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HomeMy WebLinkAbout10-1232A LED-C, C" T r ,r - ,TY .. , I?: t',,.. I , 2010 FEv 23 F; 11C: C.' J JODIE E. TEFFETtL ER'., Plaintiff T V. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE NOTICE You have been sued in Court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following papers, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a Decree in Divorce or annulment may be entered against you by the Court. A judgment may also be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for the divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at the Cumberland County Court House, One Courthouse Square, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF PROPERTY, LAWYER'S FEES OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 32 South Bedford Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 Phone: (717) 249-3166 r Christine Taylor Br squire Counsel for Plaintiff -NZZ0v 1/8- sG - a Qc&- Cols SIU`?' ? - Q 379Z-1- JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff v. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE AVISO USTED HA SIDO DEMANDADO A EN CORTE. Si usted desea defenderse de las demandas que se presentan mas adelante en las siguientes paginas, debe tomar accion dentro de los proximos veinte (20) dias despues de la notification de esta Demanda y Aviso radicando personalmente o por medio de un abogado una comparecencia escrita y radicando en la Corte por escrito sus defensas de, y objecciones a, las demandas presentadas aqui en contra suya. Se le advierte de que si usted falla de tomar accion como se describe anteriormente, el caso puede proceder sin usted y un fallo por cualquier suma de dinero reclamada en la demanda o cualquier otra reclamacion o remedio solicitado por el demandante puede ser dictado en contra suya por la Corte sin mas aviso adicional. Usted puede perder dinero o propiedad u otros derechos importantes para usted. USTED DEBE LLEVAR ESTE DOCUMENTO A SU ABOGADO INMEDIATAMENTE. SI USTED NO TIENE UN ABOGADO [O NO PUEDE PAGARLE A UNO], LLAME O VAYA A LA SIGUIENTE OFICINA [PARA AVERIGUAR DONDE PUEDE ENCONTRAR ASISTENCIA LEGAL]. ESTA OFICINA PUEDE PROVEERLE INFORMACION A CERCA DE COMO CONSEGUIR UN ABOGADO. SI USTED NO PUEDE PAGAR POR LOS SERVICIOS DE UN ABOGADO, ES POSIBLE QUE ESTA OFICINA LE PUEDA PROVEER INFORMACION SOBRE AGENCIAS QUE OFREZCAN SERVICIOS LEGALES SIN CARGO O BAJO COSTO A PERSONAS QUE CALIFICAN. CUMBERLAND COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 32 South Bedford Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3166 JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF COUNSELING To the Within Named Defendant: You have been named as the Defendant in a divorce proceeding filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County. This notice is to advise you that in accordance with Section 3302(d) of the Divorce Code, you may request that the Court require you and your spouse to attend marriage counseling prior to a divorce decree being handed down by the Court. A list of professional marriage counselors is available at the Office of the Prothonotary, One Courthouse Square, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. You are advised that this list is kept as a convenience to you and you are not bound to choose a counselor from this list. All necessary arrangements and the cost of counseling sessions are to be borne by you and your spouse. If you desire to pursue counseling, you must make your request for counseling within twenty (20) days of the date on which you receive this notice. Failure to do so will constitute a waiver of your right to request counseling. Prothonotary Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire PA I.D. No 82204 James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly LLP P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 (717) 533-3280 JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. NO. ?3 ? civy`f THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE COMPLAINT UNDER SECTION 3301 OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. Plaintiff is Jodie E. Teffeteller, who currently resides at 6 Center Drive, Camp Hill, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17011. 2. Defendant is Thomas E. Teffeteller, who currently resides at 6 Center Drive, Camp Hill, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17011. 3. Plaintiff and Defendant have been bona fide residents in the Commonwealth for at least six months immediately previous to the filing of this Complaint. 4. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on February 9, 1994, in Las Vegas, Nevada. 5. There have been no prior actions for divorce or annulment between the parties. 6. The Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States of America. 7. The Defendant is not a member of the Armed Services of the United States of America or its Allies. 8. The marriage is irretrievably broken. The parties to this action have been separated since February 9, 2007 9. The Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling and that the Plaintiff may have the right to request that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. 10. Plaintiff requests the Court to enter a Decree in Divorce. 11. This action is not collusive. COUNT II CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 3502 OF THE DIVORCE CODE 13. Plaintiff and Defendant are the owners of various real and personal property, motor vehicles, bank accounts and insurance policies acquired during their marriage which are subject to equitable distribution by this Court. COUNT III CLAIM FOR ALIMONY UNDER SECTION 3701 OF THE DIVORCE CODE 14. Plaintiff lacks sufficient property and income to provide for her reasonable needs. Plaintiff requires reasonable alimony to adequately maintain herself in accordance with the standard established during the marriage. Defendant is financially able to provide for the reasonable needs of the Plaintiff. COUNT IV CLAIM FOR ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE, COUNSEL FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER SECTION 3702 OF THE DIVORCE CODE 15. Plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to support herself and pay the counsel fees and expenses incidental to this action. 16. Defendant is full and well able to pay Plaintiff alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and expenses incidental to this divorce action. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests the Court to enter a Decree: a. dissolving the marriage between the Plaintiff and Defendant; b. equitably distributing all property owned by the parties hereto; C. directing the Defendant to pay alimony to Plaintiff; d. directing the Defendant to pay alimony pendente lite, Plaintiff s counsel fees and the cost of this suit; and e. for such further relief as the Court may determine equitable and just. Respectfully submitted, JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: 02 d By: 14 Christine Taylor Br quire Attorney I.D. #82204 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Counsel for Plaintiff, Jodie E. Teffeteller VERIFICATION I, Jodie E. Teffeteller, verify that the statements made in the foregoing Pleading are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject tofthe penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: / f Jodi E. ~ - JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 10-1232 THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, :CIVIL ACTION.- LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE ~ ~, , : m r: ~ AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE ~ x ~~ n c i ~ w r ,~ -~ 2 c ~= rn COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ~~ i`•' COUNTY OF DAUPHIN AND NOW, this 2nd day of March, 2010, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforementioned, Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire, who, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that a copy of the Divorce Complaint was served on the Defendant, Thomas T. Teffeteller, by certified mail number 7008 1300 0001 8217 3993, as evidenced by the return receipt card attached hereto and made a part hereof. ~r~~ ~ ~ 1r~~C./ Christine Tay or r uire ~.-~ Sworn to and subscribed before me this ~ ~ day of March, 2010. 0 Notary Public COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Notarial Seal Marla B. WRue, Notary Publk Deny Twp., Dauphin County My Commission 6~Ires Nov. 8, 2013 ember; Pennsylvania A~odatlon of Notaries ..- . ,. ate items 1.2. and 3. Also completes' if Reshicted Delivery is desired. a your name and address on the reverse ~~. ~ tl~ we can return the cans to you. ads cafd to the back of the mailpiece, t1~f ~,.~'hin space permits. . Addressed to: ~lD~-S E ~ 7~'f~~P~ ~~ ~lnY ,+, X u aaarees.s B. Name) C. Date of Day address different from item 17 ^ Yes D. b d~lwery M YEg, errhr delivery address below: L9rNo 3. TYPe 6~"'ied Mail ^ Express Mail ^ Registered ^ Return Receipt for MerchandlM ^ Insured Mail ^ C.O.D. 4. Restricted pdivery7 (Extra Fee) _ Yes 2. ~. i 7~~8 1~r_Q~l01 8217 3993 (fir iom aaMoa Mbr9 y.i-- ~' °`"~,'` 7~~ tasasrbaa-M-ts~o ; pg ~t 3611, F~ _ _ _ ~__ _ - .~ .. ~ m ,, • ..• • , .•. Ir o~ ~ Postage $ , as Certified Fee ~ r ~ ~ pogltoiark p ~ Return Receipt Fee (Endorsement Required) ~re p2 , ~ Restdded Dellvery.Fee (Endorsement Regwred) n ; ~-i ifs ~ , ~ (/ O f1l Total Postage & Fees - ~~ a O ................."" ~ ~ Sheet, Apr. No.; /~) ~/ or PO Box No. f Q ~ JJ.-~-!-~- ---°-^----° ` -- --- + ~c .. Cary - _ ~ ~ ~ JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA o NO. 10-1232 a CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE -o AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT SUN a 1. A Complaint in Divorce under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed on February 23, 2. The marriage of the Plaintiff and Defendant is irretrievably broken, and ninety days have elapsed from the date of both the filing and service of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of a final dec.ee of divorce after service of Notice of Intention to request entry of the Decree. WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER 43301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the Decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. I verify that the statements made above are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities. Date: a?J? 17 201 JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVA Q NO. 10-1232 0 THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Q Defendant : IN DIVORCE v e 3 AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1. A Complaint in Divorce under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed on February 23, 2010. 2. The marriage of the Plaintiff and Defendant is irretrievably broken, and ninety days have elapsed from the date of both the filing and service of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce after service of Notice of Intention to request entry of the Decree. WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER 43301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the Decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. I verify that the statements made above are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities. Date: 6?f / 7/2 0 / 0 JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff v. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE NOTICE OF ELECTION TO RETAKE FORMER NAME Notice is hereby given that the Plaintiff in the above matter, hereby elects. to retake and hereafter use her former name of Jodie Ellen Payne and gives this written notice avowing her intention in accordance with the provisions of 54 Pa.C.S.A. § 704(a). DATED: ~ 02~ ~ ~ Sworn to and subscribed before me this aZ ~ S + day of 2010. OTARY PUBLIC QOMMONWEALTH.OF PENNSYLVANIA Notadal5ea~ l~lalia 8. LaRue. Notary Publk oanY 1Ww oaup,in courrty n na. ,4'/~ oo ~d_ ~ e~ Sy~r9( 2~--aYs~o~ cr -~~ rri~' ern xs ~~ -t~'' r-~ ~~ ~n ~o ~,c -~ c~ cn w -~ ~- c~ -~~ --~ ~m rn ~:...: ~~ ~~ ~~ a --~ ~~ a ~, --{ -~ MICHAEL L. BANGS, ESQUIRE I.D. No. 41263 429 South 18th Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 730-7310 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS LAURA FRAZIER, Plaintiff vs. HUMAN ELEMENT GROUP, INC., PAYTIME HARRISBURG, INC. and NATHAN PATTERSON, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2010-01765 CIVIL ACTION -LAW NOTICE: YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED TO RESPOND TO THE ENCLOSED NEW MATTER WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS FROM SERVICE OR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY BE TERED AGAINST YOU Z MIC AEL L. B NGS (ID 41263) Attorney for Defendants ANSWER AND NEW MATTER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT NATHAN PATTERSON 1. Admitted. 2. Not applicable to answering Defendant. To the extent it is, it is denied. 3. Not applicable to answering Defendant. To the extent it is, it is denied. 4. Denied as stated. Defendant Patterson did own 100% and was President of Defendant HEG but was not the sole owner of Defendant Paytime yet he did serve as President. Defendant Patterson does reside at 3 Brandy Circle, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. 5. No answer required. 6. No answer required; the matter has been resolved and jurisdiction and venue are ~-~ properly in Cumberland County. ` -~ ... r~ '^~ ~ ~,F~ 7. No answer required by this answering Defendant. ~ f r' ~ ~? ~n ~ ~~ F w ~~~ r~ c`~.~" :~ c~ -,, c~ '. ~ ~ c-7 `~ ~ ~ °° ~ -t 8. Denied. Defendant Patterson, after reasonable investigation, is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 9. Denied. Mr. Haverstick, an employee of Defendant Paytime, never took any action on behalf of Defendant Patterson individually in making any contact to the extent any contact was made to Plaintiff. Defendant Patterson was aware of Plaintiff because Plaintiff, individually and through her companies, had provided some human resource consulting to Defendant Paytime and in fact Defendant Paytime had referred those clients to Plaintiff. Defendant Patterson, in his role as President of Paytime, had dealings with Plaintiff because she or her companies were providing consulting services to some of Paytime's clients and Defendant Patterson in his role as President of Paytime became aware that she or her companies were having financial problems and he sought to seek some continuity with having Paytime's clients continue to receive those services. 10. Denied as stated. Defendant Patterson denies the implications and statements contained in this averment. Defendant Patterson in his role as President of Paytime, was aware that Human Element Group, LLC, was having some financial difficulties although he was not aware of the extent of those difficulties until after Plaintiff had provided some specific financial information that she represented reflected the condition of Human Element Group, LLC. Defendant Patterson's sole concern initially was that Defendant Paytime's customers would be affected by the failure of Plaintiff and Human Element Group, LLC to service Defendant Paytime's customers. It is specifically denied that Patterson in his individual capacity or as President of Paytime agreed to assume any office or copier leases or cause Human Element Group, LLC, to enter into an employment agreement with Plaintiff. Further, to the extent that this averment contains any other facts to which a response is required, after reasonable 2 investigation Defendant Patterson is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 11. Admitted. 12. Denied. Defendant Patterson is not the sole officer of Defendant Paytime. 13. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 14. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 15. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 16. Denied. The final Employment Agreement was not executed personally by Defendant Patterson; rather it was executed by Patterson acting in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG. 17. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 18. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 19. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 20. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 3 21. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Patterson personally purchased some furniture and equipment of Human Element Group, LLC and that that was used by Defendant HEG. Defendant Patterson personally purchased that equipment and furniture because Plaintiff was in dire financial straits and requested that Defendant Patterson purchase those items from her to give her some financial assistance. 22. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Patterson individually assumed any office or copier lease of Human Element Group, LLC or that he personally essentially took over and continued to operate Plaintiff s former business in the same location. 23. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 24. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 25. Denied as it relates to Defendant Patterson. Defendant Patterson was not in any business relationship personally with Defendant HEG and Defendant Paytime except that Defendant Patterson had to provide capital to Defendant HEG. 26. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 27. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Patterson loaned Defendant HEG funds. Any inference that Plaintiff is deriving from that loan is denied. 28. Denied. Paragraph 28 is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required it is specifically denied that Defendant Patterson is individually liable for Defendant HEG's obligations when Defendant HEG was a properly formed 4 corporation and a separate and distinct legal entity whose stock was owned by Defendant Patterson individually. 29. Denied. Defendant Patterson, after reasonable investigation, is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 30. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff would seek approval from Defendant Patterson in his individual capacity regarding any administrative actions and decisions. Plaintiff may have involved Defendant Patterson in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG regarding administrative actions and decisions although those actions and decisions were the sole responsibility of Plaintiff under her Employment Agreement. 31. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 32. Denied as stated. Defendant Patterson, in his capacity as President of HEG, notified Plaintiff that Defendant HEG would cease operation as of December 31, 2009. This letter followed up a personal contact by Defendant Patterson in his capacity as President of HEG to Plaintiff. Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the correspondence. 33. Denied. Defendant Patterson, after reasonable investigation, is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 34. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 35. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 36. Denied. Defendant Patterson, after reasonable investigation, is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trail of this case. To the extent that any employees of Defendant HEG retained any furniture, that furniture was owned by Patterson and purchased by Patterson and he could do with the furniture as he wished. 37. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 38. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 39. Denied. Paragraph 39 is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required by Defendant Patterson it is denied. Defendant Patterson, in his individual capacity, could not and did not cause a de facto merger in that the de facto merger doctrine does not apply in any way to an individual. 40. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 41. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 42. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 43. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 44. Denied. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson because Defendant Patterson did not have anon-compete with Plaintiff. Further, it is irrelevant and ethically 6 impermissible for Plaintiff's attorney to attempt to make a claim or include an averment in a complaint which involves an exchange of correspondence between attorneys. Further, there has never been any enforcement of any of the non-competition provisions of HEG under the Employment Agreement with Plaintiff even though Plaintiff contacted and retained customers of Defendant HEG in violation of that agreement. 45. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 46. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 47. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 48. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 49. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. COUNTI VIOLATION OF PENNSYLVANIA WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION LAW 50. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 49 are incorporated herein by reference. 51. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 52. Denied. Paragraph 52 is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required it is specifically denied. 7 53. Denied. This averment is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required, there is no basis from which to pierce a corporate veil to assess liability directly against Defendant Patterson since at all times Defendant HEG was a separate and distinct corporation and was properly capitalized. 54. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 55. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 56. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 57. Denied. To the extent that Paragraph 57 is making an averment against Defendant Patterson, it is specifically denied because the WPCL does not apply to Defendant Patterson and Plaintiff s wages that she earned were paid in full as of the date of the closing of the corporation, Defendant HEG. 58. Denied. To the extent that Paragraph 58 is making an averment against Defendant Patterson, it is specifically denied because the WPCL does not apply to Defendant Patterson and Plaintiff's wages that she earned were paid in full as of the date of the closing of the corporation, Defendant HEG. WHEREFORE, Defendant Patterson demands judgment in his favor and against Plaintiff, together with costs. COUNT II CIVIL CONSPIRACY 59. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 58 are incorporated herein by reference. 8 60. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that Defendant Patterson, in his individual capacity, was involved with the operation of Defendant HEG. It is averred that Defendant Patterson, in his capacity as the sole shareholder and President, was involved in the operation of Defendant HEG. The rest of the averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson. 61. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 62. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 63. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 64. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. WHEREFORE, Defendant Patterson requests judgment be found in his favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. COUNT III BREACH OF CONTRACT 65. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 64 are incorporated herein by reference. 66. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that Defendant Patterson in his individual capacity entered into any Employment Agreement with Plaintiff. It is also specifically denied that the Employment Agreement provided Plaintiff with a guaranteed payment of $70,000.00 as inferred by the averment. 9 67. Denied. Paragraph 67 is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required, it is specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 68. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 69. This averment does not apply to Defendant Patterson and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 70. Denied to the extent that Plaintiff asserts in this averment that Defendant Patterson, in his individual capacity, could terminate or could end Plaintiff s employment with Defendant HEG. 71. Denied. It is specifically denied that the Employment Agreement provides a guaranteed payment to Plaintiff as inferred in this averment in that the Employment Agreement provides no such guarantee. 72. Denied to the extent that Defendant Patterson never had a contract with Plaintiff; the contract was solely between Plaintiff and Defendant HEG. WHEREFORE, Defendant Patterson requests judgment in his favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. COUNT IV TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 73. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 72 are incorporated herein by reference. 74. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 75. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 76. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 10 77. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 78. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 79. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 80. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. COUNT V INDEMNITY 81. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 80 are incorporated herein by reference. 82. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 83. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 84. Denied. After reasonable investigation Defendant Patterson is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 85. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 86. Denied. After reasonable investigation Defendant Patterson is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 87. Denied. Defendant Patterson never took over any lease for Human Element Group, LLC, nor did he provide any indemnity to Plaintiff personally on any personal liability that she may have in her prior company. 88. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 89. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 90. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 11 WHEREFORE, Defendant Patterson requests judgment in his favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. COUNT VI FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 91. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 90 are incorporated herein by reference. 92. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Patterson. 93. Denied as stated. Defendant Patterson, in his individual capacity, did not cause the cessation of Defendant HEG's business operations nor did he transfer any assets of Defendant HEG to Defendant Paytime. Finally, Defendant Patterson did nothing improper with shutting down Defendant HEG's business operations because it was losing money. 94. To the extent that this averment may apply to Defendant Patterson, it is specifically denied that Defendant Patterson transferred any assets from any corporations zn which he had an interest for the sole purpose of avoiding payment of any wages to Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Defendant Patterson demands judgment be found in his favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. NEW MATTER 95. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 94 are incorporated herein by reference. 96. Defendant Patterson became aware of Plaintiff in his capacity as President and primary shareholder of Paytime, Inc. and in that capacity had referred clients of Paytime to Plaintiff or Plaintiff s companies for purposes of providing human resource consulting services. 97. Patterson, in his capacity as President of Paytime, Inc. and through his discussions in the operation of his business, became aware that Plaintiff s companies were suffering significant 12 financial difficulties such that Plaintiff or her companies would not longer be able to service Paytime's clients with human resource services. 98. Patterson, in his capacity as President of Paytime, Inc., engaged personally or through employees of Paytime, in several discussions with Plaintiff concerning the operation of her businesses to find out if Plaintiff intended to continue to provide the human resource services to Paytime's customers. 99. Plaintiff represented to Patterson that she had extensive experience in providing human resources and essentially claimed that any financial difficulties that she had incurred with her companies was because of forces outside of her control and that all that was needed was the infusion of capital to allow her to make those businesses profitable. 100. Plaintiff provided certain financial information to Patterson that she represented accurately reflected the operations of those companies to provide Patterson with some basis from which she could support her claims that a human resource company could be profitable. 101. Plaintiff also made claims to Patterson that she had the ability to increase sales and provide additional services that would cause a human resource company to be profitable. 102. Plaintiff claimed to Patterson that because she did not have enough resources to get her company out of debt that it would continue not to be profitable and that she could not commit additional funds but that absent that debt, it could be a profitable endeavor. 103. Based upon the representations made by Plaintiff to Patterson, and based upon Plaintiff s disclosure of her financial records regarding her company and the liabilities that existed to her companies, Patterson decided that he was willing to invest personal funds to start up a new company, Defendant HEG and that Defendant HEG would employ Plaintiff to run that company. 13 104. Patterson set up and formed Defendant HEG which is a Pennsylvania corporation properly formed and operating under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 105. Patterson also is a primary owner of Defendant Paytime which is properly formed and operating in accordance with the corporation laws under the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 106. Both HEG and Paytime adhere to all corporate formalities as required under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Internal Revenue Code. 107. Patterson's willingness to commit his personal funds to the start up of a new company was based solely upon the representations of Plaintiff as to her abilities and the income and expense information that she provided to Patterson regarding the operation of her human resource companies. COUNTERCLAIM NATHAN PATTERSON vs. LAURA FRAZIER 108. Paragraphs 1 through 107 are incorporated herein by reference. 109. Plaintiff made certain representations to Patterson concerning her ability to run a human resource company and provided certain documentation to Patterson claiming that that documentation accurately reflected the income and expenses of her human resource companies. 110. Plaintiff either knew that she was overstating her abilities and knew that the information she provided was not accurate or made those statements and produced documentation which she should have known were not accurate had she conducted any complete and thorough investigation. 14 111. Plaintiff made these representations about her ability and the financial information concerning her companies at a time when she was faced with being unemployed because she could not continue to fund those operations. 112. At the time that Plaintiff made these representations to Patterson, she had no other means of employment nor had she made any applications for employment elsewhere. 113. Plaintiff was desperate to come up with a method by which she would earn an income because her debts were mounting and she could not longer afford to fund her companies. 114. Patterson, having not been involved previously in any human resource company, and relying upon Plaintiff s information as being accurate as it related to the income and expenses of her companies, agreed to invest significant funds of his own to start up a new company which would employ Plaintiff. 115. Patterson's willingness to incur those costs to start up the company to employ Plaintiff was based solely upon the representations of Plaintiff as to her abilities; what she claimed she did with the various accounts that she had with her companies; and the financial information that she provided concerning the income and expenses of her companies. 116. By the late fall of 2008, it became readily apparent to Patterson that Plaintiff had misrepresented her abilities, what she claimed that she had done for the various clients, and most importantly the income and expenses of her former companies. 117. Patterson also agreed to purchase certain furniture from Plaintiff s companies solely because of the representations made by Plaintiff concerning her abilities and the income and expenses of her former companies. 118. Patterson justifiably relied on the various misrepresentations made by Plaintiff in that he believed what she said was true and that the information that she provided was accurate 15 and as a result, he incurred significant damages in funds that he utilized to loan to his new company and for the purchase of the furniture and equipment of Plaintiffls former companies. 119. The amount of damages incurred by Patterson as a result of the misrepresentations by Plaintiff are in excess of $100,000.00. WHEREFORE, Patterson demands judgment against Plaintiff in an amount in excess of $100,000.00, plus interest, plus costs of suit. Respectfully submitted, MICHAEL L. BANGS Attorney for Defendant N~ 429 South 18th Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 730-7310 Supreme Court ID #41263 Patterson 16 VERIFICATION I hereby verify that the statements made in the foregoing document are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: o?o? i~ ATHA PATTERSON CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this day served the foregoing ANSWER, NEW MATTER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT NATHAN PATTERSON, by depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, addressed to the following: Andrew J. Miller, Esquire Miller, Poole & Lord 137 East Philadelphia Street York, PA 17401 DATE: Z~L (~ 17 MICHAEL L. BANGS, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS I.D. No. 41263 429 South 18~` Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 730-7310 LAURA FRAZIER, ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff ) OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. ) NO.2010-01765 HUMAN ELEMENT GROUP, INC., ) PAYTIME HARRISBURG, INC. and ) CIVIL ACTION -LAW NATHAN PATTERSON, ) NOTICE: YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED TO Defendants ) RESPOND TO THE ENCLOSED NEW MATTER WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS FROM SERVICE OR A DF,FAULT JUDGME T MAY BE ENTERED A AINST Y i _ MICHAEL L. BANGS (I 41263) Attorney for Defendants ANSWER. NEW MATTER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT PAYTIME HARRISBURG. INC 1. Admitted. 2. No applicable to answering Defendant. To the extent it is, it is denied. 3. Admitted. 4. Not applicable to answering Defendant. To the extent it is, it is denieii. 5. No answer required. 6. No answer required; the matter has been resolved and jurisdiction and venue are properly in Cumberland County. 7. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Paytime provides pa~roll ~- ,,~, ~~~ services to clients. It is denied that that is all that Paytime provides to its clients _~~~-~ E r; '~~-:-~ . i~ , :-, i-r-s - ~; rte- -~' ;-~ ~ -C ~ t~ w t~ ~-~ r -~'=' -~:. c~ ,,, -~ c:a -~,y ~~ n ~;~ ~ ~ ~}~ ~rn -~ ~ ~ to -C 8. Denied. Defendant Paytime, after reasonable investigation, is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 9. Denied as stated. Defendant Paytime, after reasonable investigation, is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied. However, it is specifically denied that there was any attempt by Defendant Paytime to "turn around Human Element Group, LLC" and to "grow Defendant Paytime's services." Paytime, through its President, Nathan Patterson, had dealings with Plaintiff because she or her companies were providing consulting services to some of Paytime's clients and Paytime and Patterson, in his role as President of Paytime, became aware that Plaintiff or her companies were having significant financial problems and Patterson, in his role as President of Paytime, was concerned about some of Paytime's clients losing human resource consulting services provided by Plaintiff or her companies. 10. Not applicable to answering Defendant. To the extent it is, it is specifically denied. 11. Not applicable to answering Defendant. To the extent it is, it is specifically denied. 12. Not applicable to Defendant Paytime. 13. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 14. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 15. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 2 16. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 17. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 18. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 19. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 20. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 21. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 22. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 23. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 24. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 25. 26. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant HEG paid Defendant Paytime a monthly management fee. It is averred that the monthly management fee was required to be paid, upon advice of Defendant's CPA, to account for back office, primarily sales, services that Defendant was providing to HEG which otherwise HEG would have had to provide by securing elsewhere or by hiring additional employees. 27. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 28. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 29. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 30. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 31. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 32. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 33. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 34. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytirne "took over" all sixteen active accounts served by Defendant HEG or that there were in fact sixteen active accounts. Further, it is denied that Plaintiff brought six accounts from her prior business and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. It is averred that Plaintiff herself took over operation of some of her own accounts and was never prevented from continuing to service those clients if she so chose. Defendant Paytime, in order to not cause an interruption of business to its 4 own clients, continued to service the accounts of Defendant HEG so as to preserve the relationship it had with its own clients as a result of the failure of Defendant HEG. 35. Denied as stated. To the extent that this averment is referencing or at all related to Defendant Paytime, it is specifically denied that there was any "transfer" of customer accounts. It is averred that Defendant Paytime, after Defendant HEG ceased operation, attempted to preserve its own relationship with its own clients by continuing to provide those clients with the services that were provided by Defendant HEG. It is averred that Plaintiff herself retained some. of her own clients and was free to service any and all accounts of Defendant HEG and was never prevented to do so. 36. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 37. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime "renegotiated" any lease for the Camp Hill office that was previously Defendant HEG's office. It is averred that Defendant Paytime negotiated an entirely new lease with the landlord for the Camp Hill office after Defendant HEG ceased operations and that the landlord was agreeable to having Defendant Paytime continue to lease the space under the terms and agreement of the new lease. 38. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime "retained the copier leased" to Source Point, LLC from The Phillips Group. After reasonable investigation, Defendant Paytime is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the rest of the averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. It is averred that Plaintiff s former business, Source Point, LLC, was on the copier lease with The Phillips Group and at the time that Defendant HEG shut down, Plaintiff did nothing to remove the copier or return it to The Phillips Group thus requiring Defendant Paytime to dispose of it. 5 39. Denied. To the extent that the averment is intended to mean that Defendant Paytime continued to service Defendant HECi's accounts and provided employment to some of Defendant HEG's employees to the exclusion of Plaintiff, it is denied. The remainder of the averment is also denied as it implies facts that lead to a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required by Defendant Paytime, the entire averment is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 40. Denied. Defendant Paytime is not the "successor to Defendant HEG;" rather, Defendant Paytime was a fully operational, separate and distinct corporation in business for years prior to the beginning of Defendant HEG and continues to this day. The rest of the averment is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent that an answer is required, it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 41. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 42. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 43. This averment does not apply to Defendant Faytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 44. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 45. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 6 46. Denied as stated. After reasonable investigation, Defendant Paytime is unable to ascertain exactly what Plaintiff means by this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 47. Admitted. 48. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Paytime provides payroll services for employees located in York County, Pennsylvania. The exact amount is unknown. 49. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Paytime had an exhibitor booth at the York County Chamber of Commerce Business Expo in York County. It is denied that Defendant Paytime provide the "same services" previously performed by Defendant HEG. Rather, the services provided by Defendant Paytime as it relates to the human resource work is provided in a much different way than the business model previously done by Plaintiff or done by Defendant HEG. COUNTI VIOLATION OF PENNSYLVANIA WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION LAW 50. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 49 are incorporated herein by reference. 51. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 52. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 53. This averment does not apply to befendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 7 54. Denied. Defendant Paytime was not a "managing agent" of Defendant HEG nor can it be determined to bean "employer" as defined under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law. Defendant Paytime was paid a management fee by Defendant HEG as required under the IRS regulations and under the advice of its CPA since Defendant HEG was receiving services from Defendant Paytime which it otherwise would have had to acquire by hiring additional employees or obtaining elsewhere at additional higher costs than what it paid. Further, Plaintiff herself, under the terms of her employment contract, was entirely responsible for all management of Defendant HEG. 55. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime acquired any "assets" of Defendant HEG or that it continued to operate in the leased office of Defendant HEG. Defendant HEG had no assets at the time it shut down in that it was losing significant amount of funds. Further, Defendant Paytime acquired an entirely new lease with the landlord which previously housed Defendant HEG. To the extent that Defendant Paytime hired any employees that were previously working for Defendant HEG, that is a decision that Defendant Paytime made in order to provide continuing services to its clients. Finally, the rest of the averment is a legal conclusion regarding de facto merger and no answer is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 56. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 57. Denied. To the extent that Paragraph 57 is making an averment against Defendant Paytime, it is specifically denied because the WPCL does not apply to Defendant Paytime in that Defendant Paytime was never an employer nor does it apply because Defendant Paytime 8 believes that all of Plaintiff's wages that she earned were paid in full as of the date of the closing of the corporation Defendant HEG. 58. Denied. To the extent that Paragraph 57 is making an averment against Defendant Paytime, it is specifically denied because the WPCL does not apply to Defendant Paytime in that Defendant Paytime was never an employer nor does it apply because Defendant Paytime believes that all of Plaintiff s wages that she earned were paid in full as of the date of the closing of the corporation Defendant HEG. WHEREFORE, Defendant Paytime demands judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff, together with costs. COUNT II CIVIL CONSPIRACY 59. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 58 are incorporated herein by reference. 60. Denied as stated. Plaintiff, under the terms of her employment contract and as indicated by Defendant Patterson in his role as President of Defendant HEG, was given autonomy and responsibility for the management and success of Defendant HEG. To the extent that Zeigler, who was employed by Defendant Paytime, had any involvement with Plaintiff, it was solely as and in conjunction with the need to have synergy between Paytime and HEG. Further, Defendant Paytime received a management fee as required by the IRS regulations and in accordance with the instructions of Defendant Paytime's CPA for services provided by Defendant Paytime which otherwise would have been required to be purchased by Defendant HEG through the hiring of additional employees or by using another outside consulting firm. 61. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime is legally able to conspire with Defendant HEG since Defendant Paytime is primarily owned by Defendant Patterson and 9 Defendant HEG was owned entirely by Defendant Patterson. Further, it is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime was involved in any way in an attempt to evade paying any of Plaintiff's wages or violated the WPCL. Further, it is averred that upon information and belief, Plaintff was paid all wages due her by Defendant HEG. 62. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime and Defendant HEG could legally conspire to do anything, much less fraudulently convey any "assets" of Defendant HEG since Defendant Pay~time is owned primarily by Defendant Patterson and Defendant HEG was owned entirely by Defendant Patterson and it is a legal impossibility for them to conspire against themselves. Further, there was no conveyance of any "assets" of Defendant HEG to Defendant Paytime in that Defendant HEG had no assets. Finally, Defendant Paytime, upon information and belief, believes that Plaintiff was paid all her wages as that is defined under the WPCL. 63. Denied. Since Defendant Paytime was owned primarily by Defendant Patterson and Defendant HEG was owned entirely by Defendant Patterson, it is a legal impossibility for those entities to conspire with one another. Further, it is specifically denied that there was any violation of the WPCL or that it even applied to Defendant Paytime. Finally, Defendant Paytime denies that Plaintiff has suffered any damages or that she is entitled to receive $35,000.00. 64. Denied. This averment is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. To the extent an answer is required, it is specifically denied that Plaintiff is entitled to a claim for punitive damages under this claim. WHEREFO1tE, Defendant Paytime requests judgment be found in its favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. 10 COtiNT III BREACH OF CONTRACT 65. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 64 are incorporated herein by reference. 66. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 67. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 68. Denied. This averment is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required, it is specifically denied that there is any basis for "a de facto merger" because Defendant Paytime was never a successor to Defendant HEG and cannot be held liable for any of Defendant HEG's obligations to the extent Plaintiff can prove any liability against Defendant HEG. 69. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 70. Denied. To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to backdoor this averment by making a claim against Defendant Paytime, it is specifically denied because Defendant Paytime never employed Plaintiff. 71. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 72. Denied. It is denied that Defendant Paytime could breach any contract with Plaintiff because Defendant Paytime never had a contract with Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Defendant Paytime requests judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. 11 COUNT IV TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 73. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 72 are incorporated herein by reference. 74. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime was "fully aware of any employment agreement that Plaintiff had with Defendant HEG." Further, it is denied that Defendant Paytime "acquired" all the accounts of Defendant HEG or "acquired" employees of Defendant HEG. It is averred that Defendant Paytime serviced its own accounts after Defendant HEG shut down so that its accounts could be provided with the same continuity of services that it had prior to Defendant HEG shutting down and further, it is averred that Defendant Paytime hired some of Defendant HEG's employees. It is averred that Plaintiff at all time had the ability to continue servicing any accounts of Defendant HEG or hire any of Defendant HEG's employees which she declined to do. 75. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime entered into any employment agreement with Plaintiff. 76. This averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 77. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime interfered with Plaintiff's contractual relationship with Defendant HEG or that it acquired any of Defendant HEG's accounts; facilitated the liquidation of Defendant HEG's assets; or retained all of Defendant HEG's employees which caused Defendant HEG to cease performing under any employment agreement that it had with Plaintiff. It is averred that Defendant Paytime, in order to make sure that its own clients were continuing to be served and provided with the continuity of service, 12 after Defendant HEG shut down, maintained those relationships and attempted to provide them with continuing services to maintain that relationship. 78. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime interfered with any contractual relationship that Plaintiff had with Defendant HEG or that it in any way caused Defendant HEG to breach any employment agreement. Further, it is denied that Defendant Paytime acquired any "valuable assets" of Defendant HEG since there were no assets to acquire. Finally, the rest of the averment does not apply to Defendant Paytime because Defendant Paytime had no obligation to pay anything to Plaintiff under any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant HEG. 79. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime has any obligation to Plaintiff under any terms of an Employment Agreement that she had with Defendant HEG in that Defendant Paytime is a separate and distinct corporation and never employed Plaintiff. 80. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime assumed any copier lease agreement that was the obligation of Plaintiff's prior company, Source Point, LLC, or that it acquired any office lease agreement of Defendant HEG. Further, it is denied that Defendant Paytime "assumed" Defendant HEG's employees or that it in any way interfered or caused Defendant HEG to breach any contract that it had with Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Defendant Paytime demands judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff, together with costs. COUNT V INDEMNITY 81. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 80 are incorporated herein by reference. 13 82. Denied. This averment is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required, it is specifically denied. 83. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Paytime. 84. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime "retained" the copier lease leased to Source Point, LLC. It is averred that Plaintiff at all times had the ability to pick up the copier but refused to do so or did not take any steps to do so and thereafter Defendant Paytime advised The Phillips Group that it needed to pick up the copier. 85. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Paytime contacted The Phillips Group regarding the copier and that it should be picked up from its location. The rest of the averment is denied to the extent that Defendant Paytime had no obligation to make any lease payments on the copier at all; the copier being leased to Source Point, LLC and/or Plaintiff who had the opportunity and responsibility to pick up the copier at any time but refused to do so. 86. Denied. After reasonable investigation Defendant Paytime is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 87. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Paytime. 88. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant Paytime. 89. Denied. It is specifically denied that there was any de facto merger between Defendant Paytime and Defendant HEG. Further, it is denied that there was any "renegotiation" of the lease for the Camp Hill office space. Rather, Defendant Paytime, because it needed space, negotiated with the landlord to use the space because it was aware of the space and that it suited its needs. 14 90. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendant Paytime is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. It is averred that there has been no claim against Plaintiff for any obligations of the previous landlord by Source Point, LLC and that Plaintiff has not personally guaranteed that lease. WHEREFORE, Defendant Paytime demands judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff, together with costs. COUNT VI FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 91. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 90 are incorporated herein by reference. 92. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG "transferred any assets" to Defendant Paytime. It is averred that Defendant HEG had no assets at the time that it ceased operating. Further, it is averred that Defendant Paytime serviced all of the accounts that it had post closing of Defendant HEG so as to provide a continuity of service to its clients. 93. Denied as stated. To the extent this averment is suggesting that Defendant Paytime was "transferred" any of Defendant HEG's assets, or that Defendant HEG had any assets at all, then this is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. Further, it is denied that there was a "transfer" of any accounts or a "transfer" of any employees of Defendant HEG to Defendant Paytime. It is averred that Defendant Paytime, after Defendant HEG ceased doing business, continued to provide services to its own clients and that it hired some of Defendant HEG's employees to continue that service so as to provide a continuity of service to Defendant Paytime's accounts. 15 94. Denied to the extent that this averment is meant to suggest that Defendant Paytime was "transferred" any assets of Defendant HEG in that that never occurred nor did Defendant HEG have any assets to transfer. Further, it is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime did anything to avoid or evade any payment of wages to Plaintiff under any employment agreement since Defendant Paytime had no employment agreement with Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Defendant Paytime demands judgment be found in its favor and against Plaintiff, together with costs. NEW MATTER OF DEFENDANT PAYTIME 95. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 94 are incorporated herein by reference. 96. Defendant Patterson became aware of Plaintiff in his capacity as President and primary shareholder of Defendant Paytime and in that capacity had referred clients of Defendant Paytime to Plaintiff or Plaintiff s companies for purposes of providing human resource consulting services. 97. Patterson, in his capacity as President of Paytime, Inc. and through his discussions in the operation of his business, became aware that Plaintiffls companies were suffering significant financial difficulties such that Plaintiff or her companies would not longer be able to service Paytime's clients with human resource services. 98. Patterson, in his capacity as President of Paytime, Inc., engaged personally or through employees of Paytime, in several discussions with Plaintiff concerning the operation of her businesses to find out if Plaintiff intended to continue to provide the human resource services to Paytime's customers. 99. Plaintiff represented to Patterson that she had extensive experience in providing human resources and essentially claimed that any financial difficulties that she had incurred with 15 her companies was because of forces outside of her control and that all that was needed was the infusion of capital to allow her to make those businesses profitable. 100. Plaintiff provided certain financial information to Patterson that she represented accurately reflected the operations of those companies to provide Patterson with some basis from which she could support her claims that a human resource company could be profitable. 101. Plaintiff also made claims to Patterson that she had the ability to increase sales and provide additional services that would cause a human resource company to be profitable. 102. Plaintiff claimed to Patterson that because she did not have enough resources to get her company out of debt that it would continue not to be profitable and that she could not commit additional funds but that absent that debt it could be a profitable endeavor. 103. Based upon the representations made by Plaintiff to Patterson, and based upon Plaintiff s disclosure of her financial records regarding her company and the liabilities that existed to her companies, Patterson indicated that he was willing to invest personal funds to start up a new company, Defendant HEG and that Defendant HEG would employ Plaintiff to run that company. 10~. Patterson set up and formed Defendant HEG which is a Pennsylvania corporation properly formed and operating under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 105. Patterson also is a primary owner of Defendant Paytime which is properly formed and operating in accordance with the corporation laws under the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 106. Both HEG and Paytime adhere to all corporate formalities as required under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Internal Revenue Code. 17 107. Patterson's willingness to commit his personal funds to the start up of a new company was based solely upon the representations of Plaintiff as to her abilities and the income and expense information that she provided to Patterson regarding the operation of her human resource companies. 108. The representations and information provided by Plaintiff to Patterson was fraudulent and had Plaintiff provided accurate information about the operation of her companies, Patterson would not have committed his personal funds to the formation of Defendant HEG. 109. Plaintiff was notified by Defendant Patterson, in his capacity as owner and President of Defendant HEG, in early December 2008 that Defendant HEG was going to cease operation at the end of the year. 110. Prior to December 2008, Plaintiff was aware that Defendant HEG was losing money. 111. Plaintiff had been involved in numerous meetings with Defendant Patterson and/or Mr. Zeigler concerning the operation of Defendant HEG and the fact that Defendant HEG was not progressing in the way that Plaintiff had represented. 112. Between December 1, 2008 and January 1, 2009, Plaintiff began contacting Defendant HEG's customers indicating that she could provide human resource consulting for them once Defendant HEG shut down. 113. Plaintiff advised one or more customers of Defendant HEG that Defendant HEG was going to shut down as of December 31, 2008; said contact occurring some time between December 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008. 18 114. Plaintiff had discussions with one or more employees of Defendant HEG between December 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008 advising them that Defendant HEG was going to shut down and cease operation and requesting if they would like to continue working with her. 115. As of December 31, 2008, Plaintiff's prior business Source Point, LLC, was still operational and had not been formally shut down. 116. Plaintiff serviced one or more of Defendant HEG's accounts/customers following January 1, 2009. 117. Plaintiff had not personally guaranteed any lease for the premises where her previous business was located and which was signed by Source Point, LLC. 118. The landlord of the premises where Defendant HEG was located has never made any claim against Plaintiff individually for any past due lease payments owed by Source Point, LLC. COUNTERCLAIM PAYTIME HARRISBURG. INC. vs. LAURA FRAZIER 119. Paragraphs 1 through 118 are incorporated herein by reference. 120. Plaintiff filed a six Count, ninety-four averment Complaint which included claims against Defendant Paytime Harrisburg, Inc. Those claims are without basis and as Plaintiff has admitted on a number of occasions it is done as "alternative pleading" even though Plaintiff knows or should know after reasonable investigation that she has no claims against Defendant Paytime. 121. Plaintiff is aware that Defendant Paytime is a separate and distinct corporation and that she never entered into any agreement with Defendant Paytime. 19 122. Plaintiff knows or should know after reasonable investigation that Defendant Paytime cannot conspire with Defendant Human Element Group, Inc. because Defendant Paytime is primarily owned by Defendant Patterson and Defendant HEG is owned by Defendant Patterson and therefore they cannot conspire with itself. 123. Many of the claims made by Plaintiff against Defendant Paytime have no legal basis and were done solely to keep Defendant Paytime in a case because Plaintiff knows that Defendant HEG has no assets by which it can pay any judgment that she may obtain against Defendant HEG. 124. Plaintiff forced Defendant Paytime to defend jurisdiction and venue even though she knew or should have known that the agreement between Defendant HEG and Plaintiff clearly indicated that proper venue was in Cumberland County; and that Defendant Paytime was not a party to that agreement. 125. Plaintiff has used a legal process against Defendant Paytime to accomplish a purpose by which the process was not designed for, namely to try to extract a settlement or funds from Defendant Paytime knowing that it had no contractual agreement with Plaintiff. 126. Plaintiff has made claims that are not recognizable under Pennsylvania law under any theory against Defendant Paytime and cannot hide behind her claim that she is doing "alternative pleading" as a basis to avoid liability. 127. Defendant Paytime has incurred substantial legal fees by hiring Michael L. Bangs, Esquire, at the rate of $210.00 per hour, in order to defend these claims which would not have been incurred had Plaintiff pursued the proper defendant alone. 20 128. The legal fees that Defendant Paytime have incurred were caused solely by the abuse of the legal process by Plaintiff and until such time as Plaintiff voluntarily removes Defendant Paytime, those fees will continue. WHEREFORE, Defendant Paytime has been damaged by Plaintiff in an amount in excess of $20,000.00, plus costs of suit. Respectfully submitted, v(~ ~ p G MICHAEL L. BANGS Attorney for Defendant Pa 429 South 18th Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 730-7310 Supreme Court ID #41263 Harrisburg, Inc. 21 VERIFICATION NATHAN PATTERSON, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the President of Paytime Harrisburg, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, and that as such officer, he is authorized to make this Verification on its behalf and that the facts set forth in the foregoing document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and further understands that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. PAYTIME HARRISBURG, INC. BY: NATHAN PAT ERSON President CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this day served the foregoing ANSWER, NEW MATTER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT PAYTIME HARRISBURG, INC., by depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, addressed to the following: Andrew J. Miller, Esquire Miller, Poole & Lord 137 East Philadelphia Street York, PA 17401 DATE: b WENDY . S UB Paralegal 22 MICHAEL L. BANGS, ESQUIRE I.D. No. 41263 429 South 18~' Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 730-7310 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS LAURA FRAZIER, ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff ) OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. ) NO.2010-01765 HUMAN ELEMENT GROUP, INC., ) PAYTIME HARRISBURG, INC. and ) CIVIL ACTION -LAW NATHAN PATTERSON, ) NOTICE: YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED TO Defendants ) RESPOND TO THE ENCLOSED NEW MATTER WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS FROM SERVICE ) OR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST)YOU. C.. MICHAEL L. BANGS (ID 63) Attorney for Defendants ANSWER AND NEW MATTER OF DEFENDANT HUMAN ELEMENT GROUP, INC 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Human Element Group, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business at 3552 Gettysburg Road, Suite 200, Camp Hill. It is denied that Human Element Group, Inc. ever had a location at 2556 Eastern Boulevard, York, York County, Pennsylvania. 3. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 4. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 5. No answer required. 6. No answer required; this matter has been resolved and jurisdiction and venue are properly in Cumberland County. 7. This averment is not applicable to answering Defendant HEG ~ o . ~ ~ ~ ~ ` --~ ~~' ' ~ ~° rn r'"-- ro ~~ N w ~ =acs '~= q 1 ~ ° ~~ ~ o~ z© ~- ~~ ~ -~-rm `i Q 8. Denied. Defendant HEG, after reasonable investigation, is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 9. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 10. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 11. Admitted. 12. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 13. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant HEG used the address of its incorporation on its checking account. It is also admitted that that is the same location where Defendant Paytime is located. Any other inference on this averment is denied. 14. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff was employed pursuant to the Employment Agreement which is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint and marked as Exhibit A. It is denied that it was executed by Defendant Patterson; rather, it was executed by Defendant Patterson in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG. 15. Denied as stated. To the extent that Paragraph 15 relates to the justification for jurisdiction and venue occurring in York County, that matter has been decided and proper jurisdiction and venue have determined to be in Cumberland County. 16. Denied. The final Employment Agreement was not executed personally by Defendant Patterson; rather it was executed Defendant Patterson acting in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG. 17. Denied as stated. The Employment Agreement speaks for itself and to the extent that this averment deviates from any of its terms and conditions it is denied. Further, the 2 Employment Agreement never discussed nor did Plaintiff enter into a three year employment agreement with Defendant HEG. 18. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Paragraph 18 accurately reflects the language of the agreement. It is denied that any other inference meant by this averment is denied in that the agreement speaks for itself. 19. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Paragraph 19 accurately reflects the language of the agreement. It is denied that any other inference meant by this averment is denied in that the agreement speaks for itself. 20. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant HEG eventually employed most or all of the former employees of Human Element Group, LLC. The rest of the averment is denied because Defendant HEG cannot ascertain what the averment means when it says "for use by" Defendant HEG. To the extent that the averment means that Plaintiff consented to the use of the name Human Element Group by Defendant HEG, then it is admitted. 21. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 22. Denied. Defendant HEG never assumed the office or copier lease of Human Element Group, LLC nor did it take over or continue to operate Plaintiff s former business in its same location in that Plaintiff didn't have a former business in the location. It is averred that Defendant HEG was a separate and distinct corporation. It is further averred that Plaintiff's former company, Human Element Group, LLC, benefited by Defendant HEG making payments on the copier lease and making payment on the office lease. 23. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant HEG made payments on the office lease for 3552 Gettysburg Road, Suite 200 to DEEM Guys, LLC until December 31, 2008 which benefited Plaintiff s former company. It is averred that this benefit Plaintiffl s former companies and at no time did Plaintiff request that a separate lease be entered into between Defendant HEG and DEEM Guys, LLC. 24. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant HEG made payments for a copier lease from The Phillips Group to Source Point, LLC and that payments were made through January 7, 2009 and further that Exhibit D reflects the final payment. Any other inference in this averment is denied. It is averred that any payments made on the copier lease benefited Plaintiff who had personally guaranteed this lease and who did not want to turn that copier lease back to The Phillips Group because of personal liability. 25. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG but to the extent it does, it is denied. 26. Admitted. 27. Admitted. 28. Denied. Paragraph 28 is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. It is specifically averred that the loaning of funds by Defendant Patterson to Defendant HEG was properly done and in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and in now way suggests that there was any improper capitalization nor does it make Defendant Patterson liable for any of the obligations of Defendant HEG, a separate and distinct corporation. 29. Denied. Defendant HEG, after reasonable investigation, is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. It is averred that Plaintiff, in her capacity as the manager of HEG, would be in contact with the President and owner of Defendant HEG, Defendant Patterson, and Zeigler to coordinate management of the operations. 4 30. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 31. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that there was no formal performance evaluation of Plaintiff by Defendant HEG nor was there any disciplinary action taken against her at any time. It is averred that under the terms of the Employment Agreement, Plaintiff was solely responsible for the success or failure of Defendant HEG as clearly outlined in that agreement and Defendant HEG ultimately failed. 32. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Patterson, acting in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG, notified Plaintiff in early December 2008 that Defendant HEG would cease operation at the end of the year because of the mounting losses and that Defendant Patterson, in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG, sent a letter dated December 31, 2008 formally indicating that Defendant HEG was shut down. All other inferences of this averment are denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 33. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 34. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 35. Denied as stated. Defendant HEG ceased operation on December 31, 2008 and therefore could no longer service any customer accounts and therefore no transfer of its customer accounts ever occurred since it was not operating. Plaintiff began servicing some of Defendant HEG's customers prior to and after Defendant HEG shut down as did Defendant Paytime. 36. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 37. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 38. Denied to the extent any of this averment applies to Defendant HEG. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG made any lease payments on the copier after January 7, 2009 in that Defendant HEG had no obligation to make any payments and did it only as an accommodation to Plaintiff which benefited Plaintiff. 39. Paragraph 39 is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required by Defendant HEG it is denied. There was never a de facto merger between Defendant HEG, Defendant Patterson or Defendant Paytime. 40. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime is a "successor" to Defendant HEG or that Defendant Paytime is at all liable for any obligations of Defendant HEG. 41. Denied. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff is entitled to "bi-weekly installments" of any salary due her under the Employment Agreement. It is averred that Defendant HEG paid Plaintiff any salary that she earned on a bi-weekly basis pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement and that there are no additional wages due under that Employment Agreement. 42. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG owes any additional wages to Plaintiff. 