HomeMy WebLinkAbout09-6864
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717) 421-3215
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION - LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa.
Plaintiff
VS.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
1331 Sconsett Way,
New Cumberland, Pa.
Defendant
THOMAS BEENE
27 Fort Street
Lemoyne, Pa.
CIVIL ACTION,
NO.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Defendant
NOTICE
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the
claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after
this Complaint and notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by
attorney and filing in writing with the court your defenses or objections to the claims set
forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed
without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court without
further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or
relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights
important to you.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF
YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET
FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION
ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER.
IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY
BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES
THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A
REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.
Cumberland County Bar Association
32 South Bedford Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-3166
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717) 421-3215
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION - LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. CIVIL ACTION,
Plaintiff
NO. 4y- 6,F6'1 -7 u
vs.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
1331 Sconsett Way,
New Cumberland, Pa.
Defendant
THOMAS BEENE
27 Fort Street
Lemoyne, Pa.
Defendant
COMPLAINT
Petitioner, Margaret M. Stuski, by her attorney undersigned below, hereby petitions this
Court as follows:
1. Plaintiff Margaret M. Stuski (hereinafter Plaintiff) is an adult individual residing
at 908 Walnut Street, Wormleysburg, Pa., 17043.
2. Defendant Sheryl Delozier (hereinafter Delozier) is an adult individual residing at
1331 Sconsett Way, New Cumberland, Pa., 17070.
3. Defendant Thomas Beene (hereinafter Beene) is an adult individual residing at 27
Fort Street, Lemoyne, Pa., 17043.
4. Delozier was a candidate for State Representative for the 88 h district seat
covering Lemoyne, New Cumberland, Lower Allen, Upper Allen, Monroe,
Shiremanstown, Mechanicsburg and Wormleysburg in Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania.
5. Delozier narrowly won the Republican Primary in a seven way contest.
6. Beginning in November, 2007, Beene was and still is employed by the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in the Office of Legislative Affairs.
7. Delozier was employed by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in the
office of Commissioner Kim Pizzigrilli.
8. Commissioner Kim Pizzigrilli is a Republican that was appointed by former
Governor Tom Ridge, a Republican.
9. At the time, it was uncertain as to whether Commissioner Pizzigrilli would be
reappointed under Governor Edward G. Rendell, a Democrat.
10. Under this cloud of uncertainty regarding her position at the PUC, Delozier made
the decision to run for the State House seat.
11. As early as November 2007, Beene started working on Delozier's behalf in order
to secure her the State House seat.
12. Delozier did not resign her position at the PUC until on or about January 2008.
13. Delozier and Beene acted together to try to determine who the Democratic
candidate would be and to discourage Plaintiff from running.
14. Plaintiff announced her candidacy after the then incumbent legislator announced
his retirement.
15. Beene immediately began circulating a-mails to Democratic Area Leaders,
Democratic Committeemen and other volunteers looking for an alternative candidate to
Plaintiff.
16. Plaintiff was unopposed in the Democratic primary.
17. Plaintiff was the endorsed Democratic candidate for State Representative for the
88th district seat.
18. Beene e-mailed Plaintiff and said he would give her money to not run in this race.
19. When the offer was refused, Mr. Beene engaged in an e-mail campaign to
discredit Plaintiff, promote falsehoods concerning her residency and other facts and to
actively discourage individuals from supporting Plaintiff.
20. Beene continued as Democratic Area Leader for Lemoyne and Wormleysburg,
despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier.
21. Beene has never been elected nor been appointed a Democratic Committeeman in
Lemoyne.
22. Beene became a volunteer coordinator for the Clinton campaign and drove on the
campaign's behalf in exchange for free tickets to the Clinton/Obama Forum at Messiah
College, despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier.
23. After the primary, Beene sought to be the volunteer coordinator for the Obama
campaign, despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier.
24. Beene attended Executive Committee Meetings of the Cumberland County
Democratic Party, despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier.
25. As a candidate, Plaintiff was invited to these meetings and asked to provide
updates on her campaign.
26. This situation was stressful and awkward for Plaintiff due to the animosity
demonstrated by Beene.
27. Beene donated money to Republican Delozier's campaign, despite being a
Democratic Area Party leader.
28. Beene wrote a letter to the editor supporting Delozier which was published in the
Patriot-News after Plaintiff received that paper's endorsements.
29. Beene made false statements in that letter in that he stated that he had worked
with Plaintiff before when in fact, he had never worked with Plaintiff and was constantly
hostile to Plaintiff, thereby alluding to knowledge he did not possess.
30. Plaintiff had previously disagreed with Beene when, despite being an Area
Democratic Leader, he sent out an e-mail urging support for a Republican friend of his
who was running for Wormleysburg Council.
31. Beene's job entails working with the Pennsylvania Legislature and the House of
Representatives in particular.
32. A great amount of legislation affecting the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission is handled by the House of Representative Consumer Affairs Committee.
33. Delozier upon her election now serves on the State House Consumer Affairs
Committee. Beene has attended several of these meetings as part of his job.
34. Plaintiff was vocal in her criticism of the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, where both Delozier and Beene worked, prior to her race for State
Representative for the PUC's failure to examine the finances of a public utility and its
for-profit subsidiaries in determining a rate case.
35. Plaintiff was also vocal during her campaign of the failure of the PUC to keep
staff salaries in line and the lack of enforcement by the PUC to address water and sewer
issues.
36. Beene attended the West Shore Chamber of Commerce legislative forums to see
Delozier and Plaintiff address issues during business hours.
37. Beene also attended the placing of the Lemoyne sign during business hours.
38. Delozier worked in the Governors' Office during the Ridge/Schweiker
administration.
39. At one point, Delozier was in charge of gubernatorial nominations to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Boards and Commissions.
40. Delozier nominated herself, her father and her husband to boards and
commissions.
41. Delozier also nominated a co-worker and friend who worked in the Governor's
office, Joseph Deklinski, to a Pennsylvania Board.
42. Both Delozier's father and her husband were successfully appointed to
Pennsylvania boards.
43. Joseph Deklinski was successfully appointed to the board of Kutztown University
from which he graduated.
44. Plaintiff truthfully represented these facts regarding Delozier in a mailing to
voters in the 88th District.
45. Delozier reacted badly, including making disparaging remarks about Plaintiff at a
Ron Paul forum.
46. Delozier's sister-in-law attempted to intimidate Plaintiff by facial expressions and
loud remarks in the audience at this forum.
47. Delozier then mailed a campaign piece containing false and misleading statements
using a white envelope to voters in the 88 h District days before the election.
48. The piece accused plaintiff of being untruthful, having a troubled record, not
being fit for elected office as judged by a panel of her peers, and being unpredictable.
This campaign piece is attached as Exhibit A.
49. The piece also stated that plaintiff was a car dealer citing a newspaper article that
was incorrect.
50. Plaintiff has never been a licensed car dealer in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania nor has she owned an interest in a car dealership.
51. Delozier's brother-in-law, Mr. Delozier, on Election Day made derogatory
comments to Plaintiff's sister.
52. Mr. Delozier stated that minority voters were Plaintiff s sister's votes and he
stated that "we have to cut the grass over there" referencing the low-income housing in
that precinct.
53. Plaintiff did not win the election.
54. Plaintiff lost the election by approximately 5000 votes.
55. Delozier's mailing was so vicious and vile that it influenced at least 2500 people
to vote against Plaintiff.
56. Delozier's mailings generated comments on the internet blogs of the two
newspapers covering the 88th District.
57. The blogs also influenced the election results.
58. A change of less than 5000 votes in favor of Plaintiff would have meant victory.
59. Plaintiff's livelihood as an attorney and officer of the court is dependent on her
reputation for truthfulness.
60. Plaintiff seeks to have her reputation restored and to set the record straight
regarding the falsehoods which Defendants Delozier and Beene have made and repeated.
61. The damage from the false statements has continued as Karen Deklinski, the wife
of Republican committeeman Joseph Deklinski, repeated the false statements in May
2009 at Plaintiff's Wormleysburg polling place.
62. Defendants Delozier and Beene have spread their falsehoods and slander as
widely as they could.
63. The recipients of defendant Delozier and Beene's falsehoods and slander include
Delozier's brother in law, Mr. Delozier, Delozier's sister in law, as well as Joseph
Deklinski and Karen Deklinski in addition to the residents of the 88" district.
64. Plaintiff is a Wormleysburg Borough council candidate and an elected
Democratic committeewoman and the repetition of the false claims continues to injure
her reputation, defame her character and seeks to thwart her candidacy for borough
council.
COUNTI
Defendant Sheryl Delozier's Mispresentations Concerning Plaintiffs Fitness for
Elective Office and the Meaning of the Bar Association Ratings Constituted
Libel Against Plaintiff
65. Paragraphs 1 through 64 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
66. In defendant Delozier's campaign piece, Delozier stated that plaintiff was not
qualified for elective office based on a panel of her peers. (No. 3 on Exhibit A).
67. The Pennsylvania Bar Association has provided the public service of reviewing
candidates for judicial election.
68. On or about 1994 or 1995, plaintiff filed nominating papers to run for Justice of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
69. Plaintiff publicly stated that her candidacy was to comment on the recent
impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen on which she served on the
Impeachment Committee staff as counsel for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
70. Plaintiff went through the interview process with the Pennsylvania Bar
Association.
71. In the meantime, a challenge was made to the petitions of Plaintiff and it was
determined that due to a change in voting boundaries, Plaintiff did not get enough
signatures in the required number of counties, although she did get enough overall
signatures.
72. Plaintiff s name was stricken from the ballot and she was not a candidate at that
time.
73. The Pennsylvania Bar Association website, which is publicly available, explains
the rating system as follows:
RATINGS' DEFINITIONS
Highly Recommended: The candidate possesses the highest combination of
legal ability, experience, integrity and temperament and would be capable of
outstanding performance as a judge or justice of the court for which he/she is a
candidate.
Recommended: Based on legal ability, experience, integrity and temperament,
the candidate would be able to perform satisfactorily as a judge or justice of the
court for which he/she is a candidate.
Not Recommended: Based on legal ability, experience, integrity or
temperament, or any combination thereof, at the present time, the candidate is
inadequate to perform satisfactorily as a judge or justice of the court for which
he/she is a candidate.
74. Ms. Frances Deluca, one of the reviewers, has stated that plaintiff did not get the
endorsement to be a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice solely based on her having
only ten years of legal experience at the time of the review.
75. The ratings were done in 1995, thirteen years prior, and were not relevant to the
2008 legislative election.
76. Defendant Delozier's statement in the campaign piece was a statement of fact.
77. Defendant Delozier's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to
deprive her of her good name, and to defame and injure her.
78. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was false as presented due to
confusing a review for an election thirteen years prior for a seat on the judiciary being
presented as a relevant statement on an election in 2008 for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
79. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it implied negatively on her fitness as a legislative candidate.
80. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
plaintiff herself directly.
81. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people in the 88 h district of Pennsylvania as part of an election campaign.
82. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to statements.
83. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as the election for state
representative was an open seat election.
84. Defendant Delozier knew that the wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement
she made was not truthful as the previous judicial campaign reviewers stated that
plaintiff was unqualified thirteen years ago for a seat on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
85. For defendant Delozier to ascertain the prior judiciary recommendation
information, it would have involved discussions with others.
86. Defendant Delozier ignored the truth or did not properly investigate the claims of
others.
87. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Delozier's actions as she lost the
election due to Delozier's knowingly false statements.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award Plaintiff
nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $67,709.64, a letter of apology
sent to all voters in the 88 h district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
COUNT II
Defendant Sheryl Delozier's Written Words Regarding Plaintiffs Honesty and
Truthfulness Constituted Libel Against Plaintiff
88. Paragraphs 1 through 87 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
89. In defendant Delozier's campaign piece, Delozier stated that plaintiff "can't tell
the truth". (Top of Exhibit A).
90. Defendant Delozier's statement in the campaign piece was a statement of fact.
91. Defendant Delozier's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to deprive
her of her good name, to defame and injure her and to inflict lasting damage to her
reputation beyond the election.
92. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was false as there is no
evidence that plaintiff was or is a liar.
93. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it implied negatively on her fitness as a candidate and an attorney.
94. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
plaintiff herself, with no confusion as to its subject.
95. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people in the 88th district of Pennsylvania as part of an election campaign.
96. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to statements.
97. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as well as her ability to represent
clients in the district where she resides.
98. Defendant Delozier knew that the statement she made was not truthful.
Additionally, Delozier had conflicts with the plaintiff over her position on many issues of
relating to the office of State Representative.
99. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Delozier's actions as she lost the
election due to Delozier's knowingly false statements as well as having her truthfulness
questioned in the eyes of potential clients, coworkers and others not personally known to
her who relied on this false information.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award Plaintiff
nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $64,709.64, a letter of apology
sent to all voters in the 88th district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
COUNT III
Defendant Sheryl Delozier's Misrepresentations of Characteristics against
Plaintiff Constituted Lihel
100. Paragraphs 1 through 99 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
101. In defendant Delozier's campaign piece, Delozier stated that plaintiff was
unpredictable. (Top of Exhibit A).
102. Defendant Delozier's statement in the campaign piece was a statement of fact.
103. Defendant Delozier's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to deprive
her of her good name, and to defame and injure her.
104. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was false as presented due to
there being no factual basis for this statement of fact.
105. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it implied negatively on her fitness as a candidate and an attorney.
106. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
plaintiff herself, with no confusion as to its subject.
107. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people in the 88th district of Pennsylvania as part of an election campaign.
108. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to statements.
109. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as well as her ability to obtain and
retain clients as an attorney.
110. Defendant Delozier knew that the statement she made was not truthful.
111. Defendant Delozier ignored the truth or did not properly investigate.
112. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Delozier's actions as she lost the
election due to Delozier's knowingly false statements and lost potential clients.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award Plaintiff
nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $64,709.64, a letter of apology
sent to all voters in the 88th district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
COUNTIV
Defendant Sheryl Delozier's Words Concerning Defendant's Occupation Were
False and Constituted Libel Against Plaintiff
113. Paragraphs 1 through 112 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
114. In defendant Delozier's campaign piece, Delozier stated that plaintiff was a
former car dealer. (No. 1 on Exhibit A.)
115. Defendant Delozier's statement in the campaign piece was a statement of fact.
116. Defendant Delozier's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to deprive
her of her good name, and to defame and injure her.
117. This wicked, malicious, and illegal statement was false.
118. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it cast a negative connotation on her fitness as both a candidate and an attorney.
119. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was intended to cast doubts on
her ability to practice law and legislate by linking her to popular notions of car dealers as
being untrustworthy or by suggesting she was not a sound businesswoman by suggesting
she could not earn a livelihood as an attorney.
120. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement also attributed the business
troubles of plaintiff's client as her own personal responsibility.
121. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
Plaintiff herself, with no confusion as to its subject.
122. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people in the 88th district of Pennsylvania as part of an election campaign.
123. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to statements.
124. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as well as affect her ability to
obtain clients.
125. Defendant Delozier ignored the truth or did not properly investigate the claims of
others.
126. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Delozier's actions as she lost the
election due to Delozier's knowingly false statements as well as lost potential clients.
127. As the Governor's representative concerning boards and commissions, the
defendant Delozier known or could have known the falsity of the statement by
researching the website for the Department of State, Bureau of Professional Affairs, State
Board of Motor Vehicle Manufactures, Dealers and Salespersons to ascertain the truth of
that statement.
128. The website would disclose that plaintiff was never a licensed car dealer in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award
Plaintiff nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $64,709.64, a letter of
apology sent to all voters in the 88th district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
COUNT V
Defendant Thomas Beene's Words were False and Malicious With the Intention
of Assisting a Former Fellow PUC Employee in the Commission of Libel
129. Paragraphs 1 through 128 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
130. Defendant Beene distributed an e-mail regarding various falsehoods about
Plaintiff.
131. The statements defendant Beene made were statements of fact.
132. Defendant Beene's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to deprive
her of her good name, and to defame and injure her.
133. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was false as presented due to
there being no factual basis for this statement of fact.
134. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it implied negatively on her fitness as a candidate and an attorney.
135. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
plaintiff herself, with no confusion as to its subject.
136. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people to whom defendant Beene had no privilege regarding recipients of statements.
137. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to types of statements.
138. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as well as her ability to obtain and
retain clients as an attorney.
139. Defendant Beene knew that the statement he made was not truthful.
140. Defendant Beene ignored the truth or did not properly investigate.
141. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Beene's actions as she lost the
election due to Beene's knowingly false statements and lost potential clients.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award Plaintiff
nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $64,709.64, a letter of apology
sent to all voters in the 88th district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
Respectfully submitted,
9
Margaret M. Stuski
Pro se
I III - " I ?-U-gt
11 - 1-11
Say NO to Marge Stuskis
Philadelphaagutter-style campaign
f r State Kepresentatzve!
e A Philadelphia lawyer & for. mer car dealer
with. -troubled record-
Stuski admits she was; f sired from her job at
2.
the State Senate
Rated `Not Recommended' for elective o, f %e by
her peers at the Pa. Bar Association
4. A 4E-time failed candidate
* 1-2. Phila. Cis r Paper 7123196 3. Phi& lapinr3126197 4. Slate carer rwenir
Marge StusVs barrage of negative campaign mailers
in the 88th District would make a Philadelphia ward
boss blush with pride, given their blatant disregard
of the facts.
