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Home My WebLink About99-06426.^ ?.3 LGN?'9 l s - L..s I s t ? f } 4 y _ ply" rv .. ? v ? S } t. s : S . ), k p db '? t '". d+ x f?? x' l M ? S YTJ \ 8 i 4 3 yl? YY a P {a h M1 9a t f it a` w { ,; A BEVERLY E. CI IARRON Plaintiff VS. LEO D. MARRON Dcfcndant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL. 19 IN DIVORCE STATUS SHEET DATE: In ACTIVITIES: Y/ )- v- 6T,t?2f- w"f IYE r o'Y Q, i' 0"1/ or t r Psi pA W4d . Nb MAO ?-- j,0' D,?' 0 ) 17 A- // /f7r 'Q1 C4f4??? 9e } r BEVERLY E. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Vs. NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN DIVORCE TO: Samuel L. Andes , Attorney for Plaintiff LeRoy Smigel Ann V. Levin , Attorneys for Defendant DATE: Monday, March 18, 2002 CERTIFICATION I certify that discovery is complete as to the claims for which the Master has been appointed. OR IF DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE: (a) Outline what information is required that is not complete in order to prepare the case for trial and indicate whether there are any outstanding interrogatories or discovery motions. (b) Provide approximate date when discovery will be complete and indicate what action is being taken to complete discovery. DATE COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF ( ) COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT ( ) NOTE: PRETRIAL DIRECTIVES WILL NOT BE ISSUED FOR THE FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS UNTIL COUNSEL HAVE CERTIFIED THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, OR OTHERWISE AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. AFTER RECEIVING THIS DOCUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL OR A PARTY TO THE ACTION, IF NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, INDICATING THAT DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE, THE DIRECTIVE FOR FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. HOWEVER, IF BOTH COUNSEL, OR A PARTY NOT REPRESENTED, CERTIFY THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, A DIRECTIVE TO FILE PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY. THE CERTIFICATION DOCUMENT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE MASTER'S OFFICE WITHIN TWO (2) WEEKS OF THE DATE SHOWN ON THE DOCUMENT. 8 g 0 N N gnn N o N 8 g M N N C) N $ o 7 ? j .Z t0 N N N N - - - C1 W Q? O O O Goo r r o w C r ? ? f0 1 1 1f7 M C T m r ? O C m r N SS S SS S 4 1 C 0 ?+ f0 3 o $ c ? o 00, CM M a C-4 N tX r V O IL C_ 4' ,? C y cad y fA m C A C O ? ? a x co a) 0 N N M C9 C 1 i :R ,r z BEVERLY E. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN DIVORCE NOTICE OF P RE-HEARING CONFERE NCE TO: Samuel L. Andes , Attorney for Plaintiff Ann V. Levin , Attorney for Defendant A pre-hearing conference has been scheduled at the Office of the Divorce Master, 9 North Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the 16th of August, 2002, at 9:30 a.m., at which time we will review the pre-trial statements previously filed by counsel, define issues, identify witnesses, explore the possibility of settlement and, if necessary, schedule a hearing. Very truly yours, Date of Notice: 7/1/02 E. Robert Elicker, II Divorce Master BEVERLY E. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN DIVORCE CONFERENCE WITH COUNSEL AND THE PARTIES TO: Samuel L. Andes Beverly E. Charron Counsel for Plaintiff Plaintiff Ann V. Levin Leo D. Charron Counsel for Defendant Defendant A conference has been scheduled at the office of the Divorce Master, 9 North Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the loth day of September 2002, at 1:00 p.m., with counsel and the parties to discuss the outstanding economic issues to determine if there is a basis of settlement of claims. If issues remain after the conference, a hearing will be scheduled at another date. Very truly yours, Date of Notice: E. Robert Elicker, II August 16, 2002 Divorce Master r? OFFICE OF DIVORCE MASTER CUMBERLAND COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 9 North Hanover Slreel Carlisle. PA 17013 (717) 240.6535 E. Robert Ellcker, 11 Divorce Master Tract Jo Colyer Office Manager/Reporter Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North Twelfth Street P.O. Box 168 Lemoyne, PA 17043 May 6, 2002 West Shore 697.0371 Ext. 6535 Ann V. Levin Attorney at Law SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS 4431 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 RE: Beverly E. Charron vs. Leo D. Charron No. 99 - 6426 Civil In Divorce Dear Mr. Andes and Ms. Levin: Counsel have indicated that discovery is complete. The issues pending before me are equitable distribution and counsel fees and expenses, which are preserved in the divorce decree, which was entered on January 29, 2002. In accordance with P.R.C.P. 1920.33(b) I am directing each counsel to file a pretrial statement on or before Friday, June 7, 2002. Upon receipt of the pretrial statements, I will immediately schedule a pre-hearing conference with counsel to discuss the issues and, if necessary, schedule a hearing. Very truly yours, E. Robert Elicker, li Divorce Master Mr. Andes and Ms. Levin, Attorneys at Law 6 May 2002 Page 2 NOTE: Sanctions for failure to file the pretrial statements are set forth in subdivision (c) and (d) of Rule 1920.33. THE ORIGINAL PRETRIAL STATEMENT SHOULD BE FILED IN THE MASTER'S OFFICE AND A COPY SENT DIRECTLY TO OPPOSING COUNSEL. FAILURE TO FILE PRETRIAL STATEMENTS AS DIRECTED BY THE MASTER MAY RESULT IN THE MASTER'S APPOINTMENT BEING VACATED. SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW March 21, 2002 Office of Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Re: Beverly E. Charron v. Leo D. Charron No.: 99-6426 Civil Dear Sir or Madam: ANN V. LEVIN, ESQUIRE PHONEt (717) 23/-2421 TOLL FREEt 14=421.6737 FACSIMILE (717) 231-3811 EMAIIA alevinQeullp.com www.eeeltp.com File No. 5587-1-4 Enclosed please find the signed Certification, verifying that discovery is complete in the above referenced case. Please call with any questions. Vely yAAVL/cjw Enclosure cc: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire Leo D. Charron 2917 North Front Street. Ilnrriebure. Pennevlvnnin 17110.1260 A PENNSYLVANIA LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP I % SAMUEL L. ANDES ATTORNEY AT LAW 5Q6 NORTH TWELTTII STREET P.O. BOX 15R LEMOYNE, PENNSYLVANIA 11040 TLLRPIIUNS UI II M.5561 29 April 2002 E. Robert Elicker, II Office of the Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, Pa 17013 RE.• Beverly E. Charon vs. Leo D. Charon No. 99.6426 C1v11 Term Dear Mr. Elicker: PAN (711) 161.14'15 enclose the discovery certification which I have signed in the above matter. apologize for the delay in getting it back to you. I received it a month ago and thought I had filed it at that time. Formal discovery is complete. The parties will still have to complete the exchange of information about the assets, primarily to update the information we already have. However, I do not think there are any outstanding formal discovery matters and that you can set a date for the parties to file their pre-trial memos. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely, Sa Fel. Andes amh / Enclosure cc: Ann V. Levin, Esquire f ' BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff Va. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL IN DIVORCE TO: Samuel L. Andes , Attorney for Plaintiff LeRoy Smigel Ann V. Levin Attorneys for Defendant DATE: Monday, March 18, 2002 ft CERTIFICATION s I certify that discovery is complete as to the claims for which the Master has been appointed. r OR IF DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE: (a) Outline what information is required that is not complete in order to prepare the case for trial and indicate whether there are any outstanding interrogatories or discovery motions. ' ?s . (b) Provide approximate date when discovery will be complete and indicate what action is being taken to complete discovery. ZS' $ 1 2.W Z 1 DATE 4?t C EL FOR PLAINTIFF ( ) COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT ( ) NOTE: PRETRIAL DIRECTIVES WILL NOT BE ISSUED FOR THE FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS UNTIL COUNSEL HAVE CERTIFIED THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, OR OTHERWISE AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. AFTER RECEIVING THIS DOCUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL OR A PARTY TO THE ACTION, IF NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, INDICATING THAT DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE, THE DIRECTIVE FOR FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. HOWEVER, IF BOTH COUNSEL, OR A PARTY NOT REPRESENTED, CERTIFY THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, A DIRECTIVE TO FILE PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY. THE CERTIFICATION DOCUMENT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE MASTER'S OFFICE WITHIN TWO (2) WEEKS OF THE DATE SHOWN ON THE DOCUMENT. 4 . sf 20•v:? BEVERLY E. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN DIVORCE TO: Samuel L. Andes Attorney for Plaintiff LeRoy Smigel Ann V. Levin Attorneys for Defendant DATE: Monday, March 18, 2002 CERTIFICATION I certify that discovery is complete as to the claims for which the Master has been appointed. OR IF DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE: (a) Outline what information is required that is not complete in order to prepare the case for trial and indicate whether there are any outstanding interrogatories or discovery motions. (b) Provide approximate date when discovery will be complete and indicate what action is being taken to complete discovery. 3- oz DATE COUN EL FOR PLAINTIFF ( ) COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT (?) NOTE: PRETRIAL DIRECTIVES WILL NOT BE ISSUED FOR THE FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS UNTIL COUNSEL HAVE CERTIFIED THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, OR OTHERWISE AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. AFTER RECEIVING THIS DOCUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL OR A PARTY TO THE ACTION, IF NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, INDICATING THAT DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE, THE DIRECTIVE FOR FILING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED AT THE MASTER'S DISCRETION. HOWEVER, IF BOTH COUNSEL, OR A PARTY NOT REPRESENTED, CERTIFY THAT DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, A DIRECTIVE TO FILE PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WILL BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY. THE CERTIFICATION DOCUMENT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE MASTER'S OFFICE WITHIN TWO (2) WEEKS OF THE DATE SHOWN ON THE DOCUMENT. BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0?G42G CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE AND NOW, this 'y day of Lt l , 2002, ?>s? tM C •?? 11Au Esquire is appointed master with respect to the following claims: distribution of property, counsel fees, costs and expenses. l y v2 R s Il zo_ ?0 Boylel By the Court: W //I/ V1 I 1'9 J. 1 T • r;/ U? h,''.2 I tt Pr 3 ?.? f'Cit:? f Lori" ? :.• ? 1%I7 11AUTM PM AflT M MATMAVV,q BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 99-6426 : CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE Leo D. Charron, Defendant, moves the court appoint a master with respect to the following claims: ( ) Divorce ( X) Distribution of Property ( ) Annulment ( ) Support ( ) Alimony ( X) Counsel Fees ( ) Alimony Pendente Lite ( X) Costs and Expenses and in support of the motion states: (1) Discovery is complete as to the claim(s) for which the appointment ofa master is requested. (2) The Plaintiff is currently represented by Samuel L. Andes, Esquire. (3) The statutory ground for divorce is irretrievable breakdown. (4) Delete the inapplicable paragraph(s): (a) Tim action is not contumd. aims. (c) The action is contested with respect to the following claims: those claims listed above. (5) The action does not involve complex issues of law or fact. (6) The hearing is expected to take 1 day. (7) Additional information, if any, relevant to the motion: None Date: 3' II - 002- L V Z?'_) LeRo Smigel, Esquire Ann V. Levin, Esquire Attorneys for Defendant N 11 t.y -I y < 7 CZ, U M3^9 S ?r r k : as , yqr? BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN TILE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM TO COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE AND NOW, comes Defendant, Leo D. Charron, by and through his counsel, Smigcl, Anderson Mfr Sacks, and answers Plaintiffs Complaint in Divorce as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. No response required, To the extent a response is required, Defendant is without knowledge as to how Plaintiff has been advised. By way of further answer, the parties arc divorced per the Decree dated January 29, 2002. 8. No response required. To the extent a response is required, the parties arc divorced per the Decree dated January 29, 2002. 9. Admitted. 10. Denied. It is denied that Plaintiff is without sufficient funds to retain counsel to represent her in this matter. Byway of further answer, Plaintiff is employed on a full-time basis. 11. Denied. 12. Denied. It is denied that Defendant enjoys a substantial income and that he is able to bear the expense of Plaintiffs attorney and expenses of this litigation. 5587-14 COUNTERCLAIM COUNT COUNSEL. FEES. COSTS AND EXPENSES UNDER SECTION 3702 13. Dcfendant/Plaintiff in Counterclaim repeats and reallegcs the averments of paragraphs 1 through 12, which are incorporated by reference herein. 14. Defendant/Plaintiff in Counterclaim does not have adequate means of support for himself during the course of this litigation. 15. Defendant/Plaintiff in Counterclaim does not have sufficient funds to pay counsel fees, costs or expenses incidental to this action. WHEREFORE, Defcndant/Plaintiff in Counterclaim requests the Court to award him alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, costs and expenses. Dale: 3 // - o a-LI Respectfully submitted, SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS, LLP By: J?- -.' ZeD LeRoy Smigcl, Esquire I.D. M 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. M 70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant I, Leo D. Charron, verify that the statements contained in the foregoing pleading are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: D.;2- ?4 LEO D. C N 5587-14 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 99 - 6426 : CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE f, Ann V. Levin, Esquire, attorney for Defendant in the above-captioned matter, do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim to Complaint in Divorce on counsel for Plaintiff by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the 14th day of March, 2002, addressed as follows: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Smigel, Anderson & Sacks, LLP I.D.#09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire 1.D. #70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant ' C C\\ ? f u.+ -- Illu w t.7 U BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN THE COURT OF COMMONS PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99-6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE PLAINTIFF'S WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER §3301(c) AND §3301(d) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a divorce decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein arc made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: Beverly E. Charton, Plaintiff L: CV yt?. N t{. cv O BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. IN THE COURT OF COMMONS PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 99-6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT AND WAIVER OF COUNSELING 1. A Complaint in Divorce under §3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed on October 19, 2001. 2. The manage of Plaintiff and Defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety (90) days have elapsed from the date of filing and service of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce after service of notice of intention to request entry of the decree. I verify that the statements made in this Affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unworn falsification to authorities. l7Et_ °?? Date: 31 Lco D. Charron, De 11 ant f?'1 N J % f sf . iE J 2 ti. nJ V { 1 .L E iyb lLti "All f xYh'1 r. Y 5 u its i CIA f BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. IN THE COURT OF COMMONS PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99-6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER §3301(c) AND 0301(d) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if 1 do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a divorce decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: 31 4LLco D. Cha n, Defendant c., Cl) L{ N 7 0 N q 3 ? x ? ,4 i 0 a o of < z i o n S a BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff Vs. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON I PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 1 CIVIL ACTION - LAW ) NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM 1 I IN DIVORCE qI ORDER AND NOW this '9 \ day of I 2000, upon the Stipulation of both parties as attached hereto, we hereby modify our Orders of October 28, 1999 and January 19, 2000, to provide as follows: 1. The accounts owned by the parties, either jointly or in their individually names with USAA, being Account Nos. 634707 and 7896904, shall be transferred by the parties into the name of the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, alone. The parties shall make, execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all documents required by USAA to complete such transfer as promptly as possible following the entry of this Order. 2. In all other respects, the Orders of October 28, 1999 and January 19, 2000 shall remain in full force and effect, unmodified by the terms and provisions of this Order. BY THE COURT, Distribution: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire (Attorney for Plaintiff) 525 North 121^ Street, Lemoyne, Pa 17043 ?? Ann V. Levin, Esquire (Attorney for Defendant)- 2917 North Front Street, Harrisburg, Pa 17110" b a, ?ik BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff vs. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE STIPULATION AND NOW come the above-named parties, by their undersigned counsel, and stipulate and agree as follows: 1. The parties have agreed to distribute and divide certain marital assets as part of an Interim marriage settlement. Those assets Include two accounts held by the parties with USAA (being Account Nos. 634707 and 7896904), which shall be transferred to the name of the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron alone, and the residence at 581 Crossroad School Road, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, which shall be transferred to the name of the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, alone, subject to its mortgage, and various other assets which the parties have agreed to divide and distribute, all as set out in an Interim Marriage Settlement Agreement dated 7 July 2000. 2. To accomplish the distribution of assets contemplated by the parties, it is necessary that this court amend its Orders of October 28, 1999 and January 19, 2000 to permit the transfer of the USAA accounts. Attached to this Stipulation is a proposed order making that modification. 3. The parties jointly request this court enter the attached Order to permit them to implement their Interim Marriage Settlement Agreement and complete the distribution and division of assets contemplated by that Agreement. WHEREFORE, the parties hereto have caused and authorized their attorneys to execute this Stipulation on their behalf. Date: I! yu Date: Sa I L. An e Attorney for Plaintiff V ;?"-) - Ann V. Levin Attorney for Defendant a r ? lJ -'• Ci ! 4+ 1- i`i " r: C ? (,)y CS ? ? F ? p 3 °m I. .?i v 'a a, ;? a°•; p 0 6 C. {• • O W ti i O W J i, :. ;, .:, ?: BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO 1i - CHARRON, Defendant c.. -j AND NOW this 21 ORDER OF COURT day of 0 JI- C-1 , IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99- G iIAL CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE 1999, upon consideration of the attached petition, we hereby order and direct as follows: 1. A hearing is hereby scheduled, to be held before the undersigned in Court Room No. --,/- of the Cumberland County Court House in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the attached petition, such hearing to commence at 3 :00 o'clock _.m., on the ?;& day of KS?G/'e lreJ.e . , 1999. ' 2. Pending such hearing, the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or his representative, shall not dispose of, sell, liquidate, transfer, or change ownership of, or otherwise conceal or dissipate, the assets held by Plaintiff and Defendant, or either of them, with USAA, American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., and Members First Federal Credit Union or any other financial asset or account held or controlled by him. 3. Pending the hearing scheduled above, USAA shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. 4. Pending the hearing scheduled above, American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. 5. Pending the hearing scheduled above, Members First Federal Credit Union shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. BY THE COURT, I BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99- CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE AND NOW comes the above-named Plaintiff, by her attorney, Samuel L. Andes, and petitions the Court for emergency relief, in the form of an order prohibiting the dissipation of marital assets, based upon the following: 1. The Petitioner herein is the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron. The Respondent is the Defendant, Leo D. Charron. 2. The parties were married on 7 January 1984. There are no children born of this marriage. 3. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired assets having substantial value which include, but are not limited to, the following investments: A. Six separate mutual fund accounts held with USAA which Plaintiff believes have a total value of approximately $158,000.00. B. Several universal life insurance policies which insure the life of the Defendant and which Plaintiff believes have cash value in excess of $20,000.00 or more. C. Various stock accounts and investment accounts with American Express Financial Advisors, the present value of which are not known to Plaintiff but which Plaintiff believes have values, in total, in excess of $100,000.00. D. Savings accounts, certificates of deposit, a stock investment account, and one or more individual retirement accounts at Members First Federal Credit Union, which Plaintiff believes have values in excess of $50,000.00 in total. The majority of the above assets are registered and held in Defendant's name alone. 4. The assets owned by the parties, the majority of which are registered in Defendant's name, represent a combination of assets each party contributed to the marriage and marital assets acquired by the parties during the marriage. 5. Plaintiff believes that Defendant will seize, dissipate, conceal, or otherwise place beyond her reach or her protection or the control of this Court, one or more of the above assets and other liquid financial assets which are not yet known to Plaintiff. 6. Plaintiff has these beliefs and fears because of the following: A. Defendant is an alcoholic in an advanced and acute stage of his alcoholic-related diseases. Defendant has been diagnosed as having cirrhosis of the liver, tortal hypertension, neuropathy, cerebellan degeneration, hepactic encepholiphthy, Korsacoff Syndrome, and other medical conditions which impair his ability to think clearly, exercise his judgment properly, and otherwise make proper and rational decisions. B. Husband has suffered from delusions which have caused him to take irrational and irresponsible actions. C. Defendant was confined to various hospitals and institutions for treatment of his alcohol-related disorders and his delusions from 23 June 1999 through 7 October 1999. I D. Defendant has refused further in-patient medical treatment as recommended by his physician and has refused to abide by the advice of his physician and to receive the treatment recommended by his physician. As a result of these critical medical problems, Plaintiff believes that Defendant is not able to exercise proper judgment, to make rational and intelligent decisions, or protect himself from scheming persons. 7. Following Defendant's discharge from the hospital on 7 October 1999, Defendant took steps to liquidate the insurance on his life and transfer the cash value of those assets to himself, using the address of a friend and confidant. Defendant took these steps in an effort to deprive Plaintiff of the protection of the life insurance and the benefit of this significant marital asset, he did so without making these actions known to Plaintiff, and he attempted to conceal these actions from Plaintiff. 8. Following his discharge from the hospital on 7 October 1999, Defendant has attempted to keep all financial affairs secret and to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining any information about the assets and finances of the parties. Following his discharge from the hospital, Defendant revoked the power of attorney with which he had previously appointed Plaintiff as his attorney-in-fact to act for him with regard to the parties' marital assets. Since that time, Defendant has refused to provide any information to Plaintiff regarding their finances and assets or his actions with regard to those assets and finances. 9. Defendant does not require immediate access to these funds to meet his living expenses and other immediate financial needs. Defendant receives a monthly retirement pension from the military and has other financial assets reasonably available to him to meet such needs without access to the accounts and assets held by the parties with USAA, American Express Financial Advisors, and Members First Federal Credit Union. 3 10. Plaintiff has been able to secure and remove from the parties' joint accounts at the Members First Federal Credit Union $35,000.00 in marital funds, which Plaintiff is now holding for the mutual protection of Plaintiff and Defendant. She has not, however, been able to remove or otherwise secure the other accounts and assets owned by the parties with USAA, American Express Financial Advisors, or Members First Federal Credit Union. She requires court action to secure protection of those assets. 11. Action by the Court is required to prevent the dissipation of the marital assets known to Plaintiff. Plaintiff requests this Court to enter an order directing USAA, American Express Financial Advisors, and Members First Federal Credit Union from making any further transfers out of any of the assets or accounts held in the name of either party without the consent of both parties or further order of this Court. 12. If the relief prayed for herein is not granted, Plaintiff believes that she will suffer irreparable harm in that these valuable marital assets will be dissipated and lost or will be placed beyond the jurisdiction of this Court or the control of Plaintiff and this Court. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court to take the following actions: A. Schedule a hearing on this petition at the earliest convenience of the Court. B. Pending such hearing, enjoin the Defendant, or his representative, from dissipating, liquidating, or concealing any of the assets held by either of the parties with USAA, American Express Financial Advisors, and Members First Federal Credit Union; and C. Enter an order directing USAA, American Express Financial Advisors, and Members First Federal Credit Union to freeze all assets and accounts held by Plaintiff and Defendant, or either of them, with such institutions without f= I I ? I the prior written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court; and D. Order and direct Defendant or his representative to account for and disclose all assets under his control at or prior to the hearing scheduled in accordance with this petition; and E. Following such hearing, make the orders issued prior to the hearing permanent and take such other action as the Court deems necessary or appropriate to protect the assets and claims of both parties. rQe' Sa L. Andes Attorney for Plaintiff Supreme Court ID 17225 525 North 12" Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 761-5361 5 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ) SS.. COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND ) BEVERLY E. CHARRON, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that the facts set forth in the foregoing document are true and correct to the best of her knowledge, information, and belief. Atu-Aklf i (A 0-,?c Beverly E.1Charron Sworn to and subscribed before me this 19 4 day of OCTbeeg , 1999. Notar Public NOTARIAL BEAL LYNN EHRENRELD, Notary Public 1.8moyne Dom. Cumberland Countyy MY Ocimmisslon E?Ires Aug. 17,Y01)t) 6 !587.14 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA V. : NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AND NOW, this Wday ofe 2001, upon consideration of the previously filed Petition for Bifurcation of Divorce, a Rule is hereby issued on Plaintiff to show cause, if any there be, why the relief requested should not be granted. RULE RETURNABLE DAYS FROM SERVICE. - OR - RULE RETURNABLE AT HEARING ON THIS MATTER SCHEDULED FOR THE DAY OF ALMZdjw , 2001, AT 9:. ?? O'CLOCK ?.M., COURTROOM NO. CUMBERLAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE, I COURTHOUSE SQUARE, CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA. BY THE COURT: I /pay Q1 Rs 1 , I J CI (!CT 7.?: Pi 2: Ili cuivoi ,! XL t) GGUNiY PENidSMANA .P t- t I r{?? t4 y, ? . t rA 4..y 5397•14 'OCT ? 2 200 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA V. NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE ORDER AND NOW, this _ day of , 2001, upon consideration of the previously filed Petition for Bifurcation of Divorce, it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED that the entry of a final Decree in Divorce in the above captioned matter in no way prejudices the legal claims of either party with respect to any ancillary relief heretofore requested under the Divorce Code of 1980, 23 PA.C.S.A. §3301 et se_{c . Defendant is permitted to obtain a divorce under §3301 (d) of the Divorce Code and the Defendant is directed to file a Praecipe to Transmit the Record to this Court. This Court reserves jurisdiction over any pending ancillary economic claims. BY THE COURT: J. /AVUcjwl/Petition for Ilifurcotioo of DivorceOclober 12.2001 11:16 AAI BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF v. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.99.6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION • DIVORCE PETITION FOR BIFURCATION OF DIVORCE AND NOW comes Petitioner, Lco D. Charron, by and through his counsel, Smigcl, Anderson & Sacks, LLP, and avers as follows: 1. Petitioner is Leo D. Charron, Defendant in the above captioned divorce caption. 2. Respondent, Beverly E. Charron, initiated the above referenced divorce action on October 21, 1999 seeking a divorce on the grounds that the marriage is irretrievably broken. Respondent's Complaint is verified. 3. Petitioner has filed an Answer and Counterclaim on November 16, 1999. 4. The parties have stipulated that they separated on October 15, 1999. The parties are quickly approaching the two-year separation period required to obtain a divorce under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §3301(d). 5. The parties maintain separate health insurance coverage. 6. On July 7, 2000, the parties entered into an interim Marriage Settlement Agreement wherein they divided certain marital assets including but not limited to the marital home, vehicles and USAA accounts. 7. On or about May 18, 2001, the Honorable J. Wesley Olcr, Jr. entered an order on Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. This order declares that certain accounts am not subject to equitable distribution. G, !597.14 8. There arc very limited economic issues left to be resolved by the Divorce Master or by agreement. 9. Bifurcation of the divorce would not alter the economic status quo. 10. Bifurcation is authorized by Pa.R.C.P. 1920.52(c). 11. Respondent will not be prejudiced by the granting of a divorce decree prior to the adjudication of the economic aspects of this divorce. 12. If the divorce claim is resolved, it will enable the parties to restructure their personal lives after a two-year separation. 