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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-06659`i ,s I--? L I? .j Q) ?f Z MIKELL Y. WORLEY, Plaintiff VS. W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant : IN TIIE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA CIVIL DIVISION -LAW IN DIVORCE No. 99 - (.s-9 C, NOTICETO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must lake prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a decree of divorce or annulment may be entered against you by the court. A judgment may also be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for divorce is indignitiles or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in file Office of the Prothonotary, Cumberland County Court House, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF PROPERTY, LAWYERS FEES OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE TIIE RIGIIT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER Olt CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 2 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 Telephone: (717) 249-3166 MIKELL Y. WORLEY, : IN'I HE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : OF CUI17131;ItLAND COUNTY, PA VS. c CIVIL DIVISION- LAW IN DIVORCE W. MICIIALL WORLEY, Defendant No. ?`i ?CVC-/ COMPLAINT COUNTI SBCI ION 3301(c) OF Tl lli DIVORCE CODE OP 1930 1. Plaintiff is Mikell Y. Worley, an adult individual who currently resides at 1633 Shecpford Street, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17055. 2. Defendant is W. Michael Worley, :m adult individual who currently resides ,d R.D. 2, Box 345, Liverpool, Pennsylvania 17045. 3. Plaintiff and Defendant have been bona fide residents in the Commonwealth for at lust six (6) months immediately previous to the filing of this Complaint. 4. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on June 9, 1971. 5. There have been no prior actions for divorce or annulment between the parties hereto. 6. Plaintiff avers that Defendant is not in any branch of the Armed Services. 7. This action is not collusive. 3. The marriage is irretreivably broken. 9. The Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling and that the Plaintiff nmy have the right to request that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests your Honorable Court to enter a Decree in Divorce, divorcing Plaintiff and Defendant from the bonds of matrimony. COUNT II SECTION 3301(4) OF THE DI VORCF CODE OF 1980 10. Paragraphs one through nine of Ihis Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though set forth in full. 11. The parties are now living separate and apart; al the appropriate time Plaintiff will submit an affidavit alleging that the parties have lived separate and apart for at least two (2) years zinc] that the marriage is irretreivably broken. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request your Honorable Court to enter a Decree in Divorce, divorcing Plaintiff and Defendant from the bonds of matrimony. Respectfully submitted: Date: BRATIC& PORTKO By: Stephen K. Portko, Esquire 1() 1 South U.S. Route 15 Dillsburg, PA 17019 (717) 432-9706 I.D. No. 34533 Attorney for Plaintiff VERIFICATION I, MIKELL Y. WORLEY, hereby acknowledge that I am Plaintiff in the foregoing Divorce Complaint, that I have read the foregoing, and the facts stated therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief I understand that any false statements herein are made subject to penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: L/ -AL-1 MIKELLJY. WORLE W u?- WC.. 1 F: CD c r: m t z 5G U i y m O a C - . x W I E H '" Q W O CO„, V a 41?NAN V „y U7 o-n N w a E u . 0061 00 c '. MIKELL Y. WORLEY, Plaintiff V. W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 99-6659 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 22nd day of October, 2002, upon oral motion made in open court by Plaintiff's counsel, Stephen K. Portko, Esquire, requesting that the case be stricken from the purge list, and no objection having been made to the request, the motion is granted, the case is stricken from the purge list, and the case shall remain active. By the Court, / Stephen K. Portko, Esquire For the Plaintiff W. Michael Worley R.D. 2, Box 345 7 Liverpool, PA 17045 Defendant Court Administrator wcy W J. esley Ole Jr., za kys 1 ? MIKELL Y. WORLEY, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA VS. NO. 99-6659 W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant CIVIL ACTION -- DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1. A complaint in divorce under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed on November 3, 1999. 2. The marriage of plaintiff and defend&nt is irretrievably broken and ninety days have elapsed from the date of filing and service of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce after service of notice of intention to request entry of decree. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: W. Michael Worley Social Security n .206• 3 9 72 j -1 1. ?..? _? ?? :'v .y•, _'_ i... ... _? MIKELL Y. WORLEY, Plaintiff VS. W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA NO. 99-6659 CIVIL ACTION -- DIVORCE WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER SECTION 3301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a divorce decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the prothonotary. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S_ Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: /0 ., 1?, - GSl r?, 7J(J?i W. Michael Worley, Defendant v's Case No. CrL Statement of IIIICI1tion to Proceed To the Court: ?C?? t L? ?l A r^ h--?e 2 intends to proceed with the abovelIcaptioned matter. Print Name LJ • ?I e 1, n 1- I hJ Sign Name w t.J a Date: IU'`D DS Attorney For Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administmtinn 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment. 1. Role ojcivil Procedure New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope or the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The temmination of these cases For inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a unikinn statewide practice, preempting local rules. This mle was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v. Eagle, 551 I'a. 360,710 A.2d 1104 (1993) in which the court held that "prejudice to the detention[ as it result of delay in prosecution is required beforea case may be dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901.- Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(6) has been amended to accommodate the new rule or civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition ofmatcrs set forth in subdivision (;u) of that rule continues to be applicable. II Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases front the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate all action for inactivity, the coupe of the procedure is with the panics. If ftte panics do not wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and "the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of cpar.c hem:i:mating the natter with pr.-ejudicc 1nr failure in prosecute.- If a puny wishes to coma : the matter. he or site will file a notice or intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action hay been ter thiate l Iliac action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been temhinated, that party may proceed under Rulc230(d) for relief from the order ortemhination. An ex;unple of such an occurrence nhight be the temtination of a viable action when the aggrieved pany did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the tiling or the petition to reinstate the action is important. Into, petition is filed within thirty days of the entry ofthe order of tennimnion on the docket, subdivision (d)(2) provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period, subdivision (d)(3) requires flat the plaintin" must make a slow in to the court that the petition was promptly Ned and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order or temtination on the docket and For the failure to life the petition within the thirty-Jay period under subdivision (d)(2). B. Where the tenon has not Iron lenninnred An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the Filing or a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. [it such an instance, the aggrieved pany may pursue the renhedy of a common kov non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2. MIKELL Y. WORLEY, :1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. :CIVIL ACTION - LAW JN DIVORCE W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant :NO. 99-6659 PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE To the Prothonotary: Kindly enter the appearance of Elizabeth S. Beckley, Esquire, Charles O. Beckley, II, Esquire and Beckley & Madden, of Counsel, on behalf of the Plaintiff, Mikell Y. Worley, in the above-captioned matter. DATED: -5 r3 1'&?- iza h S. Be ' Of Counsel BECKLEY & MADDEN 212 North Third Street P.O. Box 11998 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 (717) 233-7691 Charles O. Beckley, I - squire CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Elizabeth S. Beckley, Esquire, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this day served upon the person and in the manner indicated below. SERVICE BY FIRST CLASS MAIL: Elizabeth B. Stone, Esquire Stone, LaFaver & Shekletski 414 Bridge Street New Cumberland, PA 17070 Stephen K. Portko, Esquire 101 South U.S. Route 15 Dillsburg, PA 17019 DATED: &'3 J'6? t) ^a ?., rj -? c 17F , C11 - G MIKELL Y. WORLEY, Plaintiff V. W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant JN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA :CIVIL ACTION - LAW JN DIVORCE :NO. 99-6659 PETITION FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION UNDER SECTION 3502 OF THE DIVORCE CODE AND NOW comes the Plaintiff, Mikell Y. Worley, who, by and through her attorneys, Elizabeth S. Beckley, Esquire, Charles O. Beckley, II, Esquire, and Beckley & Madden, of Counsel, files this Petition for Equitable Distribution under Section 3502 of the Divorce Code, in which she avers that: 1. Plaintiff, Mikell Y. Worley, is an adult individual residing at 1629 Sheepford Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17055. 2. Defendant, W. Michael Worley, is an adult individual residing at 313 Cherry Road, Liverpool, Pennsylvania 17045. 3. Plaintiff filed a Divorce Complaint in this matter on November 3, 1999. 4. Plaintiff and Defendant have acquired property, both real and personal, during the marriage which constitutes marital property subject to equitable distribution under the Divorce Code. 5. Plaintiff and Defendant each owned, prior to the marriage, both real and personal property which has increased in value during the marriage, and/or which has been exchanged for other property which has increased in value during the marriage, all of which property is marital property, subject to equitable distribution under the Divorce Code. 6. Plaintiff and Defendant have been unable to agree as to an equitable division of said property. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mikell Y. Worley, respectfully requests the Court to divide all marital property equitably between the parties. DATED:,S-3/ v 7 of Counsel BECKLEY & MADDEN 212 North Third Street P.O. Box 11998 Harrisburg, PA 17108 (717) 233-7691 2 Respectfully submitted, VERIFICATION I, Mikell Y. Worley, hereby verify that the statements made in the foregoing document are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties 18 Pa. C. S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. DATED: Mi ell Y ley CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Elizabeth S. Beckley, Esquire, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this day served upon the person and in the manner indicated below. SERVICE BY FIRST CLASS MAIL: Elizabeth B. Stone, Esquire Stone, LaFaver & Shekletski 414 Bridge Street New Cumberland, PA 17070 09, DATED: li be c u' C-3 W „?? rarn ,r- ('a +y cn u° MIKELL Y. WORLEY, :IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. :CIVIL ACTION -LAW :IN DIVORCE W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant :N0.99-6659 WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER SECTION 3301(C) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a divorce decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the prothonotary. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Dated: g'- / ~ - 0~0~ D --~~~ °~-~ Mikkell Y. o ey MIKELL Y. WORLEY, :IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. :CIVIL ACTION -LAW :IN DIVORCE W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant :N0.99-6659 AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1. A complaint in divorce under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed on November 3, 1999. 2. The marriage of plaintiff and defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety days have elapsed from the date of filing and service of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce after service of notice of intention to request entry of the decree. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Dated: ~ - ~ ~ - o~ b G 0 ~~~~ Mikell Y. Wor y _ ~ `'~> c~ , .J - -- C`* __ :._ .~ - °^ ,.. „r,"-. -- s MIKELL Y. WORLEY, Plaintiff vs. . W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0. 99 - 6659 CIVIL IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 1 ~~ day of , 2010, counsel and the parties having entered into an agreement and stipulation resolving the economic issues on August 12, 2010, the date set for a Master's hearing with counsel and the parties, the agreement and stipulation having been transcribed, the appointment of the Master is vacated and counsel can conclude the proceedings by the filing of a praecipe to transmit the record with the affidavits of consent of the parties so that a final decree in divorce can be entered. BY THE COURT, ~ ~7' / Kev' A. Hess, P.J. cc: ~ Elizabeth S. Beckley ~, 6 Attorney for Plaintiff r? ~. Vi=a ,p -; St -? ~ . a~T~ Elizabeth B. one ~ ; ~ Attorney for Defendant ~ "'~-; _ ~: _.. ,~ ~ e ,~ ~~~~ ~ :~ 4._.- e . • MIKELL Y. WORLEY, :IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVAg A !?-- 2 V. :CIVIL ACTION - LAW rnw x3. rnF :IN DIVORCE ,,r- N =o W. MICHAEL WORLEY, r<> cn °a Defendant :NO. 99-6659 ° X AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE -< ? I, Elizabeth S. Beckley, being duly sworn according to law, do depose and say: 1. I am an adult individual over eighteen years of age. 2. I was retained by the Plaintiff in 2007, eight years after this proceeding began. 3. Prior counsel to Plaintiff, Stephen K. Portko, Esquire, did not file proof of service of the complaint in this matter and I have been unable to reach him regarding the same. 4. Defendant was, at some point, served with a copy of the divorce complaint as evidenced by his participation in this matter. a. On October 12, 2005, Defendant signed an Affidavit of Consent and Waiver of Notice and filed these documents with the Court on October 20, 2005. A true and correct copy of Defendant's Affidavit of Consent and Waiver of Notice is attached hereto marked as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. b. On October 20, 2005, Defendant signed and filed with the Court a Statement of Intention to Proceed. A true and correct copy of Defendant's Statement of Intention to Proceed is attached hereto marked as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference. C. Defendant, with his counsel Elizabeth Stone, Esquire, also participated in the Divorce Master's proceedings as evidenced by their signature on the parties' settlement agreement. A true and correct copy of the parties' settlement agreement is attached hereto marked as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by reference. 5. All of the aforementioned documents demonstrate the Defendant received a copy of the Divorce Complaint and participated in the Divorce action. iza th Sworn and subscribed to before me this ob-7111lay of , 2011. No ary Public (SEAL) COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA NOTARIAL SEAL ANN M. CARPER, Notary Public City of Harrisburg, Dauphin County My Commission Expires June 23, 2012 YPIFl< MIKELL Y. WORLEY, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA VS. NO. 99-6659 W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant CIVIL ACTION --- DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1. A complaint in divorce under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed on November 3, 1999. 2. The marriage of plaintiff and defend&nt is irretrievably broken and ninety days have elapsed from the date of filing and service of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce after service of notice of intention to request entry of decree. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date:-/0 - I Z ' ?' ?? ftiJ . /'? c. i_. ,-.) ??JO'? `? W. Michael Worley ` Social Security R?70 t 3'.q 7 0> 7 t r i i f `s i 1 ti. ..? r? __? rj . _. :1.j '??.• ? ? ? ? '` ... t ' ?:, _.. i,. ti ems; ?i MIKELL Y. WORLEY, Plaintiff VS. W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA NO. 99-6659 CIVIL ACTION -- DIVORCE WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER SECTION 3301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a divorce decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the prothonotary. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: o if tr?, Al,c. L I U')o? 4 ? W. Michael Worley, ,efendant __ CLX A2 4000 vs Case No. AQ - Statement of Itttentian to Proceed To the Court: "1 • jr ' I1 A w7 i,,. intends to proceed with the above captioned matter. -Lci ['tint Namc_W• I "i r p i- L Sign Name ,,- t Date: IU bllQ QS Attorney fur Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new hiu)c of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and attended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901, Two aspects of the mcommendatiom rncrit comment. 