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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-07406 V r a 1.4 s. d / *. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW SAIDIS, SHUFF AND MASLAND and MARY E. WANYO, Plaintiffs V. ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, Defendants DECLARATORY JUDGMENT No. 98-7046 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of , 1999, at _.M. upon consideration of the Preliminary Objections of the Defendants, Anthony J. Urban, Esquire and Joseph Semasek, Esquire, and any response(s) thereto, if any, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the Petition in the above-captioned action is hereby DISMISSED for want ofjurisdiction. BY THE COURT: r IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW SAIDIS, SHUFF AND MASLAND and MARY E. WANYO, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Plaintiffs V. ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, Defendants ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this _ day of No. 98-7046 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED , 1999 at _.M., upon consideration of the Preliminary Objections of the Defendants, Anthony J. Urban, Esquire and Joseph Semasek, Esquire, and any response(s) thereto, if any, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the Plaintiff, SAIDIS, SNUFF AND MASLAND, is DISMISSED as a Party-Plaintiff. BY THE COURT: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW SAIDIS, SHUFF AND MASLAND and MARY E. WANYO, V. Plaintiffs ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, Defendants DECLARATORY JUDGMENT : No. 98-7046 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of , 1999, at M. upon consideration of the Preliminary Objections of the Defendants, Anthony J. Urban, Esquire, and Joseph Semasek, Esquire, and any response(s) thereto, if any, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the action filed to the above term and number be DISMISSED for improper venue and TRANSFERRED to the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. BY THE COURT: i i Y r m v 0 0 a 7 z 0 1 ANTHONY URBAN LAW OFFICES, P.C. BY: ANTHONY JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE PA Supreme Court I.D. No. 73249 474 North Center Street Third Floor, P.O. Box 890 Pottsville, Pennsylvania 17901-0890 Ph. (570) 622-1247 Fax (570) 622-4255 Attorney for the Defendants SAIDIS, SHUFF AND MASLAND and MARY E. WANYO, Plaintiffs V. ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION DECLARATORY JUDGMENT No. 98-7046 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NOTICE TO PLEAD You are hereby notified to respond to the pleadings contained in the enclosed Preliminary Objections within twenty (20) days after service thereof orjudgmenl may be entered against you. Respectfully Submitted, ANTHONY URBAN LAW OFFICES, P.C. BY: ANTHONY JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE Attorney for the Defendants U w :J L 7 '!. 0 ANTHONY URBAN LAW OFFICES, P.C. BY: ANTHONY JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE PA Supreme Court I.D. No. 73249 474 North Center Street Third Floor, P.O. Box 890 Pottsville, Pennsylvania 17901-0890 Ph. (570) 622-1247 Fax (570) 622-4255 Attorney for the Defendants SAIDIS, SHUFF AND MASLAND and MARY E. WANYO, Plaintiffs V. ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA: CIVIL ACTION DECLARATORY JUDGMENT No. 98-7046 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF DEFENDANTS AND NOW, conies the Defendants, Anthony J. Urban, Esquire and Joseph Semasek, Esquire, by and through their attorneys, Anthony Urban Law Offices, P.C.,who jointly file the within Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Petition Seeking Declaratory Judgment and in support aver the following: On or about December 14, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a Petition Seeking Declaratory Judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County naming Saidis, Shuff and Masland and Mary E. Wanyo as Plaintiffs. A true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' Petition Seeking Decalatory Judgment is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "A" and made a part of hereof by specific reference. 2. The Petition filed by Plaintiffs seeks declaratory judgment and attaches certain documents as evidence. in , L 3. Attached to Plaintiffs' Declaratory Judgment Petition as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference is an additional document relative to the contract between Mary E. Wanyo and Defendants. COUNT I PRELIMINARY OB iF TION FOR WANT OF i RI DICTION 4. The averments of Paragraphs 1 through 3 above are incorporated herein by reference as if textually set forth at length. 5. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has squarely dealt with the issue of disputes u w y O s •r. m z 0 P over fees in the Rules of Professional Conduct. 6. Disputes over legal fees should be resolved by mediation or arbitration procedures of the Pennsylvania Bar Association or the local bar association or the Fee Dispute Committee of the Disciplinary Board. Defendants respectfully deny that this Honorable Court has subject matter jurisdiction, based on the issues raised in the Plaintiffs' Petition Seeking Declaratory Judgment, to declare the rights of the respective parties under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7531 et seg. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that the Honorable Court dismiss the above-captioned matter for lack of jurisdiction. COUNT 11 PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE NATURE OF A DEMURRER AS TO THE LAW FIRM OF SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND A A PARTY PLAINTIFF IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION g, The averments of Paragraphs l through 7 above are incorporated by reference as if textually set forth at length. 9. Plaintiffs' Petition is based upon legal services and legal representation provided to Plaintiff, Mary E. Wanyo by Defendants y 10. Plaintiff, Saidis, Shuff & Masland, have alleged no contract between itself and the iJ s Defendants. 11. Plaintiff, Saidis, Shuff &Masland, has alleged no quantum meruit relationship z 2 between its firm and the respective firms of the Defendants. 0 12. The documents which form the basis for Plaintiffs' claim (attached as an exhibit H to Plaintiffs' Petition) evidence a contract between Defendants and Mary E. Wanyo; they do not II evidence any contract or any legal or equitable relationship between Defendants and Saidis, Shuff & Masland. 13. The law firm of Saidis, Shuff & Masland has failed to state with particularity any actual controversy between its firm and the firm of the Defendants, and no actual controversy can exist between the law firms in quantum meruit as a matter of law. 14. There is no basis of an action between Saidis, Shuff & Masland and the Defendants. 