HomeMy WebLinkAbout10-22-04 IN RE: ESTATE OF :
JOSEPH D. BRENNER, SR., JOSEPH D. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
BRENNER, JR., and MARGARET B. BUSHEY, : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
: PENNSYLVANIA
Petitioners,
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
V.
No. 21-2004-087
MANUFACTURERS AND TRADERS TRUST
COMPANY, a New York corporation, DAVID C.
GORITY, an individual, and CURT R. '
STAUFFER, an individual,
Respondents. :
PETITIONERS' HEARING BRIEF
Petitioners Margaret B. Bushey, Joseph D. Brenner, Jr. ("Brenner J.~), and joseph
D. Brenner, Sr. ("Brenner Sr" ......
· ) respectfully submit the following in antlmpatlon of the hearing to
commence before Auditor James D. Bogar on November 2.
I. Procedural History and Posture
This is an action for breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty, in connection with four family trusts. Petitioners originally filed their claims
against Respondents in a complaint in the Civil Division on August 22, 2003, but were
subsequently directed to file a Petition in the Orphans' Division, which they did on February 2,
2004. Respondents filed objections to the Petition on March 9, 2004, which were argued before
the Court, and decided on June 18, 2004. As a result of the preliminary objections, the Court
stuck Petitioners' claim for punitive damages, and struck the specific figure cited in the Petition
as a damages estimate. However, the Court rejected Respondents' objection to the claims against
Gority and Stauffer, and rejected Respondents' objection to the manner in which Respondents
requested a jury trial.
In the meantime, shortly after Petitioners filed their complaint, Respondent M&T
filed "First and Final Accountings" for the same four trusts in the Orphans Division on October
24, 2003. Petitioners filed objections to M&T's accountings on November 21, 2003. Petitioners
object to confirmation of the accountings for the same reason they have filed claims against
Respondents, i.e., because Respondents breached their fiduciary duties with respect to the trusts
in several regards and thereby caused a substantial reduction in the value of the trust assets.
The Court appointed James D. Bogar, Esq., as auditor for the accountings on
December 19, 2003. On June 18, 2004, Respondents filed an Answer and New Matter, asserting
various defenses to Petitioners' claims in the New Matter, including arguing that Petitioners
failed to mitigate their damages by not repurchasing Tyco stock with the trust assets after June
12, 2002, and that Petitioners breached their own fiduciary duties by failing to diversify the trust
assets. After a hearing before the Honorable Edgar B. Bayley regarding the scope of the auditor's
duties, the Court ruled on October 8, 2004, that Auditor Bayley should hear Petitioners fiduciary
duty claims against Respondents in addition to acting upon M&T's accountings. The hearing
before Auditor Bayley is scheduled to commence on November 2.
II. Statement of Facts
This matter involves four trusts created by Petitioner Brenner Sr. and his wife
Jane Brenner (deceased). On November 23, 1994, Brenner Sr. and Jane Brenner executed an
Irrevocable Agreement of Trust, which created a trust for the benefit of their four children and,
upon their children's deaths, their grandchildren (hereinafter "the Grandchildren's Trust"). On the
same date, Jane Brenner also executed an Amendment and Restatement to Declaration of Trust
with regard to the other three trusts at issue in this case, referred to as the Jane Brenner "B" Trust,
the Jane Brenner "C" Trust, and the Blakely Trust (hereinafter, collectively, "the Children's
Trusts"). The Jane "B" and Jane "C" Trusts are for the benefit of Brenner Sr. during his lifetime
and, upon his death, the Brenners' children and grandchildren. The Blakely Trust is for the
benefit of Nancy B lakely (one of the Brenners' four children) and her children.
2
By the terms of the trust instruments, Farmers Trust Company was to serve as co-
trustee with Brenner Sr. of the Jane "B," Jane "C," and Blakely Trusts.~ Brenner Sr. owned stock
in Farmers Trust and served on its Board. He knew the principal officers of Farmers Trusts and
trusted them. David Gority was one of the officers of Farmers Trust who Brenner Sr. knew and
trusted. In addition to the Children's Trusts, Farmers Trust was also to serve along with
Petitioners Bushey and Brenner Jr. as co-trustees of the Grandchildren's Trust. In approximately
1997, Keystone Financial Bank acquired Farmers Trust and took over the co-trustee role for the
trusts. When Keystone Financial was in turn acquired by Respondent M&T in late 2000, M&T
took over the co-trustee role. The trust accounts have been maintained at M&T under the
account numbers 32-1056-60-8 (Jane Brenner "B" Trust), 32-1057-60-6 (Jane Brenner "C"
Trust), 41-7090-60-2 (Blakely Trust), and 43-1075-60-5 (Grandchildren's Trust).
All four trusts were funded solely with shares of Amp, Inc. ("Amp") stock.