1. Ruleofeivil Procedrem New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of civil Procedure. The tennination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rulec promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a unilbrm statewide practice, preempting local rules. This rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v. Eagle. 551 I'a. 160.710 A.2d 1104 (1998) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case may be dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901.- Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amcndml to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of maters set forth in subdivision (a) of that rule continues to he applicable. I i lmacrimr Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity, the course of the procedure is with the panics. If the parties do not wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and "the Prothonotary shall enter arm order as of course tcrrriru.:ing the matter with prtjuclit.; Inr failure is, prosecute." If n pony wishes to puraic the matter, fie or slue will file a notice of invention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. II'/rere the action has been termlxare d il'the action is terminated when a parry believes that it should not have been terminated, that party may proceed under Ru1e230(d) for relief froth the order of ternmination, An example of such an occurrence might lie the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved pany did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and tit's did not timely tine the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the tiling of the petition to reinstate the action is important, If the petition is riled within thirty days of the entry of tic order or termination on the docket. subdivision (d)(2) provides than the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period, subdivision (d)(3) requires that the plaintilr must make a show in to the court that the petition was promptly riled and that there is a reasanablc explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to rile the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty-day period under subdivision (d)(2). a. Where the anion hers nor Well rcrraiaared An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the riling ofa notice of in(ention to procetid may have been the subject of inordinate delay. in such an instance, the aggrieved piny may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.3. } ?W? .,,,r e? MIKELL Y. WORLEY, Plaintiff vs. W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant E IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6659 CIVIL IN DIVORCE THE MASTER: Today is Thursday, August 12, 2010. This is the date set for a hearing in the above-captioned divorce proceedings. Present in the hearing room are the Plaintiff, Mikell Y. Worley, and her counsel Elizabeth S. Beckley, and the Defendant, W. Michael Worley, and his counsel Elizabeth B. Stone. This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint in divorce on November 3, 1999. The divorce complaint raised grounds of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The parties have signed affidavits of consent and waivers of notice of intention to request entry of divorce decree so that the divorce can conclude under Section 3301(c) of the Domestic Relations Code. Mr. Worley's affidavit and waiver were signed on October 12, 2005, and filed on October 20, 2005. Mrs. Worley's affidavit and waiver were signed on August 12, 2010. Her affidavit and waiver will be filed by the Master's office with the Prothonotary. On May 31, 2007, wife filed a petition for 1 C equitable distribution. Neither party has filed a claim for alimony or counsel and costs. An agreement is going to be placed on the record in the presence of the parties. The parties have worked extensively with counsel to reach an accord with regard to the economic claim of equitable distribution. The agreement as placed on the record will be considered the substantive agreement of the parties, not subject to any changes or modifications except for correction of typographical errors which may be made during the transcription. Consequently, when the parties leave the hearing room, after the agreement has been stated on the record, they are bound by the agreement even though they have not subsequently signed the agreement affirming the terms of settlement. The agreement is going to be transcribed and then the parties and counsel will be asked to return to the Master's office to review the document for typographical errors, make corrections as necessary, and then the parties will be asked to affix their signatures affirming the terms of settlement as stated on the record. Upon receipt by the Master of a completed agreement, the Master will prepare an order vacating his appointment and counsel can then file a praecipe transmitting the record to the Court requesting a final 2 0 decree in divorce. The parties were married on June 9, 1971, and separated on April 1, 1999. They are the natural parents of two daughters, both of whom are emancipated. AGREEMENT The parties have agreed to the following distribution of the marital assets and the resolution of the claim of equitable distribution as follows: 1. Husband has a pension with PSERS. That pension is currently in pay status and the parties have agreed that wife has a marital portion of that pension entitled to her in the amount of $1,453.00 monthly. Immediately the parties are going to arrange to have a QDRO prepared providing that wife receive her monthly benefit from the pension. The balance of the benefit from the pension of approximately $2,500.00 will be payable to husband. Because this pension has been in pay status for approximately 38 months and wife has not received her monthly portion of the pension, husband owes wife, based calculations of deductions and credits, the amount of $20,000.00. In arriving at this amount, we have taken into account that wife is