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Home My WebLink About07-3915IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, V. : COMPLAINT IN EQUITY AND PETITION VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and FOR A PERMANENT t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD; INJUNCTION and , 0-7- 391S ?E? STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants, MICHAEL C. GERDES DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY ID NO. 88390 KATHRYN H. SILCOX DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY I.D. NO. 81735 OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION HARRISBURG REGIONAL OFFICE 301 CHESTNUT STREET, SUITE 105 HARRISBURG, PA 17101 717-787-7109 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, V. VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD; COMPLAINT IN EQUITY AND PETITION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants, NOTICE YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Petition and Notice are served, by entering in writing with the court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the court without further notice for money claimed in the Petition or for any other claim or relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICES SET FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE: 2 CUMBERLAND COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 2 LIBERTY AVENUE CARLISLE, PA 717-249-3166 DATE: ?kk 7 ?, MICHAEL C. GERDES DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY I.D. NUMBER 88390 OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION HARRISBURG REGIONAL OFFICE 301 CHESTNUT STREET, SUITE 105 HARRISBURG, PA 17101 717-787-7109 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, V. VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD; COMPLAINT IN EQUITY AND PETITION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants, 0-1- 391S (21u?4 ? COMPLAINT IN EQUITY AND PETITION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND NOW, this day of UN. , 2007, comes the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, acting by the Office of Attorney General, through the Bureau of Consumer Protection (hereinafter referred to as "Commonwealth"'), who brings this action pursuant to the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P. S. § § 201-1 - 201-9.3 (hereinafter referred to as "Consumer Protection Law"), to restrain by Permanent Injunction unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce declared unlawful by § 201-3 of the Consumer Protection Law. In support thereof, the Commonwealth respectfully represents the following: 4 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to § 931 of the Judicial Code. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931. 2. Venue is proper in this action pursuant to § 931 of the Judicial Code. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931. PARTIES 3. Plaintiff is the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, acting through Attorney General Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., through the Bureau of Consumer Protection, Harrisburg Regional Office, 301 Chestnut Street, Suite 105, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101, on behalf of the citizens of the Commonwealth. 4. Defendant Vincent S. Failor is an adult individual with a permanent residence at 1194 Myerstown Road, Gardners, Pennsylvania 17324. 5. Defendant Steve Failor is an adult individual with a permanent residence at 573 Mt. Rock Road, Newville, Pennsylvania 17241. 6. Defendant Vincent S. Failor and Defendant Steve Failor (collectively "Defendants") co-own and operate a salvage vehicle business known as Failor's Salvage Yard, located at 452 Crossroad School Road, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. 7. Any references herein to Defendants shall jointly include the acts of Defendant Vincent S. Failor and Defendant Steve Failor. 5 BACKGROUND 8 9. 10. Defendants are engaged in trade and commerce in the Commonwealth by way of placing advertisements for motor vehicles in newsprint publications, and operating a salvage vehicle and repair shop business in Cumberland County. The Commonwealth has reason to believe that Defendants have used methods, acts or practices declared unlawful by § 201-3 of the Consumer Protection Law. Pursuant to § 201-2(4)(ii), (iii), (v), (ix), and (xxi) of the Consumer Protection Law, the following acts or practices are defined as unfair or deceptive: (ii) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services; Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection or association with, or certification by, another; (v) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have; (ix) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised; and, (xxi) Engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding. 73 P.S. §§ 201-2(4)(ii), (iii), (v), (ix), and (xxi). 11 12 The Commonwealth has reason to believe that Defendants have used methods, acts or practices declared unlawful by § 301.2 of the Automotive Industry Trade Practices, 37 Pa. Code §§ 301.1-301.6 (hereinafter referred to as "Auto Regs"). Pursuant to § 301.2(2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) of the Auto Regs, the following are considered unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices: 6 (2) The misrepresentation in any way of the size, inventory or nature of the business of the advertiser or seller; the expertise of the advertiser or seller or his agents or employes; or the ability or capacity of the advertiser or seller to offer price reductions; (3) The use of an advertisement or sales presentation as part of a plan or scheme not to sell the vehicles or services advertised, or both, or not to sell the vehicles or services advertised or presented at the advertised price; (4) The failure or refusal to sell a motor vehicle or other goods or services under terms or conditions, including price or warranty, which a motor vehicle manufacturer or dealer or repair shop has advertised or otherwise represented; (5) The representation in an advertisement or sales presentation that a motor vehicle or motor vehicle goods or services are of a particular style, model, standard, quality or grade if they are of another or if the representation conflicts with a written notice or disclosure required under this chapter; and (6) The making of a representation or statement of fact in an advertisement or sales presentation if the advertiser or salesperson knows or should know that the representation is false and misleading or if the advertiser or salesperson does not have sufficient information upon which a reasonable belief in the truth of the representation could be based. 37 Pa. Code §§ 301.2(2), (3), (4), (5), and (6). 13. Section 201-3.1 of the Consumer Protection Law provides, in pertinent part, that rules and regulations adopted by the Attorney General as necessary to enforce and administer the Consumer Protection Law shall have the force and effect of law. 14. Section 201-4 of the Consumer Protection Law provides, in pertinent part, that if the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person is using or about to use any method, act or practice declared unlawful by the § 201-3 of the Consumer Protection Law, the Attorney General may bring an action to impose a civil penalty and to seek other relief, including injunctive relief, under the Consumer Protection Law. 15. The Commonwealth believes that the public interest is served by seeking a Permanent Injunction to restrain the methods, acts and practices of Defendants as hereinafter set forth. Further, the Commonwealth requests injunctive relief, civil penalties, costs and other appropriate equitable relief as redress for violations of the Consumer Protection Law. 16. The Commonwealth has reason to believe that Defendants have used methods, acts or practices declared unlawful by the Board of Vehicles Act. 63 P.S. §§ 818.1 -- 818.37. 17. Pursuant to § 818.5 of the Board of Vehicles Act, it is unlawful for any person to engage in the business of a vehicle dealer without first securing a license to do so. 18. At all times relevant and material hereto the unfair methods, acts and practices complained of herein have been willfully used by Defendants. 19. The Commonwealth is informed, believes and therefore avers that Defendants directed, supervised, controlled, approved, formulated, authorized, ratified, benefited from and/or otherwise participated in the acts and practices hereinafter alleged herein. DEFENDANTS' BUSINESS PRACTICES 20. Paragraphs 1 through 19 are incorporated herein and made part hereof as if fully set forth herein. 21. Defendants, directly or through their agents, engaged in trade and commerce within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by way of operating an automobile salvage yard and repair shop known as Failor's Salvage Yard, and by way of placing advertisements for motor vehicles in newsprint publications. 