??q 1 ?` LL SfY :A ,y SY?S^ 4.N } 4.? SS}4 Y ^ ? Sr 1 u2? r . x r T : a? S Z >+4? ? St. S St'?Yv r i R r Y ?1 " x * r Y r ? r; .{t oj o + ti; t ^ ) e ? i h< i Y x t rt i ' r f A y• ; y n s? yid A y y M, a•- CASE NO: 1999-06348 P SHERIFF'S RETURN - REGULAR COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND GRANT ROSE A VS. PFARR WILLIAM ET AL CPL. MICHAEL BARRICK Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of CUMBERLAND County, Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according to law, says, the within WRIT OF SUMMONS was served upon PFARR VIOLET the defendant, at 12:03 HOURS, on the 20th day of October 1999 at 1810-C STERRETTS GAP AVE CARLISLE, PA 17013 CUMBERLAND , County, Pennsylvania, by handing to WILLIAM PFARR a true and attested copy of the WRIT OF SUMMONS and at the same time directing His attention to the contents thereof. Sheriff's Costs: So answers: Docketing 6.00 Affidavit .00 ?:?? -??? 1 Surcharge 8.00 W R-I1TaTITdB , -10/21%199I9CNIGHT & HUGHES ..? by Sworn and subscribed to before me this day of -i4n-' 19 A.D. ?,G rLUL CASE NO: 1999-06348 P SHERIFF'S RETURN - REGULAR COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND GRANT ROSE A VS. PFARR WILLIAM ET AL CPL. MICHAEL BARRICK Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of CUMBERLAND County, Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according to law, says, the within WRIT OF SUMMONS was served upon PFARR WILLIAM the defendant, at 12:03 HOURS, on the 20th day of October , 1999 at 1810-C STERETTS GAP AVE CARLISLE, PA 17013 CUMBERLAND , County, Pennsylvania, by handing to WILLIAM PFARR a true and attested copy of the WRIT OF SUMMONS , and at the same time directing His attention to the contents thereof. Sheriff's Costs: So answers Docketing 18.00 P Affidavit 3.00 Surcharge 8.00 , $9.10-10 21%1CKNIGHT & HU ES by Sworn and subscribed to before me this Cjtr? day of tD.,.?_P... 19qq A.D. V??? tl. L4 Goa F" 'Elk jb?l n tiY z y , r w f ? Y tl..1[ ? I•tl 4? i I tl j A • ? W ? , `?`(V? ??? yatl?y ii a, a w _. x b* p¢p? j?+j7 . ??a71 4 ' f fR f^we ? F ? f ya'?1y # I f?. J a4F{ wiSy a4 .? +r r V `: ROSE A. GRANT. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFF V. NO. 99. 1?, 3 C?4 CIVIL ACTION - LAW WILLIAM PFARR AND VIOLET PFARR, his wife, DEFENDANTS PRAECIPF FOR A WRIT OF SUNENIONS TO CURTIS R. LONG, PROTHONOTARY: Please enter my appearance on behalf of the plaintiff and issue a Writ of Summons ngainst the defendants, William Pfarr and Violet Pfarr. Please direct the Sheriff to serve the defendants as follows: Sir. William Pfarr Sts. Violet Pfarr 1810-C Sterretts Cap Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 Respectfully submitted, IR?1'IN, A1cKN}CII'1' & III,CIIES By: 60 West Pomfret Sure-i.-Carlisle. PA 17013 Date: October 18, 1999 (717) 249-2353 - Supreme Court I.D. No: 25476 To: Mr. William Pfarr and Ms. Violet f furr You are hereby notified that Rose A. Grant, the plaintiff, has commenced no action in trespass against you which you are required to defend or a default judgment may Ix entered against you. PROTIIONOTAR lip: 221121Y DF PU'1 Y Date:()c4 . lP , 1999 ROSE A. GRANT, Plaintiff V. WILLIAM PFARR AND VIOLET PFARR, his wife, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 99-6348 CIVIL TERM AND NOW, this 22nd day of October, 2002, upon consideration of a letter from Plaintiff's counsel, Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire, requesting that this case be stricken from the purge list, and no objection having been made in open court to the request, the Plaintiff's request is granted, the case is stricken from the purge list, and the case shall remain active. 4 Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire For the Plaintiff /William Pfarr and Violet Pfarr 7 1810-C Sterretts Gap Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 Defendants Court Administrator wcy a? - Ii -Iy -oa V 15)- By the Court, N.., , i ROSE A. GRANT, PLAINTIFF vs Case No. 1999-6348 WILLIAM PFARR and VIQLET PFARR, hie wife DEFENDANTS Stalentent of Intention to Proceed To the Court: ROSE A. GRANT intends to proceed with the above captioned mutter. Print Namc MARCUS A. McKNICHT, III Sign Name ?_W U? Dale: SEPTEMBER 23., 2-005 Attomeyfor PLAINTIFF Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment, 1. Hale ojeivil Procedure New Rule of civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govem the temmination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The termination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform statewide practice, preempting local rules. This rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v. Eagle, 551 Pa. 360,710 A.2d 1141 (1998) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case may be dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901." Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amended to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of mutters set forth in subdivision (a) of that rule continues to be applicable. 