15. Because no cause of action can be sustained against Defendants by Saidis, Shuff & Masland, its petition as a party-Plaintiff must be dismissed. WHEREFORE, Defendants request Your Honorable Court to dismiss Saidis, Shuff & r m :l :L O m 5 0 0 Masland as a party-Plaintiff in the above-referenced action. COUNT III MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE 16. The averments of Paragraphs I through 15 above are incorporated herein by reference as if textually set forth at length. 17. Plaintiff, Saidis, Shuff & Masland, has alleged that it has a professional corporation with a place of business in Cumberland County. 18. Plaintiffs have not alleged that Plaintiff, Mary E. Wanyo, is a resident of Cumberland County. 19. Plaintiff Wanyo is a resident of North Carolina. 20. Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendants are residents of Cumberland County. 21. Defendants are residents of Schuylkill County. 22. Defendants cannot be served in Cumberland County. 23. Defendants can only be served in Schuylkill County. 4 24. Plaintiffs have alleged that the incident giving rise to the claim arose out of legal services performed for Wanyo by Defendants in Schuylkill County without payment having been made therefor. 25. The Contingent Pee Agreement between Wanyo and Defendants was negotiated between the parties in Schuylkill County; it was drafted by Defendant Semasek in Schuylkill County; and it was executed by Wanyo in Schuylkill County. 26. The attorney-client relationship between Wanyo and Defendants was created in J W 0 a z Schuylkill County. 27. Virtually all of the legal services which Defendants performed on behalf of Wanyo, save for two (2) brief depositions, were performed in and from their respective Schuylkill County offices. 28. The cause of action did not arise in Cumberland County. 29. Plaintiffs have not alleged that the cause of action or that any transaction out of which the cause of action accrues occurred in Cumberland County. 30. Plaintiffs' only colorable claim to proper venue in Cumberland County is that Plaintiff, Saidis, Shuff & Masland, is a professional corporation in Cumberland County. 31. If Plaintiff, Saidis, Shuff & Masland, is dismissed as a party to this action, there will no longer be any ties for venue for this case within Cumberland County. 32. Defendants respectfully submit that Cumberland County does not have proper venue and that the above-referenced case should be transferred to the court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. 33. Simultaneously with the filing of these Preliminary Objections, Defendants have filed a Petition for Change of Venue to a more convenient forum, Schuylkill County. WHEREFORE, Defendants request Your 1-lonorable Court to transfer venue of this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. Respectfully Submitted, ANTHONY URBAN LAW OFFICES, P.C. U e; v w w 0 5 z 0 BY: /-A r 4 ANTHON JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE 474 North Center Street Third Floor, P.O. Box 890 Pottsville, PA 17901-0890 Attorney for the Defendants rE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY OF SCHUYLKILL SS. II 1, ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE, hereby depose and say that the facts contained in the foregoing Pleadings are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I make w this statement subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. R.C.P. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to U c authorities. a z a a z o THO AN, ESQUIRE F z T VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Preliminary objections are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C. S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. DATED: January 13, 1999 L ANTHONY URBAN LAW OFFICES, P.C. BY: ANTHONY JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE PA Supreme Court I.D. No. 73249 474 North Center Street Third Floor, P.O. Box 890 Pottsville, Pennsylvania 17901-0890 Ph. (570) 622-1247 Fax (570) 622-4255 SAIDIS, SHUFF AND MASLAND and MARY E. WANYO, Plaintiffs v. w U w 0 ?i :a 00 ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, Defendants Attorney for the Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION DECLARATORY JUDGMENT No. 98-7046 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS Defendants, Anthony J. Urban, Esquire and Joseph Semasek, Esquire, by and through their attorneys, Anthony Urban Law Offices, P.C., respectfully submit the following Brief in support of their Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiffs' Petition, as follows: I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. On or about August 22, 1992, Plaintiff, Mary E. Wanyo ("Wayno"), was injured when a car driven by Benjamin Earl Wilson, in which she was a passenger, collided with a utility pole. Subsequent to her motor vehicle accident, Wanyo contacted and met with Defendant, Joseph P. Semasek, Esquire ("Semasek"), in Schuylkill County to provide representation to her to which Wayno did retain Semasek. Thereafter, when litigation in the matter was inevitable and upon Semasek discussing with Wayno her various options, Wayno agreed tQ refer the matter to a board certified civil and criminal trial advocate, namely, Defendant, Anthony J. Urban, Esquire ("Urban"), to wit: on or about May 4, 1994, Plaintiff, Mary E. Wanyo, retained both the law offices of Semasek and Urban, by signing a Contingent Fee Agreement prepared by Semasek. Plaintiff Wayno signed the Contingent Fee Agreement in Schuylkill County. When Wayno met with the Defendants, she met them in Schuylkill County. The Defendants zealously prosecuted Wanyo's claims for personal injuries and on or about November 10, 1995, a Complaint was filed by Defendant Urban as counsel for Plaintiff Wanyo, against Benjamin Earl Wilson in Adams County, the situs of the accident. Thereafter, the matter was litigated earnestly on behalf of Wanyo. On or about August 15, 1996, in an attempt to resolve the dispute with Wilson, a settlement offer of $75,000.00 was received by o Urban and same was communicated to Wanyo. On August 15, 1996, and again on December 19, 1996, the offer was relayed to Wanyo to which no response was forthcoming. On or about January 17, 1997, a Motion to Compel and Rule to Show Cause was filed by ? Wilson's counsel since Wanyo had failed to keep numerous scheduled appointments for an independent medical examination and vocational evaluation scheduled by Wilson's counsel. Thereafter, on or about January of 1997, Wayno without notifying Defendants, retained the firm of Saidis, Guido, Shuff & Masland, now Saidis, Shuff & Masland (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Saidis"). Nearly one (1) year later, Saidis, on behalf of Wayno, negotiated a settlement of just $90,000.00, which was only $15,000.00 more than what Defendant's had negotiated on behalf of Wanyo at the time counsel was substituted. Even though Cumberland County