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HomeMy WebLinkAbout09-6263IN THE COUIRT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL DIVISION ROYCE BROWN 400 E. King St., #2 Shippensburg, PA 17257 Plaintiff, Case No.109-4,2&3 Civil Term V. Civil Action LORI WHITE and RICHARD C. WHITE 9526 Cumberland Hwy. Pleasant Hall, PA 17246 Defendants. PRAECIPE FOR WRIT OF SUMMONS TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF SAID COURT: Please issue summons in the above case. Writ of Summons shall be issued and forwarded to Sheriff. Date: /Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Es e 402 Grant Avenue Leechburg, PA 15656 412-855-6598 attorney.pascal@gmail.com Supreme Ct. I.D. No. 90872 WRIT OF SUMMONS TO: Lori White and Richard C. White YOU ARE NOTIFIED THAT THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF S COMMENCED ACTION AGAINST YOU. Prothonotary Date: 7 by 4 11 Deputy (:;P) RL.EQ-,:)? 'HCE OF ?tics: ?'!0TARY 2009 SEID i 7 FM 2* 29 F78.s?v??A, ( ?? :2307/3 Sheriffs Office of Cumberland County R Thomas Kline Sheriff Ronny R Anderson Chief Deputy 4titi„to aiu,rrbrrt1114 FILF-D-rORCE OF THE F^07104%10TARY 2009 OCT -5 AN 11: O3 Jody S Smith Civil Process Sergeant Edward L Schorpp Solicitor Royce Brown vs. Lori White Case Number 2009-6263 SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE 09/17/2009 R. Thomas Kline, Sheriff who being duly sworn according to law states that he made a diligent search and inquiry for the within named defendant, to wit: Lori White, but was unable to locate her in his bailiwick. He therefore deputized the Sheriff of Franklin County, PA to serve the within Writ of Summons according to law. 09/17/2009 R. Thomas Kline, Sheriff who being duly sworn according to law states that he made a diligent search and inquiry for the within named defendant, to wit: Richard C. White, but was unable to locate him in his bailiwick. He therefore deputized the Sheriff of Franklin County, PA to serve the within Writ of Summons oo?? according to law. X9428/2009 02:30 PM - Franklin County Return: And now September 28, 2009 at 1430 hours I, Dane Anthony, Sheriff of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, do herby certify and return that I served a true copy of the within Writ of Summons, upon the within named defendant, to wit: Lori White by making known unto Richard White, adult in charge at 9526 Cumberland Highway Pleasant Hall, PA 17246 its contents and at the same time handing to him personally the said true and correct copy of the same. 128/2009 02:30 PM - Franklin County Return: And now September 28, 2009 at 1430 hours I, Dane Anthony, Sheriff of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, do herby certify and return that I served a true copy of the within Writ of Summons, upon the within named defendant, to wit: Richard C. White by making known unto himself personally, at 9526 Cumberland Highway Pleasant Hall, PA 17246 its contents and at the same time handing to him personally the said true and correct copy of the same. SHERIFF COST: $44.44 SO ANSWERS, October 02, 2009 R THOMAS KLINE, SHERIFF FILE% .~A~~_.~~r~`F i ~~ ~ ~. E":.. "R'l~Y Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Esquire Pa. I.D. #90872 402 Grant Avenue Leechburg, Pennsylvania 15656 (412) 855-6598 attorney.pascal@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiff 1DIQ.1t~L -I ~;~§ II~ ~9 ~. ROYCE BROWN, Plaintiff, v. LORI WHITE and RICHARD WHITE Defendants. TO: Defendants c~:r~ ~:~ ;~:;~ ;~N~ ~. ` p,;p IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No.09-6263-CIVIL CIVIL ACTION-LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NOTICE TO DEFEND You have been sued in Court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Complaint and Notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney, and filing in writing with the Court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court without further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any claim or relief requested by the plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE OR KNOW A LAWYER, THEN YOU SHOULD GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP: CUMBERLAND COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 34 S. Bedford Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 717-249-3166 Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Esquire Pa. I.D. #90872 402 Grant Avenue Leechburg, Pennsylvania 15656 (412) 855-6598 attorney.pascal@gmail.com ROYCE BROWN, Plaintiff, v. LORI WHITE and RICHARD WHITE Defendants. Attorney for Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No.09-6263-CIVIL CIVIL ACTION-LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED COMPLAINT IN CIVIL ACTION AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, Royce Brown, by and through his counsel, Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Esquire, and files this Complaint in Civil Action, and states as follows: 1. The Plaintiff, Royce Brown, is an adult individual residing at 400 East King Street, Shippensburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, 17257. 