going to receive her Girl Scout pension, free of claims by husband, and that wife will receive as a cash out payment of an IRA, which is currently held by husband of approximately $26,700.00. Husband will cash out the IRA within five (5) days and pay to wife the proceeds from the IRA. If he gets more than $26,700.00, he can use that as a credit toward the amount of $20,000.00 which he owes to wife; if he does not get $26,700.00, then the difference between that amount and $26,700.00 will be added to the $20,000.00 which he owes wife. 2. The QDRO will be prepared by Jonathan Cramer of Conrad Siegel and Associates. He will be contacted by counsel immediately to prepare the QDRO and the parties will share in the cost of the preparation of the QDRO which will subsequently be presented to the Court for an order effectively setting forth the terms of division of the pension as provided hereinabove. 3 3. With respect to the payment that is owed to wife of $20,000.00 (the number being taken into account without the credit or debt of what may be received from the payment of the IRA) husband shall have sixty (60) days in which to refinance the residence where he is living at 313 Cherry Road, Liverpool, Perry County, Pennsylvania. From the proceeds of the refinancing, wife will receive the monies that are due her under the terms of this agreement. If husband fails to pay to wife within the sixty (60) day period the monies that he owes wife, then he will be compelled to list the house for sale where he lives to raise the monies that are owed wife. If wife is forced to engage an attorney to collect the monies that she is owed by way of enforcing the terms of this agreement, those costs incurred by wife for attorneys and incidental filing fees will be reimbursed to wife by husband. 4. Husband agrees to name wife as the beneficiary of 1/2 of the death benefit provided through his pension now and following the execution of a decree in divorce. Wife will be entitled to receive evidence of her being named as beneficiary within two (2) weeks of today's agreement. Such evidence will be provided by husband by presenting to wife the documents which he has had to prepare in order to effectuate the beneficiary designation. It is the specific intent of the parties that should husband predecease the effectuation of the implementation of wife as his 1/2 death benefit beneficiary or the cashing out of the IRA, the parties agree that wife is herein entitled to same even though the paperwork has not been completed. 5. Each party will retain the tangible personal property in his or her possession free of any claims by the other party. 6. Neither party has any joint debt with the other party and the debt that each party has presently will be the responsibility of the party who has incurred the debt. 7. Except as herein otherwise provided, each party may dispose of his or her property in any way and each party hereby waives and relinquishes any and all rights he or she may now have or hereafter acquire under the present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property or the estate of the other as a result of the marital relationship including without limitation, statutory 4 r u allowance, widow's allowance, right of intestacy, right to take against the will of the other, and right to act as administrator or executor in the other's estate. Each will at the request of the other execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all instruments which may be necessary or advisable to carry into effect this mutual waiver and relinquishment of all such interest, rights, and claims. THE MASTER: Mrs. Worley, have you heard what I have stated on the record today? MRS. WORLEY: Yes. THE MASTER: And you've been present during the discussion in getting to the agreement today? MRS. WORLEY: Yes. done? THE MASTER: Do you understand what we have MRS. WORLEY: Yes. THE MASTER: Do you have any questions? MRS. WORLEY: No. THE MASTER: And are you in accord with the agreement to finalize all matters involving your divorce? MRS. WORLEY: I am. THE MASTER: Mr. Worley, have you been present during the statement of the agreement on the record? MR. WORLEY: I have. THE MASTER: Have you been present during the previous discussion in arriving at the agreement that we have put on the record? 5 MR. WORLEY: Yes, I have. E THE MASTER: Do you have any questions about it? MR. WORLEY: I do not. THE MASTER: Do you understand it? MR. WORLEY: I do. THE MASTER: And you are in agreement to accept this as a final resolution of all outstanding matters with regard to the equitable distribution issue raised in the divorce action? MR. WORLEY: Reluctantly but yes. THE MASTER: Thank you. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement, that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to the methods and procedures of enforcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: M kell Orley w. chael Worley 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Elizabeth S. Beckley, Esquire, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this day served upon the person and in the manner indicated below. SERVICE BY FIRST CLASS MAIL: Elizabeth B. Stone, Esquire Tanner Law Offices, LLC 1300 Market Street, Suite 10 Lemoyne, PA 17043 DATED:3 , I ?Iyq 5 1 a th . e , • MIKELL Y. WORLEY, . Plaintiff VS. W. MICHAEL WORLEY, Defendant THE MASTER: 2010 11 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 99 - 6659 CIVIL mrn IN DIVORCE N :p CD Today is Thursday, Augu9t=12 This is the date set for a hearing in the r- above-captioned divorce proceedings. Present in the hearing room are the Plaintiff, Mikell Y. Worley, and her counsel Elizabeth S. Beckley, and the Defendant, W. Michael Worley, and his counsel Elizabeth B. Stone. This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint in divorce on November 3, 1999. The divorce complaint raised grounds of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The parties have signed affidavits of consent and waivers of