In one mailer, Stuski the Democrat candidate for
State House in the 88th, makes the outlandish charge
that Sheryl Delozier -- as a former employee of the
PUC -- is personally responsible for coming electric
rate increases. Wrong' A few facts are in order.
1. When electric deregulation was gut together in the
mid-1999x, Delozier worked for the Lt. Governor,
where she led efforts to streamline government
through the cost-cutting IMPACCT Commission.
2. Delozier worked for the PUC for several rears,
but left in 2007, before beginning her campaign for
the State House. And while at the PUC, Delozier
inclusively handled issues pertaining to water and
transportation.
In another mailer Stuski says that Delozier gave state
jobs to her friends and relatives, which is untrue-
Again, it's time for the facts:
1. As head of the Office of Public Liaison under
then Gov. Mark Schveiker, Delozier was in charge
of finding the hundreds of Pennsylvania citizens
needed to fill slots on the state's numerous boards
and commissions, as mandated by state law...such as
the State Board of Barber Examiners and State
Board of Cosmetology.
2. These volunteers were nominated by the governor
and then approved by the state senate.
3. Delozier herself never served on a Board or
Commission.
4. The positions mentioned in Stuslti's negative
mailer were volunteer positions that did not receive
any salary.
The 88th District Deserves Better!
Paid for by Friends ror Sheryl Dewier
VERIFICATION
I, Margaret M. Stuski, verify that the statements made in this Complaint are true
and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
Date: /G? /3 n-
Margaret M. Stuski
Or T+
L?uJ W?L f 4 f't:l 10: V i
SO ,o? , If
/* llq?
A*s*
Sheriffs Office of Cumberland County
R Thomas Kline OF ? ?AW
Sheri ?
Ronny R Anderson 209 OCT 27 AM 9; 00
Chief Deputy
Jody S Smith CU??? ?'i .t ti Ell i;OUNTY
Civil Process Sergeant Q`4t vCi`.UANA
Edward L Schorpp
Solicitor
Margaret M. Stuski
vs.
Sheryl M. Delozier
Case Number
2009-6864
SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE
10/16/2009 07:05 PM - William Cline, Deputy Sheriff, who being duly sworn according to law, states that on October
16, 2009 at 1905 hours, he served a true copy of the within Complaint and Notice, upon the within named
defendant, to wit: Thomas Beene, by making known unto Jillian Wagner, Daughter of defendant at 27 Fort
Street Lemoyne, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17043 its contents and at the same time handing to
her personally the said true and correct copy of the same.
10/20/2009 09:49 AM - Jody Smith, Sergeant, who being duly sworn according to law, states that on October 20, 200E
at 0949 hours, she served a true copy of the within Complaint and Notice, upon the within named
defendant, to wit: Sheryl M. Delozier, by making known unto Jason Kutulakis, Attorney for defendant at
The Cumberland County Sheriffs Office 1 Courthouse Square Room 303 Carlisle, Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania 17013 its contents and at the same time handing to him personally the said true and correct
copy of the same.
SHERIFF COST: $73.24
SO ANS R
October 20, 2009 R THOMAS KLINE, SHERIFF
Zp?uty Sheriff
By t t t i'VUi
Se ant
? v
Acceptance of Service
I accept the service of the Lc rn C? j k n4
(on behalf of finer y ( M . ?e.10 2 e r and
certify that I am authorized to do so.)
?o -, -
Date Au on d Agent
MARGARET M. STUSKI, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
VS.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, 09-6864 CIVIL
Defendant
and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendant
Preliminary Objections of Defendant Thomas Beene
Defendant Beene, by his attorney Karen M. Balaban, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P 1028, submits
the following Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Complaint filed on October 14, 2009, and
states the following in support of these Preliminary Objections.
DEMURRER - Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4)- the legal insufficiency of a pleading
1. Plaintiff has not pled material facts required under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a) [The material facts
on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form]
and 1019(f) [Averments of time, place and items of special damage shall be specifically stated]
that are legally sufficient for a cause of action for libel.
1. Paragraph 130 states: "Defendant Beene distributed an e-mail regarding various
falsehoods about Plaintiff." This statement is merely a vague, generalized accusation of falsity
which is insufficient to constitute a valid claim for libel.
2. Paragraph 130 is legally insufficient because it does not
a. Provide a date when the alleged e-mail was distributed;
b. Allege that the e-mail contained false statements; and
c. State the specific language of any alleged "falsehoods".
3. Count V and paragraphs 1 through 128, which are incorporated under paragraph
129 in the Complaint, are legally insufficient because these paragraphs, and specifically
paragraphs 15, 18, 19, 29, and 30
a. Do not provide a date when the alleged a-mails or letter were distributed;
and
b. Do not provide the specific language of any alleged libelous statements.
4. Plaintiff's allegations, specifically paragraphs 15, 18, 19, 29, 30, and 130, as well
as all paragraphs of the Complaint incorporated into Count V against Defendant Beene, do not
constitute libel because even if proven to be true none of these paragraphs contain statements
capable of a defamatory meaning. At most, the stated allegations were annoying, unpleasant,
frustrating to Plaintiff's political campaign, embarrassing, and apparently have offended
Plaintiffs own self-estimation.
5. Since 1994 Plaintiff has been a candidate for various public offices in multiple
primaries and elections and therefore is a public figure. Plaintiff has pled facts regarding
Defendant Beene's conduct that even if proven do not constitute actual malice.
6. No facts are asserted in the Complaint to provide a factual basis for the legal
conclusions presented in paragraph 134 that:
"This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as it
implied negatively on her fitness as a candidate and an attorney"
because Plaintiff has not related any actual circumstances where as a result of Defendant Beene's
alleged conduct either
a. Electors did not vote for Plaintiff, or
b. Clients or potential clients have been deterred from associating with Plaintiff.
2
WHEREFORE, Defendant Beene respectfully requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint
due to the legal insufficiency of the pleading and failing to conform to rules of court.
II. Plaintiff has failed to provide documents required under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(1) that form a
legal basis for the libel claim.
7. Plaintiff has failed to attach a copy of the a-mails referred to in paragraphs 15, 18,
19, 30, and 130, and the letter referred to in paragraph 29 which are essential documents that
form the basis for the libel claim and Count V against Defendant Beene.
8. Plaintiff has failed to allege that the a-mails referred to in paragraphs 15, 18, 19,
30, and 130, and the letter referred to in paragraph 29 are not accessible and if so, has not stated
the reason they are not accessible, nor has Plaintiff provided the substance of the e-mail referred
to in paragraph 130.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Beene respectfully requests the Court to strike paragraphs 15,
18, 19, 29, 30, and 130 for failure to conform to a rule of court, i.e. Pa.R.C.P. 1019(1), and to
dismiss the Complaint due to the legal insufficiency of the pleading.
III. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support an award of damages.
9. No facts are asserted in the Complaint to support the conclusion that Plaintiff
would have won or even had a reasonable chance of winning the open seat for State
Representative in the 88th District in 2008, regardless of the alleged conduct, given the
overwhelming number of registered Republican electors than the number of registered
Democratic voters in the 88th District. The 36% of the votes Plaintiff received in 2008 closely
represents the Democratic Party's registration in the 88th District. Plaintiff only received 28% of
the vote when she ran for the same seat in 2004 and in 2006 against the Republican incumbent.
No Democratic Party candidate received more than 43% of the total vote cast in Cumberland
3
County or within any legislative or congressional district within Cumberland County during the
2008 presidential election year. Both Obama (president - no incumbent) and Wagner
(incumbent auditor general) each received 43% of the vote cast in the November 2008 election in
Cumberland County.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Beene respectfully requests the Court to dismiss the Complaint due to
the legal insufficiency of the pleading by failing to state facts upon which recovery for libel
could be based and a measure of damages for libel could be made.
Respectfully submitted by:
Karen M. Balaban
Attorney ID No. 28160
Karen M. Balaban LLC
P.O. Box 821
223 State Street, Suite 200
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0821
Phone 717.232.3708
Fax: 717.232.2748
e-mail: KMBalaban(a-),BalabanLLC.com
4
MARGARET M. STUSKI, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, 09-6864 CIVIL
Defendant
and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendant
Certificate of Service
I certify that I am this day serving the foregoing document upon the persons and in the
manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. 440:
Service by first class mail addressed and by facsimile as follows:
Plaintiff
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
Attornev for Defendant Delozier
Jason Kutulakis
Abom & Kutulakis LLP
2 W High St
Carlisle, Pa 17013
Date: October 30, 2009 by: /[?.r.. "V ? -
Karen M. Balaban
Attorney I.D. 28160
FILES
F T HIE 2009 OCT 30 AM 11: 53
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717) 421-3215
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION - LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa.
CIVIL ACTION,
Plaintiff
vs.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
1331 Sconsett Way,
New Cumberland, Pa.
Defendant
THOMAS BEENE
27 Fort Street
Lemoyne, Pa.
Defendant
NO. (A-U664 Civik7-em
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
NOTICE
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the
claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after
this Complaint and notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by
attorney and filing in writing with the court your defenses or objections to the claims set
forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed
without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court without
further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or
relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights
important to you.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF
YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET
FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION
ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER.
IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY
BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES
THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A
REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.
Cumberland County Bar Association
32 South Bedford Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-3166
I
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717) 421-3215
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION - LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. CIVIL ACTION,
Plaintiff
VS.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
1331 Sconsett Way,
New Cumberland, Pa.
NO.
Defendant
THOMAS BEENE
27 Fort Street
Lemoyne, Pa.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Defendant
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Petitioner, Margaret M. Stuski, by her attorney undersigned below, hereby petitions this
Court as follows:
1. Plaintiff Margaret M. Stuski (hereinafter Plaintiff) is an adult individual residing
at 908 Walnut Street, Wormleysburg, Pa., 17043.
2. Defendant Sheryl Delozier (hereinafter Delozier) is an adult individual residing at
1331 Sconsett Way, New Cumberland, Pa., 17070.
3. Defendant Thomas Beene (hereinafter Beene) is an adult individual residing at 27
Fort Street, Lemoyne, Pa., 17043.
4. Delozier was a candidate for State Representative for the 88th district seat
covering Lemoyne, New Cumberland, Lower Allen, Upper Allen, Monroe,
Shiremanstown, Mechanicsburg and Wormleysburg in Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania.
5. Delozier narrowly won the Republican Primary in a seven way contest.
6. Beginning in November, 2007, Beene was and still is employed by the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in the Office of Legislative Affairs.
7. Delozier was employed by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in the
office of Commissioner Kim Pizzigrilli.
8. Commissioner Kim Pizzigrilli is a Republican that was appointed by former
Governor Tom Ridge, a Republican.
9. At the time, it was uncertain as to whether Commissioner Pizzigrilli would be
reappointed under Governor Edward G. Rendell, a Democrat.
10. Under this cloud of uncertainty regarding her position at the PUC, Delozier made
the decision to run for the State House seat.
11. As early as November 2007, Beene started working on Delozier's behalf in order
to secure her the State House seat.
12. Delozier did not resign her position at the PUC until on or about January 2008.
13. Delozier and Beene acted together to try to determine who the Democratic
candidate would be and to discourage Plaintiff from running.
14. Plaintiff announced her candidacy after the then incumbent legislator announced
his retirement.
15. Beene immediately began circulating e-mails to Democratic Area Leaders,
Democratic Committeemen and other volunteers looking for an alternative candidate to
Plaintiff.
16. Plaintiff was unopposed in the Democratic primary.
17. Plaintiff was the endorsed Democratic candidate for State Representative for the
88`h district seat.
18. Beene e-mailed Plaintiff and said he would give her money to not run in this race.
19. When the offer was refused, Mr. Beene engaged in an e-mail campaign to
discredit Plaintiff, promote falsehoods concerning her residency and other facts and to
actively discourage individuals from supporting Plaintiff.
20. Beene continued as Democratic Area Leader for Lemoyne and Wormleysburg,
despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier.
21. Beene has never been elected nor been appointed a Democratic Committeeman in
Lemoyne.
22. Beene became a volunteer coordinator for the Clinton campaign and drove on the
campaign's behalf in exchange for free tickets to the Clinton/Obama Forum at Messiah
College, despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier.
23. After the primary, Beene sought to be the volunteer coordinator for the Obama
campaign, despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier.
24. Beene attended Executive Committee Meetings of the Cumberland County
Democratic Party, despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier.
25. As a candidate, Plaintiff was invited to these meetings and asked to provide
updates on her campaign.
26. This situation was stressful and awkward for Plaintiff due to the animosity
demonstrated by Beene.
27. Beene donated money to Republican Delozier's campaign, despite being a
Democratic Area Party leader.
28. Beene wrote a letter to the editor supporting Delozier which was published in the
Patriot-News after Plaintiff received that paper's endorsements.
29. Beene made false statements in that letter in that he stated that he had worked
with Plaintiff before when in fact, he had never worked with Plaintiff and was constantly
hostile to Plaintiff, thereby alluding to knowledge he did not possess.
30. Plaintiff had previously disagreed with Beene when, despite being an Area
Democratic Leader, he sent out an e-mail urging support for a Republican friend of his
who was running for Wormleysburg Council.
31. Beene's job entails working with the Pennsylvania Legislature and the House of
Representatives in particular.
32. A great amount of legislation affecting the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission is handled by the House of Representative Consumer Affairs Committee.
33. Delozier upon her election now serves on the State House Consumer Affairs
Committee. Beene has attended several of these meetings as part of his job.
34. Plaintiff was vocal in her criticism of the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, where both Delozier and Beene worked, prior to her race for State
Representative for the PVC's failure to examine the finances of a public utility and its
for-profit subsidiaries in determining a rate case.
35. Plaintiff was also vocal during her campaign of the failure of the PUC to keep
staff salaries in line and the lack of enforcement by the PUC to address water and sewer
issues.
36. Beene attended the West Shore Chamber of Commerce legislative forums to see
Delozier and Plaintiff address issues during business hours.
37. Beene also attended the placing of the Lemoyne sign during business hours.
38. Delozier worked in the Governors' Office during the Ridge/Schweiker
administration.
39. At one point, Delozier was in charge of gubernatorial nominations to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Boards and Commissions.
40. Delozier nominated herself, her father and her husband to boards and
commissions.
41. Delozier also nominated a co-worker and friend who worked in the Governor's
office, Joseph Deklinski, to a Pennsylvania Board.
42. Both Delozier's father and her husband were successfully appointed to
Pennsylvania boards.
43. Joseph Deklinski was successfully appointed to the board of Kutztown University
from which he graduated.
44. Plaintiff truthfully represented these facts regarding Delozier in a mailing to
voters in the 88"' District.
45. Delozier reacted badly, including making disparaging remarks about Plaintiff at a
Ron Paul forum.
46. Delozier's sister-in-law attempted to intimidate Plaintiff by facial expressions and
loud remarks in the audience at this forum.
47. Delozier then mailed a campaign piece containing false and misleading statements
using a white envelope to voters in the 88th District days before the election.
48. The piece accused plaintiff of being untruthful, having a troubled record, not
being fit for elected office as judged by a panel of her peers, and being unpredictable.
This campaign piece is attached as Exhibit A.
49. The piece also stated that plaintiff was a car dealer citing a newspaper article that
was incorrect.
50. Plaintiff has never been a licensed car dealer in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania nor has she owned an interest in a car dealership.
51. Delozier's brother-in-law, Mr. Delozier, on Election Day made derogatory
comments to Plaintiff's sister.
52. Mr. Delozier stated that minority voters were Plaintiff's sister's votes and he
stated that "we have to cut the grass over there" referencing the low-income housing in
that precinct.
53. Plaintiff did not win the election.
54. Plaintiff lost the election by approximately 5000 votes.
55. Delozier's mailing was so vicious and vile that it influenced at least 7,500 people
to vote against Plaintiff, if not more.
56. Delozier's mailings generated comments on the internet blogs of the two
newspapers covering the 88th District.
57. The blogs also influenced the election results.
58. A change of votes in favor of Plaintiff would have meant victory.
59. Plaintiff's livelihood as an attorney and officer of the court is dependent on her
reputation for truthfulness.
60. Plaintiff seeks to have her reputation restored and to set the record straight
regarding the falsehoods which Defendants Delozier and Beene have made and repeated.
61. The damage from the false statements has continued as Karen Deklinski, the wife
of Republican committeeman Joseph Deklinski, repeated the false statements in May
2009 at Plaintiff's Wormleysburg polling place.
62. Defendants Delozier and Beene have spread their falsehoods and slander as
widely as they could.
63. The recipients of defendant Delozier and Beene's falsehoods and slander include
Delozier's brother in law, Mr. Delozier, Delozier's sister in law, as well as Joseph
Deklinski and Karen Deklinski in addition to the residents of the 881h district.
64. Plaintiff is a Wormleysburg Borough council candidate and an elected
Democratic committeewoman and the repetition of the false claims continues to injure
her reputation, defame her character and seeks to thwart her candidacy for borough
council.