13. Bifurcating the divorce action will assure that each party's personal life is not bound to the pending economic claims. WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Leo D. Charron, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to enter an Order granting his Petition for Bifurcation and reserving jurisdiction over any pending ancillary economic claims. Date: 18 - /a. al Respectfully submitted, SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS V2? ?, - J , LeRoy migel, Esquire I.D. #: 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. #: 70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant . 1 5587.14 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF v. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1, Ann V. Levin, Esquire, hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Bifurcation of Divorce upon counsel for Plaintiff as addressed below by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the 12th day of October, 2001. Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 I WEL, A DEION & SACKS, LLP By: ll LcRoy Smigcl, Esquire I.D. #09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D.#70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant 1, Loo D. Charon, verify that the statements contained in the foregoing pleading are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief I understand that false statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Q Date: 10 - /0 -01 1 LEO D. CHARR N C C r: yy` 4 E V a 0 ?' cr J O 5387-is BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT No. 99.6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE ORDER AND NOW, this I ?& day of ?? r t -,1 a-j 20o 1, upon the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Order, the October 21, 1999 and October 28, 1999 Orders are hereby amended as follows: 1. The October 21, 1999 Order is hereby vacated in its entirety. 2. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the October 28, 1999 Order arc hereby vacated. 3. USAA shall remove any holds that have been placed on accounts owned by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them. These accounts shall be accessible to the respective account owner to access and manage as he/she deems appropriate. 4. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc. shall remove any holds that have been placed on accounts owned by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them. These accounts shall be accessible to the respective account owner to access and manage as he/she deems appropriate. 5. Members First Federal Credit Union shall remove any holds that have been placed on IRAs owned by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron. These accounts shall be accessible to the respective account owner to access and manage as he/she deems appropriate. •? 3587.14 6. Members First Federal Credit Union shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or exchange ownership of any of the non-IRA accounts in existence prior to October 15, 1999 held by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them except as permitted by paragraph 5 of the October 28, 1998 Order and the January 19, 2000 Order, which require the written consent of both parties or further order of court. Accounts opened with Members First Federal Credit Union after October 15, 1999 shall be accessible to the respective account owner to access and manage as he/she deems appropriate. BY THE COURT: '? ???? ? = ? ?? ° ? : *-c 1,... z .t C? ^_t:- ? r- _ u? ?,?? ... ? 3 CJ ?i ?ay4 :? : ?'?. .,?} i :.ffwf?r '. rG ?w tf } fi ??? A`1?? d ? KK (( ..} ?. ? .1 ?? ? r ?:.? ? L?u? ??l r,2-.? ??' +± ?' r y ::r?w„? .{P: ?? i "cfa< ' \Ir r ? :4?'? r."r ?• ? ?.. ui `e 9' ' 5587.14/Slipulation/AVLAId 5/30/01 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT AND NOW, this -?$4a : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : No. 99-6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE STIPULATION day of, bo cp.,,.. L, , 2001, the above-named parties, by and through their counsel, stipulate and agree that this Court's Order of October 21, 1999 shall be vacated and the Order of October 28, 1999 shall be amended and modified in accordance with the proposed Order which is attached to this Stipulation. S uel L. A es, Esquire ID# 225- 525 N. Twclllh Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 761-5361 Attorney for Plaintiff SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS By. ij-ot,? 1. 0 fio LeRoy Sm el, Esquir ID #09617 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorney for Defendant BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : No. 99-6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE r, c- REPLY TO NEW MATTER AND NOW, comes Defendant, Leo D. Charron, by and through his couriscl;,Smiael, Anderson & Sacks, and replies to Plaintiffs New Matter as follows: 13. Denied. To the contrarytithc Agreement specifically does apply. Individual retirement accounts arc, in fact, retirement vehicles. 401(k) plans are, in fact, retirement plans. The parties definitely contemplated that a_y retirement vehicles which were acquired by the parties would be their sole and separate property and excluded from marital assets. Whether the Defendant retired from the military and entered service with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and obtained retirement benefits or whether he established his own retirement accounts would not have changed the clear intention of the parties' agreement to exclude retirement benefits, pensions and/or annuities. 14. Denied. The parties did anticipate exclusion of the specific individual retirement accounts and 401(k) type plans. The intention of the parties was to exclude all retirement vehicles. This is evidenced by the language of the Agreement which states " [i]n the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pension, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, 2r may become entitled to receive." (emphasis added.] Clearly, the parties intended to exclude all types of retirement assets from the marital estate. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court declare that the within . t i identified retirement accounts are excluded from the marital estate and are the sole property of the Defendant. SMIGEL, ANDERSON &&SSj,.A,CKKSy? N' O`?" Date: 3. Z rl . O 1 By: LeRoy 1, Esquire ID #09617 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant -2. .. VERIFICATION I I verify that the statements made in the foregoing instrument are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities. Date: 3-2-1-01 Leo D. Charron '3 .,I BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : No. 99-6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, LeRoy Smigel, Esquire, hereby certify that I have served the foregoing Reply to New Matter upon counsel for Plaintiff by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on March 27, 2001, addressed as follows, and also by facsimile transmission on March 27, 2001, to the number listed below: SAMUEL L. ANDES, ESQUIRE 525 NORTH TWELFTH STREET P.O. BOX 168 LEMOYNE, PA 17043 FAX 717-761-1435 Date: 3. 2-`1 • o ( SMIGEL, ANDERSON & S?kCKS By. , LeRoy Smig , Esquire ID 409617 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant f1 •:Yiil X1:1 .a A C w < Q?? x a r ? S ti p ? a a 6 < s n ? R1 .1 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff Vs. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant TO DEFENDANT NAMED HEREIN: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99.6426 IN DIVORCE YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED TO RESPOND TO THE ENCLOSED ANSWER AND NEW MATTER WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS FROM SERVICE HEREOF OR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU. Samuel L. Andes Attorney for Plaintiff Supreme Court ID 17225 525 North 12" Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 761-5361 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 IN DIVORCE PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND NOW comes the above-named Plaintiff, by her attorney, Samuel L. Andes, and makes the following Answer to Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment: 1 through 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted. Plaintiff states, however, that the various accounts have been co- mingled and exchanged various times during the marriage and she asserts that almost all of those accounts are marital property because they represent assets earned and otherwise acquired during the marriage. 10. Admitted. 11. Plaintiff admits that the accounts identified in this paragraph are at issue in this matter and that Defendant claims they are excluded as marital property while she claims they are not so excluded, by virtue of the agreement the parties signed prior to their marriage. Plaintiff denies, however, that these are the only accounts involved and she believes there may be others affected by this Court's interpretation of the agreement. 12. Admitted in part and denied in part. Although Plaintiff admits that a portion of the funds in each of the accounts which are identified in Defendant's motion were transferred from tax-deferred assets acquired by him during the marriage, she expressly denies that all of those funds in those accounts were derived from such source. To the contrary, Plaintiff believes that a substantial portion of the funds in each of those accounts represent contributions made by one or both of the parties during the marriage and earnings on all of the contributions, from whatever source, during the marriage. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court to deny Defendant's motion or, in the alternative, to declare that the agreement signed by the parties prior to their marriage does not apply to any of the individual retirement accounts now owned by either of them. 13. The agreement signed by the parties prior to their marriage is limited, by its express language, to "retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities" and does not apply to individual retirement accounts, 401(k) plans, or other tax-deferred accounts. 14. At the time the parties signed the agreement in question, neither of them intended to exclude from treatment as marital assets individual retirement accounts, 401(k) plan account, or other tax-deferred accounts which they accrued during the marriage. It was the intention of the parties only to exclude pension annuities, such as the military pension that Defendant had acquired by the time of the marriage. 1) WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court to deny Defendant's motion or, in the alternative, to declare that the agreement signed by the parties prior to their marriage does not apply to any of the individual retirement accounts now owned by either of them. I verify that the statements made in this document are true and correct. I understand that any false statements in this document are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. 4904 (unsworn falsification to authorities). DATE: 21 I"' q,/c 200, BEVERLY E' CHARRON 3 Supreme Court ID 17225 525 North 12" Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 761-5361 I hereby certify that on at 10" 2001 1 served a copy of the foregoing document upon counsel for Defendant by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: LeRoy Smigel, Esquire 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Sa . Andes Attorney for Plaintiff Supreme Court ID 17225 525 North 12'h Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 4 i i y J 1 r i . .. r i? BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : No. 99-6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER AND NEW MATTER AND NOW, comes Defendant, Leo D. Charron, by ant through his counsel, Smigel, Anderson & Sacks, and supports Defendant's Reply To New Matter as follows: 1. Plaintiff relies upon Ohm v.Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392,431 A.2d 1371 (Md. App.; 1981)1 which interpreted whether the right to receive benefits under a private pension plan was marital property under Section 3.6A-01 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Procedure Code.' The Ohm case was decided in 1981. Section 3-6A-01 was repealed in 1984 and replaced by Sections 8-201 through 8-213 of the Maryland Family Law Code. Therefore, Plaintiff relies upon a case that is no longer relevant to the dispute at issue here. Even if Qbt were applicable, it discusses only one type of private pension plan and does not make any blanket statements with reference to all pension plans, as Plantiff s Brief suggests. 2. Plaintiff asserts that the language in paragraph 3 of the antenuptial agreement between the parties is too broad to include 401(k) plan accounts within the meaning of "any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature" of said paragraph 3. Under Maryland law, 401(k) plans ar.+ included as retirement benefits. Under the Code of 'Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md.App. 392, 396, 431 A.2d 1371, 1374 (Md. App.; 1981); Md. Cts. And Iud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3.6A•01 (198- Repl. Vol. 1980 Cum Supp); Md. Family Law Code §§ 8-201 to 8.213 (Supp. 2000). Maryland Regulations, Section 07.07.14.05 B(5) states as follows: "Retirement benefits through a recognized quality plan such as 401(k), profit sharing, or other pension 2 In addition, under the Code of Maryland Regulations, Section 05.06.06.06 B(5), 401(k) plans are included with other retirement accounts as follows: "... except for a loan secured by a 401(k) or other retirement account that is subject to a penalty for early withdrawal under the federal tax code". 3 3. Plaintiff relies upon Golden v. Golden, 116 Md. App.190, 695 A.2d 1231 (Md. App. 1997), which is distinguishable to the case at bar, as ode involved the reconciliation of the parties and an oral agreement. Since an oral agreement is definitely not the same as a written agreement, the ode case does not apply to the facts at issue here. 4. The Plaintiff relics upon Falise v. Falise, 63 Md. App. 574, 493 A.2d 385, (Md. App. 1985), where the parties did not execute an antenuptial agreement. The primary issue in Falise was whether a tract of land upon which the Falises constructed their marital home was marital or non-marital property. alise does not discuss retirement accounts at all, therefore, a 's does not apply to the issue at bar. 5. Defendant relies upon Her¢ctt v. Hcraelt, 319 Md. 466, 573 A.2d 798 (Md. App. 1990), where the court stated as follows:'"fhe language of the release and waiver portions of the agreement was very broad .... 'what other anticipatory language could be used when the parties to an agreement wish to relinquish all future rights and interests known and unknown? i 4 = MD. BEGS. CODE tit. 07, § 07.14.05 B(5) (Supp. 2001). r MD. REGS. CODE tit. 05, § 06.06.06 B(5) (Supp. 2001). Ilerget v. Iterget, 319 Md. App. 466 at 474, 573 A.2d 798 at 802 (Md. App. 1990) (quoting the language of the trill judge). Respectfully submitted, SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKSp LLP Date: March 27, 2001 By: LeRoy S ' el, Esquire I.D. # 09617 June C. Lee, Esquire LD. # 83582 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant BEVFRLY I:. CI IARRON, ) IN TI [It COURTOF COMMON I'laintilf ) PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. ) CIVIL. AC'T'ION - LAW 1,11-0 D. CI IARRON, ) NO. 99.6426 Defendant ) IN DIVORCE PLAINT'IFF'S BRIEF TO OPPOSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMEN'I' Plaintiff, Beverly E. C'harron (hereinafter "Wife"), files this brief to oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment tiled by the Defendant, Leo D. Charron (hereinafter "I lusband"). I. FACTS Wife is 60 years of age :md is currently employed as an administrative assistant at the Carlisle Hospital, l lusband is 57 years of age and is retired. I lushand had a lull career in the military, from which he receives a military pension. After his retirement from the military, he worked in private industry for approximately 15 years and he enjoys retirement income as it result of that second career. The parties were married on 7 January 1984. No children were horn of this marriage. The parties separated in October of 1999 and, at about the time of their final separation, Plaintill'commenced this divorce action. Prior to their marriage, the parties signed an Antenuptial Agreement in January of 1984.' A copy of the agreement was attached to Defendant's motion fir Summary Judgment. The agreement purported to limit or otherwise affect certain property rights the parties would acquire as it result of their marriage and contained the hollowing paragraph: 'Although the agreement itself is not dated, the parties' signatures were notarized in January of 1984. 3. In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and Lill retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. The parties were subsequently married and, its a result of their employment and savings during the marriage, acquired individual retirement accounts and accounts within 401(k) plains operated or provided by their employers.' Following the separation of the parties, I lusband asserted that the language quoted above from the parties' Anlenuptial Agreement prevents this Court from treating tiny of the individual retirement accounts or 401(k) plan accounts as marital property and excludes such assets from equitable distribution in the divorce case. 11. ISSUES A. IS TIIE LANGUAGE OF TIIE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SUFFICIENT, UNDER MARYLAND LAW, TO WAIVE ALL CLAINIS TO THE EQUITABLE. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS I'ARTIES' 1'RIVATE'I'AX-DEFEIIREI) SAVINGS ASSISTS? ANSWER: NO 11. DOES TIIE EXPRESS LANGUAGE, OF TIIE AGREEMENT EXCLUDE'I'IIE PRIVA'm TAX-DEFERRED SAVINGS ACCOUNTS OF Til[E PARTIES FROM EQUITAIILE DISTRIBUTION BV THIS COURT? ANSWER: NO C. IS PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN THIS MArrER, RULING THAT HE 1'RIVATE,'I'AX-DEFERRED SAVINGS ACCOUNTS OF THE PARTIES ARE MARITAL PROPERTY AND ARE NOT EXCLUDED AS SUCH BY THE AGREEMENT? ANSWER: YES 21 lusband argues, in his brief', that a portion ofthe finds now held in the individual retirement accounts can be traced back to deposits made into his 401(k) plan accounts prior to the date of marriage. The record will not support such a claim. At the little of the parties' marriage, Husband was still employed, on a ftdl-time basis, by the U.S. Military and was still a fill-time officer in the military. I le had not worked for any employer outside of the military up to the date of marriage and had not, therefore, had the opportunity to make deposits into a 401(k) plan account. III. DISCUSSION A. THE LANGUAGE OF TIIE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, AND IN PARTICULAIt PARAGRAPH 3 THEREOF, IS NOT SUFFICIENT, UNDER MARVLAND LAW, TO ItFMOVF. THE PRIVATE, TAX-DEFERRED SAVINGS ACCOUNTS OF THE PARTIES FROM EQUITABLE DISTRIBU'T'ION BV THIS COURT. We must first note that our task here is somewhat complicated by the requirement, in the agreement, that the agreement be construed by the law of Maryland' I lowever, the central focus of our inquiry remains the same. Does the language of Paragraph 3 of the agreement effect a waiver by each party of claims to private tax-deferred savings accumulated during the marriage by the parties. Under Maryland law, agreements which curtail or limit a parties' mnrital rights to marital property are strictly construed. In Falise vs. Falfse, 63 Md. App. 574, 493 A.2d 385 (1985), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals specifically held: In order to exclude property "by valid agreement" from the reach of a monetary award, we believe that the parties must specifically agree that the subject property must be considered "non marital" or in sonic other terms specifically exclude the property from the scope of the Marital Property Act. 'fhe same court, in Golden vs. Golden, 695 A.2d 1231 (Md. App.; 1997), confirmed that finding and declined to accept an oral property settlement agreement which did not specifically describe assets which were to be excluded as marital property. Thus, the law of Maryland would not accept the general language set out in Paragraph 3 of the agreement here as waiving or disclaiming rights to individual 3Paragraph 8 of the agreement provides: 8. 'this agreement is entered into in Maryland and shall be construed under and in accordance with the laws of Maryland and shall in no way he affected by any change in domicile of either party. 3 retirement accounts, 401(k) plan accounts, or similar assets which were not specifically identified, or even mentioned, in the agreement.' B. THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF TIIE AGREEMENT ITSELF DOES NOT EXCLUDE PRIVATELY-FUNDED RETIREMENT ASSETS. If this Court determines that the language of the agreement is sufficient to nice( the requirements of specificity provided by Maryland law, then the only assets which are waived or disclaimed are those specifically identified. Here, the only assets specifically identified are "retirement benefits, pensions and/or annuities." The courts of Maryland have established definitions for these terms. In Ohm vs. Ohm, 431 A.2d 1371 (Md. App.; 1981), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals determined whether a party's right to receive payments under a private, non-contributory pension plan was marital property. In concluding that such a right was marital property, the court conducted a lengthy review of case law in other states and reached the following conclusions: The overwhelming majority of the courts have determined, either expressly or by implication, that vested rights under a private or public pension plan, to the extent such rights were acquired during the marriage, are property subject to division upon dissolution. The rational of these decisions is that retirement benefits are a form of deferred compensation or wage substitute and the right to receive such benefits, being contractual in nature, is it chose in action and, thus, property. (431 A.2d at 1374) (cites omitted). Thus the courts in Maryland defined the first two terms used in the agreement here as being a "form of deferred compensation or wage substitute" provided by either a public or private employer. I lere, the ,,rhe parties could not have identified these assets because the assets did not exist at the time of the 1994 agreement. Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine how the parties could have intended to waive rights in assets which they could not even identil'y. Clearly, the requirement of Maryland law has not been met, and cannot he met, with regard to assets that came into being long alter the agreement was signed. 4 assets in question, which represent finds earned by the parties during the marriage and set aside in tax- de lerred accounts, are not "deferred compensation" or "salary continuation" payments. Here, the assets in question were not provided by it public or private employer, bill represent savings created by the parties themselves. The accounts in question represent a special type of savings that the Internal Revenue Code permits a party to make privately. As such, the 401(k) plan accounts and the individual retirement accounts do not satisfy the definition established by the courts of law as "retirement benefits" or "pensions." Maryland law also provides its with it definition of the third terns. "Annuity" is it right, whether bequeathed, donated, or purchased, to receive Ixed or certain periodic payments, either for Iife or for a stated period of time.' Again, the individual retirement accounts and the 401(k) plan accounts involved here do not satisfy that definition because they do not provide a fixed or certain periodic payment. Again, the assets which I lusband seeks to exclude here are merely lax-favored savings accounts containing contributions voluntarily made by the parties, or one of them, during the marriage. From the above, it is clear that a strict reading of 1he agreement between the parties, as required by Maryland law, does not exclude the individual retirement accounts or the 401(k) plan accounts which the parties voluntarily created during the marriage. None of those accounts contain funds contributed by either of the parties' employers in the firm of "deferred compensation" or "salary continuation." None of them provide for fixed payments over time. The accounts in question only constitute savings accounts that the parties set up to take advantage of a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that permits them, by voluntarily saving funds in these accounts, to defer income taxes on those deposits, and the earnings the deposits generate, until it later date. As such, these accounts do not constitute "retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities" and, therefore, are not excluded as marital assets under the parties' agreement. Vest's Maryland Law Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, Annue_e , Section I, citing 4 Am, Jur. 2d Atnn untie., Section I. C. PLAINTIFF IIERSIsLF IS 1sl?'I'I'I'LIsU'1'O A UECLARA'1'ORY JUDGMENT IN TIIIS MA'1 rElt. For the reasons set firth above, the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the parties' agreement, interpreted in accordance with Maryland law, do not effect a waiver by either party of the right to claim, as marital property, the individual retirement accounts and the 401(k) plan accounts held by the other, to the extent that those assets otherwise constitute marital property. The evidence at the hearings in this matter will establish that all of the 401(k) plan accounts and individual retirement accounts which Husband now seeks to exclude as marital property were created and funded entirely during the marriage, by diverting income that the parties received during the marriage and which they could have otherwise spent to enhance their living standard. As such, those accounts are marital property subject to equitable distribution. All the Court needs to do here, now, is to decide that the agreement signed by the parties in January of 1984, and in particular Paragraph 3 of that agreement, does not exclude the 401(k) plan accounts and the individual retirement accounts from equitable distribution. CONCLUSION Agreements in which parties waive marital rights must be strictly construed and interpreted under the law of Maryland. A review of the agreement here, particularly the paragraph on which Husband relies in making his argument to exclude these assets, demonstrates that there is no reference whatsoever to 401(k) plan accounts, individual retirement accounts, or other tux-deferred savings accounts funded entirely by the parties. 'rhe only reference in the agreement is to pensions, retirement benefits, and annuities. Without that type of specificity, the parties cannot waive rights to assets under the law of Maryland. G Even if the language of the agreement is deemed to be sufficiently specific as to the assets in question, a careful reading of the language makes it clear that it does not apply to any of the tax-deferred savings accounts in question here. Retirement benefits and pensions are defined under Maryland law to be a type of deferred compensation, provided by employers not by employees. Annuities are, under Maryland law as elsewhere, contracts which provide for fixed and certain payments over time in the future. Neither of those definitions applies to the tax-deferred savings accounts which the parties here acquired privately during the marr iage, with their earnings. In sum, the agreement in question does not exclude the private tax-deferred savings accounts of the parties from equitable distribution as marital property. 'this Court should enter a declaratory judgment, in Wife's favor, ruling that the parties' Antenuptial Agreement, signed in January of 1984, does not exclude the parties' individual retirement accounts and 401(k) plan accounts from equitable distribution in this action. /.V S L. lAt-, Samucl L. Andes Attorney for Plaintiff Supreme Court ID 17225 525 North 12" Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 761-5361 I ?tiTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on 21 March 20011 served a copy of the foregoing document upon counsel for Defendant by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: LeRoy Smigel, Esquire 2917 North Front Street Ilarrisburg, FA 17110 uc'a 4 Samuel L. Andes Attorney for plaintiff Supreme Court ID 17225 525 North 121h Street Lemoyne, FA 17043 8 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 : CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 1. Issue Presented. A. Whether certain accounts owned separately by each of the parties should be excluded from equitable distribution based on the Antenuptial Agreement that the parties mutually agreed on and executed on January 5, 19847 11. Short Answer. Yes, the accounts in question should be excluded from equitable distribution. The Antenuptial Agreement signed by the parties in csnlcmplation of marriage is a valid contract that is subject to the rules of contract interpretation. Therefore, the general rules regarding marital property and pensions will not apply. III. Facts. On January 5, 1984, Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, formerly Beverly Martin, and Defendant, Lco D. Charron, Jr. entered into an Antcnuptial Agreement in contemplation of marriage. The Antcnuptial Agreement provides for the property rights of each party in the event of divorce, dissolution or separation. The Agreement provided for choice of law. Because the parties entered the Agreement in the state of Maryland, they agreed that Maryland law shall govern in the event of a dispute. Each party had his or her own independent legal counsel prior to signing the Antenuptial Agreement. On or about October 21, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Divorce containing a count for equitable distribution. Defendant filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment on or about February 6, 2001, requesting the Court to declare the rights and status of the parties with regard to the count for equitable distribution. In particular, Defendant submits that the following accounts arc to be excluded from equitable distribution based on the Antenuptial Agreement: (1) Member's First IRA 25008, owned by Husband, (2) Member's First IRA 59355, owned by Wife, (3) USAA IRA 634707AA, owned by Husband, (4) American Express IRA, owned by Husband, (5) T. Rowe Price Trust Company accounts, 4010051180-2 and 4010051178-9, owned by Wife and (6) Copeland account number 011 302 76, owned by Wife. (Motion for Declaratory Judgment, p. 2). The accounts owned by defendant contain funds transferred from Defendant's 401(k) account he held with prior employers. (Motion for Declaratory Judgment, p. 3). IV. Statement of Jurisdiction. Defendant made a motion to the court for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §7531 ct seq., for the purpose of determining a question of actual controversy between the parties. Jurisdiction of this action is based'on 42 Pa.C.S. §7532 which provides than Pennsylvania Courts of Record, within their respective jurisdictions, have power under the Declaratory Judgments Act to declare rights, status, and other legal relations and Declaratory Judgments may be procured in Pennsylvania Courts, including Court of Common Pleas, which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and only in those Courts which have subject matter jurisdiction. V. Areument. The issue is whether the Antenuptial Agreement is valid and therefore subject to the rules of contract interpretation or whether the general rules regarding marital property should apply. In the absence of an agreement between parties, the laws of the State of Maryland provide for the division of marital property based on nine basic factors. Generally, marital property includes all property that was acquired during the marriage, including pensions and business interests. However, in this case, the parties entered into a legally binding agreement that provided for the division of property in the event of separation, divorce or dissolution. Therefore, in order to determine what law governs, the first issue to be addressed is whether the Antenuptial Agreement is valid and enforceable. In order to determine the validity of an Agreement, four criteria must be met: (1) The agreement must be fair and equitable in procurement and result; (2) The parties must make full and truthful disclosure of their assets; (3) The agreement must be entered into voluntarily and with full knowledge of its meaning and effect; and (4) Whether each party had independent legal advice in evaluating whether the Agreement was voluntary and understandingly made. Hartz v. Hartz., 234 AN 865, 248 Md. 47 (1967). First, in this case, the Antenuptial Agreement divides the property of the parties in an arrangement that was suitable to each. Paragraph number nine (9) provides that "[t]his Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective parties ... notwithstanding the extent or size of the parties' individual estates at the time of the execution of this Agreement or 3 subsequently." (Antenuptial Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "A.") With respect to the particular property in question, the third paragraph of the Agreement states that "[i]n the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to federal, military and/or VA retirement benefits that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive." (Exhibit "A." emphasis added). Secondly, at the time of execution of the agreement, each of the parties made a full and truthful disclosure of their assets. The parties attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit B of the Antenuptial Agreement the property each owned on the date of execution of the agreement. (Exhibit "A'). The third and fourth requirements for a valid contract regarding the voluntariness in entering the agreement and whether each had independent legal counsel are satisfied by an examination of the four comers of the instrument. Paragraph ten (10) of the Antenuptial Agreement states that "[e]ach party has had independent advice by counsel of his or her own selection. Each party regards the terms of this agreement as fair and reasonable and each has signed it freely and voluntarily without relying upon any representation other than those expressly set forth herein." (Exhibit "A"). All four criteria of determining whether an agreement is enforceable and valid have been met. Therefore, the agreement will control in dividing the property. Further, in Herpet v. Hcrget, the court held that an antenuptial agreement is a contract, subject to the rules of contract interpretation and thus the general rule regarding marital property will not apply. In determining the meaning of an antenuptial agreement, the court "determine[d] 4 from the language of the agreement itself, what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. Where the language of the contract is unambiguous, its plain meaning will be given effect." Hereet v. Hemet, 573 A.2d 798, 319 Md. 466 (1990). In the Here case, the court upheld a very broad anlenuptial agreement with many nonspecific provisions and denied the spouse of a monetary award that was otherwise available under the divorce laws. In the present case, the Antenuptial Agreement is unambiguous. Paragraph three (3) specifically states that, "[i]n the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pension, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive." (Exhibit "A"). Plaintiff may argue that the funds in the accounts at issue are included in equitable distribution based on paragraph four (4), which states that, "[a]ll property, rights to property or less than absolute interest therein created by the parties subsequent to their marriage, shall be considered the joint property of the parties and shall be considered the joint property of the parties and the same shall be subject to all of the laws, claims and incidence of such joint property as defined by the laws of the State of Maryland ...