had no bearing on the above described factual scenario, on or about December 14, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a civil action in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (the "Action"), which was filed to the above court term and number (See Exhibit "A"). The gravamen of the Action complains that Defendants are only entitled to a quantum meruit recovery in full satisfaction of any obligation owed by Wanyo for legal services provided to her in prosecuting her case against Wilson. Defendants have filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Petition Seeking Declaratory UJ u. 0 2 z 0 i Judgment based upon lack of jurisdiction, legal insufficiency of Saidis remaining as a party- Plaintiff, and improper venue. This brief is filed in support of Defendants' Preliminary Objections. L STATEMENT OF THE LEGAL ISSUES A. Whether the Honorable Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County has subject matter jurisdiction to declare the rights of the respective parties under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7531 el seq. and Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1), based upon the issues raised in the Plaintiffs' Petition Seeking Declaratory Judgment? (SUGGESTED) ANSWER: IN THE NEGATIVE. B. Whether sufficient facts have been alleged to justify retaining Saidis, Shuff and Masland as a party Plaintiff pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7531 et seq. and Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4)? (SUGGESTED) ANSWER: IN THE NEGATIVE. C. Whether the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County is the proper forum in which this litigation should be conducted pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(x)(1)? (SUGGESTED) ANSWER: IN THE NEGATIVE. III. DISCUSSION A defendant in a declaratory judgment action, may by his answer, without first replying J LL 0 'l. T m Y r 0 to the averments of fact in the complaint, raise any question of law which goes either to the jurisdiction of the court or to plaintiffs legal right to have the disputed matter determined in that character of proceeding. Daniels Co. v. Nevling, 5 D & C. 2d 314 (1955), affd 385 Pa. 276, 122 A.2d 814. An insufficient complaint for declaratory judgment may be attacked by preliminary objections, and questions of law in an action for a declaratory judgment are commonly raised by preliminary objections. Melnick v Melnick, 147 Pa.Super. 564, 25 A.2d I 11; Palm Beach Stores Inc v. Millescamns, 75 D & C 522 (1951). Accordingly, Defendants have filed three (3) preliminary objections raising questions of law, namely, 1) lack of jurisdiction because the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has created on obligation on attorneys to submit their fee disputes to an alternative dispute resolution method; 2) legal insufficiency of Plaintiffs' Petition to retain the law firm of Saidis, Shuff & Masland as a party-Plaintiff; and, 3) improper venue since no events giving rise to the Plaintiffs' action involve Cumberland County. A. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS LACKS THE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PLAINTIFFS' PETITION SINCE THE SUPREME COURT HAS CREATED AN OBLIGATION ON THE PARTIES TO SUBMIT THE MATTER TO FEE RESOLUTION BOARDS. Preliminary Objections may be filed by any party to any pleading on the grounds of lack :l L w U :L 0 J O ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1), 42 Pa.C.S.A. Defendants file the instant preliminary objection and contend with due respect that the Honorable Court of Common Pleas does not have subject matter jurisdiction to declare the rights of the respective parties, based upon the issues raised in the Plaintiffs' Petition Seeking Declaratory Judgment under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7531 of seq. The gravamen of the Petition Seeking Declaratory Judgment seeks to resolve a fee dispute between Wayno and the Defendants. Rule 1.5 of The Rules of Professional Conduct, as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, deals squarely with the issue of disputes over fees. Rule 1.5 provides in pertinent part: RULE 1.5 FEES COMMENT Disputes Over Fees If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it.... It is Disciplinary Board policy that allegations of excessive fees are initially referred to the Fee Dispute Committees for resolution. (Emphasis added). The term "should", which is used to describe the obligation which the Supreme Court has placed upon parties to a fee dispute, is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, as follows: The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from `ought.' It is no normally synonymous with `may,' and although often interchangeable with the word `would,' it does not ordinarily express certainty as `will' sometimes does. II (Emphasis added). In order to maintain the integrity of our profession, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 'l. W has clearly spoken on the issue of dispute over fees and has created an obligation on the lawyer o ' to a fee dispute to submit the matter to the Fee Dispute Committee of the Disciplinary Board of r the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or the mediation/arbitration panels of either the Pennsylvania Bar Association or the local bar association. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has so 0 x r spoken, the Court of Common Pleas is without jurisdiction to determine the outcome of the s instant fee dispute. Where the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot entertain a proceeding for a declaratory judgment, even though both parties consent to its jurisdiction. I Deal ,3Q2. International Assoc, of Fir Fighters v Allentown, 55 Pa.Cmwlth. 599,423 A.2d 1119 (1980), 511 Pa. 275, 512 A.2d 1175. WHEREFORE, since the Plaintiffs' Petition does not demonstrate that this Honorable Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, but rather that such jurisdiction is reposed for the Fee Dispute Committee of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or the mediation/arbitration panels of either the Pennsylvania Bar Association or the local bar association, Plaintills' Petition should be dismissed accordingly. B. THE LAW FIRM OF SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND SHOULD NOT BE RETAINED AS A PARTY-PLAINTIFF BECAUSE NO VALID CAUSE OF ACTION IS ALLEGED OR CAN EXIST AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS. a T z Y :J Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading on the ground of the legal insufficiency of a pleading; such a preliminary objection is commonly referred to as a demurrer. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4), 42 Pa.C.S.A. A preliminary objection in the form ofa demurrer challenges the pleadings as failing to set forth a cause of action upon which relief can be granted under any theory of law. Balsbaugh v Rowland, 447 Pa. 423, 290 A.2d 85 (1972); Sutton v. Miller, 405 Pa.Super. 