2. The Defendant, Lori White, is an adult individual residing at 95 Shippensburg Mobile, Shippensburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, 17257. 3. The Defendant, Richard White, is an adult individual residing at 9526 Cumberland Highway, Post Office Box B, Pleasant Hall, Franklin County, Pennsylvania 17246. FACTS 4. On or about September 25, 2007, the Defendant, Lori White, was driving a 1994 Geo Tracker owned by the Defendant, Richard White, east on East King Street in Shippensburg Borough, Cumberland County. At the intersection of East King Street and Queen Street, Shippensburg Borough, the Defendant, Lori White, illegally drove through a steady red light, straight through said intersection traveling east, at which time she veered from her lane of travel and struck a legally parked vehicle (2007 Ford F-150 Supercrew XLT) owned by the Plaintiff, Royce Brown, pushing said vehicle into another legally parked vehicle (1994 Jeep), also owned by the Plaintiff, Royce Brown. 6. The impact of the White vehicle with the vehicle owned by Brown was with such force that it caused the White vehicle to roll over and come to rest on its roof. 7. Upon investigation, the Shippensburg Borough Police determined that the Defendant, Lori White, was driving while under the influence of both alcohol and one or more controlled substances, and charged her criminally with Driving Under the Influence and other Vehicle Code violations. 8. Both vehicles owned by Brown, a 2007 Ford F-150 Supercrew XLT pickup truck, and a 1994 Jeep were damaged by the collision. 9. At the time of the damage caused by White, the 2007 Ford F-150 Supercrew XLT owned by Brown had approximately 7789 miles on it. 10. The damage to the 2007 Ford F-150 Supercrew XLT owned by Brown required repairs totaling $19,592.22. COUNTI Vs. Defendant Lori White flVegligence-Resulting in Harm to Chattels) 11. The averments of paragraphs 1-10 are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully stated herein. 12. The Defendant, Lori White, operated a motor vehicle in a negligent, careless and reckless manner, in that she was driving under the influence, ran a red light, failed to remain in her traffic lane, and struck the parked vehicle owned by the Plaintiff. 13. The Defendant, Lori White, failed to exercise due care, diligence or ordinary and common prudence in her driving, and her driving was outside of the standard of care expected of drivers on our highways. 14. The negligence of the Defendant was the cause of the damage to the property of the Plaintiff. 15. As a result of the negligence of the Defendant, Lori White, the Plaintiff suffered diminution in the value of his 2007 Ford F-150 Supercrew XLT pickup truck. 16. Even following the $19,592.22 repair to said vehicle, the Plaintiff was not made whole; to the contrary, the value of the vehicle after repair was substantially reduced from the pre-impact value of the vehicle as a result of the Defendant's actions. 17. The fair market value of the Plaintiff's 2007 F-150 Supercrew XLT prior to the impact caused by the Defendant was $25,675.00. See exhibit A. 18. The fair market value of the Plaintiff's 2007 F-150 Supercrew XLT following the impact, and following the repairs, was $16,690.00. See exhibit A. 19. Thus, the diminution in the value of the vehicle suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendant's negligence was $8,985.00. See exhibit A. 20. The Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for harm to his chattel, not amounting to the difference between the value of the chattel before the harm and the value after the harm or, at his election in an appropriate case, the reasonable cost of repair or restoration, with due allowance for any difference between the original value and the value after repairs. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 928. 21. Therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to the allowance for the difference between the original value and the value after repairs, which, to date, has not been compensated. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment in his favor, and against Defendant, in the amount of $8,985.00 plus interest and costs. COUNT II Vs. Defendant Richard White 1Negligent Entrustment Resulting in Harm to Chattels) 22. The averments of paragraphs 1-22 are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully stated herein. 23. The Defendant, Richard White, entrusted the Defendant, Lori White, with his vehicle on or about September 27, 2007. 24. The Defendant, Richard White, did not use reasonable care in entrusting said vehicle to Lori White, in that he did not assure that Lori White would drive said vehicle in a safe and legal manner. 25. The Defendant, Richard White, did not use reasonable care in entrusting said vehicle to Lori White, in that he did not assure that Lori White would drive said vehicle while not under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. 26. Richard White acted in a negligent manner by entrusting said vehicle to Lori White, in part because it was reasonably foreseeable that Lori White would operate said vehicle in a negligent and illegal manner, and that Lori White would drive said vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or controlled substances. 