Petitioner Brenner Sr. joined Amp, an electrical products company based in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, after completing his service in World War 1I. He worked there for more than
40 years, eventually becoming its CEO and then Chairman of its Board. During his time at Amp,
Brenner Sr. acquired numerous shares of Amp stock, many of which he gifted or put into trust for
the benefit of his family, including the shares in the Children's and Grandchildren's Trusts. The
Grandchildren's Trust, in fact, contains a provision that recognizes the assets placed in trust
consist solely of Amp common stock and expressly releases the trustees fi.om "all responsibility
and obligation to dispose of any portion of the AMP, Inc. stock by reason of the concentration of
the investment of the Trusts in the stock of one corporation.''2 The Amp shares in the trusts were
converted to shares of Tyco International Ltd. ("Tyco") stock when Tyco acquired Amp in 1998.
Brenner Sr. was 80 years old in 1997 when his wife Jane died. Already suffering
from profound hearing loss, Brenner Sr.'s physical and mental health began to decline noticeably
z As to Nancy Blakely, Brenner Sr. also had limited power of attorney for Mrs. Blakely for many
years, including in 2002, although he no longer has power of attorney for her.
2 The provision does not prohibit the trustees fi'om selling Amp stock.
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after Jane's death. This decline was recognized by Gor/ty. Brenner Sr. had been in the habit of
visiting the bank frequently and dropping in on Gority and other bank employees on an
unannounced basis. In the time period after his wife's death, Brenner Sr.'s questions started to
become repetitive, i.e., Brenner Sr. would ask Gority and others questions that they had akeady
answered previously and sometimes multiple times.
In the summer of 1998, Gority called Bushey into his office and politely, but
clearly, raised his concerns about Brenner Sr., including Brenner Sr.'s confusion and the fact that
Brenner Sr. was taking up a lot of the bank employees' time. Gority suggested that, from that
time forward, either Bushey or Brenner Jr. should be present at all meetings between the bank
and Brenner Sr., so that they could help him understand what was being said and so that Brenner
Sr. could turn to Bushey or Brenner Jr. when he wanted the subject of a meeting explained to him
or discussed again later. Bushey (and subsequently Brenner Jr.) agreed that this was an
appropriate arrangement for dealing with their father's declining capacity. From that time
forward, Bushey or Brenner Jr. attended all substantive meetings regarding the trusts, except the
most important one--the June 12, 2002, meeting to which they were not invited and which
resulted in the complete liquidation of the Tyco stock held in the trusts. Brenner Sr.'s accountant
also attended at least one occasion to assist him.
Brenner Sr.'s physical health and mental acuity continued to decline after 1998.
By 2002, Brenner Sr. was 85 years old, suffered from profound hearing loss, had significantly
impaired vision due to cataracts, and suffered from dementia associated with his advanced age.
M&T, and in particular Gority, who had remained with the bank through its acquisitions and
continued to have principal responsibility for the Children's and Grandchildren's Trusts, was well
aware of these facts. Bushey regularly assisted Brenner Sr. with both his routine and significant
business and personal affairs. Brenner Sr. willingly accepted her and Brenner Jr.'s assistance,
and came to rely on them to help him with many things that he could no longer manage alone. In
March 2001, Brenner Sr. granted a durable general power of attorney to Bushey, and to Brenner
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Jr. in the event that Bushey was unable or unwilling to so act. This power of attorney replaced a
prior power of attorney that no one was able to locate. M&T appears to have kept copies of this
power of attorney in the trust files.
Having Bushey and Brenner Sr. assist Brenner Sr. was an effective approach to
managing Brenner Sr.'s reduced capacity. This solution worked effectively until June 2002,
when the issue of Tyco concentration in the trusts came to head. Farmers Trust Company, the
corporate co-trustee actually named in the trust instruments, had never objected to the fact that
the Brenner trusts were funded solely with Amp stock. Keystone Financial, immediate successor
to Farmers Trust and M&T's predecessor, asked Brenner Sr. to sign letters authorizing Keystone
to continue holding all the Tyco shares in the Children's Trusts, acknowledging that Keystone
had discussed with him the risk of not diversifying the portfolio, and stating that the
authorization would remain in effect until he authorized the sale of any shares in writing.
Brenner Sr. provided such letters in August 2000.
M&T assumed co-trustee responsibilities for the Children's and Grandchildren's
Trusts in approximately October 2001. Curt Stauffer, who was assigned to work with Gority on
the trusts, made a presentation to all three Petitioners in November 2001 urging diversification.
Shortly thereafter, Gority indicated in a letter to Petitioners that 20% liquidation was "well within
the parameters we are comfortable with," and Stauffer recommended in a letter that a liquidation
plan for the Children's Trusts be "carded out in a disciplined and timely manner" and that
"market prices...need not dictate the progress of the liquidation plan." Petitioners Bushey and
Brenner Jr. had already agreed to sell 40% of the Tyco shares in the Grandchildren's Trust
previously. Petitioners decided not to sell any additional Tyco stock at that time. Unbeknownst
to Petitioners, M&T considered the Tyco concentration in the stocks so unacceptable that it was
considering resigning as co-trustee if it could not get Petitioners to agree to its Tyco divestiture
plan.
