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HomeMy WebLinkAbout07-4357,~- ELIZABETH C. SCHORPP, Plaintiff vs. EARL L. SCHORPP, II, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0.2007- x}357 CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS You have been sued in Court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case will proceed without you and a decree in divorce or annulment may be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation or your children. When the ground for the divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at the First Floor, Cumberland County Courthouse, 1 Courthouse Square, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, LAWYER'S FEES, OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 32 S. Bedford Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 (717) 249-3166 s ~ ELIZABETH C. SCHORPP, Plaintiff v. EARL L. SCHORPP, II, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0.2007- 1,/3,ti 7 CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE UNDER SECTION 3301 (C) OR 3301 (D) OF THE DIVORCE CODE AND NOW comes Elizabeth C. Schorpp, plaintiff herein, by and through her attorney, Jacqueline M. Verney, Esquire, and represents the following: 1. Plaintiff is Elizabeth C. Schorpp, an adult individual, currently residing at 1826 Rasp Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17013 since August, 1978. 2. Defendant is Earl L. Schorpp, II, an adult individual, currently residing 1826 Rasp Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17013 since August, 1978. 3. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and have been so for at least six months immediately previous to the filing of this complaint. 4. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 20, 1974, in Silver Spring, Montgomery County, Maryland. 5. There have been no prior actions for divorce or annulment between the parties. 6. The Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of marriage counseling and the Plaintiff may have the right to request that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. Having been so advised Plaintiff does not desire the Court to order counseling. J- '~ 7. This marriage is irretrievably broken. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays Your Honorable Court enter a decree in divorce. Respectfully submitted, ,~ acq ine M. Verney, Esquir~ Supreme Ct. ID. 23167 44 South Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-9190 Attorney for Plaintiff ~ `. VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing divorce complaint are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date Eliz eth C. Schorpp, Plaintiff _ .,~ ^ 1 r..._ }~ ~. V~~ a.. V-01 ~ . * ~ ~-~-~ ~ ~=~'' D _ c..~ l ELIZABETH C. SCHORPP, Plaintiff vs. EARL L. SCHORPP, II, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA N0.2007-4357 CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL PURSUANT TO Pa. R.C.P. 1930.4 (c) COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND SS I, Jacqueline M. Verney, Esquire, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the attorney for plaintiff, Elizabeth C. Schorpp, and that she did serve a true and correct copy of the divorce Complaint that was filed in the above matter, by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, certified with restricted delivery, return receipt requested, unto the defendant, Earl L. Schorpp, II, on July 26, 2007. The receipt form is attached hereto as EXHIBIT "A". /"~° ac line M. Verney, Esquire # 167 44 S. Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-9190 Attorney for Plaintiff Sworn to and subscribed be re me this 3 day of ~ , 2007. Gl_ Notary Public c ~w+vv~,~~TM~o ~a~.v~+wu- NOTARIAL SEAL VALERIE F. SELL, No~ry Public Earusle Boro., CumberlarM C,oaMJ! iNy Commission Expires Oc~dber 9,.2010 A1Nh~ ~,4':L1~~3 ir'~ I~. ''2 v1. a"~trlv'IG.'°": i .... .. .,.. .,... .,wn•.. «..~:. ...,... I '_ '' .Fib. .` i __ ;:~'~ _. r'~. ,., {; r ^ Complete items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. ^ Print your name and address on the reverse so that we can return the card to you. ^ Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece, or on the front if space permits. 1. Article Addressed to: j~la ~ ~~-s,~ ~~ i v~ A. Received:.bYiplal~se Print CleaAy) B. pate Delivery l•-~st 1 1 Sc ~nc~rt~c~ ~ 1`Z.lo~ ~~ C. Sir tore ^ Addres~N D. Is delivery address different from rtem 1? ^ Yes If YES, enter delivery address below: ^ ~ C n ~ / / ~ 3. Service Type r`t' S C.~ R- ~ 7 ~ ~ 3 'Certified Mail ^ Express Mail RESTRICTED ^ Ins~urede M 1 ^ C.O.D. ~~pt for Merchar~ !1 c i r~ l r o v 4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) Yes 2. "'~'~~"`""~' ~ 7223 1010 2201 1198 2905 (lfansfer from service label) PS Form 3$11, March 2001 Domestic Retum Receipt to25ss-o1-M-1424 EXHIBIT "A" ~~ ,..,,3 __ y(Z~ ~ W ) . r . .. ~rn _ " . r ~~ , ? yT•.. ... ~ i T~ ~_~ ~ ~ : ""`"r M. "~. ~.~.} 11,1 Z~~~7~-~ ~. ScG~o,e~p- PGFF, N T ~ F ~ vs /.J-/L G L , .S~~lo,e/~~ ~F ~!~~,' TARY Case No. o~.'PI =~(~~"~' 44 Statement of Intention to Proceed To the Court: ~p~E~l{ ~YLV 07' y35`7 h Ll 2 A- /~ ~ T I-~ ~ . S GG, 6/L ip intends to proceed with the above captioned matter. Print Name ~ 0 4 U ~ ~ ~~ , ' ` ' V ~-+J Sign Name -~c_ - y[ . - O Date: ! ' a -1 ~ Attorney for I ~' Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the ternination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment. I. Rule of civil Procedure New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The termination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform statewide practice, preempting local rules. This rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v. Eagle, 551 Pa. 360,710 A.2d 1104 (1998) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case maybe dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901." Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amended to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of matters set forth in subdivision (a) of that rule continues to be applicable. II Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity, the course of the procedure is with the parties. If the parties do not wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and "the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of course terminating the matter with prejudice for failure to prosecute." If a party wishes to pursue the matter, he or she. will file a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action has been terminated If the action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been terminated, that party may proceed under Ru1e230(d) for relief from the order of temvnation. An example of such an occurrence might be the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the filing of the petition to reinstate the action is important. If the petition is filed within thirty days of the entry of the order of termination on the docket,. subdivision (d)(2) provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period, subdivision (d)(3) requires that the plaintiff must make a showing to the court that the petition was promptly filed and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty-day period under subdivision (d)(2). B. Where the action has not been terminated An action which has not been temunated but which continues upon the filing of a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggrieved party may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2. 12 A-6£i 1-f vs Case No. c2_6d 7 q 3 S 7 F Aiz L . . p Statement of Intention to Proceed To the Court: - a rt C- S vL-0P e�.? intends to proceed with the above capteinil ma-ft"er. A� // / M Print Name�r4clru�!.✓t. dot�V F/G1J�V Sign Name Date: / - 9 "/3 Attorney for Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment. I.Rule of civil Procedure New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The termination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform statewide practice, preempting local rules. This rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v.Eagle, 551 Pa.360,710 A.2d 1104 (1998) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case may be dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901." Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amended to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of matters set forth in subdivision(a)of that rule continues to be applicable. II Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity,the course of the procedure is with the parties. If the parties do not wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and"the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of course terminating the matter with prejudice for failure to prosecute." If a party wishes to pursue the matter,he or she will file a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action has been terminated If the action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been terminated, that party may proceed under Ru1e230(d)for relief from the order of termination. An example of such an occurrence might be the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the filing of the petition to reinstate the action is important. If the petition is filed within thirty days of the entry of the order of termination on the docket,subdivision(d)(2)provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period, subdivision(d)(3)requires that the plaintiff must make a showing to the court that the petition was promptly filed and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty-day period under subdivision(d)(2). B. Where the action has not been terminated An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the filing of a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggrieved party may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2.