213, 592 A.2d 83 (1991). A preliminary objection on the ground of legal insufficiency of the pleading, in the nature ofa demurrer, admits all well-pleaded material facts as well as all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, but not conclusions of law or unjustified inferences, with all doubts resolved against the moving party. Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833 (1976); Aetna Electroplating Cn v Jenkins, 335 Pa.Super 283, 484 A.2d 134 (1984). A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, however, does not admit averments in a complaint which conflict with supporting exhibits or documentation found in the pleadings. Pramlau Corp v County of Delaware, 223 Pa.Super. 272, 299 A.2d 335 (1972). Moreover, such an objection does not admit averments in a complaint which conflict with the Plaintiffs contract. Roban Constr. Inc V. Ilousing Authority of Hazelton, 67 D. & C.2d 130 (1976). ( I In this case, it is acknowledged that Plaintiff Wayno had a contractual relationship with r :a. q z 'L O x C Z Defendants. However, no facts were averred in Plaintiffs' Petition that give rise to some other analogous relationship between Saidis and the Defendants. In fact, the only documentation supporting any relationship between any of the parties is the Contingent Fee Agreement, which was appended to Plaintiffs' Petition Seeking Declaratory Judgment. Significantly, this documentation is evidence of some relationship, contractual or otherwise, between only Plaintiff Wanyo and the Defendants, but does it does not give rise to any relationship between Saidis and Defendants. In order to properly maintain a cause of action premised upon contract, express or implied-in-fact, it is necessary for a Plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to support the existence of a contract. The requirements for a binding contract in Pennsylvania were adequately summarized in the Pennsylvania Trial Guide: In order to constitute a contract, there must be an offer on one side and an unconditional acceptance on the other, and so long as any condition is not acceded to by both parties to the contract, the dealings are mere negotiations and may be terminated at any time by either party. A contract is enforceable when the parties have reached a mutual agreement, have exchanged consideration, and have outlined the terms of their bargain with sufficient clarity. In order that a contract may be enforceable, the promise or agreement of the parties must be certain and explicit so that the full intention of the parties may be ascertained to a reasonable degree of certainty... to be enforceable, a contract must represent a mutual manifestation of the intent to be bound. In absence of a manifestation of an intent to be bound, negotiations concerning the terms of a possible future agreement do not result in an enforceable contract... a transaction is complete when the parties intend it to be complete and despite the language in some cases about the requirement of meeting of the minds of the parties, a literal meeting of the minds is not necessary in order to form a contract.... a contract ?i Al I I cannot legally bind a person who is not a party thereto. Feldman, Pennsylvania Trial Guide, §25.2 at pages 309 - 311. In this case, no such relationship has been alleged between Plaintiff Saidis and the U n w U w LL a ri 7 0 ?F Defendants, and no such relationship can exist in this case under the facts of record. Moreover, the documentation referred to above reflects an agreement between Wanyo and the Defendants. Saidis is not listed as a party to that agreement. Saidis did not sign the agreement as a party, and none of the obligations set forth in that agreement apply to Saidis. The Defendants zealously performed legal services on behalf of Wanyo, not for the benefit of Saidis. In short, the implied- in-fact contractual relationship alleged by Plaintiffs is between only Defendants and Wanyo -- and not Saidis. With all well-pleaded material facts as well as all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom being admitted, and all doubts being resolved against the moving party, Saidis simply cannot remain as a party Plaintiff to the above action. A Pennsylvania Court, in a proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, may render a declaratory judgment where the judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove the uncertainty. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7536. Likewise, the Court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where the judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, will not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §7536. The Declaratory Judgments Act requires a petition praying for declaratory relief to state the actual controversy between the petitioner and the named defendants. Petition of Capital Bank & Trust Co., 336 Pa. 108, 6 A.2d 790 (1939); Lakeland Joint School Di tr Authority v y :I y 0 z z z School-Distr., 414 Pa. 451, 200 A.2d 748 (1964). A party seeking relief must demonstrate an actual controversy indicating imminent and inevitable litigation, and direct, substantial and present interest. Gulnac v. S. Butler School Dist r., 587 A.2d 699 (Pa. 1991); Avrich v. General Accid. Ins. Co., 367 Pa.Super 248, 532 A .2d 882 (1987). The alleged controversy must be related to the invasion or threatened invasion of one's legal rights. PA Instit. Health Serv. v. Dept. of Corr., 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 221, 631 A.2d 767 (1993). A controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests. AC & S. v. Aetna, 666 P.2d 819 (3rd Cir. 1981). Contrary to the legal requirements set forth with regard to a petition for declaratory judgment, Plaintiff Saidis has failed to state the actual controversy between itself, as a petitioner, and the named Defendants. Cf. Capital Bank, supra; Lakeland School Distr., supra. In its petition, Plaintiff Saidis, has failed to demonstrate what actual controversy exists giving rise to imminent and inevitable litigation between itself and the named Defendants, and what direct, substantial and present interest Saidis has. C( Gulnac., supra; vrich, supra. Moreover, Saidis has failed to demonstrate how the alleged controversy is related to an invasion or threatened invasion of its legal rights. See PA Instit. Health Serv., supra. The most obvious reason why Saidis failed to allege with any particularity the actual controversy which allegedly exists between itself and the Defendants is simple: no such controversy exists. Moreover, under the quantum meruit theory which Plaintiffs urge the Court follow, no such actual controversy can exist. To illustrate this concept, we need only look to the 10 Plaintiffs' "WHEREFORE" clause at the end of its Petition for Declaratory Judgment, where the Plaintiffs