notice of intention to request entry of divorce decree so that the divorce can conclude under Section 3301(c) of the Domestic Relations Code. Mr. Worley's affidavit and waiver were signed on October 12, 2005, and filed on October 20, 2005. Mrs. Worley's affidavit and waiver were signed on August 12, 2010. Her affidavit and waiver will be filed by the Master's office with the Prothonotary. On May 31, 2007, wife filed a petition for 1 equitable distribution. Neither party has filed a claim for alimony or counsel and costs. An agreement is going to be placed on the record in the presence of the parties. The parties have worked extensively with counsel to reach an accord with. regard to the economic claim of equitable distribution. The agreement as placed on the record will be considered the substantive agreement of the parties, not subject to any changes or modifications except for correction of typographical errors which may be made during the transcription. Consequently, when the parties leave the hearing room, after the agreement has been stated on the record, they are bound by the agreement even though they have not subsequently signed the agreement affirming the terms of settlement. The agreement is going to be transcribed and then the parties and counsel will be asked to return to the Master's office to review the document for typographical errors, make corrections as necessary, and then the parties will be asked to affix their signatures affirming the terms of settlement as stated on the record. Upon receipt by the Master of a completed agreement, the Master will prepare an order vacating his appointment and counsel can then file a praecipe transmitting the record to the Court requesting a final 2 decree in divorce. The parties were married on June 9, 1971, and separated on April 1, 1999. They are the natural parents of two daughters, both of whom are emancipated. AGREEMENT The parties have agreed to the following distribution of the marital assets and the resolution of the claim of equitable distribution as follows: 1. Husband has a pension with PSERS. That pension is currently in pay status and the parties have agreed that wife has a marital portion of that pension entitled to her in the amount of $1,453.00 monthly. Immediately the parties are going to arrange to have a QDRO prepared providing that wife receive her monthly benefit from the pension. The balance of the benefit from the pension of approximately $2,500.00 will be payable to husband. Because this pension has been in pay status for approximately 38 months and wife has not received her monthly portion of the pension, husband owes wife, based calculations of deductions and credits, the amount of $20,000.00. In arriving at this amount, we have taken into account that wife is going to receive her Girl Scout pension, free of claims by husband, and that wife will receive as a cash out payment of an IRA, which is currently held by husband of approximately $26,700.00. Husband will cash out the IRA within five (5) days and pay to wife the proceeds from the IRA. If he gets more than $26,700.00, he can use that as a credit toward the amount of $20,000.00 which he owes to wife; if he does not get $26,700.00, then the difference between that amount and $26,700.00 will be added to the $20,000.00 which he owes wife. 2. The QDRO will be prepared by Jonathan Cramer of Conrad Siegel and Associates. He will be contacted by counsel immediately to prepare the QDRO and the parties will share in the cost of the preparation of the QDRO which will subsequently be presented to the Court for an order effectively setting forth the terms of division of the pension as provided hereinabove. 3 3. With respect to the payment that is owed to wife of $20,000.00 (the number being taken into account without the credit or debt of what may be received from the payment of the IRA) husband shall have sixty (60) days in which to refinance the residence where he is living at 313 Cherry Road, Liverpool, Perry County, Pennsylvania. From the proceeds of the refinancing, wife will receive the monies that are due her under the terms of this agreement. If husband fails to pay to wife within the sixty (60) day period the monies that he owes wife, then he will be compelled to list the house for sale where he lives to raise the monies that are owed wife. If wife is forced to engage an attorney to collect the monies that she is owed by way of enforcing the terms of this agreement, those costs incurred by wife for attorneys and incidental filing fees will be reimbursed to wife by husband. 4. Husband agrees to name wife as the beneficiary of 1/2 of the death benefit provided through his pension now and following the execution of a decree in divorce. Wife will be entitled to receive evidence of her being named as beneficiary within two (2) weeks of today's agreement. Such evidence will be provided by husband by presenting to wife the documents which he has had to prepare in order to effectuate the beneficiary designation. It is the specific intent of the parties that should husband predecease the effectuation of the implementation of wife as his 1/2 death benefit beneficiary or the cashing out of the IRA, the parties agree that wife is herein entitled to same even though the paperwork has not been completed. 5. Each party will retain the tangible personal property in his or her possession free of any claims by the other party. 