The URL can be used to link to this page

Home My WebLink About06-02-08 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS COURT DIVISION In re: "Estate of Joseph P. Beil, Petitioner a Co ~~Q :n~m ~~::o Z(i.J:;;o;: OC)~ File No. 21-07-075JP~ j2 ANSWER of PRAM CO III, LLC TO PETITION FOR RULE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY INSURANCE PROCEEDS SHOULD NOT BE PAYABLE TO LEANNE E. BElL ,.." = = <X> Co.- c:: Z I N ~ ::It <a .. ~r: Cf, -".""''1 ~". C,._) ,. ....'1 f" (c.') :--~~ --.., Respondent Pramco III, LLC ("Respondent"), creditor of the Estate of Joseph P. Beil, through its undersigned counsel, hereby answers the above-referenced Petition, as follows: 1. ADMITTED. 2. ADMITTED. 3. The document attached as Exhibit "A" to the Petition is a document that speaks for itself, therefore no response is necessary. 4. ADMITTED. 5. DENIED. The Respondent, after reasonable investigation, is without information sufficient to permit it to admit or deny this averment, which is deemed denied. 6. The document attached as Exhibit "B" to the Petition is a document that speaks for itself, therefore no response is necessary. 7. DENIED as a conclusion of law. 8. DENIED. The Respondent, after reasonable investigation, is without information sufficient to permit it to admit or deny this averment, which is deemed denied. 9. The document attached as Exhibit "c" to the Petition is a document that speaks for itself, therefore no response is necessary. The remainder of Paragraph 9 of the Petition is DENIED as a conclusion of law. 1 REJ 6611/40 1305862vl 06/02/2008 11:34 am ~j 10. ADMITTED. 11. ADMITTED. 12. DENIED. The Respondent, after reasonable investigation, is without information sufficient to permit it to admit or deny this averment, which is deemed denied. 13. The document attached as Exhibit "D" to the Petition is a document that speaks for itself, therefore no response is necessary. The remainder of Paragraph 13 of the Petition is DENIED. The Respondent, after reasonable investigation, is without information sufficient to permit it to admit or deny the remainder of this averment, which is deemed denied. 14. DENIED as a conclusion of law. By way of further answer, 20 Pa.C.S.A. ~~6111.2 provides that "any designation in favor of [a] former spouse which was revocable by [a decedent] after the divorce shall become ineffective for all purposes and shall be construed as if such former spouse had predeceased [the decedent]." The Pennsylvania Legislature then carved out three exceptions to the above-quoted general rule: "unless it appears from the wording of the designation, a court order or a written contract between the person and such former spouse that the designation was intended to survive the divorce." In the instant matter, the wording of the designation on the insurance policy ("Insurance JPolicy") attached as Exhibit "A" to the Petition only lists LeAnne E. Biel as a beneficiary and does not contain any indication that the designation was intended to survive the divorce. There is no court order evidencing that the designation was intended to survive the divorce. Finally, there is no written contract between the person (Joseph P. Beil) and the former spouse (LeAnne E. Beil) that proves that the designation was intended to survive the divorce. Joseph P. Beil's Last Will and Testament ("Will") is not a written contract between the ex-spouses. The Will does provide that LeAnne E. Beil is the executrix and the sole primary beneficiary of the estate, 2 REJ 6611/40 1305862vl 06/02/2008 II :34 am however it is completely silent regarding the designation of the beneficiary of the Insurance Policy. There is no wording in the Will that indicates that the designation on the Insurance Policy was intended to survive the divorce. 15. DENIED as a conclusion oflaw. Any remaining factual averments are DENIED. The Respondent, after reasonable investigation, is without information sufficient to permit it to admit or deny this averment, which is deemed denied. 16. DENIED as a conclusion of law. Any remaining factual averments are DENIED. The Respondent, after reasonable investigation, is without information sufficient to permit it to admit or deny this averment, which is deemed denied. 17. DENIED as a conclusion of law. By way of further answer, 42 Pa.C.S.A. !~8124( c), exempts life insurance proceeds in the hands of insurors from execution process issued by creditors. It does not exempt those proceeds once paid to the party entitled to receive them. The intentions of the statute are two-fold: to encourage individuals to insure against financial loss for benefit and protection of those dependent on them for support, and to prevent individuals subject to financial hardship from becoming public charges. In re Lowenthal Bkrtcy, 203 B.R. 576 (E.D.Pa.1996). This statute is inapplicable to the within matter because the Insurance Policy does not have a beneficiary pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. 