urge the Court to "declar[e] that Defendants are only entitled to a quantum meruit recovery in full satisfaction of any obligation owed by Plaintiff Mary E. Wanyo for the Defendants' services in the above described matter brought by Mary E. Wanyo against Benjamin Earl Wilson". Simply stated, this case involves only Mary Wayno and how much she must pay to Semasek and Urban. Pennsylvania courts have embraced the definition of quantum meruit as defined by Black's Law Dictionary 1119 (5th ed. 1979). The equitable doctrine of quantum meruit involves a class of obligations imposed U by law, regardless of the intention or assent of the parties for reasons dictated by o justice and is based upon the concept that no one who benefits by the labor and materials of another should be unjustly enriched thereby. To avoid such unjust enrichment, the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable amount for the labor and materials furnished, even absent a specific contract therefor. In short, this doctrine describes the extent of liability on a contract implied-in-law for labor and z materials and, while there is no contract per se, the form of the action is contract. 1'a DER v. Winn, 142 Pa.Cmwlth. 375, 597 A.2d 281 (1991). "Where unjust enrichment is found, the law implies a contract, referred to as either a quasi-contract or a contract implied in law, which requires that the defendant pay to plaintiff the value of the benefit conferred ... in quantum meruit". Schenck v K E David Ltd., 446 Pa.Super. 94,666 A.2d 327 (1995). This concept under the fact scenario at hand, is not supportive of an action of law firm versus law firm or lawyer versus lawyer. Under the quantum meruit theory, Semasek and Urban would recover from Wayno the reasonable value of the legal services which they provided to her. Quantum meruit actions begin to accrue as of the date on which the relationship between the parties is terminated. Cole v Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987 (Pa.Super. 1997). See Kenis v. Perini Corp., 452 Pa.Super. 634, 682 A.2d 845 (1996)(attomey's quantum meruit claim against former client accrues as of the date of the attorney's termination of representation). The relevant time period of the services would be from the time Wanyo engaged the services of Defendants up to the time counsel was substituted. In other words, as soon as Saidis became involved representing Wanyo, the window for Defendants' quantum meruit claim would close. This necessarily means that under quantum meruit theory that Saidis cannot as a matter of law state an actual controversy y against Defendants. o Had the Saidis law firm hired Defendants to perform legal services on its behalf and later renege on payment, then Saidis may be a party with Defendants in a quantum meruit action. 'I. T However, these are not the facts of the case. o WHEREFORE, the Honorable Court should dismiss the law firm of Saidis, Shuff & x H Masland as a party Plaintiff to the above-described action. II C. CUMBERLAND COUNTY DOES NOT POSSESS PROPER VENUE TO DECIDE THIS CASE. Pa.R.C.P. 1028 (a)(1) permits a party to file Preliminary Objections based upon lack of proper venue. Proper venue only exists in the county in which the Defendant may be served, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose, or in any other county authorized by law. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006(a); 2179. Here, no proper venue exists and the matter should be transferred to Schuylkill County 1 t ?I 12 pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006(c). Defendants cannot be served in Cumberland County, therefore, venue in Cumberland County is improper. Plaintiffs' Petition for Declaratory Judgment requests the Court determine what relationship, contractual or quasi-contractual (quantum meruit), exists between Plaintiff Wanyo and the Defendants. Plaintiffs' Petition for Declaratory Judgment alleges at Paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively that the "Defendant, Anthony J. Urban, Esquire, is ... situate at 101 North Centre Street, 7" Floor, Pottsville, Pennsylvania 17901," and "Defendant, Joseph Semasek, Esquire, is . situate at 331 West Monroe Street, McAdoo, Pennsylvania 18237." 'Cite addresses of both r J Urban and Semasek in Pottsville and in McAdoo are located wholly within Schuylkill County, 0 not Cumberland County. Defendants never subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of 7. M Cumberland County. Defendants may only be served in Schuylkill County. In fact, the z Defendants were previously served in this action by Sheriff in Schuylkill County. 0 2. The cause of action did not arise in Cumberland County, therefore, venue in Cumberland County is improper. A cause of action in quantum meruit of Defendants presenting a claim against Wanyo ripened when Wanyo failed to pay Semasek and Urban for the reasonable value of the legal services which they performed on her behalf. Plaintiffs' Petition for Declaratory Judgment at paragraph 2 correctly identifies Wanyo's place of residence as "3300-203 Cotton Mill Drive, Raleigh, North Carolina 27612" -- not Cumberland County (See Exhibit "A"). Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Plaintiffs' Petition identifies Defendants' respective addresses as both within Schuylkill 13 County -- not Cumberland County (See Exhibit "A"). Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Petition correctly identifies that Adams County -- not Cumberland County -- as the venue of the underlying action of Wanyo v. Wilson, which is the case in which Defendants performed the legal services to Wanyo that arc now at issue in the above-captioned. The attorney-client relationship between Wanyo and Defendants was created in j J w w 0 l z 0 z Schuylkill County. Moreover, virtually all legal services which Defendants performed on behalf of Wayno were performed in their Schuylkill County offices. Lastly, the attorney-client relationship between Wanyo and the Defendants terminated in Schuylkill County when Defendant received confirmation of substitute counsel, thereby giving rise to the potential action between Wanyo and Defendants. If there was but one unerring conclusion that can be drawn from the factual circumstances making up this case, it is that the cause of action di not arise in Cumberland County. The cause of action arose in Schuylkill County, where the legal services were performed for Plaintiff Wanyo, without payment having been made to Defendants in Schuylkill County. It is curious that the only real link that can be made of this case to Cumberland County is that the law firm of Saidis, Shuff & Masland -- who cannot as a matter of law be a party to an action of quantum meruit with Defendants -- has an office in Carlise, Cumberland County. In this case venue is based entirely upon the fact that Saidis maintains an address in Cumberland County. Absent the tenuous allegations that Saidis is a party to this action, which Defendants strongly urge Saidis should not be a party-Plaintiff, there is nothing at all in the Petition that links 14 ( rt?Ly++I the litigation to Cumberland County. To uphold venue in Cumberland County would be to allow Saidis to shop for a forum in any county in which it had an office even though no material events took place in that county, and it would completely undermine the legislative intent of the general assembly in adopting uniform venue laws. 3. None of the transactions or occurrences took place in Cumberland County out of which the cause of action arose, therefore, venue in Cumberland County is improper. With respect to the rule that an action against an individual may be brought where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose, in a contract action J the place of the making of the contract in question constitutes the transaction. Telstar v. Berman, i 281 Pa.Super. 