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HomeMy WebLinkAbout04-30-07 J. 567012/06 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P.65.37 IN RE: DAVID F. HECKENDORN, AN ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: DAVID F. HECKENDORN No. 757 MDA 2006 (~) Appeal from the Order entered April 20, 2006, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Orphans' Court, at No. 21-06-0155. 'V ;::.!,J C,'j c.) l _~ BEFORE: HUDOCK, BOWES and TAMILIA, JJ. , i MEMORANDUM: FILED: March 20, 2007 0\ This is an appeal from an order adjudicating David F. Heckendorn (Heckendorn) a totally incapacitated person and appointing his mother as plenary guardian over his person and estate.! We affirm. The certified record discloses that, at the time of the proceedings underlying this appeal, Heckendorn was thirty-five years of age. For more than twelve years, he was employed in a supervisory capacity as a network administrator in the information technology division of the Pennsylvania Department of Health. In October of 2001, he began to suffer from serious mental health conditions including paranoid delusions. In addition to his mental health problems, he also has been diagnosed with other serious II \~L J. 567012/06 conditions including ulcerative colitis and primary sclerosing cholangitis 1 This is a companion case to the appeal filed at No. 1089 MDA 2006. The Honorable M. L. Ebert, Jr., presided over the proceedings underlying both appeals. - 2 - J. 567012/06 (P5C). Ulcerative colitis impairs the digestive system and P5C negatively affects liver functions. Because of Heckendorn's P5C, he will require a liver transplant at some point, likely within the next five years. Without the liver transplant, he will die. However, Heckendorn will not be eligible to receive a transplant unless his mental health problems are under control for a significant period of time prior to his placement on the transplant list. Heckendorn's mental instability created difficulties on the job, which led to the loss of his supervisory authority and lowered results on his employee evaluations. Although previously he had received very high evaluations, in 2004 he was presented with an "average" evaluation. Heckendorn refused to sign the evaluation form, but eventually drew a stick figure with XiS over the eyes and a knife in the head. Heckendorn was notified on December 14, 2004, that his employment was being terminated. His actual separation date for payroll purposes was January 19, 2005. After the onset of his illness in 2001, Heckendorn sometimes lived on his own and sometimes resided with his parents. In July of 2005, he moved into his parents' boathouse, but took his meals in the main house with his parents. After his termination from state employment, Heckendorn did not work but depleted his deferred compensation account to pay his bills. In mid-August of 2005, he became violent. He broke dishes and destroyed other property, threatened both of his parents with physical harm, and actually beat his father. N.T., 4/20/06, at 29. Mental health treatment had - 3 - J. 567012/06 been a condition of continued employment but Heckendorn stopped all such treatment after his termination. The trial court found that Heckendorn stopped taking the medications prescribed by the mental health care provider approximately two and a half years prior to August of 2005. Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/06, at 3. Heckendorn's condition deteriorated over the next several months. On December 15, 2005, he again became violent, and his parents served him with an eviction letter as a result. He was arrested the next day on a charge of criminal trespass for refusing to leave. On January 24, 2006, he was again arrested for criminal trespass at a hotel in which he was staying. Heckendorn would not leave his room or permit the cleaning staff to enter it because he believed they were spying on him. He was incarcerated in the Cumberland County Prison (CCP) after this incident. Because of incidents that occurred subsequent to his arrest, a Cumberland County mental health caseworker filed a petition for involuntary treatment pursuant to the provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA).2 A hearing on the petition was conducted on February 7, 2006. The hearing officer recommended that Heckendorn be committed for a period of up to ninety days for involuntary treatment. An order was so issued, and Heckendorn 2 50 P.S. ~~ 7101-7503. - 4 - J. 567012/06 was involuntarily committed to Mayview State Hospital on March 2, 2006, pursuant to section 7102 of the MHPA. The trial court has explained the serious difficulties created by Heckendorn's condition in the following apt manner: Heckendorn has little money in his savings and after depleting his deferred compensation account his parents have been paying many of his bills. Meanwhile his serious medical cond~tion is proving expensive-one required medication for his liver condition costs between $50.00 to $150.00 per week. Instead of requesting the benefits that are available to him through his former state employment which would cover his many medical needs, Heckendorn filed for Regular Retirement from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This retirement option would provide him little more than $300 a month and no medical benefits. He refuses to apply for the disability benefits for which he is eligible because of his adamant belief that he is in fine mental health. Given his length of state employment, the vested disability retirement for which he is eligible would provide full medical benefits. . . and $1,486.65 per month in disability payments for the rest of his life. Heckendorn admits this option is available to him, but refuses to apply for it because of his continued insistence that he is not mentally ill, even though this conclusion endangers his life. Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/06, at 4 (footnotes omitted). The certified record amply supports the trial court's factual findings in this regard. In particular, we note that the regular retirement income that Heckendorn would receive would be only $315.81 per month whereas his disability retirement income would be $1,486.65 per month. N.T., 4/20/06, at 8-9, 12-13. The cost of the health insurance he would receive as a permanent benefit pursuant to disability retirement was $768.12 per month at the time the hearing was conducted on April 20, 2006. Id. at 8-9. Thus, - 5 - J. 567012/06 the cost value of the health insurance alone is more than twice the monthly income Heckendorn would receive under the regular retirement option. Heckendorn testified that he has no psychiatric problems. Id. at 63. He also testified that he realized he could not pay for health insurance with his own income if he took regular retirement rather than disability retirement. Id. at 63-64. He indicated that he had asked his mother to pay for his health insurance. Id. at 64. Heckendorn also admitted that he had not had health insurance since the fall of 2005. Id. at 67.3 In February of 2006, Heckendorn's mother filed an emergency petition for appointment of a guardian of his person and estate and requested that a permanent guardianship be established. Pursuant to this petition, the trial court found Heckendorn to be incapacitated and appointed his mother as temporary guardian. The trial court then appointed counsel to represent Heckendorn and ordered an independent psychiatric evaluation to be performed. The trial court directed Heckendorn's counsel to recommend the name of a "reputable licensed mental health professional" to conduct the evaluation. Counsel did so, and the trial court appointed John Hume, M.D., a board certified psychiatrist as well as a medical doctor. Heckendorn refused to meet with Dr. Hume because he distrusts medical doctors. 3 The record is silent on the question of whether Heckendorn can, in fact, obtain private health insurance following this lapse in coverage and in light of his serious pre-existing medical conditions. - 6 - J. 567012/06 Based on an examination of Heckendorn's health records, Dr. Hume stated that the mental illness from which Heckendorn appeared to suffer since 2001 was correctly diagnosed as Bipolar Affective Disorder I with psychosis. This illness is characterized by periods of normalcy- perhaps months or years-interspersed with episodes of bizarre or psychotic behavior. Heckendorn "feels like he's okay, and for brief periods of time between episodes, he is okay," which contributes to his problems with taking medication. His refusal to take medication to treat this illness has serious consequences on his mental state. With each new psychotic episode, it becomes more difficult to get the illness under control, making ongoing medication the treatment of choice. Heckendorn's eligibility for the liver transplant that will soon be necessary to prolong his life rests on receiving ongoing treatment of his mental illness with medication. Dr. Hume also reviewed Heckendorn's laboratory studies of his liver function, and stated that although they have remained fairly stable, Heckendorn has shown a tendency to fail to keep up with necessary testing in a timely fashion. Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/06, at 5 (footnotes and citations omitted). Dr. Hume stated that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Heckendorn's mental illness impairs his ability to make and communicate decisions and renders him incapable of handling his financial affairs or to make decisions concerning his own medical care. Id. The trial court determined that the record presented in this case provided clear and convincing evidence that Heckendorn's ability to receive and evaluate information effectively and to communicate decisions was significantly impaired. As a result of this impairment, the trial court found that Heckendorn was unable to manage his financial resources or to meet the essential requirement for his own physical health and safety. - 7 - J. 567012/06 Accordingly, on April 20, 2006, the trial court granted plenary guardianship of Heckendorn's person and estate to his mother, Mary Anne Heckendorn. A timely notice of appeal was filed on May 1, 2006. The trial court ordered Heckendorn to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, and he complied. The trial court wrote a full opinion addressing the claims raised therein. On appeal, Heckendorn raises one issue: whether the trial court erred in determining that he is in need of a guardian. Heckendorn's Brief at 5. The thrust of this claim is that the trial court purportedly lacked sufficient current information to sustain the appointment of a guardian. When reviewing an order appointing a guardian, or declining to do so, we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are not based on competent evidence. In re Peery, 727 A.2d 539, 540 (pa. 1999). The trial court's factual findings in a guardianship case must receive the same deference that would be accorded to the factual findings of a jury. In re Estate of Rosengarten, 871 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2005). However, this Court must ensure that the decision of the trial court is free from legal error. Id. The question of whether a person should be adjudicated