COUNTI
Defendant Sheryl Delozier's Mispresentations Concerning Plaintiffs Fitness for
Elective Office and the Meaning of the Bar Association Ratings Constituted
Libel Against Plaintiff
65. Paragraphs 1 through 64 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
66. In defendant Delozier's campaign piece, Delozier stated that plaintiff was not
qualified for elective office based on a panel of her peers. (No. 3 on Exhibit A).
67. The Pennsylvania Bar Association has provided the public service of reviewing
candidates for judicial election.
68. On or about 1994 or 1995, plaintiff filed nominating papers to run for Justice of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
69. Plaintiff publicly stated that her candidacy was to comment on the recent
impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen on which she served on the
Impeachment Committee staff as counsel for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
70. Plaintiff went through the interview process with the Pennsylvania Bar
Association.
71. In the meantime, a challenge was made to the petitions of Plaintiff and it was
determined that due to a change in voting boundaries, Plaintiff did not get enough
signatures in the required number of counties, although she did get enough overall
signatures.
72. Plaintiff's name was stricken from the ballot and she was not a candidate at that
time.
73. The Pennsylvania Bar Association website, which is publicly available, explains
the rating system as follows:
RATINGS' DEFINITIONS
Highly Recommended: The candidate possesses the highest combination of
legal ability, experience, integrity and temperament and would be capable of
outstanding performance as a judge or justice of the court for which he/she is a
candidate.
Recommended: Based on legal ability, experience, integrity and temperament,
the candidate would be able to perform satisfactorily as a judge or justice of the
court for which he/she is a candidate.
Not Recommended: Based on legal ability, experience, integrity or
temperament, or any combination thereof, at the present time, the candidate is
inadequate to perform satisfactorily as a judge or justice of the court for which
he/she is a candidate.
74. Ms. Frances Deluca, one of the reviewers, has stated that plaintiff did not get the
endorsement to be a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice solely based on her having
only ten years of legal experience at the time of the review.
75. The ratings were done in 1995, thirteen years prior, and were not relevant to the
2008 legislative election.
76. Defendant Delozier's statement in the campaign piece was a statement of fact.
77. Defendant Delozier's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to
deprive her of her good name, and to defame and injure her.
78. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was false as presented due to
confusing a review for an election thirteen years prior for a seat on the judiciary being
presented as a relevant statement on an election in 2008 for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
79. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it implied negatively on her fitness as a legislative candidate.
80. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
plaintiff herself directly.
81. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people in the 88th district of Pennsylvania as part of an election campaign.
82. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to statements.
83. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as the election for state
representative was an open seat election.
84. Defendant Delozier knew that the wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement
she made was not truthful as the previous judicial campaign reviewers stated that
plaintiff was unqualified thirteen years ago for a seat on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
85. For defendant Delozier to ascertain the prior judiciary recommendation
information, it would have involved discussions with others.
86. Defendant Delozier ignored the truth or did not properly investigate the claims of
others.
87. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Delozier's actions as she lost the
election due to Delozier's knowingly false statements.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award Plaintiff
nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $67,709.64, a letter of apology
sent to all voters in the 88th district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
COUNT II
Defendant Sheryl Delozier's Written Words Regarding Plaintiffs Honesty and
Truthfulness Constituted Libel Against Plaintiff
88. Paragraphs 1 through 87 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
89. In defendant Delozier's campaign piece, Delozier stated that plaintiff "can't tell
the truth". (Top of Exhibit A).
90. Defendant Delozier's statement in the campaign piece was a statement of fact.
91. Defendant Delozier's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to deprive
her of her good name, to defame and injure her and to inflict lasting damage to her
reputation beyond the election.
92. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was false as there is no
evidence that plaintiff was or is a liar.
93. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it implied negatively on her fitness as a candidate and an attorney.
94. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
plaintiff herself, with no confusion as to its subject.
95. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people in the 88th district of Pennsylvania as part of an election campaign.
96. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to statements.
97. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as well as her ability to represent
clients in the district where she resides.
98. Defendant Delozier knew that the statement she made was not truthful.
Additionally, Delozier had conflicts with the plaintiff over her position on many issues of
relating to the office of State Representative.
99. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Delozier's actions as she lost the
election due to Delozier's knowingly false statements as well as having her truthfulness
questioned in the eyes of potential clients, coworkers and others not personally known to
her who relied on this false information.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award Plaintiff
nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $64,709.64, a letter of apology
sent to all voters in the 88"' district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
COUNT III
Defendant Sheryl Delozier's Misrepresentations of Characteristics against
Plaintiff Constituted Libel
100. Paragraphs 1 through 99 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
101. In defendant Delozier's campaign piece, Delozier stated that plaintiff was
unpredictable. (Top of Exhibit A).
102. Defendant Delozier's statement in the campaign piece was a statement of fact.
103. Defendant Delozier's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to deprive
her of her good name, and to defame and injure her.
104. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was false as presented due to
there being no factual basis for this statement of fact.
105. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it implied negatively on her fitness as a candidate and an attorney.
106. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
plaintiff herself, with no confusion as to its subject.
107. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people in the 88th district of Pennsylvania as part of an election campaign.
108. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to statements.
109. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as well as her ability to obtain and
retain clients as an attorney.
110. Defendant Delozier knew that the statement she made was not truthful.
111. Defendant Delozier ignored the truth or did not properly investigate.
112. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Delozier's actions as she lost the
election due to Delozier's knowingly false statements and lost potential clients.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award Plaintiff
nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $64,709.64, a letter of apology
sent to all voters in the 88th district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
COUNT IV
Defendant Sheryl Delozier's Words Concerning Defendant's Occupation Were
False and Constituted Libel Against Plaintiff
113. Paragraphs 1 through 112 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
114. In defendant Delozier's campaign piece, Delozier stated that plaintiff was a
former car dealer. (No. 1 on Exhibit A.)
115. Defendant Delozier's statement in the campaign piece was a statement of fact.
116. Defendant Delozier's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to deprive
her of her good name, and to defame and injure her.
117. This wicked, malicious, and illegal statement was false.
118. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it cast a negative connotation on her fitness as both a candidate and an attorney.
119. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was intended to cast doubts on
her ability to practice law and legislate by linking her to popular notions of car dealers as
being untrustworthy or by suggesting she was not a sound businesswoman by suggesting
she could not earn a livelihood as an attorney.
120. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement also attributed the business
troubles of plaintiff's client as her own personal responsibility.
121. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
Plaintiff herself, with no confusion as to its subject.
122. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people in the 88th district of Pennsylvania as part of an election campaign.
123. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to statements.
124. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as well as affect her ability to
obtain clients.
125. Defendant Delozier ignored the truth or did not properly investigate the claims of
others.
126. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Delozier's actions as she lost the
election due to Delozier's knowingly false statements as well as lost potential clients.
127. As the Governor's representative concerning boards and commissions, the
defendant Delozier known or could have known the falsity of the statement by
researching the website for the Department of State, Bureau of Professional Affairs, State
Board of Motor Vehicle Manufactures, Dealers and Salespersons to ascertain the truth of
that statement.
128. The website would disclose that plaintiff was never a licensed car dealer in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award
Plaintiff nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $64,709.64, a letter of
apology sent to all voters in the 88th district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
COUNT V
Defendant Thomas Beene's Words were False and Malicious With the Intention
of Assisting a Former Fellow PUC Employee in the Commission of Libel
129. Paragraphs 1 through 128 are hereby incorporated as set forth in their entirety.
130. Defendant Beene distributed an e-mail regarding various falsehoods about
Plaintiff.
131. The statements defendant Beene made were statements of fact.
132. Defendant Beene's misstatement of fact was falsely, maliciously, wickedly and
illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard to the
truthfulness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, to deprive
her of her good name, and to defame and injure her.
133. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was false as presented due to
there being no factual basis for this statement of fact.
134. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as
it implied negatively on her fitness as a candidate and an attorney.
135. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was made regarding the
plaintiff herself, with no confusion as to its subject.
136. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was published to a number of
people to whom defendant Beene had no privilege regarding recipients of statements.
137. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was not subject to any form of
privilege accorded to types of statements.
138. This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement caused an injury to the plaintiff
as it damaged irreparably her chances of being elected as well as her ability to obtain and
retain clients as an attorney.
139. Defendant Beene knew that the statement he made was not truthful.
140. Defendant Beene ignored the truth or did not properly investigate.
141. Plaintiff was harmed financially by defendant Beene's actions as she lost the
election due to Beene's knowingly false statements and lost potential clients.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to award Plaintiff
nominal damages, actual damages in the amount of $64,709.64, a letter of apology
sent to all voters in the 88"' district, punitive damages as this Court sees fit and
attorney's fees and costs.
Respectfully submitted,
r ^?
/Margaret M. Stuski
Pro se
Marge Stusm"
unpredictable, inonamied, Cant Ten, the mik
- ? ? Say NO to Marge Sturki's
Philadephidgutter-style campaign
for State Aepresentative!
- ------- - - - --- --
1. A Philadelphia lawyer & former car dealer
with-? troubled record _
2. Stuski admits she was fired from her job at
the State Senate
l3. Rated 'Not Recommended' for elective office by
her peers at the Pa. Bar Association
4. A 4-time failed candidate
* 1-2. Phila. Ciro, Paper 7125196 3_ Phila. Iergrrinr 3126197 4. State voter twordr
Marge Stusld's barrage of negative campaign mailers
in the 88th District would make a Philadelphia ward
boss blush with pride, given their blatant disregard
of the facts.
In another mailer Stuski says that Delozier gave state
jobs to her friends and relatives, which is untrue.
Again, it's time for the facts:
1. As head of the Office of Public Liaison under
In one mailer, Stuski the Democrat candidate for then Gov. Mark Schweiker, Delozier was in charge
State House in the 88th, makes the outlandish charge of finding the hundreds of Pennsylvania citizens
that Sheryl Delozier -- as a former employee of the needed to fill slots on the state's numerous boards
PUC -- is personally responsible for coming electric and commissions, as mandated by state laxv-such as
rate increases. Wrong! A few facts are in order the State Board of Barber Examiners and State
Board of Cosmetology.
]- When electric deregulation was put together in the
nud-1990's, Delozier worked for the Lt. Governor,
where she led efforts to streamline government
through the cost-cutting INIP ACCT Commission.
2. Delozier worked for the PLC for several rears,
but left in 2007, before beginning her campaign for
the State House. r-Ind while at the PliC, Delozier
exclusiveh` handled issues pertaining to water and
truisporration.
2. These volunteers were nominated bv the governor
and then approved by the state senate.
3. Delozier herself never served on a Board or
Commission.
4. The positions mentioned in Stuski's negative
mailer were volunteer positions that did not receive
any sa aty.
The 88th District Deserves Better!
Paid for by Friends for Sheryl Delozier
VERIFICATION
I, Margaret M. Stuski, verify that the statements made in this Complaint are true
and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
Date: 10 - 0 -01
Margaret M. Stuski
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717) 421-3215
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION - LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. CIVIL ACTION,
Plaintiff
NO.
VS.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
1331 Sconsett Way,
New Cumberland, Pa.
Defendant
THOMAS BEENE
27 Fort Street
Lemoyne, Pa.
Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 440, the undersigned does hereby verify that a true and correct
copy of the within Amended Complaint was served on , 2009, on
the following by first-class mail, postage pre-paid to
Jason Kutulakis, Esquire,
Attorney for Sheryl M. Delozier
Abom & Kutulakis
2 West High Street
Carlisle, PA. 17013
Thomas Beene
27 Fort Street
Lemoyne, PA. 17043
Date: 11) 130 ? ()9
? f
Maret M. Stusk, Esq.
Pro Se
FILFi_)--u?r?CF
T THE :? ^F NARY
L,
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER
By: Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire (#51785)
John R. Ninosky, Esquire (#78000)
Elizabeth D. Snover, Esquire (#200997)
301 Market Street
R O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
Phone: (717) 761-4540
Attorney for Defendant:
Sheryl M. Delozier
MARGARET M. STUSKI, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiffs CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V. : NO. 09-6864 Civil
SHERYL M. DELOZIER and CIVIL ACTION - LAW
THOMAS BEENE, :
Defendants JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
TO THE PROTHONOTARY:
Please enter the appearance of Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire; John R. Ninosky,
Esquire; and Elizabeth D. Snover, Esquire on behalf of Defendant Sheryl M. Delozier in the
above-captioned matter.
Date: November 3, 2009
Respectfully submitted,
JOH O , DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER
By:
Je rs J. Shipma , Esquire (ID #51785)
Jo n R. Ninosky, Esquire (ID #78000)
Elizabeth D. Snover„ Esquire (ID #200997)
301 Market Street
P. O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
Telephone (717) 761-4540
Counsel for Defendant Delozier
-4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Praecipe for Entry of Appearance has
been duly served upon the following counsel of record, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid, in Lemoyne, Pennsylvania, on November 3, 2009:
Margaret M. Stuski (Pro Se)
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
Karen Balaban, Esquire
P.O. Box 821
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0821
Counsel for Thomas Beene
JOHNSO DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER
By:
Je rs J. Shipmafi
John R. Ninosky
Elizabeth D. Snover
2009 NOV -4 a'i'l 2: 5 1
t
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
VS.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
Defendant
and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
09-6864 CIVIL
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Preliminary Objections of Defendant Thomas Beene to Amended Complaint
Defendant Beene, by his attorney Karen M. Balaban, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P 1028, submits
the following Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed on October 30,
2009, and states the following in support of these Preliminary Objections.
DEMURRER - Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4)- the legal insufficiency of a pleading
1. Plaintiff has not pled material facts required under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a) [The material facts
on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form]
and 1019(f) [Averments of time, place and items of special damage shall be specifically stated]
that are legally sufficient for a cause of action for libel.
1. Paragraph 130 states: "Defendant Beene distributed an e-mail regarding various
falsehoods about Plaintiff." This statement is merely a vague, generalized accusation of falsity
which is insufficient to constitute a valid claim for libel.
2. Paragraph 130 is legally insufficient because it does not
a. Provide a date when the alleged e-mail was distributed;
b. Allege that the e-mail contained false statements; and
c. State the specific language of any alleged "falsehoods".
3. Count V and paragraphs 1 through 128, which are incorporated under paragraph
129 in the Amended Complaint, are legally insufficient because these paragraphs, and
specifically paragraphs 15, 18, 19, 29, and 30
a. Do not provide a date when the alleged a-mails or letter were distributed;
and
b. Do not provide the specific language of any alleged libelous statements.
4. Plaintiffs allegations, specifically paragraphs 15, 18, 19, 29, 30, and 130, as well
as all paragraphs of the Amended Complaint incorporated into Count V against Defendant
Beene, do not constitute libel because even if proven to be true none of these paragraphs contain
statements capable of a defamatory meaning. At most, the stated allegations were annoying,
unpleasant, frustrating to Plaintiffs political campaign, embarrassing, and apparently have
offended Plaintiff's own self-estimation.
5. Since 1994 Plaintiff has been a candidate for various public offices in multiple
primaries and elections and therefore is a public figure. Plaintiff has pled facts regarding
Defendant Beene's conduct that even if proven do not constitute actual malice.
6. No facts are asserted in the Amended Complaint to provide a factual basis for the
legal conclusions presented in paragraph 134 that:
"This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement was defamatory to plaintiff as it
implied negatively on her fitness as a candidate and an attorney"
because Plaintiff has not related any actual circumstances where as a result of Defendant Beene's
alleged conduct either
a. Electors did not vote for Plaintiff, or
b. Clients or potential clients have been deterred from associating with Plaintiff.
2
WHEREFORE, Defendant Beene respectfully requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint due to the legal insufficiency of the pleading and failing to conform to rules of court.
II. Plaintiff has failed to provide documents required under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(1) that form a
legal basis for the libel claim.
7. Plaintiff has failed to attach a copy of the a-mails referred to in paragraphs 15, 18,
19, 30, and 130, and the letter referred to in paragraph 29 which are essential documents that
form the basis for the libel claim and Count V against Defendant Beene.
8. Plaintiff has failed to allege that the a-mails referred to in paragraphs 15, 18, 19,
30, and 130, and the letter referred to in paragraph 29 are not accessible and if so, has not stated
the reason they are not accessible, nor has Plaintiff provided the substance of the e-mail referred
to in paragraph 130.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Beene respectfully requests the Court to strike paragraphs 15,
18, 19, 29, 30, and 130 for failure to conform to a rule of court, i.e. Pa.R.C.P. 1019(1), and to
dismiss the Amended Complaint due to the legal insufficiency of the pleading.
III. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support an award of damages.
9. No facts are asserted in the Amended Complaint to support the conclusion that
Plaintiff would have won or even had a reasonable chance of winning the open seat for State
Representative in the 88th District in 2008, regardless of the alleged conduct, given the
overwhelming number of registered Republican electors than the number of registered
Democratic voters in the 88th District. The 36% of the votes Plaintiff received in 2008 closely
represents the Democratic Parry's registration in the 88 h District. Plaintiff only received 28% of
the vote when she ran for the same seat in 2004 and in 2006 against the Republican incumbent.
No Democratic Party candidate received more than 43% of the total vote cast in Cumberland
3
County or within any legislative or congressional district within Cumberland County during the
2008 presidential election year. Both Obama (president - no incumbent) and Wagner
(incumbent auditor general) each received 43% of the vote cast in the November 2008 election in
Cumberland County.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Beene respectfully requests the Court to dismiss the Amended
Complaint due to the legal insufficiency of the pleading by failing to state facts upon which
recovery for libel could be based and a measure of damages for libel could be made.