43. Denied. Defendant Patterson, in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG, notified Plaintiff that Defendant HEG was losing significant funds and that it would be shut down as of December 31, 2008. As a result of the shut down of Defendant HEG, Plaintiff was no longer employed. Plaintiff had the sole responsibility for the success or failure of Defendant HEG and it failed due to Plaintiff's lack of ability to make it profitable. 44. Denied as stated. This averment contains claims that are regarding discussions between attorneys that is ethically impermissible for Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel to contain in this lawsuit. Any inference made by this averment is strictly denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 6 45. Denied. Defendant HEG is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 46. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 47. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 48. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 49. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. COUNTI VIOLATION OF PENNSYLVANIA WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION LAW 50. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 49 are incorporated herein by reference. 51. Admitted. 52. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 53. Denied as stated. Defendant HEG was not an undercapitalized sham corporation; rather it was a corporation properly formed and capitalized in accordance with IRS regulations and generally accepted accounting principles. 54. Denied. Defendant Paytime was not the "managing agent" of Defendant HEG; rather Plaintiff was responsible for all management of Defendant HEG. It is averred that Defendant Paytime provided services that Defendant HEG paid Defendant Paytime for which otherwise Defendant HEG would have had to secure by hiring additional employees or by paying higher costs to outside consultants. 55. Denied. Defendant HEG had no assets at the time that it shut down in that it had lost significant amounts of money and any accounts that it had were not sufficient to pay the 7 operating expenses. Further, it is denied that Defendant HEG engaged in a de facto merger with Defendant Paytime in that Defendant HEG was a separate and distinct corporation. 56. Denied as stated. It is unknown what Plaintiff means by "at all relevant times" and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 57. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG violated the WPCL. It is averred that Defendant HEG paid Plaintiff all wages that she earned up and to the time that Defendant HEG closed its doors. 58. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG is liable for any claims of Plaintiff under the WPCL in that Defendant HEG has paid Plaintiff for all wages that she earned up and through the time that Defendant HEG closed its doors. WHEREFORE, Defendant HEG demands judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. COUNT II CIVIL CONSPIRACY 59. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 58 are incorporated herein by reference. 60. Denied as stated. It is averred that Defendant HEG was a separate and distinct corporation and that Defendant Patterson, as its President and owner, was involved in Defendant HEG's operations in that capacity. Further, it is averred that Defendant HEG paid Defendant Paytime a management fee for all the services provided by Defendant Paytime to Defendant HEG and in accordance with the advice of its CPA and in accordance with IRS regulations because otherwise Defendant HEG would have had to hire additional employees or pay additional consulting fees which would have exceeded those which were charged to it by Defendant Paytime. Further, it is averred that as a result of the management hierarchy, Plaintiff 8 did have contact with Zeigler but Plaintiff was solely responsible for the management of Defendant HEG per the terms of her Employment Agreement. 61. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG conspired with anyone to evade paying Plaintiff s wages or that they violated the WPCL. It is averred that Plaintiff has been paid all of her wages that she earned up and to the time that Defendant HEG shut its doors. 62. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG conspired with Defendant Paytime or that it could legally conspire with Defendant Paytime since they were owned primarily by Defendant Patterson. It is also denied that Defendant HEG "conveyed" any assets that it had to Defendant Paytime in that it had no assets because it had significant losses. 63. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG conspired with Defendant Paytime or that it legally could do so since they were primarily owned by the same individual. Furthermore, it is specifically denied that Defendant HEG violated the WPCL in that it paid Plaintiff all wages that she earned up and through the time that Defendant HEG shut its doors. 64. Denied. This averment is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required but to the extent an answer is required, it is specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. WHEREFORE, Defendant HEG requests judgment be found in its favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. COUNT III BREACH OF CONTRACT 65. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 64 are incorporated herein by reference. 66. Denied as stated. Defendant Patterson signed an Employment Agreement with Plaintiff which is attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff s Complaint in his capacity as President of 9 Defendant HEG. The terms and conditions of the agreement are set forth in that agreement and any deviation by this averment is therefore denied in that the agreement speaks for itself. 67. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Patterson is liable for the obligations of Defendant HEG which is a separate and distinct properly organized corporation under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania. 68. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Paytime is a successor to Defendant HEG. Defendant Paytime was in existence prior to Defendant HEG and continues to operate. Defendant HEG shut down and there has been no successor corporation. 69. Denied. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff properly performed all of her obligations in accordance with the terms of the Employment Agreement because the venture failed. Plaintiff was entirely responsible for the success or the failure of the operation and since it lost significant funds and was shut down, Plaintiff failed to do what she promised she could do prior to entering into the Employment Agreement with Defendant HEG. 70. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff was not advised that Defendant HEG was losing money and in fact Plaintiff was aware that it was losing significant funds. As a result of Defendant HEG's significant losses, Defendant HEG shut its doors. Plaintiff was responsible for the success or failure of Defendant HEG and as a result, she was keenly aware of her failure to perform under the Employment Agreement. 71. Denied as stated. The Employment Agreement speaks for itself and to the extent that this averment means to suggest that Plaintiff was guaranteed a $70,000.00 payment it is denied. Plaintiff was provided a salary of $70,000.00 which was earned bi-weekly and was paid all of the salary that she earned up to the time Defendant HEG closed its doors. 10 72. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG breached any contract with Plaintiff or that Plaintiff was due any additional payments for any salary that she did not earn after January 1, 2009. WHEREFORE, Defendant HEG requests judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. COUNT IV TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 73. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 72 are incorporated herein by reference. 74. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 75. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 76. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 77. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 78. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 79. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 80. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. COUNT V INDEMNITY 81. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 80 are incorporated herein by reference. 82. Denied. There was no de facto merger of Defendant HEG and Defendant Paytime in that Defendant HEG was a separate and distinct corporation operating in accordance with the laws of the State of Pennsylvania. Further, it is denied that Defendant HEG has any obligations to which are owed by anyone else in that Defendant HEG has paid all of its obligations at the time it shut its doors. 11 83. Denied as stated. It is denied that Defendant HEG "took over" the payments for the copier lease from The Phillips Group from Source Point, LLC. It is averred that Defendant HEG, as an accommodation to Plaintiff and because Plaintiff had personally guaranteed the lease, made payments on her behalf since it was using the copier. It is averred that Plaintiff took no steps to get out of the copier lease since she was benefiting by the payments from Defendant HEG. 84. This averment does not apply to answering Defendant HEG. 85. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant HEG made no payments for the copier lease after January 7, 2009. It is averred that Defendant HEG had no obligation to make any payments on the copier lease at any time but only made payments as an accommodation to Plaintiff because Plaintiff had failed or refused to negotiate out of the copier lease and was benefiting by those payments. 86. Denied. After reasonable investigation Defendant HEG is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this averment and therefore it is denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the trial of this case. 87. Denied as stated. It is denied that Defendant HEG "took over" the lease for Human Element Group, LLC's Camp Hill office or that it absolved Plaintiff of any personal liability because Plaintiff had no personal liability under the lease. It is averred that Defendant HEG made the payments of the lease directly to the landlord for the Camp Hill office while it used the space which benefited Human Element Group, LLC. Further, it is averred that neither Plaintiff nor her former company Human Element Group, LLC or Source Point, LLC, ever contacted the landlord to advise them that her company was no longer leasing the space; rather she accepted the payments on behalf of her companies directly to the landlord and remained silent. 12 88. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant HEG made lease payments directly to the landlord up until the time it had ceased doing business. It is averred that Plaintiff accepted those payments which benefited her and at no time notified the landlord that her businesses were no longer leasing the space. 89. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG had any de facto merger with Defendant Paytime. 90. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG had any obligation to make any payments on the lease between Source Point, LLC and the landlord and further that Plaintiff has any damages since she did not personally guarantee that lease. WHEREFORE, Defendant HEG requests judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. COUNT VI FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 91. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 90 are incorporated herein by reference. 92. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant HEG transferred any assets to Defendant Paytime. It is averred that Defendant HEG had no assets at the time it shut down its operation in that the liabilities greatly exceeded anything that was owned and that the accounts could not generate sufficient income to pay off the existing obligations. 93. Denied. It is specifically denied that Defendant Patterson, in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG, transferred any of Defendant HEG's assets after it ceased doing business in that Defendant HEG had no assets. Further, it is averred that Defendant HEG was not operating or taking care of any of its accounts after it shut down and that its employees were unemployed at the time that it shut down. Further, it is averred that Defendant HEG has paid all 13 of its obligations including any payment of salary earned by Plaintiff up until the time that it closed its doors. 94. Denied. It is specifically denied that any assets were transferred by Defendant HEG in that Defendant HEG had no assets. Further, it is averred that Defendant HEG has paid Plaintiff all salary and benefits that she earned up to the point that it stopped doing business. WHEREFORE, Defendant HEG demands judgment be found in its favor and against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. NEW MATTER 95. Answers to Paragraphs 1 through 94 are incorporated herein by reference. 96. Plaintiff was notified by Defendant Patterson, acting in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG, in early December 2008 that Defendant HEG would cease operations at the end of the year. 97. Plaintiff, in December 2008, contacted many of Defendant HEG's accounts advising them that Defendant HEG was shutting down and indicating that she could provide services to them moving forward. 98. After Defendant HEG shut down, Plaintiff did in fact provide consulting services to one or more of Defendant HEG's clients. 99. Plaintiff discussed with one or more of Defendant HEG's employees whether or not they wished to continue working with her moving forward. 100. None of Defendant HEG's employees wanted to work with Plaintiff moving forward after the close of Defendant HEG. 101. Plaintiff had not taken any steps to formally close down Source Point, LLC or Human Element Group, LLC by the time that Defendant HEG shut down. 14 102. Plaintiff was aware, prior to December 2008, that many of the employees of Defendant HEG were disgruntled with her management style and that Defendant HEG was losing money. 103. Plaintiff, beginning in early December 2008, did not work on behalf of Defendant HEG; rather, she pursued the accounts and other means of employment. 104. Plaintiff was paid all of her wages and benefits through December 31, 2008 by Defendant HEG. 105. Plaintiff performed no work for Defendant HEG after December 31, 2008. 106. Plaintiff knew that the financial information; account information; and projections that she had provided to Defendant Patterson individually and in his capacity as President of Defendant HEG were not accurate and misleading and overstated her abilities and the revenues that could be obtained by Defendant HEG. 107. Plaintiff knew that her former company Source Point, LLC, t/a Human Element Group, was still under lease for the space occupied by Defendant HEG at the time that Defendant HEG ceased doing business yet took no steps to contact the landlord to advise the landlord that her companies would continue to operate under the terms of the lease. 108. Plaintiff on her own behalf and on behalf of her companies accepted payments made by Defendant HEG for the copier lease with The Phillips Group and for payments towards the outstanding lease knowing that she, or her companies, were obligated to make those payments. 15 WHEREFORE, Defendant HEG demands judgment against Plaintiff together with costs of suit. Respectfully submitted, ~, -~ MICHAEL L. BANGS Attorney for Defendant H an Element Group, Inc. 429 South 18th Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 730-7310 Supreme Court ID #41263 16 VERIFICATION NATHAN PATTERSON, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the President of Human Element Group, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, and that as such officer, he is authorized to make this Verification on its behalf and that the facts set forth in the foregoing document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and further understands that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. HUMAN ELEMENT GROUP, INC. BY:~~ v` NATHAN PATTERSON President CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this day served the foregoing ANSWER AND NEW MATTER OF DEFENDANT HUMAN ELEMENT GROUP, INC., by depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, addressed to the following: Andrew J. Miller, Esquire Miller, Poole & Lord 137 East Philadelphia Street York, PA 17401 DATE: ~2" ~~ 17 NOV 1 5 Eutu Jodie E. Teffeteller Plaintiff VS. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL TERM Thomas T. Teffeteller NO. 10-1232 Defendant QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court finds that: 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and over the subject matter of this action and has the authority to enter this Qualified Domestic Relations Order. 2. This Order is intended to be a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") as that term is defined in section 206(d) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and section 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code"). This QDRO is granted in accordance with 23 P.C.S.A. §3502, which relates to marital property rights. 3. The retirement plan subject to this Order is the Thrift and Investment Plan of Norfolk Southern Corporation and Participating Subsidiary Companies ("TIP"). 4. TIP is administered by the Board of Managers for TIP, whose address is Three Commercial Place, Norfolk, Virginia 23510-9228. 5. Thomas T. Teffeteller ("Participant") is a participant in TIP. The Participant's address is as follows: Address: 420 Water Street New Cumberland, PA 17070 Social Security No.: See Addendum Date of Birth: See Addendum The address of the Participant may be changed from time to time by written notice given to the Board of Managers. The Participant has the duty to notify the Plan Administrator of any change in the above-listed address subsequent to the entry of this Order. 6. The Alternate Payee is Jodie E. Teffeteller ("Alternate Payee"), whose address, social security number and date of birth are as follows: Address: 6 Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17011 Social Security No.: See Addendum Date of Birth: See Addendum The address of the Alternate Payee may be changed from time to time by written notice given to the Board of Managers. The Alternate Payee has the duty to notify the Plan Administrator of any change in the above-listed address subsequent to the entry of this Order. 7. The Participant and the Alternate Payee are married, but legally separated, and a Marital Settlement Agreement dated August 17, 2010, was executed by the parties. 8. This Order assigns a portion of the Participant's benefits from TIP and TIP will pay benefits to the Alternate Payee according to the following terms and conditions: a. The assigned benefit shall be in the amount of $62,500.00 provided, however, that the assigned benefit shall be 100% of the balance of the Participant's TIP account if the dollar amount listed, as adjusted by 8.c. exceeds the balance of the Participant's TIP account (excluding any portion of the Participant's account(s) subject to a plan loan) as of the date the assigned benefit is to be segregated. b. The assigned benefit will be valued as of the date TIP receives the Order. C. The assigned benefit described above shall not be adjusted by earnings or losses allocable to the account from the date of valuation of the account to the date of segregation of the account. d. The Alternate Payee's benefit will be assigned from the Participant's TIP account(s) by excluding any portion of the Participant's account that is subject to a loan, and further assigned pro rata from all TIP accounts maintained by the Participant. e. TIP shall segregate the assigned benefit, separately maintain the assigned benefit in an account established in the Alternate Payee's behalf, and shall allocate earnings and losses from the date the assigned benefit is segregated to the date of distribution to the Alternate Payee. f. The Alternate Payee's assigned benefit shall be proportionately divided among the investment funds in the same manner as the Participant's account(s) are allocated as of the date the Alternate Payee's account is established. g. The Alternate Payee may elect to receive the assigned benefit in a lump sum as soon as administratively feasible after qualification of this Order. 9. The parties to this Order intend that it shall comply with all applicable provisions of ERISA and the Code. Nothing in this Order shall require TIP or the Board of Managers of TIP: a. To provide any type or form or benefit, or any option, not otherwise provided under TIP; b. To pay any benefits not permitted under the Code or ERISA; C. To pay total benefits with a value in excess of the benefits the Participant would otherwise be entitled to receive under TIP; d. To provide benefits to the Alternate Payee required to be paid to another alternate payee under another order previously determined to be a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. 10. The Alternate Payee shall, prior to the distribution of benefits awarded hereunder, complete and return all forms and documents required by the plan administrator for TIP, the trustee, or as may be required by law. The Alternate Payee shall timely make in writing all appropriate elections required by TIP or the Board of Managers. 11. On and after the date this Order is determined to be a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, but before the Alternate Payee receives a total distribution under TIP, the Alternate Payee shall be entitled to all the rights and election privileges afforded to alternate payees under the Plan including, but not limited to, the rules regarding the right to designate a beneficiary and the right to direct investments of the Alternate Payee's separate account under TIP. 12. All payments made pursuant to this Order shall be conditioned on the certification by the Alternate Payee and the Participant to the Plan Administrator of such information as the Plan Administrator may reasonably require from such parties. 13. It is the intention of the parties that this QDRO continue to qualify as a QDRO under Code §414(p), as it may be amended from time to time, and that the Plan Administrator shall reserve the right to reconfirm the qualified status of the Order at the time benefits become payable hereunder. 14. In the event that the Plan inadvertently pays to the Participant any benefits that are assigned to the Alternate Payee pursuant to the terms of this Order, the Participant shall immediately reimburse the Alternate Payee to the extent that he has received such benefit payments and shall forthwith pay such amount so received directly to the Alternate Payee within ten (10) days of receipt. In the event that the Plan inadvertently pays to the Alternate Payee any benefits that are assigned to the Participant pursuant to the terms of this order, the Alternate Payee shall immediately reimburse the Participant to the extent that she has received such benefit payments and shall forthwith pay such amount so received directly to the Participant within ten (10) days of receipt. 15. In the event that the Participant's benefits, or any portion thereof, become payable to the Participant as a result of termination or partial termination, then the Alternate Payee shall be entitled to commence her benefits immediately in accordance with the terms of this QDRO and in accordance with the termination procedures of the Plan. 16. The Alternate Payee assumes sole responsibility for the tax consequences of the distribution under this QDRO. 17. Until the Plan completes payment of all benefits pursuant to this QDRO, the Plan shall treat the Alternate Payee as a surviving spouse for purposes of Code §§401(a)(11) and 417, but the Alternate Payee shall receive, as surviving spouse, only the amount described in paragraph 8 of this QDRO. The sole purpose of this paragraph 18 is to ensure payment to the Alternate Payee in the event of Participant's death prior to payment by the Plan of the amount described in paragraph 8 of this QDRO. In the event of the Alternate Payee's death prior to the payment by the Plan of all benefits pursuant to this QDRO, the plan shall pay the remaining benefits under this QDRO to the Alternate Payee's beneficiary, as subsequently designated by the Alternate Payee and recorded with the Plan Administrator under the terms of the Plan. 18. This Court retains jurisdiction to amend the Order for purposes of establishing or maintaining its qualification as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. BY THE COURT ?? ?