27. Richard White knew or should have known that it was reasonably foreseeable that Lori White may operate his vehicle in an unsafe, unlawful, negligent, or reckless manner if entrusted with said vehicle. 28. Richard White knew or should have known that it was reasonably foreseeable that Lori White may operate his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance if entrusted with said vehicle. 29. It was reasonably foreseeable in September, 2007 to Richard White that Lori White would drive while under the influence of alcohol and/or controlled substances, in violation of the Vehicle Code, if entrusted with a motor vehicle in that Lori White had been arrested and criminally charged in May, 2007 and again in August, 2007 with possession of controlled substances. 30. Richard White was otherwise familiar with Lori White and that Lori White had problems with alcohol and drug abuse. 31. As the owner of the vehicle, Richard White is otherwise responsible for the actions of, and damage caused by, Lori White. 32. As a proximate result of Richard White's actions, Lori White caused damage to Plaintiffs Ford F-150 Supererew XLT pickup truck, resulting in the need for substantial repair. 33. Even following the $19,592.22 repair to said vehicle, the Plaintiff was not made whole; to the contrary, the value of the vehicle after repair was substantially reduced from the pre-impact value of the vehicle as a result of the Defendant's actions. 34. The fair market value of the Plaintiff's 2007 F-150 Supercrew XLT prior to the impact caused by the Defendant was $25,675.00. See exhibit A. 35. The fair market value of the Plaintiffs 2007 F-150 Supercrew XLT following the impact, and following the repairs, was $16,690.00. See exhibit A. 36. Thus, the diminution in the value of the vehicle suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendant's negligence was $8,985.00. See exhibit A. 37. The Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for harm to his chattel, not amounting to the difference between the value of the chattel before the harm and the value after the harm or, at his election in an appropriate case, the reasonable cost of repair or restoration, with due allowance for any difference between the original value and the value after repairs. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 928. 38. Therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to the allowance for the difference between the original value and the value after repairs, which, to date, has not been compensated. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment in his favor, and against Defendant, in the amount of $8,985.00 plus interest and costs. Respectfully submitted, Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Esq it Attorney for Plaintiff Collision Claim Associates, inc. P.t). Box 1734 Cumming, GA 30828 Phone - 778-887-762fi Uwner. Royce Brown Address: 480 E. King St, Apt 2 Shippensburg, PA 97257 Customer Number: 15280 Date Prepared: '8/2!2008 Vin#: 1P'TPVY14V37FA16337 Doors: 4 Roar Year. 2007 Trans: Automatic Make: Ford Eng Cyt: 8 CYL Model: F-1.58 Color.: Red. Series:. SupercrewXLT Mileage: 7789 F{~Ir Nlartcat Value is defined as tfie amount at which-the property vrould change hands between a wiping buyer and a willing seller, each being under no pressuro to buy or sell and etch being aware of'relevant facts. Pre-Damage Vehicle Value - $25,675,00 Cause of Damage: Collision Date of Damage: 9/Z5/2007 Point of impact: Rear Left Cost:~f Repairs:= $19,592.23 'this is the expected value of the veFiiGe with disclosure or discovery of the nature, location and extent of-the damage. This. amount does noftake into consideration additional reductions due to repair quality issues. Post Repair Vehicle 1/alue = $1 fi,690,00 This fs the expected diminished value. This figure represents the average loss of market value of your vehicle w&h discovery or disclosure of the damage sustained. Inherent Diminished Value=:$$,985.00 4 Copyrighf 2008 Collision Claim Associates, Inc. All. Rights Reserved. Dupiicadon in whole orin partis strictly prohibited. Weassume nd responsibiNtyforerrors, omissions or outcomes. ~~. ~i; i~ ~ '~ 111u~~' fi' ~~ jj ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ fa.-~r AnnratserCredentiais -Richard Hixenbaugh has personally written over 115,000 vehicle appraisals including; Damage Appraisals, Total Loss Value Appraisals, Value Appraisals of AntiquelClassic/FxoticVeh~cles and Diminished Value Appraisals. I have been qualified in numerous courts of law as an expert witness in this field. l have completed courses in total loss i~ppraisalL and diminished value appraisal offered by the tntemational Soclety of Appraisers and I am ASE Certified in Collision Qamage,Analysis. tnherent i]iminishetl Value is the sudden and unforeseen. loss of value. of a vehicle dt~e to having sustained collision damage and subsequent repair's; This is not'to be confused with normal depreraation .that occurs to a vehicle over Gme, Inhererrt diminished value assumes that the