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HomeMy WebLinkAbout09-8858IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No. Oq - Be S8 DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION - LAW 0'-1,4itTerPx JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NOTICE TO DEFEND You have been sued in Court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Amended Complaint and notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing with the Court your defense or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court without further notice for any money claimed in the Amended Complaint or for any other claim or relief requested by the Plaintiffs. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Lawyer Referral Service of the Cumberland County Bar Association 32 South Bedford Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 Telephone No. (717) 249-3166 or 800-990-9108 (In PA only) AVISO USTED HA SIDO DEMANDADO EN LA CORTE. Si usted desea defenderse de las quejas expuestas en las paginas siguientes, debe tomar accion dentro de veinte (20) dias a partir de la fecha en que recibio la demanda y el aviso. Usted debe presentar comparecencia escrita en persona o por abogado y presentar en la Corte por escrito sus defensas a sus objeciones a las demandas en su contra. Se le avisa que si no de defiende, el caso puede proceder sin usted y la Corte puede decidir ensu contra sin mas aviso a notificacion por cualquier dinero reclamado enla demanda o por cualquier otra queja o compensation reclamados por el Demandante. USTED PUEDE PERDER DINERO, O PROPIEDADES U OTROS DERECHOS IMPORTANTES PARA USTED. LLEVE ESTA DEMANDA A UN ABOGADO INMEDIATAMENTE. SI USTED NO TIENE O NO CONOCE UN ABOGADO, VAYA O LLAME A LA OFICINA EN LA DIRECCION ESCRITA ABAJO PARA AVERIGUAR DONDE PUEDE OBTENER ASISTENCIA LEGAL. Lawyer Referral Service of the Cumberland County Bar Association 32 South Bedford Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 Telephone No. (717) 249-3166 or 800-990-9108 (In PA only) 2 COMPLAINT AND NOW, TO WIT, this 13?day of j)V-_M?(2009,come the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, the Law Offices of Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, and file the following Complaint upon a cause of action whereof the following is a statement: 1. Plaintiffs Mark E. Jackson and Deborah Jackson, husband and wife, reside at 890 Whisler Road, Etters, Pennsylvania 17319-9444, in York County. 2. Defendant Leslie Fields, Esquire, is an attorney and licensed professional with offices in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, at Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, 831 Market Street, Lemoyne, Pennsylvania 17043-0222. Plaintiff is asserting a professional liability claim against this Defendant. 3. Attorney Fields is a partner in the partnership Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, and this action is brought against her individually and against the partnership in which she was doing business at the time of the professional negligence alleged below. 3 COUNTI NINUI ELDSuuALLY AND T COSTOPOULOS FOSTER & FI NEGLIGENCE 4. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-3 of this Complaint are incorporated herein as though fully set forth. 5. On March 8, 2006, Mr. Jackson was seen by Matthew D. Davidson, D.O., of Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., for left inguinal pain that had continued since a hernia repair surgery he had undergone approximately two years before on January 9, 2004. 6. Dr. Davidson scheduled surgery for a left groin exploration, and entertained a diagnosis of ileoinguinal nerve entrapment and possible hernia; however, no testing was done to confirm this diagnosis. 7. Dr. Davidson did not note whether Mr. Jackson had been seen in a pain clinic for evaluation, nor did Dr. Davidson note whether any nerve blocks had been done to confirm the diagnosis. 8. Dr. Davidson failed to document the precise location of Mr. Jackson's pain, type of pain, its duration, what made the pain worse, or what relieved the pain. 4 9. On June 6, 2006, Plaintiff Mark Jackson underwent surgery for a left inguinal hernia repair by Matthew Davidson, D.O. 10. During his surgery, Dr. Davidson used electrocautery several times. 11. Dr. Davidson discovered a large foreign body granuloma associated with the mesh from the first hernia repair surgery. 12. Dr. Davidson, using electrocautery, excised the majority of the mesh in Mr. Jackson, along with suture granulomas and scar tissue granulomas. 13. Dr. Davidson specifically noted that, after exploring the entire groin, there was no evidence of any direct or indirect inguinal hernia; however, the lower inferior portion of the mesh had the ilioinguinal nerve tightly adhered to it, which Dr. Davidson dissected free and transected. 14. When Dr. Davidson removed the mesh that had been placed in the previous hernia repair surgery two years before, it became likely that a recurrent hernia would result. 5 15. When he removed the mesh, Dr. Davidson caused a high likelihood that the blood supply to the cord and small blood vessels would be disrupted, compromising the blood supply to the testes and the cords. 16. Before his surgery, Dr. Davidson did not inform Mr. Jackson of the risk that the blood supply to his cords and testes may be disrupted or compromised. 17. Before his surgery, Dr. Davidson did not inform Mr. Jackson of the risk of ischemic orchitis; the risk of testicular atrophy; the risk of orchiectomy; the risk of necrosis of the testicles; or the risk of reduced fertility. 18. From June 7 through June 12, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Jackson made multiple telephone calls to Dr. Davidson's office with complaints of excessive pain and swelling. 19. Mr. and Mrs. Jacksons' concerns were assured by Dr. Davidson's staff to be normal, and that treatment should continue as prescribed with ice, antibiotics, and elevation. 20. On Saturday, June 17, 2006, Mr. Jackson called Dr. Davidson's office, and spoke with him that day about the excessive swelling and pain. 6 21. Mr. Jackson informed Dr. Davidson that his first scheduled appointment with Dr. Davidson after the surgery was scheduled for the following week, on Wednesday, June 21, 2008. 22. Dr. Davidson dissuaded Mr. Jackson from going to an Emergency Room, and did not give him an earlier appointment, but told Mr already scheduled the following Wednesday. 23. Jackson to come into his office as On June 21, 2006, Mr. Jackson saw Dr. Davidson, who expressed concern that Mr. Jackson had left testicular torsion. He ordered a stat duplex study of the left testicle to evaluate its viability. 24. On June 21, 2006, Dr. Davidson exclaimed to Mr. and Mrs. Jackson that he had never before seen a condition as that presented by Mr. Jackson on that day. 25. On June 21, 2006, Mr. Jackson had a scrotal ultrasound at Smith Radiology, Inc., the report of which stated the radiologist's impression that Mr. Jackson's left testicle demonstrated diffusely increased flow, indicating epididymal orchitis with possible abscess formation in the left testicle. 26. Mr. Jackson returned to Dr. Davidson on June 26, 2006, with a slight fever, to review the ultrasound results. 7 27. Dr. Davidson placed Mr. Jackson on Cipro, an antibiotic, and asked him to return in two weeks. 28. On July 5, 2006, Mr. Jackson again presented persistent complaints of pain, and he had a very firm left testicle. Dr. Davidson referred Mr. Jackson to Frank C. D'Amico, M.D., an urologist. 29. On July 6, 2006, having seen Mr. Jackson, Dr. D'Amico believed that Mr. Jackson had a resolving scrotal hematoma and a possible epididymal orchitis. Dr. D'Amico told Mr. Jackson to continue with the Cipro, begin taking Sitz baths, apply traction to his testicle twice a day in light of his shortening cord structure, and to return in two to three weeks. 30. Mr. Jackson was seen by J.C. Trussell, M.D., at the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, on July 10, 2006. 31. Dr. Trussell reviewed the previous ultrasound, noting that it showed epididymo- orchitis; however, he noted that there was no evidence of ongoing abscess or infection. 32. Dr. Trussell ordered a repeat scrotal ultrasound in two weeks, which occurred on July 31, 2006. 8 33. Dr. Trussell ordered another ultrasound, which occurred on August 11, 2006, which was "worrisome for vascular injury versus separate or superimposed infectious process." 34. Following his surgery by Dr. Davidson, Mr. Jackson developed an orchitis secondary to ischemia and underwent an orchiectomy by Dr. Trussell. 35. Pathologic examination revealed that the testis had ischemic necrosis, fibrosis and degeneration. 36. Following his surgery by Dr. Davidson, Mr. Jackson's complaints of unusually high pain uncontrolled by pain medication and excessive swelling were not appreciated as a threat or a danger to the patient by Dr. Davidson. 37. Dr. Davidson delayed seeing his patient for his complaints after the surgery, compromising the viability of the cord and the testicle. 38. Despite multiple telephone calls from Mr. and Mrs. Jackson about his complaints, Mr. Jackson was not seen by Dr. Davidson until his regularly scheduled post-operative appointment on June 21, 2006. 9 39. Following the orchiectomy, Mr. Jackson has continued to suffer great pain and suffering, including groin pain and phantom testicular pain, despite treatment by pain management specialists including multiple nerve blocks that have had limited success. 40. Dr. Davidson was negligent in treating his patient, Mr. Jackson, in the following particulars: (a) failing to confirm the diagnosis of ileoinguinal nerve entrapment before performing surgery on June 6, 2006; (b) failing to performing testing to diagnose the cause of the patient's pain before performing surgery on June 6, 2006; (c) failing to determine the cause of the patient's pain before performing surgery on June 6, 2006; (d) failing to consider or refer the patient to a pain clinic for evaluation before performing surgery on June 6, 2006; (e) failing to consider or refer the patient for nerve blocks in an attempt to successfully treat or diagnose the cause of the patient's pain. (f) failing to take a thorough and adequate pain history of the patient before performing surgery on June 6, 2006; (g) failing to document the patient's pain history, including a description of the location, duration, type, palliative activities or measures, and aggravating activities or measures of the pain; 10 (h) performing the surgery on June 6, 2006, before determining whether there was a definite recurrent hernia; (i) failing to appreciate the greatly increased risk of severe and permanent injury to his patient in light of the first surgery performed on Mr. Jackson in 2004; G) removing the mesh remaining in the patient after the first hernia repair surgery in his surgery of June 6, 2006, when there was no indication to do so, and no documentation of the reason for its removal; (k) failing to properly release any nerve that may be entrapped following the patient's first hernia repair surgery two years before; (1) failing to properly document the operation performed on June 6, 2006; (m) failing to property document the surgery performed and his intraoperative findings, or lack thereof, to the extent necessary to justify the surgery performed on June 6, 2006; (n) performing the June 6, 2006, surgery in such a manner as to compromise the blood supply to the testes and cords, resulting in ischemia and orchiectomy; (o) employing cautery in proximity to tissues that could lead to venous thrombosis of, or vascular injury to, the cord structures; (p) failing to timely and appropriate respond to his patient's complaints of pain and extreme swelling of the testicle following the surgery on June 6, 2006; 11 (q) failing to timely evaluate his patient post-operatively in light of his complaints; (r) failing to rapidly consider the diagnosis of an evolving testicular ischemia in light of the patient's complaints; (s) failing to perform an appropriate differential diagnosis for the cause of the patient's complaints; and (t) failing to timely initiate appropriate treatment for the findings revealed by the ultrasound ordered on June 21, 2006. 