-a TO Attorney for Plain ' Date Alternate Payee N/A - Pro Se Attorney for Defendant/ Date Participant C-) f-'> cr -n G . -- -i t'R b r' -- Vo C:) Q? =a NCO -v C:)-n COO I V5 r1rO & IECIL I1 lL f [? t., I"Y l Judge 4 : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, PENNSYLVANIA CUMBERLAND COUNTY Plaintiff , : v : NO. 10-1232 THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE =M -<> TO WITHDRAW CLAIMS -r, c3"i TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Please withdraw the claims for equitable distribution, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and expenses in the above-captioned divorce action. JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: January 5, 2011 By: us A.Kel, Esquire Attorney I.D. #44837 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Attorneys for Plaintiff JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : NO. 10-1232 THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE rTjr ic? per:: e:, PRAECIPE TO TRANSMIT RECORD J To the Prothonotary: Transmit the record, together with the following information, to the Court for entry of a Divorce Decree: 1. Ground for divorce: irretrievable breakdown under Section (x) 3301(c) ( ) 3301(d) of the Divorce Code. 2. Date and manner of service of the Complaint: Upon. Defendant by certified, restricted mail as evidenced by the Affidavit of Service on record. 3. Complete either paragraph (a) or (b). (a) Date of execution of the Affidavit of Consent and Waiver of Counseling required by Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code: by Plaintiff: August 17,2010; by Defendant: August 17, 2010. (b) (1) Date of execution of the Plaintiff's Affidavit required by Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code: (2) Date of service of the Plaintiffs Affidavit upon the Defendant: 4. Related claims pending: All claims have been settled pursuant to a Marital Settlement Agreement dated August 17, 2010. 5. Date and manner of service of the notice of intention to file Praecipe to Transmit Record, a copy of which is attached, if the decree is to be entered under Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code: or, date of execution of Waiver of Notice of Intention to Request Entry of a Divorce Decree under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code: by Plaintiff.- August 17,2010; by Defendant: August 17, 2010. and, date of filing of the Waiver of Notice of Intention to Request Entry of a Divorce Decree: by Plaintiff: August 19, 2010; by Defendant: August 19, 2010. JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: January 5, 2010 By: Susan -M. Kadel, Esquire Attorney I.D. #44837 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Attorneys for Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA JODIE E. TEFFETELLER V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER : NO. 10-1232 DIVORCE DECREE AND NOW, I AV) k) O%M " , U 1k , it is ordered and decreed that JODIE E. TEFFETELLER , plaintiff, and THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER , defendant, are divorced from the bonds of matrimony. Any existing spousal support order shall hereafter be deemed an order for alimony pendente lite if any economic claims remain pending. The court retains jurisdiction of any claims raised by the parties to this action for which a final order has not yet been entered. Those claims are as follows: (If no claims remain indicate "None.") Anna By the Court, ??k 1-? 41r,?A Attest: J. Prothonotary &t. 04DPy mailed qo a tty Kadal 1 k*w ip '(spy mouled -& b,?rt Susan M. Kadel, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 44837 James Smith Dietterick & Connelly, LLP P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 Attorneys for Petitioner JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Petitioner V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/Respondent Fit ED-CFFICE N THE PROTHONOTt RY 2511M421 PM 1-%1 CUMBERLAND MCI 4 Y PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE PETITION TO ENFORCE MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND NOW, comes the Petitioner, Jodie E. Teffeteller, now known as Jodie E. Payne, by and through her counsel, Susan M. Kadel, Esquire, and the law firm of James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, LLP, and sets forth the following in support of her Petition to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement. 1. The Plaintiff in the above-captioned action is Petitioner, Jodie E. Teffeteller, now known as Jodie E. Payne, represented by the law firm of James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, LLP. 2. The Defendant in the above-captioned action is Respondent, Thomas T. Teffeteller, who is pro se. 3. On August 17, 2010, in the above-captioned divorce action, the parties entered into a comprehensive Marital Settlement Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement'), resolving all of the economic issues between the parties. A true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached hereto, incorporated herein, and identified as Exhibit "A". 4. A Divorce Decree was entered by the Court on January 11, 2011. A true and correct copy of the Decree is attached hereto, incorporated herein, and identified as Exhibit "B". 5. Paragraph 5(a) of the Agreement provides that with regard to the marital residence located at 6 Center Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, which is currently titled in joint names that "Husband shall execute a Special Warranty Deed at the time of the execution of this Agreement transferring title to Wife individually". 6. On October 22, 2010, correspondence was sent to Respondent, Thomas T. Teffeteller, enclosing a Special Warranty Deed for his signature. A true and correct copy of that correspondence is attached hereto, incorporated herein, and identified as Exhibit "C" 7. As the signed Deed was not received, additional correspondence was sent to Respondent on December 14, 2010, specifically requesting return of the signed Deed. A true and correct copy of that correspondence is attached hereto, incorporated herein, and identified as Exhibit "D". 8. To date, there has been no response from Respondent to the request to return the Special Warranty Deed as is mandated under the terms of the Agreement. 9. Pursuant to paragraph 5(e) of the Agreement, concerning Respondent's retirement benefits, Petitioner was to receive a rollover of $62,500.00 from Respondent's Norfolk Southern Thrift Investment Plan through Vanguard. The Agreement specifically provided that "in the event the balance of Husband's Norfolk Southern Thrift Investment Plan in less than $62,500.00 as of the date of distribution, Husband shall provide payment to Wife directly so that the entire amount received by Wife shall total $62,500.00, which shall be considered a nontaxable event". 10. On November 22, 2010, the Norfolk Southern Corporation confirmed through correspondence that the Qualified Domestic Relations Order was approved and proceeded to make a distribution of the funds to the Petitioner. A true and correct copy of that correspondence is attached hereto, incorporated herein, and identified as Exhibit "E". 11. The Petitioner received the sum of $61,555.48 from the QDRO distribution of the Norfolk Southern Pension and, accordingly, Respondent now owes the remaining balance of $944.52. 12. By letter dated December 14, 2010, a request was made of Respondent to provide Petitioner with the funds as requested pursuant to the Agreement. A true and correct copy of that correspondence is attached hereto, incorporated herein, and identified as Exhibit "D". 13. It is believed, and therefore averred, that Respondent is intentionally in breach of the terms of the Agreement as set forth above. 14. Paragraph 15 of the Agreement provides as follows: If either party hereto breaches any provision hereof, the other party shall have the right, at his or her election, to sue for damages for such breach, or seek such other remedies or relief as may be available to him or her. The non-breaching party shall be entitled to recover from the breaching party all costs, expenses and legal fees actually incurred in the enforcement of the rights of the non-breaching party. 15. Accordingly, Petitioner is requesting reimbursement of all counsel fees incurred by her in order to bring forth this Petition to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement. WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Jodie E. Payne, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to direct Respondent, Thomas T. Teffeteller, to execute the Special Warranty Deed transferring title of the marital home to Petitioner and pay Petitioner the sum of $944.52, which represents the remaining balance owed from distribution of the Norfolk Southern Pension. Within ten (10) days of the date of an Order directing him to do so, Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner all counsel fees incurred in bringing this matter before the Court. Respectfully submitted, JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: JanuarmpQO, 2011 By: Susan el, Esquire Attorney I.D. #44837 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Attorneys for Petitioner VERIFICATION I, Jodie E. Payne, verify that the statements made in the foregoing pleading are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unworn fal Date: l /'? 0 A Exhibit "A" MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT RV AND BETWFEN JODIE E. TEFFETELLER AND THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY LLP P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 Telephone: (717) 533-3280 Counsel for Jodie E. Teffeteller MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT, made this 7 day of c/ G VS 7- 2010, by and between JODIE E. TEFFETELLER and THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER. WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, Jodie E. Teffeteller (hereinafter called "Wife") currently resides at 6 Center Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 17011; WHEREAS, Thomas T. Teffeteller (hereinafter called "Husband") currently resides at 6 Center Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 17011; WHEREAS, the parties hereto are husband and wife, having been lawfully married on February 9, 1994; WHEREAS, the parties have lived separate and apart since on or about February 9, 2007; WHEREAS, two (2) children were born of the marriage between the parties, namely, Rubie Teffeteller, born June 30, 1995; and Cooper Teffeteller, born March 12, 1998. WHEREAS, the parties hereto are desirous of settling fully and finally their respective financial and property rights and obligations as between each other, including, without limitation, the settling of all matters between them relating to the ownership of real and personal property, the supportand maintenance of one another and, in general, the settling of any and all claims and possible claims by one against the other or against their respective estates. NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of these premises, and of the mutual promises, covenants and undertakings hereinafter set forth, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by each of the parties hereto, Husband and Wife, each intending to be legally bound hereby, covenant and agree as follows: 1. PERSONAL RIGHTS. Husband and Wife may, at all times hereafter, live separate and apart. Each shall be free from all control, restraint, interference and authority, direct or indirect, by the other. Each may reside at such place or places as he or she may select. Each may, for his or her separate use or benefit, conduct, carry on or engage in any business, occupation, profession or employment which to him or her may seem advisable. Husband and Wife shall not molest, harass, disturb or malign each other, nor compel or attempt to compel the other to cohabit or 1 dwell by any means or in any manner whatsoever with him or her. Neither party will interfere with the use, ownership, enjoyment or disposition of any property now owned by or hereafter acquired by the other. 2. ADVICE OF COUNSEL. Each party acknowledges that he or she has had the opportunity to receive independent legal advice from counsel of his or her selection. Wife has secured legal advice from Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire, her counsel. Husband has not secured legal advice, as he is voluntarily proceeding pro se in this matter. Although Husband has proceeded in this matter pro se, he has been advised of his right to seek legal counsel of his choice and although having the opportunity to do so, has voluntarily elected to proceed pro se. Each party fully understands the facts and his or her legal rights and obligations, and each party acknowledges and accepts that this Agreement is, in the circumstances, fair and equitable, and that it is being entered into freely and voluntarily, and that the execution of this Agreement is not the result of any duress or undue influence, and that it is not the result of any improper or illegal agreement or agreements. In addition, each party understands the impact of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, whereby the court has the right and duty to determine all marital rights of the parties including divorce, alimony, alimony pendente lite, equitable distribution of all marital property or property owned or possessed individually by the other, counsel fees and costs of litigation and, fully knowing the same, each party hereto still desires to execute this Agreement acknowledging that the terms and conditions set forth herein are fair, just and equitable to each of the parties, and waives his and her respective right to have the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, or any other court of competent jurisdiction, make any determination or order affecting the respective parties' rights to alimony, alimony pendente lite, support and maintenance, equitable distribution, counsel fees and costs of litigation. 3. DISCLOSURE OF ASSETS. Each of the parties hereto acknowledges that he or she is aware of his or her right to seek discovery including, but not limited to, written interrogatories, motions for production of documents, the taking of oral depositions, the filing of inventories and all other means of discovery permitted under the Pennsylvania Divorce Code or the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Each of the parties further acknowledges that he or she has had the opportunity to discuss with counsel the concept of marital property under Pennsylvania law 2 and each is aware of his or her right to have the real and/or personal property, estate and assets, earnings and income of the other assessed or evaluated by the courts of this Commonwealth or any other court of competent jurisdiction. The parties do hereby acknowledge that there has been full and fair disclosure to the other of his or her respective income, assets and liabilities, whether such are held jointly, in the name of one party alone or in the name of one of the parties and another individual or individuals. Each party agrees that any right to further disclosure, valuation, appraisal or enumeration or statement thereof in this Agreement is hereby specifically waived, and the parties do not wish to make or append hereto any further enumeration or statement. Specifically, each party waives the need for copies of bank statements, insurance policies, retirement plan statements or any other documentation. Each party warrants that he or she is not aware of any marital asset that is not identified in this Agreement. The parties hereby acknowledge and agree that the division of assets as set forth in this Agreement is fair, reasonable and equitable, and is satisfactory to them. Each of the parties hereto further covenants and agrees for himself and herself and his or her heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, that he or she will never at any time hereafter sue the other party or his or her heirs, executors, administrators or assigns in any action of contention, direct or indirect, and allege therein that there was a denial of any rights to full disclosure, or that there was any fraud, duress, undue influence or that there was a failure to have available full, proper and independent representation by legal counsel. 4. MUTUAL CONSENT DIVORCE. It is the intention of the parties, and the parties agree, that by this Agreement they have resolved all ancillary economic issues related to the dissolution of their marriage and thus any divorce action with respect to these parties shall be limited to a claim for divorce only. Wife acknowledges that on February 23, 2010 she filed a Divorce Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas Cumberland County, Pennsylvania at Docket No. 10-1232. The parties agree that, at the time of the execution of this Agreement, they will each execute an Affidavit of Consent and Waiver of Notice of Intention to Request Entry of Divorce Decree in order that counsel for Wife may finalize the divorce action as of January 1, 2011, but not earlier than that date. Upon completion of the divorce action, counsel for Wife shall supply Husband with a copy of the Decree. 3 5. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION. A. Real Estate. Wife shall retain as her sole and separate property the marital residence located at 6 Center Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. The property is currently titled in joint names. Husband shall execute a Special Warranty Deed at the time of the execution of this Agreement transferring title to Wife individually. Said Deed in a notarized state shall be held in escrow -by counsel for Wife pending the completion of provisions more particularly set forth herein. Pending the transfer of title, Wife agree to indemnify and hold wtL cs FgR&0 Husband harmless on the mortgage held by erase Mertgage Wife e s that she shall cause Husband's name to be released from the aforementioned mortgage debt either by mortgage release, modification, refinancing or any other method which removes Husband's name from said mortgage debt, which shall occur no later than January 1, 2021. Husband shall have thirty (30) days from the date this Agreement is executed to vacate the residence and remove all of his personal property. B. Furnishings and Personalty. The parties agree that they will divide by agreement between themselves all furnishings and personalty located in the Marital Residence, including all furniture, furnishings, antiques, jewelry, rugs, carpets, household appliances and equipment. C. Motor Vehicles. (1) Wife shall retain ownership of the 2006 Volkswagen Beetle and she shall be solely responsible for any liabilities on said vehicle. (2) Husband shall retain ownership of the 2010 Nissan Cube and 1978 Honda Motorcycle and he shall be solely responsible for any liabilities on said vehicles. (3) The parties agree that they will cooperate in effectuating the transfer of titles and insurance to accomplish the purposes of this subparagraph. D. Life Insurance. Husband shall continue to name Wife as primary beneficiary of his Norfolk Southern Life Insurance Policy, naming the parties' children as secondary beneficiaries in equal proportion, so long as Husband is employed by Norfolk Southern Corporation. Within twenty-four (24) months from the date of the execution of this Agreement, Husband shall obtain additional life insurance, insuring his life for the benefit of 4 Wife naming Wife as beneficiary in the amount of at least $192,000.00 which may be reduced according to the following schedule: (a) $144,000.00 as of January 1, 2014; (b) $96,000.00 as of January 1, 2018; (c) $48,000.00 as of January 1, 2022. Said life insurance for the benefit of Wife shall remain until Husband is no longer obligated to pay alimony as set forth herein. E. Pension and Retirement Benefits. Wife does not maintain any employment related or individual retirement benefits. Husband shall maintain his Norfolk Southern Retirement Plan and Railroad Retirement System Pension without any claim or interest by Wife. Husband also maintains a Norfolk Southern Thrift and Investment Plan through Vanguard. Wife shall be entitled to a rollover of $62,500.00 from said plan. In the event the balance of Husband's Norfolk Southern Thrift and Investment Plan through Vanguard is less than $62,500.00 as of the date of distribution, Husband shall provide payment to Wife directly so that the entire amount received by Wife shall total $62,500.00, which shall be considered a nontaxable event. Said amount shall be transferred via rollover pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO"). Said Order shall be prepared by counsel for Wife. F. Bank Accounts. There are no jointly maintained bank accounts. Each party shall retain the respective bank accounts in their individual names. G. Miscellaneous Property. As of the execution date of this Agreement, any and all property not specifically addressed herein shall be owned by the party to whom the property is titled; and if untitled, the party in possession. This Agreement shall constitute a sufficient bill of sale to evidence the transfer of any and all rights in such property from each to the other. H. Property to Wife. The parties agree that Wife shall own, possess, and enjoy, free from any claim of Husband, the property awarded to her by the terms of this Agreement. Husband hereby quitclaims, assigns and conveys to Wife all such property, and waives and relinquishes any and all rights thereto, together with any insurance policies covering that property, and any escrow accounts relating to that property. This Agreement shall constitute 5 a sufficient bill of sale to evidence the transfer of any and all rights in such property from Husband to Wife. L Property to Husband. The parties agree that Husband shall own, possess, and enjoy, free from any claim of Wife, the property awarded to him by the terms of this Agreement. Wife hereby quitclaims, assigns and conveys to Husband all such property, and waives and relinquishes any and all rights thereto, together with any insurance policies covering that property, and any escrow accounts relating to that property. This Agreement shall constitute a sufficient bill of sale to evidence the transfer of any and all rights in such property from Wife to Husband. 6. DEBTS. A. Marital Debt. The parties acknowledge that their credit card debt of approximately $45,000.00 is subject to a Debt Consolidation Program agreed upon by the parties in January 2010. Husband agrees to satisfy all marital debt, other than the mortgage previously addressed herein, without Wife's contribution and Husband agrees to indemnify Wife as. to same. Other than the debt subject to the Debt Consolidation Program, the parties have no other marital debt other than the mortgage previously addressed. The parties shall cooperate in signing any and all documentation relative to the Debt Consolidation Program to remove Wife's name from same. B. Liability not Listed. Each party represents and warrants to the other that he or she has not incurred any debt, obligation or other liability, other than those described in this Agreement, for which the other party is or may be liable. A liability not disclosed in this Agreement will be the sole responsibility of the party who has incurred or may hereafter incur it, and such party agrees to pay it as the same shall become due, and to indemnify and hold the other party and his or her property harmless from any and all debts, obligations and liabilities. C. Indemnification of Wife. If any claim, action or proceeding is hereafter initiated seeking to hold Wife liable for the debts or obligations assumed by Husband under this Agreement, Husband will, at his sole expense, defend Wife against any such claim, action or proceeding, whether or not well-founded, and indemnify her and her property against any 6 damages or loss resulting therefrom, including, but not limited to, costs of court and actual attorney's fees incurred by Wife in connection therewith. D. Indemnification of Husband. If any claim, action or proceeding is hereafter initiated seeking to hold Husband liable for the debts or obligations assumed by Wife under this Agreement, Wife will, at her sole expense, defend Husband against any such claim, action or proceeding, whether or not well-founded, and indemnify him and his property against any damages or loss resulting therefrom, including, but not limited to, costs of court and actual attorney's fees incurred by Husband in connection therewith. E. Warrant mm * Vuture Obligations. Husband and Wife each represents and warrants to the other that he or she will not at any time in the future incur or contract any debt, charge or liability for which the other, the other's legal representatives, property or estate may be responsible. From the date of execution of this Agreement, each party shall use only those credit cards and accounts for which that party is individually liable and the parties agree to cooperate in closing any remaining accounts which provide for joint liability. Each party hereby agrees to indemnify, save and hold the other and his or her property harmless from any liability, loss, cost or expense whatsoever, including actual attorneys fees, incurred in the event of breach hereof. 