HomeMy WebLinkAbout05-14-10IN RE:
ESTATE OF I.OTTIE IVY DIXON
Deceased
1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
NO. 21-07-0686
IN RE:
ESTATE OF GEORGE F. DIXON, JR.
Deceased
:IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
;CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
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:ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION?r~
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:NO. 21-1994-0754 ;/ ~,-;-,
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REPLY OF GEORGE F. DIXON, III AND RICHARD E. DIXO~~'O rv
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND : L> o
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF MARSHALL DIXON, EXECUTOR ~~'
I. Reply Findings of Fact
1. Simply because a statement is made in "Marshall Dixon's Answer to
Motion to Extend Discovery Deadline" filed with the Court does not make it a fact of
record.
2. Marshall Dixon did not provide all documents "related to Mrs. Dixon's
financial affairs" as alleged in paragraph 12 of the Proposed Findings of Fact of Marshall
Dixon, Executor (hereinafter referred to as "Executor at para. 12")
3. The Brothers did not receive all of the monthly account statements and all
of the cancelled checks for the M&T checking account as alleged by Executor at para. 14.
4. The Brothers' counsel was not fully aware of the extent to which the
Executor's interrogatory responses were incomplete at the time the responses were
submitted (see Executor at para. 26) -but determined them to be significantly incomplete
based on later discovery, including the deposition of Marshall Dixon.
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Contrary to the characterization in Executor at para. 30, the Brothers'
Motion to Extend Discovery Deadline was sought "to further investigate Marshall Dixon's
finances." Motion to Extend Discovery Deadline at para. 10.
6. Present counsel for the Brothers was not involved in the Discovery
Conference of October 11, 2009 and has no knowledge or information regarding whether
Brothers' prior counsel "conceded that they were unable to prove that Mrs. Dixon had been
subject to incapacity or undue influence during her lifetime." Executor at para. 32. The
Brothers have no knowledge or information that such a concession was made and would
not have accepted it. Nevertheless, at the Pre-Hearing Conference of February 12, 2010,
counsel was told that the Brothers were precluded from presenting evidence of incapacity
or undue influence.
7. The Brothers have consistently contended that there were transfers of
substantial assets by Marshall Dixon that were includable in the estate of Lottie Ivy Dixon
that were not accounted for.
8. The Auditor's Report on Discovery Issues, for example, noted that the
Brothers "question dozens of checks in the total amount of approximately $220,000 that
were drawn against that account to pay various credit card statements or otherwise to or for
the benefit of Marshall." That Report also noted the Brothers' concerns about brokerage
accounts for both Marshall Dixon and Mrs. Dixon.
9. Although Marshall Dixon may have produced some of his personal
brokerage account statements required by the Auditor's Report of November 20, 2009, the
statements produced were limited in time period covered and it is unknown whether all
statements for all brokerage accounts were produced. See Executor at para. 36. Additional
4468181 2
brokerage account statements are required to properly trace funds and track the use of the
accounts by Marshall Dixon, both his own and that of Mrs. Dixon, including his use of
margin accounts that leveraged the assets in Mrs. Dixon's account.
10. The Brothers' discovery requests, discussed in the Auditor's Report
"specified as requests for copies of credit card statements of Marshall for accounts where
bills were paid by Lottie from 2001 through her date of death, requests for information as
to whether or not various credit cards were accounts of Marshall or his related business
entities" apparently slipped through the cracks and were not resolved by the Auditor's
Report. Information responsive to those discovery requests was never produced and would
be essential to properly track the misuse of estate assets.
11. The Brothers have been denied a full and fair opportunity to develop
complete financial data with which to trace, track and analyze the misuse or
misappropriation of estate assets.
12. The Brothers' various Pre-Hearing Memoranda discussed the assets they
contended were not included in the estate - as best they could on the basis of the
information made available -and identified exhibits and witnesses as required.
13. While the Court granted leave to the Martson Firm to withdraw as counsel
for the Brothers by Order entered December 14, 2009, the pre-trial conference was
scheduled for February 12, 2010 by the same Order.