41. Dr. Davidson also failed to obtain the patient's informed consent to the June 6, 2006, surgery, in that he failed to advise the patient of a risk of a reherniation, a risk of a compromise to the blood supply to the cords and testes, a risk of ischemic orchitis, a risk of testicular atrophy, a risk of orchiectomy, a risk of necrosis, and a risk of reduced fertility. 42. Dr. Davidson's failure to obtain his patient's informed consent to the surgery constitutes a battery under Pennsylvania law, warranting the submission of punitive damages for the fact-finder's consideration. 43. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Dr. Davidson, Plaintiff suffered severe and continuing pain following the June 2006 surgery, which pain and suffering is expected to continue into the future. 12 44. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Dr. Davidson, Mr. Jackson suffered general damages past, present and future to wit: Plaintiff suffered and will continue to suffer severe mental anguish and physical pain and suffering, great inconvenience, humiliation, disfigurement, embarrassment, loss of life's enjoyment and pleasures, and of the damages which discovery will show are appropriate under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 45. As a direct result of the negligence of the Defendant, Plaintiffs were forced and will be forced to incur expenses for necessary medical care. 46. At the time and place aforesaid, and by the reason of Dr. Davidson's negligence, Mr. Jackson suffered severe shock and damage to his physical, emotional and mental systems, both known and unknown; existing weaknesses or preexisting conditions, if any of the Plaintiffs physical, emotional or mental systems were injured or aggravated. 47. As a result of the negligence of Dr. Davidson, Plaintiff suffered a loss of earnings and earning capacity. 48. As a result of the negligence of Dr. Davidson, Mrs. Jackson has suffered a loss of her husband's consortium, thus warranting compensation for her loss. 13 49. Damages suffered by Mr. Jackson as a result of the professional negligence of Dr. Davidson exceed the amount requiring mandatory Arbitration in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 50. The Jacksons entered into an attorney-client relationship and employment agreement with Attorney Fields by which the attorney and/or The Firm were hired to pursue a claim of medical malpractice against Dr. Davidson. 51. The employment agreement is not written; however, the parties to the agreement mutually understood that Attorney Fields and/or The Firm were to pursue a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Davidson on a contingency fee basis, and the Jacksons were to reimburse the costs of litigation. 52. Attorney Fields represented to the Jacksons, both expressly and as implied, that she was competent and skilled in handling cases such as the medical negligence and battery claims against Dr. Davidson, and she had a duty to represent the Jacksons with reasonable care, skill and diligence possessed by the ordinary attorney in similar circumstances. 53. At all times relevant hereto, Attorney Fields acted individually, and/or by and through her authorized agents, servants and employees, including secretarial staff, paralegal staff, and other office staff at the Law Firm of Costopoulos, Foster & Fields. 14 54. After entering into the express or implied contract to render legal services in exchange for a contingent fee, Attorney Fields and/or her authorized agents, servants and employees specified in Paragraph 53, above, continued to assure the Jacksons that they were diligently pursuing the prosecution of their claims against Dr. Davidson, that the claims were proceeding well and would be successfully completed in a short period of time. 55. In pursuing the Jackson's claim against Dr. Davidson, Attorney Fields engaged the services of Subir Ray, M.D., a surgeon, to act as an expert medical witness. 56. Dr. Ray issued a report stating his professional opinion that the medical malpractice claim against Dr. Davidson had merit and was viable. A copy of Dr. Ray's report dated July 15, 2008, is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 57. In Pennsylvania, there is a two-year statute of limitations applicable to Mr. and Mrs. Jackson's professional negligence claims against Dr. Davidson. 58. Attorney Fields failed to institute suit within the required two years, and the Jacksons' claims against Dr. Davidson were forever barred by the statute of limitations. 59. Attorney Fields has admitted that she is responsible for the missing of the deadline for filing suit as required by the statute of limitations. A copy of Attorney Fields' 15 letter to Mr. and Mrs. Jackson dated September 11, 2008, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 60. Had their claims been competently prosecuted to conclusion and not barred by their untimely assertion by Attorney Fields under the statute of limitations, the Jacksons would have recovered a substantial judgment or settlement against Dr. Davidson. 61. Had the claim been prosecuted to conclusion, the Jacksons would have been able to collect the amount due and owing from Dr. Davidson. 62. Attorney Fields had a duty to represent the Jacksons with reasonable care, skill and diligence possessed by the ordinary attorney in similar circumstances. 63. Attorney Fields undertook to represent the Plaintiffs in their claims against Dr. Davidson. 64. However, during the course of that professional relationship and employment and acting within the scope of the attorney-client relationship, Attorney Fields failed to exercise ordinary skill, knowledge, care or reasonable competence that would normally be possessed and exercised under the circumstances by members of the legal profession, in the following particulars: (a) failing to investigate the Jacksons' claims against Dr. Davidson properly, competently, timely and adequately; 16 (b) failing to obtain all information available in order to determine all claims that could be successfully pursued on behalf of the Jacksons; (c) failing to perform independent medical and legal research to familiarize herself with the matters under investigation in order to properly evaluate and assert the valid claims the Jacksons had against Dr. Davidson; (d) failing to properly and effectively gain supporting expert medical witness opinion for all valid claims the Jacksons had against Dr. Davidson; (e) failing to ensure that the expert medical witness opinion that she did gain from Dr. Ray was thorough, complete, and well-informed, and properly considered all potentially valid claims against Dr. Davidson; (f) failing to consider the impact of the first surgery performed on Mr. Jackson in 2004 with respect to the Jacksons' claims against Dr. Davidson; (g) failing to consider the viability of any claims the Jacksons may have had against the surgeon who performed the surgery on Mr. Jackson in 2004; (h) agreeing to represent the Jacksons in a medical negligence claim when Attorney Fields had insufficient knowledge, training or experience to do so competently; (i) failing to timely file suit to preserve the Jacksons' claims against Dr. Davidson within the applicable statute of limitations; 0) failing to timely and diligently prosecute the Jacksons' claims against Dr. Davidson within the applicable statute of limitations; (k) failing to promptly refer the Jacksons to other attorney(s) who were competent in the area of practice in which she attempted to engage; 17 (1) failing to keep the clients, the Jacksons, apprised of the status of their claims; (m) failing to carefully and accurately calculate the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations; (n) failing to enforce or implement a system to prevent the unnoticed or noticed passing of crucial deadlines in the Jacksons' case to their prejudice; (o) failing to engage a physician expert witness who would or could provide a competent basis for the claims properly asserted against Dr. Davidson within the applicable statute of limitations; (p) failing to obtain a sufficient and adequate expert witness opinion that supported the claims properly asserted against Dr. Davidson within the applicable statute of limitations; (q) failing to draft and file an adequate and sufficient complaint before the applicable statute of limitations expired; (r) failing to assert a claim of negligence on behalf of the Jacksons against Dr. Davidson before the applicable statute of limitations expired; (s) failing to assert a claim that Dr. Davidson did not obtain the patient's informed consent on behalf of the Jacksons before the applicable statute of limitations expired; (t) failing to assert a claim for punitive damages on behalf of the Jacksons against Dr. Davidson before the applicable statute of limitations expired; 18 (u) failing to assert a claim for loss of Mrs. Jackson's consortium with her husband against Dr. Davidson before the applicable statute of limitations expired; and (v) failing to perform her professional duties to her clients in a manner that caused harm or prejudice to her clients. 65. The Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Davidson were meritorious claims for which Dr. Davidson was liable, and but for Attorney Fields' breach of duty, lack of skill, care and competence as aforesaid, the Plaintiffs would have received a substantial and fair verdict, settlement or award of compensation. 66. Attorney Fields failed to investigate the viability of any claims the Jacksons may have had against the surgeon who performed the first surgery on Mr. Jackson in 2004, or the impact of that first surgery on the failure of the second surgery performed by Dr. Davidson. 67. Had Attorney Fields properly investigated potential claims the Jacksons may have had against the first surgeon, found them to have merit, and timely asserted them under the statute of limitations and the discovery rule, if applicable, the Jacksons would have recovered a substantial judgment or settlement against the first surgeon. 19 68. Had any viable claim on behalf of the Jacksons been prosecuted to conclusion against the surgeon who performed the surgery in 2004, the Jacksons would have been able to collect the amount due and owing from the first surgeon. 69. Attorney Fields prepared a draft of a complaint that was never filed in the Jackson matter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 70. The draft complaint does not contain the grounds of Dr. Davidson's liability as supported by the expert report of Dr. Ray. 71. The draft complaint does not contain all meritorious claims against Dr. Davidson that a reasonable and diligent pre-suit investigation, had it been done appropriately under the applicable professional standard of care, would have revealed. 72. Rather, the draft complaint fails to assert that Dr. Davidson was negligent in failing to perform an adequate and complete pre-operative work-up, including a history, pain history, or any diagnostic testing. 73. Further, the draft complaint fails to assert that Dr. Davidson failed to obtain his patient's informed consent to the surgery in that certain but important risks of the surgery were not disclosed, which assertion is supported by Dr. Ray in his expert report. 20 74. Further, the draft complaint does not include a claim for battery (lack of informed consent) against Dr. Davidson and a corresponding claim for punitive damages, which would be warranted. 