96111.2, therefore the proceeds of the Insurance Policy must be contributed to the Estate of Joseph P. Bie!, and once that occurs, they are available for distribution to creditors as would be any other property of the Estate. 18. DENIED. The Respondent, after reasonable investigation, is without information sufficient to permit it to admit or deny this averment, which is deemed denied. By way of further answer, it is irrelevant whether any contingent beneficiary designations were made on an 3 REJ 6611/40 1305862v I 06/02/2008 II 34 am application form for an insurance policy because the actual insurance policy, attached as Exhibit "A" to the Petition, does not list any contingent beneficiaries. 19. DENIED as a conclusion of law. By way of further answer, 20 Pa.C.S.A. 9 6111.2 is valid, existing Pennsylvania law which mandates that upon Joseph P. Biel's death, the designation of his ex-wife LeAnne E. Biel as the primary beneficiary is revoked unless three specific exceptions apply. None of the exceptions to this general rule apply to the within matter. Furthermore, the Respondent specifically denies any characterization that it is attempting to circumvent the protections given to life insurance policy owners, when in fact the Respondent is merely following and requesting enforcement of the existing law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 20. DENIED as a conclusion of law. The Parsonese case cited by Petitioner is distinguishable from the within matter because the Parsonese case dealt with a life insurance policy that was executed before the Pennsylvania legislature enacted 20 Pa.C.S.A. 96111.2, though the case was decided after the statute took effect. Parsonese v. Midland International l'nsurance Co., 706 A.2d 814 (Pa. 1998). In fact, the court in Parsonese explicitly stated that it was "critical to [their] analysis that application of the [new] statute [96111.2] in this case would be retroactive application." Id. at 819. Furthermore, the Court said that retroactive application of the statute presented a constitutional problem, because it would effectively modify pre- existing contracts. "If the statute is not applied retroactively, the constitutional conflict is avoided in this case." Id. Here, the constitutional issue does not arise, because the Genworth policy was issued in 2000, eight years after 96111.2 took effect. 4 REJ 6611/40 1305862vl 06/02/2008 II :34 am 21. DENIED as a conclusion of law. See responses set forth above in Paragraphs 14, 19 and 20. WHEREFORE, the Respondent respectfully requests this Court to enter an order directing Genworth to distribute the proceeds of Joseph Beil's Life Insurance Policy into the Estate of Joseph P. Beil. Respectfully submitted, KAPLIN STEWART MELOFF REITER & STEIN, P.c. BY~~ . 1iam J. Levant, uire Re ecca E. Johnson, Esqmre Counsel for Respondent 5 REJ 6611/40 1305862vl 06102/2008 II 34 am VERIFICATION I, William J. Levant, Esquire, under penalty of 18 P.S. ~4904, do hereby state that I am eounsel for the Respondent, that I am authorized to give this verification on my client's behalf, and that the factual allegations and denials set forth in the foregoing response are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I am taking this verification in my client's stead because my client is located out-of-state, and a client signature could not be obtained in time to file this document with it. /', I c Date: June 2, 2008 (0 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYL VANIA ORPHANS COURT DIVISION In re: Estate of Joseph P. Beil, Petitioner File No. 21-07-0753 CERTIFICA TE of SERVICE I, Rebecca E. Johnson, under penalty of 18 P.S. ~4904, do hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within Answer to the Petition for Rule to Show Cause Why Insurance Proceeds of the Decedent's Life Insurance Policy with Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company Should not be Payable to the Policy Beneficiary Leanne E. Beil, to be sent, via First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: Lowell R. Gates, Esquire Gates, Halburner & Hatch, PC 1013 Mumma Road, Suite 100 Lemoyne, P A 17043 on this date: June 2, 2008 KAPLIN STEWART MELOFF REITER & STEIN, P.c. BY.~ ~ Rebecca E. Johnson, Esquire Counsel for Defendants 7 REJ 6611/40 1305862vl 06/02/2008 II :34 am IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS COURT DIVISION In re: Estate of Joseph P. Beil, Petitioner File No. 21-07-0753 ORDER AND NOW, this day of , 2008, upon consideration of the Petition of the Executrix to Show Cause Why Certain Insurance Proceeds Should Not Be Paid to Leanne E. Beil, the Response of Pramco III, LLC in opposition, and for good cause shown, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1) The Petition is DENIED; and 2) Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company is AUTHORIZED and DIRECTED to pay the proceeds of the Decedent's life insurance policy to the Executrix, for distribution to the creditors of the Decedent in the manner prescribed by law. BY THE COURT: 1. 8 REJ 6611/40 1305862vl 06/02/2008 11:34 am