443, 422 A.2d 551 (1980); Lucas Enterprises Inc v. Paul C Harman Co., 273 f Pa.Super 422, 417 A.2d 720 (1980). "Transaction or occurrence" does not include just any act in the contract formation process; it refers to the ultimate formation of the contract itself. -L Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency v Denvore, 267 Pa.Super. 744, 406 A.2d 343 •r. (1979). Thus, in determining the county in which a transaction or occurrence took place for the purpose of establishing venue in a contract (or implied-in-fact contract) action, the transaction occurs where the offer is accepted. Lucas Enterprises Inc.. v. Paul C. Harman Co., 273 Pa.Super. 422, 417 A.2d 720 (1980). There can be no mistake, the contract between Defendants and Wayno was negotiated between the parties, drafted by Semasek and executed by Wanyo all in Schuylkill County. All discussions regarding the method of payment of Defendants took place in Schuylkill County. 15 Defendants never subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of Cumberland County. The underlying action of Wanvo GIs, which is the case in which Defendants performed the legal services on behalf of Wanyo, was not filed in Cumberland County, it was filed in Adams County. Plaintiff Wayno, herself, has no ties to Cumberland County, she having taken up residency in Raleigh, North Carolina since before the Complaint in Wanvols - was filed. Notwithstanding that the contract was made in Schuylkill County; virtually all legal services provided were performed in Schuylkill County and from Schuylkill County; and the underlying personal injury action was filed in Adams County; Saidis filed the above-captioned action in Cumberland County. No allegation of any occurrence or cause of action accruing in Cumberland ' County has been alleged. At most, Plaintiff has alleged it has a mailing address in Cumberland z County. Accordingly, the above-referenced case should be transferred to the Court o Common x Pleas of Schuylkill County due to the lack of proper venue within Cumberland County. 0 rr 16 - ?- --yam -- - inni?n? nw•® WHEREFORE, Defendants request Your Honorable Court make a finding that venue in Cumberland County is improper and transfer venue of this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. Respectfully Submitted, ANTHONY URBAN LAW OFFICES, P.C. BY: /1& ANTHONY JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE 474 North Center Street J i w V w w O m a O Third Floor, P.O. Box 890 Pottsville, PA 17901-0890 Attorney for the Defendants 17 SAIDIS, SHUFF AND MASLAND and MARY E. WANYO, Plaintiffs V. ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, Defendants . IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 98-7046 and : CIVIL ACTION - DECLARATORY . JUDGMENT NOTICE YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Complaint and Notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing with the court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the court without further notice for any other claim or relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you Q :^ YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT OPCE.? IF,YbU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPRONE;fHE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET:-LEGAL HiLp. 1 Schuylkill County Legal Services, Inc. - 514 North Centre Street Pottsville, PA 17901 SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND ATTO M•ANAW 26 W. High Street Carlisle, PA By: Mark W. Allshouse, Esquire Supreme Court ID # 78014 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-6222 Counsel for Plaintiffs SAIDIS, SNUFF & MASLAND MMUSIAT•UW 26 W. High Street Carlisle, PA SAIDIS, SNUFF AND MASLAND IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF and MARY E. WANYO, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs V. NO- q O - -7`>t i _ t?- ? ?1erM ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, CIVIL ACTION - DECLARATORY Defendants JUDGMENT PETITION SEEKING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND NOW, comes the Plaintiffs, Saidis, Shuff and Masland, P.C. and Mary E. Wanyo, who by and through their attorneys, SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND, complains of the Defendants, Anthony J. Urban and Joseph Semasek, as follows: 1. Plaintiff Saidis, Shuff and Masland is a professional corporation with a place of business at 26 West High Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 2. Plaintiff Mary E. Wanyo is an adult individual who resides at 3300-203 Cotton Mill Drive, Raleigh, North Carolina 27612. 3. Defendant Anthony J. Urban, Esquire, is an. adult individual who is an attorney licensed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with his office situate at 101 North Centre Street, 7th Floor, Pottsville, Pennsylvania 17901. 4. Defendant Joseph Semasek, Esquire is an adult individual who is an attorney licensed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with his off ice situate 331 W. Monroe Street, McAdoo, Pennsylvania 18237. TRIJE 00,PY FROM RECORD in j$5J!YI t:2ft'. unto SPI my hano r iv" tai' •• i-`i ^•7';-j "I., 't at Ben --:e, ?. RNS Gt 19q Prothonotary +t ,,2_CAN 5. On or about August 22, 1992, Plaintiff, Mary E. Wanyo, was injured when a car in which she was a passenger collided into a utility pole. 6. On or about May 4, 1994, Plaintiff, Mary E. Wanyo, signed a Contingent Fee Agreement (Attorney Agreement) prepared by Joseph P. Semasek, Esquire. The agreement authorizes her representation in a civil action against Benjamin Earl Wilson, the driver of the vehicle at the time of the aforementioned accident. Although the said Agreement lists Attorney Joseph Semasek and Attorney Anthony J. Urban, Plaintiff Mary Wanyo denies that Attorney Urban's name appeared on the Agreement signed on the above date. Plaintiff Mary E. Wanyo did not receive a copy of the Agreement she signed. A copy of the Agreement provided by Defendants to Plaintiff's counsel is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 7. The Agreement provided that Defendants would receive 33 1/3% of any amount recovered or 4096 percent of any amount recovered after an appeal is taken. 