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In early Jnne 2002, events conspired to create an opporttmity for M&T to try to
rome through its plan. On Monday, June 3, 2002, Tyco's CEO was arrested and charged with tax
evasion, which caused a drop in Tyco's stock price. Petitioners were aware of the situation and
had no immediate plans to sell Tyco shares. On Friday, June 7, 2002, Stauffer called petitioner
Bushey in a panic. Stauffer told Bushey that Gority was on vacation so he was taking it upon
himself to call the family to notify them that M&T was "eliminating its position in Tyco
immediately" and recommend they do the same. Stauffer breathlessly described his concems
about Tyco and indicated he would call Bushey again later to set up a time to meet the following
week after Gority returned fi.om vacation. Stauffer made a similar call to Brenner Jr.
The next contact with M&T regarding the trusts occurred on or about Tuesday,
June 11, 2002, when Stauffer telephoned Brenner Sr. and asked him to come by M&T's office the
following morning when Gority was back from vacation. Brenner Sr. agreed to come to the bank
for a brief informational meeting about the Tyco situation. Stauffer did not contact Bushey or
Brenner Jr. to advise them of the meeting or invite them to attend. When Brenner Sr. arrived at
M&T on June 12, 2002, Stauffer and Gority were already on a conference call with John
Klubosicky, a senior M&T employee in Buffalo, New York. During the course of the meeting,
Stauffer, Gority, and Klubosicky persuaded Brenner Sr. to sign two papers purportedly
authorizing the immediate sale of one-third of the Tyco shares in the Children's Trusts and the
entry of a stop loss order at $9.00 on the remaining two-thirds of the Tyco shares in those trusts.
One of the papers related to the Jane "B" and Jane "C" Trusts, and one of the papers related to the
Blakely Trust. Brenner Sr. signed the papers under pressure from the meeting participants,
including Stauffer, who pounded on the desk and said words to the effect "we have to do it now."
Respondents took advantage of Brenner Sr.'s reduced capacity to achieve the
diversification that M&T had wanted for the account and been frustrated it had not been able to
achieve, without regard to the wisdom of the specific recommendation under the cimumstances
or the fact that Brenner Sr. could not give meaningful consent. Brenner Sr. did not understand the
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meaning of the documents he signed. Brenner Sr. did not understand and still does not
understand what a stop loss order is or why it would be used in connection with the Children's
Trusts. He was not told and did not understand the rationale for the $9.00 trigger price for the
stop loss order. He did not understand and still does not believe that one of the papers related to
the Blakely Trust.
After Brenner Sr. left M&T's offices, Respondent Gority called Bushey. Gority
informed Bushey that her father had just been at the office and had agreed to liquidate one-third
of the shares in the Children's Trusts immediately and subject two-thirds to a $9.00 stop-loss
order. Bushey was dumbfounded, and expressed her surprise to Gority. She did not know that
her father had been at M&T that morning. She did know that when she had last spoken to him he
had not been planning to sell any Tyco stock. Gority asked whether she agreed with the plan her
father had purportedly agreed to. Bushey did not understand that Gority was asking whether she
agreed to apply the same plan to the Grandchildren's Trust, but rather believed Gority was asking
her to affirm her father's decision since she had not been invited to the meeting. Confused but
under pressure, Bushey "agreed." However, she could not give meaningful consent since Gority
had not explained the basis for the recommendation, had not explained what a stop loss order
was or its benefits and disadvantages, did not explain why she had not been invited to the
meeting, did not ensure that she understood he was talking about the Grandchildren's Trust, did
not give her any time or opportunity to discuss the matter with the other co-trustees before
responding, and did not discuss the consequences of the sale or how the proceeds would be
invested. Indeed, according to Gority's own deposition testimony, Stauffer was the only person
in the M&T hierarchy who should have been advising Respondents on investment matters
(although that was not in fact tree), and he was not on the call. The call also lasted only a few
minutes.
Next, Gority called Brenner Jr. and again had only a few minute phone call in
which he represented to Brenner Jr. that his father and sister had already consented to the Tyco
7
liquidation plan and that he should as well. Like Bushey, Brenner Jr. was surprised and confused
by what Gority was telling him. However, Gority again provided minimal information to
Brenner Jr., characterized the plan as "a done deal," and pressured Brenner Jr. to go along with
his father's and sister's purported wishes. Brenner Jr. ultimately "agreed," but specifically
expressed reservations about the stop loss order and said he would call back after speaking to
Bushey and Brenner Sr. After getting off the phone with Gority, Brenner Jr. attempted to reach
his father at home but he was not there. Brenner Jr. also called Bushey. It was in that
conversation that Bushey learned she had allegedly agreed to allow M&T's liquidation plan to be
applied to the Grandchildren's Trust over which she was co-trustee. Bushey never agreed or
intended to agree to liquidate the Tyco shares in the Grandchildren's Trust. Brenner Jr. then
called Gority, but had to leave a message when he was told Gority was at lunch.