[i]n the event of a divorce, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation the parties hereto shall have such rights and incidence in said joint property as arc applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland." (Exhibit 'W'). However, the accounts in question are titled in each of the parties' respective names. There is no question as to which party has an absolute interest. Further, the accounts referenced in the Motion for Declaratory Judgment contain funds transferred from Defendant's 401(k) with prior employers and paragraph three (3) of the Antcnuptial Agreement specifically addresses retirement benefits. (Motion for Declaratory Judgment, p.2-3). There is no ambiguity and the plain meaning of the contract should be given effect. v. Conclusion. The terms of the Antcnuptial Agreement are fair and equitable in procurement and result. The parties made full and truthful disclosure of their assets. The agreement was entered into voluntarily and with full knowledge of its meaning and effect and each had independent legal advice in evaluating the agreement. Therefore, because the Antcnuptial Agreement is valid, it is subject to the rules of contract interpretation and the general rule regarding the division of marital property and pensions will not apply. Further, each party holds accounts in his or her separate name. The Defendant's accounts in question are funds transferred from his 401(k). Because the Antcnuptial Agreement is valid and enforceable, the terms provided therein should be upheld. The parties clearly contracted that in the event of separation, divorce or dissolution, they would each keep his or her respective retirement accounts. Therefore, the Defendant respectfully requests that his Motion for Declaratory Judgment be granted. In granting his Motion for Declaratory Judgment, the Defendant specifically requests that the amounts transferred to his Member's First IRA 25008, his USAA IRA 634707" and his American Express IRA and the increase of value thereon, be excluded for purposes of equitable distribution. 6 Date: March 15, 2001 Respectfully submitted, SMIGE1.1 ANDERSON & SACKS, LLP By:_ Roy Sm gel, squire I.D. # 096 June C. Lee, Esquire I.D. # 83582 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant ®1 7 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLANDCOUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE I, LeRoy Smigel, Esquire, attorney for Defendant in the above-captioned matter, do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief in Support of Motion for Declaratory Judgment on counsel for Plaintiff by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on this 15th day of March, 2001, addressed as follows: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 SMICEL, ANDERSON & SACKS, LLP By: line y Smig , Es uirc ?Le, e Lee, , 0unn1--ee?C. Esquire I.D. #: 83582 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant 8 ti 7 J ? "S J?y'Y . ni Fe * t J FC Y? Y F J '.IY ? .S ?t it { `. Y .t? .?{sy by ?? :pt g 9 Fr 4 '1 As, MIIMMMOIC+^IM461CM1'M?'?"4?°'Y3W,h#iYH.Y.WGM`JrNtf9»>a>'?V+`?ew.w'.+NMr....w.uNi ez>'m?atM::euV+?F.=+'ff=vgM»wti.wfWte Fiw.tiFnMhV*.+Ywb'tVl^k'k+? 'M?M???, I ? ? y ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT This Antenuptial Agreement made this day of , 1981, between LEO D. CHARRON, JR.r and DEVERLY E. MARTIN. WITNESSETHI WHEREAS, the parties hereto are contemplating marrying each other, and WHEREAS, they desire and Intend to establish their mutual property rights now and for the future, and to guarantee to each individual ownership in and to all property and estate which each now owns or subsequently may acquire, and WHEREAS, the parties have discussed their property rights with each other and have made such disclosure of assets to one another as the parties.deem desirable, and WHEREAS, the real and personal property owned by each of the parties is set forth in Exhibit A and e, attached hereto and made a part of this Agreement. NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the marriage of the parties hereto, and intending to be legally bound,•the parties agree as followse 1. All property and estate of the parties hereto, of every nature, and wheresoever.situate, acquired by each of the parties before their marriage shall be and remain forever the individual property and estate of the party so owning and acquiring it and neither of the parties shall acquire any interest in the individual property and estate of the other acquired before the marriager because of their subsequent marital relationshipl and inch shall hold and possess all such property and estate as if he and she had remained unmarried. 2. Each of the parties hereby disclaims all right, title and interest in all property and•estate now owned which has been acquired by the other before their marriage renouncing forever all claims to the separate estate of the other including all right of dower, curtsey, family exemption, to elect against the will or conveyances, or to receive a share of the estate under the Intestate laws, with regard to such previously acquired property. i . ? r -2- 1. In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. 4. All property, rights to property or leas than absolute interest therein created by the parties subsequent to their marriage, shall be considered the joint property of the parties and the same shall be subject to all of the laws, claims and incidence of such joint property as defined by the laws of the State of Maryland) except that it is expressly understood that i this provision shall not apply to motor vehicles acquired by the parties after their marriage. In the event of a divorce, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation the parties hereto shall have such rights and incidence in said joint property as are applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland. In the event of death of either of the parties the normal laws of inheritance shall apply to such jointly acquired property an limited by paragraph 6(b) (1) hereof. S. a. Each of the parties will contribute a sum certain toward the purchase and initial redecoration of a marital abode which they shall own as tenants by the entirety. The amount each party contributes shall be net forth in a document which shall subsequently be executed by both parties and appended to, and made a part of, thin agreement. b. In the event the parties dissolve their marriage, upon the sale of said abode all outstanding mortgages, liens# taxes due thereon, and closing costs and fees shall be promptly paid. The remainder of the proceeds realized from the sale shall be distributed between the parties as follows, -3- (1) Each party will recover his or her initial contribution without interest. (2) Any proceeds remaining after each party has fully recovered his or her said contribution will be distributed evenly between the parties. (3) Capital gains taxes, if any, will be assessed in equal shares between the parties. (1) In the event that one of•the parties predeceases the sale of the said abode, the surviving party will take all necessary steps to assure that upon said sale, or upon the surviving party's death, expressly recognizing the surviving parties right to live in the house, whichever event occurs first, a sum of money equivalent to one half (1/2) of the fair market value of said abode at the time of sale or death, whichever is applicavle, minus the above-cited costs and expenses, is distributed in equal shares to the heirs or legatees of the predeceased party, excluding the surviving party, provided, that if the parties were not pending divorce at the time of death of the predeceased party and if the abode is not sold, that portion of the proceeds which is reinvested in another abode shall be exempt from said distribution. c. The above provisions shall apply to the initial marital abode and to any subsequent abodes, purchased from funds reinvested from the sale of said initial abode. 6. Each of the parties agree to join in any deed, or in the execution of any paper necessary to effect the sale of real estate or to assist the other in the administration or sale of his or her individual property and estate. 7. Nothing herein shall be construed as preventing either of the parties from giving any of his or her property or estate to the other by deed, gift, will or otherwise. -4- B. This Agreement is entered into in Maryland and shall be construed under and in accordance with the laws of Maryland and shall in no way be affected by any change in domicile of either party. 9. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective parties, their heirs, leagatess, devisees, personal representatives and assigns, notwithstanding the extent or size of the parties' individual estates at the time of the execution of this Agreement or subsequently. 10. Each party has had independent advice by counsel of his or her own selection. Each party regards the terms of this agreement as fair and.reasonable and each has signed it freely and voluntarily without relying upon any representation other than those expressly eat forth herein. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties have hereunto set their hands and again the day and year first above written. WITNESSt / ill (SEAL) 4eo rron?J ,, p„ ,? ,`71ttRAtZfC (SEAL) r y ar n PENNSYLVANIA, CUMBZRLAN COUNTY, to-witt- STATE OF MOB, NBaRIf)OOl911 I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this Sthday of January 198 4, personally appeared Leo D. Charron, who made oath in due form of law that hmatters n information, knowledgeaande true and correct to the beat of his belief. WITNESS my hand and official Notarial Seall- yXA1y t) " o a y u my Commission 3jiDyampown November 10, 1986 Sun Axll 1a11M. 110W1 /u1110 CA1ln11 SOFA CONS11U01e CO0111 at CNKIISI04 WISH in. 11.0111 ru1N. tKKtind1 AnKYIIM,I 11e1111 i -S- STATE OF MARYLAND, WASHINGTON COUNTY, to-witt- I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this -td day of;/Q?tttt? 1981/ r personally appeared Beverly E. Martin, wKo made th in due form of law that the matters and facts not forth in the above are true and correct to the best of her information, knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and official Notarial Seal. wo-tacy Public My Commission Expirest July 1, 1986 I el. •r EXHIBIT A" PROPERTY OWNED BY LEO D. CHARRON I, REAL ESTATE more 1. 8228 Clifton Farm Court, Alexandria, Virginia being fully described in a certain deed recorded in the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia in Deed Book 4955, Page 282 subject to the mortgage held by Arvida Mortgage Company. Florida. 2. 1114 Pheasant Drive, North, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in a certain deed recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "K," Volume 29, Page 237, subject to the mortgage held by First United Federal, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. 3. 1160 Belvedere Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, formerly 302 Circle Drive, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in the deed of John D. Keeney, Jr. and Anna Marie Keeney to Leo D. Charron as recorded in the office of the Cumberland .• County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "I," Volume 30, Page 574' subject to the mortgage held by Carlisle Building and Loan Association. II. .Deed of'Trust dated October 27, 1989, between Miriam Virginia Lucas, Grantor, and Robert V. Moss and Patricia C. Broyles, Trustees, in the principal sum of $43,500.00 and recorded in the Clerk's Office of Montgomery County, Maryland in Liber 5600 Folio 641. III. One-sixth (1/6) undivided interest in the Joint Venture* Agreement for the MBC investment Group. IV. Bonds and Accounts 1. Twenty-five (25) - $75.00 savings bonds in various sta- tes of maturity. 2. Cavanough Corporate bonds with a face value of $1,800.00. 3. Share account number 25008 with U.S. Defense Activities . Federal Credit Union, with a balance of $17,400 as of 5 December 1983, part of which is to be used *towards the purchase and rede- coration of a marital abode as set forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. V. Insurance policies (beneficiary for all policies: Farmers Trust Company as Trustee for the three children of a prior marriage, to wit: Leo Desire Charron III, Catherine Marie Charron, and Michelle Elizabeth Charron). 1. $35,000.00 servicemen's group life insurance 2. Two (2) $30,000.00 term policies with-State Farm Insurance 3. $15,000.00 whole life policy with Army Mutual Aid 4. $10,000.00 whole life policy with USAA VI. Automobiles 1. 1983 Ford Mustang 2. 1976 Ford Station Wagon vii. Other Personal Property 1. Syracuse China 2. Stamp Collection 3. Coin Collection 4. Oil Paintings 5. Thomas Organ 6. 25" RCA color television set 7. 19" RCA color television set 8. Antique 14K gold railroad watch 9. Antique pool table 10. Three (3) Hummel.figurines. • EXHIBIT B' PROPERTY OWNED BY BEVERLY E. MARTIN I. PERSONAL PROPERTY 1. Kirk silver service 2. Lenox china 3. Assorted items of fine jewelry including, but not limited to, diamond engagement ring, diamond earings, opal ring, 14K gold chains, 14K gold bracelets. 4. Bedroom suite 5. Dining room set including table, hutch and four (4) chairs 6. 'Ranch mink fur coat 7. Two (Z) leather English riding saddles 8. 1980 Toyota automobile II. Retirement plan-with Western Maryland Review III. Various bank accounts of de minimis value IV. $48,000.00 in cash which proceeds resulted from the sale of real property in.Hagerstown, Maryland, and part of which is to be used towards the purchase and redecoration of a marital abode as set-forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. a kPjrFX1ae,??ToRs.(,,elaxmmew ')OW AIIN CoAoR 7 ZCV/.f/on/ SET MA y77;6 &JA,sW R. ANn &VY6T, a 5n9oqa._ ?r4mAs?: H0400 717-761-1435 SAM ANDES BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff va. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant Sir: 678 P85 OCT 27 199 12:32 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE Please enter my appearance for the Defendant, Leo D. Charron in the above action. i Date: 10 *3- %q_ Attorney for Defendant I Supreme Court ID # q 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, Pa 17110 ?, ..... ' Lf z r .== ? ?? , .- c s :' ?,. ? ? 7 ? yr r? l. ? ? r . y U n _. ?;s ? :iii . ?v c i3 PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT (Must be typewritten and suhmitted in duplicate) TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: Please list the within matter for the next Argument Cast. CAPTION OF CASE (entire caption must be stated in full) BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Vs. IM D. CHARRCN, (Defendant) No. 99-6426 Civil Term . 2001 1. State matter to be argued (i.e., plaintiff's motion for new trial, defendant's denurxer to complaint, etc.): Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment 2. Identify counsel who will argue case: (a) for plaintiff: Address: (b) for defendant: Address: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North 12th Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 LeRoy Smigel, Esquire 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 3. I will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has been listed for argument. 4. Argument Court Date: March 28, 2001 t Dated: February 28, 2001 Attorney for Dfffer 7+;,V?' a 1 a 1 °l'4 pSde e'i ,.cY i N s t F < r 3 n tit,f? i. 7` a 'A 2 z ,, r -?, ? r r* a- V s?t?k'y9 +a { * i ? O O W ? xAµ ss 1"+?'""Fuaz??? '?y? "'F?e 3 - t v? ? n O z Yr .` s`art iy'rsfi?t$7?+?ry?+ m a tine i ra ^rs `as •`q.S??b??ji ?? ??yai r ? ? J 'f, Q k e e a P,a f'i ? rta, { s A Yti e Vy; ?4 ?- p1i f ¢ 5 r. , s E a r ?._ki a>,K r.? -; e to la z f i ; a f i. 7 g I 7S j 4 a 'R+tr d a ?7? ?i':Stip?bs i T3 ti.k :1 s 5 ?< ?f r'S D r li °???Si i?i3{y Yy 5 ('w Y,a?T?W rc '? E'7k ? a kr F Lar qty ? .. i 5 BEVERLY E. CI IARRON, IN'1'IIIi COUIi'1' OP COvINION I'I.EAS PLAINTIFF CUM13ERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : No. 99.0420 LEO D. MARRON, DEPENDANT CIVIL ACTION- DIVORCE REPLY TO NEW MATTER AND NOW, comes Defendant. Lco D. Charron, by and through his counsel, Smigel, Anderson S Sacks, and replies to Plaintiff's New Maucr as follows: 13. Denied. To the contrary, the Agreement specifically does apply. Individual retirement accounts are, in fact, retirement vehicles. 401(k) plans are, in fact, retirement plans. The partics definitely contemplated that any retirement vehicles which were acquired by the parties would be their sole and separate property and excluded from marital assets. Whether the Defendant retired from the military and entered service with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and obtained retirement benefits or whether he established his own retirement accounts would not have changed the clear intention of the partics' agreement to exclude retirement benefits, pensions and/or annuitics. 14. Denied. The partics did anticipate exclusion of the specific individual retirement accounts turd 401(k) type pl:uts. The intention or the partics was to exclude all retirement vehicles. This is evidenced by the language of the Agreement which states " [i]n the event or a divorce each of the partics hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pension, andlor annuities of h it_soever nature, including, hul not 1 r4. i { t 1+ i f i ?R???i.-.. ?+5'4,6'wh£N:# t t{4V.HaA:w49 ...•.e".w...v,?.? _..?__.. - SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS, LLP Attorneys at Law 2817 North Front Street Harrisburg. Pwm ytvwda 171101223 i II i S SAMUEL L. ANDES, ESQUIRE 525 NORTH TWELFTH STREET LEMOYNE, PA 17043 AA. ??"???« U.S.POS7ACE - 81)!04? y,f Y f Ai I { limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, S may become entitled to receive." [emphasis added.] Clearly, the parties intended to exclude all types of retirement assets from the marital estate. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court declare that the within identified retirement accounts are excluded from the marital estate and are the sole property of the Defendant. SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACCKKS?? x??? Date. 3. Z rl - G ? gy;_ LeRoy Smigel, Esquire 1D 1109617 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant -2- V, VERIFICATION / J 1 verify that the statements made in the foregoing instrument are true and correct. 1 understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. 1 Date: ?. Z-1. C> I Lco D. Charrowl BEVERLY E. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : No. 99-6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION- DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1, LeRoy Smigcl, Esquire, hereby certify that I have served the foregoing Reply to New Matter upon counsel for Plaintiff by depositing sane in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on March 27, 2001, addressed as follows, and also by facsimile transmission on March 27, 2001, to the number listed below: SAMUEL L. ANDES, ESQUIRE 525 NORTH TWELFTH STREET P.O. BOX 168 LEMOYNE, PA 17043 FAX 717-761-1435 Date: 3. 21 O ( SMIGEL, ANDERSON & lf?CKS By: 490;rA*-1W LeRoy Smig , Esquire ID 409617 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant ;- , :.. .?. C^ `.e Imo. ? ?.. ?_ ? ! - I ? 1 (v ?.? n? `f?a _ i?a ?_ . `i: ? .e, ? ll ? ' c? r'.i ,- ` ;? i } ?' 4 ?_ .. { • ' '? BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff V. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW :No. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM :1N DIVORCE IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER and HESS, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 180' day of May, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for declaratory judgment and the briefs submitted, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant's motion is granted, and the IRA accounts at issue arc declared not subject to equitable distribution. BY THE COURT, 1, 61'-'/ J cslcy 0 r r., J. Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff LeRoy Smigel, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1223 Attorney for Defendant i BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff V. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant : IN T1IE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW :No. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM : IN DIVORCE IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER and HESS, JJ. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT This divorce action was commenced in 1999. For disposition at this time is a motion of Defendant for a declaratory judgment with respect to the effect of a certain antenuptial agreement. STATEMENT OF FACTS On January 5, 1984, in contemplation of their marriage, the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement, which provided for the property rights of each party in the event of divorce.' The agreement contained a choice-of-law provision, and the parties elected the application of Maryland law in the event of a dispute.2 Paragraph three of the agreement provided that In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive.3 1 Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. Exhibit A. filed February 9, 2001; Plaintiffs Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment, filed March 21, I Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Exhibit A. 31(1. In October of 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint in divorce requesting, inter alia, equitable distribution of marital property.° In February of 2001, Defendant filed a motion for a declaratory judgment, requesting that this court declare the rights and status of the parties with regard to equitable distribution.3 At issue on the motion are several individual retirement accounts (IRAs), owned by Defendant, which include funds transferred from Defendant's 401(k) accounts with prior employers 6 The accounts include a Member's First IRA, a USAA IRA, and an American Express IRA. Also at issue are several retirement accounts owned by Plaintiff, including a Member's First IRA, a Copeland account, and T. Rowe Price Trust Company accounts! Defendant asserts that the accounts are excluded from equitable distribution based on paragraph three of the agreement:' Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that the accounts are not excluded from equitable distribution.10 In support of her argument, Plaintiff contends that the accounts should not be excluded because the language of the agreement lacks the specificity required by Falise v. Falisell to 4 Complaint in Divorce, filed October 21, 1999. See Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. Id., paras. I 1-12. Id., Pam. 11. a Id. See Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 10 ,See Plaintin's Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 11493 AN 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 2 exclude property from the scope of the Maryland Property Act, 12 or alternatively because the express language of the agreement does not include IRAs. 13 Briefs on Defendant's motion were submitted by counsel, and oral argument was held on March 28, 2001. At the argument, neither counsel challenged the validity of the antenuptial agreement, and both agreed that the language of the agreement should be interpreted by the court without development of a parol evidence record. The issues to be decided are 1) whether the language of paragraph three of the parties' antenuptial agreement contains the degree of specificity required by Fallse to exclude property from the Marital Property Act, and 2) if so, whether the express language of the agreement includes IRAs. . DISCUSSION Marital property defined. Section 8-201(e)(1) ofthc Maryland Family Law Code defines marital property as "the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage." 14 Subsection (e)(3)(iii), however, provides that marital property does not include any property "excluded by valid agreement." Specificity of the agreement. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has held that, to exclude property "by valid agreement" under subsection (e)(3)(iii), the parties must "specifically provide that the subject property must be considered `non marital' or in some other terms specifically ercltule the property from the scope of the Marital Property Act." Falise v. Falise, 493 A.2d 385, 389 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (emphasis added). In Falise, the parties entered into a separation agreement whereby they relinquished "all rights, title, interest and 12 See Plaintiff's Brief To Opposc Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment, dated March 21, 2001. 12 Plaintiffs Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment, para. 13. 1" Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-201 (2001). 3 claims which said parties might now have or may hereafter have ... in and to any property, real or personal, that either of said parties may own or hereafter acquire Id. at 388. The Court of Special Appeals declined to give effect to the agreement stating, "We doubt that the subject agreement could affect the status of something which is neither an interest in real or personal property, i.e., marital property." Id. The court also reasoned that the parties could not release a right that they did not have and could not have reasonably anticipated at the time of the agreement. Id. at 389. Following its holding in Falise, the Court of Special Appeals declined to give effect to an alleged oral settlement agreement that basically provided that "what is hers is hers and what is mine is mine." Golden v. Golden, 695 A.2d 1231, 1237 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert, denied, 702 A.2d 290 (Md. 1997). The Court of Special Appeals stated that such an agreement, "no matter how often repeated, could [njever contain the degree of specificity required by Falise ...." Id, at 1237. In Herget v. Herget, 573 A.2d 798 (Md. 1990), however, the Court of Appeals declined to expand the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Falise. In Herget, the parties entered into a very general antenuptial agrcement.ts The 15 The agreement provided that the parties: waive, relinquish and bar .,. all ... rights and interests which [they] ... may become entitled to, except as in this Agreement provided, with respect to any property, real or personal, now owned or hcreaaer acquired by the other party. Paragraph two and three of the agreement provided that the parties: release[d] and surrendcr[d] any and all claims [they] may have, now, or at the time of any termination of the proposed marriage between the parties ... in any estate or property of [the other party] now owned or hereafter acquired by [them] ... and all other rights and interests of every kind therein that shall arise out of the relation of the parties .... Finally, paragraph four provided that the parties: waive[d] and release[d] unto the other party ... all of [their] respective rights, interests and claims in and to said property of the other, to the end that neither of the parties shall obtain any right or interest to or in any property of the other by virtue of their marriage .... M. at 799. 4 Court of Appeals, in giving effect to the general language contained in the agreement, stated, "We reject the notion that the parties in the case before us were incapable of releasing a right that did not then exist. We also reject the argument that general language cannot effect a full release of a specific right, even a right that is unknown at the time the agreement is drawn" Id. at 473. Plaintiff relics on Falise and its progeny to support her contention that paragraph three of the agreement sub judice lacks the requisite specificity to exclude property from the Marital Property Act. However, this court is of the opinion that the language contained in paragraph three of the agreement contained the degree of specificity required by Maryland law. The language contained in paragraph three, which includes "retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities," is clearly specific enough under the decision of the Court of Appeals in Herget. The language contained in the Herget agreement, which the court gave effect to, was remarkably general in comparison to the specific language of paragraph three of the agreement of the parties herein. Furthermore, the court is of the opinion that the language of paragraph three also contained the degree of specificity required by the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Falise. Both Falise and Golden are distinguishable from this case in that the agreements under consideration therein were extremely general, waiving the parties' rights to any and all present and future property, whereas the parties in the present case specifically provided that paragraph three applied only to "retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities." Golden can be further distinguished on the ground that the alleged understanding at issue had not been defined by a writing, whereas here the parties entered into a valid written contract. Consequently, the court is of the view that paragraph three was sufficient to "specifically exclude the property [i.e. retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities] from the scope of the Marital Property Act" under Falise and its progeny. 