22. Defendants purchase salvage vehicles and repair them at their repair shop. 23. Defendants place advertisements in periodicals, including Auto Locator magazine, offering automobiles for sale. 24. Defendants' advertisements contain pictures of automobiles, with descriptions of the make, model, mileage, condition, and price of each automobile. 25. Defendants' advertisements contain vehicle descriptions such as "good dependable car," "runs very strong," and "very solid running car." 26. Defendants' advertisements fail to disclose that the automobile offered for sale is a salvage vehicle; and, they do not identify the seller or indicate that the seller is a dealer in salvage vehicles. 27. Defendants routinely purchase salvage vehicles, restore them to putative roadworthy condition, and advertise the reconstructed vehicles for sale. 28. Consumers who inquire about the advertised vehicles are told that they can purchase the vehicle, and Defendants will prepare the forms necessary to obtain a reconstructed vehicle title from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT"). 29. Defendants prepare the reconstructed vehicle title application to PennDOT on behalf of the consumer. 30. By selling reconstructed vehicles, and preparing the forms necessary to obtain a reconstructed vehicle title from PennDOT, Defendants are engaging in the business of selling motor vehicles, and not merely salvage vehicles. 9 31. Defendants are not licensed as a motor vehicle dealer under the Board of Vehicles Act, 63 P.S. §§ 818.1 - 818.37. 32. In certain instances, Defendants advertised and sold vehicles prior to the completion of their reconstruction. In some of those instances, Defendants contracted with the purchaser of the vehicle to complete reconstruction of the vehicle by a certain date, and received payment for the vehicle, including the reconstruction costs. 33. In certain instances, Defendants guaranteed that a vehicle would be reconstructed and ready for delivery to the purchaser by a certain date, but failed to honor that guarantee. 34. Defendants failed to provide consumers with a refund when the delivery dates were not met. 35. In certain instances, Defendant represented that the vehicles which they had reconstructed were roadworthy when those vehicles were not. COUNTI DEFENDANTS' ADVERTISEMENTS MISREPRESENTED THE NATURE OF THE VEHICLES OFFERED FOR SALE 36. Paragraphs 1 through 35 are incorporated herein and made part hereof as if fully set forth herein. 37. By advertising vehicles without providing any indication that the vehicles were salvage vehicles, Defendants caused likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services in violation of the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(ii). 10 38. By advertising vehicles without indicating that the vehicles were salvage vehicles and could not be operated as motor vehicles until the buyer received a reconstructed vehicle title from PennDOT, Defendants caused likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection or association with, or certification by, another, in violation of the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(iii). 39. By advertising vehicles without providing any indication that the vehicles were salvage vehicles, Defendants represented that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have in violation of the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(v). 40. By advertising vehicles without indicating that the vehicles required reconstruction and the issuance of a reconstructed vehicle title from PennDOT, Defendants advertised goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised, in violation of the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(ix). 41. By advertising vehicles without indicating that the vehicles were salvage vehicles and required a reconstructed vehicle title from PennDOT, Defendants engaged in other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding, in violation the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201- 2(4)(xxi). 42. By advertising vehicles without indicating that the vehicles required reconstruction and the issuances of a reconstructed vehicle title from PennDOT, Defendants used an advertisement or sales presentation as part of a plan or scheme not to sell vehicles or services advertised, or both, or not to sell vehicles or services advertised 11 or presented at the advertised price, in violation of the Auto Regs. 37 Pa. Code § 301.2(3). 43. By advertising vehicles without providing any indication that the vehicles were salvage vehicles, Defendants represented in an advertisement or sales presentation that a motor vehicle or motor vehicle goods or services are of a particular style, model, standard, quality or grade when they are of another, or when the representation conflicts with a written notice or disclosure required under this chapter, in violation of the Auto Regs. 37 Pa. Code § 301.2(5). 44. By advertising vehicles without providing any indication that the vehicles were salvage vehicles and using terms such as "good dependable car," "runs very strong," and "very solid running car," Defendants made representations or statements of fact in an advertisement or sales presentation when Defendants knew or should have known that the representations are false and misleading, in violation of the Auto Regs. 37 Pa. Code § 301.2(6). 45. The acts, practices and methods of competition set forth above are unlawful and in violation of § 201-3 of the Consumer Protection Law in that they constitute "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in the conduct of trade and commerce set forth in § 201-2(4) of the Consumer Protection Law. 46. Residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm unless the acts and practices complained of herein are permanently enjoined. 12 PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commonwealth respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue an Order: A. Finding Defendants' conduct in violation of the Consumer Protection Law; B. Finding Defendants' conduct in violation of the Automotive Industry Trade Practices; C. Permanently enjoining Defendants, their agents, successors, assignees and employees acting directly or through any corporate device from engaging in the aforementioned acts, practices, methods of competition or any other practice in violation of the Consumer Protection Law, or the Automotive Industry Trade Practices; D. Directing Defendants to pay restitution to consumers who have filed or come forward to file verified consumer complaints against Defendants with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General regarding the business practices complained of herein; E. Directing Defendants to pay civil penalties in the amount of One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) for each and every violation of the Consumer Protection Law and increased to Three Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($3,000.00) for each violation involving a consumer 60 years of age and older; F. Directing Defendants to pay the Commonwealth for the costs of its investigation and prosecution of this action to be used for public protection and education purposes; and, G. Providing any other such relief as the Court may deem necessary and appropriate. 13 COUNT II DEFENDANTS' ADVERTISEMENTS MISREPRESENTED THE NATURE OF DEFENDANTS' BUSINESS AS A DEALER IN SALVAGE VEHICLES 47. Paragraphs 1 through 46 are incorporated herein and made part hereof as if fully set forth herein. 48. By advertising vehicles without indicating that the vehicles were salvage vehicles or identifying the seller as a dealer in salvage vehicles, Defendants misrepresented the nature of the business of the advertiser or seller, in violation of the Auto Regs. 37 Pa. Code § 301.2(2). 49. The acts, practices and methods of competition set forth above are unlawful and in violation of § 201-3 of the Consumer Protection Law in that they constitute "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in the conduct of trade and commerce set forth in § 201-2(4) of the Consumer Protection Law. 50. Residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm unless the acts and practices complained of herein are permanently enjoined. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commonwealth respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue an Order: A. Finding Defendants' conduct in violation of the Consumer Protection Law; B. Finding Defendants' conduct in violation of the Automotive Industry Trade Practices; C. Permanently enjoining Defendants, their agents, successors, assignees and employees acting directly or through any corporate device from engaging in the 14 aforementioned acts, practices, methods of competition or any other practice in violation of the Consumer Protection Law, or the Automotive Industry Trade Practices; D. Directing Defendants to pay restitution to consumers who have filed or come forward to file verified consumer complaints against Defendants with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General regarding the business practices complained of herein; E. Directing Defendants to pay civil penalties in the amount of One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) for each and every violation of the Consumer Protection Law and increased to Three Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($3,000.00) for each violation involving a consumer 60 years of age and older; F. Directing Defendants to pay the Commonwealth for the costs of its investigation and prosecution of this action to be used for public protection and education purposes; and, G. Providing any other such relief as the Court may deem necessary and appropriate. COUNT III DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF A MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A LICENSE AS PROVIDED UNDER THE BOARD OF VEHICLES ACT 51. Paragraphs 1 through 50 are incorporated herein and made part hereof as if fully set forth herein. 