Respectfully submitted by:
Karen M. Balaban
Attorney ID No. 28160
Karen M. Balaban LLC
P.O. Box 821
223 State Street, Suite 200
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0821
Phone 717.232.3708
Fax: 717.232.2748
e-mail: KMBalabanaBalabanLLC.com
4
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
VS.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
Defendant
and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
09-6864 CIVIL
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Certificate of Service
I certify that I am this day serving the foregoing document upon the persons and in the
manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. 440:
Service by first class mail addressed and by facsimile as follows:
Plaintiff
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
Attornev for Defendant Delozier
Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire
301 Market Street
P.O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
Date: November 18, 2009 by:
Karen M. Balaban
Attorney I.D. 28160
FUD-Cyrra
OF THE PROI)IONO?TARY
2899 NOV 19 PM 1: 32
G:i sl , si a .' l.)JUN l I
PW
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER
By: Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire (#51785)
John R. Ninosky, Esquire (#78000)
Elizabeth D. Snover, Esquire (#200997)
301 Market Street
P. O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
Phone: (717) 761-4540
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
V.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendants
TO: Margaret M. Stuski, Esquire
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
Attorney for Defendant:
Sheryl M. Delozier
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NOTICE TO PLEAD
NO. 09-6864 Civil
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
AND NOW, this 24th day of November, 2009, you are hereby notified to file a written
response to the enclosed Preliminary Objections within 20 days of the date of service hereof or
judgment may be entered against you.
J
By:
John R. Ninosky, Esquire
Date: November 24, 2009
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER
By: Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire (#51785)
John R. Ninosky, Esquire (#78000)
Elizabeth D. Snover, Esquire (#200997)
301 Market Street
P. O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
Phone: (717) 761-4540
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
V.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendants
Attorney for Defendant:
Sheryl M. Delozier
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 09-6864 Civil
CIVIL ACTION- LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE SHERYL M D LOZIER
AND NOW, comes Representative Sheryl M. Delozier, by and through her counsel,
Johnson, Duffle, Stewart & Weidner, who files these Preliminary Objections pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2)-(4) to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint by respectfully stating the following:
1. Plaintiff, Margaret Stuski, Esquire, (Stuski), on October 14, 2009, filed a
seventeen (17) page Complaint which contains four (4) counts for defamation/libel against
Representative Sheryl M. Delozier (Representative Delozier) and one (1) count for defamation
against Thomas Beene (Beene).
2. Preliminary Objections as to the Complaint were filed by Beene on October 30,
2009.
3. Later that same day, Stuski filed an Amended Complaint against the Defendants
which changed only paragraphs 55 and 58 increasing the alleged number of votes she lost due
to the flyer from 2,500 votes to 7,500 votes.
4. Delozier now files Preliminary Objections to the Amended Complaint.
5. The cause of action as to Representative Delozier allegedly arises from a political
flyer allegedly mailed days before the election for the State Representative race for the 88th
District of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which was held on November 7, 2008.
(Amended Complaint 147)
6. In that race, Representative Delozier defeated Stuski for the seat. (Amended
Complaint % 4, 53).
7. Stuski has attached a campaign flyer to her Amended Complaint as Exhibit A.
8. This flyer, by its own contents, was made in response to several negative
campaign flyers attacking Representative Delozier. See, Exhibit A).
9. The flyer clearly, as indicated at the bottom, was paid for by "Friends of Sheryl
Delozier" and does not contain anything to indicate that the statements were made by
Representative Delozier herself or were distributed by Representative Delozier herself. (Exhibit
A).
10. In fact, the flyer refers to Representative Delozier in the third person, clearly
indicating that Representative Delozier is not the one making the statements therein. (Exhibit
A).
11. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a) states in pertinent part:
"Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading and are limited to the following
2
grounds: (2) failure of pleading to conform to law or rule of court or inclusion of scandalous and
impertinent matter; (3) insufficient specificity of a pleading; and (4) legal insufficiency of a
pleading (demurrer)..."
1. DEMURRER AS TO ALL COUNTS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION UNDER PA.R.C.P. 1028(4)
12. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is not legally sufficient and should be dismissed
because the Amended Complaint, when read as a whole, does not support and no reasonable
jury could that the statements contained in the flyer were made by Representative Delozier or
published by Representative Delozier.
13. While it is true that Stuski baldly alleges that Representative Delozier made the
statements and mailed/published the statements in her Amended Complaint this contradicts the
flyer itself attached as Exhibit A.
14. When deciding Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer, the Court
must accept all material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom as admitted and true and decide whether, based on the facts averred,
recovery is impossible as a matter of law. Wiernik v. PHH U.S. Mortq. Corp., 736 A.2d 616 (Pa
Super. 1999), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 700, 751 A.2d 193 (2000).
15. Courts reviewing preliminary objections must consider not only the facts pled in
the complaint, but also documents or exhibits attached to the complaint, and based upon the
averments and documentary support may address challenges to the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. Diess v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transp, 935 A.2d 895, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
3
16. However, the Court need not consider the pleader's conclusions of law or
unwarranted inferences from facts, opinions, argumentative allegations, or expressions of
opinion. Myers v. Ridge, 712 A.2d 791 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
17. Exhibit A attached to the Amended Complaint cannot be conceivably attributed to
Representative Delozier.
18. A brief reading of this flyer shows that it was paid for by Friends of Sheryl
Delozier.
19. Additionally, the flyer speaks of Representative Delozier in the third person,
clearly indicating that Representative Delozier is not making the statements therein.
20. As such, the averments by Stuski that Representative Delozier mailed the flyer,
made the statements in the flyer or published the statements in the flyer are contradicted by her
own Exhibit A.
21. Therefore, it is clear that the Amended Complaint does not state a cause of
action for defamation against Representative Delozier based upon the statements in the flyer.
22. Furthermore, Counts I - IV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are not legally
sufficient because Stuski has not alleged facts to support that the alleged defamatory
statements were made with actual malice.
23. Stuski is a public figure and her qualifications for office are a matter of public
concern.
24. Pennsylvania law is clear that statements made about public figures regarding
matters of public concern are afforded more constitutional protections than other speech.
4
Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-86, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105
L.Ed.2d 562 (1989).
25. As such, Pennsylvania Courts have required pleadings supporting that the
defendant made the statements with "actual malice."
26. In Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News, 848 A.2d 113 (Pa. 2004), the Supreme
Court sustained preliminary objections for failing to adequately plead "actual malice."
27. In that case, the Court held that a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts supporting
actual malice such that a jury could eventually conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the statements at issue were false. Id. at 130-131.
28. The question of whether a pleading sufficiently alleges facts to support actual
malice is a matter of law. Id. at 626.
29. The "actual malice" standard is a rigorous, if not impossible, burden to meet in
most defamation cases involving a public official, and the "actual malice" standard goes so far
as to forbid imposition of liability even in those instances where the defendant negligently
publishes false, defamatory statements about a public figure or public official. Manning v.
WPXI. Inc., 886 A. 2d 1137 (Pa. Super. 2005).
30. The Amended Complaint alleges very generally and in conclusory fashion that
the statements were false and that Representative Delozier ignored the truth or did not properly
investigate the claims of others, and that the statements were malicious. (Amended Complaint
Counts I - IV).
31. This is not sufficient enough to meet the pleading standards for "actual malice."
5
32. The flyer clearly shows citations to newspapers and other sources for the non-
opinion statements (those not concerning "unable to tell the truth" and "unpredictable" as argued
later herein) contained in the flyer. (Exhibit A).
33. Stuski's allegations that Representative Delozier did not properly investigate the
claims of others is not sufficient under the actual malice standard which requires the Plaintiff to
pled that Representative Delozier knew that the statements were false or acted with reckless
disregard for the truthfulness of the statements.
34. The fact that the flyer includes these citations, in and of itself, defeats a finding of
actual malice because the plaintiff must plead facts to support that the defendant entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the statement. Manning v. WPXI. Inc., 886 A.2d 1137 (Pa.
Super. 2005).
35. Pennsylvania courts have held, as a matter of law, that failure to investigate the
factual accuracy of a statement, without more, will not support a finding of actual malice in a
defamation action involving a public official. Id.
36. With regard to the opinion statements, Stuski has also failed to plead facts to
support actual malice, because opinions are not actionable and cannot support a colorable
claim for defamation. Green v. Mizner, 692 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
WHEREFORE, Representative Sheryl M. Delozier respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to sustain her Preliminary Objection in the nature of a demurrer to Counts I - IV of
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) and to dismiss Counts I - IV in
its entirety.
6
11. DEMURRER AS TO COUNT I
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION UNDER PA.R C P 1028(41
37. Count I of Stuski's Amended Complaint is legally insufficient and should be
dismissed because the statement she attributes to Representative Delozier is, by Stuski's own
admission, true and factual.
38. Stuski alleges in Count I that the flyer, which she attributes to Representative
Delozier, states that Stuski was "not qualified for elective office based on a panel of her peers."
(Amended Complaint 166).
39. Rather, the flyer, as clearly shown at Exhibit A, states that Stuski was "rated 'not
recommended' for elective office by her peers at the Pa. Bar Association." (Exhibit A).
40. Later in paragraph 84 of the Amended Complaint, Stuski avers that "the previous
judicial reviewers stated that plaintiff was unqualified thirteen years ago for a seat on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court."
41. She also avers that "one of the reviewers has stated that plaintiff did not get the
endorsement of to be a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice solely based on her having only
ten years of legal experience at the time of the review." (Amended Complaint ¶ 74).
42. It has long been the law of Pennsylvania that the truth of an allegedly
defamatory statement of fact if a complete defense to an action for defamation. Schnabel v.
Meredith, 107 A.2d 860 (Pa. 1954); Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News, 757 A.2d 938 (Pa.
Super. 2000).
43. Since Stuski herself admits that the statement in the flyer is true, no cause of
action for defamation can be sustained.
7
44. Arguing that the rating by the Pennsylvania Bar Association is not relevant to the
2008 election cannot support a colorable action for defamation when Plaintiff herself admits the
truth of the statement.
WHEREFORE, Representative Sheryl M. Delozier respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to sustain her Preliminary Objection in the nature of a demurrer to Count I of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) and to dismiss Count I in its entirety.
III. DEMURRER AS TO COUNT II
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION UNDER PA R C P 1028(4)
45. Count II of Stuski's Amended Complaint is legally insufficient and should be
dismissed because the statement that Stuski "cannot tell the truth" is not capable of a
defamatory construction as this is purely an opinion statement protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
46. Statements of opinion, without more, generally are not actionable. Green v.
Mizner, 692 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super. 1997).
47. An actionable defamatory statement may be an opinion only if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. Baker v. Lafayette
College, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987).
48. A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed non-defamatory
facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and
unreasonable this opinion may be or how derogatory it is. Braila v. Field Communications, 456
A.2d 1366 (Pa. Super. 1983).
8
49. Any statement that cannot be proven true or false is not actionable due to First
Amendment free speech concerns. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695
(1990).
50. The flyer states that Stuski "cannot tell the truth" and goes on to rebut statements
made in several flyers attacking Representative Delozier, which statements Stuski repeats in
her Amended Complaint.
51. The statement that Stuski "cannot tell the truth" is a statement of opinion
protected by the First Amendment and not capable of defamatory meaning and not actionable
under Pennsylvania law.
WHEREFORE, Representative Sheryl M. Delozier respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to sustain her preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to Count II of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) and to dismiss Count II in its entirety.
IV. DEMURRER AS TO COUNT III
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION UNDER PA R C P 1028141
52. Count III of Stuski's Amended Complaint is legally insufficient and should be
dismissed because the statement that Stuski is "unpredictable" is not capable of a defamatory
construction as this is purely an opinion statement protected by the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
53. A statement of opinion, without more, is not actionable under Pennsylvania law.
54. As such, Plaintiff has failed to plead a colorable cause of action in defamation
based upon this opinion statement.
9
WHEREFORE, Representative Sheryl M. Delozier respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to sustain her preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to Count III of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) and to dismiss Count III in its entirety.
V. DEMURRER AS TO COUNT IV
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION UNDER PA.R.C.P. 1028(4)
55. Count IV of Stuski's Amended Complaint is legally insufficient and should be
dismissed because the statement that Stuski is "a former car dealer" is not capable of a
defamatory meaning as a matter of law.
56. In order for a statement to be considered defamatory, the Court must, in the first
instance, make a determination as to whether the communication complained of can be
construed to have the defamatory meaning ascribed to it by the complaining party. Baker v.
Lafayette College, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987).
57. In making this determination, the Court must view the statement in its factual
context because the test regarding the defamatory meaning of a statement is the impression
that it would naturally engender in the minds of the average persons among whom it is intended
to circulate. Rush v. Philadelphia Newspapers Inc., 732 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. 1999)
58. If the court concludes the publication is incapable of defamatory meaning, the
case is properly dismissed. Feldman v. Lafayette Green Condominium Ass'n, 806 A.2d 497
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
59. Stuski avers that this statement attempted to link her to "popular notions of car
dealers as being untrustworthy or by suggesting that she was not a sound businesswoman by
suggesting she could not earn a livelihood as an attorney." (Amended Complaint 1119).
10
60. It is respectfully submitted that the statement that Stuski was a "former car
dealer" cannot be attributed to untrustworthiness or that she is a bad businesswoman or lawyer.
61. As such, this statement is not capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of
law.
WHEREFORE, Representative Sheryl M. Delozier respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to sustain her preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to Count IV of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) and to dismiss Count IV in its entirety.
VI. FAILURE OF PLEADING TO CONFORM TO LAW
AND INCLUSION OF SCANDALOUS AND IMPERTINENT
MATTER PRELIMINARY OBJECTION UNDER PA R C P 1028(2)
62. The inclusion of the language in paragraphs 7-13, 38-46, 51-52, 61, are irrelevant
to Plaintiff's claims and consists of impertinent matter which should be stricken from the
Amended Complaint.
63. For allegations to be "scandalous and impertinent," and thus subject to being
stricken, allegations must be immaterial and inappropriate to the proof of the cause of action.
Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2); Common Cause/Pennsylvania v Com, 710 A.2d 108 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1998).
64. The averments contained in the paragraphs listed above bear absolutely no
relation to Stuski's claims and, for the most part, amount to a reassertion of certain statements
made in campaign flyers attacking Representative Delozier in the November 2008 election.
65. As such, these paragraphs should be stricken as improper, scandalous, and
impertinent matter.
11
66. Additionally, Stuski, an attorney acting pro se, demands in each Count that the
Defendants pay her attorney's fees.
67. "Parties to litigation are responsible for their own counsel fees unless there is an
agreement by the parties, statutory authority, or other recognized exception." Hart v. O'Malley,
781 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. 2001).
68. Plaintiff has failed to plead facts or cite law to support that she is entitled to
recover attorney's fees from the Defendants, therefore, the demand for attorney's fees does not
conform to law and is scandalous or impertinent matter.
WHEREFORE, Representative Sheryl M. Delozier respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to sustain her preliminary objection as to failure of the Amended Complaint to conform to
rule of law and for inclusion of scandalous and impertinent matter in the Amended Complaint
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2) and to enter and order striking paragraphs 7-13, 38-46, 51-52,
61 as scandalous and impertinent matter and striking Plaintiffs demand for attorney's fees.
VII. INSUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY IN A PLEADING
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION UNDER PA R C P 1028(3)
69. In her Amended Complaint, Stuski demands actual damages from the
Defendants in the amount of $64,709.64.
70. There are no allegations in the Amended Complaint to support how Stuski
reaches this number as actual damages.
71. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure requires that special damages be pled with
specificity. Pa. R.C.P. 1019(f).
72. This specificity is in addition to the fact pleading requirements.
12
73. While it is true that an action for defamation need not set forth nominal damages
with specificity, Stuski has alleged a specific amount of damages without any factual averments
to support this figure.
74. As such, Delozier is unable to prepare a defense to this item of damage since the
calculation of actual damages is unsupported by the Amended Complaint.
WHEREFORE, Representative Sheryl M. Delozier respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to sustain her preliminary objection as to failure of the Amended Complaint to plead
special damages with specificity pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(3) and 1019(f) and to enter and
order requiring Plaintiff to file a more specific pleading supporting her demand for actual
damages.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER
By: Z?61 9AIZXZ?
J n . Ninosky, Esquire
I.D. No. 78000
Jefferson J. Shipman, Esquire
Elizabeth D. Snover, Esquire
301 Market Street
P. O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
Telephone (717) 761-4540
Counsel for Defendant Delozier
Date: November 24, 2009
:382132
13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint have been duly served upon the following counsel of record, by depositing the same
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, in Lemoyne, Pennsylvania, on November 24, 2009:
Margaret M. Stuski (Pro Se)
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
Karen Balaban, Esquire
223 State Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 821
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0821
Attorney for Defendant Beene
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER -- ( 4 By: Ae
Jeff on J. Shipman
John R. Ninosky
Elizabeth D. Snover
Counsel for Defendant Delozier
Or" THE ?; ,; i ' ?i'O Af?Y
2P, v1 i V 2- F 12: u 5
PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT
(Must be typewritten and submitted in duplicate)
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: (List the within matter for the next Argument
Court.)