On June 12, 2002, at 11:33 a.m., M&T caused 4,533 shares of Tyco stock in the
Jane Brenner "B" Trust (one-third of the total) and 13,866 shares of Tyco stock in the Jane
Brenner "C" Trust (one-third of the total) to be sold at $10.23 per share. At 11:36 a.m., M&T
caused 24,274 shares of Tyco stock in the Blakely Trust (one-th/rd of the total) to be sold at
$10.23 per share. Less than thirty minutes later, at 12:05 p.m., M&T caused 11,134 shares of
Tyco stock in the Grandchildren's Trust (one-third of the total) to be sold at $10.23 per share. It
is unclear whether M&T entered the latter sale before or after speaking to Bushey and Brenner Jr.
on the phone. Only a few hours later, on the same afternoon of June 12, 2002, Tyco's stock price
fell below $9.00 for a short time and, as a result of the stop loss orders, all remaining Tyco shares
were sold out of the four trusts at $8.75 per share. Specifically, M&T sold 9,067 shares out of
the Jane Brenner "B" Trust, 27,734 shares out of the Jane Brenner "C" Trust, 48,468 shares out of
the Blakely Trust, and 22,266 shares out of the Grandchildren's Trust. Gority had not yet called
Brenner Jr. back when the stop loss executed on the Grandchildren's Trust.
Several hours later, Brenner Sr. arrived home, with no idea that the Tyco stock
had been completely liquidated fi.om the trusts. That night, Bushey attempted to explain to him,
8
for the first of what would be many times, what he had signed at M&T on the morning of June 12
and how the Tyco stock had come to be liquidated. Brenner Sr. did not believe Bushey that
night, and to this day does not believe he agreed to the plan M&T executed. Only after
Petitioners had an opportunity to talk to each other, which M&T had not allowed them earlier,
were they able to start piecing together what had happened. Petitioners were upset about the
events and in particular about Respondents' conduct and tried to figure out what to do. Bushey
and Brenner Jr. refused to sign the written consent that Gority sent them to "confirm" their
purported verbal consent on the telephone.
Ultimately, Petitioners decided to pursue claims against Respondents based on the
events of June 12, 2002, and to remove M&T as co-trustee on the accounts pursuant to their
authority under the trust agreements. Petitioners appointed Orrstown Bank as successor trustee.
Despite the efforts of Respondents and their counsel, however, M&T refused, without
explanation, to release the assets so that Orrstown could reinvest them. On July 8, 2004, M&T's
counsel finally offered to release the assets if Petitioners signed a proffered release. Petitioners
did not believe they should be required to sign the release in order to exercise their right to
appoint a successor co-trustee and by that time, due to M&T's delays, anticipated trial in the near
future in any event.
III. Arguments of Law
M&T, aided and abetted by Gority and Stauffer, breached its fiduciary duties
when it sold the entirety of the assets in the Children's and Grandchildren's Trusts in a matter of
hours based on an ill-advised recommendation and without the true consent of the co-trustees
who had joint investment authority. M&T also breached its fiduciary duties to the Children's and
Grandchildren's Trusts by subsequently refusing to timely release the trusts assets to the
designated successor trustee so that they could be appropriately reinvested.
A. M&T is Liable for Multiple Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
The elements that must be proven to establish liability for breach of fiduciary duty
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are: (1) that the defendant (trustee) negligently or intentionally failed to act in good faith and
solely for the benefit of plaintiff in ail matters for which he or she was employed; (2) that the
plaintiff suffered injury; and (3) that the defendant's failure to act solely for the plaintiffs benefit
was a real factor in bringing about plaintiffs injuries. See In re Church of St. James the Less~
2003 WL 22053337 '19 (Pa. Com.P1. March 10, 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Once the plaintiff shows a causal connection between the trustee's breach and the trusts' losses,
the burden of persuasion shifts to the trustee to prove, as a matter of defense, that the loss would
have occurred in the absence of a breach of duty. See Estate of Stetson, 463 Pa. 64, 84 (1975).
Under Pennsylvania's "prudent investor rule," a fiduciary "shall invest and manage
property held in a trust as a prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, and other
cimumstances of the trust and by pursuing an overail investment strategy reasonably suited to the
trust." 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7203(a). A fiduciary is to consider multiple factors in making investment
and management decisions, including but not limited to:
(1) the size of the trust;
(2) the nature and estimated duration of the fiduciary relationship;
(3) the liquidity and distribution requirements of the trust;
(4) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies and of
distributions of income and principal;
(5) the role that each investment or course of action plays in the overall
investment strategy;
(6) an asset's special relationship or special vaiue, if any, to the purposes of the
trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries * * *;
(7) to the extent reasonably known to the fiduciary, the needs of the beneficiaries
for present and future distributions authorized or required by the governing
instrument; and
(8) to the extent reasonably known to the fiduciary, the income and resources of
the beneficiaries and related trusts.