75. The draft complaint does not contain all meritorious claims against the surgeon who performed the first surgery on Mr. Jackson in 2004 that a reasonable and diligent pre-suit investigation, had it been done appropriately under the applicable professional standard of care, would have revealed. 76. The inadequacies of the draft Complaint, and its failure to incorporate theories of liability supported by expert testimony and claims that due diligence would have revealed, demonstrate a grave misapprehension of the complexity and essence of medical negligence claims generally-and specifically with the Jacksons' claims against Dr. Davidson-on the part of Attorney Fields. 77. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Attorney Fields and/or The Firm, the Jacksons' claims against Dr. Davidson were barred by the lapse of time pursuant to the two-year statute of limitations, and the once viable claims against Dr. Davidson and the first surgeon were extinguished without resolution on the merits, or the recovery of a judgment or settlement against Dr. Davidson. 21 78. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Attorney Fields and/or The Firm, the Jacksons suffered the following injuries, harms, and damages: (a) an inability to recover for the loss of Mr. Jackson's left testicle; (b) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's loss of earnings and earnings capacity; (c) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's mental anguish, disfigurement, embarrassment and humiliation; (d) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's loss of life's pleasures; (e) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's pain and suffering, past, present and future; (f) an inability to recover monetary compensation for medical expenses incurred, and to be incurred, by the Jacksons; (g) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mrs. Jackson's loss of her husband's consortium, past, present and future; (h) the loss of a verdict, settlement, or fair and substantial compensation awarded against Dr. Davidson; (i) an inability to recover punitive damages against Dr. Davidson; and Q) such other damages as discovery may show are properly allowed by Pennsylvania law. 22 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully demand judgment against Defendants together with interest, costs of suit, and counsel fees if provided by law under the facts of this case as alleged and proven. COUNT II MARK E. JACKSON vs. LESLIE M. FIELDS ESQUIRE INDIVIDUALLY AND T/D/B/A COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS BREACH OF CONTRACT 79. All preceding and succeeding paragraphs are incorporated by reference herein, and made a part hereof. 80. Attorney Fields' aforesaid agreement to represent the Jacksons in their claims against Dr. Davidson for a fee gave rise, by implication, to an understanding and expectation that the Plaintiffs would be provided with professional legal services consistent with those expected of the legal profession at large. 81. The breach of duty, lack of skill, care and competence, set forth in pertinent preceding paragraphs, constituted a failure on the part of Attorney Fields to provide legal services consistent with those expected of the legal profession at large, and was therefore a breach of that aforesaid implied contractual obligation. 23 82. Attorney Fields' aforesaid breaches of care (or any of them) was a breach of that said implied term of the contract, and was a proximate, direct, factual and legal cause of the Jackson s' damages, specifically: (a) an inability to recover for the loss of Mr. Jackson's left testicle; (b) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's loss of earnings and earnings capacity; (c) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's mental anguish, disfigurement, embarrassment and humiliation; (d) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's loss of life's pleasures; (e) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's pain and suffering, past, present and future; (f) an inability to recover monetary compensation for medical expenses incurred, and to be incurred, by the Jacksons; (g) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mrs. Jackson's loss of her husband's consortium, past, present and future; (h) the loss of a verdict, settlement, or fair and substantial compensation awarded against Dr. Davidson; (i) an inability to recover punitive damages against Dr. Davidson; and 0) such other damages as discovery may show are properly allowed by Pennsylvania law. 24 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully demand judgment against Defendants together with interest, costs of suit, and counsel fees if provided by law under the facts of this case as alleged and proven. COUNT III MARK E. JACKSON vs. LESLIE M FIELDS, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY AND T/D/B/A COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 83. All preceding and succeeding paragraphs are incorporated by reference herein, and made a part hereof. 84. At all times relevant hereto, Attorney Fields and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, and that fiduciary duty was breached by the conduct set forth above. 85. Defendants were in a position of trust and authority; however, the lack of care and skill exercised from that position caused detriment to Plaintiffs. 86. The breach of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs has caused them to expend fees and costs in an attempt to recoup fair compensation for their injuries caused by the conduct of Dr. Davidson. 25 87. The aforesaid breach of fiduciary duty was the legal cause of Plaintiffs' injuries, losses and damages, specifically: (a) an inability to recover for the loss of Mr. Jackson's left testicle; (b) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's loss of earnings and earnings capacity; (c) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's mental anguish, disfigurement, embarrassment and humiliation; (d) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's loss of life's pleasures; (e) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mr. Jackson's pain and suffering, past, present and future; (f) an inability to recover monetary compensation for medical expenses incurred, and to be incurred, by the Jacksons; (g) an inability to recover monetary compensation for Mrs. Jackson's loss of her husband's consortium, past, present and future; (h) the loss of a verdict, settlement, or fair and substantial compensation awarded against Dr. Davidson; (i) an inability to recover punitive damages against Dr. Davidson; and Q) such other damages as discovery may show are properly allowed by Pennsylvania law. 26 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully demand judgment against Defendant together with interest, costs of suit, and counsel fees if provided by law under the facts of this case as alleged and proven. Date: v Respectfully submitted, I ? § n By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Date: I q'-?) U9 By: ., J n S. Ba , Esq. up. Ct. I.D. #66122 27 VERIFICATION We, the undersigned, hereby affirm that the facts contained in the foregoing document are true and correct to the best of our knowledge, information, and belief. This statement is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: INIo'SO Date: -OTz vvl J MARK E. JAC ON ` EBORAH JACK ON Exhibi+ Pr Surgical Physicians, P.C. 891 South Arlington Avenue Phone: 717-233-9093 Harrisburg, PA 17109 Toll Free Phone: 1-866-SUR-PHYS ax. 717-233-6387 . ............................ .............................. .....Subir...Ray.,..M... D., F.A.C.S. Ge.neral, Laparoscopic & Advanced Laparoscopic Surgery July 15, 2008 Ms. Leslie M. Fields Attorney At Law 831 Market Street P.O. Box-222 Lemoyne, PA 17042 RE: Mark E. Jackson Dear Ms. Fields: Mark E. Jackson is a 48 year old male who had a left inguinal hernia repair done on January 9, 2004 by anterior approach for an incarcerated direct left inguinal hernia. This was repaired using mesh and evidently was uneventful. What is not clear to me from the note, that I received, is how the patient did postoperatively. Obviously, two years later he was seen by Dr. Davidson with ongoing left groin pain and a diagnosis of ileoinguinal nerve entrapment was entertained. There was no testing done to confirm this diagnosis and no note in the chart that shows that the patient was seen in a pain clinic for evaluation or had any nerve block done prior to the surgery to confirm this diagnosis. The preoperative note by Dr. Davidson is quite insufficient to make any diagnosis. All it states is that the patient has left groin pain. The location, duration and what was done is definitely not seen in the notes that I received and reviewed. If the diagnosis of ileoinguinal nerve entrapment was made then the surgery would be to release the nerve and only the nerve. From the operative note of June 5, 2006 it is not clear why the mesh was removed. Was there pus visible? Apparently, f the operative rom note there was no obvious pus. A suture granuloma and reaction to the mesh can be seen even after two years following a mesh placement if one undergoes an exploration of the groin. If the patient's pain is from chronic rejection of the foreign object and in this case (the mesh) I would agree with the removal of the mesh but I do not understand how the diagnosis was made and how it is possible that the patient would not have a recurrent hernia since the original hernia was repaired with mesh. If the patient had a hernia in 2004 and it was repaired with mesh then there are no questions when you remove the mesh that the patient will have a recurrent hernia noted at the time of the procedure. When the mesh is removed after two years there is a very high likelihood that the blood supply to the cord, which are quite small capillaries and small blood vessels will be disrupted and the blood supply to the testes and the cords will be compromised. Page #2 RE: Mark E. Jackson July 15, 2008 The patient should have been informed very clearly of this prior to the second surgery as to this complication. Was the patient's pain after the first surgery from nerve entrapment or a chronic rejection to the mesh? Although the pathology report shows a fibrosis with chronic inflammation this could be seen with a patient with no reaction to the mesh and obviously there was no increase in his white count or redness or sign of infection that I can see from the physical examination prior to the surgery. Obviously, after two months of following his second groin surgery he developed an orchitis secondary to ischemia and underwent an orchiectomy. The patient's detailed account of the postoperative pain and discomfort and swelling and the delay in his postoperative appointment is a serious problem. Patients are usually discharged after a hernia repair or minor surgery and in this case exploration of the groin and removal of the mesh and the surgery were uncomplicated. The patient's postoperative pain should have been controlled with plain p.o. analgesics. In this case the patient was having unusually high levels of pain and swelling and this was not controlled by the analgesic that was prescribed. The patient should have been evaluated prior to his postoperative appointment by the surgeon, one of his associates or sent to the ER for evaluation. At present the patient still has significant discomfort in the groin and he sometimes limps when he walks. Even after the orchiectomy and removal of the mesh he still has ongoing serious problems with the groin. The cause could be multiple, of course, nerve injury is most likely the cause of his problem but a weakened floor after removal of the mesh may, also, contribute to his problem. If he in the future develops a hernia then definitely this should be repaired by laparoscopy to avoid any other complications. The physician deviated from the standard of care as there was no preoperative