52. By reconstructing salvaged vehicles and selling those vehicles along with the forms necessary to obtain a reconstructed vehicle title for the vehicle from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Defendants sold motor vehicles 15 without being licensed to do so, in violation of Section 818.5 of the Board of Vehicles Act. 63 P.S. § 818.5. 53. Violations of the Board of Vehicles Act are per se violations of the Consumer Protection Law. 54. By selling motor vehicles without being licensed to do so, Defendants caused a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection or association with, or certification by, another, in violation of the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(iii). 55. By selling motor vehicles without being licensed to do so, Defendants represented that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have, in violation of the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(v). 56. By selling motor vehicles without being licensed to do so, Defendants engaged in other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding, in violation the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P. S. § 201- 2(4)(xxi). 57. The acts, practices and methods of competition set forth above are unlawful and in violation of § 201-3 of the Consumer Protection Law in that they constitute "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in the conduct of trade and commerce set forth in § 201-2(4) of the Consumer Protection Law. 58. Residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm unless the acts and practices complained of herein are permanently enjoined. 16 PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commonwealth respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue an Order: A. Finding Defendants' conduct in violation of the Board of Vehicles Act; B. Finding Defendants' conduct in violation of the Consumer Protection Law; C. Permanently enjoining Defendants, their agents, successors, assignees and employees acting directly or through any corporate device from engaging in the aforementioned acts, practices, methods of competition or any other practice in violation of the Consumer Protection Law, or the Board of Vehicles Act; D. Directing Defendants to pay restitution to consumers who have filed or come forward to file verified consumer complaints against Defendants with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General regarding the business practices complained of herein; E. Directing Defendants to pay civil penalties in the amount of One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) for each and every violation of the Consumer Protection Law and increased to Three Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($3,000.00) for each violation involving a consumer 60 years of age and older; F. Directing Defendants to pay the Commonwealth for the costs of its investigation and prosecution of this action to be used for public protection and education purposes; and, G. Providing any other such relief as the Court may deem necessary and appropriate. 17 COUNT IV DEFENDANTS FAILED TO DELIVER GOODS ACCORDING TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THEIR SALES TO CONSUMERS 59. Paragraphs 1 through 58 are incorporated herein and made part hereof as if fully set forth herein. 60. By failing to deliver reconstructed vehicles to purchasers by the date promised at the time of sale, Defendants advertised goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised, in violation of the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(ix). 61. By failing to fulfill the terms and conditions of sale agreed to at the time of sale, and refusing to provide a refund to consumers who then requested such refunds. Defendants engaged in other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding, in violation the Consumer Protection Law. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi). 62. By failing to deliver reconstructed vehicles to purchasers by the date promised at the time of sale, and failing to provide refunds subsequently demanded by consumers, Defendants failed or refused to sell a motor vehicle or other goods or services under terms or conditions, including price and warranty, which a motor vehicle manufacturer or dealer or repair shop has advertised or otherwise represented, in violation of the Auto Regs. 37 Pa. Code § 301.2(4). 63. The acts, practices and methods of competition set forth above are unlawful and in violation of § 201-3 of the Consumer Protection Law in that they constitute "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in the conduct of trade and commerce set forth in § 201-2(4) of the Consumer Protection Law. 18 64. Residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm unless the acts and practices complained of herein are permanently enjoined. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commonwealth respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue an Order: A. Finding Defendants' conduct in violation of the Consumer Protection Law; B. Finding Defendants' conduct in violation of the Automotive Industry Trade Practices; C. Permanently enjoining Defendants, their agents, successors, assignees and employees acting directly or through any corporate device from engaging in the aforementioned acts, practices, methods of competition or any other practice in violation of the Consumer Protection Law, or the Automotive Industry Trade Practices; D. Directing Defendants to pay restitution to consumers who have filed or come forward to file verified consumer complaints against Defendants with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General regarding the business practices complained of herein; E. Directing Defendants to pay civil penalties in the amount of One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) for each and every violation of the Consumer Protection Law and increased to Three Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($3,000.00) for each violation involving a consumer 60 years of age and older; 19 F. Directing Defendants to pay the Commonwealth for the costs of its investigation and prosecution of this action to be used for public protection and education purposes; and, G. Providing any other such relief as the Court may deem necessary and appropriate. Respectfully submitted, THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR. ATTORNEY GENERAL DATE:---(D BY: MICHAEL C. GERDES DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY I.D. NUMBER 88390 KATHRYN H. SILCOX DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY I.D. NUMBER 81735 OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION HARRISBURG REGIONAL OFFICE 301 CHESTNUT STREET, SUITE 105 HARRISBURG, PA 17101 (717) 787-7109 20 VERIFICATION I, Richard P. LeBlanc, hereby verify that the statements made in the foregoing Complaint in Equity and Petition for Permanent Injunction are true and correct upon my information and belief. I understand that any false statements are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: By: P 24- Richard P. LeBlanc Consumer Protection Agent 21 Q W L, 1 -rA V ,`f a _° E° Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 07-3915 CIVIL TERM RETURN OF SERVICE Attached hereto please find an original Affidavit of Service executed by COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., V. Plaintiff VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Ric P. LeBlanc, of the Office of Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Protection. Agent LeBlanc served Defendants with the Complaint in Equity and Petition for Permanent Injunction on June 28, 2007. Respectfully submitted, Date: 7 NO 7 Michael C. Gerdes Deputy Attorney General Attorney I.D. No. 88390 Office of Attorney General Bureau of Consumer Protection Harrisburg Regional Office 301 Chestnut Street, Suite 105 Harrisburg, PA 17101 Telephone: (717) 787-7109 FAX: (717) 772-3560 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff V. VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 07-3915 CIVIL TERM AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE I, Ric P. LeBlanc, being duly sworn according to law depose and state that I am an Agent for the Harrisburg Regional Office of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and I hereby certify that on June 28, 2007 2.50 PM, a copy of the Complaint in Equity and Petition for Permanent Injunction was personally served to the following: Steve Failor Failor's Auto Salvage 452 Crossroad School Road Carlisle, PA 17013 Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of , 20 0?. Notary ublic My Commission Expires: N4TAP K NX SUSAN J. DORN, NoWy Pubft Cky of Herd", Dagft Canty CommbWw EWkw Mardi 14 2011 By: Ric P. LeBlanc Consumer Protection Agent C7 ? -$ . ?q - ?,?, .? 