14. The Brothers' present counsel, undersigned attorneys, retained as of January
22, 2010, had only twenty (20) days to prepare this substantial estate matter for the Final
Pre-trial Conference and just over thirty (30) days to prepare for the hearing.
4468181 3
15. The Brothers' Supplemental Pre-trial Memorandum Addendum, as noted by
Executor at para. 48, again included a list of checks written from the M&T account that
amount to at least $154,743.74 and a supplemental list of checks that amount to at least
$43,591.41. The original list was first provided by Marshall Dixon in discovery responses.
Executor conceded that these transactions reflect checks written on the M&T account to or
for the benefit of Marshall Dixon. The list of checks and the supplemental list is attached
as Exhibit B.
16. As noted by Executor, the Auditor precluded the Brothers from introducing
any evidence regarding the checks drawn on the M&T joint checking account (Executor at
para. 53), and that included questioning of the Executor/Marshall Dixon.
17. The Brothers were precluded from questioning the Executor regarding the
M&T joint checking account, except on a limited basis after Marshall Dixon was called as
a witness as Executor of the Estate.
18. The Brothers were unfairly restricted in their ability to present their case.
19. The only witness called by the Executor, Marshall Dixon, was Marshall
Dixon.
20. There was no independent evidence introduced by Marshall Dixon to
establish the nature and circumstances of the checks written or transfers made to him or for
his benefit from the joint account.
21. There was no independent evidence introduced by Marshall Dixon to
establish that each of the many checks written on the joint account or transfers made to him
or for his benefit were valid inter vivos gifts from the decedent.
4468181 4
22. Marshall Dixon's testimony that he wrote checks from the joint checking
account primarily during the last year or so of Mrs. Dixon's life - as summarized by
Executor at para. 74 -was not accurate and not credible.
23. Marshall Dixon wrote numerous checks from the joint checking account
primarily to or for his own benefit going back to at least 2004.
24. There were many joint account checks written to credit card companies as
payments for Marshall Dixon's credit card accounts and signed by Marshall Dixon.
25. An impartial, neutral executor should have fully questioned and
investigated the suspect use of the joint checking account and estate assets by Marshall
Dixon.
26. Prior to the hearing, the record had already established at least some of the
payments and transfers made from the checking account to or for the benefit of Marshall
Dixon -See, e.g., Exhibit B -that should be returned to the estate.
27. Because of the confidential relationship that existed between Marshall
Dixon and his mother, evidence relating to the use or misuse of the joint checking account
and estate assets is within the exclusive province and control of Marshall Dixon.
II. Reply Conclusions of Law
1. In this case, Marshall Dixon, as alleged donee, has the burden of proof by
clear, convincing, precise and independent evidence that monies paid out of the checking
account to or for his benefit were valid and legitimate inter vivos gifts.
2. With regard to the joint account, pursuant to 20 Pa. C.S. § 6304(a),
Marshall Dixon, as surviving party, was entitled to the sum remaining on deposit at the
death of Lottie Ivy Dixon.
aa6stst 5
3. However, unless proven to be valid inter vivos gifts, funds paid to or for the
benefit of Marshall Dixon during Mrs. Dixon's lifetime out of the joint checking account
are property of the estate and must be returned to the estate. See e.g., In re Novosielski,
2010 WL 1078284 (Pa. Mar. 25, 2010).
4. The joint checking account did not regenerate on its own -the account was
regularly replenished by depositing monies from other funds or accounts that were estate
assets, including the Revocable Trust. Thus, Marshall Dixon's improper use of the joint
checking account for his own benefit certainly did drain the estate.
5. The addition of Marshall Dixon to the pre-existing checking account of
Lottie Ivy Dixon to make it a joint account did nothing to change complete ownership of
the account by decedent during her lifetime - as provided by 20 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a). See In
re Nnv~sielski_
6. The Multiple Party Accounts Act ("MPAA") makes clear that joint
accounts with a presumed right of survivorship are not treated as inter vivos gifts. The
joint account operates only as a disposition at death. Id.