CAPTION OF CASE
(entire caption must be stated in full)
MARGARET M. STUSKI
Plaintiff
vs.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER and
THOMAS BEENE
Defendants
No. 09-6864, Civil Term
State matter to be argued (i.e., plaintiffs motion for new trial, defendant's demurrer to
complaint, etc.):
Defendant Delozier's Preliminary Objections
2. Identify counsel who will argue cases:
(a) for plaintiffs:
Margaret M. Stuski. 908 Walnut Street. Wormleysburg, PA 17043
(Name and Address)
(b) for defendants:
John R. Ninosky, P.O. Box 109. Lemoyne. PA 17403 (Counsel for Delozier)
(Name and Address
Karen Balaban. P.O. Box 821. Harrisburg, PA 17108 (Counsel for Beene)
(Name and Address)
3. 1 will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has been listed for argument.
4. Argument Court Date: January 6, 2010
Si ture
John R. Ninosky
Print your name
Date: November 24, 2009
Attorney for Defendant Delozier
INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Two copies of all briefs must be filed with the COURT ADMINISTRATOR
(not the Prothonotary) before argument.
2. The moving party shall file and serve their brief 12 days prior to argument.
3. The responding party shall file their brief 5 days prior to argument.
4. If argument is continued new briefs must be filed with the COURT
ADMINISTRATOR (not the Prothonotary) after the case is relisted.
CA/ 1'?:-
J ?
2413 N3125 P 12: 5, 6
Cl ` 'r
ca f A~
PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT
(Must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate) ,~ _
~~ c~
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: (List the within matter fo~;the f~xt _~
Argument Court.) ~` ~ ~: r:~
--°------------------------------------°-------°-_---------°------------------- ~ -r;T
CAPTION OF CASE _ --~ ' ~'' }
(entire caption must be stated in full) -~ -~=
-. '~ -
Margaret M. Stuski ~ ~ - ~.., ~~" '
-- .. ;:~
vs. y'~ ~
~.:~
Sheryl M. Delozier and Thomas Beene No 09-6864 Civil Term
1. State matter to be argued (i.e., plaintiffs motion for new trial, defendant's demurrer to
complaint, etc.):
~< f~-~ ~-.~~ ~~ ~h < ~s p~~, ~~y Q,~ ~ e ~ ~~,-F-N-L
2. Identify all counsel who will argue cases:
(a) for plaintiffs:
Margaret M. Stuski, 908 Walnut Street, Wormleysburg, PA 17043
(Name and Address)
(b) for defendants:
John R. Ninosky, PO Box 109, Lemoyne, PA 17043 (Counsel for Delozier)
(Name and Address)
Karen M. Balaban, PO Box 821, Harrisburg, PA 17108-0821 (Counsel for Beene)
3. I will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has been listed for
argument.
4. Argument Court Date: February 17, 2010
Signature
Karen M. Balaban
Print your name
Defendant Thomas Beene
January ,?6, 2010 Attorney for
Date:
INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Two copies of all briefs must be filed with the COURT ADMINISTRATOR
(not the Prothonotary) before argument.
2. The moving party shall file and serve their brief 12 days prior to argument.
3. The responding party shall file their brief 5 days prior to argument.
4. If argument is continued new briefs must be filed with the COURT
ADMINISTRATOR (not the Prothonotary) after the case is relisted.
#29
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
V.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
N0.2009 - 6864 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
BEFORE GUIDO, J.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 22ND day of FEBRUARY, 2010, it appearing to the court that
plaintiff has filed, or will soon be filing, a third amended complaint, argument on
defendants' preliminary objections to plaintiff s second amended complaint is continued
generally. If no such complaint is filed, this matter may be relisted by any party.
By the ,
Edward E. Guido, J.
Margaret M. Stuski ~ ~ ;
~, -,-;
Pro Se ,~°~ -,.i .~
_~' , rx, ~ +3 r-
John R. Ninosky, Esquire ~° ~ ~ ~ ~;
=_ ; -
~en Balaban, Es uire ~ ~' ~'
q -
Court Administrator ~ ~ L~,c~ ~;v ~ L~ .~
:sld
~S ~ ~L~.
~ ~~~~~
~~
#29
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
VI.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendant
: 1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
N0.2009 - 6864 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
BEFORE GUIDO, J.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 22ND day of FEBRUARY, 2010, plaintiff is granted leave to file
a third amended complaint within 10 days. No further amendments to the complaint will
be allowed.
By th ,
Edward E. Guido, J.
~ Margaret M. Stuski
Pro Se
~hn R. Ninosky, Esquire
~n Balaban, Esquire
Court Administrator - I l~~ ~ ~ ~ L~
:sld
~D~ ~ £S rn~ i L~c~
a f~~./~~
~-j-~t
-~,t-
c,'. `,
~. ~ ~-
N
:~'
-*~
r;
N
0
..,
.Y~
=-,~
.. ~ f ~.
_~~ ; ;.
_a ~.
~.,
,~~ it G-tin ~Ir`',` ~T
LOIO ~ItY~ I ( M~ ~• ~'
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
v.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
THOMAS BEENE,
FRIENDS OF SHERYL DELOZIER
Defendants
TO: Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 09-6864 Civil
CIVIL ACTION -LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Notice to Plead
You are hereby notified to file a written response to the enclosed Defendant Beene's
Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days from
service hereof or a judgment maybe entered against you.
March 11, 2010 /1~•~-.-- ~ ~.,....
Karen M. Balaban
Karen M. Balaban, Esquire (#28160) Attorney for Defendant:
223 State Street, Suite 200 Thomas Beene
P.O. Box 821
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0821
Phone 717.232.3708
e-mail: KMBalaban(a~BalabanLLC.com
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
v.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
THOMAS BEENE,
FRIENDS OF SHERYL DELOZIER,
Defendants
No. 09-6864 Civil
CIVIL ACTION -LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Preliminary Objections of Defendant Thomas Beene to
Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint
Defendant Beene, by his attorney Karen M. Balaban, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P 1028, submits
the following Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint, filed on February
16, 2010, prior to obtaining leave of court, and states the following in support of these
Preliminary Objections.
DEMURRER - Pa.R.C.P.1028(a)(4) -the legal insufficiency of a pleading
I. Plaintiff has not stated material facts that are legally sufficient to establish a cause of action
for libel as required under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a), i.e. material facts on which a cause of action or
defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form, and under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(f),
i.e. averments of time, place and items of special damage shall be specifically stated.
1. The Third Amended Complaint is legally insufficient because the facts pleaded
and the reasonable inferences that can deduced from the facts pleaded, when read as a whole, do
not support a finding that the alleged "Words" of defendant Beene are, as a matter of law,
capable of a defamatory meaning ascribed to the Plaintiff.
2. Count V, consisting of paragraphs 137 through 160, is the only count directed
against defendant Beene. It is titled "Defendant Thomas Beene's Words were False and
Malicious With the Intention of Assisting a Former Fellow PUC Employee in the Commission of
Libel" and describes an action for conspiracy to commit libel. This is not a recognized civil
cause of action in Pennsylvania.
3. Paragraph 137 of plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint' incorporates the previous
paragraphs 1 through 136 which include Exhibits A through O referenced in paragraphs 16, 19,
20, 24, 28, and 29.
4. Paragraphs 30 and 31 are legally insufficient because they do not identify specific
language that is allegedly libelous, nor are the contents of Exhibit O. referred to in paragraph 29
and upon which paragraphs 30 and 31 are based, capable of a defamatory meaning against the
plaintiff.
5. E-mails and letters are attached to plaintii~s Third Amended Complaint as
Exhibits A through O in support of her libel claim against Defendant Beene. However, none of
the substance in any of these documents constitutes libel, nor is their content, singly or
collectively, capable of a defamatory meaning regarding the plaintiff. At most, the language
contained in these documents were annoying, unpleasant, frustrating to plaintiff s political
campaign, embarrassing, and apparently have offended plaintiff's own self-estimation.
6. Paragraph 16 states: "Beene immediately began circulating a-mails to Democratic
Area Leaders, Democratic Committeemen and other: volunteers looking for an alternative
candidate to Plaintiff:' Exhibit "A ". This statement is not capable of a defamatory meaning
against the plaintiff.
1 All "paragraphs" referred to in these preliminary objections correlate to the same numbered pazagraphs contained
in plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint.
2
I
7. Paragraph 19 states: "Beene e-mailed Plaintiff and said he ,would give her money
to .not run in this race! Exhibit "C ". This statement is not capable of a defamatory meaning
against the plaintiff. Further, plaintiff's averment is a gross misrepresentation and blatant
misleading interpretation of the statement contained in the e-mai1.2 The only mention of money
in Exhibit C is contained in the second paragraph, line 3 of the Exhibit C e-mail which states: "I
think that if you were to run' in Philadelphia, I would support you and in fact, contribute to your
campaign. "
8. Paragraph 20 states: "When the offer was refused, 11Ir. Beene engaged in an
e-mail'campaign to discredit Plainti, f,~; promote falsehaods concerning her residency and other
facts and to actively discourage individuals from supporting Plaintiff. Exhibit "D-L". This
pleading is not capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff. It is merely a vague,
generalized accusation of falsity which is insufficient to constitute a valid claim for libel. This
pleading fails to quote specific language, either contained in exhibits A through O or made
separately from these exhibits, which discredit plaintiff or promote falsehoods concerning her
residency. Conduct or statements which "actively discourage individuals from supporting" are
not per se defamation absent a specifically identified statement that is alleged to be false,
provided such false statement is capable of having a defamatory meaning. The pleading is not
legally sufficient because it lacks specificity.
9. Paragraph 28 states: "Beene: donated money to Republican Delozier's campaign,
despite being a Democratic Area Party leader., Exhibit "N". Neither this pleading nor the
underlying Exhibit N is capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff. The conduct is a
well-recognized exercise of a citizen's constitutional 1St amendment rights.
s Plaintiff should be mindful of the Rules of Professional Conduct which require attorneys to exercise candor
towards the tribunal. See RPC Rule 3.3
10. Paragraph 29 states: "&eene wrote a letter to `the editor supporting Delozier which
was published in the.Patriot-News after Plaintiffreceived that paper's endorsements. Exhibit
"O ". Neither this pleading nor the underlying Exhibit O is capable of a defamatory meaning
against the plaintiff. The letter in Exhibit O does not even mention plaintiff by name. The letter,
which is simply an expression of opinion and support for a candidate for public office is a well-
recognized expression of a citizen's freedom of speech exercised as a constitutional right under
the 1St amendment.
11. Paragraph 138 states: "Defendant Beene distributed an a-mail regarding various
falsehoods about Plaintiff" This averment is a vague, generalized accusation of falsity which is
insufficient to constitute a valid claim for libel. This pleading fails to identify a specific
statement of falsehood, either contained in exhibits A through O or made separately from these
exhibits, capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
12. Paragraph 139 states: "The statement defendant Beene made were statements: of
fact." If these unidentified statements are "factual" by plaintiffls own admission, and apparently
include statements attributable to Beene collectively under other paragraphs in plaintiff's Third
Amended Complaint and in the attached Exhibits A through O, then there can be no libel as a
matter of law.
13. Since 1994 plaintiff has been a candidate for various public offices in multiple
primaries and elections and therefore is a public figure. The factual allegations made by plaintiff
in her Third Amended Complaint regarding defendant Beene's conduct, even if proven to be
true, do not constitute actual malice.
14. Paragraph 140 states: "Defendant Beene's misstatement'of fact was falsely,
maliciously, wickedly.. and illegally said and made knowing that it was false or with reckless
disregard to the. truthfudness of the statement, with the intent to deny plaintiff a fair election, ''ta
4
deprive her of her good name, and to defame and injure her. " This is merely a recitation of the
factors to be considered to establish malice. It is not based upon any identified false statements
attributable to Beene that are capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff. Therefore
the pleading cannot meet the presumption of malice.
15. Paragraphs 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, and 146 all begin with a common
introductory clause: "This wicked, malicious, false and illegal statement ", but each paragraph
fails to provide the language of any such statement. Plaintiffhas not identified any facts or
specific statements attributable to Beene upon which a cause of action for defamation or libel
may be based. As a matter of law, plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint is devoid of any
statement capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
16. Paragraph 141 states: "This wicked, malicious, false and illegal tatement was
false as presented due to there being no factual basis for this statement offact."
Notwithstanding that this paragraph's unidentified "statement of fact" had "no factual basis", if a
statement is factual there can be no libel. Further, the paragraph fails to attribute its allegations
defendant Beene. Plaintiff s contradiction in her averment is an admission that the alleged
statement is true.
17. Paragraphs 142, 143, 145, and 146 all begin with a common introductory clause:
"Tfeis wicked, malicious, false and illegal tatement" qualifying the following allegations:
142. "... was defamatory to plaintiff as it implied negatively on her fitness as a
candidate and an attorney."
143 "... was made regarding the plaintiffherself, with no confusion as to its
subject."
145. "... was not subject to any form of privilege accorded to types of
statements."
146. "...caused an injury to the plaintiff as it damage irreparably Plaintiff's
chances of being elected as well as her ability to obtain and retain clients
as an attorney."
However, these paragraphs fail to attribute any of their allegations to defendant Beene.
Therefore, even if this conclusion of law is presumed, there is no basis for a cause of action for
defamation caused by defendant Beene against plaintiff.
18. Paragraph 147 states: "Defendant Beene knew that the statement he made was not
truthful." This averment recites one element to sustain a cause of action for defamation.
However, plaintiff has not provided the "untruthful" statement that was not truthful. Therefore,
as a matter of law this court cannot reach a conclusion that defendant Beene made any statement
that is capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
19. Paragraph 148 states: "Defendant Beene ignored the truth or did nat properly
investigate. " This is present two factors considered in determining whether malice exists.
However, no connection is made between the alleged malicious conduct and the making of any
false statements capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
20. Paragraph 149 states: "Defendant Beene distributed emails`with this information
to members of the Democratic committee as undisclosed recipients at a time when his official job
was Assistant Legislative Director at the Publie Utility Commission. " This allegation lacks
specificity because it fails to identify the (a) "distributed emails" and (b) the content of "this
information". Therefore, as a matter of law this court cannot reach a conclusion that defendant
Beene made any statement capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
21. Paragraph 150 states: "Defendant Beene also provided this information to
Defendant Delozier who used it as'a basis for the campaign piece. " This allegation lacks
specificity because it fails to identify (a) the content of "this information" and (b) "the campaign
piece". Therefore, as a matter of law this court cannot reach a conclusion that defendant Beene
made any statement capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
6
22. Paragraph 151 states: "[P]laintiff was. harmed financially.: by defendant Beene's
actions as she lost the election due to Beene's knowingly false statements and lost potential
clients. " This allegation lacks specificity because it fails to identify (a) "Beene's actions" and
(b) "Beene's knowingly false statements". Therefore, as a matter of law this court cannot reach a
conclusion that defendant Beene made any statement capable of a defamatory meaning against
the plaintiff.
23. Paragraph 157 states: "Plaintiff Stuski while calling voters in several areas but
specifically in Lemoyne had'voters hostile to herspecifically due o the actions and words of
Defendant Beene. " This allegation lacks specificity because it fails to identify "the actions and
words of Defendant Beene". Therefore, as a matter of law this court cannot reach a conclusion
that defendant Beene made any statement capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
24. Paragraph 158 states: "T'he publishing of the letter by Defendant Beene to the
editor of the Patriot News caused public comments on PennLiye and in the forums in the 88th
District in response to the article that echoed the false statements made by Defendant Beene and
Defendant Delozier. " This allegation lacks specificity because it fails to identify (a) the date of
"the letter by Defendant Beene", (b) "the article that echoed the false statements made by
Defendant Beene and Defendant Delozier" and (c) "the false statements made by Defendant
Beene and Defendant Delozier". Therefore, as a matter of law this court cannot reach a
conclusion that defendant Beene made any statement capable of a defamatory meaning against
the plaintiff.
25. Paragraph 159 states: "Defendant Beene's emails, letter to the editor, and other
efforts to disbarage [sic] Plaintiff contributed to the loss of the election by Plaintiff." This
allegation lacks specificity because it fails to identify (a) the date and alleged defamatory
language of "Defendant Beene's emails", (b) the date and alleged defamatory language of
defendant Beene's "letter to the editor" and (c) describe defendant Beene's "other efforts to
disbarage [sic] Plaintiff'. Therefore, as a matter of law this court cannot reach a conclusion that
defendant Beene made any statement capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
26. Paragraph 160 states: "Plainti,,~'Stuski seeks;actual damages in the amount of
money spent on her campaign as well as other punitive damages for damage to her reputation
caused by Defendant Beenes words. " This allegation lacks specificity because it fails to identify
the alleged defamatory language that constitutes "Defendant Beene's words". Therefore, as a
matter of law this court cannot reach a conclusion that defendant Beene made any statement
capable of a defamatory meaning against the plaintiff.
27. The contents of Exhibits A through O contain expressions of opinions by
defendant Beene. Therefore, plaintiffhas failed to plead facts to support actual malice because
opinions are not actionable and cannot support a claim for libel.