55? t .?-! ?? om!!. ? ? ?? A.? "1 ? "%''" t (.7 ? , ? , .• ? mss ~~ ? r: ? ?? ? ? ? ? COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, by ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JIL, Plaintiffs, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 2007 - 3915 CIVIL TERM V. VINCENT S. FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, and STEVE FAILOR, Individually and Vd/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, CIVIL ACTION Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND NOW this 17a' day of September, 2007, come the Defendants, VINCENT S. FAILOR and STEVE FAILOR, by and through their attorneys, Irwin & McKnight, and make the following Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Complaint, and in support thereof aver the following: I. Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Demurrer pursuant to Pa. R.Civ. P. 1028(s)(4). 1. Plaintiff, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by Attorney General Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., filed a complaint on or about June 28, 2007, against Defendants Vincent S. Failor and Steve Failor, both individually and t/d/b/a Failor's Salvage Yard. 2. Plaintiff alleges various counts of misrepresentation by Defendants and violation of the "Consumer Protection Law" with regard to the sale of "motor vehicles." 3. For example, in paragraph seventeen (17) of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that it is unlawful under the "Board of Vehicles Act" for a person to "engage in the business of a vehicle dealer without securing a license to do so." 4. In Count III, Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants sold salvage vehicles without being licensed to so under the "Board of Vehicles Act," 63 P.S. § 818.5. 5. Plaintiff recognizes in its Complaint, however, that Defendants operated an automobile salvage yard and repair shop. 6. In regulations promulgated by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, a "vehicle salvage dealer" is defined as a person "engaged in the business of buying or selling parts or buying, selling or exchanging used, wrecked or abandoned vehicles and junkers for the purpose of remodeling, taking apart or rebuilding them" (emphasis added). 67 Pa. code § 53.2. 7. As the operators of a licensed salvage yard, Defendants are permitted to sell used, wrecked, or abandoned vehicles and junkers in accordance with their licensure as vehicle salvage dealers. 8. As a matter of law, Defendants are not therefore required to obtain separate additional licensure as a dealer, as long as they are engaged in the transfer of used, wrecked or abandoned vehicles. 9. Defendants therefore demur to Count III of the Complaint, and all other references in the Complaint which imply that Defendants are required to be licensed under the "Board of Vehicles Act." 2 WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court to dismiss Count III of Plaintiff s Complaint, along with Paragraph Seventeen (17) and all other references in the Complaint which imply that Defendants are required to be licensed under the "Board of Vehicles Act.". Respectfully Submitted, IRWIN & MCKNIGHT O?4? AA, By: • . Doaglas Miller, nice Supreme Court ID No. 83776 West Pomfret Professional Building 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 (717) 249-2353 Dated: September 17, 2007 Attorney for Defendants, Vincent S. and Steve Failor 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, do hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the persons indicated below both by facsimile and by first class United States mail, postage paid in Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013, on the date set forth below: MICHAEL C. GERDES, ESQUIRE KATHRYN H. SILCOX, ESQUIRE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 301 CHESTNUT STREET, SUITE 105 HARRISBURG, PA 17101 Date: September 17, 2007 IRWIN & McI(NIIGHT AA Douglas r, Esquire Supreme Court I.D. No. 83776 West Pomfret Professional Building 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-3222 (717) 249-2353 Attorney for Defendants, Vincent S. and Steve Failor -ri to IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, V. VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD; and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants, No. 2007-3915 CIVIL TERM PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND NOW, this -S-0-? day of October, 2007, comes the Plaintiff, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, acting by the Office of Attorney General, through the Bureau of Consumer Protection (hereinafter referred to as "Commonwealth"), who files this Answer to the Preliminary Objections of Defendants to Plaintiff's Complaint, and in support thereof, the Commonwealth respectfully represents the following: 1. Denied as stated in that the Complaint of the Commonwealth speaks for itself. 2. Denied as stated in that the Complaint of the Commonwealth speaks for itself. 3. Denied as stated in that the Complaint of the Commonwealth speaks for itself. 4. Denied as stated in that the Complaint of the Commonwealth speaks for itself. 5. Denied as stated in that the Complaint of the Commonwealth speaks for itself. 6. Denied. Defendants' allegations constitute conclusions of law which require no response and are deemed denied. 7. Denied. Defendants' allegations constitute conclusions of law which require no response and are deemed denied. Denied. Defendants' allegations constitute conclusions of law which require no response and are deemed denied. 9. Denied. Defendants' allegations constitute conclusions of law which require no response and are deemed denied. To the extent that an answer may be required, it is denied that the Commonwealth's Complaint fails to state a cause of action under Count III or otherwise. 2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to overrule and dismiss the Preliminary Objections of Defendants and order said Defendants to answer Plaintiff's Complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of service of this Court's Order. Respectfully submitted, THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR. ATTORNEY GENERAL DATE: 4o 7 S BY: MI HAEL . GERDES DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY I.D. NUMBER 88390 KATHRYN H. SILCOX DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY I.D. NUMBER 81735 OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION HARRISBURG REGIONAL OFFICE 301 CHESTNUT STREET, SUITE 105 HARRISBURG, PA 17101 (717) 787-7109 3 .+ " Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 07-3915 CIVIL TERM CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Michael C. Gerdes, hereby certify that on this "3 day of COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., V. Plaintiff VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, C&W,C- ! , 2007, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Answer to Preliminary Objections of Defendants to Plaintiff's Complaint by first class mail to the following: Douglas G. Miller, Esq. IRWIN & McKNIGHT West Pomfret Professional Building 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, PA 17013-3222 Attorney for Defendants By: Michael C. Gerdes Deputy Attorney General ?-. _ _ ??' ? ? ? --, , ? C - a't1 - - ' -J _ ?? C_7 i ' _ I'a i . ;, i, PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT (Must be typewritten and submitted in duplicate) TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: (List the within matter for the next Argument Court.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CAPTION OF CASE (entire caption must be stated in full) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania By Attorney General Thomas W. Corbett, Jr. vs. Vincent S. Failor, individually and t/d/b/a/Failor's Salvage Yard and Steve Failor, individually and No. 2007-3915 Civil Term t/d/b/a Failor's Salvage Yard 1. State matter to be argued (i.e., plaintiff's motion for new trial, defendant's demurrer to complaint, etc.): Defendant's Preliminary objections 2. Identify all counsel who will argue cases: (a) for plaintiffs: Michael C. Gerdes (Name and Address) Strawberry Square, 15th Floor, Harrisburg, PA 17120 (b) for defendants: Douglas G. Miller (Name and Address) 60 West Pomfret Street, Carlisle, PA 17013 3. 1 will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has been listed for argument. 