consultation with a pain management specialist for possible nerve block especially since no definite recurrent hernia was noted on preop examination. Also, the patient should have been seen by the surgeon in a more timely manner or sent to the ER due to his severe pain and swelling which did not improve from the original phone call postoperatively. The above is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. If you have any questions please do not hesitate t tact me. Thank you. Sincere o s Subir ay,. F.A.C.S. SR:geb a fyh a'• j?7 0 0 m v a' 0 - xhi hit 6 CoSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIIct-,DS ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 831 MARKET STREET WILLIAM C. COSTOPOULOS P.O. BOX 222 LEMOYNE, PENNSYLVANIA 17043-0222 DAVID J. FOSTER LESLIE M. FIELDS GEORGE H. MATANGOS HEIDI F. EAKIN September 11, 2008 Mark & Deborah Jackson 890 Whisler Road Etters, PA 1 73 1 9-9444 Re: Medical Negligence Claim Dear Mark and Deborah: TELEPHONE (717) 761-2121 FAX (717) 761- 4031 WW W.COSTOPOU LOS.COM As a follow-up to my conversation today with Mark, I am writing to confirm with you that due to inaction on the part of my office, the statute of limitations in your case has expired. This means that the underlying case would be dismissed. This was realized by me today, while reviewing a draft of the complaint. I am not sure exactly how this happened, but clearly the correct information about the date of your surgery did not make it into our system properly, and the system failed, for which 1 take full responsibility. If you would to take this up with my insurance carrier, please call and we will provide you with that information. Please do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions. Again, I pray that you will accept my sincerest apologies and remain, Very truly yours, Leslie TMFields LMF jme Enclosure ExwI,+L MARK E. JACKSON AND DEBORAH A. JACKSON, HIS WIFE, Plaintiffs V. : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MATTHEW DAVIDSON, D.O., : No. and CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, LTD., : CIVIL ACTION - L Defendants :JURY TRIAL DEM PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT Cpl Y C6 1. Plaintiffs, Mark E. Jackson and Deborah A. Jackson, his wife, are adult individuals residing at 890 Whisler Road, Etters, York County, Pennsylvania 1 73 1 9-9444. 2. Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O., is an adult individual and physician who, at the time of the occurrences alleged herein, was employed by and/or was the agent, ostensible agent, or apparent agent of Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd. Upon information and belief, Defendant Davidson purported to specialize in surgery. The principal place of business of Defendant Davidson was/is 875 South Arlington Avenue, Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania 17109. 3. Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., is, upon information and belief, a corporation which conducts business on a substantial and -1- continuous basis within the jurisdiction of the Court, including business at the time of the occurrences alleged herein. 4. On or about January 9, 2004, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, underwent a left inguinal hernia repair using mesh. 5. In June 2006 Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, was experiencing extreme left groin pain and was diagnosed by Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O., as suffering from ilioinguinal nerve entrapment. 6. On or about June 5, 2006, Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O., performed a left inguinal exploration procedure on Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, with ilioinguinal neurolysis and removal of the old mesh. 7. Two days later, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, experienced severe pain and testicular swelling. 8. Plaintiff, Deborah A. Jackson, telephoned Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., and was told by staff to apply ice and continue with current medications, which they did. 9. Over the next fourteen days, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, continued to experience severe pain and testicular swelling and he and his wife made repeated phone calls to Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., expressing their concerns; no suggestion was made by staff to have him seen by a -2- physician but, rather, they were told to continue applying ice and were reassured that this was normal. 10. On or about June 21, 2006, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, was seen by Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O., for his scheduled postoperative visit and, upon examination of his testicle, was sent emergently for an ultrasound and then a urology consult, both of which verified the presence of infection and the potential non-viability of the testicle; Plaintiff was started on stronger antibiotics. 11. On or about July 10, 2006, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, was examined by J. C. Trussell, M.D., a urologist at the Hershey Medical Center, and was found to have a swollen, indurated left testicle, epididymis and cord. 12. Despite multiple office visits, ultrasounds and medications, the condition of Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, continued to worsen and, on or about August 16, 2006, Dr. Trussell surgically removed his left testicle; the pathology report noted ischemic necrosis, fibrosis and degeneration. 13. After the surgery, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, continued to be treated by the Urology Clinic of Hershey for persistent pain despite the surgical removal of the testicle. 14. Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, has been treated in the chronic pain management clinic of the Hershey Medical Center and has undergone multiple -3- nerve blocks for the extreme pain that extends from his scrotum to his thigh; he uses Lidoderm patches and pain medications. 15. Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, continues to suffer extreme and chronic pain as of this writing. COUNT I 16. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth. IT Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O. failed to provide reasonable care, caused injury, and/or increased the risk of harm as follows: a) Failing properly to examine, evaluate, and treat Mark E. Jackson on June 5, 2006 and between June 5, 2006 and June 21, 2006; b) Failing to recognize Mark E. Jackson's symptoms and properly treat same; c) Failing to recognize the severity of Mark E. Jackson's condition; d) Failing to order appropriate tests to determine the source/cause of Mark E. Jackson's conditions; including but not limited to, -4- his significant pain and swelling; e) Failing to consider/make a differential diagnosis and/or failing to order tests or take appropriate actions to confirm or rule out a differential diagnosis; 0 Failing to undertake or order postoperative pain consultation with a pain management specialist for possible nerve block; g) Failing to timely refer Mark E. Jackson to a urologist, a surgeon or other specialist for diagnosis and treatment of the pain and swelling; h) Failing to timely refer Mark E. Jackson to the emergency room due to his severe pain and swelling which did not improve from the original telephone call postoperatively; i) Ignoring Mark E. Jackson's condition and/or failing to find/attempt to find a source/cause of the condition; j) Failing to instruct Mark E. Jackson regarding appropriate follow up care; k) Although Mark E. Jackson had concerns about the care -5- provided to him, the Defendant held out expertise intended to induce him to believe that adequate and proper care was provided when, in fact, it was not. 1) Failing to treat his pain and swelling; and m) Being dismissive of information and sYmptomatology. 18. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct set forth, the Plaintiff Mark E. Jackson, has sustained the following: a) prolonged and chronic pain and suffering and emotional distress, mental anguish and humiliation; b) the loss of his left testicle; c) the need for continuing medical treatment, care and attention, medical expenses; d) loss of earnings and a loss of earnings capacity; e) loss of life's pleasures; and f) such other damages as properly allowed by Pennsylvania law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, demands that judgment be entered against Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O., for an amount in excess of the limits of arbitration exclusive of interest and costs of prosecution. -6- COUNT II H Associates Ltd. 19. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein as though fully set forth. 20. Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O., was an employee, agent or servant of Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd. at the time of the occurrences alleged herein. 21. At all relevant times hereto, Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O., was acting within the scope of his employment with Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd. 22. Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., is vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of Defendant, Matthew Davidson, D.O., as though Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., performed the acts or omissions itself. 23. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct set forth, the Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, has sustained the following: a) prolonged and chronic pain and suffering and emotional distress, mental anguish and humiliation; -7- b) the loss of his left testicle; c) the need for continuing medical treatment, care and attention, medical expenses; d) loss of earnings and a loss of earnings capacity; e) loss of life's pleasures; and f) such other damages as properly allowed by Pennsylvania law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, demands that judgment be entered against Defendant, Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., for an amount in excess of the limits of arbitration exclusive of interest and costs of prosecution. COUNT III Plaintiff Deborah A. Jackson v. Defendants 24. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein as though fully set forth. 25. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff, Deborah A. Jackson, and Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson, were lawfully and continuously married. 26. As a direct result of the conduct of the Defendants, Matthew Davidson, D.O., and Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., Plaintiff, Deborah A. Jackson, has suffered a loss of consortium, society and companionship of her -8- husband, Plaintiff, Mark E. Jackson. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Deborah A. Jackson, demands that judgment be entered against Defendants, Matthew Davidson, D.O., and Central Pennsylvania Surgical Associates, Ltd., jointly and severally, for an amount in excess of the limits of arbitration exclusive of interest and costs of prosecution. Respectfully submitted: Leslie M. Fields, Esquire I.D. No. 29411 COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS 831 Market Street/P.O. Box 222 Lemoyne, Pennsylvania 17043 Phone: 717.761.2121 Fax: 717.761.4031 Web: www.Costopoulos.com ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS DATED: September __,,2008 -9- G? *q,2. 