6. Neither party has any joint debt with the other party and the debt that each party has presently will be the responsibility of the party who has incurred the debt. 7. Except as herein otherwise provided, each party may dispose of his or her property in any way and each party hereby waives and relinquishes any and all rights he or she may now have or hereafter acquire under the present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property or the estate of the other as a result of the marital relationship including without limitation, statutory 4 allowance, widow's allowance, right of intestacy, right to take against the will of the other, and right to act as administrator or executor in the other's estate. Each will at the request of the other execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all instruments which may be necessary or advisable to carry into effect this mutual waiver and relinquishment of all such interest, rights, and claims. THE MASTER: I have stated on the record MRS. WORLEY: THE MASTER: the discussion in getting tc MRS. WORLEY: THE MASTER: Mrs. Worley, have you heard what today? Yes. And you've been present during D the agreement today? Yes. Do you understand what we have done? MRS. WORLEY: Yes. THE MASTER: Do you have any questions? MRS. WORLEY: No. THE MASTER: And are you in accord with the agreement to finalize all matters involving your divorce? MRS. WORLEY: I am. THE MASTER: Mr. Worley, have you been present during the statement of the agreement on the record? MR. WORLEY: I have. THE MASTER: Have you been present during the previous discussion in arriving at the agreement that we have put on the record? 5 V • MR. WORLEY: Yes, I have. THE MASTER: Do you have any questions about it? MR. WORLEY: I do not. THE MASTER: Do you understand it? MR. WORLEY: I do. THE MASTER: And you are in agreement to accept this as a final resolution of all outstanding matters with regard to the equitable distribution issue raised in the divorce action? MR. WORLEY: Reluctantly but yes. THE MASTER: Thank you. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement, that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to the methods and procedures of enforcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: Y--1 ? - X016 M kell Y. Orley W. chael Worley 6 MIKELL Y. WORLEY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ( 0 ° 2n --s Plaintiff : DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANI;ov z? : f= z v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW ter' -um IN DIVORCE ch =° W. MICHAEL WORLEY, *C') -v _ z? Defendant : NO. 99-6659c rv PRAECIPE TO TRANSMIT RECORD -c TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Please transmit the record, together with the following information, to the Court for the entry of a Decree of Divorce. 1. Ground for divorce: irretrievable breakdown of the marriage under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code. 2. Date and manner of service of the Complaint: Please see the Affidavit of Service being filed contemporaneously herewith. 3. Date of execution of the affidavit of consent required by Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code: by plaintiff on August 12, 2010; by defendant on October 12, 2005. 4. Related claims pending: All economic claims raised were resolved by a Settlement Agreement dated August 12, 2010. 5. (a) Date plaintiff's Waiver of Notice August 12, 2010, and it was filed the same date. (b) Date defendant's Waiver of Notice October 12, 2005, and it was filed on October 20, 2005. DATED: Res c ll sub 'tt 1 ' of Counsel BECKLEY & MADDEN 212 North Third Street P.O. Box 11998 Harrisburg, PA 17108 (717)233-7691 li eth S. Attorney for Plaintiff CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Elizabeth S. Beckley, Esquire, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this day served upon the person and in the manner indicated below. SERVICE BY FIRST CLASS MAIL: Elizabeth B. Stone, Esquire Tanner Law Offices, LLC 1300 Market Street, Suite 10 Lemoyne, PA 17043 oArEO COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVAI;A N C, c ? Worley Mikell Y m ? -a . Plaintiff z CIVIL ACTION - LAW :Zzo ? . :;0 -0 r- A -< ? m C)cv VS. IN DIVORCE ,?? ° s" C:) -r? W. Michael Worley NO. 99-6659 CIVIL Defendant C) STIPULATION FOR THE ENTRY OF "DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER" AND NOW, this day of h? &A4 2 o_L, the parties, Mikell Y. Worley, Plaintiff, and W. Michael Worley, Defendant, do hereby Agree and Stipulate as follows: The Defendant, W. Michael Worley (hereinafter referred to as "Member"), is a member of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State Employees' Retirement System (hereinafter referred to as "SERS") 2. SERS, as a creature of statue, is controlled by the State Employees' Retirement Code, 71 Pa. C.S. §§5101-5956 ("Retirement Code") 3. Member's date of birth and Social Security number are contained in the attached Addendum. 4. The Plaintiff, Mikell Y. Worley (hereinafter referred to as "Alternate Payee"), is the former spouse of Member. Alternate :payee's elate of birth and Sociai Security number are contained in the attached Addendum. 5. Member's last known mailing address is: 313 Cherry Road Liverpool, PA 17045 6. Alternate Payee's current mailing address is: 1629 Sheepford Road Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 DRO Page 2 It is the responsibility of the Alternate Payee to keep a current mailing address on file with SERS at all times. 7. The Alternate Payee is entitled to a portion of the Member's benefits under the Plan as set forth below. The Plan is hereby directed to pay Alternate Payee's share directly to Alternate Payee. 8. The Member is currently receiving a monthly annuity for his lifetime pursuant to the terms of Option 1. Member's retirement options are final, binding, and irrevocable. Should Member return to State service, Member and Alternate Payee understand and acknowledge that payments to both Member and Alternate Payee shall be suspended for the duration of Member's subsequent State service. SERS shall not be required to make payments to Alternate Payee during any period in which Member is engaged in active State service subsequent to the approval of this Stipulation and Agreement. Member and Alternate Payee further understand that upon Member's re-retirement after a period of State service subsequent to his first retirement, SERS will not make retroactive benefit payments to Member, Alternate Payee, or any other person for any period in which Member was engaged in active State service subsequent to his first retirement. 