5 Scope of the agreement. Because the language of the agreement has been found to contain the degree of specificity required to exclude property from Maryland's Marital Property Act, the court must now examine whether the express language of the agreement includes the specific types of property at issue in this case, 401(k)s and IRAs. An antenuptial agreement is a contract, subject to the general rules of contract interpretation. Herget v. Herget, 573 A .2d 798, 800 (Md. 1988). Furthermore, it is well settled that where an agreement is unambiguous Maryland follows the objective law of contracts; the intent of the parties is in a sense irrelevant, for it is presumed that they meant what they expressed. PaineWebber, Inc. v. East, 768 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Md. 2001). The procedure for interpreting such agreements under Maryland law is prescribed as follows: [U]nder the objective law of contracts, a court, in construing an agreement, must first determine from the language of the agreement itself, what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. Where the language of the contract is unambiguous, its plain meaning will be given effect. Herget, 573 A.2d at 800. The interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a question of law. PaineWebber, Inc., 768 A.2d at 1032. Plaintiff contends that the term "retirement benefits" has been judicially defined in Ohm v. Ohm, 431 A.2d 1371, 1374 (Md. Cl. Spec. App. 1981), as "deferred compensation or wage substitute[s]," and that, as a result, the term does not include 401(k)s or IRAs. Plaintiffs reliance on Ohm is misplaced due to the fact that the issue in Ohm is wholly unrelated to the issue in the case sub judice. The issue in Ohm was whether "retirement benefits" constitute marital property. Here, there is no question as to whether "retirement benefits;" 401(k)s, or IRAs constitute marital property; instead, the question is whether the 401(k)s and IRAs are excluded from the Marital Property Act by the express language of the parties' antenuptial agreement. There was no agreement at issue in Ohm, and, therefore, 6 the holdings of the Court of Special Appeals in Oltnt arc not pertinent to the determination in this case. The court is of the view that a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have considered both 401(k) plans as well as individual retirement accounts as falling within the classification of "retirement benefits." The Code of Maryland Regulations supports this interpretation with respect to 401(k) plans .16 Black's Law Dictionary also defines "401(k) plan" as "[a] retirement ... plan" Furthermore, the court is of the view that the phrase IRA, i.e. individual retirement account, given its plain meaning, would also fall within the category of "retirement benefits." Consequently, the 401(k)s and IRAs at issue are excluded by valid agreement from the Marital Property Act under Section 8- 201(e)(3)(iii) of the Maryland Family Law Code and arc not subject to equitable distribution. For these reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 18" day of May, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for declaratory judgment and the briefs submitted, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Def'endant's motion is granted, and the IRA accounts at issue are declared not subject to equitable distribution. BY THE COURT, /s/ J. Wesley Oler. Jr. J. Wesley Olcr, Jr., J. 16 See Md. Regs. Code tit. 07, § 07.14.05 B(5) (Supp. 2001) ("[r]etirement benefits through a recognized quality plan such as 401(k) ...;'). 7 Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff LeRoy Smigel, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1223 Attorney for Defendant 8 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE DEFENDANT ORDER AND NOW, this day of , 2001, upon consideration of the attached Motion for Declaratory Judgment, oral argument on this matter is scheduled for the day of , 2001, at o'clock, _.m., Courtroom No. , Cumberland County Courthouse, 1 Courthouse Square, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The parties shall file Briefs in support of their respective positions within days prior to the scheduled argument. BY THE COURT: J. IAVIAUMotion for Declaratory JudgmrnV2712001 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND NOW, comes Defendant, Leo D. Charron, by and through his attorneys, Smigel, Anderson & Sacks, and avers as follows: Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, is an adult individual who resides in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Defendant, Leo D. Charron, is an adult individual who resides at 581 Crossroad School Road, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Divorce on or about October 21, 1999 containing a count for equitable distribution. 4. This is an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §7531 et seq., for the purpose of determining a question of actual controversy between the parties as hereinafter set forth. 5. Jurisdiction of this action is based on 42 Pa.C.S. §7532 which provides that Pennsylvania courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, have power under the Declaratory Judgments Act to declare rights, status, and other legal relations and declaratory judgments may be procured in Pennsylvania courts, including court of common pleas, which has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and only in those courts which have subject matter jurisdiction. 5587-14 6. The parties executed an Antcnuptial Agreement on or about January 5, 1984. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Paragraph 4 of the Antcnuptial Agreement provides in part: "In the event of a divorce, dissolution of marriage or legal separation, the parties hereto shall have such rights and incidents in said joint property as arc applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland." 8. Paragraph 3 of the Antenuptial Agreement specifically provides: In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to federal, military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. 9. Each party holds accounts in their separate name. 10. The parties disagree as to whether certain of these accounts arc to be excluded from equitable distribution based on their Antcnuptial Agreement. 11. The accounts at issue arc as follows: (a) Member's First IRA 25008, owned by Husband; (b) Member's First IRA 59355, owned by Wife; (c) USAA IRA 634707AA, owned by Husband; and (d) American Express IRA, owned by Husband, consisting of account nos.: 0010 6806 1039 0 002 0010 7806 1039 9 002 0011 2806 1039 2 002 0011 9806 1039 5 002 0012 5806 1039 7 002 0013 1806 1039 9 002 5587-14 (e) T.Rowe Price Trust Company accounts, 4010051180-2 and 4010051178-9 owned by Wife: (0 Copeland account 011 302 76, owned by Wife. 12. The accounts referenced in paragraphs I I(a), 11(c) and I I(d) above contain funds transferred from Defendant's 401(k) with prior employers. The following amounts transferred and the growth on these funds since deposit arc Defendant's separate property and not subject to distribution: (a) 529,245.84 transferred on or about August 13, 1991 from Nationwide 401(k); (b) $12,699 transferred on or about October 8, 1996 from Tracor, Inc. 401(k); (c) $60,008.64 transferred on or about December 2, 1998 from Tracor, Inc. 401(k); (d) $20,526.87 transferred on or about December 15, 1998 from Diverse Technologies Corp.; and (e) The USAA account in II(c) was opened in April, 1996 with funds from Defendant's Member's First account in 11(a). WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this court enter a declaratory judgment determining whether certain accounts owned by the parties as set forth above are to be included for purposes of equitable distribution. Respectfully submitted, S111CEL, ANDERSON & Si CKS Date: February 6, 2001 By: LeRoy Smige , Esquire, I.D. tt 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire, I.D. tt 70259 i 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 ' Attorneys for Defendant t ? y ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT This Antenuptial Agreement made this day of , 1954, between LEO 0. CHARRON, JR., and BEVERLY E. MARTIN. WITNESSETHs WHEREAS, the parties hereto are contemplating marrying each other, and WHEREAS, they desire and Intend to establish their mutual property rights now and for the future, and to guarantee to each individual ownership in and to all property and estate which each now owns or subsequently may acquire, and WHEREAS, the parties have discussed their property rights with each other and have made such disclosure of assets to one another as the parties deem desirable, and WHEREAS, the real and personal property owned by each of the parties Is set forth in Exhibit A and B, attached hereto and made a part of this Agreement. NOW THEREPORE, in consideration of the marriage of the parties hereto, and intending to be legally bound,'the parties agree as followas 1. All property and estate of the parties hereto, of every nature, and wheresoever situate, acquired by each of the parties before their marriage shall be and remain forever the individual property and estate of the party so owning and acquiring it and neither of the parties shall acquire any interest in the individual property and estate of the other acquired before the marriage, because of their subsequent marital relationship; and each shall hold and possess all such property and estate as if he and she had remained unmarried. .2. Each of the parties hereby disclaims all right, title and interest in all property and estate now owned which has been acquired by the other before their marriage renouncing forever all claims to the separate estate of the other Including all right of dower, curtsey, family exemption, to elect against the will or conveyances, or to receive a share of the estate under the Intestate laws, with regard to such previously acquired property. _2_ 3. In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, Including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. 4. All property, rights to property or less than absolute interest therein created by the parties subsequent to their marriage, shall be considered the joint property of the parties and the same shall be subject to all of the laws, claims and Incidence of such joint property as defined by the laws of the State of Marylandl except that it is expressly understood that this provision shall not apply to motor vehicles acquired by the parties after their marriage. In the event of a divorce, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation the parties hereto shall have such rights and incidence in said joint property as are applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland. In the event of death of either of the parties the normal laws of inheritance shall apply to such jointly acquired property as limited by paragraph 6(b) (4) hereof. 5. a. Each of the parties will contribute a sum certain toward the purchase and initial redecoration of a marital abode which they shall own as tenants by the entirety. The amount each party contributes shall be not forth in a document which shall subsequently be executed by both parties and appended to, and made a part of, this agreement. b. In the event the parties dissolve their marriage, upon the sale of said abode all outstanding mortgages, liens, taxes due thereon, and closing costs and fees shall be promptly paid. The remainder of the proceeds realized from the sale shall be distributed between the parties as follows, -3- (1) Each party will recover his or her initial contribution without interest. (2) Any proceeds remaining after each party has fully recovered his or her said contribution will be distributed evenly between the parties. (3) Capital gains taxes, if any, will be assessed in equal shares between the parties. (4) In the event that one of the parties predeceases the sale of the said abode, the surviving party will take all necessary steps to assure that upon said sale, or upon the surviving party's death, expressly recognizing the surviving parties right to live in the house, whichever event occurs first, a sum of money equivalent to one half (1/2) of the fair market value of said abode at the time of sale or death, whichever is applicavle, minus the above-cited costs and expenses, is distributed in equal shares to the heirs or legatees of the predeceased party, excluding the surviving party, provided, that if the parties were not pending divorce at the time of death of the predeceased party and if the abode is not sold, that portion of the proceeds which is reinvested in another abode shall be exempt from said distribution. c. The above provisions shall apply to the initial marital abode and to any subsequent abodes, purchased from funds reinvested from the sale of said initial abode. 6. Each of the parties agree to join in any deed, or in the execution of any paper necessary to effect the sale of real estate or to assist the other in the administration or sale of his or her individual property and estate. 7. Nothing herein shall be construed as preventing either of the parties from giving any of his or her property or estate to the other by deed, gift, will or otherwise. -4- 8. This Agreement is entered into in Maryland and shall bi construed under and in accordance with the laws of Maryland and shall in no way be effected by any change in domicile of either party. 9. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective parties, their heirs, leagatees, devisees, personal representatives and assigns, notwithstanding the extent or size of the parties' individual estates at the time of the execution of this Agreement or subsequently. 10. Each party has had independent advice by counsel of his or her own selection. Each party regards the terms of this agreement as fair and reasonable and each has signed it freely and voluntarily without relying upon any representation other than those expressly set forth herein. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. WITNESSt 001 M2 l (SEAL) eo . Cron] 1..,? AIU.U.,.Xt? .. /I(a•?f1. (SEAL) Bever y erETn PENNSYLVANIA, CUMBERLAND STATE OF mnaaIOOIND, WOSM121=10 COUNTY, to-witt- I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this Sthday of isnuery 198 4, personally appeared Leo D. Charron, who made oath in due form of law that the matters and facts set forth above are true and correct to the beet of his information, knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and Official Notarial Seal. Notary ru •1 My commission Expirest avxVoacpOZ9UKG November 10, 1986 MANY ANSI 111m, 14TANY PYIIIC CIIUIII 1010. CUMIIIWID COUNTY MY CM911110N (IFIIHI NOV. It lots .0,mw,, h nyInds AuwYUm of 1011111 -5- STATE OF MARYLAND, WASHINGTON COUNTY, to-wit:- I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ..?,t0/ day of ,J t4uz'Uy f 198y , personally appeared Beverly E. Martin, wKKKo made th in due form of law that the matters and facts set forth in the above are true and correct to the best of her information, knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and official notarial Seal. No? tary Public My Commission Expires: July 1, 1966 i f y ,?r4 ' r ?t Ii EXHIBIT A PROPERTY OWNED BY LEO D. CHARRON I, REAL ESTATE 1. 8228 Clifton Farm Court, Alexandria, Virginia being more fully described in a certain deed recorded in the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia in Deed Book 4955, Page 282 subject to the mortgage held by Arvida Mortgage Company, Clearwater, Florida. 2. 1114 Pheasant Drive, North, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in a certain deed recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "K," Volume 29, Page 237, subject to the mortgage held by First United Federal, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. 3. 1160 Belvedere Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, formerly 302 Circle Drive, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in the deed of John D. Keeney, Jr. and Anna Marie Keeney to Leo D. Charron as recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "I," Volume 30, Page 574 subject to the mortgage held by Carlisle Building and Loan Association. ii. Deed of Trust dated October 27, 1989, between Miriam Virginia Lucas, Grantor, and Robert V. Moss and Patricia C. Broyles, Trustees, in the principal sum of $43,500.00 and recorded in the 'Clerk's Office of Montgomery County, Maryland in Liber 5600 Folio 641. III. One-sixth (1/6) undivided interest in the Joint Venture Agreement for the MBC Investment Group. IV. Bonds and Accounts 1. Twenty-five (25) - $75.00 savings bonds in various sta- tes of maturity. 2. Cavanough Corporate bonds with a face value of $1,800.00. 3, Share account number 25008 with U.S. Defense Activities Federal Credit Union, with a balance of $17,400 as of 5 December 1983, part of which is to be used towards the purchase and rede- coration of a marital abode as set forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. V. insurance policies (beneficiary three children of a Farmers Trust Company prior marriage, to wit: Leo Desire Charron III, Catherine Marie Charron, and Michelle Elizabeth Char)life insurance 1, $35,000.00 servicemen's group 2, Two (2) $30,000.00 term policies with State Farm Insurance 3, $15,000.00 whole life policy with Army Mutual Aid 4, $10,000.00 whole life policy with USAA VI, Automobiles 1, 1983 Ford Mustang 2, 1976 Ford Station Wagon VII. Other Personal Property 1, Syracuse China 2, Stamp Collection 3, Coin Collection 4, Oil Paintings 5, Thomas organ 6, 25" RCA color television set 7, 19" RCA color television set 8. Antique 14K gold railroad watch 9. Antique pool table 10. Three (3) Hummel.figurines. EXHIBIT B PROPERTY OWNED BY BEVERLY E. MARTIN 1. PERSONAL PROPERTY 1. Kirk silver service 2. Lenox china 3. Assorted items of fine jewelry including, but not limited to, diamond engagement ring, diamond earings, opal ring, 14K gold chains, 14K gold bracelets. 4. Bedroom suite 5. Dining room set including table, hutch and four (4) chairs 6. Ranch mink fur coat 7. Two (1) leather English riding saddles 8. 1980 Toyota automobile II. Retirement plan with Western Maryland Review III. Various bank accounts of de minimis value IV. $48,000.00 in cash which proceeds resulted from the sale of real property in Hagerstown, Maryland, and part of which is to be used towards the purchase and redecoration of a marital abode as set forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. a 40CFX/6CA04 7ORS {F,c'iaSGRtP? *,4V foNie COAoR 7E7EV1f1one .SET AA YTX6 &JA.sffi!rR. AAIJ) ORY6T. a 5rl?-. ?.RmAs., yokf VERIFICATION I, Leo D. Charon, verify that the statements contained in the foregoing pleading are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities. Date: d I Q a' LEO D. CH tON 5587.14 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO.99.6426 : CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, LcRoy Smigcl, Esquire, attorney for Defendant in the abovc•captioned matter, do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Declaratory Judgment on counsel for Plaintiff by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the _jDay of February, 2001, addressed as follows: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Smigel, Anderson & S cks By: LeRoy Smigcl, Esquire I.D. #09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. #70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant r- c ; r: Cli rG -- '7 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant No. 99-6826 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 31st day of December, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's Petition for Bifurcation of. Divorce, and pursuant to an agreement reached in open court in which Plaintiff was represented by Samuel L. Andes, Esquire, and Defendant was represented by Leroy Smigel, Esquire, and Ann V. Levin, Esquire, it is ordered and directed as follows: 1. The parties will present contemporaneously an order to modify and vacate portions of orders previously entered in this case which are dated October 21, 1999, and October 28, 1999. 2. The Defendant's Petition for Bifurcation is hereby granted, and the Court will enter a decree upon presentation of the appropriate documents either under Section 3301(c) or Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code, upon a praecipe to transmit the record. 3. The Court reserves jurisdiction over any economic claims which have been raised in this action or which may be raised before the Master, and the parties are directed to move the Court for the appointment of the Master if they cannot resolve the remaining economic issues. '8a6muel L. Andes, Esquire For the Plaintiff -/ 1 Le oy Smigel, Esquire .2n; V. Levin, Esquire For the Defendant wcy By the Court, Of 02 JAIN 29 fill I: 13 CU„6EALA'IJ C`Uiti7Y PENASc kvAAiI SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW ANN V. LEVIN, ESQUIRE PHONE: (717) 4114•!401 TOLL FREE: 14MU11.9757 FACSIMILE (717)114.0011 EMAIL: elevinesasllp.com www.sasllp.com File No. 5587-1-4 June 5, 2002 E. Robert Elicker, II, Esquire Office of Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Re: Charron v. Charron NO. 99 - 6426 Dear Mr. Elicker: Enclosed please find a Pre-Trial Statement filed on behalf of the Defendant. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at your earliest convenience. Very truly yours, ?A? Ann V. Levin AVL/mek Enclosure cc: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire Leo Charron Riverchase Office Center. 3r4 Floor. 4431 North Front Street. Harrisbura. Pennsylvania 17110 A PENNSYLVANIA LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY STATE OF ?»- PENNA. BEVERLY E. CHARRON PLAINTIFF N O. 99-6426 VERSUS LEO D. CHARRON DECREE IN DIVORCE AND NOW, J?R7U?1 `-, L / , 2602 , IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED THAT BEVERLY E. CHARRON , PLAINTIFF, AND LEO D. CHARRON DEFENDANT, ARE DIVORCED FROM THE BONDS OF MATRIMONY. THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OF THE FOLLOWING CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED OF RECORD IN THIS ACTION FOR WHICH A FINAL ORDER HAS NOT YET BEEN ENTERED; Frn,i ahl - rlis rih,t-ion, counsel fees and Pmncps BY THE.C PROTHONOTARY rede x:31 •O? SJ_ BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.-6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Transmit the record, together with the following information, to the Court for entry of a divorce decree: 1. Ground for divorce: Irretrievable breakdown under §3301(c) of the Divorcc Codc. 2. Date and manner of service of the Complaint: Complaint was filed on or about October 21, 1999 and served on Defendant over one (1) year ago. An Acceptance of Service was filed with the Court on November 9, 1999. 3. Affidavits of consent required by §3301(c) of the Divorce Code for both Plaintiff and Defendant arc being filed simultaneously with the filing of this Praccipe. (a) Date of execution of the affidavit required by §3301(d) of the Divorce Code: N/A. (b) Date of filing and service of the Affidavit upon the respondent: N/A. 4. Related claims pending: Equitable distribution, counsel fees and expenses. 5. Complete either (a), (b) or (c). (a) Date and manner of service of the Notice of Intention to File Praccipe to Transmit Record, a copy of which is attached: N/A. (b) Plaintiffs Waiver of Notice in §3301(c) Divorce is being filed with the Prothonotary simultaneously with the filing of this Praccipe. (c) Defendant's Waiver of Notice in §3301(c) Divorce is being filed with the Prothonotary simultaneously with the filing of this Praccipe. SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS Date: January 17, 2002 By: LeRoy Smigel, Esquire I.D. # 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. # 70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant 3 y o- } i c v j C a„ ?' C7 S N u - ^ C Z CJ ;l 'n4 k , p ? v;y '4 Y r?Sr: iaL U 5?. ji V 1 L4 'ter ? ? ?????111 V n 1 L 7 0 N ? A f ? .T S y ., d a J p ? i 0 6i V1 ri o ? s. m BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. NO. 99- let-la(o CIVIL TERM LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the foregoing pages, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a decree in divorce or annulment may be entered against you by the court. A judgment may also be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for the divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at: Office of the Prothonotary Cumberland County Court House 1 Courthouse Square Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 TRUE n Fi IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF PROPERTY, LAWYER'S FEES OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 2 Liberty Avenue OPY FROM RECORD Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 I here UMO ad my hand Telephone: (717) 249.3166 lot 564 Court at cadJ'*, FL- Dday - -?? I BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99- L'/.J(, CIVIL TERM LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant THE WITHIN-NAMED DEFENDANT: IN DIVORCE You have been named as the Defendant in a Complaint in a divorce proceeding filed in Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County. This notice is to advise you that in accordance with Section 3302(d) of the Divorce Code, you may request that the court require you and your spouse to attend marriage counseling prior to a divorce being handed down by the court. A list of professional marriage counselors is available at the Domestic Office, 13 North Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. You are advised that this is kept as a convenience to you and you are not bound to choose a counselor from this All necessary arrangements and the cost of counseling sessions are to be borne by you and your spouse. If you desire to pursue counseling, you must make your request for counseling within enty days of the date on which you receive this notice. Failure to do so will constitute a iver of your right to request counseling. 1 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99- 41/-)L CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE AND NOW comes the above-named Plaintiff, BEVERLY E. CHARRON, by her attorney, Samuel L. Andes, and makes the following Complaint in Divorce: 1. The Plaintiff Is BEVERLY E. CHARRON, an adult individual who resides in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. The Defendant is LEO D. CHARRON, an adult individual who currently resides at 581 Crossroad School Road, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant have been bona fide residents of the Common- wealth of Pennsylvania for at least six months immediately previous to the filing of this Complaint. 4. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on 7 January 1984 in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 5. There have been no prior actions of divorce or annulment between the parties. 6. This marriage is irretrievably broken. 3 7. Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of marriage counseling and the Plaintiff have the right to request that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. 8. The Plaintiff requests this Court to enter a Decree of Divorce. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court to enter a decree in divorce pursuant to the Code of Pennsylvania. 9. During the course of the marriage, the parties have acquired numerous items of property, both real and personal, which are held in joint names and in the individual names of each of the parties hereto. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Honorable Court, after requiring full disclosure by the Defendant, to equitably divide the property, both real and personal, owned by the parties hereto as marital property. 10. Plaintiff is without sufficient funds to retain counsel to represent her in this matter. 11. Without competent counsel, Plaintiff cannot adequately prosecute her claims against Defendant and cannot adequately litigate her rights in this matter. 4 12. Defendant enjoys a substantial income and is well able to bear the expense of attorney and the expenses of this litigation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Honorable Court to order Defendant to pay the legal and expenses incurred by Plaintiff in the litigation of this action. I verify that the statements made in this Complaint are true and correct. I understand any false statements in this Complaint are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. 4904 falsification to authorities). TE: W. X9,1999 `-Pu(c,L& 1. , LZ4 ?o-,J BEVERLY CHARRON . Sami el L. Ande?v' Attorney for Plaintiff Supreme Court ID 17225 525 North 12th Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 5 BEVERLY E. CHARRON,: Plaintiff V. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 5a' day of November, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's Petition To Vacate Order and of the attached letter from Ann V. Levin, Esq., attorney for Defendant, a Rule is hereby issued upon Plaintiff to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted. RULE RETURNABLE within 20 days of service. BY THE COURT, Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North 12`h Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff Ann V. Levin, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 Attorney for Defendant ?.u I U? '17y , L, 11 :rc i r UI1107-6 Ali 9, fly PcBLN5M%4%%'A Int. r y I' Y -a ¢ y ? lk s da ?.?4 Fac{, r t BEVERLY E. CHARRON,: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 51h day of November, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's Petition To Vacate Order and of the attached letter from Ann V. Levin, Esq., attorney for Defendant, a Rule is hereby issued upon Plaintiff to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted. RULE RETURNABLE within 20 days of service. BY THE COURT, Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North 12th Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff Ann V. Levin, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 Attorney for Defendant :rc NOV-02-01 13:16 FROM-SMIGEL.ANDERSON 6 SACKS SMIGEL9 ANDERSON & SACKS UP ATTORNEYS AT LAW ANN V. LEVIN, ESQUIRE PHONES (717)234-Ml TOLL FREE: 14004822.9757 PACeVULE (717) Z3"511 RMAIL, &Iavr.Oo„enp.oom I ww on -11P 00M Pilo No. 5587-1-4 November 2, 2001 no Honorable J. Wesley 01er Cumberland County Court House Onc Court House Square Carlisle, PA 17013 Re: Charron v. Charron No. 99-6426 Dear Judge Olen This correspondence is rent in follow-up to the Petition to Vacate Order. Attorney Andes has advised my office that he is unable to agree to the Order being vacated at this time and will need to speak with his client regarding that. Accordingly, it would be appreciated if a Rule to Show Cause would be entered Attorney Andes is in agreement with the Rule being entered. Thank you for you& atterdiult to this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. Very truly yours, Ann V. Levin AVrJcjw Enclosure cc: Samuel L, Andes, Esquire TAn Charron 1172313611 T-172 P.02/03 F-600 2917 North Front Sttwt. Harriebu>a. Pennevlvenle 17110.1260 A PL'NNaYLVANIA LtMIT6n LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA LEO D. CHARRON, V. : No. 99-6426 DEFENDANT : CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE ORDER AND NOW, this day of , 2001, upon the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Order, the October 21, 1999 and October 28, 1999 Orders arc hereby amended as follows: The October 21, 1999 Order is hereby vacated in its entirety. 2. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the October 28, 1999 Order are hereby vacated. USAA shall remove any holds that have been placed on accounts owned by the Plaintiff. Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them. These accounts shall be accessible to the respective account owner to access and manage as he/she deems appropriate. 4. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc. shall remove any holds that have been placed on accounts owned by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them. These accounts shall be accessible to the respective account owner to access and manage as he/she deems appropriate. 5. Members First Federal Credit Union shall remove any holds that have been placed on IRAs owned by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron. These accounts shall be accessible to the respective account owner to access and manage as he/she deems appropriate. 3387.1-t 6. Members First Federal Credit Union shall not permit any party to withdraw•funds . from, transfer, or exchange ownership of any of the non-IRA accounts in existence prior to October 15, 1999 held by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Lco D. Charron, or either of them except as permitted by paragraph 5 of the October 28, 1998 Order and the January 19, 2000 Order, which require the written consent of both parties or further order of court. Accounts opened with Members First Federal Credit Union after October 15, 1999 shall be accessible to the respective account owner to access and manage as he/she deems appropriate. BY THE COURT: J. IAVI/cjw//Petition to Vacate rhderOctober It. 20015,06 PM , BEVERLY E. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO VACATE ORDER AND NOW, comes Defendant, Lco D. Charron, by and through his counsel, Smigel, Anderson & Sacks, LLP, and avers as follows: 1. Prior Court Orders were entered in this matter on October 21, 1999 and October 28, 1999. (See attached Exhibits A and B) 2. An Order was entered on January 19, 2000 which modified the October 28, 1999 Order to allow the parties to access a particular account upon agreement. (See attached Exhibit C) 3. Defendant filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment regarding accounts that had been frozen by the Orders of Court referenced above. (A copy of the Motion for Declaratory Judgment is attached as Exhibit D) 3. On or about May 18, 2001, the Honorable J. Wesley Olcr, Jr. granted Defendant's Motion and declared that the IRA and accounts at issue in the Motion were not subject to equitable distribution. (A copy of Judge Oler's order is attached hereto as Exhibit E). S. Defendant now desires to resume control of the accounts frozen by the aforementioned October, 1999 Orders. Defendant is unable to do so until the prior Orders of 5587.14 6. Defendant has been advised by the financial institutions that an Order vacating the. October, 1999 Orders must be submitted before he will be permitted to exercise any control over the accounts. Counsel for Defendant has prepared an Order consistent with Judge Oler's Order regarding Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 8. Defendant's proposed Order will allow Plaintiff and Defendant to access those accounts which, pursuant to Judge Oler's Order, are not subject to equitable distribution. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Honorable Court sign the attached Order which is consistent with Judge Oler's Order regarding Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. Respectfully submitted, Date: /D • l1- 1L_ SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS, LLP I.D. #70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 LeRoy Smigel, Esquire I.D. #09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire Attorneys for Defendant 5587.14 1 BEVERLY B. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF ; CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Ann V. Levin, Esquire, hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition to Vacate Order upon counsel for Plaintiff as addressed below by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the I 1 th day of October, 2001. Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 SMICEL, ANDERSON & SACKS, LLP By: LcRo Smigcl, Esquire I.D. #09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. #70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant t , VERIFICATION 1, Leo D. Chatron, verify that the statements contained in the foregoing pleading arc true and correct to the best of my knowledge, infomtation and belief. I understand that false statements therein arc made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: ct? r OLC? LEO D. C ON .kT(?y4?}Y.YY3iYY'n+914YA?G?:Tm`rnmm?vi+-.araa a+?....?..-.-?-,_.:t i .. i C ri3 I k S. t zl ' ?(+ 124N i??i„± d oor rv. 3F -a {f } t hn4,? ¢? ? y ?iyb t ?' ou 1 4 J CUU1 E , Uw A 21 1999 I (7• z(Q_? ?J y `SS a7. 1. 1 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON Plaintiff ) PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY , 1 PENNSYLVANIA 1 VS. ) CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-L.YZo CIVIL TERM LEO D. CHARRON, 1 Defendant 1 IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW this olII&day of (S2t;" " , 1999, upon consideration of the attached petition, we hereby order and direct as follows: 1. A hearing is hereby scheduled, to be held before the undersigned in Court Room No. / of the Cumberland County Court House in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the attached petition, such hearing to commence at 3. 'do o'clock -e.m., on i2 , the _Y %k day of e?zcc. Gc ` 1999. 2. Pending such hearing, the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or his representative, shall not dispose of, sell, liquidate, transfer, or change ownership of, or otherwise conceal or dissipate, the assets held by Plaintiff and Defendant, or either of them, with USAA, American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., and Members First Federal Credit Union or any other financial asset or account held or controlled by him. 3. Pending the hearing scheduled above, USAA shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. 4. Pending the hearing scheduled above, American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that Institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both,Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. 5. Pending the hearing scheduled above, Members First Federal Credit Union shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. BY THE COURT, J. Y f ;fn Exhibit 8 ?S t.- fir ?Oti.Yrr?'."'FSbk.W-?H-1: ..,f r?Pa. .i ? ,. ?-.. e,.;i..':i ? ,r.,. .;i?• .,Y^"?v..s'43[+$Yj? `?' llC1 k .1 aul p BEVERLY E. CHARRON, ) Plaintiff ) ) vs. ) ) LEO D. CHARRON, ) Defendant ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW this c9VA day of t1 _??j1999, upon the stipulation of the parties and their attorneys which is attached hereto, we hereby amend and modify our order of October 21, 1999, as follows: ; 1. A hearing is hereby scheduled, to be held before the undersigned in II it i Court Room No. 1 of the Cumberland County Courthouse in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, such hearing to commence at 3:00 o'clock p.m., on Wednesday, the 8"' day of December, 1999. 2. Pending such hearing, the Defendant, Leo D. Charron or his !>:` representative shall not depose of, sell, liquidate, transfer, or change ownership of, or otherwise conceal or dissipate the assets held by Plaintiff and Defendant, or either of them, with USAA or American Express Financial Advisors, Inc. i 3. Pending the hearing scheduled above, USAA shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. ; BEVERLY E. CHARRON, ) Plaintiff ) ) VS. ) ) LEO D. CHARRON, ) Defendant ) UCH t tWl hd IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW this c97+A day of.Lta'd 1999, upon the stipulation of the parties and their attorneys which is attached hereto, we hereby amend and modify our order of October 21, 1999, as follows: 1. A hearing is hereby scheduled, to be held before the undersigned in Court Room No. 1 of the Cumberland County Courthouse in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, such hearing to commence at 3:00 o'clock p.m., on Wednesday, the 8°i day of December, 1999. 2. Pending such hearing, the Defendant, Leo D. Charron or his representative shall not depose of, sell, liquidate, transfer, or change ownership of, or otherwise conceal or dissipate the assets held by Plaintiff and Defendant, or either of them, with USAA or American Express Financial Advisors, Inc. 3. Pending the hearing scheduled above, USAA shall not permit any party U II i' I to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. it r I? ?I :i 4 Pending the hearing scheduled above, American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. 5 Each of the parties shall withdraw and place into an account in their own name $8,000.00 of the funds which were in their joint accounts at the Members First Federal Credit Union as of October 18, 1999. The balance of those funds, which should be approximately $27,000.00, will be deposited by Wife into an account at the Members First Federal Credit Union held in the joint names of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The parties may use the funds from that account to pay the cost to continue their present health insurance. Otherwise, pending further order of this Court, neither party shall make any withdrawals from or make any change in the ownership of the joint account opened in accordance with this paragraph. Distribution: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire (Attorney for Plaintiff) 525 North 12"' Street, Lemoyne, PA 17043 LeRoy Smigel, Esquire (Attorney for Defendant 2917 North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110 BY THE COURT, 1AVWd/0rder/Januxry 14,2D00 4:15 PM BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT OCT z zotn : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO, 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE 1000, the Order dated AND NOW, this ,L9 day of ;M 7 1 October 28, 1999 shall remain in full force and effect with the following modification to paragraph 5: (a) The parties shall use funds from the joint account at Members First Federal Credit Union to pay for repairs to the jointly-owned rental property. The parties shall also use funds from this account to pay for property appraisals for purposes of the pending divorce action. The total withdrawals for repairs and appraisals shall not exceed 510,000. (b) Both parties shall be required to consent prior to withdrawals from this account for either repairs or appraisals. (c) No other withdrawals shall be made from this account until further order of court or agreement of the parties. Distribution: Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff LeRoy Smigel, Esq./Ann V. Levin. Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorneys for Defendant BY THE COURT: 4J fg-,, It 8 D J. .JI01.1-1 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE 2LioD AND NOW, this t_ day of T)eu t , "", counsel for ilia parties In the above-referenced action hereby stipulate and agree that the Order attached hereto encompasses the intent of their respective clients and that it may be adopted as it Court Order. SMIGEL, ANDERSON &SACKS By; "-?L V 'Cl Le oy Smigel, Esquire I.D. No. 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. No. 70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 LAW OFFICES OF SAMU4- ?*'?uel L . ANDES By: r?? L. Andes, Esquire I.D. No. -J-q_j 5 525 North Twclllh Strect Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 761.5361 Attorneys for Defendant Attomcy for Plaintiff .r..?..tee,.....-,.n..?.m...a.waa+rs. K...';.tr.r.ka,;a?a}v ..:„'r ,i ,4. .u;;.? ....? :. ,.:. ,. a.r i 1'-• ? _, :. 1'(:: BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE DEFENDANT ORDE AND NOW, this day of . 2001, upon consideration of the attached Motion for Declaratory Judgment, oral argument on this matter is scheduled for the day of 2001, at o'clock, _.m., Courtroom No. , Cumberland County Courthouse, 1 Courthouse Square, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The parties shall file Briefs in support of their respective positions within days prior to the scheduled argument. BY THE COURT: J. /AVLAU/Motion for Declaratory JudgmrnV2f7R001 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE C-) c -• MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND NOW, comes Defendant, Leo D. Charron, by and through his attorneys, Smige7l Anderson & Sacks, and avers as follows: 1. Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, is an adult individual who resides in Cum; crlQ County, Pennsylvania. 2. Defendant, Leo D. Charron, is an adult individual who resides at 581 Crossroad School Road, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Divorce on or about October 21, 1999 containing a count for equitable distribution. 4. This is an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §7531 et seq., for the purpose of determining a question of actual controversy between the parties as hereinafter set forth. Jurisdiction of this action is based on 42 Pa.C.S. §7532 which provides that Pennsylvania courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, have power under the Declaratory Judgments Act to declare rights, status, and other legal relations and declaratory judgments may be procured in Pennsylvania courts, including court of common pleas, which has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and only in those courts which have subject matter jurisdiction. 5597.14 6. The parties executed an Antcnuptial Agreement on or about January 5, 1984. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A. 7. Paragraph 4 of the Antenuptial Agreement provides in part: "In the event of a divorce, dissolution of marriage or legal separation, the parties hereto shall have such rights and incidents in said joint property as arc applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland." 8. Paragraph 3 of the Antenuptial Agreement specifically provides: In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to federal, military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. 9. Each party holds accounts in their separate name. 10. The parties disagree as to whether certain of these accounts are to be excluded from equitable distribution based on their Antenuptial Agreement. 11. The accounts at issue are as follows: (a) Member's First IRA 25008, owned by Husband; (b) Member's First IRA 59355, owned by Wife; (c) USAA IRA 634707AA, owned by Husband; and (d) American Express IRA, owned by Husband, consisting of account nos.: 0010 6806 0010 7806 0011 2806 0011 9806 0012 5806 0013 1806 1039 0 002 1039 9 002 1039 2 002 1039 5 002 1039 7 002 1039 9 002 3597-1-t (c) T.Rowc Price Trust Company accounts, 4010051180-2 and 4010051178.9 owned by Wife: (f) Copeland account 011 302 76, owned by Wife. 12. The accounts referenced in paragraphs I1(a), 11(c) and 11(d) above contain funds transferred from Defendant's 401(k) with prior employers. The following amounts transferred and the growth on these funds since deposit are Defendant's separate property and not subject to distribution: (a) $29,245.84 transferred on or about August 13, 1991 from Nationwide 401(k); (b) $12,699 transferred on or about October 8, 1996 from Tracor, Inc. 401(k); (c) $60,008.64 transferred on or about December 2, 1998 from Tracor, Inc. 401(k); (d) $20,526.87 transferred on or about December 15, 1998 from Diverse Technologies Corp.; and (e) The USAA account in II(c) was opened in April, 1996 with funds from Defendant's Member's First account in I I(a). WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this court enter a declaratory judgment determining whether certain accounts owned by the parties as set forth above are to be included for purposes of equitable distribution. Respectfully submitted, SMIGEL, ANDERSON & S CKS Date: February 6, 2001 By: LeRzoyy quire, I.D. # 09617 Smige 6AZ-- Ann V. Levin, Esquire, I.D. It 70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT This Antenuptial Agreement made this day of , 1981, between LEO D. CHARPON, JR., and BEVERLY E. MARTIN. WITNESSETHt WHEREAS, the parties hereto are contemplating marrying each other, and WHEREAS, they desire and intend to establish their mutual property rights now and for the future, and to guarantee to each individual ownership in and to all property and estate which each now owns or subsequently may acquire, and WHEREAS, the parties have discussed their property rights with each other and have made such disclosure of assets to one another as the parties deem desirable, and WHEREAS, the real and personal property owned by each of the parties is set forth in Exhibit A and e, attached hereto and made a part of this Agreement. NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the marriage of the ' parties hereto, and intending to be legally bound,'the parties agree as followae 1. All property and estate of the parties hereto, of every nature, and wheresoever situate, acquired by each of the parties before their marriage shall be and remain forever the individual property and estate of the party so owning and acquiring it and neither of the parties shall acquire any interest in the individual property and estate of the other acquired before the marriage, because of their subsequent marital relationships and each shall hold and possess all such property and estate as if he and she had remained unmarried. 2. Each of the parties hereby disclaims all right, title and interest in all property and estate now owned which has been acquired by the other before their marriage renouncing forever all claims to the separate estate of the other including all right of dower, curtesy, family exemption, to elect against the will or conveyances, or to receive a share of the estate under the intestate laws, with regard to such previously acquired property. . •2- • ). in the event of a divorce each of the pacties•hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. 4. All property, rights to property or lees than absolute interest therein created by the parties subsequent to their marriage, shall be considered the joint property of the parties and the same shall be subject to all of the laws, claims and incidence of such joint property as defined by the laws of the State of Marylandi except that it is expressly understood that this provision shall not apply to motor vehicles acquired by the parties after their marriage. In the event of a divorce, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation the parties hereto shall have such rights and incidence in said joint property as are applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland. In the event of death of either of the parties the normal laws of inheritance shall apply to such jointly acquired property as limited by paragraph 6(b) (4) hereof. 5. a. Each of the parties will contribute a sum certain toward the purchase and initial redecoration of a marital abode which they shall own as tenants by the entirety. The amount each party contributes shall be set forth in a document which shall subsequently be executed by both parties and appended to, and made a part of, this agreement. b. In the event the parties dissolve their marriage, upon the sale of said abode all outstanding mortgages, liens, taxes due thereon, and closing costs and fees shall be promptly paid. The remainder of the proceeds realized from the sale shall be distributed between the parties as follows, -1- (1) Each party will recover hie or her initial contribution without interest. (2) Any proceeds remaining after each party has fully recovered his or her said contribution will be distributed evenly between the parties. (1) Capital gains taxes, if any, will be assessed in equal shares between the parties. (4) In the event that one of the parties predeceases the able of the said abode, the surviving party will take all necessary steps to assure that upon said sale, or upon the surviving party's death, expressly recognising the surviving parties right to live in the house, whichever event occurs first, a sum of money equivalent to one half (1/2) of the fair market value of said abode at the time of sale or death, whichever is appllcavle, minus the above-cited coats and expenses, is distributed in equal shares to the heirs or legatees of the predeceased party, excluding the surviving party, provided, that if the parties were not pending divorce at the time of death of the predeceased party and if the abode is not sold, that portion of the proceeds which Is reinvested in another abode shall be exempt from said distribution. c. The above provisions shall apply to the initial marital abode and to any subsequent abodes, purchased from funds reinvested from the sale of said initial abode. 6. Each of the parties agree to join in any deed, or in the execution of any paper necessary to effect the sale of real estate or to assist the other in the administration or sale of his or her individual property and estate. 7. Nothing herein shall be construed as preventing either of the parties from giving any of his or her property or estate to the other by deed, gift, will or otherwise. -4- . 8. This Agreement is entered into in Maryland and shall be construed under and in accordance with the laws of Maryland and shall in no way be effected by any change in domicile of either party. 9. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective parties, their heirs, leagatees, devisees, personal representatives and assigns, notwithstanding the extent or size of the parties' individual estates at the time of the execution of this Agreement or subsequently. 10. Each party has had independent advice by counsel of his or her own selection. Each party regards the terms of this agreement as fair and reasonable and each has signed it freely and voluntarily without relying upon any representation other than those expressly set forth herein. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. WITHESSt ( (SEAL) eo Cron Aever4y4X-nbrn- PENNSYLVANIA, t,4,CeZ (SEAL) CUMBERLAND STATE OF MI1gXWND, W82MIMO0m1A COUNTY, to-witt- I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this Sthday of January 198 4, personally appeared Leo D. Charron, who made oath in due above are true mof law ahtrnfand and correct to the beat of his Information, knowledge belief. WITNESS my hand and Official Notarial Seal. d o OIy u c My Commission Expires ,Iyy1prpown Havesber 10, 1986 UW AN1191110. NOWT ?UIUC C"USH I420. C011111WO COUNTY my C"1111191011 will$ MY. it His /,alw, rew,Tlw,l, Atudia e,l NeuUn -5- STATE OF MARYLAND, WASHINGTON COUNTY, to-wits- I I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ?tcj day of a 24ettee?. 1901/ , personally appeared Beverly E. Martin, wKKo made J th in due form of law that the matters and facts set forth In the above are true and correct to the beet of her information, knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and official Notarial Beall. notary Public My Commission Expires: July 1, 1906 19: .n . EXHIBIT A PROPERTY OWNED BY LEO D. CHARRON I, REAL ESTATE Farm Court, Alexandria, Virginia being more 1, 8228 Clifton nd records of fully described in a certain deed recorded in the la Fairfax County, Virginia in Deed Book 4955, Page 282 Clearwater, to the mortgage held by Arvida Mortgage Company, Florida. . 2. 1114 Pheasant Drive, North, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in a certain deed recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "K," Volume 29, Page 237, subject to the mortgage held by First United Federal, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. 3, 1160 Belvedere Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, formerly 302 Circle Drive, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in the deed of John D. Keeney, Jr. and Anna Marie Keeney to Leo D. Charron as recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Dees held Deed CaBook rlisle/BUildinq and Loan 574 subject to the mortgage Association. between Miriam Virginia II. Deed of Trust dated October 27, 1989, Lucas, Grantor, and, Robert V. Moss and Patricia C. Broyles, the Trustees, in the principal um of $43ain Liberd5600nFolio 'Clerk's Office of Montgomery County, Maryland 641. III. One-sixth (1/6) undivided interest in the Joint Venture Agreement for the MBC investment Group. IV. Bonds and Accounts 1. Twenty-five (25) - $75.00 savings bonds in various sta- tes of maturity. 2. Cavanough Corporate bonds with a face value of $1,800.00. ?r 3, Share account number 25008 with U.S. Defense Activities Federal Credit Union, with a balance of $17,400 as of 5 December 1983, part of which is to be used towards the purchase and rede- coration of a marital abode as set forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. V. Insurance policies (beBSfTrusteefforathepthreeechildren of a Farmers Trust Company prior marriage, to wit: Leo Desire Charron III, Catherine Marie Charron, and Michelle Elizabeth Charron). 1. $35,000.00 servicemen's group life insurance 2. Two (2) $30,000.00 term policies with State Farm insurance 3, $15,000.00 whole life policy with Army Mutual Aid 4, $10,000.00 whole life policy with USAA VI. Automobiles 1. 1983 Ford Mustang 2. 1976 Ford Station Wagon VII. Other Personal Property 1. Syracuse China 2. Stamp Collection 3, Coin Collection 4, Oil Paintings 5, Thomas Organ 6. 25" RCA color television set 7. 19" RCA color television set 8. Antique 14K gold railroad watch 9. Antique pool table 10. Three (3) Hummel.figurines. EXHIBIT B PROPERTY OWNED BY BEVERLY E. MARTIN I. PERSONAL PROPERTY 1. Kirk silver service 2. Lenox china 3. Assorted items of fine jewelry including, but not limited to, diamond engagement ring, diamond earings, opal ring, 14K gold chains, 14K gold bracelets. 4. Bedroom suite 5. Dining room set including table, hutch and four (4) chairs 6. Ranch mink fur coat 7. Two (1) leather English riding saddles 8. 1980 Toyota automobile II. Retirement plan with Western Maryland Review III. Various bank accounts of de minimis value IV. $48,000.00 in cash which proceeds resulted from the sale of real property in Hagerstown, Maryland, and part of which is to be used towards. the purchase and redecoration of a marital abode as set-forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. a AF6F916,6P47095 60XIOX,0014' •dyytfoN/a CoAoR TElEV/.f/ont .SET / MA Mg luM1W9• AMP oRyam= a 5179A?L RmAs.: yoR-f 6 VERIFICATION I, Leo D. Charron, verify that the statements contained in the foregoing pleading are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: 0'1 d 1 os? .J &It:n" LEO D. C ON 3387.1.4 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, LeRoy Smigel, Esquire, attorney for Defendant in the above-captioned matter, do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Declaratory Judgment on counsel for Plaintiff by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the 'Lay of February, 2001, addressed as follows: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Smigel, Anderson & LeRoy Smigel, Esquire I.D. #09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. #70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant 'vent '? .. .? r y tyea A'}a 'S+ '_ c it n fi 4 A ? R TA ?'ha x k?}? =? ? . y y, m ra f? Yr i ?Y -i ,r ? i?§ ? 1 E ! t ^ f t ... I i {? FS 1? Y A 3 Z t t; ?' ; a Yt?r ` ? yp i , x EXhlbll E ?rt2^ It 5?' i? ? a- l i ti < sl- ? ? ? . ? i s yy r j l d r t 3 i 4 UVi . 'Jul Z2.O ?l sss? • i Jy BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF I y ;; ?t)C11 Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA' J" V. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW LEO D. CHARRON, :No. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM Defendant : IN DIVORCE IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFE% P.J., OLER and HESS, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 18'h day of May, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for declaratory judgment and the briefs submitted, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant's motion is granted, and the IRA accounts at issue are declared not subject to equitable distribution. BY THE COURT, 43c's 1cy tr r., J. Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff yeRoy Smigel, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1223 Attorney for Defendant BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW No. 99.6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER and HESS, JJ. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT This divorce action was commenced in 1999. For disposition at this time is a motion of Defendant for a declaratory judgment with respect to the effect of a certain antenuptial agreement. STATEMENT OF FACTS On January 5, 1984, in contemplation of their marriage, the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement, which provided for the property rights of each party in the event of divorce.t The agreement contained a choice-of-law provision, and the parties elected the application of Maryland law in the event of a dispute. Paragraph three of the agreement provided that In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. ' Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Exhibit A, filed February 9, 2001; Plaintiffs Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment, filed March 21, 2001. 2 Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Exhibit A. 2 !d. In October of 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint in divorce requesting, inter alia, equitable distribution of marital property 4 In February of 2001, Defendant filed a motion for a declaratory judgment, requesting that this court declare the rights and status of the parties with regard to equitable distributions At issue on the motion arc several individual retirement accounts (IRAs), owned by Defendant, which include funds transferred from Defendant's 401(k) accounts with prior employers. The accounts include a Member's First IRA, a USAA IRA, and an American Express IRA Also at issue are several retirement accounts owned by Plaintiff, including a Member's First IRA, a Copeland account, and T. Rowe Price Trust Company accounts! Defendant asserts that the accounts are excluded from equitable distribution based on paragraph three of the agreement 9 Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that the accounts are not excluded from equitable distribution.10 In support of her argument, Plaintiff contends that the accounts should not be excluded because the language of the agreement lacks the specificity required by FaUse v. FaUsell to I Complaint in Divorce, filed October 21, 1999. s See Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 61d., paras. I I-12. id., para. 11. ` /d. See Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 10 See Plaintiffs Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 11493 A.2d 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 2 exclude property from the scope of the Maryland Property Act,12 or alternatively because the express language of the agreement does not include IRAs. 13 Briefs on Defendant's motion were submitted by counsel, and oral argument was held on March 28, 2001. At the argument, neither counsel challenged the validity of the antenuptial agreement, and both agreed that the language of the agreement should be interpreted by the court without development of a parol evidence record. The issues to be decided arc 1) whether the language of paragraph three of the parties' antenuptial agreement contains the degree of specificity required by Falise to exclude property from the Marital Property Act, and 2) if so, whether the express language of the agreement includes IRAs. DISCUSSION Marital property defined. Section 8-201(e)(1) of the Maryland Family Law Code defines marital property as "the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage."14 Subsection (e)(3)(iii), however, provides that marital property does not include any property "excluded by valid agreement." Specificity of the agreement. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has held that, to exclude property "by valid agreement" under subsection (c)(3)(iii), the parties must "specifically provide that the subject property must be considered 'non marital' or in sane other terms specifically exclude the propertyfrom the scope of the Marital Property Act." Falise v. Falise, 493 AN 385, 389 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (emphasis added). In Falise, the parties entered into a separation agreement whereby they relinquished "all rights, title, interest and 11 See Plaintiff's Brief To Oppose Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment, dated March 21, 2001. u Plaintif's Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment, para. 13. " Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8-201 (2001). 3 claims which snid parties might now have or may hereafter have ... in and to any property, real or personal, that either of said parties may own or hereafter acquire ...." Id. at 388. The Court of Special Appeals declined to give effect to the agreement stating, "We doubt that the subject agreement could affect the status of something which is neither an interest in real or personal property, i.e., marital property." Id. The court also reasoned that the parties could not release a right that they did not have and could not have reasonably anticipated at the time of the agreement. Id. at 389. Following its holding in Falise, the Court of Special Appeals declined to give effect to an alleged oral settlement agreement that basically provided that "what is hers is hers and what is mine is mine." Golden v. Golden, 695 A.2d 1231, 1237 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 702 A.2d 290 (Md. 1997). The Court of Special Appeals stated that such an agreement, "no matter how often repeated, could [n]ever contain the degree of specificity required by Falise ...." Id. at 1237. In Herget v. Herget, 573 AN 798 (Md. 1990), however, the Court of Appeals declined to expand the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Falise. In Herget, the parties entered into a very general antenuptial agreement," The is The agreement provided that the parties: waive, relinquish and bar ... all ... rights and interests which (they) ... may become entitled to, except as in this Agreement provided, with respect to any property, real or personal, now owned or hereafter acquired by the other party. Paragraph two and three of the agreement provided that the parties: release[d] and surrender[d) any and all claims [they] may have, now, or at the time of any termination of the proposed marriage between the parties ... in any estate or property of [the other party] now owned or hereafter acquired by [them) ... and all other rights and interests of every kind therein that shall arise out of the relation of the panics .... Finally, paragraph four provided that the panics: waive[d] and rclease[d) unto the other party ... all of [their) respective rights, interests and claims in and to said property of the other, to the end that neither of the parties shall obtain any right or interest to or in any property of the other by virtue of their marriage .... Id. at 799. 