8. The Agreement does not state any other manner of SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND Anoarn n-AT.uW 26 W. High Street Carlble. PA compensation, including whether payment for services would be required in the event Mary Wanyo discharged, fired or otherwise terminated the attorney-client relationship prior to disposition of the case. 9. On or about November 10, 1995, a Complaint was filed by Defendant, Anthony J. Urban, as counsel for Plaintiff, Mary E. Wanyo, against Benjamin Earl Wilson. The Complaint was filed in 2 SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND ATrQ9 m'S.AT•IAW 26 W. Nigh Street Carlisle. PA the Adams County Court of Common Pleas, docketed to Civil Action Number 94-S-586. Mary Wanyo avers that she was unaware of Attorney Urban's involvement in the case including his preparation of the Complaint. 10. Plaintiff Mary Wanyo was dissatisfied with the services of the Defendants and was unhappy with the previously unknown involvement of the Defendant Urban. 11. The settlement offer of $75,000.00 was received by Defendant Urban on behalf of Plaintiff Mary E. Wanyo in an attempt to resolve the dispute between Plaintiff, Mary E. Wanyo and Benjamin Earl Wilson. This offer was obtained after becoming aware of Mary Wanyo's dissatisfaction with Defendants but prior to her discharge of the Defendants. 12. Mary W. Wanyo rejected the settlement offer set forth in paragraph 11 hereof. 13. on or about January 9, 1997 the Plaintiff in the underlying action, Mary E. Wanyo terminated the attorney-client relationship with Defendants and retained the firm of Saidis, Guido, Shuff & Masland, now Saidis, Shuff & Masland. 14. Subsequent to the initiation of legal representation, Saidis, Shuff & Masland, specifically between February 1997 and May 1998 Plaintiff, Saidis, Shuff and Masland, repeatedly offered to pay Defendants Urban and Semasek on a quantum meruit basis upon receipt of a statement of time expended and costs from Defendants Urban and Semasek. 3 i Wanyo. 15. In response to the aforementioned offer from Plaintiff, Saidis, Shuff and Masland, Defendants Urban and Semasek refused to submit a statement of time expended to Plaintiffs Saidis, Shuff and Masland. Defendants insist upon payment of $25,000.00 which has been refused by Saidis, Shuff & Masland and Mary E. 16. On or about October/November 1997 Mary E. Wanyo accepted an employment position in Asia and accordingly directed the firm of Saidis, Shuff & Masland to attempt a prompt resolution of the underlying action. 17. On December 12, 1997 the underlying action was settled in the amount of $90,000.00. 18. Defendants Urban and Semasek continued to insist upon full payment of $25,000 representing 1/3 of the offer made at the time of Mary E. Wanyo terminated the attorney-client relationship. 19. Mary E. Wanyo instructed Saidis, Shuff & Masland to disburse the settlement funds and to not make any payments to Defendants Urban and Semasek. 20. On or about January 27, 1998, Plaintiff Saidis, Shuff SAIDIS, SNUFF & MASLAND ATrppA'M-ANAW 36 W. High Simi Carlisle, PA and Masland sent to Plaintiff Mary E. Wanyo a check for $59,086.96 representing the net recovery payable to her pursuant to the aforementioned settlement Agreement. 21. Defendants Urban and Semasek have, to the present time, refused to submit a statement of time expended and costs to Plaintiffs, Saidis, Shuff and Masland. 4 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to enter judgment: (a) declaring that Defendants are only entitled to a quantum meruit recovery in full satisfaction of any obligation owed by Plaintiff Mary E. Wanyo for the Defendants' services in the above described matter brought by Mary E. Wanyo against Benjamin Earl Wilson. (b) declaring that Defendants shall be required to provide Plaintiff Saidis, Shuff and Masland with proper documentation of costs and time expended owed by Mary E. Wanyo for services rendered pursuant to the Defendant's representation of Mary E. Wanyo in the above described matter brought by Mary E. Wanyo against Benjamin Earl Wilson. (c) granting such further relief as the Court may deem SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND ATTORMM-AT.UW 26 W. HISh Slrnl Grllrle, PA appropriate. Respectfully submitted, //JJ SAIDIS, S FF & MASLAND Date: By: ,' t? / Robert'C. Saidis, Esquire Supreme Court ID # 21458 Mark W. Allshouse, Esquire Supreme Court ID # 78014 26 West High Street :arlisle, P.A. 17013 (717) 243-6222 Counsel for Plaintiffs 5 V :J y x r z 0 F 2 ANTHONY URBAN LAW OFFICES, P.C. BY: ANTHONY JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE PA Supreme Court I.D. No. 73249 474 North Center Street Third Floor, P.O. Box 890 Pottsville, Pennsylvania 17901-0890 Ph. (570) 622-1247 Fax (570) 6224255 SAIDIS, SHUFF AND MASLAND and MARY E. WANYO, Plaintiffs V. ANTHONY J. URBAN, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH SEMASEK, ESQUIRE, Defendants Attorney for the Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION DECLARATORY JUDGMENT No. 98-7046 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1, ANTHONY JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE, hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the Preliminary Objections and Brief via U.S. First Class Mail and/or Via Hand Delivery to the following person(s) listed below on this 19 th day of January, 1999. Mark W. Allshouse, Esquire Robert C. Saidis, Esquire SAIDIS, SHUFF & MASLAND 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Respectfully Submitted, ANTHONY URBAN LAW OFFICES, P.C. BY: y M ANTHO JAMES URBAN, ESQUIRE Attorney for the Defendants BAMBI L. CRUMMETT, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. DAVID A. CRUMMETT, DEFENDANT 99-7406 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ?_day of January, 2000, following a chambers hearing, and our having determined that proper venue in this case lies in Somerset County pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5344, IT IS ORDERED that the Prothonotary, upon payment of the costs by plaintiff, shall transfer this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County. The conciliation conference scheduled for January 13, 2000, is cancelled. Timothy J. Colgan, Esquire For Plaintiff Joan Carey, Esquire For Defendant Dawn Sunday, Esquire Custody Conciliator By the Pouit, Edgar B. Bayley, , , M141 RJ{g :sea BAMBI L. CRUMMETT, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. DAVID A. CRUMMETT, Defendant NO. 99 -7406 CIVIL TERM CUSTODY PETITION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Defendant, David A. Crummett, by and through his counsel, Joan Carey of Legal Services, Inc., states the following: 1. Defendant, David A. Crummett, hereinafter referred to as the father, resides at 1166 Whistler Road, Hooversville, Somerset County, Pennsylvania 15936. 