7. Marshall Dixon had no right of ownership in the joint account funds until
the death of Lottie Ivy Dixon, the contributing owner of the account. Id.
8. There was no evidence, and certainly no clear and convincing evidence, that
Mrs. Dixon intended the addition of Marshall Dixon on her checking account to be an
immediate transfer of ownership of the funds in the account.
9. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary: (a) Mrs. Dixon was the primary
check writer and retained control of the checkbook; (b) Marshall Dixon allegedly felt it
was required to have Mrs. Dixon's approval for any checks he wrote on the account; (c) it
4468181 6
was a matter of convenience to have Marshall Dixon be able to sign checks as Mrs. Dixon
encountered advancing age and health problems.
10. Marshall Dixon's testimony that all of the payments and transfers from the
joint account to him or for his benefit were either gifts to him or reimbursements was not
credible.
11. Marshall Dixon's testimony that decedent was aware of all bills paid or
transfers made electronically from the joint account was not credible.
12. Estate of D'Alessio, 2004 WL 3186286, 26 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 236 (C.P. Phila.
2004) does not stand for the blanket propositions for which it is cited by Marshall Dixon
(Executor's Proposed Conclusions of Law at para. l ). That case involved whether
objectors overcame the presumption of survivorship under MPAA Section 6304 by
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent had a contrary intent. Our
case involves the presumption under MPAA Section 6303, where the burden is on
Marshall Dixon.
13. In the case at bar, the law in Pennsylvania is clear and well-settled that
Marshall Dixon has the burden to establish valid inter vivos gifts of the payments and
transfers made from the joint account by "clear, precise, direct and convincing evidence."
Ems, In re Pappas Estate, 428 Pa. 540, 239 A.Zd 298 (1968); Hera v. McCormick, 425 Pa.
Super. 432, 625 A.2d 682 (1993).
14. The funds in the joint account are presumed to be and were in fact owned
by Mrs. Dixon during her lifetime. Payments or transfers of those funds made improperly
by Marshall Dixon or without qualifying as valid inter vivos gifts remained her property
and must be returned to the estate.
4468181 ']
1 S. Marshall Dixon failed to overcome the presumption that the checking
account established by Mrs. Dixon belonged to Mrs. Dixon and no transfer of ownership
occurred by the addition of Marshall Dixon's name on the account in 2003.
16. Marshall Dixon failed to satisfy his heavy burden of proof as the alleged
donee to establish valid inter vivos gifts, including donative intent and delivery, by clear,
precise and convincing evidence from legally competent witnesses.
17. There is no proof, aside from Marshall Dixon, that "the decedent intended
or comprehended" that she was making unfettered gifts to Marshall Dixon by countless
checks and electronic transfers. See Hawk Estate, 8 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 391 (Allegh. 1988).
18. The Brothers did not waive any objection to Marshall Dixon's testimony
under the Dead Man's Rule. First of all, the Brothers objected to questioning of Marshall
Dixon concerning what decedent knew or intended or was aware of with regard to
transactions from the joint account. See Transcript at 86-87. Secondly, although Marshall
Dixon was called as a witness as of cross by the Brothers, his counsel objected to, and the
Auditor precluded, any testimony relating to the joint checking account checks. Counsel
for Marshall Dixon cannot have it both ways - he cannot be deemed to have become a
"competent" witness by being called as of cross and then preclude the Brothers from
eliciting any testimony about the checks.
19. The Brothers never had the opportunity as of cross to initiate testimony
from the challenged witness that was adverse to his interest. Therefore, the rationale for
the asserted exception to the dead man's statute does not apply and Marshall Dixon did not
become fully competent to testify as to matters that occurred before decedent's death. See
4468181
Hera v. McCormick, supra. See also, In re Estate of Hosfeld, 414 Pa. 602, 292 A.2d 69
(1964); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Szabo, 394 Pa. 272, 138 A.2d 85 (1957).
20. The Brothers did not and were not permitted to "examin[e] him as to
matters which occurred during the decedent's lifetime" such as might render Marshall
Dixon a competent witness as to such matters. Hosfeld, supra, 414 Pa. at 605, 202 A.2d
at 70; Szabo, supra.