in need of a guardian is governed by the Probate Estates and Fiduciaries Code (the PEF - 8 - J. 567012/06 Code).4 Chapter 55 of the PEF Code, which relates to incapacitated persons, 20 Pa.C.5.A. sections 5501-5555, sets forth the following stated purpose: Recognizing that every individual has unique needs and differing abilities, it is the purpose of this chapter to promote the general welfare of all citizens by establishing a system which permits incapacitated persons to participate as fully as possible in all decisions which affect them, which assists these persons in meeting the essential requirements for their physical health and safety, protecting their rights, managing their financial resources and developing or regaining their abilities to the maximum extent possible and which accomplishes these objectives through the use of the least restrictive alternative; and recognizing further that when guardianship services are necessary, it is important to facilitate the finding of suitable individuals or entities willing to serve as guardians. 20 Pa.C.5.A. 9 5502. The term "incapacitated person" means "an adult whose ability to receive and evaluate information effectively and communicate decisions in any way is impaired to such a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to manage his financial resources or to meet essential requirements for his physical health and safety." ld. 9 5501. The determination that a person is incapacitated must be made pursuant to section 5512.1 of the PEF Code, which states: (a) Determination of incapacity.-In all cases, the court shall consider and make specific findings of fact concerning: 4 20 Pa.C.5.A. 99 101-8814.1. In 1974, the heading of Title 20 was changed from "Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries" to "Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries." However, the short title was not altered and remains the "Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code." 20 Pa.C.5.A. 9 101. Title 20 commonly is called the "PEF Code," and we shall apply that abbreviation. - 9 - J. 567012/06 (1) The nature of any condition or disability which impairs the individual's capacity to make and communicate decisions. (2) The extent of the individual's capacity to make and communicate decisions. (3) The need for guardianship services, if any, in light of such factors as the availability of family, friends and other supports to assist the individual in making decisions and in light of the existence, if any, of advance directives such as durable powers of attorney or trusts. (4) The type of guardian, limited or plenary, of the person or estate needed based on the nature of any condition or disability and the capacity to make and communicate decisions. (5) The duration of the guardianship. (6) The court shall prefer limited guardianship. (b) Limited guardian of the person.-Upon a finding that the person is partially incapacitated and in need of guardianship services, the court shall enter an order appointing a limited guardian of the person with powers consistent with the court's findings of limitations, which may include: (1) General care, maintenance and custody of the incapacitated person. (2) Designating the place for the incapacitated person to live. (3) Assuring that the incapacitated person receives such training, education, medical and psychological services and social and vocational opportunities, as appropriate, as well as assisting the incapacitated person in the development of maximum self-reliance and independence. (4) Providing required consents or approvals on behalf of the incapacitated person. - 10 - J. 567012/06 (c) Plenary guardian of the person.- The court may appoint a plenary guardian of the person only upon a finding that the person is totally incapacitated and in need of plenary guardianship services. (d) Limited guardian of the estate.-Upon a finding that the person is partially incapacitated and in need of guardianship services, the court shall enter an order appointing a limited guardian of the estate with powers consistent with the court's finding of limitations, which shall specify the portion of assets or income over which the guardian of the estate is assigned powers and duties. (e) Plenary guardian of the estate.-A court may appoint a plenary guardian of the estate only upon a finding that the person is totally incapacitated and in need of plenary guardianship services. (f) No presumption.-No presumption of incapacity shall be raised from the alleged incapacitated person's institutionalization. (g) Legal rights retained.-Except in those areas designated by court order as areas over which the limited guardian has power, a partially incapacitated person shall retain all legal rights. (h) Information as to rights.-At the conclusion of a proceeding in which the person has been adjudicated incapacitated, the court shall assure that the person is informed of his right to appeal and to petition to modify or terminate the guardianship. 