28. Plaintiff has not described any circumstances upon which a court could
reasonably conclude a cause and affect between defendant Beene's alleged conduct and
plaintiff's assertion that
a. Electors did not vote for plaintiff, or
b. Clients or potential clients have been deterred from associating with plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, defendant Beene requests this court to sustain his preliminary objections
in the nature of a demurrer to Count V of plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) and to dismiss Count V in its entirety which by virtue of its paragraph 137
would result in dismissing the entire complaint against defendant Beene.
8
II. Plaintiff failed to allege any facts to support an award of damages.
29. No facts are presented in plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint to support the
conclusion that plaintiff would have won or even had a reasonable chance of winning the open
seat for State Representative in the 88~' District in 2008, regardless of Beene's alleged conduct,
given the overwhelming larger number of registered Republican electors than the number of
registered Democratic voters in the 88~' District. The 36% of the votes plaintiffreceived in 2008
closely represents the Democratic Party's registration in the 88~' District. Plaintiff only received
28% of the vote when she ran for the same seat in 2004 and in 2006 against the Republican
incumbent. No Democratic Party candidate received more than 43% of the total vote cast in
Cumberland County or within any legislative or congressional district within Cumberland
County during the 2008 presidential election year. Both Obama (president - no incumbent) and
Wagner (incumbent auditor general) each received 43% of the vote cast in the November 2008
election in Cumberland County.
WHEREFORE, defendant Beene respectfully requests the court to sustain defendant
Beene's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Count V of plaintiffs Third
Amended Complaint and to dismiss Count V of plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint due to the
legal insufficiency of the pleading which fail to state facts upon which a recovery of damages for
libel or defamation could be based.
III. The Third Amended Complaint Fails to conform to Law and Includes Scandalous and
Impertinent Matters. Pa.R.C.P.1028(a)(2)
30. Paragraph 24 states: "After the primary, Beene sought to be the volunteer
coordinator for the Obama campaign, despite assisting the Republican candidate, Delozier
Exhibit "". This averment is immaterial and impertinent to plaintiff's cause of action for
defamation or libel.
9
31. Paragraph 28 states: "Beene ..donated money to Republican Deloaier's campaign,
despite being a'Democratic Area Party leader. Exhibit "N". This averment is immaterial and
impertinent to plaintiff s cause of action for defamation or libel. Donating money to a
candidate's political action committee is awell-recognized exercise of a citizen's constitutional
1St amendment rights.
32. Paragraph 29 states: "Beene wrote a letter to the editor supporting Delozier which
was published in the Patriot News a, fter Plaintiff received that paper's endorsements.. F~hibit
"O ". This averment is immaterial and impertinent to plaintiff s cause of action for defamation
or libel. The letter (exhibit O), which is simply an expression of opinion and support for a
candidate for public office, is awell-recognized expression of a citizen's freedom of speech
exercised as a constitutional right under the 1St amendment.
33. Paragraph 149 states: "Defendant Beene distributed emails with'. this information
to members of the Democratic committee as undisclosed recipients at a time when his of~ j`icial job
was Assistant Legislative Director`at the Public Utility Commission. "The language "at a time
when his official job was Assistant Legislative Director at the Public Utility Commission" is
immaterial and impertinent to plaintiff's cause of action for defamation or libel against defendant
Beene.
34. Paragraphs 7, 14, 22, 23, and the words "a Former Fellow PUC Employee" in the
title of Count V are irrelevant to plaintiff's claim against defendant Beene and consist of
impertinent and immaterial allegations that are not necessary to prove the stated cause of action
for defamation or libel against defendant Beene.
35. Plaintiff, who is an attorney acting pro se in this matter, has demanded attorney
fees under all Counts. Plaintiff has not presented any facts or cited any case law supporting
10
entitlement to recover attorney fees from defendant Beene or defendant Delozier. Therefore, the
pleading requesting attorney fees does not conform to law and is impertinent matter.
WHEREFORE, defendant Beene respectfully requests the court to sustain his preliminary
objections to Count V of plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint, filed pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
1028(2) by
(a) Striking paragraphs 7, 14, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 149 and the words "a Former Fellow
PUC Employee" in the title of Count V of plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint as impertinent
and immaterial matter, and
(b) Striking plaintiff s demand for attorney fees as not conforming to law.
Upon consideration of all the foregoing reasons contained in these preliminary objections
presented pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028, defendant Beene requests the court to sustain all his
preliminary objections and to dismiss plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint, in its entirety,
against defendant Beene.
Respectfully submitted by:
March 11, 2010
Karen M. Balaban
Attorney for Defendant Beene
11
PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: (List the within matter for the
next Argument Court.)
MARGARET M. STUSKI, Plaintiff _~
'.~`.~.
V. Z' l'1~%
~-~ ~ ~.
No. 09-6864, Civil Term y° ~:':
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, _~
THOMAS BEENE,
FRIENDS OF SHERYL DELOZIER, ~~__,
Defendants ~ c=-
1. State matter to be argued:
Defendant Beene's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint
2. Identify all counsel who will argue cases:
(a) for plaintiffs:
Margaret M. Stuski, Esquire 908 Walnut Street Wormleysburg PA 17043
(b) for defendants:
John R. Ninosk Es uire P.O. Box 109 Lemo e PA 17043-0109
Karen M. Balaban, Esquire P.O. Box 821 Harrisburg PA 17108-0821
Unknown -Friends of Sheryl Delozier P O Box 66 New Cumberland PA 17070
N
_~
C.~
3. I will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has been listed for argument.
4. Argument Court Date: March 31, 2010
Date: March 11, 2010 ~~,~.,*„ ~Z
Karen M. Balaban
Attorney for Defendant Thomas Beene
-`Ti _
T
r ~~~
3C
r i ~,,,
'_1~ ~
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717)730-0568
(717) 730-9891 (Fax)
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION -LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043. CIVIL ACTION-LAW
Plaintiff
NO. 09-6864 Civil
vs.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
1331 Sconsett Way,
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Defendant ~ o C3,
THOMAS BEENE
~ p
;~
r`,~,
27 Fort Street _ ---
Lemoyne, PA 17043.
Y ~
w
~~
t~
r;~a n~
Defendant i ~
! ,~- U n
y
~ ~~
FRIENDS OF SHERYL DELOZIER ``~'
P.O. Box 66
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Defendant
ANSWER TO PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT SHERYL M. DELOZIER TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND NOW, comes Margaret M. Stuski, Esquire, pro se, who files this Answer to Defendant
Sheryl M. Delozier' Preliminary Objections to PlaintifYs Third Amended Complaint by respectfully stating
the following:
1. Admitted.
2. Admitted.
3. Admitted. By way of further answer, Stuski had not been served nor was she aware of
the Preliminary Objections that were filed earlier in the day on October 30, 2009.
4. Admitted.
5. Admitted and Denied. By way of further answer, it is admitted that the Second
Amended Complaint. Denied as to when the Complaint was served beyond placing it in the mail as
stated in the Certificate of Service.
6. No response is necessary. The document speaks for itself.
7. Admitted.
8. Denied. By way of further answer, Delozier's counsel was offered the opportunity to
have a filed copy but due to the acrimonious exchange did not answer when asked. A copy of the filed
document has been mailed to Delozier's counsel.
9. No response is necessary as the Order speaks for itself.
10. Admitted.
11. No response is necessary as the Order speaks for itself.
12. Denied. By way of further answer, the cause of action is also based on the rest of the
allegations in the conduct including the conduct of the Defendant Delozier.
13. Admitted.
14. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
15. Denied. By way of further answer, Stuski is not aware of why Delozier produced a false
document and there is nothing to show that Stuski's mailers were untrue.
16. Denied. By way of further answer, when Delozier became a candidate she executed a
document authorizing "Friends of Sheryl Delozier" as her official political action committee and cannot
by law disclaim the acts of her authorized political action committee.
17. Denied. By way of further answer, when Delozier became a candidate she executed a
document authorizing "Friends of Sheryl Delozier" as her official political action committee and cannot
by law disclaim the acts of her authorized political action committee.
18. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself. By way of further answer,
the paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is required.
19. No response is necessary to citations of the law.
20. Denied. By way of further answer, when Delozier became a candidate she executed a
document authorizing "Friends of Sheryl Delozier" as her official political action committee and cannot
by law disclaim the acts of her authorized political action committee.
21. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
22. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
23. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
24. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
25. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
26. Admitted.
27. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
28. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
29. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
30. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
31. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself. By way of further answer,
the paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
32. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself. By way of further answer,
the paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
33. Denied. By way of further answer, Stuski does not now or ever has held elective office
except as a committeewoman. Stuski is not a public figure and this paragraph calls for a conclusion of
law. Even if the court determines that Stuski's candidacy makes her a public figure, she is at best a
limited one.
34. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
35. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
36. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
37. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
38. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
39. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
40. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
41. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
42. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
43. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
44. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
45. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
46. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
II. DEMURRER AS TO COUNT I
47. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
48. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
49. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
50. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
51. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
52. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
53. Denied. By way of further answer, Stuski did not admit that the statements in the flyer
are true. The rest of the paragraph is a conclusion of law to which no response is required.
54. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
55. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
56. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
57. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
58. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
59. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
60. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
61. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
62. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
63. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
64. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
65. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
66. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
67. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
68. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
69. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
70. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
71. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
72. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
73. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
74. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
75. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
76. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
77. Admitted and denied. By way of further answer, Stuski admits that she is currently
appearing in Court pro se for the prosecution of this case. Stuski, however, did incur attorney fees in the
preparation of the original complaint for which she is seeking payment.
78. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
79. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Margaret M. Stuski respectfully requests this Honorable Court to deny
the Defendant Sheryl M. Delozier's preliminary objections and to order the Defendant to answer the
Third Amended Complaint.
Respectfully Submitted,
7
rgaret M. Stuski, Esquire
ID# 42478
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
(717) 730-0568
(717) 730-9891 (fax)
Pro Se
Dated: March 19, 10
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717) 730-0568
(717) 730-9891 (Fax)
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION -LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043.
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
N0. 09-6864 Civil
vs.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
1331 Sconsett Way,
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
THOMAS BEENE .
27 Fort Street .
Lemoyne, PA 17043.
Defendant .
FRIENDS OF SHERYL DELOZIER
P.0. Box 66 .
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Defendant
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT SHERYL M DELOZIER'S PRELIMINARY
OBJEt~TIONS Tom( PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 14, 2009, Plaintiff, Margaret M. Stuski, Esquire, (hereinafter "Stuski"),
filed a 17- page Complaint which contains four (4) Counts of defamation/libel against
Sheryl M. Delozier (hereinafter "Delozier") and one (1) Count for defamation against
Thomas Beene (hereinafter "Beene"). Preliminary Objections to the Complaint were filed
by Beene on October 30, 2009. Stuski filed an Amended Complaint on October 30, 2009.
On November 25, 2009, Delozier filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on December 2, 2009. Delozier
filed Preliminary Objections to the Second Amended Complaint. On February 16 , 2010,
Stuski filed a Third Amended Complaint. In addition, Stuski filed a Nunc Pro Tunc Motion
to allow the filing of the Third Amended Complaint. The Honorable Judge Guido issued an
Order granting the filing of the Third Amended Complaint. On March 5, 2010, Defendant
Delozier filed Preliminary Objections to the Third Amended Complaint. This filing is in
response to those Preliminary Objections. On March 11, 2010, Defendant Beene filed
Objections to the Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint.
In 2008, Plaintiff ran for the open State Representative seat in the 88~ District in
Cumberland County. Delozier was also a candidate for the seat. Beene was and is still
employed by the Public Utility Commission (PUC) as the Assistant Director of Legislative
Affairs. Beene and Delozier both worked at the PUC at the same time and are friends and
political allies. Delozier in the final three days of the campaign had her campaign
committee mail in plain white envelopes the flyer attached to the Third Amended
Complaint to registered voters in the 88~ District. The flyer contained false information
which bore upon the reputation of Stuski and was sent out with the deliberate knowledge
that the information contained within had been discussed with Beene previously. Delozier
caused the false information supplied by Beene to be sent to voters. Such a false and
shocking piece caused voters not to vote for Stuski and Stuski lost the election. Stuski
brings this action for defamation/libel against Defendants Delozier and Beene.
II. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
A. SHOULD STUSKI'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED IN ITS
ENTIRELY FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLIAM UPON WHICH RELIEF SHOULD BE
GRANTED?
Suggested Answer: No. Stuski's Third Amended Complaint states a claim for
defamation as to Delozier because the flyer attached to the Complaint contain statements
to which Delozier is liable as the campaign committee is Delozier's authorized committee
as required by Pennsylvania Election Law. Further, Stuski has plead facts to support actual
malice based upon the contents of the flyer.
B. SHOULD COUNTS I-IV BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
SINCE THE STATEMENTS DELOZIER MADE ARE FALSE, DEFAMATORY AND
ACTIONABLE?
Suggested Answer: No.
C. IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO DISMISSAL, SHOULD CERTAIN PARAGRAPHS
OF THE THIRD AMEDED COMPLAINT AND STUSKI'S DEMAND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
BE STRICKEN?
Suggested Answer: No.
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. STUSKI'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT IS LEGALLY SUFFICENT AND STATES A
CLIAM UPON WHICH RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AN
ANSWER SHOULD BE FILED DISCOVERY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO FURTHER
DEVELOP EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.
Defendant Delozier argues that the libelous/defamatory statements contained in the
flyer are not her words but those of her committee. It is clear from some of the language
that these are words that Delozier used at an campaign appearance with Stuski that raised
the issue of her nominating her family and friends to state positions while she was in
charge of this job at the Governor's Office. The additional words added also contain
language that were in the emails Beene exchanged with Stuski.
Interestingly, Delozier argues that they are words from her authorized political
action committee but in her pleadings never denies that it was her who wrote those words
and/or approved those words for publication. It is curious that the argument is that the
words are in third person. She never states who wrote the words and therefore an Answer
in this Matter would be appropriate to determine the answer to that question if the answer
is different from the fact that Delozier herself participated in, formulated, approved and
committed the publication of the defamation/libelous words.
Clearly, under Pennsylvania Law, a candidate must authorize a political action
committee on its behalf if they are to receive campaign funds. A candidate must sign the
authorization form provided by the Pennsylvania Department of State at least at the time of
filing of the nomination petitions . If Delozier blames her campaign committee for
collecting and expending funds that were not authorized by her then that is more
appropriate a response for an answer to the complaint and not a demurrer as there is
evidence to the contrary that she knew the committee was sending out the flyer and she
was responsible for the approval of the statements on the flyer as contributed to by her
friend and ally, Thomas Beene.
Delozier filed a Demurrer as to all Counts of the Complaint under Pa.R.C.P.1028(4).
More specifically, it should be Pa.RC.P. 1028 (a)(4) that reads in relevant part:
(a) Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to
any pleading and are limited to the following grounds:
(4) legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer);
The appellate court has articulated the standards that the
appellate court will examine in reviewing such matters:
We will begin by setting forth our standard of review from
an appeal from the grant of preliminary objections. In
determining whether the trial court properly sustained
preliminary objections, the appellate cour~t~ must
examine the averments in the complaint, together with the
documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to
evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred. Clemleddv
Constr., Inc. a Yorston. 2002 PA Super 342 810 A Zd 693
(Pa. Super. 2002).
Therefore, the trial Court must now take as true all facts and exhibits that Stuski has
brought forth in the Complaint:
In reviewing preliminary objections, all material facts
averred in the complaint and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from them are admitted as true.
Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hospital, Inc.. 502 Pa. 241.465
A.2d 1231 1983.; Fletcher v. Pennsylvania Property &
Casualty Insurance GuarantvAssociation.914 A.Zd 477
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2007..
Delozier argues that Stuski is a public figure. Stuski has never held office but was
running as a candidate in the election for State Representative in 2008. At best, Stuski
would only be considered a public figure in the limited capacity under the law and
therefore the standard to be applied would be the requirement of showing what
responsibility Delozer had to Stuski. The court has stated the following in these situations
when weighing the important constitutional right of free speech to the responsibility of
using that right in a manner that does not harm another:
We consider and would hold that a "public figure"
who is not a public official may also recover damages
for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing
of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers. Cf. Sulzberger, Responsibility and Freedom,
in Nelson, Freedom of the Press from
Hamilton to the Warren Court 409, 412. as set forth in
Curtis Pub Co v Butts 388 U S 130
Delozier infers that even if defamation/libel occurred in the publication of the
that the standard
of law is so high that Stuski could not possibly defend her reputation. The Pennsylvania
Courts have held to the contrary however:
In Sprague, the plaintiff was a public official who sued a
newspaper for printing an article which allegedly defamed the
plaintiff. In this context, the Sprague court addressed the issue of
whether the federal Constitution provides that representations
made by a confidential source are presumptively valid. We
concluded that the free expression rights accorded by the U.S.
Constitution were not so expansive.