vehiciehas.been repaired to industry standards. Although vehicle repair technology is of a high level, there is still a difference between the manufacturing process and the repair process. Consumers generally believe that a vehicle damaged by collision wilt never be the same and has a stigma that renders it less valuable than a similar vehicle with no damage history. With most states requiring disclosure of collision..damage, airbag deployment and significant refinish work, as well as consumers having access to vehicle history reports, a vehicle's damage history will fdlow the vehicle wherever. it goes. As a result, consumers wiN not pay the same price for a`wrecked and repaired vehicle as theywill for a vehicle with no damage history. Inherent Diminished Value is nova quality of repair issue of a specrfic vehicle. It is a doss of value based on general public perception that a vehicle repaired by a bodyshop is not in exactly the same condition as prior to the collision, thafthe refinish work done is not as good: as that done by the manufacturer and that the structural integrity of the .vehicle. may have been compromised. As'a result of these perceptions, a collision-damaged. vehicle will suffer from a loss of value perception and'therefore a loss of matketabfity, which translates into a lower value. Fair Market Value: is defined as the. amount at which the property Would change hands between a vuilling buyer and a willing seller, each being'under no pressure to buy or sell and teach being aware of relevant facts. Calfisicn history is a relev~t fact Research indicatesthat severely damaged and,repaired vehicles can lose as much as 40°10 of<their pre damage value, even with quality repairs. C?f course, the amount of value lost by a particular vehicle is dependent on many factors, such as the year, make, model, location of damage and the extent ofidamage, 1t has been determined that 43% of consumers would not even consider purchasing a vehicle with a moderate io severe damage history regardless of the price. Many states require disclosure of damage at`the time of sale. As a result of these disclosure requirements,: dealers would send these vehicles to auction rather than incurthe risk. of having them on their tot forextended periods of time. Vehicle dues are basedon the perceution of the buying aubiic The`fac# that a vehicle has been damaged and`repaired will have a negative effec# on its value.. Mast consumers today utilize numerous information sources when mafdng a purohasing declsion. With the creation of several Internet based vehicle history reporting companies, such as CARFAX, i# is easier than .ever before to research the history of a vehicle. Most dealerships' wili simply refuse to accepttrade-ins with a damage history due to state damage disclosure laws and liability concerns. In some cases where previously damaged and repaired vehicles are accepted as trade-ins they are simply sent to auction for disposal. Even at auction, there are requirements for disclosure of structural :damage or air bag deployment. This means that the auctioneer must make an announcement of this kind of damage when the vehicle enters. the auction lane. in addition to this announcement, a yellow light is turned on indicating caution to any potential bidders. Sincerely, 2t1~.f~~~lla~ll~~ ASE: Certified Senior Appraiser RJ Cbpyright2008 CdGsion Claim Associates, inc. All Rights Reserved. Duplication ~ whole or in part isstricdy prohibited. We assume no responsibility for errors, omissions oroutcomes. VERIFICATION I verify that I am the plaintiff in the within action, and that the statements of fact made in this Complaint are true and correct to the best of my krnowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. DATE: ~ Royce own VERIFICATION I verify that the Plaintiff is unavailable to sign the verification in this matter within the time allowed for filing of this Complaint, and that I have sufficient knowledge, information and belief to verify the statements of fact in the within Complaint. T'he source of said information is from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has authorized the signing of said verification on his behalf. Upon receipt of the Verification signed by the Plaintiff, the same will be filed with the Court. Date: f~~~ ~ --(~`tc Charles A. Pascal, r., Esqui CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the within Complaint was served on the following by depositing the same in the United States Mail, first class postage prepaid, on this, the 30~' day of June, 2010, addressed as follows: Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire Johnson, Duffie, Stewart & Weidner 301 Market Street P. O. Box 109 Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Defendants Respectfully submitted, Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Esquire ~i! ~D'OFFiCE o~ s~~~ ~r~o~I~aA~~at~.