11 Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases front the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity, the course of the procedure is with the parties. If the panics do nut wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and "the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of course terminating the matter with prejudice for failure to prosecute." Ira party wishes to pursue the matter, he or she will file a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action has been terndnated If the action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been tcmtinated, that parry may proceed under Rulc230(d) for relief from the order of termination. An example of such an occurrence might be the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the filing of the petition to reinstate the action is important. If the petition is filed within thirty days of the entry of the order of termination on the docket, subdivision (dx2) provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period, subdivision (d)(3) requires that the plaintiff must make a show in to the court that the petition was promptly filed and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty- day period under subdivision (d)(2). B. Where the action has not been terminated An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the filing of a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggricxcd party may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2. t4 t ? f 1 LL- ? l1 r t? Gy ROSE A. GRANT, Plaintiff vs WILLIAM PFARR & VIOLET PFARR, Defendants Case No. 1999-6348 CIVIL TERM Statement of Intention to Proceed To the Court: ROSE A. GRANT Print Name MARCUS A. McKNIGHT, III intends to proceed with the above captioned matter. kf Sign Name , Date: OCTOBER 27, 2008 Attorney for PLAINTIFF Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment. 1. Rule of civil Procedure New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The termination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. Ncw Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform statewide practice, preempting local rules. This rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v. Eagle, 551 Pa. 360,710 A.2d 1104 (1998) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case may be dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901." Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amended to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of matters set forth in subdivision (a) of that rule continues to be applicable. II Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity, the course of the procedure is with the parties. If the parties do not wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and "the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of course terminating the matter with prejudice for failure to prosecute." If a party wishes to pursue the matter, he or she will file a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action has been terminated If the action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been terminated, that party may proceed under Rule230(d) for relief from the order of termination. An example of such an occurrence might be the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the filing of the petition to reinstate the action is important. If the petition is filed within thirty days of the entry of the order of termination on the docket, subdivision (d)(2) provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period, subdivision (d)(3) requires that the plaintiff must make a show in to the court that the petition was promptly filed and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty-day period under subdivision (d)(2). B. Where the action has not been terminated An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the filing of a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggrieved party may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2. CS ROSE GRANT, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. , CIVIL ACTION - LAW N0.1999 - 6348 CIVIL TERM'-: WILLIAM P D E~NDANT . ' N t•~; ~ ~ _ STATEMENT OF INTENTION TO PROCEED _ . TO THE COURT: Rose Grant, Plaintiff, intends to proceed with the above-captioned matter. Respectfully Submitted: IRWIN & McKNIGHT, P.C. 4Mar. Mc ght, III, Esq. #25476 m et Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Date: October 21, 2011 Rose A, Grant William Rfarr et. al To the Court: The Plaintiff Statennent of Intention to Proceed captioned matter. Print Name Marcus A. McKnight, III Sign Name Date: October 21, 2014 Attorney for Plaintiff Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment. 1. Rule of civil Procedure New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The termination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform statewide practice, preempting local rules. This rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v. Eagle, 551 Pa. 360,710 A.2d 1104 (1998) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case may be dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901." Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amended to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of matters set forth in subdivision (a) of that rule continues to be applicable. II Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity, the course of the procedure is with the parties. If the parties do not wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and "the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of course terminating the matter with prejudice for failure to prosecute." If a party wishes to pursue the matter, he or she will file a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action has been terminated If the action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been terminated, that party may proceed under Ru1e230(d) for relief from the order of termination. An example of such an occurrence might be the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the filing of the petition to reinstate the action is important. If the petition is filed within thirty days of the entry of the order of termination on the docket, subdivision (d)(2) provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty -day period, subdivision (d)(3) requires that the plaintiff must make a showing to the court that the petition was promptly filed and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty -day period under subdivision (d)(2). B. Where the action has not been terminated An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the filing of a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggrieved party may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2.