Id. § 7203(b).
"The standard of care imposed upon a trustee is that which a man of ordinary
prudence would practice in the care of his own estate. Ifa fiduciary has greater skill than that of
a person of ordinary prudence, then the fiducia~y's standard of care must be judged according to
the standard of one having this special skill." In re Estate of Scharlach, 809 A.2d 376, 384, 2002
10
Pa Super 279 (2002). Similarly, "a trustee who obtains the appointment as trustee by
representing that he or she has greater skill than a person of ordinary prudence...will be held to
that higher standard." Pew, supra, 440 Pa. Super. at 237. As a financial institution that
specialized in fiduciary accounts, M&T owed a higher standard of care than an ordinary person.
See Scharlach, supra, 809 A.2d at 384; see also In re Mendenhall. 484 Pa. 77, 82-83 (holding
that trustee bank, which assigned an investment officer to each trust account, which organized
investment committee to make recommendations as to trust acquisitions and retentions, and
which employed outside investment analysts, possessed greater resources and skills than those of
the ordinary individual trustee, and thus should be held to standard of care higher than "prudent
man" standard in administering the trust).
In addition to their investment obligations, fiduciaries must be held to a high
standard of conduct in their dealings with co-trustees and trust beneficiaries. To do less
abrogates the settlor's intent to have co-trustees jointly responsible for the trusts, and risks
undermining the importance of the fiduciary relationship. "Many forms of conduct permissible
in the work-a-day world for those acting at arms length, are forbidden to those botmd by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending. * * * Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd." In re Holmes'
Trust., 139 A.2d 548, 551 (1958), quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).
See also In re Dingee's Estate, 35 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. Super. 1944) ("It is the duty of a trustee to
keep the beneficiaries fully informed of his acts.").
In this case, Petitioners will establish that M&T breached its standard of care in
the administration of the Children's and Grandchildren's Trust, that the trusts were damaged, and
that a causal relationship exists between M&T's breaches and the trusts' losses. With regard to
the Children's Trusts, M&T breached its fiduciary duties by, inter alia, conducting a crucial
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meeting without Bushey or Brenner Jr. present as agreed previously and as necessary in light of
Brenner Sr.'s reduced capacity, failing to take reasonable measures to ensure that Brenner Sr.
understood the recommendation being made, failing to provide adequate information about the
rationale for the recommendation, failing to ensure that Brenner Sr. understood what he was
signing, applying improper pressure to obtain Brenner Sr.'s "consent," and acting immediately
upon Brenner Sr.'s purported "consent" without consideration of any of the foregoing.
With regard to the Grandchildren's Trust, M&T breached its fiduciary duties by,
inter alia, contacting Bushey and Brenner Jr. separately and solely by telephone, failing to
provide an adequate explanation of the recommendation being made, failing to explain the
benefits and disadvantages of the recommendation, failing to provide a meaningful opportunity
for Bushey or Brenner Jr. to consider the recommendation and discuss it with each other and
Brenner Sr. before making a decision, applying improper pressure, failing to clearly define the
consent being sought in the conversation with Bushey, and failing to address Brenner Jr.'s
express concern about the stop loss order prior to entering it.
As a result of M&T's breaches, over 160,000 shares of Tyco stock, constituting
100% of the assets in the Children's Trusts and approximately 60% of the assets in the
Grandchildren's Trust, were liquidated in a matter of hours, at the bottom of the market. Had
M&T not breached its fiduciary duties, and had Respondents dealt honestly and fairly with the
co-trustees and reacted to the situation in a calm and deliberate manner, the Tyco shares would
not have been liquidated fi'om the trusts on June 12, 2002.
With regard to both trusts, M&T breached its fiduciary duties by failing to release
the trust assets to the successor trustee so that they could be appropriately reinvested. Had M&T
properly released the funds, they would have been reinvested rather than remaining at M&T in
the form of cash earning a very low rate of return.