7. INCOME TAX. The parties have heretofore filed joint federal and state tax returns and agree to file joint federal, state and local tax returns for 2010. Both parties agree that, in the event any deficiency in federal, state or local income tax is proposed or any assessment of any such tax is made against either of them, each will indemnify and hold harmless the other from and against any loss or liability for any such tax deficiency or assessment and any interest, penalty and expense incurred in connection therewith. Such tax, interest, penalty or expense shall be paid solely and entirely by the individual who is finally determined to be the cause of the misrepresentations or failures to disclose the nature and extent of his or her separate income on the aforesaid joint returns. 7 8. SUPPORT. A. ALIMONY, ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE, SPOUSAL SUPPORT. Husband shall pay to Wife alimony commencing September 1, 2010 for a period of sixteen (16) years until September 1, 2026 with Husband paying the sum of $700.00 per month as alimony, commencing September 1, 2010 through February 28, 2013. Commencing March 1, 2013, Husband shall pay Wife the sum of $1,000.00 per month as alimony for the balance of the sixteen (16) year period until September 1, 2026. Said monthly alimony payments shall terminate upon the first to occur of the following: (1) The expiration of the alimony term; (2) Death of Husband; (3) Death of Wife; or (4) Wife's remarriage. In addition to the above referenced alimony payments, Husband shall pay Wife one-half of his annual bonus for the years 2010 through and including 2013, within thirty (30) days of receipt of said bonus. In 2014, Husband shall pay Wife one-sixth of his annual bonus received by his employer, within thirty (30) days of receipt of said bonus. Husband shall provide proof of said bonus with documentation from his employer confirming said amount. All such payments by Husband to Wife shall be deemed alimony, as defined in Section 71 (b) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and as said Section is amplified by the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and Tax Reform Act of 1986, and any future laws or regulations related thereto. Payments from Husband, when received by Wife, shall be deductible in the year of payment by Husband pursuant to Section 215 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or any similar future laws or regulations thereto, and shall be includable in the year of receipt in the gross income of Wife pursuant to Section 71 (b) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended or any similar future laws or regulations thereto. B. CHILD SUPPORT. Based upon Husband's estimated annual gross income of $82,500.00 and Wife's estimated annual gross income of $18,000.00, Husband shall pay to Wife the sum of $1,300.00 per month representing child support for the benefit of the parties' two minor children, Rubie Teffeteller, date of birth June 30, 1995; and Cooper Teffeteller, 8 date of birth March 12, 1998. Husband's child support obligation is subject to modification pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1910.19. In addition to Husband's child support obligation for the benefit of the two minor children, Husband shall be solely responsible to pay for any and all of the softball dues for the benefit of Rubie and the golf camp for the benefit of Cooper each year. Husband agrees to continue to maintain health insurance for the benefit of the parties' children and be solely responsible for the cost of any unreimbursed medical expenses for the benefit of the children, including, but not limited to, medical, dental, vision, psychological and psychiatric expenses. Wife shall claim Cooper on her tax returns and, Husband shall claim Rubie on his tax returns. C. SUPPORT PAYMENTS SECURED BY ALIMONY. For so long as Husband is required to pay Wife alimony and/or child support pursuant to this Agreement, he shall maintain a life insurance policy naming Wife as beneficiary in an amount necessary to pay any outstanding alimony/child support obligation due Wife pursuant to the terms of this Agreement at the time of Husband's death. D. DUE DATE AND METHOD OF PAYMENTS. Husband shall make direct payments to Wife of his child and alimony support obligations set forth herein from Husband's individual bank account by way of personal check delivered to Wife no later than the first (1St) of each month, commencing September 1, 2010. E. COLLEGE EXPENSES. Husband shall be responsible for seventy-five percent (75%) of the cost of the children's college education, including tuition, room, board, books, application fees, testing, activity fees, reasonable transportation expenses, costs related to PSAT, SAT testing and any other miscellaneous expenses associated with the children's attendance at college. At such time as each child may consider college, the parties agree to confer with each other and the child relative to their college choices and to discuss their respective obligations in this regard. 9. WAIVER OF. INHERITANCE RIGHTS. Unless otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, as of the execution date of this Agreement, Husband and Wife each waive all rights of inheritance in the estate of the other, any right to elect to take against the will or any trust of the other or in which the other has an interest, and each of the parties waives any 9 additional rights which said party has or may have by reason of their marriage, except the rights saved or created by the terms of this Agreement. This waiver shall be construed generally and shall include, but not be limited to, a waiver of all rights provided under the laws of Pennsylvania or any other jurisdiction. 10. WAIVER OF BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION. Unless otherwise specifically set forth in this Agreement, each party hereto specifically waives any and all beneficiary rights and any and all rights as a surviving spouse in and to any asset, benefit or like program carrying a beneficiary designation which belongs to the other party under the terms of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, pensions and retirement plans of any sort or nature, deferred compensation plans, life insurance policies, annuities, stock accounts, bank accounts, final pay checks or any other post-death distribution scheme, and each parry expressly states that it is his and her intention to revoke by the terms of this Agreement any beneficiary designations naming the other which are in effect as of the date of execution of this Agreement. If and in the event the other party continues to be named as beneficiary and no alternate beneficiary is otherwise designated, the beneficiary shall be deemed to be the estate of the deceased party. 11. RELEASE OF CLAIMS. A. Wife and Husband acknowledge and agree that the property dispositions provided for herein constitute an equitable distribution of their assets and liabilities pursuant to §3502 of the Divorce Code, and Wife and Husband hereby waive any right to division of their property except as provided for in this Agreement. Furthermore, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, each of the parties hereby specifically waives, releases, renounces and forever abandons any claim, right, title or interest whatsoever he or she may have in property transferred to the other party pursuant to this Agreement or identified in this Agreement as belonging to the other party, and each party agrees never to assert any claim to said property or proceeds thereof in the future. The parties have divided between them to their mutual satisfaction, personal effects, household goods and furnishings and all other articles of personal property which have heretofore been used in common by them, and neither party will make any claim to any such items which are now in the possession or under the control of the other. Should it become necessary, each party agrees to sign any title or documents necessary to give effect to this 10 paragraph, upon request. However, neither party is released or discharged from any obligation under this Agreement or any instrument or document executed pursuant to this Agreement. Husband and Wife shall hereafter own and enjoy independently of any claim or right of the other, all items of personal property, tangible or intangible, acquired by him or her from the execution date of this Agreement, with full power in him or her to dispose of the same fully and effectively for all purposes. B. Each party hereby absolutely and unconditionally releases and forever discharges the other and the estate of the other for all purposes from any and all rights and obligations which either party may have or at any time hereafter has for past, present or future support or maintenance, alimony pendente lite, alimony, equitable distribution, counsel fees, costs, expenses, and any other right or obligation, economic or otherwise, whether arising out of the marital relationship or otherwise, including all rights and benefits under the Pennsylvania Divorce Code of 1980, its supplements and amendments, as well as under any other law of any other jurisdiction, except and only except all rights and obligations arising under this Agreement or for the breach of any of its provisions. Neither party shall have any obligation to the other not expressly set forth herein. C. Except as otherwise set forth in this Agreement, each party hereby absolutely and unconditionally releases and forever discharges the other and his or her heirs, executors, administrators, assigns, property and estate from any and all rights, claims, demands or obligations arising out of or by virtue of the marital relationship of the parties whether now existing or hereafter arising. The above release shall be effective regardless of whether such claims arise out of any former or future acts, contracts, engagements or liabilities of the other or by way of dower, curtesy, widow's or widower's rights, family exemption or similar allowance, or under the intestate laws or the right to take against the spouse's will, or the right to treat a lifetime conveyance by the other as testamentary or all other rights of a surviving spouse to participate in a deceased spouse's estate, whether arising under the laws of Pennsylvania, any state, commonwealth or territory of the United States, or any other country. D. Except for the obligations of the parties contained in this Agreement and such rights as are expressly reserved herein, each party gives to the other by the execution of this 11 Agreement an absolute and unconditional release and discharge from all causes of action, claims, rights or demands whatsoever in law or in equity, which either party ever had or now has against the other. 12. PRESERVATION OF RECORDS. Each party will keep and preserve for a period of four (4) years from the date of their Divorce Decree all financial records relating to the marital estate, and each parry will allow the other party access to those records in the event of tax audits. 13. MODIFICATION. No modification, rescission, or amendment to this Agreement shall be effective unless in writing signed by each of the parties hereto. 14. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be void, invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions hereof shall nevertheless survive and continue in full force and effect without being impaired or invalidated in any way. 15. BREACH. If either party hereto breaches any provision hereof, the other party shall have the right, at his or her election, to sue for damages for such breach, or seek such other remedies or relief as maybe available to him or her. The non-breaching parry shall be entitled to recover from the breaching party all costs, expenses and legal fees actually incurred in the enforcement of the rights of the non-breaching party. 16. WAIVER OF BREACH. The waiver by one party of any breach of this Agreement by the other party will not be deemed a waiver of any other breach or any provision of this Agreement. 17. NOTICE. Any notice to be given under this Agreement by either party to the other shall be in writing and may be accomplished by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Notice to Wife will be sufficient if made or addressed to the following: Jodie E. Teffeteller 6 Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17011 12 and to Husband, if made or addressed to the following: Thomas T. Teffeteller 6 Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17011 Notice shall be deemed to have occurred upon the date received by the recipient. Each party may change the address for notice to him or her by giving notice of that change in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. 18. APPLICABLE LAW. All acts contemplated by this Agreement shall be construed and enforced under the substantive laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (withaut reWd to the conflict of law rules applicable in Pennsylvania) in effect as of the date of execution of this Agreement. 19. DATE OF EXECUTION. The "date of execution" or "execution date" of this Agreement shall be defined as the date upon which the parties signed the Agreement if they do so on the same date, or if not on the same date, then the date on which the Agreement was signed by the last party to execute this Agreement. 20. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Agreement shall become effective and binding upon both parties on the execution. date. 21. EFFECT OF RECONCILIATION. COHABITATION OR DIVORCE. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and shall not be abrogated even if the parties effect a reconciliation, cohabit as husband and wife or attempt to effect a reconciliation. This Agreement also shall continue in full force and effect in the event of the parties' divorce. There shall be no modification or waiver of any of the terms hereof unless the parties in writing execute a statement declaring this Agreement or any term of this Agreement to be null and void. 22. HEADINGS NOT PART OF AGREEMENT. Any headings preceding the text of the several paragraphs and subparagraphs hereof are inserted solely for convenience of reference and shall not constitute a part of this Agreement nor shall they affect its meaning, construction or effect. 13 23. AGREEMENT BINDING ON PARTIES AND HEIRS. This Agreement shall bind the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, assigns, and successors in any interest of the parties hereto. 24. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. Each party acknowledges that he or she has carefully read this Agreement; that he or she has discussed its provisions with an attorney of his or her own choice, and has executed it voluntarily and in reliance upon his or her own attorney; and that this instrument expresses the entire agreement between the parties concerning the subjects it purports to cover and supersedes any and all prior agreements between the parties. This Agreement should be interpreted fairly and simply, and not strictly for or against either of the parties. 25. MUTUAL COOPERATION. Each party shall, on demand, execute and deliver to the other any deeds, bills of sale, assignments, consents to change of beneficiary designations, tax returns, and other documents, and shall do or cause to be done every other act or thing that may be necessary or desirable, to effectuate the provisions and purposes of this Agreement. If either party unreasonably fails on demand to comply with these provisions, that party shall pay to the other party all attorney's fees, costs, and other expenses actually incurred as a result of such failure. 26. AGREEMENT NOT TO BE MERGED. This Agreement may be incorporated into a decree of divorce for purposes of enforcement only, but otherwise shall not be merged into said decree. The parties shall have the right to enforce this Agreement under the Divorce Code of 1980, as amended, and, in addition, shall retain any remedies in law or in equity under this Agreement as an independent contract. Such remedies in law or equity are specifically not waived or released. 14 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands and seals as of the date hereinabove set forth. Christine Taylor Brann quire WITNESS 15 T. T ler Exhibit "B" IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA JODIE E. TEFFETELLER V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER : NO. 10-1232 DIVORCE DECREE AND NOW, ?Januar, l l 7(L11 , it is ordered and decreed that JODIE E. TEFFETELLER , plaintiff, and THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER defendant, are divorced from the bonds of matrimony. Any existing spousal support order shall hereafter, be deemed an order for alimony pendente lite if any economic claims remain pending. The court retains jurisdiction of any claims raised by the parties to this action for which a final order has not yet been entered. Those claims are as follows: (If no claims remain indicate "None.") None. By the Court, M. L. Ebert. Jr. Attest: J. Prothonotary Certified Copy Issued: January 11, 2011 Date G IF Alf 7 Exhibit "C" JAN Es SvuTt f D1ET1 mcK & Cotiti-:. Y -, Christine Taylor Bran ctb<d:isdc.corr FAX 717.298 2021 P.O. BOX 650 HERSHEY, PA 17033 Courier Address: October 22, 2010 E HUMMELSTOWN PA 17036 TEL. 717.533.3280 WWW.JSDC.COM Thomas T. Teffeteller 42 Water Street Apartment 3 New Cumberland, PA 17070 Re: Teffeteller v. Teffeteller Dear Mr. Teffeteller: GARY L. JAMES Enclosed is an original Special Warranty Deed for your signature, which transfers MAX J. SMITH, JR. JOHN J. CONNELLY, JR. title of the former marital residence to Jodie's name individually. PPlease note that your SCOTT A. DIETTERICK JAMES F. SPADE signature must be notarized. This is being provided to you pursuant to the terms set forth MATTHEW CHABAL, III NEIL W. YAHN wherein this Deed is to be in paragraph 5(A) of your Marital Settlement Agreement EDWARD P. SEEBER , executed and held in escrow by our office pending Jodie's ability to release your name RONALD T. TOMASKO SUSAN M. KADEL from the Wells Fargo Mortpgpage. W. HANDELMAN COURTNNE E JARAD Y K. . PO WELL LL KIMBERLY A. BONNER KAREN N. CONNELLY Thank you for your attention to this matter. JOHN M. HYAMS CHRISTINE T BRANN JESSICA E. LowE Very truly yours, V SEAN M. CONCANNON GREGORY A. KOGUT, JR. THOMAS J. CAR r OF COUNSEL: GREGORY K. RICHARDS BERNARD A. RYAN, JR. Christine Taylor Br CTB/mbl Enclosure cc: Jodie E. Teffeteller Parcel Identification No.: 13-24-0805-071 SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED THIS DEED, made the day of , 2010, BETWEEN THOMAS TEFFETELLER and JODIE ELLEN PAYNE, formerly known as JODIE TEFFETELLER, husband and wife, of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, Grantors, AND JODIE ELLEN PAYNE, an adult individual, of Lower Allen Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, Grantee. WITNESSETH, that in consideration of One Dollar ($1.00), in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said Grantors do hereby grant and convey unto the said Grantee, her heirs and assigns, ALL THAT CERTAIN tract or Parcel of land and premises, situate, lying and being in the Township of Lower Allen, in the County of Cumberland and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, more particularly described as follows: BEGINNING at a point on the eastern side of Center Drive which point, measured along the eastern side of Center Drive is 295 feet South of the southeast comer of Center Drive and Clemson Drive and which point is also at the southwest comer of Lot No. 113 on the Plan of Lots hereinafter referred to; thence eastwardly along the southern line of Lot No. 113, 125 feet to a point at the western line of Lot No. 118 on said Plan; thence southwardly along the western line of Lots Nos. 118 and 119 on said Plan 80 feet to a point at the northern line of Lot No. 111 on said Plan; thence westwardly along the northern line of Lot No. 111, 125 feet to a point at the eastern side of Center Drive; thence northwardly along the eastern side of Center Drive 80 feet to a point, the Place of BEGINNING. BEING Lot No. 112 on Plan No. 1 of Cedar Cliff Manor, recorded in Cumberland County Recorder's office in Plan Book 6, Page 33. HAVING thereon erected a brick ranch dwelling being known and numbered 6 Center Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, 17011. BEING the same premises which Robert L. Davison and Cheryl L. Davison, husband and wife, by deed dated June 23, 2003, and recorded on July 22, 2003 in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds in and for Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, in Deed Book 258, Page 1148, granted and conveyed unto Thomas Teffeteller and Jodie Teffeteller, husband and wife, the Grantors herein. Jodie Teffeteller is now known as Jodie Ellen Payne by virtue of a Notice of Election to Retake Former Name filed by her on September 23, 2010 in a pending action in divorce in which she, identified therein as Jodie E. Teffeteller, is plaintiff and Thomas Teffeteller, identified therein as Thomas T. Teffeteller, is defendant, indexed to Docket No. 10-1232 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. THE CONVEYANCE MADE IN THIS INSTRUMENT IS A TRANSFER BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE, AND IS THEREFORE EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA REALTY TRANSFER TAX. AND the said grantors will SPECIALLY WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the property hereby conveyed. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said grantors have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year first above-written. Sealed and delivered in the presence of Thomas Teffeteller Jodie Ellen Payne formerly known as Jodie Teffeteller Certificate of Residence I hereby certify, that the precise residence of the grantee herein is as follows: 6 Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Grantee 2 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY OF ss. On this, the day of , 2010, before me, a notary public, the undersigned officer, personally appeared Thomas Teffeteller, a married person, known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the same for the purpose therein contained. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal. My Commission Expires: Notary Public COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA . ss. COUNTY OF DAUPHIN On this, the day of 2010, before me, a notary public, the undersigned officer, personally appeared Jodie Ellen Payne, formerly known as Jodie Teffeteller, a married person, known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged that she executed the same for the purpose; therein contained. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal. My Commission Expires: Notary Public 3 Exhibit "D" Susan M. Kadel smkPo-isdc.com FAX 717.298.2091 P.O. BOX 650 HERSHEY, PA 17033 December 14, 2010 Courier Address: 134 SIPE AVENUE HUMMELSTOWN, PA 17036 TEL. 717.533 3280 WWW.JSDC.COM Thomas T. Teffeteller 420 Water Street Apartment 3 New Cumberland, PA 17070 Re: Teffeteller v. Teffeteller Dear Mr. Teffeteller: It is my understanding from your correspondence with both this office and Jodie GARY L. JAMES MAX J. SMITH, JR. Payne that you are requesting that modifications be made to the Marital Settlement JOHN J. CONNELLY, JR. J Agreement. I can advise that my client is not agreeable to the modifications you suggested. SCOTT A. DIETTERICK JAMES F. SPADE The Marital Settlement Agreement was negotiated in good faith and, in fact, is based MATTHEW CHABAL, III NEIL W. YAHN on that you made for settlement. Accordingly, we will not a ee to an primarily proposals Y ?Y? ?' Y EDWARD P. SEEBER RONALD T. TOMASKO modification of that Agreement. Agreement. SUSAN M. KADEL JARAD W. HANDELMAN COURTNEY K. POWELL ph 5(a) of the Agreement you were to execute a Deed at Further, pursuant to paragra KIMBERLY A. BONNER KAREN N. CONNELLY the time of execution of the Agreement transferring Q title of the marital home to Jodie. A Agreement JOHN M. HY CHRISTINE T. . BR BRANN Deed was forwarded to you on October 22, 2010 and we have yet to receive that signed JESSICA E. LowE SEAN M.CONCANNON Deed. GREGORY A. KDGUT, JR. THOMAS J. CAR with regard to 5(e) of the Agreement, you were to provide payment paragraph Also OF COUNSEL: , GREGORY K. RICHARDS to Jodie in the total amount of $62,500.00 from your pension. As you know, the amount BERNARD A. RYAN, JR. rolled over pursuant to a QDRO was in the sum of $61,555.48 and, accordingly, you now owe her the remaining balance of $944.52. With regard to the Deed and the pension payment, we are requesting that you provide both of these items by January 1, 2011 or we will need to proceed with a Petition to enforce the terms of the Marital Settlement Agreement. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerel Susan M. Kadel SMK/mbl cc: Jodie E. Payne Exhibit "E" .r Norfolk Southern Corporation Three Commercial Place Norfolk, VA 23510-928 FAX: (757)664-5113 Christine Taylor Brann, Esq. James Smith Dietterick & Connelly LLP P. O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 Matt Tanana Lori Hipps Manager Benefits Benefits Administrator (757) 664-2003 (757) 629-2049 November 24, 2010 File: 0918288 Re: Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), Thrift and Investment Plan of Norfolk Southern Corporation and Participating Subsidiary Companies (TIP), Thomas T. Teffeteller v. Jodie E. Teffeteller Dear Ms. Brann: We received on November 22, 2010 the order titled "Qualified Domestic Relations Order" (the "order") in the above captioned case. We have determined that this order is a Qualified Domestic Relations Order under the Thrift and Investment Plan of Norfolk Southern Corporation and Participating Subsidiary Companies (TIP). In order to obtain an immediate distribution of her portion of the TIP account, Ms. Teffeteller will need to call Vanguard at 1-800-523-1188 to make her distribution election. Since the amount assigned to Ms. Teffeteller is greater than $5,000, she may leave her funds in TIP for the present time. The following documents are included with Ms. Teffeteller's copy of this letter: • Summary Plan Description for TIP • TIP Prospectus • Fund Fact Sheets for TIP investment options If Ms. Teffeteller elects to leave her funds in TIP, she should designate a beneficiary online at www.Vanguard.com. See "How to Contact Vanguard to Access Your Account" in the enclosed plan summary. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at the above number. cc: Jonathan D. Cramer, F.S.A. Jodie E. Teffeteller Thomas T. Teffeteller Sincerely, l Operating Subsidiary: Norfolk Southern Railway Company JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Petitioner V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Susan M. Kadel, Esquire, of James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, LLP attorney for the Petitioner, Jodie E. Payne, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Petition to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement on the following on the date and in the manner indicated below: VIA U.S. MAIL, FIRST CLASS, PRE-PAID Thomas T. Teffeteller 420 Water Street Apartment 3 New Cumberland, PA 17070 Dated: Januarr;??O , 2011 JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP By: usanel, Esquire Attorney I.D. #44837 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Attorneys for Petitioner Z' JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Petitioner V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE 1h AND NOW, this 15 day of ?uti?o?y , 2011, upon consideration of the foregoing Petition to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement, a Rule is hereby entered against the Respondent/Defendant, Thomas T. Teffeteller, to show cause why said Petition should not be granted. Rule returnable in writing o days from the date of service. BY THE COURT, Distribution: J. c T, -? ,. r n rxj -? (ji ?-- Susan M. Kadel, Esquire, PO Box 650, Hershey, PA 17033 ? Thomas T. Teffeteller, Pro Se, 420 Water Street, Apartment 3, New Cumberland, PA 17070 Ma'IPd ies COP ?? c Y rn t'?ri M =70 cn r-- ar Mr- --c - o ?7 , .e [ f:l . Melanie L. Erb, Esquire 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-975-9446 Merb@dplglaw.com JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVAN IA v. : NO. 10-1232 THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE MOTION TO RECONSIDER ENTRY OF DIVORCE DECREE AND NOW, comes the Petitioner, Thomas T. Teffeteller., by and through his attorney Melanie L. Erb, Esquire and the Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC who bring this Motion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decree, and avers as follows: 1. Petitioner is Thomas T. Teffeteller, an adult individual who currently resides at 420 Water St #3, New Cumberland, PA 17070. 2. Respondent is Jodie E. Teffeteller, an adult individual who currently resides at 6 Center Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 17011 3. A Complaint in Divorce was filed in this matter on February 23, 2010. 4. Pursuant to 42PA.C.S.§ 5505, a court may modify or reseind any Order within thirty (30) days after its entry. It has been less than thirty (30) days since the Divorce Decree was entered in this matter on January 11, 2011. Furthermore no appeal has been taken or allowed in this matter. The parties in this matter executed a document entitled a Marital Settlement Agreement on August 17, 2010. 6. The Decree in Divorce dated January 11, 2011 does not indicate that the Marital Settlement Agreement was incorporated but was not merged into the Divorce Decree. 7. A Praecipe to Withdraw Claims was filed in this matter by plaintiff s attorney on or about January 6, 2011. The Marital Settlement Agreement doesn't contain language that states that it was to be incorporated but not merged into the Divorce Decree. 9. The Marital Settlement Agreement in this matter is not an enforceable contract and is subject to modification as a Court Order as it was not incorporated into the Divorce Decree. 10. Petitioner entered into this Agreement without the advice of legal counsel at the insistence of his then wife that the alleged contract was standard language. 11. At no time, was Petitioner provided the opportunity to negotiate the terms of this agreement as he was led to believe that it was not necessary because the language in the Agreement was standard/normal. 12. Section 5 part D entitled Life Insurance of the agreement requires the Petitioner to name wife as his beneficiary of this Norfolk Southern Life Insurance Policy as well as obtain a secondary Life Insurance Policy at the benefit of the Respondent: to guarantee alimony. 13. This provision to guarantee alimony is in direct contradiction to Section 8 Part A regarding Alimony which states that monthly Alimony payments shall terminate in the event of the death of Husband. 14. It was not Husband's intention to remain liable for alimony in the event of his death hence the provisions those payments would terminate in the event of his death. 15. Section 8 Part B entitled Child Support set forth Husband's estimated income and Wife's estimated income at time of entering into said Agreement. 16. This provision does not provide for modification or prevent modification of the Child Support obligation of the two minor children. However, the terms of said provision unjustly require Petitioner to be solely liable for softball dues and golf camp fees as well as unreimbursed medical expenses for the children, without limitation. 17. Further, Child Support, under the laws of Pennsylvania do not include provisions for College Expenses, Section 8 Part E of the Marital Settlement Agreement is unconscionable for Petitioner to be responsible for 75% of essentially all expenses associated with the children's attempts to enroll in college and their enrollment in college including expenses not directly attributed to tuition or room and board. This Section does not provide any limitation what so ever or allow Petitioner to have any impact on the nature of the college search partaken by the children. 18. Section 6, Part A of the Agreement requires Petitioner to be solely liable for the parties' debt aside from the mortgage for two marital residence, which has forced him to file for bankruptcy. 19. Further, Section 5, Part E, the value of Husband's Norfolk Southern Thrift and Investment Plan does not take into account the balance of the loan that was owed for the vehicle which Wife retained following the parties' separation. 20. The terms of the parties Marital Settlement Agreement are very lopsided and not equitable and therefore is unconscionable. 21. Petitioner believed he did not have an option to negotiate the terms of the Agreement. 22. Petitioner felt pressure to execute the Agreement according to Respondent's time frame. Respectfully Submitted, 01 a//A -, - - - - ?461 ie. [Rb, Esquire Att rney I.D. No. 84445 Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC 2132 Markel: Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-975-9446 Attorney for Plaintiff VERIFICATION I, THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, verify that the statements made in the foregoing Complaint in Divorce are true and correct. I understand that false statements made herein are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. -L/1a/t r DATE JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, DEFENDANT NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 15th day of February, 2011, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decree, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that: 1. A Rule shall issue upon the Plaintiff, Jodie E. Teffeteller to show cause why the relief requested by Defendant should not be granted. 2. Plaintiff shall file an Answer to the Motion on or before March 9, 2011. 3. Hearing/Argument on the motion shall be held on Tuesday, May 24, 2011, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom No. 2 of the Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. By the Court, 1-3 M. L. Ebert, Jr. - CD Susan M. Kadel, Esquire: Attorney for Plaintiff Moj led c Melanie Erb, Esquire r oZ/rg/!I Attorney for Defendant p? bas JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant To: Thomas T. Teffeteller IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO PLEAD You are hereby notified to file a written response to the enclosed New Matter within twenty (20) days from service hereof or a judgment may be entered against you. Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant AND NOW, this daGy of IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE ORDER 2011, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Reconsidet Entry of Divorce Decree, Plaintiff's Answer, New Matter and Counterclaims, it is hereby ORDE:ZED and DECREED as follows: (a) Defendant'Is Motion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decree is hereby DENIED. (b) Plaintiffs (7ounterclaim requesting counsel fees is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly Defendant, Thomas T. Teffeteller, is hereby directed to pay the sum of $ 5 representing the reasonable counsel fees incurred by Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne, Within days of the date of this Order. By the Court, M.L. Ebert, Jr., Judge Distribution: Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire, P.O. Box 650, Hershey, PA 17033 Melanie L. Erb, Esquire, 2132 Market Street, Camp Hill, PA 17011 Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 82204 James Smith Dietterick & Connelly, LLP P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 Attorneys for Plaintiff JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, Jodie E. Teffeteller, now known as Jodie E. Payne, by and through her attorneys, Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire and the law firm of James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, LLP, and files this Answer, New Matter and Counterclaims to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decr?e as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5505 relative to modification of Orders permits ? Court upon notice to the parties to modify or rescind any Order within thirty (30) days after its en*, it is denied that Husband is entitled to the relief requested. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted with clarification. It is admitted that the Divorce Decree dated January 11, 2011 does not reflect language tha? the Marital Settlement Agreement was incorporated but not merged into the Divorce Decree, al the standard Divorce Decree used in Cumberland County does not include such language. By wa? of clarification, Paragraph 26 of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement indicates "this Agreement may be incorporated into a decree of divorce for purposes of enforcement only, but otherwise shall not be merged into said decree. The parties shall have the right to enforce this Agreeme?t under the Divorce Code of 1980, as amended, and, in addition, shall retain any remedie? in law or in equity under this Agreement as an independent contract". Therefore, inclusion c f such language is irrelevant as the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement is an independent contract. 7. Admitted. Denied. It is denied that the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement does not contain language that it is to be incorporated but not merged into the Divorce Decree, as Paragraph 26 of the parties' Marital Settlement Agre0ent includes such language. See Wife's response set forth in averment number 6 hereinabove. Furthermore, 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3105 does not require such language to be part of any Marital Settlement Agreement. 9. Denied. It is denied that the Marital Settlement Agreement is not an enforceable contract. See 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 310 whether such language is included is irrelevant. 10. Admitted in part Od denied in part. It is admitted that Husband entered into this Agreement without the advice of ?ounsel. It is denied that he did not have legal counsel at the insistence of Wife. To the contra*, Paragraph 2 of the Marital Settlement Agreement reflects that Husband voluntarily proceeded pr? se in this matter having been advised of his right to seek legal counsel of his choice and although having the opportunity to do so, has voluntarily elected to proceed pro se. Additionally, this Om's letter dated February 24, 2010 serving the Complaint in Divorce upon Husband advised hio of his right to obtain separate counsel and, in fact, strongly 2 encouraged him to do so. Subseq#ent to the entry of the Marital Settlement Agreement, this firm's letter dated November 2, 2010 ag4in encouraged Husband to consult with counsel of his choosing in order to review the content of a Q*alified Domestic Relations Order. Copies of this firm's correspondence dated February 21, 2010 and November 2, 2010 are attached collectively hereto as Exhibit "A". By way of further answer, the Marital Settlement Agreement was negotiated in good faith and based primarily on proposals made by Husband. 11. Denied. See Wifejs response to averment number 10 above relative to Husband's opportunity and suggestion that ho consult with counsel of his choosing. 12. Admitted in part, ,*ith clarification, and denied in part. It is admitted that Paragraph 5(D) requires Husband to continuo to name Wife as primary beneficiary of his Norfolk Southern Life Insurance Policy as well as obtain a secondary life insurance policy insuring his life for the benefit of Wife. It is denied that Husband's obligation to maintain life insurance is to guarantee alimony only. Paragraph 5(D) of the parties' Agreement requires that the parties' children be named as secondary beneficiaries in equal proportion. An accurate recitation of Paragraph 5(D) is as follows: Paragraph 5(D), L fe Insurance. Husband shall continue to name Wife as primary beneficiary of his Norfolk Southern Life Insurance Policy, naming the parties' children as secondary beneficiaries in equal proportion, so long as Husband is employed by orfolk Southern Corporation. Within twenty-four (24) months from the date of the execution of this Agreement, Husband shall obtain additional life insurance, nsuring his life for the benefit of Wife naming Wife as beneficiary in the amo nt of at least $192,000.00 which may be reduced according to the followin schedule: (a) $114,000.00 as of January 1, 2014; (b) $90,000.00 as of January 1, 2018; (c) $41,000.00 as of January 1, 2022. 3 Said life insuranc4 for the benefit of Wife shall remain until Husband is no longer obligated to pay al mony as set forth herein. By way of clarification, Hiisband is obligated to obtain a secondary life insurance policy within twenty-four (24) months fr?m the date of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement in the amount of $192,000.00, which amount may be reduced by $48,000.00 every four (4) years until Husband no longer is obligated to pay alimony to Wife. 13. Denied. Paragraph 5(D) of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement is an independent paragraph with regar to Husband's Norfolk Southern Life Insurance and is not contradiction to Paragraph 8(A) o?the Agreement. 14. Denied. Wife is wi-thout sufficient knowledge or belief as to Husband's intention and therefore same is denied. 15. Admitted. 16. Denied. It is deni that paragraph 8(B) relative to Husband's child support obligations are not subject to modification. Specifically, paragraph 8(B) states: "Husband's child support obligation is subject tom dification pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1910.19". It is further denied that the terms of Husband' child support obligation unjustly require Husband to be solely liable for any and all of the softba dues, golf camp fees and unreimbursed medical expenses for the benefit of the children. Although ?usband may now appear to have second thoughts about the terms of the Agreement, this is no a basis to challenge same. See Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 819 A.2d 529 (2003) and Sabad v. Fessenden, 2003 Pa. Super. 202, 825 A.2d 682, 688 (Pa. Super. 2003). 17. Admitted in part ai set forth in Pa. R.C.P. No. 1910. 1, id denied in part. It is admitted that the Child Support Guidelines et seq. and 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 4301, et. seq. do not include 4 calculations for college expenses, abut it is denied to the extent parties are not permitted to set forth their financial responsibilities tow?rd same in a Marital Settlement Agreement, as the parties have done in the instant matter. It is also denied that paragraph 8(E) of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement regarding the parties' tespective obligations to pay for college expenses is unconscionable. It is further denio that Paragraph 8(E) does not provide any limitation whatsoever to allow Husband to have any impact on the nature of the college search partaken by the children. To the contrary, accordingly to Paragraph 8(E), the parties are to confer with each other and the child relative to the college choices and to discuss their respective obligations in this regard. 18. Denied. It is den* that Husband is solely liable for the parties' debt aside from a mortgage for two marital residences. To the contrary, under the terms of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement, Wife has Osumed the outstanding mortgage balance encumbering the former marital residence whose boance was approximately $162,000.00 as of the time the parties executed the Marital Settlement Agreement. In comparison, the terms of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement obligate H#sband to be solely responsible for the outstanding credit card balance owed by the parties in thelamount of approximately $45,000.00, which is subject to a debt consolidation program which Huspand commenced prior to the entry of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement. It is ftuth? r denied that Husband has been forced to file bankruptcy. 19. Denied. It is denied that the value of Husband's Norfolk Southern Thrift and Investment Plan does not take inte account the balance of any loans against that retirement plan. 20. Denied. It is denied that the terms of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement are lopsided and not equitable and thgefore unconscionable. To the contrary, as previously indicated, the terms of the Marital Settlement Agreement was negotiated in good faith over a period of several months and in large part, reflects t?e terms proposed by Husband. It is further denied that 5 Husband's claim that the parties' "unconscionable", are grounds to in his Petition. See Stoner v. Ston 2003 Pa. Super. 202, 825 A.2d 21. Denied. It is df terms of the Agreement. To the Agreement for a period of several 22. Denied. It is deni( to Wife's timeframe. To the Settlement Agreement executed finalized until January 1, 2011. irital Settlement Agreement is now "lopsided" and ;onsider the entry of a Divorce Decree as requested by Husband 572 Pa. 665, 819 A.2d 529 (2003) and Sabad v. Fessenden, 688 (Pa. Super. 2003). that Husband believed he did not have an option to negotiate the the parties negotiated between themselves the terms of the that Husband felt pressured to execute the Agreement according y, the terms of Paragraph 4(A) of the parties' Marital gust 17, 2010, indicates that the Divorce Decree will not be 23. Paragraphs 1 thro gh 22 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth below. 24. On December 9, 2 10, this firm received a copy of Husband's e-mail of the same date to Wife requesting modifica ions to the Marital Settlement Agreement. 25. Pursuant to this fi is letter dated December 14, 2010, this firm advised Husband that Wife was not agreeable to the suggested changes to the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement. A copy of this firm' letter dated December 14, 2010 is attached hereto as Exhibit «B„ 26. This firm's letter Husband's cooperation in ex, him by the parties' Marital S December 14, 2010, addressed to Husband requested a Deed to the marital residence and a payment as required by Agreement. 6 27. Wife subsequently] filed her Petition to enforce the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement on January 21, 2011. 28. On January 25, 2x11, this Court issued a Rule upon Husband to show cause why Wife's Petition should not be gr anted, returnable twenty (20) days from the date of service. 29. On or about January 30, 2011, Wife's counsel received the Deed executed by Husband. 30. Husband also pro 'ded the required payment to Wife pursuant to the terms of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement on or about February 7, 2011. 31. Such actions on t e part of the Husband to complete various executory terms of the Marital Settlement Agreeme t are not reconciled with his instant Motion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decree. 32. Husband did not #le an Answer to the Rule to Show Cause entered by this Court on January 25, 2011. I 33. Wife's Petition to enforce the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement also requested that Husband be responsible for her counsel fees in connection filing her Petition. 34. Despite Husband' eventual compliance with the executory terms of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement, Wife's counsel's correspondence dated February 7, 2011 requests that he provide payment of $500.00 in counsel fees relative to Wife's Petition to Enforce the Marital Settlement Agreement. copy of this firm's correspondence dated February 7, 2011 is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". 35. On February 10, 2P11, Husband filed his instant Motion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decree. 36. Wife believes and therefore avers that Husband's Motion is in retaliation for Wife's 7 efforts in seeking counsel fees rel tive to the Petition to Enforce the Marital Settlement Agreement. 37. As a result, Wife elieves and therefore avers that Husband's Motion is filed in i bad faith and is without merit. 38. Wife has incurred significant counsel fees in connection with her efforts to have Husband comply with the terms f the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement and in connection with the instant matter. 39. According to Paragraph 15 of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement, if either party breaches any provision oft the Agreement, the other party shall be entitled to recover from the breaching party all costs, expenses and legal fees actually incurred in the enforcement of the rights of the non-breaching party. 40. With respect to Wife's Petition to enforce the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement, Wife is simultaneously filing her Motion to make Rule Absolute relative to the counsel fees incurred by Wife in onnection with that action. A copy of Wife's Motion to make Rule Absolute is attached hereto is Exhibit "D". 41. Pursuant to Cumb rland County Rules of Civil Procedure No. 208.3(a)(2), which requires a Motion to state wheth or not a Judge has ruled upon any other issue in the same or related matter, the Honorable M. L. Ebert, Jr. entered the Rule to Show Cause dated January 25, 2011 with respect to Husband's lotion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decree. 