9. The Alternate Payee's share of Member's retirement benefit is 36.36% of the Member's gross Option 1 monthly annuity payment, together with 50% of any death benefit payable under Option 1. The Alternate Payee shall receive 36.36% of any scheduled or ad hoc increase that is applied to Member's gross xnwitlily annuity. 10. Payments to the Alternate Payee shall commence as soon as administratively feasible on or about the date SERS approves the Domestic Relations Order incorporating this Stipulation and Agreement. 11. The share of Member's retirement benefit payable to Alternate Payee pursuant to this Stipulation and Agreement shall be deducted from the Member's monthly annuity payments and/or death benefit payment by SERS and paid to the Alternate Payees. DRO Page 3 12. Member hereby nominates Alternate Payee as an irrevocable beneficiary to the extent of Alternate Payee's share of Member's retirement benefit, which pursuant to Paragraph 9 includes 50.0% of any death benefit payable under Option 1. This nomination shall become effective upon approval by the Secretary of the Retirement Board, or his authorized representative, of any Domestic Relations Order incorporating this Stipulation and Agreement. The balance of any death benefit remaining after the allocation of Alternate Payee's equitable distribution portion ("Balance") shall be paid to the beneficiaries named by Member on the last Nomination of Beneficiaries Form filed with the Retirement Board prior to Member's death. (a) If the last Nomination of Beneficiaries Form filed by Member prior to Member's death (a) predates any approved Domestic Relations Order incorporating this Stipulation and Agreement, and (b) names Alternate Payee as a beneficiary, then: (1) the terms of the Domestic Relations Order shall alone govern Alternate Payee's share of any death benefit, and (2) for purposes of paying the Balance via the last Nomination of Beneficiaries Form filed with the Retirement Board prior to Member's death, Alternate Payee shall be treated as if Alternate Payee predeceased Member. No portion of the Balance shall be payable to Alternate Payee's estate. (b) In addition, Member shall execute and deliver to Alternate Payee an authorization, in a form acceptable to SERS, which will authorize SERS to release to Alternate Payee all relevant information concerning Member's retirement account. Alternate Payee shall deliver the authorization to SERS which will allow the Alternate Payee to check that she has been and continues to be named as beneficiary for 50.0% of the Option 1 death benefit. 13. If the Alternate Payee dies before the Member, the Alternate Payee's share of the member's pension and any death benefit payable under Option 1 shall revert to the Member. 14. Alternate Payee may not exercise any right, privilege or option offered by SERS. SERS shall issue individual tax forms to Member and Alternate Payee for amounts paid to each. 15. In no event shall Alternate Payee have greater benefits or rights other than those which are available to Member. Alternate Payee is not entitled to any benefits not otherwise provided by SERS. The Alternate Payee is only entitled to the specific benefits offered by SERS as DRO Page 4 provided in this Order. All other rights, privileges and options offered by SERS not granted to Alternate Payee by this Order are preserved for Member. 16. It is specifically intended and agreed by the parties hereto that this Order: (a) Does not require SERS to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option not otherwise provided under the Retirement Code; (b) Does not require SERS to provide increased benefits (determined on the basis of actuarial value) unless increased benefits are paid to Member based upon cost of living or increases based on other than actuarial values. 17. The parties intend and agree that the terms of this Stipulation and Agreement shall be approved, adopted and entered as a Domestic Relations Order. 18. The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, shall retain jurisdiction to amend any Domestic Relations Order incorporating this Stipulation and Agreement, but only for the purpose of establishing it or maintaining it as a Domestic Relations Order; provided, however, that no such amendment shall require SERS to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option not otherwise provided by SERS, and further provided that no such amendment or right of the Court to so amend will invalidate this existing Order. 19. Upon entry as a Domestic Relations Order, a certified copy of the Domestic Relations Order and this Stipulation and Agreement and any attendant documents shall be served upon SERS immediately. The Domestic Relations Order shall take effect immediately upon SERS approval and SERS approval of any attendant documents and then shall remain in effect until further Order of the Court. DRO Page 5 WHEREFORE, the parties, intending to be legally bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Agreement, do hereunto place their hands and seals. BY THE COURT PI ntiff/Aiternate Payee 1 ? Sec e-q-4 Madden oDpie-s Mw` 3faq Jlr orb IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MIKELL Y. WORLEY V. W. MICHAEL WORLEY NO. 99-6659 DIVORCE DECREE AND NOW, Z v ! 1 , it is ordered and decreed that MIKELL Y. WORLEY , plaintiff, and W. MICHAEL WORLEY , defendant, are divorced from the bonds of matrimony. Any existing spousal support order shall hereafter be deemed an order for alimony pendente lite if any economic claims remain pending. The court retains jurisdiction of any claims raised by the parties to this action for which a final order has not yet been entered. Those claims are as follows: (If no claims remain indicate "None.") None. The Settlement Agreement between the parties shall be incorporated inot the final decree for purposes of enforcement, but shall not merge with the final Decree in Divorce. By the Court. Prothonotary COPYNwd*i ', GLy_..te