21. Here, there was no testimony elicited by Brothers' counsel that would
render Marshall Dixon a witness competent to testify as to what decedent knew or intended
with regard to checks drawn or transfers made to or for the benefit of Marshall Dixon.
Szabo, supra.
22. Marshall Dixon did not "testify against his own interest" as a result of being
called as a witness by the Brothers and, therefore, did not "become a fully competent
witness" under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5932.
23. Marshall Dixon's self-serving and incredible testimony that each and every
payment or transfer made to him or for his benefit was intended as a gift to him by Mrs.
Dixon or a reimbursement to him should be stricken as incompetent and inadmissible
evidence.
24. Without such testimony, Marshall Dixon is completely unable to make out a
prima facie showing of valid inter vivos gifts. Even with this testimony, the clear and
convincing standard has not been met.
25. As explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Estate of Baker,
495 Pa. 522, 526-527, 434 A.2d 1213, 1215:
The difficulty here is the application of the Dead Man's Act where
there is an allegation of an inter vivos gift. Appellants argue that the
4468]81 9
evidence shows a gift by decedent to them thereby removing the adverse
interest of the decedent and making appellant competent to testify. We
have encountered this argument in the past and have fashioned the
following answer to it:
In such situations, both the alleged donee and the
estate have an interest in the property which may be
adverse to the interest of the decedent, depending on
whether the alleged transfer took place or not. We held [in
Ford Estate, 431 Pa. 185, 245 A.2d 443 (1968)] that if a
valid inter vivos transfer can be shown by independent
evidence before the admission of any testimony by the
alleged donee, the donee will be considered to represent the
interest of the decedent and will be permitted to testify.
Conversely, if the alleged donee fails to establish a prima
facie gift by independent testimony before he takes the
stand, he will not be competent to testify.
Friedeman v. Kronen, 452 Pa. 365, 368-69, 305 A.2d 3, 4 (1973) (emphasis in
original).
26. As in Baker, because Marshall Dixon failed to establish a prima facie gift
by independent testimony, his own testimony as to the alleged gifts was incompetent. The
existence of inter vivos gifts was not proven.
27. In In re Estate of Citrino, 2009 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 159, the executor
son sought an accounting and the return of funds to the estate from a brother who
redeemed U.S. savings bonds owned by the deceased mother with a value of $469,024.
The brother claimed that decedent had given the bonds to him as a gift prior to her death.
The testimony of the brother that decedent had told him "I want you to have the money"
was stricken on the basis of the Dead Man's Rule since the brother had not first established
a prima facie case of inter vivos gift by other means. The court quoted from Friedeman v.
Kronen and Hera v. McCormick regarding the need for independent testimony to establish
prima facie evidence of donative intent and delivery before the alleged donee is competent
to testify as to a donor's intent to gift. Without the stricken testimony, the court concluded
4468181 1
"there was no evidence -independent or otherwise -that established [decedent's] donative
intent to give [brother] her U.S. savings bonds as a valid gift." Slip op. at 21-22.
28. Assuming arguendo that Marshall Dixon's testimony was admissible, the
evidence was insufficient to prove donative intent for inter vivos gifts. The evidence here
is even less than that found to be insufficient in Hera v. McCormick, supra. It fails to
satisfy the "clear and convincing" standard as defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The facts are not "distinctly remembered" and the details "narrated exactly" to enable a
fact finder to come to a "clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue." In re Estate of Fickert, 461 Pa. 653, 658, 337 A.2d 592, 594 (1975); In re
Novosielski, supra.
29. Rather, Marshall Dixon made blanket statements that checks and transfers
were either gifts or reimbursements without specific recollection for each transaction.
30. In Hosfeld, supra, the testimony of a son, whose name was on a joint
savings account, that the decedent mother had made a gift to him of moneys in the account
was held to be insufficient to prove a gift inter vivos: "The evidence presented in the case
at bar in support of a gift by decedent of the moneys in this account to Hosfeld falls
woefully short of the standards required by our case law in proof of such a gift." 414 Pa. at
605, 202 A.2d at 71.