4 Court of Appeals, in giving effect to the general language contained in the agreement, stated, "We reject the notion that the parties in the case before us were incapable of releasing a right that did not then exist. We also reject the argument that general language cannot effect a full release of a specific right, even a right that is unknown at the time the agreement is drawn" !d. at 473. Plaintiff relics on Falise and its progeny to support her contention that paragraph three of the agreement sub judice lacks the requisite specificity to exclude property from the Marital Property Act. However, this court is of the opinion that the language contained in paragraph three of the agreement contained the degree of specificity required by Maryland law. The language contained in paragraph three, which includes "retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities," is clearly specific enough under the decision of the Court of Appeals in Herget. The language contained in the Herget agreement, which the court gave effect to, was remarkably general in comparison to the specific language of paragraph three of the agreement of the parties herein. Furthermore, the court is of the opinion that the language of paragraph three also contained the degree of specificity required by the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Falise. Both Falise and Golden are distinguishable from this case in that the agreements under consideration therein were extremely general, waiving the parties' rights to any and all present and future property, whereas the parties in the present case specifically provided that paragraph three applied only to "retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities." Golden can be further distinguished on the ground that the alleged understanding at issue had not been defined by a writing, whereas here the parties entered into a valid written contract. Consequently, the court is of the view that paragraph three was sufficient to "specifically exclude the property [i.e. retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities] from the scope of the Marital Property Act" under Falise and its progeny. 5 Scope of the agreement. Because the language of the agreement has been found to contain the degree of specificity required to exclude property from Maryland's Marital Property Act, the court must now examine whether the express language of the agreement includes the specific types of property at issue in this case, 401(k)s and IRAs. An antenuptial agreement is a contract, subject to the general rules of contract interpretation. Herget v. Herget, 573 A.2d 798, 800 (Md. 1988). Furthermore, it is well settled that where an agreement is unambiguous Maryland follows the objective law of contracts; the intent of the parties is in a sense irrelevant, for it is presumed that they meant what they expressed. PaineWebber, Inc. v. East, 768 AN 1029, 1032 (Md. 2001). The procedure for interpreting such agreements under Maryland law is prescribed as follows: [U]nder the objective law of contracts, a court, in construing an agreement, must first determine from the language of the agreement itself, what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. Where the language of the contract is unambiguous, its plain meaning will be given effect. Herget, 573 A.2d at 800. The interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a question of law. PaineWebber, Inc., 768 AN at 1032. Plaintiff contends that the term "retirement benefits" has been judicially defined in Ohm v. Ohm, 431 AN 1371, 1374 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981), as "deferred compensation or wage substitute [s]," and that, as a result, the term does not include 401(k)s or IRAs. Plaintiffs reliance on Ohm is misplaced due to the fact that the issue in Ohm is wholly unrelated to the issue in the case sub judice. The issue in Ohm was whether "retirement benefits" constitute marital property. Here, there is no question as to whether "retirement benefits," 401(k)s, or IRAs constitute marital property; instead, the question is whether the 401(k)s and IRAs are excluded from the Marital Property Act by the express language of the parties' antenuptial agreement. There was no agreement at issue in Ohm, and, therefore, 6 the holdings of the Court of Special Appeals in Ohm arc not pertinent to the determination in this case. The court is of the view that a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have considered both 401(k) plans as well as individual retirement accounts as falling within the classification of "retirement benefits." The Code of Maryland Regulations supports this interpretation with respect to 401(k) plans. 16 Black's Law Dictionary also defines "401(k) plan" as "[a] retirement ... plan" Furthermore, the court is of the view that the phrase IRA, i.e. individual retirement account, given its plain meaning, would also fall within the category of "retirement benefits." Consequently, the 401(k)s and IRAs at issue arc excluded by valid agreement from the Marital Property Act under Section 8- 201(e)(3)(iii) of the Maryland Family Law Code and are not subject to equitable distribution. For these reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 181h day of May, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for declaratory judgment and the briefs submitted, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant's motion is granted, and the IRA accounts at issue are declared not subject to equitable distribution. BY THE COURT, /s/ J Wesley Oler. Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. "See Md. Rcgs. Code tit. 07, § 07.14.05 B(5) (Supp. 2001) ("[r]etirement benefits through a recognized quality plan such as 401(k) ...:'). 7 V Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff LeRoy Smigel, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1223 Attorney for Defendant 8 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE I hereby enter my appearance for the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, in the above- captioned action. I acknowledge receipt of a true and correct copy of the Complaint in Divorce filed in the above action on behalf of the Defendant on 1999. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 / Supreme Court ID qF- u? r c r Q N Y, t r Li.. Lt d Cn r of BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. IN THE COURT OF COMMONS PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99-6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT AND WAIVER OF COUNSELING 1. A Complaint in Divorce under §3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed on October 19, 2001. 2. The marriage of Plaintiff and Defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety (90) days have elapsed from the date of filing and service of the Complaint. 3. 1 consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce aflcr service of notice of intention to requcEt entry of the decree. 1 verify that the statements made in this Affidavit arc true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: D ;t Beverly E. Ch on, Plaintiff ye, ?C cli r 1 ?f? Y C , lug... . ? } f t) nj SAMUEL L. ANDES ATTORNEY AT LAW OYO NORTH TWELPTii XTNEET P.O. SOX IOE LEMOYNE, PENNSYLVANIA 17043 12 June 2002 E. Robert Elicker, )I, Esquire Cumberland County Divorce Master 9 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 TXLZPIIOMR (717) 761.0701 PAM 17171 761.141' 0 RE: Charron vs. Charron 99-6426 Dear Mr. Elicker: enclose the Pre-Trial Statement I file on behalf of the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, in this matter. I have, this day, sent a copy to Ann Levin, Esquire, who represents the Defendant. Please schedule a pre-trial conference at your convenience. Sincerely, aa L. Andes le Enclosure cc: Ann V. Levin, Esquire EVERLY> CHATtRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA V. : NO. 99-6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE INVENTORY AND APPRAISEMENT OF LEO D. CHARRON ASSETS OF PARTIES Defendant marks on the list below those items applicable to the case at bar and itemizes the assets on the following pages. (X) 1. Real property ( ) 2. Motor vehicles (X) 3. Stocks, bonds, securities and options (X) 4. Certificates of deposit (X) 5. Checking accounts, cash (X) 6. Savings accounts, money market and savings certificates O 7. Contents of safe deposit boxes ( ) S. Trusts (X) 9. Life Insurance policies (indicate face value and current beneficiaries ( ) 10. Annuities () 11. Gifts () 12. Inheritances () 13. Patents, copyrights, inventions, royalties (X) 14. Personal property outside the home ( ) 15. Businesses (list all owners, including percentage of ownership, and officer/director positions held by a party with company.) ( ) 16. Employment termination benefits - severance pay, workman's compensation claim/award ( ) 17. Profit sharing plans ( ) 18. Pension plans (indicate employee contribution and date plan vests) ( ) 19. Retirement plans, Individual Retirement Accounts ( ) 20. Disability payments ( ) 21. Litigation claims (matured and unmatured) ( ) 22. MilitaryN.A. benefits ( ) 23. Education benefits ( ) 2.1. Debts due, including loans, mortgages held ( ) 25. Household furnishings and personalty (include as a total category and attach itemized list if distribution of such assets is in dispute (X) 26. Other 0 0 O (O (D r? O r tf) (D M O h 01 O O O 0 co O O (ff 0 0 O N r co h O N (n 00 O M oo Cl O O 00 0 1*_ N H O 0 0 O r N to M O) M If) (O O O 00 O 0o T CO) M M (O N O •f M 00 N (f) (V r N jp M M r 1? r Q) (n (n (fi (A (A to (A U) (A w to w w w 69 w (A U) Vi (n 69 w m rn rn rn0) CY) rn rn rn rn rn rn rn ? rn rn ? rn w o 0 0 0 O 10 N oa) c` r i " 0 0 ` 0 0 0 W > 0 0 0 0 rn rn 0 0 0 ? 0 Q. r r r r r r a d d o ? a y y V1 y 0) N N ?) Q m E o v v v v E C cry v v cry 0 V Z y N y 0 0 0 0 d y y y y LO r 0) O m m 13 :9 :5 IS Q m Cl m CL x y a m F- F- O 0 0 (n LO 0) oo 00 (n 0 U) (n o co CD 0 N N CV) CV) 0 0 0 O LOf) LO 50 v v (n (n co N N N E r O a (n 0: ix -W L; C M to C C W C m C p p `) 7 p 7 7 C C 7 E M M h i7 L U UG .C p t7 8 t? 7 t?. 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O O O O Y c m 0 F'- - - - ._ . 0) r - - - - r - r - r - r -- m E C rs N m n. d co O p O o N O N 4) > (? a: N m a to E t $ Q i? °n N ? m = C e t I v ( j . m :: c > LL N m C c '? 0O # !E N d ° -- g a s v 0 ? ., a E a) O = a o s > > E _ u A = ` E ° m o 0) ? c g m 12 d r o o N v g t > u o E d ° .- Lo m m p ° > e c co > c 04 C14 4) c a d ` ? N u 12 ? .- crT v crS ?L Q ° m Q m N o L U LL ca (D m (D cu (D 2 EL C c O rl LL IL . 0 N N m t c v c v c v m v Tn t QQ E N m t N v Q_Q ¢ fo ° CD E D E n E ? E ? o N m U Q co t Q <n Q en, 0) m i a L t rz S S S H S S H ° 2 = N M ?' N f0 n 00 ' 01 , O r r .- N ?- M r j « 1 LIABILITIES OF PARTIES Defendant marks on the list below those items applicable to the case at bar and itemizes the liabilities on the following pages. SECURED O 1. Mortgages () 2. Judgments (X) 3. Liens (X) 4. Other secured liabilities ( ) 5. Credit card balances ( ) 6. Purchases () 7. Loan payments ( ) 8. Notes payable ( ) 9. Other unsecured liabilities CONTINGENT OR DEFERRED ( ) 10. Contracts or Agreements ( ) 11. Promissory notes () 12. Lawsuits O 13. Options (X) 14. Taxes ( ) 15. Other contingent or deferred liabilities i C ' N t0 N N ? p U QQO O d = E t0 ? d J3 73 C 7j td p a O V O - - - - rn e N 0 N 0 01 - - 8 c r r $ -- tD O M f? i r O O r - - - - - m r et tp t0 O O r M O O C N r% t0 O R t0 r r tt) 10 m to to to w FA r O E co EE v .J 0 « _ m z c ? ? 7 ? ? c e ? o > c ' a a to V) .S Vi 0 2 9 2 3 .4 0 ci 2i V/ C L .y C O C O x 0 E 2 N = 2 c 8 E V) 9 0 d Z r N M 'd' to t0 41 _ts ;z f: )f .i x :t I, Lao D. Charron, verify that the statements contained in the foregoing pleading are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 P&C.S. §4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: 3-5-o 4), QL==== D. C ON .- r l ?- ?? i . 111 ?'? I Is?, r 1 ..,. tl. C..' ,1111 lL ::: =';' '.i:y ? lV u CJ ?... BEVERLY E. CHARRON : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION- DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT PER PA.R.C.P. 1920.33(b) AND NOW, comes Defendant, Lco D. Charron, by and through his counsel, Smigel, Anderson & Sacks, and respectfully submits this Pre-Trial Statement as follows: 1. ASSETS - See Defendant's Inventory and Appraisement filed previously. 2. EXPERTS -Defendant anticipates the need to call the following: None are anticipated at this time. Defendant reserves the right to supplement this statement as necessary. 3. WITNESSES - Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant reserves the right to supplement this statement as necessary. 4. EXIIIBITS -Various documents evidencing values for the assets and establishing debt balances. These documents include, but arc not limited to, investment account statements, bank statements, appraisals, insurance declaration forms and debt statements. The parties' Antcnuptial agreement and interim marriage settlement agreement will also be offered. Defendant will provide evidence to document the contribution of non-marital assets and funds =s<: that he made to the marriage. Income information for the parties will also be introduced. Defendant reserves the right to supplement this statement as necessary. 5. INCOME INFORMATION - See Income and Expense Statement filed previously. 6. EXPENSE STATEMENT - See Income and Expense Statement filed previously. 7. PENSION/RETIREMENT BENEFITS -See Defendant's Inventory and Appraisement. g. COUNSEL FEES -Defendant asserts that Plaintiff should be required to make a contribution towards his legal fees. 9. ITEMS IN DISPUTE -The distribution of the parties' assets and liabilities. 10. MARITAL DEBTS - See Defendant's Inventory and Appraiscment. 11. PROPOSED RESOLUTION - The parties were divorced by a decree dated January 29, 2002. The issues that remain to be resolved are claims for equitable distribution, counsel fees, costs and expenses. The parties entered into an interim marriage settlement agreement on July 7, 2000 that determined the distribution of some of the assets. The values for some assets, for future equitable distribution purposes, were also established by this agreement. The parties also signed an Antenuptial agreement. (see attached Exhibit A). Defendant sought a declaratory judgment from the court to determine a dispute between the parties regarding the interpretation of the agreement. On May 19, 2001, an Order was entered by the Honorable J. Wesley Olcr, Jr. Judge Olcr's order limits the assets that will be available for equitable distribution. (sec attached Exhibit B). The assets that are available for distribution arc easily identified and Defendant suggests that the marital assets be divided between the parties with 60% being distributed to him and 40% being distributed to Plaintiff. Defendant contributed substantial non marital funds and assets to the marriage. Defendant is also retired while Plaintiff continues to work on a full time basis. Defendant also seeks a contribution from Plaintiff towards his legal fees and expenses. Defendant reserves the right to supplement this statement as necessary. Respectfully submitted, SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS Date: Junc-?, 2002 By: 2L ?/ Le oy Smigel, Esquire, I.D. M 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire, I.D. M 70259 4431 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant i ANTENUPTIAG AGREEMENT This Antenuptial Agreement made this day of r 1984, between LEO D. CHARPON, JR., and BEVERLY E. MARTIN. WITNESSETHI WHEREAS, the parties hereto are contemplating marrying each other, and WHEREAS, they desire and Intend to establish their mutual property rights now and for the future, and to guarantee to each individual ownership in and to all property and estate which each now owns or subsequently may acquire, and WHEREAS, the parties have discussed their property rights with each other and have made such disclosure of assets to one another as the parties.deem desirable, and WHEREAS, the real and personal property owned by each of the parties is set forth in Exhibit A and B, attached hereto and made a part of this Agreement. NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the marriage of the parties hereto, and intending to be legally bound, *the parties agree as followas 1. All property and estate of the parties hereto, of every nature, and wheresoever situate, acquired by each of the parties before their marriage shall be and remain forever the Individual property and estate of the party so owning and acquiring it and neither of the parties shall acquire any interest in the individual property and estate of the other acquired before the marriage, because of their subsequent marital relationshipf and each shall hold and possess all such property and estate as if he and she had remained unmarried. 2. Each of the parties hereby disclaims all right, title and interest In all property and estate now owned which has been acquired by the other before their marriage renouncing forever all claims to the separate estate of the other including all right of dower, curtesy, family exemption, to elect against the will or conveyances, or to receive a share of the estate under the Intestate laws, vith regard to ouch previously acquired property. Exhibit A r, -I- 3. In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, Including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. 4. All property, rights to property or leas than absolute interest therein created by the parties subsequent to their marriage, shall be considered the joint property of the parties and the same shall be subject to all of the laws, claims and incidence of such joint property as defined by the laws of the State of Maryland] except that it is expressly understood that this provision shall not apply to motor vehicles acquired by the parties after their marriage. In the event of a divorce, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation the parties hereto shall have ouch rights and incidence in said joint property as are applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland. In the event of death of either of the parties the normal laws of inheritance shall apply to such jointly acquired property as limited by paragraph 6(b) (4) hereof. S. a. Each of the parties will contribute a sum certain toward the purchase and initial redecoration of a marital abode which they shall own as tenants by the entirety. The amount each party contributes shall be set forth in a document which shall subsequently be executed by both parties and appended to, and made a part of, this agreement. b. In the event the parties dissolve their marriage, upon the sale of said abode all outstanding mortgages, lienot taxes due thereon, and closing costs and fees shall be promptll paid. The remainder of the proceeds realized from the sale shall be distributed between the parties as followst -3- (1) Each party will recover his or her initial contribution without interest. (2) Any proceeds remaining after each party has fully recovered his or hoc said contribution will be distributed evenly between the parties. (3) Capital gains taxes, if any, will be assessed in equal shares between the parties. (1) In the event that one of the parties predeceases the sale of the said abode, the surviving party will take all necessary steps to assure that upon said sale, or upon the surviving party's death, expressly recognizing the surviving parties right to live in the house, whichever event occurs first, a sum of money.equivalent to one half (1/2) of the fair market value of said abode at the time of sale or death, whichever is applicavle, minus the above-cited costs and expenses, is distributed in equal shares to the heirs or legatees of the predeceased party, excluding the surviving party, provided, that if the parties were not pending divorce at the time of death of the predeceased party and if the abode is not sold, that portion of the proceeds which is reinvested in another abode shall be exempt from said distribution. c. The above provisions shall apply to the initial marital abode and to any subsequent abodes, purchased from funds reinvested from the sale of said initial abode. 6. Each of the parties agree to Join in any deed, or in the execution of any paper necessary to effect the sale of real estate or to assist the other in the administration or sale of his or her individual property and estate. 7. Nothing herein shall be construed as preventing either of the parties from giving any of his or her property or estate to the other by deed, gift, will or otherwise. B. This Agreement is entered Into in Maryland and shall b construed under and in accordance with the laws of Maryland and shall In no way he affected by any change in domicile of either party. 9. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective parties, their heirs, leagatees, devisees, personal representatives and assigns, notwithstanding the extent or size of the parties' Individual estates at the time of the execution of this Agreement or subsequently. 10. each party has had independent advice by counsel of his or her own selection. Each party regards the terms of this agreement as fair and.reesonable and each has signed it freely and voluntarily without relying upon any representation other than those expressly set forth herein. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. WITNESS: (Jon EAL) (H QQQ ?7'? ,.- n,l.CtUL/'.EI.,/.G. r?tc4,G (SEAL) ever y Arn PENNSYLVANIA, CUNBLRLAND STATE of mnDIIzum, WBrtHIIWA)) COUNTY, to-witt- I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this Sthday of Jenu¦ry t 190 4 , personally appeared Leo D. Charron, who made oath in due knowledge ands true -` andmcoof law rrect tothat thehbeettofrhisninformation,forth belief. WITNESS my hand and official Notarial Seal. NotafY u..,.caDtr? I My Commission expires: sjVyuoqX)WM November 10, 1986 sun A111 te1Ta. 101"T MIMIC CARUSH 1014 CD1861WID CDe1TT aT CDe111D0110111110/. 141086 .1,mlw. ?mmTlw4 A:smaar,l Newts -5- STATE OF MARYLAND, WASHINGTON COUNTY, to-wltt- / I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this +1.ttt day of ?( (241vl r 11 1981/ , personally appeared Beverly E. Martin, wKKKo made th in due form of law that the matters and facts met forth in the above are true and correct to the best of her information, knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and Official Notarial Seal. Votary u c My Commission Expiress July 1, 1986 EXHIBIT A PROPERTY OWNED BY LEO D. CHARRON I, REAL ESTATE 1. 8228 Clifton Farm Court, Alexandria, Virginia being more fully described in a certain deed recorded in the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia in Deed Book 4955, Page 282 subject to the mortgage held by Arvida Mortgage Company, Clearwater, Florida. 2. 1114 Pheasant Drive, North, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in a certain deed recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "K," Volume 29, Page 237, subject to the mortgage held by First United Federal, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. 3. 1160 Belvedere Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, formerly 302 Circle Drive, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in the deed of John D. Keeney, Jr. and Anna Marie Keeney to Leo D. Charron as recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "I," Volume 30, Page 574 subject to the mortgage held by Carlisle Building and Loan Association. II. Deed of Trust dated October 27, 1989, between Miriam Virginia Lucas, Grantor, and Robert V. Moss and Patricia C. Broyles, Trustees, in the principal sum of $43,500.00 and recorde5600 d inFthe Clerk's Office of Montgomery County, Maryland 641. III. One-sixth (1/6) undivided interest in the Joint Venture Agreement for the MBC Investment Group. IV. Bonds and Accounts 1. Twenty-five (25) - $75.00 savings bonds in various sta- tes of maturity. 2. Cavanough Corporate bonds with a face value of $1,800.00. 3. Share account number 25008 with U.S. Defense Activities Federal Credit Union, with a balance of $17,400 as of 5 December 1983, part of which is to be used towards the purchase and rede- coration of a marital abode as set forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. V. Insurance policies (beneficiary for all policies: Farmers Trust Company as Trustee for the three children of a prior marriage, to wit: Leo Desire Charron III, Catherine Marie Charron, and Michelle Elizabeth Charron). 1. $35,000.00 servicemen's group life insurance 2. Two (2) $30,000.00 term policies with State Farm Insurance 3. $15,000.00 whole life policy with Army Mutual Aid 4. $10,000.00 whole life policy with USAA VI. Automobiles 1. 1983 Ford Mustang 2. 1976 Ford Station Wagon VII. Other Personal Property 1. Syracuse China 2. Stamp Collection 3. Coin Collection 4. Oil Paintings 5. Thomas Organ 6. 25" RCA color television set 7. 19" RCA color television set 8. Antique 14K gold railroad watch 9. Antique pool table 10. Three (3) Hummel.figurines. I. EXHIBIT B PROPERTY OWNED BY BEVERLY E. MARTIN 1. PERSONAL PROPERTY 1. Kirk silver service 2. Lenox china ;. Assorted items of fine jewelry including, but not limited to, diamond engagement ring, diamond earings, opal ring, 14K gold chains, 14K gold bracelets. 4. Bedroom suite 5. Dining room set including table, hutch and four (4) chairs 5. Ranch mink fur coat 7. Two (2) leather English riding saddles 8. 1980 Toyota automobile II. Retirement plan with Western Maryland Review III. Various bank accounts of de minimis value IV. $48,000.00 in cash which proceeds resulted from the sale of real property in Hagerstown, Maryland, and part of which is to be used towards the purchase and redecoration of a marital abode as set forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. a ?EFi?lfle?pRToRS ?F?'?a?ORl?P?' ' /WAIT/ COAVe TE7EV1.f1oA! SET I ^4y r e rui"lis . AAIP D e ycsr- a fng?m_ LAMAs, yoRf6 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW :No. 99.6426 CIVIL TERM : IN DIVORCE IN RF.: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER and HESS, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 18`h day of May, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for declaratory judgment and the briefs submitted, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant's motion is granted, and the IRA accounts at issue are declared not subject to equitable distribution. BY THE COURT, Jjel-- Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff j4Roy Smigel, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1223 Attorney for Defendant Exhibit B BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW :No. 99.6426 CIVIL TERM : IN DIVORCE IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER and HESS, JJ. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT This divorce action was commenced in 1999. For disposition at this time is a motion of Defendant for a declaratory judgment with respect to the effect of a certain antenuptial agreement. STATEMENT OF FACTS On January 5, 1984, in contemplation of their marriage, the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement, which provided for the property rights of each party in the event of divorce.' The agreement contained a choice-of-lays provision, and the parties elected the application of Maryland law in the event of a dispute. Paragraph three of the agreement provided that In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. ' Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Exhibit A, tiled February 9, 2001; Plaintiffs Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment, filed March 21, 2001. 3 Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Exhibit A. 3 Id. In October of 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint in divorce requesting, inter alia, equitable distribution of marital property.° In February of 2001, Defendant filed n motion for a declaratory judgment, requesting that this court declare the rights and status of the parties with regard to equitable distribution s At issue on the motion arc several individual retirement accounts (IRAs), owned by Defendant, which include finds transferred from Defendant's 401(k) accounts with prior employers. The accounts include a Member's First IRA, a USAA IRA, and an American Express IRA' Also at issue are several retirement accounts owned by Plaintiff, including a Member's First IRA, a Copeland account, and T. Rowe Price Trust Company accounts! Defendant asserts that the accounts are excluded from equitable distribution based on paragraph three of the agreement 9 Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that the accounts arc not excluded from equitable distribution.to In support of her argument, Plaintiff contends that the accounts should not be excluded because the language of the agreement lacks the specificity required by Falise v. Falisell to ' Complaint in Divorce, filed October 21, 1999. 6.See Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 6 /rl., paras. I I-12. r Id., para. 11. 1 /d. See Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 10 See Plaintiffs Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 11493 AN 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 2 exclude property from the scope of the Maryland Property Act,12 or alternatively because the express language of the agreement does not include IRAs. 13 Briefs on Defendant's motion were submitted by counsel, and oral argument was held on March 28, 2001. At the argument, neither counsel challenged the validity of the antenuptial agreement, and both agreed that the language of the agreement should be interpreted by the court without development of a parol evidence record. The issues to be decided arc 1) whether the language of paragraph three of the parties' antenuptial agreement contains the degree of specificity required by Falise to exclude property from the Marital Property Act, and 2) if so, whether the express language of the agreement includes IRAs. DISCUSSION Marital property define(l. Section 8-201(e)(1) of the Maryland Family Law Code defines marital property as "the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.„u Subsection (e)(3)(iii), however, provides that marital property does not include any property "excluded by valid agreement." Specificity of the agreement. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has held that, to exclude property "by valid agreement" under subsection (e)(3)(iii), the parties must "specifically provide that the subject property must be considered `non marital' or in some other terms specifically exclude the propertyfrom the scope of the Marital Property Act." Falise v. Falise, 493 A.2d 385, 389 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (emphasis added). In Falise, the parties entered into a separation agreement whereby they relinquished "all rights, title, interest and 1= See Plaintiffs Brief To Oppose Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment, dated March 21, 2001. 13 Plaintiffs Answer to Motion for Declaratory Judgment, para. 13. 14 Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 8.201 (2001). 3 claims which said parties might now have or may hereafter have ... in and to any property, real or personal, that either of said parties may own or hereafter acquire Id. at 388. The Court of Special Appeals declined to give effect to the agreement stating, "We doubt that the subject agreement could affect the status of something which is neither an interest in real or personal property, i.e., marital property." Id. The court also reasoned that the parties could not release a right that they did not have and could not have reasonably anticipated at the time of the agreement. Id. at 389. Following its holding in Falise, the Court of Special Appeals declined to give effect to an alleged oral settlement agreement that basically provided that "what is hers is hers and what is mine is mine." Golden v. Golden, 695 A.2d 1231, 1237 (Md. Cf. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 702 AN 290 (Md. 1997). The Court of Special Appeals stated that such an agreement, "no matter how often repeated, could [n]ever contain the degree of specificity required by Falise ...:' Id. at 1237. In Herget v. Herget, 573 AN 798 (Md. 1990), however, the Court of Appeals declined to expand the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Falise. In Herget, the parties entered into a very general antenuptial agreement." The is The agreement provided that the parties: waive, relinquish and bar ... all ... rights and interests which [they] ... may become entitled to, except as in this Agreement provided, with respect to any property, real or pe.sonal, now owned or hereaaer acquired by the other party. Paragraph two and three of the agreement provided that the parties: release[d] and surrender(d) any and all claims [they] may have, now, or at the time of any termination of the proposed marriage between the parties ... in any estate or property of [the other partyl now owned or hereafter acquired by [them] ... and all other rights and interests of every kind therein that shall arise out of the relation of the parties .... Finally, paragraph four provided that the parties: waive[d] and release[d] unto the other party ... all of [their] respective rights, interests and claims in and to said property of the other, to the end that neither of the parties shall obtain any right or Interest to or in any property of the other by virtue of their marriage .... Id. at 799. 