00 PP AT" 01,3 e -0 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No C)Q _ %58 Civi I -• ere DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Certificate of Merit as to Leslie Fields, Esquire I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that: ...,......Anappropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by this defendant in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm; AND/OR r The claim that this defendant deviated from an acceptable professional standard is based solely on allegations that other licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible deviated from an acceptable professional standard and an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by the other licensed professionals in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm; OR r- Expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the claim against this defendant. Date: r fir-19 Donald L. Reihart, Esquire Counsel for Plaintiffs IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Certificate of Merit as to Leslie Fields, Esquire was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Respectfully submitted, Date: (??k3 ?17 By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. # PA 07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Facsimile (717) 755-2530 emaiIQreihartlaw com Attorney for Plaintiffs -ui",i , - , I-r\, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. No. bq- 8858 O-Av't l 'Exiy CIVIL ACTION - LAW LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Certificate of Merit as to Costopoulos Foster & Fields I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that: r` An appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by this defendant in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm; AND/OR The claim that this defendant deviated from an acceptable professional standard is based solely on allegations that other licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible deviated from an acceptable professional standard and an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned 13 that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by the other licensed professionals in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm; OR C` Expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the claim against this defendant. Date: Donald L. Reihart, Esquire Counsel for Plaintiffs IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No. DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Certificate of Merit as to Costopoulos, Foster & Fields was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Respectfully submitted, Date: 01 n By: _ q1_ Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. # PA 07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Facsimile (717) 755-2530 emailereihartlaw com CJ _'a? 20 10 in -4 PH 1: 2 4 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs No. 09-8858 Civil Term V. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Interrogatories Directed to Defendants was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Cectfully submitted, ?1 z Date: By: Donald L. Reiha , Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. # PA 07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Facsimile (717) 755-2530 email .reihartlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiffs r , TICE 0F- 1?7AR`f 20 10 JAN -L- PH I.2 4 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEA CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVAMX ?'t•' ` MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs No. 09-8858 Civil Term V. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents Directed to Defendant Leslie Fields, Esq. (First Set) was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 ectfully submitted, Date: A.? By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. # PA 07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Facsimile (717) 755-2530 email(cD-reihartlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiffs i FILEED_4 rrl r,,,, ^TARY IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ZO(O JAN -4 F;'l (: 2 4 CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No. 09-8858 Civil Term DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Interrogatories addressed to Defendant Leslie Fields, Esq. (First Set) was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Date: ?o? ' l Respectfully submitted, By: _ Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. # PA 07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Facsimile (717) 755-2530 emailareihartlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiffs r~ 1-ilJ=.i~~i~'i ICE {)F THE I/; ~';?~I-{ ~~.,~~~ARY 2010 Jr~~# -8 Pi~i I,: 08 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA C`'r~`k -- ~`;'~''~Iil' MARK E. JACKSON and No. pq- gg~rg Civil (~ DEBORAH JACKSON, ; Plaintiffs v. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, ; Defendants. CIVIL ACTION -LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE I accept service of the Complaint on behalf of Leslie Fields, Esq. and certify that I am authorized to do so. Date: ~ ~'/~ BY: ~ , ~~?~' , Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq/ oy~ ~eNl~'c~r/c, ~'s~, O Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Telephone: 610-834-6240 Facsimile: 610-834-1749 Attorney for Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs v. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually : and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. No. 09-8858 Civil Term CIVIL ACTION -LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the Acceptance of Service was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Date: -~ ~~ l '- / d i` Respectfully submitted, By: ` ~ ~`~ Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Attorney for Plaintiffs O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III Attorneys for Defendant~7 ~ -- Identification No. 27808 Leslie Fields, Esquire and dryan~a),obrlaw.com Costopoulos, Foster &~'ields ~_ ~ Anthony P. DeMichele ~=' rv ~ ' =° ~, ^ Identification No. 87602 ~ ~' ` ` ~. -~ .._ ~' ~' ademichele@obrlaw.com t.= ~ . ~ 7 ~ c } Hickory Pointe 300 S i = ;- -. ~ " u te 2250 Hickory Road, ~ j cn Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462 "' (610) 834-8800 MARK E. JACKSON and COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DEBORAH JACKSON, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA Plaintiffs v, No. 09-8858 Civil Term LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a CIVIL ACTION -LAW COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ENTRY OF APPEARANCE TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Kindly enter our appearance on behalf of Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, in the above-captioned matter. O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP _~ DANIEL F. RYAN, III ANTHONY P. DEMICHELE Attorneys for Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields Date: / ~ ?~ C O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III Attorneys for Defendant N Identification No. 27808 Leslie Fields, Esquire a~ dryan(a),obrlaw.com Costopoulos, Foster ~~?~ld~... •~, Anthony P. DeMichele Y-~ ~ `-" Identification No. 87602 ` `~` ' N ~~ ~ ademichele@obrlaw.com ~ Hickory Pointe ~ - T c=:. ' ~^ 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 ~:J ~= Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462 ~ ~ (610) 834-8800 MARK E. JACKSON and COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DEBORAH JACKSON, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA Plaintiffs v. No. 09-8858 Civil Term LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a CIVIL ACTION -LAW COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, hereby demand a jury trial in the above-captioned matter. O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP ~/ , / _ DANIEL F. RYAN, III ANTHONY P. DEMICHELE Attorneys for Defendant, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields Date: 1 J2D~! v O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III Attorneys for Defendant, Identification No. 27808 Leslie Fields, Esquire did v ~ ~' dryan(c~obrlaw.com Costopoulos, Foster;~~~ield~ ~ ~ Anthony P. DeMichele ~-'~: ~ ~ ~ N ~ -o rn ~ ~ Identification No. 87602 - ': ~ , ademichele@obrlaw.com `= `_: -n _ -; ~ ~' Hickory Pointe ~ ~~` ~`" ~~ ~~~~ 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 ' Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462 a s~ - '~ (610)834-8800 MARK E. JACKSON and COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DEBORAH JACKSON, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA Plaintiffs v. No. 09-8858 Civil Term LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a CIVIL ACTION -LAW COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Anthony P. DeMichele, Esquire, hereby certify that on this day, I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing Entry of Appearance and Demand for Jury Trial to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: Donald L. Reihart, Esquire Law Offices of Donald L. Reihart 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402 O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP t : , r~ DANIEL F. RYAN, III ANTHONY P. DEMICHELE Attorneys for Defendant, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields Date: ~ O ~- -,~?~; IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEA ~F ,""~, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVAN,~ t ;;:~; ~a, ~ , ,'a MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs v. No. OR-8858 LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually a-~d t./d/b/a COST(~PO!JLOS_. FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION -LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE I accept service of the Complaint on behalf of Costopoulos, Foster & Fields and certify that I am authorized to do so. Date: 1 ' 1 l " 1 ~ BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. A,,,~,~yQ.~cY7;~~,e~~ Est, O'Brien & Ryan, LLP ' Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Telephone: 610-834-6240 Facsimile: 610-834-1749 Attorney for Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No. 09-8858 Civil Term DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs v. CIVIL ACTION -LAW LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the Acceptance of Service Pertaining to Costopoulos, Foster & Fields was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first- class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Date: ~~ 02 / - o q Respectfully submitted, y ~, Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Attorney for Plaintiffs O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III Attorneys for Defendant, Identification No. 27808 Leslie Fields, Esquire and dryan(a~obrlaw.com Costopoulos, Foster & Fields Anthony P. DeMichele ~ 4 Identification No. 87602 ~ a ademichele obrlaw.com ~ ~? ~ 'i Hickory Pointe ~ L; ~ 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 .~ ~= ~ Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462 ~ ~ . 3 (610)834-8800 ' ~-z- cb MARK E. JACKSON and COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DEBORAH JACKSON, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA Plaintiffs v. No. 09-8858 Civil Term LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a CIVIL ACTION -LAW COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NOTICE TO PLEAD TO: Donald L. Reihart, Esquire Law Offices of Donald L. Reihart 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402 You are hereby notified to plead to the enclosed New Matter within twenty (20) days from service thereof or a default judgment may be entered against you. O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP DANIEL F. RYAN, III ANTHONY P. DEMICHELE Attorneys for Defendant, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields Date: ~' 3 ~~ O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III Identification No. 27808 dryan~,obrlaw.com Anthony P. DeMichele Identification No. 87602 ademichele(a~obrlaw. com Hickory Pointe e 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462 (610) 834-8800 Attorneys for Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs v. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA No. 09-8858 Civil Term CIVIL ACTION -LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ANSWER AND NEW MATTER OF DEFENDANTS, LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE AND COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields ("Defendants"), by and through their attorneys, O'Brien & Ryan, LLP, hereby answer Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph one (1), and therefore, they are denied. 2. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is only admitted that Leslie Fields, Esquire is an attorney and licensed professional with offices in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, at Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, 831 Market Street, Lemoyne, Pennsylvania 17043-0222. The remaining averment in this Paragraph is a conclusion of law to which no response is required, and therefore, it is denied. 3. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is only admitted that Leslie Fields, Esquire is a partner in the partnership Costopoulos, Foster & Fields. The remaining averments in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required, and therefore, they are denied. COUNTI MARK JACKSON vs. LESLIE M. FIELDS, ESQUIRE, individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS NEGLIGENCE 4. Defendants hereby incorporate Paragraphs one (1) through three (3), of their Answer as though set forth herein at length. 5. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph five (5), and therefore, they are denied. 6. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph six (6), and therefore, they are denied. 7. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph seven (7), and therefore, they are denied. 8. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph eight (8), and therefore, they are denied. 9. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph nine (9), and therefore, they are denied. 10. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph ten (10), and therefore, they are denied. 11. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph eleven (11), and therefore, they are denied. 12. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twelve (12), and therefore, they are denied. 13. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirteen (13), and therefore, they are denied. 14. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph fourteen (14), and therefore, they are denied. 15. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph fifteen (15), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 16. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph sixteen (16), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 17. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph seventeen (17), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 18. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph eighteen (18), and therefore, they are denied. 19. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph nineteen (19), and therefore, they are denied. 20. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty (20), and therefore, they are denied. 21. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-one (21), and therefore, they are denied. 22. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-two (22), and therefore, they are denied. 23. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-three (23), and therefore, they are denied. 24. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to foam a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-four (24), and therefore, they are denied. 25. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-five (25), and therefore, they are denied. 26. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-six (26), and therefore, they are denied. 27. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-seven (27), and therefore, they are denied. 28. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-eight (28), and therefore, they are denied. 29. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph twenty-nine (29), and therefore, they are denied. 30. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty (30), and therefore, they are denied. 31. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-one (31), and therefore, they are denied. 32. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-two (32), and therefore, they are denied. 33. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-three (33), and therefore, they are denied. 34. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-four (34), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 35. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-five (35), and therefore, they are denied. 36. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-six (36), and therefore, they are denied. 37. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-seven (37), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 38. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-eight (38), and therefore, they are denied. 39. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph thirty-nine (39), and therefore, they are denied. 40 (a-t). Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty (40), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 41. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty-one (41), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 42. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 43. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge andlor information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty-three (43), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 44. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty-four (44), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 45. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty-five (45), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 46. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty-six (46), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 47. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty-seven (47), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 48. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty-eight (48), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 49. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and/or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph forty-nine (49), and therefore, they are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 50. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 51. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 52. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 53. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 54. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. By way of further response, Defendants specifically deny that they assured the Jacksons that the potential claim against Dr. Davidson would be "successfully completed." Defendants also deny the allegations in this Paragraph to the extent that they imply that there was any guarantee of a positive outcome of the potential litigation against Dr. Davidson, as no such guarantee was given by Defendants. 55. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is only admitted that Leslie Fields, Esquire retained the services of Subir Ray, M.D. It is denied however, that at the time Dr. Ray was retained by Leslie Fields, Esquire, that his role was to serve as an expert medical witness. 56. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. 57. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 58. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 59. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. 60. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 61. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 62. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 63. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is only admitted that Leslie Fields, Esquire undertook representation of the Plaintiffs. The remaining averments in this Paragraph are denied to the extent they are legal conclusions to which no response is required and to the extent that they infer and/or assume that there were claims against Dr. Davidson. 64 (a-t). Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 65. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 66. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 67. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 68. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 69. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. 70. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 71. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 72. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 73. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 74. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 75. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 76. Denied. The document referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 77. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 78 (a-j). Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. WHEREFORE, Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor, and against Plaintiffs, and award them such further relief as the Court deems necessary and/or appropriate under the circumstances. COUNT II MARK E. JACKSON vs. LESLIE M. FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS BREACH OF CONTRACT 79. Defendants hereby incorporate Paragraphs one (1) through seventy-eight (78), of their Answer as though set forth herein at length. 80. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 81. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 82 (a-j). Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. WHEREFORE, Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor, and against Plaintiffs, and award them such further relief as the Court deems necessary and/or appropriate under the circumstances. COUNT III MARK E. JACKSON vs. LESLIE M. FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 83. Defendants hereby incorporate Paragraphs one (1) through eighty-two (82), of their Answer as though set forth herein at length. 84. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 85. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 86. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 87 (a-j). Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. WHEREFORE, Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor, and against Plaintiffs, and award them such further relief as the Court deems necessary and/or appropriate under the circumstances. NEW MATTER 88. Defendants hereby incorporate each of the foregoing Paragraphs as though set forth herein at length. 89. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 90. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited by the Doctrine of Waiver. 91. Plaintiffs have suffered no damages as a result of any conduct of Defendants. 92. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited by the doctrine of estoppel. 93. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited by a failure of consideration. 94. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited by the doctrine of laches. 95. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 96. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited by consent. 97. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited by justification. 98. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited by the applicable statute of limitations. 99. Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their alleged damages. 100. Plaintiffs did not sustain any injuries cognizable under Pennsylvania law as a consequence of Defendants' alleged actions or inactions. 101. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Plaintiffs' alleged injuries, if any, were not caused by the actions of Defendants. 