4. Argument Court Date: October 22, 2008 o Signature Michael C. Gerdes Print your name Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Date: v? Attorney for INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Two copies of all briefs must be filed with the COURT ADMINISTRATOR (not the Prothonotary) before argument. 2. The moving party shall file and serve their brief 12 days prior to argument. 3. The responding party shall file their brief 5 days prior to argument. 4. If argument is continued new briefs must be filed with the COURT ADMINISTRATOR (not the Prothonotary) after the case is relisted. -n :13 --a ' T v IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY. PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, V. No. 2007-3915 CIVIL TERM VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD; and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR' S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants, CERIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the ?3 rd day of 2008, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Praecipe for Listing Case for Argument was served by means of United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, upon the following: Douglas G. Miller, Esquire Irwin & McKnight 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, PA 17103 MICHAEL C. GERDES DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY I.D. NUMBER 88390 OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION STRAWBERRY SQUARE, 15`h FLOOR HARRISBURG, PA 17120 717-787-9707 717-787-1190 (FAX) A } 47, it ern s? t4.3 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, by ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2007 - 3915 CIVIL TERM V. VINCENT S. FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, and STEVE FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants CIVIL ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE HESS, OLER, GUIDO, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this a(° day of MARCH, 2009, the Defendants' Preliminary Objections to Count III are DENIED. By ourt, Edward E. Guido, J. Michael C. Gerdes, Esquire Kathryn H. Silcox, Esquire --lbiouglas G. Miller, Esquire tF.S' rn?t? ?1 Opt .C Hd 9Z ON 6002 It i'??sf'?vr f _ ? c 3,HL ?o COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PENNSYLVANIA, by ATTORNEY : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, No. 2007 - 3915 CIVIL TERM V. VINCENT S. FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, and STEVE FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, CIVIL ACTION Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NOTICE TO PLEAD You are hereby notified to file a written response to the enclosed Answer with New Matter within twenty (20) days from service hereof or a judgment may be entered against you. IRWIN & McKNIGHT, P.C. Douglas G. Miller, Esquire Supreme Court I.D. No. 83776 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 (717) 249-2353 Attorney for Defendants Date: May 11, 2009 COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PENNSYLVANIA, by ATTORNEY : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL THOMAS W. . CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, No. 2007 - 3915 CIVIL TERM V. VINCENT S. FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, and STEVE FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, CIVIL ACTION Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND NOW this 11TH day of May, 2009, come the Defendants, VINCENT S. FAILOR and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, by and through their attorneys, Irwin & McKnight, P.C., and respectfully file this Answer with New Matter to the Plaintiff's Complaint, and in support thereof aver as follows: 1. The averments contained in paragraph one (1) of the Complaint are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 2. The averments contained in paragraph two (2) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 3. The averments of fact contained in paragraph three (3) are admitted. 4. The averments of fact contained in paragraph four (4) are admitted. 5. The averments of fact contained in paragraph five (5) are admitted. 6. The averments of fact contained in paragraph six (6) are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 7. The averments contained in paragraph seven (7) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the Defendants do not "co- own" and operate a salvage yard and do not act jointly together. 8. The averments of fact contained in paragraph eight (8) are admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that in the past certain salvage parts and salvage vehicles were offered for sale as part of the former operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. The remaining averments in paragraph eight (8), including any inference that Defendants were offering motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard, are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 9. The averments contained in paragraph nine (9) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 10. The averments contained in paragraph ten (10) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Consumer Protection Law speaks for itself, and any inference that it was violated by Defendants is specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 11. The averments contained in paragraph eleven (11) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Automotive Industry Trade Practices speak for themselves, and any inference that they were violated by Defendants is specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 12. The averments contained in paragraph twelve (12) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Automotive Industry Trade Practices speak for themselves, and any inference that they were violated by Defendants is specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 13. The averments contained in paragraph thirteen (13) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 2 14. The averments of fact contained in paragraph fourteen (14) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 15. The averments of fact contained in paragraph fifteen (15) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 16. The averments contained in paragraph sixteen (16) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 17. The averments contained in paragraph seventeen (17) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments, including any inference that Defendants engaged in the business of a vehicle dealer, are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 18. The averments contained in paragraph eighteen (18) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 19. The averments contained in paragraph nineteen (19) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 20. The averments contained in the Answers to Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs one (1) through nineteen (19) inclusive are incorporated herein by reference and are made part hereof. 21. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-one (21) are admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that in the past certain salvage parts and salvage vehicles were offered for sale as part of the former operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. The remaining averments in paragraph twenty-one (21), including any inference that Defendants were offering 3 motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard, are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 22. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-two (22) are denied as stated. It is admitted that in the past certain salvage parts and salvage vehicles were purchased as part of the former operation of Failor's Salvage Yard, and that certain repairs were also performed as part of that business. The remaining averments of paragraph twenty-two (22) are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 23. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-three (23) are denied as stated. It is admitted that in the past certain salvage parts and salvage vehicles were offered for sale as part of the former operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. The remaining averments in paragraph twenty- three (23), including any inference that Defendants were offering motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard, are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 24. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-four (24) are denied as stated. It is admitted that in the past certain salvage parts and salvage vehicles were offered for sale as part of the former operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. The remaining averments in paragraph twenty- four (24), including any inference that Defendants were offering motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard, are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 25. The averments of fact contained in paragraph twenty-five (25) are denied as stated. It is admitted that in the past certain salvage parts and salvage vehicles were offered for sale as part of the former operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. The remaining averments in paragraph twenty-five (25), including any inference that Defendants were offering motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard, are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 4 26. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-six (26) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 27. The averments of fact contained in paragraph twenty-seven (27) are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer, Defendants did not offer reconstructed motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. 28. The averments of fact contained in paragraph twenty-eight (28) are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer, Defendants did not offer reconstructed motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. 29. The averments of fact contained in paragraph twenty-nine (29) are denied as stated. It is admitted that individuals that requested that Defendants perform certain repair work to salvage vehicles after their purchase and that where appropriate title paperwork would be completed and signed by the inspecting mechanic. Defendants did not prepare the reconstructed title paperwork and submit it to PennDOT. The remaining averments in paragraph twenty-nine (29) are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 30. The averments of fact contained in paragraph thirty (30) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 31. The averments of fact contained in paragraph thirty-one (31) are admitted. 32. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-two (32) are denied as stated. It is admitted that in the past certain salvage parts and salvage vehicles were offered for sale as part of the former operation of Failor's Salvage Yard, and that in some instances after the purchase of salvage vehicles individuals contracted to have repair work performed on the salvage vehicles. The remaining averments in paragraph thirty-two (32) are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 5 33. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-three (33) are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 34. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-four (34) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 35. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-five (35) are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. COUNTI 36. The averments contained in the Answers to Plaintiffs Complaint, paragraphs one (1) through thirty-five (35) inclusive are incorporated herein by reference and are made part hereof. 37. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-seven (37) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 38. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-eight (38) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 39. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-nine (39) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 40. The averments contained in paragraph forty (40) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 6 41. The averments contained in paragraph forty-one (41) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 42. The averments contained in paragraph forty-two (42) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 43. The averments contained in paragraph forty-three (43) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 44. The averments contained in paragraph forty-four (44) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 45. The averments contained in paragraph forty-five (45) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 46. The averments contained in paragraph forty-six (46) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff in this matter, together with such other and further relief as this Court deems just. 7 COUNT II 47. The averments contained in the Answers to Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs one (1) through forty-six (46) inclusive are incorporated herein by reference and are made part hereof. 48. The averments contained in paragraph forty-eight (48) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 49. The averments contained in paragraph forty-nine (49) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 50. The averments of fact contained in paragraph fifty (50) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff in this matter, together with such other and further relief as this Court deems just. COUNT III 51. The averments contained in the Answers to Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs one (1) through fifty (50) inclusive are incorporated herein by reference and are made part hereof. 52. The averments contained in paragraph fifty-two (52) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer, Defendants did not sell reconstructed vehicles or the forms necessary to obtain a reconstructed vehicle title. 8 53. The averments contained in paragraph fifty-three (53) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments and any inference that Defendants violated the Board of Vehicles Act are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 54. The averments contained in paragraph fifty-four (54) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer, Defendants did not offer reconstructed motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. 55. The averments contained in paragraph fifty-five (55) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer, Defendants did not offer reconstructed motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. 56. The averments contained in paragraph fifty-six (56) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer, Defendants did not offer reconstructed motor vehicles for sale as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard. 57. The averments contained in paragraph fifty-seven (57) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments and any inference that Defendants violated the Consumer Protection Law are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 58. The averments contained in paragraph fifty-eight (58) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 9 WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff in this matter, together with such other and further relief as this Court deems just. COUNT IV 59. The averments contained in the Answers to Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs one (1) through fifty-eight (58) inclusive are incorporated herein by reference and are made part hereof. 60. The averments contained in paragraph sixty (60) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments and any inference that Defendants violated the Consumer Protection Law are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 61. The averments contained in paragraph sixty-one (61) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments and any inference that Defendants violated the Consumer Protection Law are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 62. The averments contained in paragraph sixty-two (62) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments and any inference that Defendants violated the Automotive Industry Trade Practices are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 63. The averments contained in paragraph sixty-three (63) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments and any inference that Defendants violated the Consumer Protection Law are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 64. The averments of fact contained in paragraph sixty-four (64) are conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the averments and 10 any inference that Defendants violated the Consumer Protection Law are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff in this matter, together with such other and further relief as this Court deems just. NEW MATTER 65. The averments of fact contained in the Answers to the Complaint are hereby incorporated by reference and are made part of this New Matter to the Complaint of the Plaintiff. 66. In regulations promulgated by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, a "vehicle salvage dealer" is defined as a person "engaged in the business of buying or selling parts or buying, selling or exchanging used, wrecked or abandoned vehicles and junkers for the purpose of remodeling, taking apart or rebuilding them" (emphasis added). 67 Pa. Code § 53.2. 67. Similarly, in the regulations of PennDOT governing the sanctions for violations by licensed vehicle salvors, a "salvor" is defined as "a person engaged in the business of acquiring abandoned vehicles for the purpose of taking apart, junking, selling, rebuilding or exchanging the vehicles or the parts thereof' (emphasis added). 67 Pa. Code § 253.2 68. As the operators of a licensed salvage yard, Defendants were permitted to sell used, wrecked, or abandoned vehicles and junkers in accordance with their licensure as vehicle salvage dealers. 69. Defendants are not therefore required to obtain separate additional licensure as a dealer, as long as they are engaged in the transfer of used, wrecked or abandoned vehicles. 