4 Court of Appeals, in giving effect to the general language contained in the agreement, stated, "We reject the notion that the parties in the case before us were incapable of releasing a right that did not then exist. We also reject the argument that general language cannot cflcct a fill release of a specific right, even a right that is unknown at the time the agreement is drawn" !d. at 473. Plaintiff relics on Falise and its progeny to support her contention that paragraph three of the agreement sub judicc lacks the requisite specificity to exclude property from the Marital Property Act. However, this court is of the opinion that the language contained in paragraph three of the agreement contained the degree of specificity required by Maryland law. The language contained in paragraph three, which includes "retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities," is clearly specific enough under the decision of the Court of Appeals in Herget. The language contained in the Herget agreement, which the court gave effect to, was remarkably general in comparison to the specific language of paragraph three of the agreement of the parties herein. Furthermore, the court is of the opinion that the language of paragraph three also contained the degree of specificity required by the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Falise. Both Falise and Golden are distinguishable from this case in that the agreements under consideration therein were extremely general, waiving the parties' rights to any and all present and future property, whereas the parties in the present case specifically provided that paragraph three applied only to "retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities." Golden can be further distinguished on the ground that the alleged understanding at issue had not been defined by a writing, whereas here the parties entered into a valid written contract. Consequently, the court is of the view that paragraph three was sufficient to "specifically exclude the property [i.e. retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities] from the scope of the Marital Property Act" under Falise and its progeny. 5 Scope of the agreement. Because the language of the agreement has been found to contain the degree of specificity required to exclude property from Maryland's Marital Property Act, the court must now examine whether the express language of the agreement includes the speci lie types of property at issue in this case, 401(k)s and IRAs. An antenuptial agreement is a contract, subject to the general rules of contract interpretation. Herget %,. Herget, 573 A.2d 798, 800 (Md. 1988). Furthermore, it is well settled that where an agreement is unambiguous Maryland follows the objective law of contracts; the intent of the parties is in a sense irrelevant, for it is presumed that they meant what they expressed. PaineWebber. Inc. v. East, 768 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Md. 2001). "Elie procedure for interpreting such agreements under Maryland law is prescribed as follows: [U]nder the objective law of contracts, a court, in construing an agreement, must first determine from the language of the agreement itself, what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. Where the language of the contract is unambiguous, its plain meaning will be given effect. Herget, 573 A.2d at 800. The interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a question of law. PaineWebber, Inc., 768 AN at 1032. Plaintiff contends that the term "retirement benefits" has been judicially defined in Ohm v. Ohm, 431 AN 1371, 1374 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981), as "deferred compensation or wage substitute[s]," and that, as a result, the term does not include 401(k)s or IRAs. Plaintiffs reliance on Ohm is misplaced due to the fact that the issue in Ohm is wholly unrelated to the issue in the case sub judice. The issue in Olun was whether "retirement benefits constitute marital property. Here, there is no question as to whether "retirement benefits," 401(k)s, or IRAs constitute marital property; instead, the question is whether the 401(k)s and IRAs arc excluded from the Marital Property Act by the express language of the parties' antenuptial agreement. There was no agreement at issue in Ohm, and, therefore, 6 M the holdings of the Court of Special Appeals in Ohm are not pertinent to the determination in this case. The court is of the view that a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have considered both 401(k) plans as well as individual retirement accounts as falling within the classification of "retirement benefits." The Code of Maryland Regulations supports this interpretation with respect to 401(k) plans. 16 Black's Law Dictionary also defines "401(k) plan" as "[a] retirement ... plan" Furthermore, the court is of the view that the phrase IRA, i.e. individual retirement account, given its plain meaning, would also fall within the category of "retirement benefits." Consequently, the 401(k)s and IRAs at issue are excluded by valid agreement from the Marital Property Act under Section 8- 201(e)(3)(iii) of the Maryland Family Law Code and are not subject to equitable distribution. For these reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this I8"' day of May, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for declaratory judgment and the briefs submitted, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant's motion is granted, and the IRA accounts at issue are declared not subject to equitable distribution. BY THE COURT, /s/ J. Wesley Oler. Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 1b See Md. Regs. Code tit. 07, § 07.14.05 B(5) (Supp. 2001) ("[r]etirement benefits through a recognized quality plan such as 401(k) ...:'). 7 Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North T%vellih Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff LeRoy Smigel, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1223 Attorney for Defendant BEVERLY E. CHARRON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY,PENNSYLVANIA V. : NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Ann V. Levin, Esquire, attorney for Defendant in the above-captioned matter, do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Pre-Trial Statement on counsel for Plaintiff by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the day of June, 2002, addressed as follows: Samuel L. Andes 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 SMIGEL, AN ERSON & SACKS By: LeRoy Smigel, Esquire, I.D. #: 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire, I.D. #: 70259 4431 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110-1260 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO D. CHARRON Defendant ! IN THE COURT OF COMMON 1 PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, 1 PENNSYLVANIA 1 1 CIVIL ACTION - LAW 1 1 NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM 1 1 IN DIVORCE PLAINTIFF'S PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT Plaintiff, by her attorney, Samuel L. Andes, files this Pre-Trial Statement in accordance with Pa. R.C.P. 1920.33(b): 1- ASSETS. A listing of both marital and non-marital assets, as known to Plaintiff at this time, is attached and marked as Exhibit A and B in this matter. 2. EXPERT WITNES ES. It may be necessary to call expert witnesses to establish the value of the parties' jewelry and of the Defendant's coin and stamp collection. Plaintiff believes, however, that the parties have agreed upon, or can agree upon, the value of other assets. However, if they cannot, she reserves the right to call such real estate appraisers, pension consultants, and the like as may be necessary to value such assets. 3. FACT WITNESSES. At the present time, Plaintiff intends to call herself as a witness. She does not anticipate the need to call other witnesses but reserves the right to identify and call such witnesses as may be necessary to respond to Defendant's case. 4. EXHIBITS. Most of the assets owned by the parties which have not previously been distributed are financial assets. Plaintiff intends to offer, as exhibits, statements showing the present value of, and activity within, those financial accounts. She will also offer into evidence the parties' Interim Marriage Settlement Agreement and documents relating to that as well as documents relating to the ownership and value of real estate, time share units, and the like. Plaintiff reserves the right to offer such additional exhibits as may be necessary to properly present the case to the master at the hearing. 5. INCOME STATEMENT. Attached hereto is a copy of an Income and Expense Statement prepared for Plaintiff. She will update that prior to the time of the hearing. 6. EXPENSE STATEMENT. Attached hereto is a copy of an Income and Expense Statement prepared for Plaintiff. She will update that prior to the time of the hearing. 7. PENSION INFORMATION. The parties excluded from the marital estate, in the event of a divorce, pension assets and accounts in a pre-nuptial agreement they signed prior to the date of their marriage. That agreement has already been interpreted and applied by the court and so it will not be necessary to value the parties' current pension benefits. 8. COUNSEL FEES. Plaintiff has raised a claim for counsel fees and will present, at the hearing, statements showing the work done and the fees charged to Plaintiff for her counsel fees and expenses. 9. PERSONAL PROPERTY. The parties have previously divided their personal property by agreement. There will be no testimony about or dispute over the division of their tangible personal property. 10. MARITAL DEBTS. The marital debts of which Plaintiff is aware are all set out on Exhibits A and B and relate to the assets listed on those exhibits. 11. PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF ECONOMIC ISSUES. This is a long-term marriage for both parties. Prior to their marriage they excluded from division in the event of a divorce any retirement accounts which they acquired during the marriage. As a result of that, Husband leaves the marriage with several retirement accounts worth in excess of $150,000.00, and a very valuable military retirement. Wife leaves the marriage with a far more modest array of retirement accounts. Given that fact, and the financial contribution which Wife made to the marriage, through her employment outside the home, her work as a homemaker, and her contribution to Husband's children by his prior marriage, Plaintiff believes that she is entitled to substantially more than 50 percent of the marital property and proposes that the assets be distributed so that she receive 60 percent of the remaining marital assets. The parties, by an Interim Marriage Settlement Agreement dated 7 July 2000, have previously distributed their marital residence, their automobiles, and one substantial marital account. Wife proposes that the remaining assets be distributed so as to give her a total of 60 percent of all of the marital property divided by the parties. Neither file has filed a request for alimony. Wife proposes that Husband pay $10,000.00 toward the substantial legal fees she has incurred to get this matter resolved. Rjz?4" - Same . Andes Attorney for Plaintiff Supreme Court ID 17225 525 North 12th Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 761-5361 EXHIBIT A - MARITAL PROPERTY DATE OF MARITAL AMOUNT ASSET VALUE VALUATION PORTION LIENS OF LIEN Residence at 581 $156,000.00 7/02 100% None N/A Crossroad School (Fn1) Road, Carlisle, PA Unimproved Lot No. 1, $33,000.00 12/99 100% None N/A Crossroad School Road, Carlisle, PA Unimproved Lot No. 2, $33,000.00 12/99 Crossroad School Road, Carlisle, PA Investment property at N/A (Fn2) 7/00 124 Faith Circle, Carlisle, PA Time share unit in $6,000.00 7/00 New Orleans, LA Proceeds of sale of N/A (Fn3) 9/01 vacation home in Holden Beach, NC Mutual funds and similar investment accounts with USAA Accounts at Members First Federal Credit Union: Savings Account 42150 Checking Account 42150 Savings Account 59355 $175,991.67 7/00 $26.00 10/99 $16.00 10/99 $2,167.00 9/99 100% None N/A 100% (Fn1) 100% None N/A (Fn1) 100% Possible N/A unpaid income taxes (Fn4) 100% None N/A (Fn1) 100% None N/A 100% None N/A 100% None N/A .?9r t' Checking Account $270.00 9/99 100% None N/A 59355 Checking Account $601.00 10/99 100% None N/A 188909 Savings Account $25.00 10/99 100% None N/A 25008 Checking Account $356.00 10/99 100% None N/A 25008 Certificate of Deposit $10,988.00 10/99 100% None N/A 25008 U.S. Savings Bonds Unknown 6/02 100% None N!A Investment Account $5,037.00 9/99 100% None N/A with MBNA (57- 172258-6) Money Market $78,589.00 10/99 100% None N/A Account with MBNA (57.04975-8) Policies of insurance issued by State Farm (cash value): LF 0687-3321 $880.00 10/99 100% None N/A LF 0687-3325 $1,008.00 10/99 100% None N/A LF 0227-7574 $878.00 10/99 100% None N/A LF 0227-7575 $920.00 10/99 100% None N/A Wife's Jewelry $1,400.00 1/02 100% None N/A acquired during the marriage Oil painting at New $5,000.00 10/99 100% None N/A Orleans time share Husband's coin and $4,000.00 10/99 100% None N/A ?? stamp collection (est'd) Bank Account with $1,875.00 10/99 100% None N/A Members First Federal Credit Union held in the name of Carlisle Applied Technical Services Cash proceeds of life $22,910.00 10/99 100% None N/A insurance policies liquidated by Husband and transferred to his children Cash taken from joint $10,000.00 10/99 100% None N/A account to fund (Fn 5) Husband's child's college education Fn1: These assets were previously divided by the parties pursuant to an Interim Marriage Settlement Agreement dated 7 July 2000, a copy of which is attached to this Pre-Trial Statement. Fn2: This property was sold and the net proceeds were divided between the parties pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Interim Marriage Settlement Agreement. Fn3: This mortgage was paid off in the fall of 2001 and the net proceeds were divided by agreement between the parties. Fn4: The property was originally sold on an installment sales agreement long prior to the parties' separation. The parties have been notified by the State of North Carolina that state income taxes are due from the gain on the sale of the property. At this point, Plaintiff does not know whether the taxes have been paid and whether that issue has been resolved or not. Fn5: While Husband was hospitalized, a educational bill came due for his child. Because Husband controlled the account from which those funds were to be paid and he was not available to withdraw funds from the account, Wife advanced funds from the joint account to pay the tuition bill, in exchange for Husband's promise to reimburse the joint account from his child's educational account after he was released from the hospital. Following his release, Husband refused to reimburse the joint account. EXHIBIT B - NON-MARITAL PROPERTY DATE OF REASON FOR AMOUNT ASSET VALUE VALUATION EXCLUSION LIENS OF LIEN Wife's IRA with $36,606.57 4/02 This is a retirement None N/A Financial Net Worth asset excluded by the Investment parties' pre-nuptial Corporation agreement as Account No. SAD- interpreted by the 960921 court. Husband's IRA with $44,525.00 10/99 This is a retirement None N/A Members First asset excluded by the known Credit Union, parties' pre-nuptial Account No. 25008 agreement as interpreted by the court. Husband's IRA with $24,020.00 12/99 This is a retirement None N/A USAA, Account No. asset excluded by the known 634707AA parties' pre-nuptial agreement as interpreted by the court. Husband's IRA $96,282.00 11/99 This is a retirement None N/A accounts with asset excluded by the known American Express parties' pre-nuptial agreement as interpreted by the court. Husband's U.S. Unknown N/A This is a retirement None N/A Army retirement pay asset excluded by the known parties' pre-nuptial agreement as interpreted by the court. NOTE: The parties previously divided several of their major marital assets pursuant to the Interim Marriage Settlement Agreement dated 7 July 2000, as noted on Exhibit A. To the extent those assets have previously been divided, those assets are no longer marital property. BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff Vs. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99.6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE PLAINTIFF'S INCOME AND EXPENSE STATEMENT Beverly Charron is employed by New Manor Care Health Services, Inc., and has been employed by that company since late 2001. Her earnings from that employment, every two weeks, are as follows: Gross Salary $2,000.00 Less: Federal income tax $336.39 Social Security tax $121.94 Medicare Tax $28.52 PA income tax $55.05 Local Income tax $20.01 Medical insurance $26.00 Dental insurance $7.85 $595 76 Total Net of Taxes . $1,404.24 This net pay averages $3,042.52 per month. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A is a copy of Mrs. Charron's paycheck stub for the period ending 14 May 2002. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit B is a list of Plaintiff's typical monthly expenses. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. DATE: BEVERLY E. CHARRON Emptoyes Name Exemptions Period Beginning Period Ending Check No. Beverly B Charron federal State 06/01/2002 00/11/2002 0002200130 Social Security Number Employee ID PTO Balance Vacation Balance Sick Balance 218-3a-0180 207000 1 1 0.000 0.000 32.000 Company Paygroup s t}, F»*•€r3?azFl F Si S ' ''? BL3 Personal Balance x?,c4 ,1. aA ? Ht5 101 r 3't y 3I$.97? ?"... : J a ?, ' V. T: ai.°.,,p"E^7fitL ?:FhM .; Hours ?'daE ttp?11g1 qTD ier • And 0 dirt lon• Dbtr Ik. 11.001 Rib 11•..• E•r.Is• Has,, F.0.6 f, Doti 14. C.rr•.1 VID Pra•• R.l.6r Nu Asia ?q 26.669600 00.00 6.000.66 106.69 21.U0.00 ra Wk01.w.1 336.79 5.066.16 11•6dry Nu A.1• At 0.10 16.0 460.00 ne MED/EE 36.53 360.00 Lbbk• Pop 9.69 0.00 300.00 rd OASDI/EE t21.06 1.961.33 6.400 Ral•k6T 0.06 0.0110.0 PA I7k1k•Np 55.65 760.66 PA Wk50•N.5 30.11 270.00 M•/ktl 26.00 306.00 • Duld 7.60 60.36 PA OmPlkul Too 6.00 to.$$ Total 109.74 6.485.10 Net Pay Distribution neck 1.006.35 A6rle. 0.00 TOtat 10.66 2.906.90 060.06 27.000.00 Total 1.505.35 NessS e: Is our home address correct? Contact our HR designee to make cha es. REMOVE DOCUMENT ALONG THIS PERFORATION 601162 ^.? ^} t ^YCar p yq. to r.?+.; EXPENSE WEEK MONTH YEAR HOME Mortgage/Rent $ $448.00 $ Townhome fee $ $45.00 $ Utilities $ $ $ Electric $ $86.00 $ Gas $ $129.00 $ 011 $ $ $ Telephone $ $34.00 $ Trash $ $ $ Water/Sewer $ $13.00 $ EMPLOYMENT Public Transportation $ $ $ Lunch $ $40.00 $ TAXES Real Estate $ $366.42 $ Personal Property $ $0.85 $ Income $ $ $ Personal Tax $ $ $ INSURANCE Homeowners $ $33.75 $ Automobile $ $102.00 $ Life $ $20.00 $ Accident $ $ $ Health $ $ $ Other $ $ $ EXPENSE WEEK MONTH YEAR AUTOMOBILE Payments $ $286.00 $ Fuel $ $100.00 $ Repairs/Maintenance/AAA club $ $18.50 $ MEDICAL Doctor $ $15.00 $ Dentist $ $8.00 $ Orthodontist $ $ $ Hospital $ $ $ Medicine $ $ $ Special needs (glasses, braces, orthopedic devices) $ $13:50 $ EDUCATION Private School $ $ $ Parochial School $ $ $ College $ $ $ Religious $ $ $ PERSONAL Clothing $ $100.00 $ Food $ $350.00 $ Barber/Hairdresser $ $17.00 $ Credit Payments: Charge Card Charge Accounts $ $250.00 $ Memberships $ $2.00 $ LOANS Credit Union $ $ $ MISCELLANEOUS Household Help/supplies $ $190.00 $ EXPENSE WEEK MONTH YEAR Child Care $ $ $ Papers/Books/Magazines $ $28,00 $ Entertainment $ $75.00 $ Pay TV/Cable $ $40.00 $ Vacation $ $100.00 $ Gifts $ $85.00 $ Legal Fees $ $100.00 $ Charitable Contributions • Church $ $225.00 $ Other: Child support $ $ $ Alimony Payments $ $ $ OTHER $ $ S S $ TOTAL EXPENSES 3321.02 INTERIM_MARRIAGE.SET_TLEMENT.AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT, made this day of 2000, by and between: BEVERLY E. CHARRON of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, hereinafter referred to as "Wife"; and LEO D. CHARRON of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, hereinafter referred to as "Husband"; WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, the parties are Husband and Wife having been marred on 7 January 1984 in Carlisle, Pennsylvania and having separated on or about 15 October 1999, and are parties to a divorce action now pending before the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County; and WHEREAS, the parties have reached agreement to divide and distribute certain of their marital assets, resolve certain of their marital claims, and reserve all other claims arising out of their marriage to be resolved by them, or by the court if necessary, at a later date, and the parties wish to have such agreement reduced to writing. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing recitals and of the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth, and intending to be legally bound and to legally bind their heirs, successors and assigns hereby, covenant, promise, and agree as follows: 1. The property and lot situate at 581 Crossroad School Road, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, as described in Schedule A attached hereto (but specifically not Page 1 of 10 including lots located on the opposite side of Crossroad School Road, which lots are also owned by the parties) shall become the sole and exclusive property of Husband. Wife shall transfer all of her right, title and interest in this property to Husband and waives any further rights and claims whatsoever to this property now and in the future. Wife shall execute a Deed transferring all right, title and interest in this property to Husband. The parties agree that the equity in the home, for purposes of further dividing marital assets not addressed by this Agreement, shall be $156,000.00. In consideration of such transfer, Husband shall assume and pay all debts and expenses resulting from the property or arising from its ownership including, but not limited to, real estate taxes, insurance, utilities, and mortgage installments and shall specifically pay, in strict accordance with its terms, the debts secured by any mortgage or other lien against the property which may now be in joint names and shall further indemnify and save Wife harmless from any loss, cost, or expense caused to her by his failure to pay such debts or expenses as they arise. Wife represents that she has not incurred or caused to be incurred any debt or obligation which has resulted in a lien against the property or which will cause a lien against the property prior to the transfer to be made pursuant to this Agreement. 2. The parties acknowledge that Wife will be purchasing real estate in tier own name within the next calendar year, using funds coming to her as a result of this Agreement or her own post-separation earnings. Husband acknowledges that he has no claim to or interest in any such real estate which Wife may purchase and further agrees to make, execute, and Page 2 of 10 acknowledge and deliver any and all documents to confirm that he owns no such interest and makes no such claim. 3. The 1997 Chevy Blazer and the 1991 Chevy 5-10 Pickup shall be transferred to Husband. Wife waives all right, title and interest in these vehicles. The parties stipulate that their combined value is $17,000.00. The parties further agree that the vehicle currently driven by Wife, and leased in her name alone, that being a 2000 Toyota Camry automobile, is leased by Wife and has no equity and, therefore, has no value as a marital asset. 4. USAA Account Nos. 634707 and 7896904 shall be transferred to Wife in their entirety and shall be Wife's sole and separate property thereafter, free of any further claim by Husband. The parties acknowledge that those accounts are currently subject to an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County restricting the parties access to or use of such accounts and the parties agree that they will, and cause their attorneys to, make, execute, acknowledge, and deliver all documents necessary to complete the transfer of those accounts into Wife's name alone immediately upon the execution of this Agreement. The value of those accounts, for purpose of dividing and distributing the parties' marital assets, shall be the value of the accounts on the date they are transferred. Tile parties further agree that both of them will cooperate to make available to Wife any and all documents necessary for liar to calculate and determine the historical value, the tax basis, and the capital gains resulting from the sale of those accounts and the assets in them. Wife Page 3 of 10 shall be solely responsible for any tax liability incurred as a result of her liquidation of or other dealings with the assets in the said accounts after the date they are transferred to her pursuant to this Agreement. 5. The net proceeds from the sale of the property located at 124 Faith Circle, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, shall be divided equally between the parties at the time of settlement. 6. The parties are joint owners of a timeshare in New Orleans. The parties agree to maintain joint ownership of the timeshare unit and alternate its use on an annual basis. Husband shall have use of the timeshare unit in even-numbered years. Wife shall have use of the time share unit in odd-numbered years. The parties further agreed that they shall divide and pay equally any expenses arising from their ownership of the property until such time as the parties agree otherwise. 7. The parties have prepared a list identifying most of their tangible household property and dividing those items and a copy of said list is attached hereto and marked as Schedule B. The parties agree that this list should determine who owns and maintains ownership of the various items of household property included on the list and both parties accept that division as set forth in the list. The parties further acknowledge that there are very few items of tangible household property not set forth on the list that they shall divide later between them but acknowledge that the list deals with the vast majority of their tangible household property. Tile parties further agree that the proposed list indicates that Page 4 of 10 Wife shall have ownership of two floral print love seats. Husband shall, at his sole expense, have the love seats professionally cleaned within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Agreement and, after Husband has had them so cleaned, Wife shall have the option of retaining the love seats as her property or exchanging them for the leather sofa if the love seats have not been cleaned and deodorized to her satisfaction. The parties also further agree that Wife shall have the camera and a reasonable share of the hand tools located in the house. Finally, the parties agree that the household property divided In accordance with this paragraph shall not be valued and will not be considered further in the equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets, whether that distribution is accomplished by agreement or by hearings before the court. 8. The parties agree that their date of final separation was 15 October 1999. 9. The parties agree to join in a motion to have issues regarding their Pre-Nuptial Agreement decided by the court through a declaratory judgment action. The parties agree to be bound by the Judge's decision regarding the interpretation of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement, and further agree that neither party shall appeal such decision. 10. The parties shall make, execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all documents necessary or appropriate to accomplish the transfers and distributions of assets set forth in this agreement and shall do so promptly upon the request of either party or their attorneys. F I Page 5 of 10 11. By this Agreement, the parties intend to effect an equitable distribution and division of the marital property specifically set forth herein. The parties have determined that an equitable distribution of the marital assets as set forth above conforms to a just and right standard, with due regard to the rights of each party. This Agreement is not intended by the parties to constitute, in any way, a sale or exchange of assets and the division or distribution contemplated hereby is being effected without the Introduction of outside funds or other property which do not constitute a part of the marital estate. It is the intention of the parties that all the divisions and distributions of assets made in accordance with this Agreement shall not be deemed taxable by any person or authority. Further, the parties agree that this Agreement shall not constitute a division, distribution, or exchange of any asset not specifically addressed in this Agreement and is not intended by the parties tc resolve any economic claim between them except as expressly set forth herein. Each of the parties expressly reserves onto themselves all economic rights which have been raised or can be raised in the divorce action which are not expressly addressed or resolved in this Agreement. 12. The provisions of this Agreement and their legal effect have been fully explained to the parties by their respective counsel. Each party acknowledging that he or site has received independent legal advice from counsel of his or her selection and that each fully understands the facts and has been fully informed as to his or her legal rights and obligations. Each party acknowledges and accepts that this Agreement is, under the Pago 6 of 10 circumstances, fair and equitable and that it is being entered into freely and voluntarily after having received such advice and with such knowledge, and that execution of this Agreement is not the result of any duress or any undue influence and that it is not the result of any collusion or improper or illegal agreement or agreements. 13. The parties acknowledge and agree that all rights and claims to remaining property and all other economic claims arising out of their marriage and separation and divorce, are preserved for further disposition by them by agreement or, if necessary, disposition by the court in accordance with the law of Pennsylvania. 14. This Agreement shall he interpreted, applied, and enforced in accordance with the laws of, and by the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and specifically the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County. This Agreement is strictly limited to its express terms and there are no agreements between the parties relating to any other economic or financial claims between them except as are expressly set forth herein. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands e:nd seals the day and year first above written. Wit s ?? Witn ss `CALL( 6 Beverly E. harron Leo D. Charro Page 7 of 10 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ? I SS,. COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND I Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the aforesaid Commonwealth and County, BEVERLY E. CHARRON, who being duly sworn according to law deposes and says that she is the party of the foregoing Agreement and she executed same for the purposes herein contained. Witness my hand and seal this &7 day of 2000. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY OF DAUPHIN Cd gym. ??'? l.? ,? Notary blic. My Commission Expires: NiriJ?iJkt?L AW 4. (?lJi,?11o1rrry ? tiallt?t#oro,t?Eaf?eball?ny,M 1 SS.: UrWomlaYoall8lpraaNov.2t12001 1 Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the aforesaid Commonwealth and County, LEO D. CHARRON, who being duly sworn according to law deposes and says that he Is the party of the foregoing Agreement and she executed some for the purposes herein contained. Witness my hand and seal this day of ?.. , 2000. i Notary Public: My Commission Expires: LL?.Fitz, Seal Vicky ?ttMn CoPublic unty Dau My commiplres Dec. 5, 2002 Member, F'ennsylvanw Association 0 Mall Page 8 of 10 EXHIBIT A Pape 9 of 10 THIS DEED THIS DEED, made the day of . 2000, between LEO D. CHARRON and BEVERLY E. CHARRON, his wife, hereinafter called "Grantors" AND LEO D. CHARRON, hereinafter called "Grantee". WrWESSETH, that in consideration of ONE ($1.00) DOLLAR, in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said Grantors do hereby grant and convey to the said Grantee: r, ALL THAT CERTAIN tract of land situated in West Pennsboro Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, bounded and described as follows: BEGINNING at a point in the centerline of Township Route 438 at the intersecting point of Lots #7 and #5 on the Plan of Lots of Robert R. Line, approved by the Board of Supervisors of West Penmsboro Township, on March 13, 1975, and recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, on March 14, 1975, in Plan Book 26, Page 32; thence North 82 degrees 23 minutes 40 seconds East, 431.62 feet to arpoint; thence North 7 degrees 33 minutes 40 seconds West 235.89 feet to a point; thence along lands now or formerly of Dean Chamberlin et ux. North 81 degrees 43 ; minutes 42 seconds West, 425.24 feet; thence along two tracts of land now or formerly of Carl L Chronister and Vance Holler, South 30 degrees 17 minutes 34 seconds East, 526.86 feet to an iron pm,,..,, thence along lands formerly of Robert Line, South 82 degrees 26 minutes 20 seconds West, 701.15 feet to is an iron pin; thence along lands now or formerly of A.T. Burke, North 8 degrees 36 minutes 20 seconds West, 145.79 feet to a point; thence along same, South 82 degrees 23 minutes 40 seconds West, 350.97 feet to a point in Township Route 438; thence North 13 degrees 20 seconds West, 99.12 feet to a point in said road, the Place of BEGINNING. BEING the same premises which Robert S. Goodrich and Gloria T. Raven, formerly Gloria T. Goodrich, by deed dated February 28, 1984, and recorded March I, 1984, in Deed Book 0, Volume 30, Page 822, in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds in and for Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, granted and conveyed unto Lco D. Charron and Beverly E. Churron, his wife, the Grantors herein. This conveyance is subject to tine following conditions and restrictions; 1. Mobile homes and double wide mobile homes arc specifically prohibited. 