102. Any acts or omissions attributable to Defendants alleged to have constituted negligence, all negligence being denied, were not a substantial factor or factual cause of the alleged harm to Plaintiffs and/or did not result in the injuries and/or losses alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint. 103. Plaintiffs' claims are subject to and limited by the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act. 104. Any and all services provided by Defendants to Plaintiffs were in accordance with the standard of care set forth in the legal community. 105. Any and all treatment and care provided by any health care provider to Plaintiffs was in accordance with the standard of care set forth in the medical community. 106. Plaintiffs' claims are or may be limited or precluded by the terms of any informed consent provided to any health care provider. 107. At all times material hereto, all health care providers provided proper and appropriate care and treatment to Plaintiffs. WHEREFORE, Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor, and against Plaintiffs, and award them such further relief as the Court deems necessary and/or appropriate under the circumstances. O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP ~ ~~ D IEL F. RYAN, III ANTHONY P. DEMICHELE Attorneys for Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields Date: '~~~ ~1~ VERIFICATION I, Leslie Fields, Esquire, hereby state that I am a partner in Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, a defendant in this matter, and that I am authorized to execute this Verification on its behalf. I hereby verify that the statements made in the foregoing Answer and New Matter to Plaintiffs' Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that the statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. eslie Field ,Esquire Costopoul ,Foster & Fields Date: VERIFICATION I, Leslie Fields, Esquire, hereby state that I am a defendant in this matter and verify that the statements made in the foregoing Answer and New Matter to Plaintiffs' Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that the statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities Leslie Fiel ,Esquire Date: O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III Identification No. 27808 dryan(a,obrlaw.com Anthony P. DeMichele Identification No. 87602 ademichele(a~obrlaw.com Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462 (610) 834-8800 Attorneys for Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields MARK E. JACKSON and COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DEBORAH JACKSON, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA Plaintiffs v. No. 09-8858 Civil Term LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a CIVIL ACTION -LAW COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Anthony P. DeMichele, Esquire, hereby certify that on this day, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer with New Matter to Plaintiffs' Complaint to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: Donald L. Reihart, Esquire Law Offices of Donald L. Reihart 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402 O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP ~~~~1 DANIEL F. RYAN, III ANTHONY P. DEMICHELE Attorneys for Defendant, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields Date: ~~3^~~ . r ~ IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No. 09-8858 Civil Term DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs v. CIVIL ACTION-LAW LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO NEW MATTER 88. 2Q 10 FEB - 9 Pik 2: 52 t'F~~~SY~t~ ;~~~~,,~ 'V~Y Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1-87 of their Complaint as though set forth herein at length. 89. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 90. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 91. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 92. Denied. • f On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 93. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 94. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 95. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 96. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 97. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 98. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 99. Denied. f ~ On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 100. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 101. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 102. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 103. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 104. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 105. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 106. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). 107. Denied. On the contrary, it is averred that the allegation constitutes a conclusion of law for which no reply is required under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(d) and (e). Respectfully submitted, Date: ~ - .5 - /y By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone 717-755-2799 Facsimile 717-755-2530 email(a~ reihartlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiffs VERIFICATION We, the undersigned, hereby affirm that the facts contained in the foregoing document are true and correct to the best of our knowledge, information, and belief. This statement is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: Z ~- U - ~ a MARK E. JA SON Date: Z - `{ -~d ~ DEBORAH JAC ON IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs v. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. No. 09-8858 Civil Term CIVIL ACTION-LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' Reply to New Matter was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Date: ~ - .5 - / a Respectfully submitted, Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone 717-755-2799 Facsimile 717-755-2530 email .reihartlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiffs IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs No. 09-8858 Civil Term v. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION -LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs' Notice of Videotape Deposition of Leslie Fields, Esq. was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: n 4 Leslie Fields, Es uire q ~ ~ c/o Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. ~f;~ ~:r- z ?' - Anthony Demichele, Esq ' ~ ~-:: =- ~ ~ ~ ~~ -~ c' > ~. Brien & Ryan, LLP O ~ - Tt Hickory Pointe z~ ~ a ~ ~:~; 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 ~ :- ~~' Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 ~ rn Filius & McLucas 1427 East Market Street York, PA 17403 Res ectfully submitted, ~° ~ ~ Date: ~ By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Attorney for Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VICKI L. MOWERS Plaintiff Vs File No. 2010=0100Q IN DIVORCE PAUL L. MOWERS n c o ,~ ~ Defendant -c7 ~ -~-~. , ': (~ r~ ( _T :~ _ NOTICE TO RESUME PRIOR SURNAME ~"' '~ ~T ~ -,. ~` .~. <~ -- r ~ iu ,i~~ `_~ Notice is hereby given that the Plaintiff/ defendant in the above matter, ~ [select one by marking "x"] prior to the entry of a Final Decree in Divorce, or x after the entry of a Final Decree in Divorce dated June 7, 2010 hereby elects to resume the prior surname of McNau~hton ,and gives this written notice avowing his /her intention pursuant to the provisions of 54 P.S. 704. Date: June 9, 2010 ~~{' ~~/~~~~ Signature Pal ~~ E ,*, ~ s Sa s 8'y ~1 Signature of name eing resumed COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ) COUNTY OF ~^-6crla,~dl On the ~ day of , 20~ 4, before me, the Prothonotary or the notary public, personally appeared the above affiant known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within document and aclaiowledged that he /she executed the foregoing for the purpose therein contained. In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand hereunto set my hand and official seal, ~~ ~ v P a PIRA Notary Public r//. cw~~ ~ ~v2,y3 y0`I Mr~~~ a aaM IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. No. 09-8858 Civil Term CIVIL ACTION - LAW v` c w ?? C? N JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs' Notice of Videotape Deposition of Leslie Fields, Esq. was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Leslie Fields, Esquire c/o Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Filius & McLucas 1427 East Market Street York, PA 17403 Respectfully submitted, - Date: () By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Attorney for Plaintiff (~ r' MARK E. JACKSON and IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DEBORAH JACKSON, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION -LAW vs. NO. 09-8858 CIVIL LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., individually: and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL ORDER AND NOW, this '? ` day of September, 2010, argument on the above-captioned motion to compel is set for Wednesday, October 13, 2010, at 1:15 p.m. in Courtroom Number 4, Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, PA. / Donald L. Reihart, Esquire F/or the Plaintiffs ./Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esquire For the Defendants :rlm l.:p t~~S jai l C£c.V q S~rv ~x ~. ~~= ~m ~~t ~~ ca -~ p ." .j ~~~ BY THE COURT, O'BRIEN & RYAN, LI.P BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III Identification No. 27808 dry an ! obrlaw.corn Anthony P. DeMichele Identification No. 87602 ademicheleCobrlaw.com Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road. Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462 (610) 834-8800 Attorneys for Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. LESLIE; FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants COURT OF COMMON CUMBERLAND COUI No. 09-8858 Civil Term CIVIL ACTION - LAW r S ? i c A to r > _ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields ("Defendants"), by and through their attorneys, O'Brien & Ryan, LLP, hereby file this response to plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of documents and for in camera review and in support thereof state as follows. Admitted. 2. Denied as stated. 3. Denied. Plaintiffs' complaint referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 4. Denied. Plaintiffs' complaint referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. 5. Denied. Plaintiffs' complaint referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response. the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 6. Denied. Plaintiffs' complaint referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. 7. Denied. Plaintiffs' complaint referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 8. Denied. Plaintiffs' complaint referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 9. Denied. Plaintiffs' complaint referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 10. Denied as stated. 11. Denied. The written discovery requests referenced in this Paragraph are documents which speak for themselves and any attempts to mischaracterize them are denied. 12. Admitted. 13. (a) Denied as stated. However, Defendants would consent to an in camera review by this Court to determine the reasonableness of the redactions. (b) Denied as stated. Documents Bates Numbered 333 and 338 14. Admitted. 15. Denied. The emails referenced in this Paragraph are documents that speaks for themselves and any attempts to mischaracterize them are denied. 16. Denied. The privilege log referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. IT Denied. The emails referenced in this Paragraph are documents that speaks for themselves and any attempts to mischaracterize them are denied. 18_ Denied. The emails referenced in this Paragraph are documents that speaks for themselves and any attempts to mischaracterize them are denied. 19. Denied as stated. However, However. Defendants would consent to an in camera review by this Court to determine the reasonableness of the redactions. Documents Bates Numbered 366, 397, 398, and 399 20. Admitted. 