11 70. Plaintiff has previously admitted that the sale of salvage vehicles prior to their reconstruction is permitted, as well as the subsequent repair of those salvage vehicles and application for reconstructed vehicle title by the purchaser. 71. It is common practice within the salvage business to list salvage parts and salvaged vehicles for sale within automobile periodicals and advertisements. 72. All prospective customers or purchasers of salvage vehicles were clearly informed in advance that they were purchasing salvaged vehicles. 73. All prospective customers or purchasers of salvage vehicles were also informed in advance that the salvaged vehicles could not legally be operated on the highway unless they were reconstructed and unless the customer applied for and obtained a reconstructed vehicle title. 74. The significantly reduced advertised price for salvaged vehicles is further evidence that Defendants were offering salvaged vehicles for sale and not motor vehicles. 75. The invoices of the Defendants clearly stated that the purchasers were obtaining salvage vehicles, parts, and/or damaged vehicles in an "as is" or "salvage" condition. 76. Defendants still retain the completed salvage title for one customer pursuant to the contract and agreement to purchase the salvaged vehicle. 77. In certain circumstances, Defendants were subsequently contracted to perform certain repair or reconstruction work of salvaged vehicles. 78. Repair or reconstruction work was always performed after the purchase of the salvaged vehicle. 79. Only a small percentage of salvaged vehicles were contracted to be repaired or reconstructed by the Defendants, while the majority of salvaged vehicles were purchased and/or delivered in their "as is" or "salvaged" condition. 80. All such work was performed at the request of purchaser in accordance with the specifications provided by the customer and in a good and workmanlike manner. 12 81. Defendants had multiple satisfied customers who clearly understood they were purchasing salvage parts or salvaged vehicles in an "as is" condition, and not roadworthy motor vehicles. 82. Some of the vehicles previously identified by Plaintiff in advertisements were not salvaged vehicles sold as part of the operation of Failor's Salvage Yard, but were the personal vehicles of the Defendants sold privately by the individual Defendant. 83. Plaintiff's Complaint therefore fails to state claims or causes of action upon which relief can be granted. 84. All or a portion of Plaintiffs claims may be barred by the defense of the applicable statute of limitations. 85. All or a portion of Plaintiff's claims may also be barred by the defense of laches 86. All or a portion of Plaintiffs claims may also be barred and/or limited by their failure to mitigate or to properly mitigate their alleged damages. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff in this matter, together with such other and further relief as this Court deems just. Respectfully Submitted, IRWIN & McKNIGHT, P.C. By: , Dou as G filler, Esquire Supreme Court ID No. 83776 West Pomfret Professional Building 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 (717) 249-2353 Attorney for Defendants Dated: May 11, 2009 13 VERIFICATION The foregoing document is based upon information which has been gathered by my counsel and myself in the preparation of this action. I have read the statements made in this document and they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. STEVEN A. F Date: Map 11, 2009 VERIFICATION The foregoing document on behalf of the Defendant is based upon information which has been gathered by counsel for the Defendant in the preparation of this document. The statements made in this document are true and correct to the best of the counsel's knowledge, information and belief. The Defendant's verification cannot be obtained within the time allowed for filing the pleading. The undersigned is therefore verifying on behalf of the Defendant according to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1024(c)(2). The undersigned understands that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities. Do as Miller, Esquire Date: May 11, 2009 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, do hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the persons indicated below both by facsimile and by first class United States mail, postage paid in Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013, on the date set forth below: MICHAEL C. GERDES, ESQUIRE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 301 CHESTNUT STREET, SUITE 105 HARRISBURG, PA 17101 Date: May 12, 2009 IRWIN & McKNIGHT, P.C. Douglas Miller, Esquire Supreme Court I.D. No. 83776 West Pomfret Professional Building 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-3222 (717) 249-2353 Attorney for Defendants, Vincent S. and Steve Failor :;,Py C r., 3 1 12 s T IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY. PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, V. No. 2007-3915 CIVIL TERM VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD; and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants, COMMONWEALTH'S REPLY TO NEW MATTER AND NOW, this 1st day of June, 2009, comes the Plaintiff, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, acting by the Office of Attorney General, through the Bureau of Consumer Protection (hereinafter the "Commonwealth"), who files this Reply to New Matter, and in support thereof, the Commonwealth respectfully represents the following: 65. This paragraph requires no responsive pleading. In any event, the Commonwealth incorporates herein by reference the averments contained in its Complaint. 66. Denied. This paragraph includes a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 67. Denied. This paragraph includes a conclusion of law to which no response is required. .v 68. Denied. This paragraph includes a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 69. Denied. This paragraph includes a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 70. Denied to the extent that Defendants seek to characterize the Commonwealth's claims and its Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference. 71. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. 72. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. 73. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. 74. Denied. Specifically, it is denied that the advertised price of the vehicle constitutes evidence that the vehicle was a salvage vehicle. 75. Denied. Specifically, it is denied that all invoices indicate that the vehicle being purchased is a salvage vehicle, damaged vehicle, or being sold "as is." 76. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. 77. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. 78. Denied. Specifically, it is denied that repair or reconstruction work was always performed after the purchase of the vehicle. 79. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. 80. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averment that all work was performed at the request of a purchaser, and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. It is further denied that all work was performed in a good and workmanlike manner. 81. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. 82. Denied. After reasonable investigation, the Commonwealth is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and the same is therefore denied, as investigation/discovery is continuing. 83. Denied. This paragraph includes a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 84. Denied. This paragraph includes a conclusion of law to which no response is required. F 85. Denied. This paragraph includes a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 86. Denied. This paragraph includes a conclusion of law to which no response is required. WHEREFORE, the Commonwealth respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter a judgment in the Commonwealth's favor against the Defendants. Respectfully submitted, Date: (Q 1 (0a By: Michael C. Gerdes Deputy Attorney General Attorney I.D. Number 88390 Office of Attorney General Bureau of Consumer Protection Strawberry Square, 15th Floor Harrisburg, Pa 17120 717-787-9707 717-787-1190 (Fax) VERIFICATION I, Richard P. LeBlanc, hereby verify that the statements made in the foregoing Reply to New Matter are true and correct upon my information and belief. I understand that any false statements are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: By: 42.4.? P. z Richard P. LeBlanc Consumer Protection Agent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BY ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, V. No. 2007-3915 CIVIL TERM VINCENT S. FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD; and STEVE FAILOR, individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants, CERIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Michael C. Gerdes, hereby certify that on the 1 st day of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Commonwealth's Reply to New Matter by means of facsimile and United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, upon the following: Douglas G. Miller, Esquire Irwin & McKnight 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, PA 17103 Counsel for Defendants Vincent S. Failor and Steve Failor Michael C. Gerdes Deputy Attorney General Attorney I.D. Number 88390 Office of Attorney General Bureau of Consumer Protection Strawberry Square, 15th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120 717-787-9707 717-787-1190 (Fax) i...L ;i .C 2033 JUN -1 P1112: 1; r . , I' ' - ~1 ~.. t~ ~i ~~ t ~ ._ l r~`` `7 ) vs Case No. l~ ~ ._ ~ ~ ~ -- __ "~.