2. The exterior orally dwelling shall not be less than 50% brick or stone. 3. Any building shall be at least 30 feet from any boundary line. AND the said Grantors do hereby WARRANT SPECIALLY the property herein conveyed. The purpose of this Deed Is to relinquish sill right, title and Interest lit the property which Beverly E. Charron may have pursuant to divorce proceedings between the parties hereto Indexed to No. 99 - 6426 In the Of(tee of the Prothonotary of Cumberland county, Pennsylvania, which proceedings are still pending. ?A This Is a conveyance from husbnnd and wife to husband and therefore exempt from the payment of Pennsylvania Realty Transfer Tax. about written. WITNESS WIIEREOF, said Grantors have executed (IIN deed the day and year first Signed, Scaled and Delivered In the Presence or. M LEO D. CI IARRON BI'VERLY F. CI IARRON .I_ f EXHIBIT -B Page 10 of 10 IrENI ?SC7- J tt' 4L.rLCi((J . (l IL&C(c' ccc. -Pie.A' ?ic'L???? ?urCz ?rc[?. L'Et.? ?C't ylkt??c? , ?tfce? cc e_ 4 r f I t h(, qq? •L.l?('."FitaCtc,ic_ild?.r.rL.? ,?l:fC['P:41 TV /vC P, l?.iatC UUcce,i[Cc??t.,c? vc! `'I ? -1te.GCj?CCQ. 60-IL#?NCrvSt a [i7rr[? ?L-/? `YJd?t t rPf ? 4Ar+rq? ?A r <<r i ('PrrrrljkrrrtPJ:l4i.+ L?rL-El. r?9• tc C_ G?JQFLC?S??J?,? (Pfile, .Pt?.?Ar?iit) L.?lt (t ?t J % (j f l/ 4 l 0I i 1-reAl 14,16 CT 8Ev I ,c Ea 1 r kv,Lpitee te p aka[.h. Lr v vk? wee. 1? -?.e.h 1i1 AU,4 d?c? .N.lced - I ?lc.c?o.il •? 12itItoAe apw v \.??,??2ILUci ?Aq e.4 . L/ L??.kue? luR??eiE•[att,?e?rt?te(r?/i'?•4LrC: 1l a (- L-, L, t_--- L, L' ,.. l VAZ u h, CP 1.TEM ?A6ScT ?Q.Lr?t-tP.rc? 'pJaelati AIL;& lG?•i??lcltGlP[!h?•oOnOri)tI@¢r? o??S.Q•rxE?(?D-??llkr? ?Q(?.?'?114?1J?P ?hf.?af3a,L l[?c? 1QCl'L?e.c?,t_? //????G? ?ct?riu (Gl 4L'hGIcice" 'eta ?)LLAA, &-k `I??Ccc) •Q?Ji.QCL?gC-,L, ?J,,i_d? 86V kRto 7 V,44 uz C? L-' b,`1?it ee ,e t11c4AV C(?.t . lC ?![ -G[OXrzC? `(,(./ri.L. iG? l4eA l$'0- ?ueY? 4?2.fe? i,a-i a Q; cJ t[? tQF'L/{e(t? Ul?se L= L.? L- ? V' L= l.- L= L. ' L- :C-rEm 146SET EV ?I??-s ? t.??RJ? ?EL, n.?J ? vzuh k?@ec.??q v V -?UcehcG?n 4?)ae C lc?c ?(? ,,?l1hlGQ.lQ,,CUd' lf?1QL-'?C.?QCU;[-rU `l ``11 l.• ?PJt lt??cce? (Aeet-tA, ir:t.G?.cc.ke% C?.e•y.i.?t 7ccecv /i el tie o?cc?.(?..,xUlcCPll[p.2C?cK ???[L'c/tl.?A_; i.:. ??cc.c?Q? htat Jl ? CipcC? Lctf.. 44.0 17 I vozuc- l/ v L- t- n ?TrM/R6S4- T ?cce.,t:?- .Gt:teR-Serhx. Ct-?1Lrd[D , r ? -?:,ia yrthcroJc_ REV I kRa I_ ! I V,4t u,C C:; L.% v ?t= ?Ca?.pp .L -rC.ru.Cr?.Q BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF v. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99-6426 LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE INCOME AND EXPENSE STATEMENT OF LEO D. CHARRON INCOME AND EXPENSE STATEMENT OF LEO D. CHARRON I Defcndnnt is retired. His monthly gross rctircmcnt is $2,900. k ? , 1 4 x sr f" Y ? , ;y V fa "n EXPENSES I Item Weekly (or) i Monthly (or) i Yearly ? I HOME ! I Mortgage I $ 985 $ 11,820 Maintenance ( I $ 250 $ 3,000 Electricity I ! S 200 $ 2,400 Trash I Is 15 I S 180 Fumiture R lacement/U rade I I S 100 S 1,200 Telephone I I S 40 I S 480 TAXES ! Real Estate Taxes W/Mt . I Personal Property Taxes I S 58 S 700 Income Taxes t S 425 S 5,100 INSURANCE Homeowners Insurance I W/Mtg. Automobile insurance S 63 $ 750 Life Insurance I $ 12 S 144 Health Insurance S 40 I S 482 Other Insurance (specify) Personal Pro /Liabilit S 28 S 340 I i I AUTOMOBILE Auto Payments (Pa Forward) S 300 $ 3,600 Automobile Fuel S 87 ! S 1,044 Automobile Repairs S 70 S 840 i MEDICAL Doctor Dentist S 50 $ 600 Orthodontist f Hospital Medicine j S ccial Mcdical Needs (s ccif) j j I I PERSONAL Clothing $ 33 $ 400 Laundry/Dry Cleaning j $ 10 $ 120 Food $ 400 $ 4,800 Qarbcr/Hairdresser I $ 50 $ 600 Crcdit Pa ents/Charge Accounts; I Mcmbershi s - AAA.AOG,AARP,TROA $ 13 $ 150 MISCELLANEOUS Household Help Pa crs/Books/Ma azincs $ 33 $ 400 Entertainment is 83 $ 1,000 Pay TV/Intcmct Acccss $ 70 $ 840 Vacations I $ 333 $ 4,000 Gifts Is 150 $ 1,800 Le al Fees Church or S a o uc Charitable Contributions I $ 45 I $ 540 Alimony Paymcnts Othcr Ex cnscs (s ccif) Pet ; $ 50 j $ 600 Total Expenses $ 3,994 $ 47,930 I I XXAL Al./w • 4L I, Leo D. Charron, verify that the statements contained in the foregoing pleading are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements Urerein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities. Date: 3 - ?- 0 ga 4DLE ICH ON 1lIC?. Q. Cat .?- J:r f' yi" :•?.' ., _ ?, y. stn r.. hl j - v o c? BEVERLY L. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEPENDANT : IN THE COURT' Of COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE- ORDER AND NOW, this 1`l day of -S 2)7L) 2-s 1 2000, the Order dated October 28, 1999 shall remain in full force and effect with the following modification to paragraph 5: (a) The parties shall use funds from the joint account at Members First Federal Credit Union to pay for repairs to the jointly-owned rental property. The parties shall also use funds from this account to pay for property appraisals for purposes of the pending divorce action. The total withdrawals for repairs and appraisals shall not exceed $10,000. (b) Both parties shall be required to consent prior to withdrawals from this account for either repairs or appraisals. (c) No other withdrawals shall be made from this account until further order of court or agreement of the parties. Distribution: Samuel L. Andes, Esq. 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff l -10.00 c, t•, ry LeRoy Smigel, Esq./Ann V. Levin, Esq. 2917 North Front Street Ilarrisburg, PA 17110 Attorneys for Defendant BY T H': COURT: .5587.14 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE STIPULATION 2?oc7 AND NOW, this day of T..,u a*A7 , t999, counsel for the parties in the abovc-referenced action hereby stipulate and agree that the Order attached hereto encompasses the intent of their respective clients and that it may be adopted as a Court Order. SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS Z? By: Al".,.? Le oy Smigel, Esquire I.D. No. 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. No. 70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234-2401 Attorneys for Defendant LAW OFFICES OF SAMUEL L. ANDES By: L. Andes, Esquire 1. D. No. 17 2?1 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 761-5361 Attorney for Plaintiff J BEVERLY E. CHARRON, ) Plaintiff ) 1 1 VS. ) 1 ) LEO D. CHARRON, ) Defendant ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW this ? day of . C?1999, upon the stipulation of the parties and their attorneys which is attached hereto, we hereby amend and modify our order of October 21, 1999, as follows: 1. A hearing is hereby scheduled, to be held before the undersigned in Court Room No. 1 of the Cumberland County Courthouse in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, such hearing to commence at 3.00 o'clock p.m., on Wednesday, the 8"' clay of December, 1999. 2. Pending such hearing, the Defendant, Leo D. Charron or his representative shall not depose of, sell, liquidate, transfer, or change ownership of, or otherwise conceal or dissipate the assets held by Plaintiff and Defendant, or either of them, with USAA or American Express Financial Advisors, inc. 3. Pending the hearing scheduled above, USAA shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. 4 Pending the hearing scheduled above, American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. 5 Each of the parties shall withdraw and place into an account in their own name $8,000.00 of the funds which were in their joint accounts at the Members First Federal Credit Union as of October 18, 1999. The balance of those funds, which should be approximately $27,000.00, will be deposited by Wife into an account at the Members First Federal Credit Union held in the joint names of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The parties may use the funds from that account to pay the cost to continue their present health insurance. Otherwise, pending further order of this Court, neither party shall make any withdrawals from or make any change in the ownership of the joint account opened in accordance with this paragraph. Distribution: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire (Attorney for Plaintifl) 525 North 12'x' Street, Lemoyne, PA 17043 II LeRoy Smigcl, Esquire (Attorney for Defendant II 2917 North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110 BY THE COURT, BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN DIVORCE ORDER AND NOW this `l day of December, 1999, upon the request and agreement of both parties, the hearings scheduled in this matter for December 8, 1999, on Plaintiff's Petition for Emergency Relief and on Defendant's Counterclaim, are hereby continued generally. We will schedule a hearing on those matters upon the request of either party in the future. Distribution: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire (Attorney for Plaintiff) 525 North 12`' Street, Lemoyne, PA 17043 Ann V. Levin, Esquire (Attorney for Defendant 2917 North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110 l ? - Virn.[Lt.Ccd. _ctd 12-9.99 R)<3 BY THE COURT, BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE RD AND NOW. this L9 t Jay of rl (t>?C .. cl' , 1999, it is hereby ordered and decreed that Plaintiff providing an accounting to Defendant of all actions she has taken in exercising the power of attorney for Defendant within 10 days of this Order. It is further ordered and that a hearing on Defendant's Counterclaim shall be consolidated with the hearing on Plaintiffs claim. The hearing has been tlschcdulcd for the day of 1) e e r ..y Le. T , 19 at l!??.m. in Court Room No. I , Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. By the Court: ,X- 9 99 NOY 2 CU?i;c4% dJ CUl ?VfY PeNINSYLVrVti A IAV 1A1d'Ans%cr to Pcutiun/No%crnhcr III. PAA! 9 49 AM BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 LEO D. CHARRON, CIVIL ACTION -DIVORCE DEFENDANT DEFENDANT'S ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM TO PETITION FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF AND NOW, conics Defendant, Leo D. Charron, by and through his attorneys, Smigel, Anderson & Sacks, and answers Plaintiffs Petition for Emergency Relief as follows: Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. A. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that there arc accounts with USAA. It is denied there arc six accounts. There arc five accounts. B. Denied. C. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that the parties have various accounts with American Express. It is denied that these accounts have a value in excess of $100,000. D. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that the parties have savings, checking and IRAs at Members' First Federal Credit Union. It is denied that the parties have a stock investment account with Members' First Federal Credit Union. By way of further S587-14 answer, the parties each maintain an IRA in their own name at Members' First Federal Credit Union. Plaintiff withdrew $35,000 from one of the parties' joint accounts. 4. Admitted. 5. Denied. Byway of further answer, Plaintiff has no justifiable reason for her belief. Plaintiff has actually given Defendant reason to believe that she would deplete the parties' assets. G. A. Denied. B. Denied. C. Denied. D. Denied. 7. Denied. 8. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is denied that Defendant was discharged from the hospital on October 7, 1999. It is admitted that Defendant revoked the power of attorney previously appointing Plaintiff as his attomey-in-fact. It is denied that Defendant has refused to provide any information to Plaintiff regarding finances and assets. By way of further answer, Defendant was a resident at Cumberland Crossing undergoing physical rehabilitation. On or about October 7, 1999 Defendant was advised by the physician that lie was rational and competent to make decisions on his own behalf. Defendant moved back home on or about October 7, 1999, 9. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant receives a monthly pension. It is denied that Defendant has other financial assets available to him to meet his immediate financial needs. Byway of further answer, Defendant's normal monthly expenses 5687.14 total approximately $2,000. Defendant also has medical bills which must be paid, which include but are not limited to, a 51,000 bill for which payment is now due. The parties jointly own a rental property in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The monthly mortgage is $423 plus utilities. Defendant does not know how this expense will be paid. 10. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff has withdrawn S35,000 in marital funds from a joint account. It is denied that Plaintiff is holding the funds for the mutual protection of both Plaintiff and Defendant. By way of further answer, the S35,000 that Plaintiff has taken, came from joint accounts which the parties maintained for the purpose of paying extraordinary expenses, in particular, medical and rental real estate expenses. By withdrawing almost all of the funds in this account, Plaintiff has Icfl Defendant with little or no resources to pay his medical bills or real estate expenses. Although Defendant intends to file a support action, it will be a number of weeks and/or months before a support order is entered. 11. Denied. 12. Denied. 13. Defendant repeats and reallegcs the avemrents of paragraphs I through 12 which arc incorporated by reference herein. 14. The parties executed a Prenuptial Agreement on or about January 5, 1984. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Paragraph 4 of the Prenuptial Agreement provides in part: "In the event of a divorce, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the parties hereto shall have such rights and incidents in said joint property as arc applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland. 3587.14 15. On or about August 2, 1999 Plaintiff began taking actions on Defendant's behalf through the use of a power of attorney. 16. Plaintiff did not act in Defendant's best interests. 17. Defendant believes that Plaintiff contacted Defendant's life insurance providers and had his children removed as contingent beneficiaries. 18. Plaintiff has also attempted to unilaterally place on hold Defendant's accounts with American Express. Defendant believes that Plaintiff tried to do this even after Defendant was informed by his physician, in Plaintiffs presence, that he was capable of making rational decisions concerning his affairs. 19. Plaintiff took Defendant's military identification card on or about August 1, 1999 and refused to return it to Defendant until October 7, 1999. This removed Defendant's access to military facilities afforded to honorably retired members of the Armed Forces. 20. Without Defendant's knowledge, Plaintiff used the identification card in conjunction with the power of attorney in an attempt to have Defendant admitted to a VA hospital. 21. Plaintiff has attempted to have Defendant admitted to a psychiatric hospital under the guise that the hospital was a rehabilitation center. 22. Plaintiff has never consulted with Defendant concerning her use of the power of attorney. 23. Plaintiff misrepresented the extent of Defendant's illness and prognosis in conversations with numerous acquaintances. 5587.14 24. Plaintiff has failed to provide Defendant with an accounting of all actions she has taken while using the power of attomcy. 25. Without Defendant's consent, or his daughter's consent, Plaintiff used the power of attorney in an attempt to gain control of Defendant's daughter's savings account at Members' First Credit Union. This account was established solely to defray Defendant's daughter's college costs plus any other unanticipated expenses. 26. Defendant fears that his assets may be depleted by Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Honorable Court direct Plaintiff to provide an accounting to Defendant of all actions she has taken in exercising the power of attorney for Defendant. Date: November 10, 1999 By: Respectfully submitted, SMIGEL, ANDERSON & SACKS V? LeRoy Smigcl, Esquire I.D. /t: 09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. #: 70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 234.2401 Attorneys for Defendant ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT This Antenuptial Agreement made this day of , 1984, between LEO D. CHARRON, JR., and BEVERLY E. MARTIN. WITNESSETHt WHEREAS, the parties hereto are contemplating marrying each other, and WHEREAS, they desire and intend to establish their mutual property rights now and for the future, and to guarantee to each individual ownership in and to all property and estate which each now owns or subsequently may acquire, and WHEREAS, the parties have discussed their property rights with each other and have made such disclosure of assets to one another as the parties deem desirable, and WHEREAS, the real and personal property owned by each of the parties is set forth in Exhibit A and B, attached hereto and made a part of this Agreement. NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the marriage of the parties hereto, and intending to be legally bound,'the parties agree as followst 1. All property and estate of the parties hereto, of every nature, and wheresoever situate, acquired by each of the parties before their marriage shall be and remain forever the individual property and estate of the party so owning and acquiring it and neither of the parties shall acquire any interest in the individual property and estate of the other acquired before the marriage, because of their subsequent marital relationships and each shall hold and possess all ouch property and estate as if he and she had remained unmarried. 2. Each of the parties hereby disclaims all right, title and interest in all property and estate now owned which has beer acquired by the other before their marriage renouncing forever all claims to the separate estate of the other including all right of dower, curtsey, family exemption, to elect against the will or conveyances, or to receive a share of the estate under the intestate laws, with regard to such previously acquired property. I? 3. In the event of a divorce each of the parties hereby disclaims and relinquishes all right, title and interest in any and all retirement benefits, pensions, and/or annuities of whatsoever nature, including, but not limited to Federal, Military and/or VA retirement benefits, that the other is currently entitled, or may become entitled to receive. 4. All property, rights to property or less than absolute interest therein created by the parties subsequent to their marriage, shall be considered the joint property of the parties and the same shall be subject to all of the laws, claims and incidence of such joint property as defined by the laws of the State of Marylandl except that it is expressly understood that this provision shall not apply to motor vehicles acquired by the parties after their marriage. In the event of a divorce, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation the parties hereto shall have ouch rights and incidence in said joint property as are applicable under the laws of the State of Maryland. In the event of death of either of the parties the normal laws of inheritance shall apply to such jointly acquired property as limited by paragraph 6(b) (4) hereof. 5, a. Each of the parties will contribute a sum certain toward the purchase and initial redecoration of a marital abode which they shall own as tenants by the entirety. The amount each party contributes shall be set forth in a document which shall subsequently be executed by both parties and appended to, and made a part of, this agreement. b. In the event the parties dissolve their marriage, upon the sale of said abode all outstanding mortgages, liens, taxes due thereon, and closing costs and fees shall be promptly paid. The remainder of the proceeds realized from the sale shall be distributed between the parties as follows, • ?1 .i. ?)'?r ????..: is -3- ) (1) Each party will recover his or her initial contribution without interest. ' (2) Any proceeds remaining after each party has fully recovered his or her said contribution will be distributed evenly between the parties. (3) capital gains taxes, if any, will be assessed in equal shares between the parties. (4) In the event that one of the parties predeceases the sale of the said abode, the surviving party will take all necessary steps to assure that upon said sale, or upon the surviving party's death, expressly recognizing the surviving parties right to live in the house, whichever event occurs first, a sum of money equivalent to one half (1/2) of the fair market value of said abode at the time of sale or death, whichever is applicavle, minus tho above-cited costs and expenses, is distributed in equal shares to the heirs or legatees of the predeceased party, excluding the surviving party, provided, that if the parties were not pending divorce al the time of death of the predeceased party and if the abode is not sold, that portion of the proceeds which is reinvested in another abode shall be exempt from said distribution. c. The above provisions shall apply to the initial marital abode and to any subsequent abodes, purchased from funds reinvested from the sale of said initial abode. 6. Each of the parties agree to join in any deed, or in the execution of any paper necessary to effect the sale of real estate or to assist the other in the administration or sale of his or her individual property and estate. 7. Nothing herein shall be construed as preventing either of the parties from giving any of his or her property or estate to the other by deed, gift, will or otherwise. _q- S. This Agreement is entered into in Maryland and shall be construed under and in accordance with the laws of Maryland and shall in no way be effected by any change in domicile of either party. 9. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective parties, their heirs, leagatees, devisees, personal representatives and assigns, notwithstanding the extent or size of the parties' individual estates at the time of the execution of this Agreement or subsequently. 10. Each party has had independent advice by counsel of his or her own selection. Each party regards the terms of this agreement as fair and reasonable and each has signed it freely and voluntarily without relying upon any representation other than those expressly set forth herein. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. WITNESS( e (SEAL) Ave eo rronart u && ,L . / ? r4 (SEAL) r y ac n -Vt PENNSYLVANIA. CUMBERLAND to-witt- STATE OF M1!>=11tH7, WSSRYt1M11 COUNTY, I HEREBY CERTIFY, that this Sthd8y Of non, who made oath in due 198 4, personally appeared Leo oo D. a eeta se forth e are true andmcorrect toathehbeat tofrhisninforms tion,knowledge and of law belief. WITNESS my hand and Official Notarial Seal. Notary ublic Sy Commission November 10, 1986 YANY A911 S11101. N51AIT FUIIIC CAIIISH 1010. C119ItILAN0 COUNTY of v*111SS101(111115 Nov. 10, 1116 puler, romTlaal AISHI,U1/ d NOmIH C .i Rte, s. f `.. .. ... r above are true and correct to the beet of her information, knowledge and belief. WITNESS my hand and Official Notarial Seel. se X17` oy Pu c STATE OF MARYLAND, WASHINGTON COUNTY, to-wilt- I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this day of ,/ j4" " 198/ , personally appeared Beverly E. Martin, wKKo made th in due form of law that the matters and facts not forth in the My Commission Expires: July 1, 1986 EXHIBIT A PROPERTY OWNED BY LEO D. CHARRON . 11 I, REAL ESTATE 1. 8228 Clifton Farm Court, Alexandria, Virginia being more fully described in a certain deed recorded in the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia in Deed Book 4955, Page 282 subject to the mortgage held by Arvida Mortgage Company, Clearwater, Florida. 2. 1114 Pheasant Drive, North, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in a certain deed recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "K," Volume 29, Page 237, subject to the mortgage held by First United Federal, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. 3. 1160 Belvedere Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, formerly 302 Circle Drive, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, being more fully described in the deed of John D. Keeney, Jr. and Anna Marie Keeney to Leo D. Charron as recorded in the office of the Cumberland County Recorder of Deeds in Deed Book "I," Volume 30, Page 574 subject to the mortgage held by Carlisle Building and Loan Association. II. Deed of Trust dated October 27, 1989, between Miriam Virginia Lucas, Grantor, and Robert V. Moss and Patricia C. Broyles, Trustees, in the principal sum of $43,500.00 and recorded in the Clerk's Office of Montgomery County, Maryland in Liber 5600 Folio 641. III. One-sixth (1/6) undivided interest in the Joint Venture Agreement for the MBC Investment Group. IV. Bonds and Accounts 1. Twenty-five (25) - $75.00 savings bonds in various sta- tes of maturity. 2. Cavanough Corporate bonds with a face value of $1,800.00. 3, Share account number 25008 with U.S. Defense Activities balance of $170400 as of 5 December Federal Credit Union, with a 1983, part of which is to be used towards the purchase and rede- coration of a marital abode as set forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. for all policies: V. Insurance policies (beneficiary Farmers Trust Company as Trustee for the three children of a prior marriage, to wit: Leo Desire Charron III, Catherine Marie Charron, and Michelle ElizabethCharron)iife insurance 1. $35,000.00 servicemen's group 2, Two (2) $30,000.00 term policies with State Farm Insurance with Army Mutual Aid 3, $15,000.00 whole life policy with USAA 4, $10,000.00 whole life policy VI. Automobiles 1. 1983 Ford Mustang 2, 1976 Ford Station Wagon VII. Other Personal Property 1, Syracuse China 2, Stamp Collection 3, Coin collection 4, Oil Paintings 5, Thomas Organ 6. 25" RCA color television set 7. 19" RCA color television set 8. Antique 14K gold railroad watch 9. Antique pool table 10. Three (3) Hummel.-figurines. R c I i EXHIBIT B PROPERTY'OWNED BY BEVERLY E. MARTIN I. PERSONAL PROPERTY .1.•:..:.Kirk silver service 2. Lenox china 3. Assorted items of fine jewelry including, but not limited to, diamond engagement ring, diamond earings, opal ring, 14K gold chains, 14K gold bracelets. 4. Bedroom suite 5. Dining room set including table, hutch and four (4) chairs 6. Ranch mink fur coat 7. Two (1) leather English riding saddles 8. 1980 Toyota automobile II. Retirement plan with Western Maryland Review III. Various bank accounts of de minimis value IV. $48,000.00 in cash which proceeds resulted from the sale of realtproperty in,Hagerstown, Maryland, and part of which is to..be_,used,towards;.the purchase and redecoration of a marital abode as set-forth in paragraph 5 of this agreement. a . ?? FR?Q'?,PA7oRS. (F,c*ia?oRl?P?" , . .AyyOONia COAOR TE7BV1J1OM .SET M-4 y77;6 wMAfrk• ANn Pt?16T= a 577G?Z-. e?RmRs?.; yoRs6 VERIFICATION I, Leo D. Charron, verify that the statements contained in the foregoing pleading are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: D•q C74X k _ LEO D. C ON 5587.14 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, PLAINTIFF V. LEO D. CHARRON, DEFENDANT : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6426 CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE CERTIFICATE. OF SERVICE. I, Ann V. Levin, Esquire, attorney for Defendant in the above-captioned matter, do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim on counsel for Plaintiff by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the 10`h day of November, 1999, addressed as follows: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire 525 North Twelfth Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Smigel, Anderson & Sacks By: Lc y Smigel, Esquire I.D. #09617 Ann V. Levin, Esquire I.D. #70259 2917 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717)234.2401 Attorneys for Defendant t ?'; C tr co (IN Ol ~1 tJ r? O F Q ? S m y a Q < $ a W m d m p s G ti { Y n s, ni J r ? 1 BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW this day of _Q c( c L e-r , 1999, upon the stipulation of the parties and their attorneys which is attached hereto, we hereby amend and modify our order of October 21, 1999, as follows: 1. A hearing is hereby scheduled, to be held before the undersigned in Court Room No. 1 of the Cumberland County Courthouse in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, such hearing to commence at 3:00 o'clock p.m., on Wednesday, the 8°i day of December, 1999. 2. Pending such hearing, the Defendant, Leo D. Charron or his representative shall not depose of, sell, liquidate, transfer, or change ownership of, or otherwise conceal or dissipate the assets held by Plaintiff and Defendant, or either of them, with USAA or American Express Financial Advisors, Inc. 3. Pending the hearing scheduled above, USAA shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff' and Defendant or further order of this Court. E N : CC) N : 1{IJ f-? CS GI L r ? Y? dpm 4 Pending the hearing scheduled above, American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., shall not permit any party to withdraw funds from, transfer, or change ownership of, any of the accounts held with that institution by the Plaintiff, Beverly E. Charron, or the Defendant, Leo D. Charron, or either of them, without the written consent of both Plaintiff and Defendant or further order of this Court. 5 Each of the parties shall withdraw and place into an account in their own name $8,000.00 of the funds which were in their joint accounts at the Members First Federal Credit Union as of October 18, 1999. The balance of those funds, which should be approximately $27,000.00, will be deposited by Wife into an account at the Members First Federal Credit Union held in the joint names of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The parties may use the funds from that account to pay the cost to continue their present health insurance. Otherwise, pending further order of this Court, neither party shall make any withdrawals from or make any change in the ownership of the joint account opened in accordance with this paragraph. Distribution: Samuel L. Andes, Esquire (Attorney for Plaintiff) 525 North 12"' Street, Lcmoyne, PA 17043 LeRoy Smigel, Esquire (Attorney 1'or Defendant 2917 North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110 BY THE COURT, 717-761-1435 SAM ANDES 678 P04 OCT 27 '99 12:31 I BEVERLY E. CHARRON, ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON , Plaintiff ) PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs ) CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 CIVIL TERM ? fl LEO D. CHARRON, ) Defendant IN DIVORCE ! ) UL &T-1-01 AND NOW come the above-named parties, by their attorneys, and stipulate and agree that this Court's Order of October 21, 1999 shall be amended and modified in accordance with the proposed order which is attached to this Stipulation. I II 1 L. And , squire I? Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendant BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO D. CHARRON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99.6426 IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW this SA day of _o c j _ , 2003, based upon the stipulation of the parties' counsel which is attached hereto, we hereby vacate those provisions of our Order of December 31, 2001, which prohibited the withdrawal, transfer, or change of ownership of any accounts, particularly the provisions of Paragraph 6 of that order. This order, and the vacation of those provisions of our prior order, are effective immediately. DISTRIBUTION: v 4amuel L. Andes, Attorney for Plaintiff, 525 N. 12"' Street, Lemoyne, PA 17043 vlCeRoy Smigel, Attorney for Defendant, 4431 North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110 V' R 1? s 10•(09-63 BY THE COURT, r'-i BEVERLY E. CHARRON, Plaintiff VS. LEO D. CHARRON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-6426 IN DIVORCE Defendant STIPULATION AND NOW come the above-named parties, by their attorneys, and stipulate and agree that this Court's Order of 31 December 2001, and particularly Paragraph 6 of that order which froze certain financial accounts held by the parties, be vacated and terminated effective immediately. The above parties have authorized their attorneys to execute this stipulation on their behalf and file the same with the Court to obtain entry of the attach d order. LeRoy Smigel Attorney for Leo D Charron Samue L. Andes Attorney for Beverly E. Charron ? K p 1' U! ? C":. _" .. "1 .? t ? Y ? ? - l., ll . 1 . ?1 _- t 1.: C. ?tl lu ? .Z _ U