The Sprague court next considered whether the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides' broader protections to the media in
a defamation action filed by a public official than does the
federal Constitution. In discussing the free expression rights
guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution, we recognized that
these rights are intension with another right guaranteed by our
commonwealth's constitution, namely the right to protect one's
reputation. n10
--------------Footnotes---------------10
The right to preserve one's reputation is contained in Article I.
section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
------------End Footnotes--------------
The Sprague court was keenly aware of the seesawing balance
between the constitutional rights of freedom of expression and of
safeguarding one's reputation: protection of one of those rights
quite often leads to diminution of the other. Yet, in the quest to
strike a balance between these two competing protections, our
court cautioned that the freedom of expression should not be
seen as dominant and the protection ~~ of reputation as
inferior. We stressed that the right to protect one's reputation is
not asecond-class right, amenable toy' being pressed into
oblivion by other constitutional provisions. We made it plain that
"a person's interest in his or her reputation has been placed in the
same category with life, liberty and property." Id. (citations
omitted). Thus, we concluded the constitutional interest in
providing for the free flow of information was not so absolute
that it granted "a license to the media to use information
recklessly and/or maliciously to destroy the reputation of a
citizen." Id. Rather, a balance must be struck between these two
constitutional rights. Norton v Glenn, 580 Pa. 212
The facts set out in the complaint set forth the necessary elements of the cause
of action and the Complaint should not be dismissed.
B. COUNTS I-IV SHOULD NOTBE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM SINCE
THE STATEMENTS DELOZIER MADE ARE FALSE, DEFAMATORY AND ACTIONABLE.
Under Pennsylvania law, a defamatory statement is one
that "'tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him."' Birl v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co.. 402 Pa. 297.303.167 A.2d 472 X1960)
(quoting Restatement of Torts § 559 (1938)); accord Thomas
Merton Center v. Rockwell Int'I Corp.. 497 Pa. 460 464 442 A 2d
213 (1981)., cer-t denied, 457 U.S. 1134.73 L. Ed. 2d 1351. 102
S. Ct. 2961 (1982. ~4~ It is for the court to determine, in the
first instance, whether the statement of which the plaintiff
complained is capable of a defamatory meaning; if the court
decides that it is capable of a defamatory meaning, then it is for
the jury to decide if the statement was so understood by the
reader or listener. Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co.. 441 Pa. 432
442.273 A.2d 899 X1971).. To ascertain the meaning of an
allegedly defamatory statement, the statement must be
examined in context Baker v. Lafayette College. 516 Pa. 291
296.532 A.2d 399 (1987.
The testis the effect the [statement] is fairly calculated to
produce, the impression it would naturally engender, in the
minds of the average persons among whom it is intended to
circulate. The words must be given by judges and juries the
same signification that other people are likely to attribute to
them.
Corabi. 441 Pa. at 447 (citation omitted).
In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving 1) the defamatory character of the communication; 2)
its publication by the defendant; 3) its application to the
plaintiff; 4) an understanding by the reader or listener of its
defamatory meaning; and 5) an understanding by the reader or
listener of an intent by the defendant that the statement refer
to the plaintiff. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8343(a~(11~(5). (1988).
Additionally, in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the statement results from fault, amounting
at least to negligence, on the part of the defendant. Gever v.
Steinbronn. 351 Pa. Super. 53b.554-55.506 A.Zd 901 (1986).;
Rutt a Bethlehems' Globe Publishing Co. 33S Pa Super 163
186.484 A.2d 72 (1984),; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8344 (1988).
Finally, the plaintiff has the burden of proving any special harm
resulting from the statement. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 83431(6).
(1988); see Restatement of Torts § 575 comment b (defining
special harm).
The words Delozier used were calculated to convey to the average person that
Stuski was not fit to practice law or run for office based on a statement by her peers which
in this case would be attorneys. This is was not just an opinion by Delozier that Stuski was
not qualified to run for State Representative as Delozier knew that was a false statement.
The true statement by the PBA is available for Delozier to review and it is obvious that she
did not review the actual statement and instead mischaracterized the statement in the
press. There is ample information from the Pennsylvania Bar Association explaining its
program of evaluating candidates and not misleading the public that it is evaluating
anything other than the qualifications to serve on a particular judicial seat.
Delozier's misuse of the comments raises a serious public policy concern over the
reputation of the PBA process, attorneys and judges in general who participate as
candidates for any office. Much care has been taken by PBA to allow the public to rely on
the information provided. This is such an affront to the process that it damages the
electoral process and tarnishes the judicial system's reputation as well as Stuski's
reputation.
The right to run for office is just as valuable as freedom of speech. This wanton
reckless and misuse of the words used by the PBA hurts the election process. Delozier was
desperate to do a last minute attack on Stuski as the materials were mailed in the last three
days of the campaign despite Delozier being aware of Stuski's mailings weeks prior to
election day. Stuski did not and has not had the opportunity to redeem her reputation due
to the malicious mailings that Delozier did.
Stuski's complaint sets forth the basis for libel/defamation claims against both
Defendants. The words of the PBA could have been easily verified and were not. Delozier
relied on the words in a newspaper article that said Stuski was a car dealer. The
publication in the newspaper was wrong in that Stuski was never a licensed car dealer and
this was easily verifiable by checking the website of the Commonwealth Department of
State. Delozier was the public employee of the Governor's Office responsible for the Boards
and Commissions and was very intimately knowledgeable of the licensing process.
Delozier deliberately intended to portray Stuski as one to be vilified or else any reference
to the car industry would have been irrelevant in Stuski's qualifications for elective office
as a State Representative.
If Delozier's actions are allowed to stand then any attorney who represents clients
such as murderers would then be a murderer themselves under Delozier's logic that it is
alright to ascribe the profession of the client to the attorney representing them. It would
then be fine to publish this in the context of a political campaign and the attorney would
have no recourse to correct their reputation.
The result of the mailings was that Stuski lost the election. Stuski also lost the
confidence of many of the general public upon whom her career as an attorney is based. It
is clear from the animosity surrounding this case that the allegations are believed and
Stuski must work hard to clear her reputation. The loss of the election was a severe
financial loss for Stuski and she seeks the money back along with an apology to clear her
name.
The Pennsylvania courts have discussed defamation at length:
The tort of defamation protects against damage to one's
reputation. As recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court,The most important function of an action for
defamation is to give the innocent and injured plaintiff a
public vindication of his good name. Its primary purpose is to
restore his unjustly tarnished reputation and 'reputation is the
estimation in which one's character is held by his neighbors or
associates.' Restatement, Torts § 577, comment b
(1938).Graham v. Todav's Spirit. 503 Pa 52 57 468 A 2d 454
457 (1983)(quoting Gaetano v Sharon Herald Co 426 Pa
179. 183.231 A.2d 753. 755 (1967. In contrast, the tort of
commercial disparagement protects one's economic interests
against pecuniary loss. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts & 623~A1. comment ~ (1977). For this reason, a cause of
action for commercial disparagement requires the showing of
actual pecuniary loss. Although a cause of action for
defamation must also show harm, the type of harm associated
with a defamation action encompasses impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, mental anguish or suffering. SeeAgriss v.
Roadwav Exp., Inc.. 334 Pa Super 295 483 A 2d 456 467
(Pa.Super. 1984~.(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc 418 U S
323.350.94 S. Ct. 2997. 3012 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974. In sum,
defamation and commercial disparagement are two distinct
torts. See Zer oa 1 Corp v DMP Corp 561 F Supp 404 408
(E.D. Pa. 1983. Pro Golf Mfg. v. Tribune Review Newspaper
Co., 2000 PA Super 273.
Wherefore, Plaintiff asks that the Preliminary Objections be dismissed as a cause of
action exists under the law.
C. IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO DISMISSAL, DEFENDANT'S DEMAND THAT CERTAIN
PARAGRAPHS OF THE THIRD AMEDED COMPLAINT AND STUSKI'S DEMAND FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES BE STRICKEN SHOULD BE DENIED.
Defendant Delozier contends that paragraphs 8-14, 39-47, 52-53, 62 and 66 of the
Third Amended Complaint are irrelevant and consist of impertinent matter which should
be stricken from the Third Amended Complaint.
Paragraphs 8-14 set forth the background whereby Defendants Delozier and Beene
knew each other, were friends and cooperated in developing a plan against Plaintiff.
Paragraphs 39-47 state the true and factual claims made against Delozier by Stuski
and demonstrate that Delozier's motivation was to consult with Beene concerning his
source of the false materials that were used against Stuski. They are relevant to the
Plaintiffs claims and necessary to the proof of her case.
Paragraphs 47, 52, 53,62 and 66 contain relevant information that is necessary to
the proof of Plaintiffs case against Defendants and should not be stricken.
Regarding all the Defendant's requests to have these paragraphs stricken, she
provides no basis except assertions that they are false or irrelevant.
Nothing contained within any of the contested paragraphs are immaterial and/or
inappropriate to the proof of the cause of action.
Stuski has made a demand for attorney fees. At present, Stuski is appearing pro se
in these proceedings. Approximately $1500 was incurred in legal research by Stuski from
another attorney . It is not known whether Stuski will employ counsel further along in the
proceedings so a demand for attorneys fee as an ongoing item is appropriate and should be
allowed until the final resolution of the matter.
It is within the discretion of the Court to award attorney fees and costs as well as
any other relief that the Court may see fit.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Honorable Court
deny Defendant Delozier's Preliminary Objections and order that an Answer be filed in this
matter.
Respectfully Submitted,
~---,
ARGAREI` M. STUSKI, ESQ.
Petitioner
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
Dated: March 19, 2010
MARGARET M. STUSKI IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
Plaintiff PENNSYLVANIA
v. N0. 09-6864 Civil
CIVIL ACTION -LAW
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, and JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
THOMAS BEENE and FRIENDS OF
SHERYL DELOZIER,
Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 440, the undersigned does hereby verify that a true and correct copy
of the within Answer and Brief in Support of PlaintifYs Answer was served on March 19,
2010 on the following by first-class mail, email or by personal service, to
John R Ninosky, Esquire
Attorney for Sheryl M. Delozier
JRNC~jdsw.com
301 Market Street
Lemoyne, PA 17043
Karen Balaban, Esquire
Attorney for Thomas Beene
223 State Street, Suite 200
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Friends of Sheryl Delozer
P.0.66
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Date: 3/19/10 i~ ~ " ~~
argaret M. tuski, Esq.
Attorney ID# 42478
Pro Se
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717) 730-0568
(717)730-9891 (Fax)
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION -LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043. CNIL ACTION-LAW
Plainriff
NO. 09-6864 Civil
vs.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED.
1331 Sconsett Way, n Q
~~~ --
New Cumberland, PA 17070 ~' K~,
- _ a
Defendant ` ~ -'
~ ~
Zj
~ ~.~ -
~
~ ~
THOMAS BEENE ~
~
27 Fort Street - ~
~~ -~-r
Lemoyne, PA 17043. ~
Defendant
FRIENDS OF SHERYL DELOZIER
P.O. Box 66
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Defendant
ANSWER TO PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT THOMAS BEENE TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT
1. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
2. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
3. No response is necessary as the document speaks for itself.
4. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
5. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
6. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
7. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
8. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
9. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
10. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
11. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
12. Denied. By way of further answer, Plaintiff did not admit that the statements were true only
that they were said. The remainder of the paragraph does not require a response as it calls for a
conclusion of law.
13. Denied. Plaintiff has run for office and was an elected committeewoman. Plaintiff is not a
public figure by the exercise of her constitutional rights to run for office and at best is a limited public
figure. The remainder of the paragraph does not require a response as it calls for a conclusion of law.
14. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
15. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
16. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
17. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
18. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
19. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
20. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
21. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
22. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
23. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
24. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary. By way of further
answer, the publication in the Patriot News is a matter of public record.
25. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary. By way of further
answer, the emails with the dates are attached to the Complaint and made a part therein.
26. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
27. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
28. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
29. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
30. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
31. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
32. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
33. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
34. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary.
35. The paragraph calls for a conclusion of law to which no response is necessary. By way of further
answer, Stuski admits that she is currently appearing in Court pro se for the prosecution of this case.
Stuski, however, did incur attorney fees in the preparation of the original complaint for which she is
seeking payment.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Stuski asks this Honorable Court to dismiss Defendant Beene's Preliminary
Objections and to order the Defendant to answer the Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint.
Respectfully Submitted,
r aret M. Stuski, Esquire
I D# 42478
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
(717) 730-0568
(717) 730-9891 (fax)
Pro Se
Dated: March 19, 2010
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
(717) 730-0568
(717) 730-9891 (Fax)
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION -LAW
MARGARET M. STUSKI
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043.
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
N0. 09-6864 Civil
vs.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
1331 Sconsett Way,
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Defendant
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
THOMAS BEENE
27 Fort Street
Lemoyne, PA 17043.
Defendant
FRIENDS OF SHERYL DELOZIER
P.0. Box 66
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Defendant
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BEENE'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 14, 2009, Plaintiff, Margaret M. Stuski, Esquire, (hereinafter "Stuski"),
filed a 17- page Complaint which contains four (4) Counts of defamation/libel against
Sheryl M. Delozier (hereinafter "Delozier") and one (1) Count for defamation against
Thomas Beene (hereinafter "Beene"). Preliminary Objections to the Complaint were filed
by Beene on October 30, 2009. Stuski filed an Amended Complaint on October 30, 2009.
On November 25, 2009, Delozier filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on December 2, 2009. Delozier
filed Preliminary Objections to the Second Amended Complaint. On February 16 , 2010,
Stuski filed a Third Amended Complaint. In addition, Stuski filed a Nunc Pro Tunc Motion
to allow the filing of the Third Amended Complaint. The Honorable Judge Guido issued an
Order granting the filing of the Third Amended Complaint. On March 5, 2010, Defendant
Delozier filed Preliminary Objections to the Third Amended Complaint. This filing is in
response to those Preliminary Objections. On March 11, 2010, Defendant Beene filed
Objections to the Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint.
In 2008, Plaintiff ran for the open State Representative seat in the 88th District in
Cumberland County. Delozier was also a candidate for the seat. Beene was and is still
employed by the Public Utility Commission (PUC) as the Assistant Director of Legislative
Affairs. Beene and Delozier both worked at the PUC at the same time and are friends and
political allies. Delozier in the final three days of the campaign had her campaign
committee mail in plain white envelopes the flyer attached to the Third Amended
Complaint to registered voters in the 88~ District. The flyer contained false information
which bore upon the reputation of Stuski and was sent out with the deliberate knowledge
that the information contained within had been discussed with Beene previously. Delozier
caused the false information supplied by Beene to be sent to voters. Such a false and
shocking piece caused voters not to vote for Stuski and Stuski lost the election. Stuski
brings this action for defamation/libel against Defendants Delozier and Beene.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Should Defendant Beene's demurrer to the Plaintiffs Third Amended
Complaint be denied as the Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint is legally sufficient
to establish a cause of action for libel?
Suggested Answer: Yes.
2. Should Defendant Beene' s Preliminary Objection to Plaintiffs Third
Amended Complaint concerning no allegation to support an award be granted as
Defendant Beene had demurred to the complaint in its entirety and damages are set
forth? Further, should Defendant Beene's extraneous analysis of the election be
considered as evidence and is it appropriate to be considered in a demurrer action
as it exists outside of the pleadings?
Suggested Answer: No
3. Should Defendant Beene's Preliminary Objection that Plaintiffs Third
Amended Complaint be striken for failure to conform to Law and inclusion of
Scandalous and Impertient Matters be denied?
Suggested Answer: Yes
III. ARGUMENT
A. Defendant Beene's demurrer to the Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint
should be denied as the Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint is legally sufficient to
establish a cause of action for libel and defamation
The Pennsylvania courts have discussed defamation at length:
The tort of defamation protects against damage to one's
reputation. As recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court,The most important function of an action for
defamation is to give the innocent and injured plaintiff a
public vindication of his good name. Its primary purpose is to
restore his unjustly tarnished reputation and 'reputation is the
estimation in which one's character is held by his neighbors or
associates.' Restatement, Torts § 577, comment b
(1938).Graham v. Todgv's Spirit. 503 Pa. 52.57.468 A.2d 454.
457 (1983).(quoting Gaetano v. Sharon Herald Co.. 426 Pa.
179. 183.231 A.2d 753. 755 j19671). In contrast, the tort of
commercial disparagement protects one's economic interests
against pecuniary loss. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 623(A). comment ~ (1977). For this reason, a cause of
action for commercial disparagement requires the showing of
actual pecuniary loss. Although a cause of action for
defamation must also show harm, the type of harm associated
with a defamation action encompasses impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, mental anguish or suffering. See Agriss v.
Roadway Exp., Inc.. 334 Pa. Super. 295.483 A.2d 456.467
(Pa.Super. 1984).(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S.
323. 350.94 S. Ct. 2997.3012.41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974. In sum,
defamation and commercial disparagement are two distinct
torts. See Zerpol or.~. v. DMP Corp.. 561 F. Super. 404.408
(E.D. Pa. 19831. Pro Golf Mfg. v. Tribune Review Newspaper
Co., 2000 PA Super 273.
Many of the same arguments have been raised by Defendant Delozier
is her request for a demurrer in this matter and Plaintiff will repeat the same
responses that were given to Delozier's demurrer and are incorporated. by
reference as a filed Court document.
To reiterate briefly:
Under Pennsylvania law, a defamatory statement is one that "'tends
so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him."' Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.. 402 Pa. 297. 303.167
A.2d 472 (1960) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 559 (1938)); accord
Thomas Merton Center v. Rockwell lnt'1 Corp.. 497 Pa. 460.464.442
A.2d 213 X1981)., cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1134.73 L. Ed. 2d 1351. 102 S.