20 Pa.C.5.A. ~ 5512.1. The appointment of a plenary guardian is required only upon a dual finding that a person is both totally incapacitated and in actual need of a guardian. Peery, 727 A.2d at 541. If a trial court determines that a person is totally incapacitated, but finds that the "circle of support" provided by friends and family is adequate to ensure the safety and financial security of - 11 - J. 567012/06 the incapacitated person, then it is not necessary to appoint a guardian of the person or of the estate. Id. at 540-41. This inquiry is a matter to be resolved by the trial court, not by the appellate courts. Id. at 541. We have carefully scrutinized the record certified on appeal in light of the arguments advanced by Heckendorn and by his mother. In particular, we have reviewed the certified record to ascertain whether it supports, by clear and convincing evidence, the factual findings and the legal conclusions of the trial court. In this case, it is clear that the trial court has carefully weighed the evidence in consideration of the requirements of the relevant statutory provisions. The trial court was well aware of the fact that a guardianship is not necessary if an incapacitated person has a "circle of support" provided by friends and family members: Heckendorn's parents and other family members are obviously available to him but cannot be effective as a support system without the appointment of guardianship. Heckendorn's tendency toward violent outbursts and his history of attacking his parents, during psychotic episodes, along with his continued insistence that he is in fine health, render it nearly impossible for his parents to have a real positive impact on his decision-making. Furthermore, his medical needs are financially and likely emotionally exhausting for family members. Without the appointment of guardianship, Heckendorn is simply incapable of both financially supporting himself and receiving the medical treatment he needs to prolong his life. Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/06, at 7. We agree with this assessment of the evidence presented to the trial court. See also N.T., 4/20/06, at 73 (testimony by Heckendorn indicating that no matter how many psychiatric - 12 - J. 567012/06 evaluations or how many doctors state otherwise, he will continue to maintain that he is not sick, that there is nothing wrong with him and that he does not need medications). We understand the fact that Dr. Hume did not personally examine Heckendorn. However, it was Heckendorn himself who refused to meet with Dr. Hume, a board certified psychiatrist and medical doctor. Thus, Dr. Hume was forced to prepare his report for the court entirely predicated solely on his evaluation of Heckendorn's medical records rather than on the basis of interviews with Heckendorn as well as a review of the medical records. Dr. Hume testified that he was prepared to go to Mayview 5tate Hospital to meet with Heckendorn, but that Heckendorn refused to speak with him or even meet with him. Id. at N.T., 4/20/06, at 51. Heckendorn himself corroborated this point. Id. at 70. Dr. Hume also testified that he did not base his report in any way on conversations with Heckendorn's parents or with court appointed counsel. Id. at 51-52. Dr. Hume's testimony was unequivocal that Heckendorn would not be considered for the necessary liver transplant as long as he has untreated medical and/or mental health issues. Id. at 56. As Dr. Hume explained, the demand for liver transplants is so high that only patients who are considered likely to remain compliant with the post-operative medication regimen will be considered for the surgery. Id. A transplant patient is required to take additional medication for organ rejection and deal with "a whole host of - 13 - J. 567012/06 other issues," some of which can create psychiatric side effects. Id. If mental health issues are treated, an otherwise ineligible candidate may be approved for the surgery. Id. However, a candidate would not be considered for the surgery unless continued stability was demonstrated for one to two years. Id. Dr. Hume acknowledged that the available laboratory studies of Heckendorn's liver function were "fairly stable," but only "up to the last ones that he was willing to do[.]" Id. at 57. But Heckendorn had become "non-compliant in terms of getting his laboratory studies done in a timely fashion." Id. Under cross-examination, Dr. Hume stated that Heckendorn could suffer a psychotic episode even while he was taking medication. Id. at 60. Furthermore, there is no clear indication of when such episodes would occur. Id. Dr. Hume also testified that refusing treatment creates a "more adverse outlook" than would occur if Heckendorn were compliant with the prescribed medical regimen. Id. We are also aware of the fact that Heckendorn was not physically present in the courtroom during the guardianship hearing. However, the trial court made provision for him to be present via telephone conference so that he could hear the proceedings and testify. 5 Heckendorn did, in fact, testify at the hearing. Id. at 61-73. We conclude, after carefully reviewing 5 We note that Heckendorn filed a petition on March 15, 2006, requesting that he be permitted to testify by telephone at a different proceeding because he wanted to avoid the stress of transfer from Mayview, an institution located at a significant distance from Cumberland County. - 14 - J. 567012/06 the certified record, that the trial court's factual findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, we find no indication that the trial court has committed any error of law in reaching its determination that Heckendorn is incapacitated and in need of a guardian. In particular, we find that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that n[i]t is not the fact that Heckendorn's parents, medical experts, and general common sense are at odds with his refusal to stay on medication or to forego financial opportunities; it is his insistence that he is healthy that precludes him from making informed decisions on his own behalf. n Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/06, at 6-7. We must therefore affirm the trial court's ruling. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered: March 20, 2007 Date: - 15 -