2. Plaintiff, Bambi L. Crummett, hereinafter referred to as the mother, resides at 95 2nd Street, Apartment 2, Enola, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17025. 3. The mother and father are the natural parents of Mark Andrew Crummett, born February 20, 1989. 4. A Petition for Custody was filed on behalf of the mother on December 14, 1999, under the above-captioned number, and a Custody Conciliation Conference was scheduled before Dawn Sunday, for January 13, 2000, at 3:00 p.m. 5. The mother and father separated and the child was left in the father's care and custody in Somerset County in approximately June of 1999. 6. The mother moved to Cumberland County in approximately October 1999, but the father and child continued to reside in Somerset County. 7. The father requests that this court dismiss this case for reasons including the following: a. Somerset County is the home county of the child. b. The child does not have a significant connection with Cumberland County; in fact, the child has only visited with the mother in Cumberland County on approximately four occasions. 4 C. The child is in the 51h grade in Somerset County, Northstar School District where he has been enrolled since Kindergarten. d. The child has consistently participated in extra curricular activities in Somerset County. C. The child's maternal and paternal relatives are in the Somerset County area. The child's medical providers are located in the Somerset County area. 9. Evidence concerning the child's education and all other substantial evidence concerning the present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships of the child is located in Somerset County. h. Cumberland County is an inconvenient forum for the father since it's a 2 %: hour drive from his home and he has no reason to come to Cumberland County. 8. The office of Timothy J. Colgan, Attorney for Plaintiff, has been informed of the filing of this Petition, but Attorney Colgan was unavailable to discuss his concurrence or non concurrence. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this court dismiss this case for lack ofjurisdiction and cancel the Conciliation Conference scheduled for January 13, 2000. Defendant also requests any other relief that is just and proper. Respectfully submitted, i (;/Joan Carey Attorney for Defendant LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 8 Irvine Row Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-9400 FL_ _ VERIFICATION I, Joan Carey, Attorney for Defendant, David A. Crummett, verify that the facts and statements contained in the above Petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I am verifying the facts in the Petition after several phone conversations with the defendant who resides in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and whose verification cannot be obtained within the time allowed for filing the pleading. I understand that any false statements are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. 0 tJ ?; yu J Dated: U " I/ oan Carey, Attorn -at-Law LEGAL SERVICES, INC. YTJ+TFJ•G BAMBI L. CRUMMETT VS. DAVID A. CRUMMETT Plaintiff Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. q9- 7111)' CIVIL ACTION - CUSTODY ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, k? fb(qQ upon consideration of the attached complaint, it is hereby directed that the parties and their respective couns ap al f re 3 r,1Cl?, S the conciliator, at P on the day of 1q-lml?at \' m., fo a Pre-Hearing Custody Conference. At suc r conferen , an effort will be made to resolve the issues in dispute; or if this cannot be accomplished, to define and narrow the issues to be heard by the court, and to enter into a temporary order. All children age five or older may also be present at the conference. Failure to appear at the conference may provide grounds for entry of a temporary or permanent order. FOR THE COURT, by: Custody Conciliator 1,Ca) The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County is required by law to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. For information about accessible facilities and reasonable accommodations available to disabled individuals having business before the court, please contact our office. All arrangenicos w st be made at least 72 hours prior to any hearing or business before the court. You must attend the schcdui d conference or hearing. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. CUMBERLAND COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE 2 LIBERTY AVENUE CARLISLE, PA 17013 (717)249.3166 ?:G.Y6 BAMBI L. CRUMMETT VS. DAVID A. CRUMMETT Plaintiff Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 9 9. 1 NO to CIVIL ACTION - CUSTODY PETITION FOR CUSTODY AND COMES NOW, BAMBI L. CRUMMETT, by his attorney, Timothy J. Colgan, Esq., and files the following Petition: 1. Petitioner, BAMBI L. CRUMMETT, resides at 95 2nd Street, Apartment 2, Enola, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania since October 1999. 2. Respondent, DAVID A. CRUMMETT, resides at 1166 Whistler Road, Hooversville, Somerset County, Pennsylvania. 3. Respondents are the natural parents of one minor child, Mark Andrew Crummett born 2/20/89. 4. The child was not born out of wedlock. 5. The child is presently in the care and custody of the Respondent. 6. There are no court orders establishing custody or visitation. 7. Petitioner has no information of a custody proceeding concerning the children pending in a court of this Commonwealth. 8. Petitioner does not know of a person not a party to the proceedings who has physical custody of the children or claims to have custody or visitation rights with respect to the child. 9. The best interest and permanent welfare of the child will be served by granting the relief requested herein. WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the Court enter an Order granting primary physical custody of the minor child to Petitioner. Dated: /-- 3 - 9 RespeSAlly submitted, Timothy I Coig sq W1LEY, LENOX & COLGAN, P.C. 1 South Baltimore Street Dillsburg, PA 17019 (717) 432-9666 I.D. #77944 S• ICIJENMCOLG"CREaafETCOA1PL4,W.14PD VERIFICATION I, BAMEI L. CRUMMETT, verify that the statements made in this document are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: o- BAMBI L. CRUMMETT Plaintiff S: ICLlPJJMCOLG"CR UADdEMCOAlPLAIN. a'PD BAMBI L. CRUMMM IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. DAVID A. CRUMMETT No. 99-7406 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION - LAW COURT OF COMMON PLEAS SOMERSET COUNTY Please acknowledge receipt of this case by signing and dating this document. RECORD RECEIVED ?orUy his 4-ook- so k5to . i? I k? . Pad ?Qe -0r&? . ?©,n Gv)•) aO ,5'I ` ? '? Date: (signature & title) I' (Sk 'a z m -- 0 O y N= n O va CIQ 3 A r}o A ..,cn :.P F I 4Ln