Ct. 2961 (1982).. ~ It is for the court to determine, in the first
instance, whether the statement of which the plaintiff complained is
capable of a defamatory meaning; if the court decides that it is capable
of a defamatory meaning, then it is for the jury to decide if the
statement was so understood by the reader or listener. Corabi v. Curtis
Publishing Co.. 441 Pa. 432.442.273 A.2d 899 X1971).. To ascertain
the meaning of an allegedly defamatory statement, the statement
must be examined in context. Baker v Lafayette College. 516 Pa. 291.
296.532 A.2d 399 (19871.
The testis the effect the [statement] is fairly calculated to produce, the
impression it would naturally engender, in the minds of the average
persons among whom it is intended to circulate. The words must be
given by judges and juries the same signification that other people are
likely to attribute to them. Corabi. 441 Pa. at 447 (citation omitted).
In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 1)
the defamatory character of the communication; 2) its publication by
the defendant; 3) its application to the plaintiff; 4) an understanding
by the reader or listener of its defamatory meaning; and 5) an
understanding by the reader or listener of an intent by the defendant
that the statement refer to the plaintiff. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. ~
8343(al(11-(51 (1988). Additionally, in order to recover damages, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the statement results from fault,
amounting at least to negligence, on the part of the defendant. Gever v.
Steinbronn. 351 Pa. Super. 536.554-55.506 A.2d 901 X1986).; Rutt v.
Bethlehems' Globe Publishing Co.. 335 Pa. Super. 163. 186.484 A.2d 72
1984 ; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. ~ 8344 (1988). Finally, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving any special harm resulting from the statement. 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8343(al(6) (1988); see Restatement of Torts § 575
comment b (defining special harm).
Beene's statements are calculated to damage Stuski's reputation. It is clear he is not
concerned with the truth of his statements and his motivation to to make sure that Stuski
did not run or if she did to use false information to damage her beyond the scope of the
election. His interference with the election should be against public policy when he stands
to benefit personally in his official position with the PUC due to his political actions.
B. Defendant Beene' s Preliminary Objection to Plaintiffs Third Amended
Complaint concerning no allegation to support an award should not be granted as
Defendant Beene had demurred to the complaint in its entirety and damages are set
forth clearly within as the losses suffered by Stuski due to the loss of the election.
Further, Defendant Beene's extraneous analysis of the election is not to be
considered as evidence and is more appropriate in an Answer to the Complaint and
not in a demurrer action as it exists outside of the pleadings.
The entire argument presented in this section on behalf of Defendant Beene centers
upon an award of damages. Financial damages are clearly set forth such as the loss of
money spent on the election and damage to reputation when Plaintiff has difficulty finding
work and experiences open hostility from counsel for Delozier and Beene.
The extraneous argument is not appropriate in consideration of a demurrer and is
more appropriate as an Answer and/or possible defense. However, Plaintiff represents
that a flawed political analysis still does not justify the false malicious statements made by
Beene.
Defendant Beene offers no case law to justify such a legal position and the
preliminary objections should be dismissed.
C. Defendant Beene's Request to Strike Portions of the Complaint is Not Founded
given Defendant Beene's Public Position as an employee in the Legislative Affairs
Office of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) and his Active Involvement in Partisan
Politics.
The Pennsylvania courts have discussed defamation at length:
The tort of defamation protects against damage to one's
reputation. As recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court,The most important function of an action for
defamation is to give the innocent and injured plaintiff a
public vindication of his good name. Its primary purpose is to
restore his unjustly tarnished reputation and 'reputation is the
estimation in which one's character is held by his neighbors or
associates.' Restatement, Torts § 577, comment b
(1938).Graham a Todgv's Spirit. 503 Pa. 52.57.468 A.2d 454.
457 (19$31(quoting Gaetano v. Sharon Herald Co.. 426 Pa.
179 183.231 A.2d 753. 755 (1967)1. In contrast, the tort of
commercial disparagement protects one's economic interests
against pecuniary loss. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts ~ 623(Al. comment ~ (1977). For this reason, a cause of
action for commercial disparagement requires the showing of
actual pecuniary loss. Although a cause of action for
defamation must also show harm, the type of harm associated
with a defamation action encompasses impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, mental anguish or suffering. See Agriss v.
Roadway Exp.. Inc.. 334 Pa. Super. 295.483 A.2d 456.467
jPa.Super. 1984(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S.
323.350.94 S. Ct. 2997. 3012.41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974.). In sum,
defamation and commercial disparagement are two distinct
torts. See ~r op 1 Corp, v. DMP Corp.. 561 F. Supp. 404.408
fE.D. Pa. 1983,. Pro Golf Mfg. v. Tribune Review Newspaper
Co., 2000 PA Super 273
It is clear that Defendant Beene was more than just a private citizen himself as he
was the Democratic Area Leader during 2008. He purposefully put himself in the middle of
the Presidential Campaigns and through his relationships with the Presidential Campaign
and the Democratic Party sought to organize others against Stuski. He did nothing more
than search the Internet for information on Stuski and took the information at face value
with no further investigation. He knew that Stuski denied his absurd conclusions and
allegations yet he relayed these to Delozier to use in the mailing against Stuski.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Honorable Court
deny Defendant Beene's Preliminary Objections and order that an Answer be filed in this
matter.
Respectfully Submitted,
~RGARET ~M. STU lI~LrS .
Q
Petitioner
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
Dated: March 19, 2010
MARGARET M. STUSKI
v.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
Plaintiff PENNSYLVANIA
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, and
THOMAS BEENE and FRIENDS OF
SHERYL DELOZIER,
Defendants
N0. 09-6864 Civil
CIVIL ACTION -LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 440, the undersigned does hereby verify that a true and correct copy
of the within Answer to Preliminary Objections and Plaintiffs Brief in support of the
Answer was served on March 19, 2010 on the following by first-class mail, email or by
personal service, to
John R Ninosky, Esquire
Attorney for Sheryl M. Delozier
JRN@jdsw.com
301 Market Street
Lemoyne, PA 17043
Karen Balaban, Esquire
Attorney for Thomas Beene
223 State Street, Suite 200
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Friends of Sheryl Delozer
P.O.66
New Cumberland, PA 17070
Date:3/19/10 ~ ~~
argaret . Stuski, Esq.
Attorney ID 42478
Pro Se
0
: NO. 2009 -6864 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
BEFORE GUIDO, OLER
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 31 ay of AUGUST, 2010, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, defendants' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are
SUSTAINED and the plaintiff's third amended complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
By the Court,
Edward E. Guido, J.
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
V.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
FRIENDS OF
SHERYL DELOZIER, AND
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendants
-'---Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
?Karen Balaban, Esquire
223 State Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 821
Harrisburg, Pa. 17108-0821
sld
I ES'
4?r?rv
011'a 1 LL
n ?.
C: co rrs
_
ca
f
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
V.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER,
FRIENDS OF
SHERYL DELOZIER, AND
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 2009 -6864 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
BEFORE GUIDO, OLER
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Margaret M. Stuski filed a multi-count complaint alleging defamation
against Defendant Sheryl M. Delozier, Defendant Friends of Sheryl Delozier and
Defendant Thomas Beene. Currently before us are the preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer filed by all defendants. The parties have briefed and argued their
respective positions. The matter is ready for disposition.
Factual Background
Stuski and Delozier were opponents in the 2008 general election to fill the open
88`x' District State House seat. Both parties campaigned vigorously with Delozier
prevailing. The claims against defendants Delozier and Friends of Delozier are based
upon statements made in a brochure mailed to prospective voters. The alleged
defamatory statements were that the plaintiff was "untruthful" "unpredictable," had a
"troubled record", and that she had been rated "not recommended" for elective office "by
NO. 2009 -- 6864 CIVIL TERM
her peers at the Pa. Bar Association."' The brochure also referred to her as "a former car
dealer. ,2 The claim against Beene is based upon a letter to the editor published in the
Patriot News as well as numerous e-mails contained in exhibits attached to the complaint.
She alleges that the defamatory statement in the letter is his allegedly false claim that "I
am fortunate to know and work closely with both of the candidates running for the open
House 88`h District."3 She does not specify the defamatory statements contained in the e-
mails.
Applicable Law
Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. We may sustain a demurrer only when the complaint is "clearly insufficient
to establish the pleader's right to relief" County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa.
360, 372, 490 A.2d 402, 408 (1985) (citations omitted). Preliminary objections admit as
true all relevant and material facts that are well-pleaded, as well as all inferences
reasonably deduced form those facts. Id.
The Uniform Single Publication Act4 sets forth the elements of a prima facie case
for defamation. The burden is upon plaintiff to prove, inter alia, the defamatory
character of the communications A communication is defamatory if it "tends to harm the
reputation" or expose the subject to "public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Feldman v.
Lafayette Green Condominium, Association, 806 A.2d 497 at 500-501 (Pa.
1 Complaint paragraph 49, Exhibit "P". We note that the third amended complaint does not have Exhibit
"P" attached. However, we consider it because it was attached to the prior complaints and addressed by the
parties in their briefs as well as at argument.
'` Complaint paragraph 50, Exhibit "P".
' Complaint paragraph 30, Exhibit "O".
' 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 8 341 - 8345.
' 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8343 (a).
2
NO. 2009 - 6864 CIVIL TERM
Commonwealth 2002). However, certain types of communications no matter how
offensive are not actionable. As the Feldman court noted, "a statement that is merely an
expression of opinion is not defamatory." Id. The court went on to explain:
Pennsylvania courts have adopted Section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts as an aid in determining whether a statement is strictly opinion. ... Section
566 states that a defamatory communication in the form of an opinion is only
actionable if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as its basis.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566. Further, comment (c) to Section 566
explains the distinction between non-actionable "pure" opinion and potentially
actionable "°mixed opinion." It states:
A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed ... facts is not itself
sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and
unreasonable the opinion may be or how derogatory it is.
Id, citations omitted.
If the plaintiff is a public figure, as in the case at bar, case law imposes an
additional burden. She must prove that the defendants published the statements with
actual malice. Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 592 Pa. 458, 926 A.2d 899 (2007);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Actual malice is a legal term of art
meaning that the defendants acted "with knowledge that the statement was false or with
reckless disregard of its falsity." Weaver, 926 A.2d at 903. Negligence or carelessness in
publishing incorrect information is not evidence of actual malice. New York Times v.
Sullivan, supra. Nor does the failure to investigate the accuracy of a statement, without
more, satisfy the requirements of actual malice. Fitzpatrick v. Philadelphia Netivspaper,
Inc. 389 Pa Super 438, 567 A.2d 684 (1989).
DISCUSSION
Applying the above law to the case at bar we are satisfied that all of defendants'
preliminary objections must be sustained. We start by noting that the alleged defamatory
statements were made during a hotly contested political campaign. We also note that
3
NO. 2009 - 6864 CIVIL TERM
they were relatively mild when judged against the standard we have come to expect in the
political arena. While plaintiff may have been personally offended, none of the
statements are actionable. We will discuss the offending statements seriatim.
"Not Recommended for Elective Office."
Count I of the complaint is based upon the claim in Delozier's campaign flyer that
plaintiff was "not recommended for elective office by her peers at the Pa. Bar
Association."6 However, it is clear from the pleadings that the element of actual malice
is lacking. The flyer itself cites to a report in the Philadelphia Inquirer as the source of
the information. Furthermore, the plaintiff admits in the complaint that she received such
a rating in connection with her aborted candidacy for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.7
"Unpredictable ... - Can't tell the truth."
At the very top of Delozier's brochure in stark bold letters is the statement
"Marge Stuski Unpredictable ... Can't Tell the Truth."8 Counts II and III of
plaintiff s complaint are based upon this statement.
However, the brochure goes on to explain: "Marge Stuski's barrage of negative
campaign mailers in the 88t" District would make a Philadelphia ward boss blush with
pride, given their blatant disregard of the facts."9 It then sets forth the allegedly false
statements contained in plaintiff's campaign mailers. Not only is the alleged defamatory
6 Exhibit 'T" to the Complaint.
7 Complaint, paragraphs 69 - 77.
s Exhibit "P".
' Exhibit 'T"
4
NO. 2009 - 6864 CIVIL TERM
statement an expression of opinion, it is clearly based upon disclosed facts. As such it is
not actionable. See Feldman supra.
"Former Car Dealer."
Count IV of the complaint is based upon the allegedly false accusation that
plaintiff was a "former car dealer."10 We cannot imagine any circumstances in which
such a statement could be considered defamatory under t:he law. Plaintiff's claim to the
contrary does not merit any further discussion.
Claims Against Defendant Beene
The plaintiff attached various e-mails and a letter to the editor as exhibits "A"
through "O" to the complaint. She alleges that they contained "wicked, malicious, false,
and illegal" statements."' The complained of statement in the letter is pure opinion.
With regard to the e-mails she does not specify, nor were we able to find any which were
actionable. Those that may be considered objectionable were statements of opinion
based upon disclosed facts. Therefore, we will enter the order that follows.
ORDER
.- ;? -
AND NOW, this V- day of AUGUST, 2010, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, defendants' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are
SUSTAINED and the plaintiff's third amended complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
1' Complaint paragraph 119, Exhibit 'T". the actual allegation in the flyer refers to plaintiff as "A
Philadelphia lawyer and former car dealer... "
'' Complaint, paragraphs 140 - 145.
5
NO. 2009 - 6864 CIVIL TERM
By the Court,
/s/Edward E. Guido
Edward E. Guido, J.
Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, Pa. 17043
Karen Balaban, Esquire
223 State Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 821
Harrisburg, Pa. 17108-0821
sld
6
~-s+ ~-s-~_~a; FICA
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART &WEIDNER
By: John R. Ninosky, Esquire (#78000)
301 Market Street
P. O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
Phone: (717) 761-4540
Email: jrn@jdsw.com
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
v.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, FRIENDS OF
SHERYL DELOZIER and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendants
L~' i
~~~~~~' f~TY
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
N0.09-6864 Civil
CIVIL ACTION -LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PRAECIPE TO ENTER JUDGMENT
TO PROHTONOTARY OF LYCOMING COUNTY:
Please enter judgment for Defendants Sheryl M. Delozier and Friends of Sheryl Delozier
and against Plaintiff pursuant to the August 31, 2010 Order of The Honorable Edward E. Quido
attached hereto.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART &WEIDNER
Date: 0 S" By: (/~-
ohn R. inosky
Counsel for Defendant Delozier
JUDGMENT
AND NOW, this (e-+~ day of _~~ , 2010, judgment is entered in
favor of the Defendants Sheryl M. Delozier and Friends of Sheryl Delozier and against the
Plaintiff as requested above. Da~-id e'.t3t~e,l~
Pro notary
~~ 3y58~/
~,~ a~9a~7
~o~ ~~
MARGARET' M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
V.
SHERYL IvL D1rL0L1ER,
FRIl.~NDS OF
SI~LRYL DELOZIER, AND
Ti:IOMAS 13~1.C,
Defcndaats
IN 'f1iC COUR? OF COMMON FL~S OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
N0.2009 -6864 CIVFL TERM
1N _t2~; D ~ • • DANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
BEFORE GUTDOiQLER
~~~ or couRr
AND NOW, this _~;~ day of AUGUST, 2010, far tiie reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, defendants' Preliminary objections in the nt~ure of a dtmurres aro
SUSTAINED rind the plsinti:EFs third arntndcd complaint is DISMISSED with prcjUdicc.
13y the Court;.=. --.~
.- ~`~
A~~
Edward E. Guido, J.
Mar~rct M: Stuslci
908 Walnut Street
Wormlcy$burg, Pa. 170.3
Karc-n Balaban, Esquire
223 State Street, Suite Z00 _
P.O. Bos 321
PIarrisbur~, Pa. 17105-0821
:sld
~X~ ~~t ~-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Praecipe to Enter Judgment has been duly
served upon the following counsel of record, by depositing the same in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, in Lemoyne, Pennsylvania, on October 5, 2010:
Margaret M. Stuski (Pro Se)
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
Karen Balaban, Esquire
223 State Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 821
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0821
Attorney for Defendant Beene
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER
By:
ohn R. Ninosky
JOHNSON, DUFFIE, STEWART & WEIDNER
By: John R. Ninosky, Esquire (#78000)
301 Market Street
P. O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
Phone: (71.7) 761-4540
Email: jrn@jdsw.com
MARGARET M. STUSKI,
Plaintiff
v.
SHERYL M. DELOZIER, FRIENDS OF
SHERYL DELOZIER and
THOMAS BEENE,
Defendants
Attorney for Defendant:
Sheryl M. Delozier
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
N0.09-6864 Civil
CIVIL ACTION -LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
RULE 236 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
TO: Margaret M. Stuski
908 Walnut Street
Wormleysburg, PA 17043
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT A JUDGMENT HAS BEEN ENTERED AGAINST YOU
IN THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER.
~iJid D~u~.
~ ~ ~ ^f01~~~R-~
Prothonotary
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ABOVE, PLEASE CONTACT:
John R. Ninosky, Esquire
Johnson, Duffie, Stewart & Weidner
301 Market Street
P.O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043
717-761-4540
jrn@jdsw.com