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B. Gority and Stauffer Are Liable for Aiding and Abetting M&T's Breaches of Fiduciary
Duty
Pennsylvania courts have only recently recognized a cause of action for aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty. The federal courts were the first to conclude that Pennsylvania
law would recognize this tort. See Stone St. Services, Inc. v. Daniels, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18904 *8 (E.D. Pa.) ("No Pennsylvania state courts have addressed whether a claim for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is actionable in Pennsylvania. However, most
Pennsylvania federal courts have concluded that the state courts would recognize the tort.");
Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp. 2d 351,357 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating similar). The first
Pennsylvania state court to recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
under state law was the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in 2003. See Koken v. Steinberg,
825 A.2d 723,731 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (concluding that aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty falls within the scope of "persons acting in concert" under Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 876 and is a "viable cause of action in Pennsylvania"). Since then, the Court of
Common Pleas has also recognized the cause of action. Sec Lichtman v. Taufer, 2004 WL
1632574 *8 (Pa. Com. P1. July 13, 2004).3
In order to make out a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty
under Pennsylvania law, the following elements must be proven: (1) a breach ora fiduciary duty
owed to another; (2) knowledge of the breach by the aider and abettor, and (3) substantial
assistance or encouragement by the aider and abettor in effecting that breach. See Lichtman,
supra, 2004 WL 1632574 at *8; Koken, supra, 825 A.2d at 732. In this case, M&T committed
3 In their preliminary objections to the Petition, Respondents asked the Court to strike Petitioners'
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary claims against Gority and Stauffer, on the grounds that no
such cause of action existed in Pennsylvania and that Petitioners had failed to state a claim even
if such a cause of action existed. By order dated June 18, 2004, the Honorable Kevin A. Hess,
Jr., rejected Respondent's objection and allowed the claims to proceed, while recognizing that the
facts would have to be developed in order to determine whether a finding of liability was
warranted. Although he reached the same conclusion, it appears that Judge Hess may have been
without the benefit of Koken in making his decision, as neither party cited it to him, and
Lichtman had not yet been decided.
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multiple breaches of fiduciary duty (as discussed in the last section), Gority and Stauffer were
aware of these breaches of fiduciary duty, and Gority and Stauffer acted in concert with each
other and M&T to provide substantial assistance or encouragement in effecting the breaches of
fiduciary duty.
Respondents are expected to argue (as they did in their preliminary objections)
that Gority and Stauffer could not aid and abet their employer's breach since it was effected
through them as M&T's agents. However, while the Pennsylvania courts have not specifically
addressed a situation like this one, courts in other states have allowed plaintiffs to pursue aiders
and abetters who have relationships with the fiduciary. See, e.g., Winer Family Trust v. Queen,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1825 *2-3 n.2 (E.D. Pa.) (identifying one person who was Vice President
of one entity and a director of the other entity, and another person who was associate general
counsel of one entity and director of the other entity, as the parties against whom aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims were asserted); Thompson v. Glenmede Trust Co., 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13675 '1-6 (£.D. Pa.) (identifying corporate officers and certain lawyers as the
parties against whom aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties claims were asserted); Taita
Chem. Co. v. Westlake Styrene, LP, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23671 *5-6 (Sth Cir.); (corporation
allegedly aided and abetted its directors' breaches of fiduciary duty); CCBN.com, Inc. v.
Thomson Financial, Inc., 270 F. Supp.2d 146, 152 (D. Mass. 2003) (recognizing that corporation
could be liable for aiding and abetting broach of fiduciary duty by its employees, who it had
appointed as directors on another corporation's board); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) ("Of course we recognize that one who knowingly joins
with a fiduciary, including corporate officials, in a breach of a fiduciary obligation is liable to the
beneficiaries of the trust relationship.").
By analogy, in the area of respondeat superior liability, it is well-established that
the injured party may make a claim against the agent as well as the principal. See Henkels &
McCoy, Inc. v. Adochio, 138 F.3d 491,493 (3d Cir. 1998); Brennan v. Huber, 112 Pa. Super.
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299, 308-09, 171 A. 122 (1934); see also. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217A cmt. a ("Ia]
principle is jointly and severally liable with the agent for whose tortious conduct he is
responsible"). At least one Pennsylvania court has suggested that respondeat superior principles
may apply to breach of fiduciary duty claims. See In re Papercraf~ 187 B.R. 486, 495 n.7
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd and remanded on other ~rounds, 211 B.R. 813 (W.D. Pa. 1997),
affd, 160 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1998) ("As a matter of law, Muqaddam [the vice president of CVC]
was CVC's agent and, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, CVC is liable for Muqaddam's
breach of fiduciary duty.").
In this case, Respondents Gority and Stauffer acted in concert with one another
and provided substantial assistance to one another and to M&T in breaching M&T's fiduciary
duties regarding the Children's and Grandchildren's Trusts. M&T could not achieve its goal of
diversification in the manner it desired without Gority and Stauffer working together to ensure
that M&T received the superficial "agreement" of its co-trustees to proceed with its plan, even if
it meant taking advantage of Brenner Sr.'s reduced capacity and improperly pressuring the co-
trustees, in breach of M&T's fiduciary duties.
C. Damages
M&T, Gority, and Stauffer are jointly and severally liable for the damages caused
to the trusts by their actions. There is no legal or factual support for Respondents' expected
assertion that Petitioners failed to mitigate damages and/or breached their own fiduciary duties to
the trusts.