~~ Johnson, Duffie, Stewart & Weidner By: Jefferson J. Shipman I.D. No. 51785 ' 301 Market Street P. O. Box 109 Lemoyne, Pennsylvania 17043-0109 (717) 761-4540 jjs@jdsw.com ROYCE BROWN, Plaintiff v. LORI WHITE and RICHARD WHITE, Defendants 2~l0 C~CT 14 PN ! ~ ! ~~~~=t~'~f~~~~nts S~F~~t~SY~.VAl~6~~ IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 09-6263 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION -LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NOTICE TO PLEAD TO: Royce Brown c/o Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Esquire 402 Grant Avenue Leechburg, PA 15656 AND NOW, this 13th day of October, 2010, you are hereby notified to plead responsively within twenty (20) days of the date of service hereof, or judgment may be entered against you. JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER J ff n J. Ship n :406639 Johnson, Duffie, Stewart & Weidner By: Jefferson J. Shipman 1. D. No. 51785 301 Market Street P. O. Box 109 Lemoyne, Pennsylvania 17043-0109 (717) 761-4540 jjs@jdsw.com ROYCE BROWN, Plaintiff Attorneys for Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 09-6263 CIVIL v. CIVIL ACTION -LAW LORI WHITE and RICHARD WHITE, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendants ANSWER AND NEW MATTER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND NOW, come the Defendants, Lori White and Richard White, by and through their counsel, Jefferson J. Shipman and Johnson, Duffle, Stewart & Weidner and file the following Answer and New Matter to Plaintiff's Complaint: 1. Admitted upon information and belief. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted in Part. Denied in Part. It is admitted only that the accident occurred at or near the intersection of East King Street and Queen Street in Shippensburg when Defendant's vehicle made contact with Plaintiff's vehicles. The remaining averments of paragraph 5 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. 6. Admitted in Part. Denied in Part. 1t is admitted only that the Defendant's vehicle came to rest on its roof. The remaining averments of paragraph 6 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. 7. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 7 are irrelevant conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. 8. Admitted upon information and belief. 9. Denied. After a reasonable investigation, the Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained in paragraph 9 and the same are therefore denied and strict proof is demanded at the time of trial. 10. Denied. After a reasonable investigation, the Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained in paragraph 10 and the same are therefore denied and strict proof is demanded at the time of trial. COUNTI Plaintiff v. Defendant Lori White (Negligence -Resulting in Harm to Chattels) 11. Ms. White incorporates herein by reference her answers to paragraphs 1 through 10 above as though fully set forth herein at length. 12. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 12 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 13. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 13 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 14. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 14 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 15. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 15 are conclusions of iaw and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 16. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 16 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 17. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 17 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 18. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 18 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 19. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 19 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 20. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 20 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. tf a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 21. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 21 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. WHEREFORE, the Defendant Lori White respectfully requests that judgment be entered in her favor and the Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. COUNT II Plaintiff v. Defendant Richard White (Negligent Entrustment -Resulting in Harm to Chattels) 22. Defendant Richard White incorporates herein by reference the answers to paragraphs 1 through 22 above as though fully set forth herein at length. 23. Admitted. 24. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 24 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 25. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 25 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 26. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 26 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 27. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 27 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 28. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 28 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 29. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 29 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 30. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 30 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 31. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 31 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 32. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 32 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. if a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 33. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 33 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 34. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 34 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 35. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 35 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. 1f a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 36. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 36 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 37. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 37 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required, the averments contained therein are specifically denied. 38. Denied. The averments contained in paragraph 38 are conclusions of law and fact to which no response is required. If a response is deemed to be required; the averments contained therein are specifically denied. WHEREFORE, the Defendant Richard White respectfully requests that judgment be entered in his favor and the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. NEW MATTER 39. That Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against the Defendants. 40. That Pennsylvania does not recognize diminished value. 41. That Plaintiff s vehicle should have been totaled. 42. That the Plaintiff is only entitled to the lesser of cost to repair or replacement. 43. That the Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. WHEREFORE, the Defendants Lori White and Richard White respectfully request that judgment be entered in their favor and the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER B. J ffe son J. Shipm n Attorney I.D. No. 51785 301 Market Street P.O. Box 109 Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109 Telephone (717) 761-4540 Date: October 13, 2010 Attorneys for Defendants :406639 VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO PA. R.C.P. NO.10241c) Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire, states that he is the attorney for the parties filing the foregoing Answer and New Matter to Plaintiffs Complaint, that he makes this affidavit as an attorney, because the parties he represents are outside of the jurisdiction of the court and their verification cannot be obtained within the time allowed for filing this pleading; and that he has sufficient knowledge or information and belief, based upon his investigation of the matters averred or denied in the foregoing document; and that this statement. is made subject to the pena{ties of 18 Pa. C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Jeff so .Shipman squire Date: October 13, 2010 . r CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND N4W, this 13~~ day of October, 2010, the undersigned does hereby certify that she did this date serve a copy of the foregoing document upon the other parties of record by causing same to be deposited in the United States Mail, first class postage prepaid, at Lemoyne, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Esquire 402 Grant Avenue Leechburg, PA 15656 JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER By: Mic ele E. eff :aossss rna- rte . ;?D G-) "Urn = {J} 2 t: --E C) C=? ID ROYCE BROWN, V. Plaintiff LORI WHITE and RICHARD WHITE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 09-6263 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendants ORDER '/ AND NOW, this SY day of NU 4 0S T , 2011, upon consideration of the foregoing Defendants' Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Answers to Discovery, it is ORDERED that the Plaintiff shall provide answers to the Defendants' Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents within twenty (20) days of this Order. Failure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4019. BY THE COURT: r J. e0pu, M ? Distribution 814,W Jefferson J. Shipman, 301 Market Street, P. O. Box 109, Lemoyne, PA 17043; Tel. (717) 761- 4540; Fax (717) 761-3015; jjs@jdsw.com. Charles A. Pascal, Jr., 402 Grant Avenue, Leechburg, PA 15656; Tel. (412) 855-6598; attorney. pascal@gmail. com. ROYCE BROWN, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. LORI WHITE and RICHARD WHITE, DEFENDANT NO. 09-6263 CIVIL ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 3d day of January, 2012, upon consideration of the Motion for Sanctions filed by the Defendants and no response being filed by the Plaintiff, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendants' Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED. The Plaintiff's cause of action is DISMISSED with prejudice. By the Court, . N--? ??A\/ M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. /Charles A. Pascal, Jr., Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff c C= -X)z Z.3 /Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire xr" Attorney for Defendants Ca Qty , z bas Oxple5 ma:lod Ir3fis =C) t v3