42. Pursuant to Cumberland County Rules of Civil Procedure No. 208.2(d), an inquiry as to the concurrence or position of opposing counsel is not required as this Motion relates to post-trial relief. WHEREFORE, it is =requested that this Honorable Court enter an Order denying the relief requested s Motion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decree. It is 8 further respectfully requested tha? this Court enter an Order requiring Husband to pay counsel fees incurred by Wife in connection with this matter within a date set certain by this Court. Respectfully submitted, JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: J -I- I I By. - ? Christine Taylor Br Attorney I.D. #8220 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne 9 VERIFICATION I, Jodie E. Payne, verify correct. I understand that false Section 4904 relating to unsworn the statements made in the foregoing pleading are true and herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. ttion to authorities. EXHIBIT "A" JAMES SMITH D11;Tr cK & CONNELLY LLP Christine Taylor Bunn otb ,isdc.com FAX 717.533.7771 February 24, 2010 RESTRICTED DELIVERY CERTIFIED MAIL Thomas E. Teffeteller 6 Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17011 Re: Jodie E. Teffeteller v. Thomas T. Teffeteller Docket No. 10 -1232 Civil Term Dear Mr. Teffeteller: Please be advised that yotz wife has retained this firm in connection with the above-referenced matter. Enclos , please find a true and correct copy of the Complaint in Divorce which has b en filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County. Please provide your attorn y with a copy of this correspondence and the enclosed documents and request at your attorney communicate with me promptly. If you do not have counsel at the present time and wish to contact me directly, you may do so; however, please note that this firm is unable to provide you with any legal advice as this firm represents your wife. As a result, you are strongly encouraged to seek counsel of your own choosing. It is your *ife's intention to proceed in this matter amicably and therefore, I look forward to hearin? from you or your counsel in the near future. In order to confirm service f the Complaint, I am enclosing an Acceptance of Service for your signature. Please return this form to me in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope. Very truly yours, P.0 BOX 650 HERSHEY, PA 17033 Courier Address 134 SIPE AVENUE HUMMELSTOWN, PA 17036 TEL. 717,533,3280 WWW.JSDC.COM GARY L. JAMES MAX J. SMITH, JR. JOHN J. CONNELLY, JR. SCOTT A. DIETTERICK JAMES F. SPADE MATTHEW CHABAL, III NEIL W. YAHN EDWARD P. SEEBER RONALD T. TOMASKO SUSAN M. KADEL JARAD W.HANDELMAN COURTNEY K. POWELL. KIMBERLY A. BONNER KAREN N. CONNELLY JOHN M. HYAMS CHRISTINE T. BRANN JESSICA E. LOWE SEAN M. CONCANNON GREGORY A. KOGUT, JR. OF COUNSEL: GREGORY K. RICHARDS BERNARD A. RYAN, JR. f pristine Taylor Brann CTB/kmm Enclosure cc: Jodie E. Teffeteller JAMES SMITH Dl>=T mcy, & CONNELLY LLP Christine Taylor Brann ctb ajsdc.com FAX 717.298.2021 P0. BOX 650 HERSHEY, PA 17033 November 2, 2010 Courier Address. 134 SIPE AVENUE HUMMELSTOWN, PA 17036 TEL. 717.533 3280 WWW.JSDC.COM Thomas T. Teffeteller 42 Water Street Apartment 3 New Cumberland, PA 17070 Re: Teffeteller v. Teffeteller Dear Mr. Teffeteller: GARY L. JAMES Pursuant to paragraph 5(E) of your Marital Settlement Agreement dated August MAX J. SMITH, JR. J C 17, 2010, enclosed is the original ualified Domestic Relations Order relative to the OHN J. ONNELLY, JR. SCOTT RICK distribution of funds from your Na folk Southern Thrift and Investment Plan through S SPADE JAMES F F. . PADE MATTHEW CHABAL, III Vanand to Jodie. Please sign gu and date this Order on page 4 above where it is indicated NEIL YARN EDWAR RD P. SEEKER "Defendant/ Participant" and r the Qualified Domestic Relations Order to me in the RONALD O self-addressed stamped envelope w hich I have provided for your convenience. I will then M. K ADEL SUSAN DEL JARAD W. HANDELMAN have Jodie execute the Qualified D omestic Relations Order and forward it to the Court to COURTNEY K. POWELL KIMBERLY A. BONNER __ 11 - --. .. _ _ _ _ . _ _._ _ be signed. Thereafter, we mayfo and the Qualified Domestic Relations Order to the Plan KAREN N. CONNELLY Administrator so that its terms ma be implemented. JOHN M. HYAMs CHRISTINE T BRANN JESSICA E. LOWE SEAN M. CONCANNON If you have any questions, lease do not hesitate to call me; however because our GREGORY A. CAR GUT, JR. TH OMAS J office represents Jodie, we are unab , le to offer you any legal advice and therefore should . you have any questions regarding a content of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order OF COUNSEL: GREGORY K. RICHARDS you are encouraged to speak with , unsel of your choosing. BERNARD A. RYAN, JR. Very truly yours, hristine Taylor Braun CTB/mbl Enclosure cc: Jodie E. Payne EXHIBIT "B" WES SV7H DTEI`I (--K & CON: 'Y T- L" Susan M. Kadel smk.'G?'s? dc.coni FAX 717.298.2091 P.O. BOX 650 HERSHEY, PA 17033 December 14, 2010 Courier Address: 134 SIPE AVENUE HUMMELSTOWN, PA 17036 TEL. 717.533.3280 Thomas T. Teffeteller WWW.JSDC.COM 420 Water Street Apartment 3 New Cumberland, PA 17070 Re: Teffeteller v. Teffetell~r Dear Mr. Teffeteller: It ism understanding from correspondence with both this office and Jodie Y your GARY L. JAMES MAX J. SMITH, JR. Payne that you are requesting that modifications be made to the Marital Settlement JOHN J. CONNELLY, JR. SCOTT A. DIETTERICK Agreement. I can advise that my client is not agreeable to the modifications you suggested. JAMES F. SPADE The Marital Settlement Agreement w negotiated in good faith and, in fact, is based MATTHEW CHABAL, III NEIL W. YAHN on that you made or settlement. Accordingly, will not agree to an primarily proposals Y Y? Y EDWARD P. o SEEBER MAS RONALD T. TMASKO modification of that Agreement . SUSAN M. KADEL JARAD W. HANDELMAN C OURTNEY K. POWELL Further, pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of the Agreement you were to execute a Deed at KIMBERLY A. BONNER KAREN N. CONNELLY the time of execution of the Agreement transferring title of the marital home to Jodie. A CHRISTI JOHN HYAMS NE T. BRANN Deed was forwarded to you on October 22, 2010 and we have yet to receive that signed JESSICA E. LOWE Deed. SEAN M.CONCANNON GREGORY A. KOGUT, JR. THOMAS J. CAR Also, with regard to paragraph 5(e) of the Agreement, you were to provide payment OF COUNSEL: G REGORY K. RICHARDS to Jodie in the total amount of $62,50 .00 from your pension. As you know, the amount BERNARD A. RYAN, JR. rolled over pursuant to a QDRO was i# the sum of $61,555.48 and, accordingly, you now owe her the remaining balance of $944.52. With regard to the Deed and t1le pension payment, we are requesting that you provide both of these items by Januar? 1, 2011 or we will need to proceed with a Petition to enforce the terms of the Marital Settlement Agreement. Thank you for your attention t? this matter. Sincerely Susan M. Kadel SMK/mbl cc: Jodie E. Payne EXHIBIT CCU ]ANTES Smrm D1E picK & CONNELLY LLP Susan M. Kadel Email: smk(a:isdc.com FAX 717.298.2091 P.0 BOX 650 HERSHEY, PA 17033 Courier Address. 134 SIPE AVENUE HUMMELSTOWN, PA 17030 i February 7, 2011 TEL 717 533 3280 WWW,JSDC.COM Thomas T. Teffeteller 420 Water Street Apartment 3 New Cumberland, PA 17070 Re: Teffeteller v. Teffeteller GARY L. JAMES MAX J. SMITH, JR. Dear * dr. Te f feteller: JOHN J CONNELL JR. 1V1 1 11 1 '. SCOTT A. DIETTERI CK JAMES F. SPADE I understand from my client that you have now reimbursed her for the retirement NEIL W. MATTHEW A HABAL, III YARN monies owed as well as her portion of our Norfolk Southern bonus. EDWARD P. SEEBER Y RONALD T. TOMASKO SUSAN M. KADEL JARAD W. HANDELMAN We are pleased that you have now complied with the Settlement Agreement; COURTNEY K. POWELL however, m client has incurred attorney's fees to simply have the Agreement enforced. We KIMBERLY A. BONNER y KAREN N. CONNELLY will agree to withdraw our petition u on payment of $500.00 in counsel fees. We will JOHN M. HYAMS CHRISTINE T. BRANN consider a payment plan with the firin if that would be acceptable to you; however, it must be JESSICA E. LOWE SEAN M. CONCANNON within a reasonable period of time. ; GREGORY A. KOGUT, JR. THOMAS J. CAR i I look forward to hearing from you with regard to this matter. OF COUNSEL: GREGORY K. RICHARDS BERNARD A. RYAN, JR. Sin erely, Sus MVadel SMK:hsd cc: Jodie E. Payne X? T i f XHIBIT "D" JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Petitioner V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of , 2011, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Petition to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motiot is GRANTED. It is ORDERED and DECREED that Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne, is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $540.00, which were incurred as a result of Defendant, !,Thomas T. Teffeteller's, actions. Defendant is directed to pay such fee to Plaintiff within ten (1 days of the date of this Order of Court. I BY THE COURT, J. Distribution: Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire, P O. Box 650, Hershey, PA 17033 Melanie L. Erb, Esquire, 2132 M4ket Street, Camp Hill, PA 17011 Susan A Kadel, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 44837 Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 82204 James Smith Dietterick & Connelly, P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Petitioner V. IN THE COURT OF COMMON :PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 10-1232 THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant/Respondent : IN DIVORCE MOTI N TO MAKE RULE ABSOLUTE AND NOW, comes the Petitioner, Jodie E. Payne, in the above-captioned action, by her attorneys, Susan M. Kadel, Esquije, Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire and the law firm of James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, LLB', and moves this Court to make Absolute the Rule to Show Cause which was issued in the above-captioned matter on January 25, 2011, and in support thereof states the following. 1. On January 21, 2011, the Petitioner, Jodie E. Payne, filed a Petition to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement in phis matter, in part seeking counsel fees relative to Husband's breach of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement. 2. On January 25, 2011, this Court issued a Rule on the Respondent to show cause why Petitioner's Petition should r1ot be granted, returnable twenty (20) days from the date of service. 3. Said Rule was se ed on Respondent by first class mail on January 27, 2011. 4. On or about J Deed signed by the Respondent, 5. On or about Febru This sum represented the remaini Pension. 30, 2011, undersigned counsel received the Special Warranty T. Teffeteller. 7, 2011, Respondent paid the sum of $944.52 to Petitioner. balance owed from distribution of the Norfolk Southern 6. However, as of this date, Petitioner has not received reimbursement in the amount of $540.00 for attorneys' fees incu*red to bring this matter before the Court. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" outlines Petitioner's l0gal fees associated with this matter. WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Jodie E. Payne, respectfully requests this Court to make the Rule to Show Cause Absolute Viand enter an Order directing the Defendant, Thomas T. Teffeteller, to pay Plaintiff s attor> eys' fees in the amount of $540.00. Respectfully submitted, JAMES SMITH DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: -?-- (? By:. Susan M. Kadel, Es e Attorney I.D. #448 Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire Attorney I.D. #82204 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne EXHIBIT "A" Jame, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, LLP P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 March 9, 2011 Jodie E. Payne 6 Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17011 v. Thomas T. Teffeteller )NAL SERVIC 12/14/2010 Letter to Tom Te ffeteller regarding status of case. 01/13/2011 Prepare Petition ?br Special Relief. 01/14/2011 Revise Petition f r Enforcement of Agreement; e-ma il client. 01/27/2011 Review Order reg arding Petition to Enforce; letter to Tom Teffeteller. 02/02/2011 Letter to Tom Te eteller. 02/07/2011 Review and resp nd to client e-mail; letter to Tom Te eteller. 02/24/2011 Preparation of M otion to Make Rule Absolute. Total Professional Services Billing Summary Total Professional Services Total Expenses Incurred Total Balance Due Client #006082 Matter #101280 Hours Amount Lawyer 0.30 $ 67.50 SMK 0.50 $ 112.50 SMK 0.40 $ 90.00 SMK 0.30 $ 67.50 SMK 0.30 $ 67.50 SMK 0.30 $ 67.50 SMK 0.30 $ 67.50 SMK 2.4 hours x $225.00 = $540.00 $540.00 $ 0.00 $540.00 JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Petitioner v. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/Respondent I, Christine Taylor Brann, the Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne, Enforce Marital Settlement below: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE ire, of James Smith Dietterick & Connelly, LLP, attorney for certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Petition to on the following on the date and in the manner indicated U.S.FIRST CLASS. PRE-PAID Melanie L. Erb, Esquire De?hlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP ` r Dated: ( By: Christine Taylor , Esquire Attorney I.D. # 04 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE TE OF I, Christine Taylor Brann, for the Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne, the following on the date and in ire, of James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, LLP attorney certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Answer on manner indicated below: Melanie L. Erb, Esquire lefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: J ' , ! I - r By: Christine Taylor Brann Attorney I.D. #82204 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, PLAINTIFF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, DEFENDANT NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 11th day of March, 2011, upon consideration of Plaintiff/Petitioner's Motion to Make Rule Absolute in the form of a Request for Attorney's Fees IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendant/Respondent shall file an Answer to the Motion on or before April 1, 2011. Hearing/Argument on the Motion shall be held at the previously scheduled hearing in this case on Tuesday, May 24, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom No. 2 of the Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Melanie L. Erb, Esquire Attorney for Defendant bas Wlecl OKS FILED-OFFICE OF THE PROTHONOTARY 2911 MAR 29 PM 2: 49 CU PE N5 LVA IAKT Melanie L. Erb, Esquire 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-975-9446 Merb@dplglaw.com JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 10-1232 : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : IN DIVORCE ANSWER TO NEW MATTER AND COUNTERCLAIMS AND NOW, comes the Petitioner, Thomas T. Teffeteller, by and through his attorney Melanie L. Erb, Esquire and the Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC who files this Answer to New Matter and Counterclaims, and avers as follows: 23. Paragraph 23 is a paragraph of incorporation and does not require a response. 24. Admitted in part. Denied in part. It is admitted that Petitioner sent an email to Respondent on that date. It is denied that Wife's counsel received a copy of the email that date as Petitioner is without information knowledge or belief as to form a conclusion as to the averment in this paragraph. 25. Admitted. 26. Admitted. 27. Admitted. 28. Admitted. 29. Admitted. 30. Admitted. 31. Paragraph 31 contains a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 32. Admitted. 33. Admitted. 34. Admitted. 35. Admitted. 36. Paragraph 36 contains a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 37. Paragraph 37 contains a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 38. Petitioner is without information, knowledge or belief as to form a conclusion as to the averment in this paragraph. 39. Paragraph 39 contains a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 40. Admitted. 41. Admitted. 42. Paragraph 42 contains a conclusion of law to which no response is required. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Honorable Court enter an Order vacating the parties Divorce Decree and invalidating the Marital Settlement Agreement to allow for economic claims to be resolved and enter an Order denying Wife's claim for attorney's fees. Respectfully Submitted, rx/ Melaie L. Erb, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 84445 Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-975-9446 Attorney for Plaintiff VERIFICATION I, THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, verify that the statements made in the foregoing Answer are true and correct. I understand that false statements made herein are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. ` ?LZI / TH T. ELLER C/ DATE Melanie L. Erb, Esquire FILED-OFFICE 2132 Market Street OF THE PROTHONOTARY Camp Hill, PA 17011 2011 MAR 29 PM 2: 51 717-975-9446 merb?dplglaw.com CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : NO.: 2010-1232 THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, CIVIL ACTION Defendant, IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date, a true a correct copy of the foregoing Answer to New Matter and Counterclaims was served by first class mail upon the following: Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire PO Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 Attorney for Plaintiff Dat tlin St 4kZL= JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Petitioner V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS c-1 r-.3 CD CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYI,4?jNI? --i zrn rn_ - NO. 10-1232 N r -<> CA o r CIVIL ACTION - LAW < c x„ .= IN DIVORCE > C :Wt c) ' ORDER AND NOW, this day of May, 2011, pursuant to Plaintiff s Motion for Continuance, the hearing currently scheduled for Tuesday, May 24, 2011, at 9:30 a.m. is continued until the i g -ay of till 2011, at 02 a.m./ .before the Honorable M.L. Ebert, I/ a Jr., Cumberland County Courthouse, Courtroom No. , Carlisle, Pennsylvania. By the Court, ?A \ - M.L. Ebert, Jr., Judge Distribution: Mpg"`"" Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire, P.O. Box 650, Hershey, PA 17033 topes a?ll? Melanie L. Erb, Esquire, 2132 Market Street, Camp Hill, PA 17011 ,S/ ` „Q Melanie L. Erb, Esquire 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-975-9446 merbna,dRlglaw.com JODIE E. TEFFETELLER,n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Respondent V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/ Petitioner, t r) ?`I ) JJ 27 AM 101- 'c:, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO.: 2010-1232 CIVIL ACTION IN DIVORCE MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND NOW, comes the Petitioner, Thomas T. Teffeteller, by and through his counsel, Melanie L. Erb, Esquire of the Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC, and files this Motion for Continuance as follows: 1. The Petitioner, Thomas T. Teffeteller, is represented by Melanie L. Erb, Esquire, in the above-captioned action, 2. The Respondent, Jodie E. Payne, is represented by Christine Taylor Brann Esquire, in the above-captioned action. 3. A hearing is scheduled in this matter for Wednesday, July 13, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. before The Honorable M.L. Ebert, Jr. 4. Due to a preplanned, prepaid vacation for Petitioner, counsel for the Petitioner is requesting a continuance of the hearing scheduled in this matter. 5. Counsel for the Petitioner has contacted counsel for the Respondent, Christine Brann, Esquire who has concurred in the request for continuance and rescheduling of this hearing. WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, through his counsel, requests that the hearing currently scheduled for Wednesday, July 13, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. be continued to a date certain to be determined by the Court. Respectfully Submitted, Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 975-9446 Attorney for Petitioner VERIFICATION I, Melanie L. Erb, Esquire, represent that I am the attorney for Petitioner, Thomas T. Teffeteller, and verify that the statements made in the foregoing Motion for Continuance are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to the authorities. Date: Mel ie . E , squire JODIE E. TEFFETELLER,n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Respondent vi. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/ Petitioner, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.: 2010-1232 CIVIL ACTION IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Melanie L. Erb, Esquire, of the Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC attorney for the Petitioner, Thomas T. Teffeteller, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Motion for Continuance on the following on date and in the manner indicated below: VIA FACSIMILE (717) 298-2021 AND VIA U.S. MAIL. FIRST CLASS. PRE-PAID Christine T. Brann, Esquire James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, LLP PO Box 650 :?Iershey, PA 17033-0650 DETHLEFS-PYKOSH LAW GROUP, LLC Dated: /Volix/z, By: squire *.o. 84445 Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 975-9446 4 JODIE E. TEFFETELLER,n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff/Respondent vii. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/ Petitioner, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO.: 2010-1232 CIVIL ACTION IN DIVORCE ORDER AND NOW, this oAay of June 2011, pursuant to Petitioner's Motion for Continuance, the hearing currently scheduled for Wednesday, July 13, 2011, at 9:00a.m. is continued until the ? ay of OWtj, , 2011, at OX a.m.tP3g,1 before the Honorable M.L. Ebert, Jr., Cumberland County Courthouse, Courtroom No. Carlisle, Pennsylvania. M.L. Ebert, Distribution: Christopher Taylor Brann, Esquire, P.O. Box 650, Hershey, PA 17033 Melanie L. Erb, Esquire, 2132 Market Street, Camp Hill, PA 17011 eep; es yii a .IeW 41.?91 1 ,w- t ;-s c -a3 rnv ern z? ?r -+CZ' r"Z v zo 7r C N ?D s s co r o-n By the Court, Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 82204 James Smith Dietterick & Connelly, LLP P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 Attorneys for Plaintiff JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant :- LL!1I-U{ 1 1I { LG12 MAY 21 PM 2* 39, CUMBERLAND CCITT°I, PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE TO WITHDRAW TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Please withdraw the Petition to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement filed January 21, 2011 and Motion to Make Rule Absolute filed March 9, 2011 by Plaintiff/Petitioner, Jodie E. Payne, in the above-captioned action. Respectfully submitted, JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: By: stine Taylor Brann Attorney I.D. #82204 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (71.7) 533-3280 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, Plaintiff V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 10-1232 CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire, of James, Smith, Dietterick & Connelly, attorney for the Plaintiff, Jodie E. Payne, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Praecipe to Withdraw on the following on the date and in the manner indicated below: U.S. MAIL. FIRST CLASS. PRE-PAID Melanie L. Erb, Esquire Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 JAMES, SMITH, DIETTERICK & CONNELLY, LLP Dated: lL By:sZ y L J Christine Taylor Brann Attorney I.D. #82204 P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033-0650 (717) 533-3280 Attorneys for Plaintiff Melanie L. Erb Attorney for Plaintiff 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 merb@dplglaw.com 717-975-9416 JODIE E. TEFFETELLER,n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff/Respondent V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/ Petitioner, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, K, NO.: 2010-1232 CIVIL ACTION IN DIVORCE Z- c7 PRAECIPE TO WITHDRAW MOTION TO RECONSIDER ENTRY OF DIVORCE DECREE TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Please Withdraw the Motion to Reconsider Entry of Divorce Decree for the above- referenced matter for the Defendant, Thomas T. Teffeteller, per his request. Respectfully Submitted, Date: M e L. Erb Attey ID # 84445 Dethlefs-Pykosh Law Group, LLC 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717)975-9446 Attorney for Defendant Melanie L. Erb, Esquire 2132 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-975-9446 Merb;&dplglaw.net JODIE E. TEFFETELLER,n/k/a JODIE E. PAYNE, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff/Respondent V. THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER, Defendant/ Petitioner, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, NO.: 2010-1232 CIVIL ACTION IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date, a true a correct copy of the foregoing Order was served by first class mail upon the following: Christine Taylor Brann, Esquire James Smith Dietterick & Connelly LLp P.O. Box 650 Hershey, PA 17033 Date: Ve i ' . Erb