1. M&T is Liable for Compensatory Damages
Petitioners are entitled to compensatory relief sufficient to make the trusts whole
for the unauthorized sale of the Tyco shares. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has adopted the
measure of damages recognized in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205, stating:
Restatement § 205 provides, "If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is
chargeable with (a) any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting
from the breach of trust; or (b) any profit made by him through the breach of trust;
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or (c) any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there had been no
breach of trust." Comment (a) explains that in choosing among these three
remedies, the beneficiary has the option of pursuing the remedy that will place
him in the position in which he would have been if the trustee had not committed
the breach.
In re Estate of Scharlaeh, 809 A.2d 376, 386 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 205); see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 208, Illustration to cmt. d ("A bequeaths
shares of stock to B in trust for C and directs him not to sell the shares. B sells the shares for
$10,000. C sues B for breach of trust. At the time of the decree, the shares are worth $12,000.
B is chargeable with $12,000 and the amount of dividends on the shares."); Application of Kettle,
423 N.Y.S.2d 701 (N.Y.A.D. 1979) (ordering trustee to repurchase wrongfully sold shares and
restore to the trusts). In this case, M&T did not have authority to dispose of the trust assets
without the consent of the co-trustees. The trust instruments' appointment of co-trustees would
be meaningless if it were sufficient for the corporate co-trustee to mn roughshod over the
individual co-trustees to acquire superficial indications of "consent," rather than true consent, to
their unilateral investment plans.
Respondents should be ordered to pay damages to restore the trusts to the position
they would have been in had M&T not breached its fiduciary duties. See Scharlach, 809 A.2d at
386. M&T sold a total of 53,807 shares of Tyco stock from the four trusts at $10.2313, and a
total of 107,535 shares of Tyco stock from the four trusts at $8.75. Respondents should pay
damages in the amount of the difference between the price at which the shares were sold, and the
price at which the shares could be purchased on the open market on the date judgment is
entered.4 Respondents should also pay damages for all fees associated with the June 12 sales
transactions. Finally, M&T should be ordered to immediately release the trust assets to the
successor trustee, or else be ordered to pay additional damages for any increase in the open
market price of Tyco between the time judgment is entered and the time the trust assets are
actually released to the successor trustee.
4 For context, the closing price of Tyco stock was $29.78 per share on October 20, 2004.
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2. Gority and Stauffer are Jointly and Severally Liable with M&T
Aiders and abetters are subject to joint and several liability for breach of fiduciary
duty. See Jackson v. Smith, 41 S.Ct. 200 (1921) (stating that persons who knowingly join a
fiduciary in an enterprise that constitutes a breach of his fiduciary duty of trust are jointly and
severally liable for any injury which results); Gotham Partners~ L.P.v. Hallwood Realty Partners~
L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 172 (Del. Supr. 2002) (holding members of the board of directors of the
General Partner jointly and severally liable with the general partner for aiding and abetting the
General Partner's breach of fiduciary duties created by the Partnership Agreement). Compare 70
Pa C.S.A. § 1-503 (Pennsylvania statute imposing joint and several liability on anyone who
materially aids in a act or transaction constituting a violation of certain securities laws); Jairett v.
First Montauk Securities Corp., 153 F.Supp.2d 562, 577 (2001) (citing same).
3. Petitioners Did Not Fail to Mitigate Their Damages
Respondents argue that Petitioners could have mitigated their damages by
repurchasing shares of Tyco stock with the proceeds from the June 12 sale, but refused or failed
to do so. Respondents ignore the fact that M&T had a sell order on Tyco stock. Gority asserts
that he had no investment authority over the trusts as of June 2002, and Stauffer and Klobusicky
have testified that a sell order from M&T's internal analysts is non-discretionary. M&T was also
strongly opposed to the lack of diversification in the trusts prior to June 12, 2002. Petitioners
could not unilaterally reinvest the trust assets in Tyco stock after June 12 (both as a legal matter
because they did not have unilateral investment authority, and as a practical matter because they
did not have physical control of thc assets). It is implausible to suggest that M&T would have
voluntarily agreed to repurchase Tyco shares into the trust accounts at all, let alone reestablish
the entire Tyco position. IfM&T wished to mitigate damages, it should have released the trust
assets to the successor trustee.
4. Petitioners Did Not Damage the Trusts by Retaining Tyco Stock
Respondents assert that Petitioners' failure to diversify the Children's Trusts, or to
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further diversify the Grandchildren's Trust, was manifestly unreasonable and a per se breach of
fiduciary duty. However, Petitioners were not required to diversify under Pennsylvania law.