~~~.~ .` ... 1 Statement of Intention to Proceed ho the Court: ~y~C7o'~V.~'~~- ~~~~~ ~ ~~~~'~~~~ intends to proceed with the above captioned matter. ~: ;, ~~: . ~~ ~~ n ivame °'~ '~ i" t~i.ut ,wine -__ --__ b __ _- ___.. _.___. -.. _...___ __. _ __ ~1 Dates ~ ~` ~-= 1 ~' Attorney for C~~~~c~~~\~~, ~'~~' i --- Explanatory Comment fl~,~ Suprcn~~~c Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated neve Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the tcnmination of maitiar cakes and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. 1'wo aspects of the recommendation merit comment. t. Mule nJ rivi! Yi~ ocedure V"e~~~ Ru!e of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases ~~ithin the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 'hhe termination of these cases for inactivity was previously s~overned by Rule of .ludicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. Ncw Rule 230.2 is tailored fi the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform state~~~ide practice. preempting local rule I his rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Su~premc Court in Shop v. ~aglc, 551 Pa. 360.710 A.2d 110-1 f ~ y`J~) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required bclbrc ~ ca~,c may he dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 19i11.'~ Rule uf~ Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amended [o accommodate Ule new rule of ci~~il procedure. The erneral policy of the prompt disposition of matters set forth in suhdivision (aj of that rule continue> [o h.. applicable. !1 ,'nacrire C'use.e I~hc purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. 'fhe process is i+iitiated by the court. ,11tcr eivina notice of intent to terminate an action Cor inactivity, the course of the procedure is ~.vith the parties. ~,~~s;: ~~ pu~su:, tl.., cos., .lr ...l: tat:,. nc '. P ~ ~ .ctar~~ .,l.a ! ~,..._ _._. s n; unn~~c ternunating the matter with prejudic: for failure to prosecute ~ If a pasty wishes to pursue tl~ic ~i,ittcr, he or she ~~ili til~_ a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. i t'6~er-Er site uc~(ion has been terminated (f the ac~_ion is terminated when a parry believes that it should not have been terminated, that par?; may proceed under ltulc 230(4) for relief from the order of termination. An example oT such an occurrence might be the termination oi~~i viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file tl~_c notice of intention to proceed. l~he timing of the tiling of the petition to reinstate the action is important. ICthe petition is filed within thirty days of thr cnu v of the order of termination on the docket, subdivision (d)(2) provides that the court must grant tPie petition and rcu~sta~c the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day pcri~:x1. subdivision (d)(3) requires ,hat the plaintiff n~~u;t mal:c a showing to the court that the petition was promptly tiled and that there is a reasonable explanation or lcr~~.tinuatc ~.zcuse both for the l~iilurc to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry a' the order of tcrmin,uicm oi; the docket aad for the failure to file the petition within the thirty-day period under subdi~~ision ~d)(2). 13 II here nc~ action Irrs no! been terrninatecf \n actiu~ which has not been germinated but which continues upon tyre filing of a notice of intention to emceed may h:nr been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggrieved p~u-ty may pursr:e th remedy of a c~~ranuu~ l;,w non pros ~~~hich exits independently of termination uuder Rule 230.2. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, by ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., Plaintiff, v. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VINCENT S. FAILOR, Individually and : t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, • and STEVE FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, Defendants. : No. 2007 - 3915 CIVIL TERM Q xWIZ -cam r =c CIVIL ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PETITION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL AND NOW, comes the Defendants' counsel, Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, of the law firm of Irwin & McKnight, P.C., the Petitioner, and files this Petition to Withdraw as Counsel averring as follows: The Petitioner is Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, of the a firm of Irwin & McKnight, P.C., with offices located at 60 West Pomfret Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. 2. Respondent is Vincent S. Failor, a Defendant in the above -captioned civil action. He resides at 1194 Myerstown Road, Gardners, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17324. 3. Additional Respondent is Steve Failor, also a Defendant in the above -captioned civil action. He resides at 573 Mount Rock Road, Newville, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17241. 2 4. The Respondents, Vincent S. Failor and Steve Failor, hired the Petitioner's law firm to represent them in this matter. 5. As a result, the Petitioner performed work for and represented Defendants' interests in this matter. 6. Invoices, letters, and other requests for payment have been sent to both of the Respondents and yet no further payments have been received from them. 7. Despite incurring significant legal fees and costs as a result of their legal representation, Respondents have not made any payment to Petitioner since January 2010. 8. Respondents have also not been cooperative with regard to attending meetings or depositions in order for Petitioner to properly and adequately represent Respondents in this matter. 9. Respondents have been advised in writing and verbally: that Petitioner is going to be seeking to withdraw as their counsel and they did not object to such action. 10. Petitioner also advised Plaintiffs legal counsel, Michael C. Gerdes, of the filing of the instant Petition and he also did not object. 3 11. Respondent Steve Failor advised that he would be in direct contact with Plaintiff's legal counsel, and upon information and belief said Respondent has already called Plaintiff's attorney. WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, therefore respectfully requests an Order of Court by this Honorable Court which grants counsel permission to withdraw as attorneys for Vincent S. Failor and Steve Failor, Individually, and t/d/b/a Failor's Salvage Yard, and removing Petitioner as counsel of record for Respondents. By: Date: November 19, 2014 Respectfully submitted, IRWIN & McKNIGHT P.C. Doug as G. ilier, E quire Attorney I. . No. 83776 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, PA 17013 717-249-2353 / 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, hereby certify that a copy of attached document was served upon the following by depositing a true and correct copy of the same in the United States mail, First Class, postage prepaid in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the date referenced below and addressed as follows: MICHAEL C. GERDES, ESQUIRE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION PUBLIC PROTECTION DIVISION 15TH FLOOR, STRAWBERRY SQUARE HARRISBURG, PA 17120 STEVE FAILOR 573 MOUNT ROCK ROAD NEWVILLE, PA 17241 VINCENT S. FAILOR 1194 MYERSTOWN ROAD GARDNERS, PA 17324 IRWIN & McKNIGHT, P.C. Douglas G. iller, Esquire Attorney I.D. No: 83776 60 West Pomfret Street . Carlisle, PA 17013 717-249-2353 Date: November 19, 2014 5 COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PENNSYLVANIA, by ATTORNEY : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., .• Plaintiff, . No. 2007 — 3915 CIVIL TERM v. VINCENT S. FAILOR, Individually and : t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, and STEVE FAILOR, Individually and t/d/b/a FAILOR'S SALVAGE YARD, CIVIL ACTION Defendants. : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 11614 day of Aid YEIn ti L... , 2014, upon consideration of the- Petition to Withdraw as Counsel filed by Defendant's counsel, Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, the Petition is hereby granted. Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, is no longer counsel for Vincent S. Failor, Individually and t/d/b/a Failor's Salvage Yard and Steve Failor, t/d/b/a Failor's Salvage Yard, in the above -referenced action. cc: ✓Michael C. Gerdes, Esquire, Attorney for the Plaintiff �ouglas G. Miller, Esquire Vincent S. Failor, Defendant —eve Failor, Defendant i'es rr/sitEc4. iipr�iy