31. If not stricken, the Auditor should reject Marshall Dixon's uncorroborated
and self-serving testimony that all of the joint account checks and electronic transfers to
him or for his benefit were made at the request of or with the express approval of the
decedent. See Estate of Keiper, 308 Pa. Super. 82, 454 A.2d 31 (1982).
4468181 1 1
32. Where the relation of the parties to each other is a confidential relationship,
"the law compels the recipient of the bequest or gift to show that it was the free, voluntary
and intelligent act of the person giving it...where circumstances make it certain the parties
do not deal on equal terms but, on the one side there is an overmastering influence or, on
the other, weakness, dependence or trust...." Keiper, supra, 308 Pa. Super. at 87, 454
A.2d at 34. (citations omitted.)
33. "A `natural confidence' existed between decedent and [Marshall Dixon] ...,
and decedent could easily have assumed [her] affairs would be administered with [her] best
interest in mind." Kei er, supra, 308 Pa. Super. at 86, 454 A.2d at 33.
34. A confidential relationship clearly existed in this case: with Marshall
Dixon's signature power on the joint account, having been named as executor, having
spent a great deal of time with decedent and supervising her care -see Hera v. McCormick
- having administered most of decedent's personal and business affairs "during the waning
years of decedent's life" -decedent had reposed trust in Marshall Dixon and rightfully
assumed her affairs would be administered with her best interest in mind. Keiper, supra.
35. Thus, because a confidential relationship existed, the burden is on Marshall
Dixon to show that the alleged gifts were "fair and free from suspicion." In re Estate of
Petro, 694 A.2d 627, 634 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 719 (1997); Hera v.
McCormick, supra. He failed to satisfy this burden of proof.
36. Marshall Dixon's Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 11 is nonsense and
contrary to the well-established law of Pennsylvania -specifically, Section 6303 of the
Multiple Party Accounts Act, In re Novosielski and other cases cited by the Brothers. The
funds in the joint checking account belonged to Lottie Ivy Dixon during her lifetime. If
4468181 ] 2
Marshall Dixon "used assets in the joint checking account for his own benefit during the
last years of Mrs. Dixon's life" then those funds must be returned to the estate.
37. There was no competent proof, and certainly not clear, precise and
convincing evidence of Mrs. Dixon's donative intent for the countless alleged inter vivos
gifts to Marshall Dixon.
38. We have no idea, and there is no evidence to establish, what Mrs. Dixon
knew or did not know about the use of assets in the joint checking account and/or whether
she knew about, comprehended or objected to the extensive checks and transfers to or for
the benefit of Marshall Dixon.
39. With regard to Executor's footnote 2, the asserted factual distinctions of
Wilhelm, Lessner and Lannin are not relevant. Those cases are cited for their pertinent
statement of Pennsylvania law relating to joint accounts and inter vivos gifts -including
Section 6303 of the MPAA. During the lifetime of the parties, the joint account belonged
to Mrs. Dixon. Marshall Dixon's name was simply added on to her pre-existing checking
account.
40. The Brothers have consistently challenged the checks and transfers from the
checking account both before and after it became a joint account, including transactions
identified by Marshall himself as representing payments to him or for his benefit. See,
e.g., Exhibit B. The Brothers' position at the hearing was clear that under Pennsylvania
law Marshall Dixon had the burden to prove valid inter vivos gifts by clear and convincing
evidence. Eg., Tr. at 52-54.
41. In this case, the Court appointed the Auditor and he was charged with
resolving multiple objections by each of the parties in both matters.
aabsisi 1 3
42. As in In re Bennett's Estate, 30 D. & C. 148, 153-54 (Pa. Orph.
Northampton 1937), cited by Executor, the Brothers' objections here were not "frivolous."
Rather, each objection represented:
"...a contention started and conducted in good faith, as reasonably
calls for the opinion and judgment of a court, as where there is a mixed
question of law and fact, as where there are circumstances sufficient to
justify an investigation, or where the facts are peculiarly in the possession
of the other party."
43. Thus, the Auditor's fees and costs of the audit should be charged to the
estate and/or to Marshall Dixon in his individual capacity and in his capacity as Executor.
44. Marshall Dixon should be directed to reimburse the estate in an amount in
excess of $200,000.
Date: May 14, 2010
Respectfully submitted,
OBERMAYER REBMANN
MAXWELL & HIPPEL LLP
By:
Walter W. Cohen, Esq.
Attorney ID # 12097
Kevin J. Kehner, Esq.
Attorney ID # 33539
200 Locust Street, Suite 400
Harrisburg, PA 17101
717-234-9730
717-234-9734 (fax)
Paul C. Heintz, Esq.
Attorney ID #02906
Nina B. Stryker, Esq.
Attorney ID #36531
Erin E. McQuiggan, Esq.
Attorney ID #205673
One Penn Center, 19th Floor
1617 JFK Boulevard
4468181 1 4
Philadelphia, PA 19103
215-665-3212
215-665-3165 (fax)
Attorneys for George F. Dixon, III and
Richard E. Dixon
4468181 1 5
C
Check # DATE
3078 05/02/01
3092 05/12/01
3104 06/04/01
3100 08/04/01 3,754.00
3125 07/05/01
3137 07!18101 2,023.14
3140 07/26/01 1,000.00
3143 08/08/01
3155 08/14/01
3185 09/04/01 1,000.00
3158 09/04/01
3184 09/06/01
3175 09/08/01 4,418.51
3181 09/18/01
3189 10/03/01
32 32 10/03!01 1, 000.00
3235 10/12/01
3244 10/23/01 1,000.00
3257 11/07/01
3281 11 / 14/01 2, 000.00
3287 12!04/01 1,000.00
3269 12/07/01
3280 12/12/01 4,417.55
3293 12/,20/01
3295 01/02/02 1000.00
3307 01/07/02
3318 02/04/02 1,000.00
3319 02/05/02
3320 02/07/02
3341 02/21/02
3351 03/08/02
3382 03/11/02
3388 03/11/02 310.00
3384 03/11/02 140.00
3369 03/25/02 1,000.00
3371 03/29/02
3377 03/29/02 813.42
3378 04101/02
3381 04/04/02
3386 04/08/02
3399 05/03/02
3418 05/13/02 1,000.00
3417 05!13/02
3427 05/28/02 3,175.80
3432 08!07/02
3434 06/07/02 2,451.51
3458 07102/02 1,000.00
Lottie Ivy Dlxon Estate
Exhibit A
21,813.20 2001
DEPOSI110N
EXHIBR~'~ //
~L ~" ~~-~
3460 07!05102
3x81 081o3/oz
3483 08/03/02 930.91
3490 08/05/02 1500.00
3499 08/12/02
3505 08/26/02 739.44
3514 09/05/02
3534 09/19/02 693.66
3540 10/01 /02
3556 10/ 16102 1, 568.42
3571 11!03102
3570 11/03/02
3589 11127/02 1 408.56
3597 12/04/02
3599 12/08/02
3800 12/08/02
3610 12116!02 1000.00
3614 1 Z/20/02 1 110.17
3820 12/28/02 1 000.00
3619 12/26/02
3822 01/03/03
3635 01/17/03 1000.00
3642 01!23/03 4,200.72
3647 01/28/03 7000.00
3645 01/28/03
3650 02/03/03 1000.00
3663 02/20/03 950.17
3672 03/03/03 500.00
3873 03104!03
3688 03/14/03
3698 04/03/03
3712 04/04/03 3 260.15
3700 04!13/03 2159.41
3721 04/29103
3725 05/03/03
3741 05/19/03 3 857.39
3752 08/02/03
3780 07/03/03
3802 07/17/03
3813 08/04/03 2 000.00
3815 08!05/03
3807 08105103 203.95
3818 08112/03 3 000.00
3826 08/15103
3838 09!04/03
3843 09/07/03 365.77
3879 10107/03 2,000.00
3901 11/04/03 144.00
3919 1 T/23/03
3929 11130!03 2 910.36
3934 12/01/03 2 000.00
3955 12/04/03 148.00
Louie ivy Dixon Estate
Exhibit A
21,839.89 2002
e
--'.
Lottle Ivy Dixon Estate
Exhibit A
38,899.92 2003
25,838.58 2004
n
~.
e
4687 11 /01105
4893 11 / 14105 1,200.00
4341 11115/05 750.00
4342 11 /19/05 1,500.00
4371 12/30/05
4365 12/30/05 1,000.00
4389 12/30/05 200.00
4386 01/25/08 1,973.20
4715 03/04106 87.00
4719 03/14/06
4722 03/22/08 122.00
4734 04/08/08 2,000.00
4758 05/19108 1000.00
4760 05/19/06 271.00
07!07/06 2,000.00
07/27/06 500.00
08/08108 1,000.00
09/01106 1,000.00
4831 09/05/08
1o/1ao6 1,000.00
4872 12/06/08
4877 12/16/08
4878 12/16/06 300.00
01/16/07 3,801.84
02/14/07 617.75
02/14/07 98.00
03/02/07 1,000.00
4905 03/2x07 1,000.00
05/04/07 6,988.78
f OTALS 154, /43. /4
Marshall
Lottie Ivy Dixon Estate
Exhibit A
22,018.80 2005
11.253.20 2008
13,484.17 2007
Supplement to "Lottie Ivy Dixon Estate Exhibit A"
Check # Date Amount Pa ee
3093 OS/18/01 $3,849.11 Discover Card
3099 06/04/01 $1,425.77 Chase Bank
3139 07/16/01 $255.48 Chase
3236 10/12/01 $2,563.14 First USA Bank
3294 11/27/01 $3,248.26 First US Bank
2001 Total $11,341.76
3309 01/07/02 $1,902.60 Chase
3372 03/29/02 $1,867.13 Chase
2002 Total $3,769.73
3786 07/03/03 $3,165.19 US Bank
3793 07/15/03 $5,596.37 US Bank
3832 08/25/03 $3,227.43 US Bank
3887 10/22/03 $50.00 Bank of America
3890 10/22/03 $535.00 US Bank
3930 11/28/03 $268.13 Bank of America
3931 11/28/03 $3,000.00 US Bank
2003 Total $12,292.97
3977 O1/OS/04 $1,310.46 Bank of America
4020 02/12/04 $1,259.10 Bank of America
4027 02/24/04 $3,527.50 US Bank
4043 03/8/04 $1,338.04 Bank of America
4090 04/19/04 $2,588.69 Visa Platinum
4125 05/18/04 $2,062.83 US Bank
4161 06/12/04 $1,597.32 US Bank
2004 Total $13,683.94
4343 11/14/OS $2,000.00 US Bank
4363 12/30/05 $882.33 Bank of America
2005 Total $2,882.33
4387 01/25/06 $3,056.57 US Bank
4758 05/18/06 $558.10 Chase
4859 11/1/06 $39b.00 Bank of America
2006 Total $3,618.63
4920 01/12/07 $205.00 Bank of America
2007 Total $205.00
Total $47,591.41
4445723
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, KEVIN J. KEHNER, ESQUIRE, certify that on this date, I have served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Reply to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law of Marshall Dixon, Executor on behalf of George F. Dixon, III and Richard E. Dixon
upon the following, by first class mail, addressed as follows:
Daniel L. Sullivan, Esq.
Saidis Flower & Lindsay
2109 Market Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Elizabeth P. Mullaugh, Esq.
Kimberly M. Colonna, Esq.
McNees Wallace & Nurick
100 Pine Street, P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108
Mark D. Bradshaw, Esq.
Stevens & Lee
Harrisburg Market Square
17 North Second Street, 16th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Charlotte Dixon
323 Bayview Street
Camden, ME 04843
Date: May 14, 2010
Wayne F. Shade, Esq.
53 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Kevin J. Kehner, Esq.
4468181 1 6