Pennsylvania does currently have a statute requiring a fiduciary to "reasonably diversify"
investments. See 20 Pa. C.S.A. § 7204(a). However, that statute--which was enacted on June
25, 1999, and made effective December 25, 1999---expressly does not apply to trusts that became
irrevocable before December 25, 1999, even if the tmstee's actions occur after December 25,
1999. See id. at § 7204(b). The Grandchildren's Trust has been irrevocable since its inception in
1994, and the Children's Trusts became irrevocable upon Jane Brenner's death in October 1997.
As such, section 7204% requirement to "reasonably diversify investments" has never applied to
the Children's or Grandchildren's Trusts.
Section 7204 was not made applicable to trusts created prior to its effective date
"because Pennsylvania had not required diversification" prior to December 25, 1999. Official
Comment to 20 Pa. C.S.A. § 7204; see also, e.g., Saeger Estates, 240 Pa. 73, 76 (1940) ("we
conclude that...there is no authority in the law of this State for the doctrine, contended for by
appellants, that trust investments, otherwise legal and entirely proper under all the recognized
standards, are necessarily improvident per se for any claimed lack of proper diversification").
Moreover, Pennsylvania law has always recognized the uniqueness of inception assets, and has
continued to do so by expressly exempting inception assets fi.om the diversification requirement
of § 7204. See 20 Pa. C.S.A. § 7205 ("Retention of inception assets") (stating that "[al fiduciary,
in the exercise of reasonable care, skill and caution, may retain any asset received in kind, even
though the asset constitutes a disproportionately large share of the portfolio"); see also Estate of
Pew, 440 Pa. Super. 195,240 (1994) ("The mere retention of stocks which the trustee received
from the settler is not, in itself, negligence. Especially when such stocks have produced a high
rate of return for the trust over an extended number of years."); Trust of Munro, 373 Pa. Super.
448, 453 (1988) ("Where the trustee is authorized to retain certain stock, an exceptant to the
trustee's account has the burden of proving that retention of the stock was negligent.").
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Petitioners had no duty to sell Tyco shares simply to diversify the trusts.
Petitioners properly considered relevant factors, including those identified in Pennsylvania's
prudent investor rule, in deciding to retain the respective concentrations of Tyco shares in the
Children's and Grandchildren's Trusts. See 20 PA C.S.A. § 7203. With regard to the
Grandchildren's Trust in particular, Article IV of the trust instrument specifically releases the
trustees from "all responsibility and obligation to dispose of any portion of the AMP, Inc. stock
by reason of the concentration of investments of the Trusts in the stock of one corporation," and
Bushey and Brenner Jr. had already diversified that trust by agreeing to sell 40% of the Tyco
shares in 1999.
The Brenner family's investments in Tyco stock, both generally and specifically in
the trusts, had proven a wise investment over the years. Cf. Pev~, supra, 440 Pa. Super. at 241
("Over the long haul, the decisions of the original trustees and the co-successor trustees to
continue to fund the trust principal with the Sun Company common stock and later the Oryx
common stock has proven to be a wise decision."). Under the circumstances, it would have been
virtually impossible for Petitioners to have sought a surcharge of M&T for failure to diversify the
trust assets. It is similarly inappropriate for M&T to seek to essentially surcharge Petitioners for
retaining the inception assets in the trust. It is also illogical to the extent that the trust assets
would have continued to perform well, as they had historically, but for Respondents' decision to
force through their own investment plan, at the worst possible time, regardless of the views of the
co-trustees.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing facts, which will be proven at hearing, and the cited legal
authority, Petitioners respectfully ask the Auditor to recommend to the Court that Respondent
M&T be surcharged for its breaches of fiduciary duty, that Respondents Gority and Stauffer be
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held jointly and severally liable for aiding and abetting M&T's breaches of fiduciary duty, and
that Respondent M&T be ordered to release the trust assets to the successor trustee.
DATED this 21st day of October, 2004.
TONKON TORP
Wil~liam F. tt(,lartson, Jr., OSB No. 72163
Robyn E. Ridler, OSB No. 00016
Attorneys for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
! hereby certify that I served the foregoing HEARING BRIEF on:
Mark D. Bradshaw
Stevens & Lee
P. O. Box 11670
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1670
Of Attorneys for Respondents
[] by mailing a copy thereof in a sealed, first-class postage prepaid envelope,
addressed to each attorney's last-known address and depositing in the U.S. mail at Portland,
Oregon on the date set forth below;
[] by causing a copy thereof to be hand-delivered to said attorneys at each
attorney's last-known office address on the date set forth below;
[~by sending a copy thereof via overnight courier in a sealed, prepaid envelope,
addressed to each attorney's last-known address on the date set forth below; or
[] by faxing a copy thereof to each attorney at each attorney's last-known
facsimile number on the date set forth below.
DATED this 21 st day of October, 2004.
TONKON TORP I~I~p
William F. Martson, Jr., OSB No. 72163
Robyn E. Ridler, OSB No. 00016
Attorneys for Petitioners
031590~0001 ~595304 VO01
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