21. Denied. The documents referenced in this Paragraph are documents that speaks for themselves and any attempts to mischaracterize them are denied. 22. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 23. Denied. The Rule referenced in this Paragraph is a document that speaks for itself and any attempts to mischaracterize it are denied. Moreover. the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 24. Denied. The averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. By way of further response, the reference to Rule 4003.4 in the first sentence of Rule 4003.3 is not intended to expand the scope of materials otherwise discoverable under Rule 4003.3. Rather, the reference to Rule 4003.4 in the first sentence of Rule 4003.3 is part 3 of a limiting clause intended to restrict the general scope of discovery set forth in that Rule, which otherwise allows a party to "obtain discovery of any matter discoverable under Rule 4003.1 even though prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative, including his or her attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor. insurer or agent." The opening clause of Rule 4003.3 restricts the broad reach of discovery otherwise permitted by the Rule by subjecting the scope of the rule to the limitations set forth in Rules 4003.4 and 4003.5. 25. Denied as stated. It is admitted only that defendant, Leslie Fields. Esquire, is, and was at all relevant times, an attorney. It is specifically denied that documents 396. 397, 398 and/or 399 are ipso facto subject to discovery by virtue of Rule 4003.4. To the contrary, as such documents contain Ms. Fields's mental impressions, conclusions and opinions regarding strategy, tactics and/or the merit of plaintiffs' claims at a time when Ms. Fields was acting as her own attorney, they are plainly protected from discovery as attorney work-product pursuant to Rule 4003.3. -The attorney work product doctrine provides, essentially, that `discovery shall not include disclosure of the mental impressions of a party's attorney or his or her conclusions, opinions, memoranda, notes or summaries. legal research or legal theories."' T.M. v. Flwyn. Inc., 950 A.2d 1050, 1062 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Pa. R.C.P. 4003.3). "'The underlying purpose of the work-product doctrine is to shield the mental processes of an attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case."' T.M., 950 A.2d 1062 ( u? oting Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1222 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Therefore, as documents 396, 397.. 398 and 399 clearly contain Ms. Fields's attorney work-product concerning plaintiffs' claims against her. including her mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, they are certainly protected from discovery pursuant to Rule 4003.3. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 4 26. Denied. The explanatory note and legal case referenced in this Paragraph are writings that speak for themselves and any attempts to mischaracterize them are denied. Moreover, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that the legal opinions of Ms. Fields concerning the merits of plaintiffs' claims against her, defense strategy and/or tactics are relevant or admissible to this action. 27. Denied. It is specifically denied that documents 396, 397, 398 and/or 399 are ipso facto subject to discovery by virtue of Rule 4003.4. To the contrary, as such documents contain Ms. Fields's mental impressions, conclusions and opinions regarding strategy, tactics and/or the merit of plaintiffs' claims at a time when Ms. Fields was acting as her own attorney, they are plainly protected from discovery as attorney work-product pursuant to Rule 4003.3. "The attorney work product doctrine provides, essentially, that `discovery shall not include disclosure of the mental impressions of a party's attorney or his or her conclusions, opinions, memoranda, notes or summaries, legal research or legal theories."' T.M. v. Elwvn. Inc., 950 A.2d 1050, 1062 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Pa. R.C.P. 4003.3). "'The underlying purpose of the work-product doctrine is to shield the mental processes of an attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case."' T.M., 950 A.2d 1062 (_ uotin Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1222 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Therefore, as documents 396, 397, 398 and 399 clearly contain Ms. Fields's attorney work-product concerning plaintiffs' claims against her, including her mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, they are certainly protected from discovery pursuant to Rule 4003.3. By way of further response, the averments contained in this Paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 5 WHEREFORE. Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields, hereby request the Court conduct an in camera review of those documents identified by Bates numbers 333 and 338 to determine the reasonableness of the redactions. Furthermore. Defendants hereby request that documents identified by Bates numbers 396, 397, 398. and 399 not be produced as those documents contain the mental impressions, conclusions and opinions regarding merit of Plaintiffs' claims, strategy and/or tactics. Respectfully submitted, O'BRII N & RYAN, LLP A THONY P. DeMICHELF Attorneys for Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Date: Costopoulos, Foster & Fields 6 O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP BY: Daniel F. Ryan, III Identification No. 27808 dryan("dobrlaw.com Anthony P. DeMichele Identification No. 87602 ademicheleLobrlaw.com Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462 (610) 834-8800 Attorneys for Defendants, Leslie Fields, Esquire and Costopoulos, Foster & Fields MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs v. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE, Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA No. 09-8858 Civil Term CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1, Anthony P. DeMichele, Esquire, hereby certify that on this day, I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to compel and for in camera review to the to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: Donald L. Reihart, Esquire Law Offices of Donald L. Reihart 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402 O'BRIEN & RYAN, LLP ANTHONY P. DeMICHELE Attorneys for Defendants, o Leslie Fields, Esquire and Date: (-?'? to Costopoulos, Foster & Fields MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 09-8858 CIVIL TERM JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 13th day of October, 2010, after argument, the court takes the matter under advisement and will review questioned Exhibits 333, 338 and 396 through 399 in camera. By the Court, Jan Barnett, Esquire For Plaintiffs ~ul E. Peel, Esquire For Defendants :bg 6~~5 ii 1 lvj~s/fo `~_,~ Kevi Hess, P.J. ~ ~ t~ -n -~ 3 ~ c`- -t ~~ ~ ~ ~ -1 ~ ~ ~a ~~ C~ Zq ~ ~w ~ ~`~7 ~ ~ S> ~ .. O tTi ~-1 "-- D ~ ~ ~ -'C MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs vs. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQUIRE, individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION -LAW NO. 09-8858 CIVIL JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ORDER c a 0 ~ ~p~ ao a -s = ~ `~ rn ~ ~ ~ °o ~ -z '~~ °D _~ x© a• a a~ 3>z ~ ° w ~ ~ J AND NOW, this ~ S day of October, 2010, following in camera review, the court finds that documents 302, 303 and 338 were properly redacted. With respect to documents 396, 397, 398, and 399, the court notes that said documents were created after the defendants' professional relationship with the plaintiffs had terminated and therefore the court gives the defendants the benefit of the doubt on the issue of attorney work product. In accordance with the foregoing, the plaintiffs' motion to compel is DENIED. BY THE COURT, ~' Hess, P. J. ./Donald L. Reihart, Esquire For the Plaintiffs /llaniel F. Ryan, III, Esquire Anthony P. DeMichele, Esquire For the Defendants :rlm CO i~~ m'a~~~ ~o ~~S~w `~ MARK E. J! CKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, vs. LESLIE FI LDS, ESQUIRE, individually, d t/d/b/a COSTOPO'~LOS,FOSTER & FIELDS, ~~~, Defendants 'I IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION -LAW N0.09-8858 CIVIL JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL ~ N c o ~~ 4 r+~ ~ ~ '-`~ ~~ ~ ~ '°. n° ~ ao ~ n ~ C? ORDER --~ -~- -t c~ ANDINOW, this / 9 * day of October, 2010, it is ordered and directed that the privilege log'~and pages attached thereto be sealed with the direction that same not be opened pending further order of court. BY THE COURT, /Donald L. R~ihart, Esquire For the Plain~~ffs ~~ aniel F. Ry ' ,III, Esquire Anthony P. DMichele, Esquire For the Deferi~lants :rlm I ~o ~es~~ P ,o~~~ ca 1, ~, ~' ~f Kevin .Hess, P. J. ca --: rn~ "t7 F"' ~~ -°.~ s° n `'~ oh ~~ z> -< LAW OFFICES DONALD L. REIHART, ESQ. 3015 EASTERN BOULEVARD YORK, PENNSYLVANIA 17402 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs No. 09-8858 Civil Term v. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' Response to Request for Production of Documents - Set II was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: }etc r` 2] Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq.° Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP_ Hickory Pointe T- C.0 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300=' Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 _ w Respectfully submitted, Date: - /0 -/C) By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone 717-755-2799 Facsimile 717-755-2530 email(a)-reihartlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiffs IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSX1,VP W-, MARK E. JACKSON and No. 09-8858 Civil Term , DEBORAH JACKSON, `- _ r Plaintiffs V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW ?, . LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually pro' A 4-1,4/ b/ COS T O a C1 H POULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs' Notice of Videotape Deposition of Leslie Fields, Esq. was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Leslie Fields, Esquire c/o Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Filius & McLucas 1427 East Market Street York, PA 17403 Date: l 0 Respectfully submitted, By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Attorney for Plaintiff J IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No. 09-8858 Civil Term DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION - LAW C-> c - -n -- Wr- 89 Ca c) G A? N --? N JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE TO SETTLE AND SATISFY TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Please mark the above captioned action settled and satisfied. Date: /"-"-;70 - // J By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. # PA 07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone (717) 755-2799 Facsimile (717) 755-2530 email reihartlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA MARK E. JACKSON and No. 09-8858 Civil Term DEBORAH JACKSON, Plaintiffs V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW LESLIE FIELDS, ESQ., Individually and t/d/b/a COSTOPOULOS, FOSTER & FIELDS, Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald L. Reihart, Esquire, certify that a true and correct copy of the Praecipe to Settle and Satisfy was caused to be served on the date shown below by depositing same in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: Daniel F. Ryan, III, Esq. Anthony Demichele, Esq O'Brien & Ryan, LLP Hickory Pointe 2250 Hickory Road, Suite 300 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462-1047 Date: / -?,r7 // Respectfully submitted, NZ By: Donald L. Reihart, Esq. Sup. Ct. I.D. #07421 3015 Eastern Boulevard York, PA 17402-2904 Telephone 717-755-2799 Facsimile 717-755-2530 email(aD-reihartlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiffs