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HomeMy WebLinkAbout10-3183 MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs vs. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Defendants IN THE COURT OF (:OMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COiJNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. / l/ - SI ~3 /°vr CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE FOR WRIT OF SUMMONS TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF SAID COURT: Please issue writ of summons in the above-captioned action. Writ of Summons shall be issued and forwarded to OAttorney James D. Flower, Jr. 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 171013 Saidis, Flower & Lindsay 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Date: May 12, 2010 Plaintiff Leslie D. Jacabsol~ Supreme Court I.D. No. 52673 -Chad J. Julius Supreme Court I.D. No.209496 8150 Derry Street, Ste. A Harrisburg, PA 17111 717.909.5858 FAX: 717.909.7788 Attorneys for Plaintiff p~~'~~~ ~~G ~~ 1~~~b~ ~~~ 9a ~y ~~,~ rya a~%G N O 1..+ O 'tl Pt'? C 3~ t'7l'~1 ~ ._ .~ t _ ° v' =~ - Vii. 3 . (x) Sher~rf cza ~~ : n. co Leslie D. Jacobson Supreme Court I.D. No. 52673 Chad J. Julius Supreme Court LD. No.209496 8150 Derry Street, Ste. A Harrisburg, PA 17111 717.909.5858 FAX: 717.909.7788 Attorneys for Plaintiff MAIN STREET ADOPTION IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and CUMBERLAND COUNTY, ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs vs. No. ~(~ - 3/ ~ ~~ ~l(1/ JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY CIVIL ACTION - LI?GAL PROFESSIONAL Defendants LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED WRIT OF SUMMONS TO: James D. Flower, Jr., and Saidis, Flower & Lindsay: You are hereby notified that Main Street Adoption Services, Nina Heller, and Robert McClenaghan have commenced an action against you. Date: ~~l~/~~~~, - / ~~ Prothonotary By Deputy MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN Plaintiffs v. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF CUMBERLAND COiJNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 10-3183 Civil CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION Defendants t? '~ 4 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED q ~i ?~ 3 ~~~ r;Y ~;- _.~ ` PRAECIPE FOR RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT ~' ° "` _ ~, , ry . TO THE PROTHONOTARY: - ~.. ~,~; ri Please enter a Rule against Main Street Adoption Services, Nina Heller,d R~ert r _~ N -< McClenaghan, Plaintiffs, to file a Complaint against James D. Flower, Jr. and Saidis, Flower & Lindsay, Defendants, within 20 days hereof or suffer Date: ~/~~/~~ udgment of Non Pros. Robert . Saidi , squire ~' Supr me Court ID # 21458 Saidis, Flowet• & Lindsay 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)243-6222 RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT SAIDIS, FIAWER ~ LINDSAY .~.>aW 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA AND NOW, this / day of May, 2010, a Rule is hereby granted upon, Main Street Adoption Services, Nina Heller, and Robert McClenaghan, Plaintiffs, to file a Complaint against James D. Flower, Jr., and Saidis, Flower & Lindsay, Defendants, within 20 days after service hereof or suffer the entry of a Judgment of Non Pros. Date: t7~~y /f, ~~/U Prothonotary/Clerk, Civil Division by CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On this ~ ~~ day of May, 2010, I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Praecipe for Rule to File Complaint and Rule to File Complaint upon the attorney of record for the Plaintiffs via United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Leslie D. Jacobson, Esquire 8150 Derry Street, Suite A Harrisburg, PA 17111 SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY By: ~~~ E. Kelso, Esquire SAIDIS, FLOWER ~ LINDSAY .vtomvExsxruw 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA MAIN STREET ADOPTION IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and CUMBERLAND COUNTY, ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs vs. No. 10-3183 JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL Defendants LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AS TO DEFENDANT JAMES D. FLOWER, JR., ESQUIRE I, Chad J. Julius, Esquire certify that an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by this defendant in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm. Respectfully submitted, BY: Jupreme court l.ll. No. 51,6/3 Chad J. Julius Supreme Court I.D. No.209496 8150 Derry Street, Ste. A Harrisburg, PA 17111 717.909.5858 FAX: 717.909.7788 b N ~.^ O !. ~ Q R ~~ ~ T ~...J, :.T~ _ __ / w"... r___. i~~ -E- +-r ` ~ -:~::_. _ ~ ; _ c-; ~~ - ~ -r -i __, .. ~ G. , } _~ ` _ ~ `-, ~rj ~ ~~ . C LAW OFFICES OF LESLIE DAVID JACOBSON MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs vs. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Defendants ,~ 201 Q ~~~ _ ,. Y ~ Pf1 1 ~ 1 ~ CUP,~i„~ IN THE COUR',~"~,~~ ~'~~, ~~~'~d PLEAS CUMBERLAND COtTN'f"~', PENNSYLVANIA No. 10-3183 CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE TO ADD CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AS TO DEFENDANT JAMES D. FLOWER, JR., ESQUIRE TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF SAID COURT: Please add the attached Certificate of Merit Certificate of Merit as to Defendant James D. Flower, Jr., Esquire to the above captioned case. Thank you. Dated: July 1, 2010 BY: LAW OFFICES OF LES~,IE D. JACOBSON Supreme CouI~,Y.D. No. 52673 Chad J. Julius Supreme Court LD. No.209496 8150 Derry Street, Ste. A Harrisburg, PA 17111 717.909.5858 FAX: 717.909.7788 MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs vs. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 10-3183 CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Elizabeth Rhoades, of the Law Offices of Leslie D. Jacobson, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Praecipe to Add Certificate of Merit as to Defendant James D. Flower, Jr., Esquire was this day served upon the following persons in the manner indicated below. CERTIFIED RETURN RECEIPT FIRST CLASS MAIL Mr. Robert C. Saidis Mr. Jason E. Kelso Saidis, Flower & Lindsay 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Dated: ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~~,~it,QG~ Eliz~ th Rhoades .~ MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs vs. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and 'fir l'ta~ ~ '~. ' ", ~ ',ARV 2010 JIiL -~ ~ i 2~ °~~ IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 10-3183 SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL Defendants LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE TO ADD CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AS TO DEFENDANT SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF SAID COURT: Please add the attached Certificate of Merit to the above captioned case. Thank you. Dated: July 1, 2010 BY: LAW OFFICES D. JACOBSON i.v~ ate. /,AVV Ll Supreme Court . No. 52673 Chad J. Julius Supreme Court LD. No.209496 8150 Derry Street, Ste. A Harrisburg, PA 17111 717.909.5858 FAX: 717.909.7788 . ~ MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs vs. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 10-3183 CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AS TO DEFENDANT SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY I, Chad J. Julius, Esquire certify that the claim that this defendant deviated from an acceptable professional standard is based solely on allegations that other licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible deviated from an acceptable professional standard and an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by the other licensed professionals in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm. Respectfully submitted, BY: Supreme Catrrt I.D. No. 52673 Chad J. Julius Supreme Court LD. No.209496 8150 Derry Street, Ste. A Harrisburg, PA 17111 717.909.5858 FAX: 717.909.7788 LAW OFFICES OF LESLIE DAVID JACOBSON MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs vs. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 10-3183 CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Elizabeth Rhoades, of the Law Offices of Leslie D. Jacobson, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Praecipe to Add Certificate of Merit as to Defendant Saidis, Flower & Lindsay was this day served upon the following persons in the manner indicated below. CERTIFIED RETURN RECEIPT FIRST CLASS MAIL Mr. Robert C. Saidis Mr. Jason E. Kelso Saidis, Flower & Lindsay 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Dated: ~/~ ~ ~~ ~,~ r.C~ 1~ Eli a eth Rhoades .~ MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. No. 10-3183 JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL Defendants LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE TO ADD CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AS TO DEFENDANT SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF SAID COURT: Please add the attached Certificate of Merit to the above captioned case. Thank you. Dated: July 1, 2010 BY: D. JACOBSON L~l~ 'D. Jac s n Supreme Court . No. 52673 Chad J. Julius Supreme Court LD. No.209496 8154 Derry Street, Ste. A Harrisburg, PA 17111 717.909.5858 FAX: 717.909.7788 LAW OFFICES O n c- ~ ~ . .. -~ , \ r• T i T.~U~ . ~.s =~1` ,=. • F f ~ ,:'~: r:--, ,~-f `r> {.r~ -~ ., MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs vs. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 10-3183 CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AS TO DEFENDANT SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY I, Chad J. Julius, Esquire certify that the claim that this defendant deviated from an acceptable professional standard is based solely on allegations that other licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible deviated from an acceptable professional standard and an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by the other licensed professionals in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm. Respectfully submitted, BY: Supreme ~ I.D. No. 52673 Chad J. Julius Supreme Court LD. No.209496 8150 Derry Street, Ste. A Harrisburg, PA 17111 717.909.5858 FAX: 717.909.7788 LAW OFFICES OF LESLIE DAVID JACOBSON ,'• MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER, and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs vs. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR and SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA No. 10-3183 CIVIL ACTION -LEGAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CERTIFICATE 4F SERVICE I, Elizabeth Rhoades, of the Law Offices of Leslie D. Jacobson, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Praecipe to Add Certificate of Merit as to Defendant Saidis, Flower & Lindsay was this day served upon the following persons in the manner indicated below. CERTIFIED RETURN RECEIPT FIRST CLASS MAIL Mr. Robert C. Saidis Mr. Jason E. Kelso Saidis, Flower & Lindsay 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Dated: ~/~ ~ ~~ Eliza eth Rhoades ~'" ~ M MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, NINA HEELER and ROBERT McCLENAGHAN, Plaintiffs IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA DOCKET NO. ,x-83 v. CIVIL ACTION -LAW JAMES D. FLOWER, JR., and SAIDIS FLOWER & LINDSAY, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendants. NOTICE TO PLEAD TO: Main Street Adoption Services Nina Heller & Robert McClenaghan c/o Leslie D. Jacobson 8150 Dairy Street, Suite A Harrisburg, PA 17111 ~~-3l P3 n R) Lt) r _ _~_ t"1 ~, : .,r, _, ~ _ ~ rv _ _. -c _, . ., ,., . -. w You are hereby notified to file a written response to the enclosed New Matter pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1030 within 20 days from service hereof. DEFENDANTS JAMES D. FLOWER, JR., AND SAIDIS FLOWER & LINDSAY'S ANSWER AND NEW MATTER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AND NOW come the Defendants, James D. Flower, Jr., and Saidis, Flower & Lindsay, (herein referred to collectively as "Defendants" unless otherwise indicated by syntax) by and through their counsel, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, and in particular the undersigned, who respectively provide the foregoing Answer and New Matter to Plaintiffs' Complaint in the above-captioned action and as such states the following: 1. Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. i• ~ ~ 2. Defendants aze without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Pazagraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 3. Defendants aze without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Pazagraph 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 4. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant James D. Flower, Jr., is an attorney licensed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The remaining averments set forth in Pazagraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint aze specifically denied. By way of further response, the current business address for Defendant James D. Flower, Jr., is 10 West High Street, Carlisle, PA 17013. 5. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that Defendant Saidis, Flower & Lindsay is a Pennsylvania corporation authorized to conduct business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and maintained a business address of 26 West High Street, Cazlisle, Pennsylvania. By way of further response, as of July 1, 2010, Saidis, Flower & Lindsay ceased operation and is in the process of winding down its corporate affairs. 6. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that on or about Mazch 28, 2002, Plaintiffs hired Defendants to represent them as legal counsel pertaining to a dispute arising out of a contract for an adoption. It is specifically denied that Plaintiffs hired Defendants to represent them in "all matters" and strict proof thereof is demand at the time trial. 7. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that pursuant to the contract between the Plaintiffs and their clients, Scott and Tracy Mullins, the issue was subject to azbitration pursuant to the American Arbitration Association and Commercial Rules of •~ Arbitration and was docketed to Number 14 170E 001221 08. It is denied that there were multiple "cases" as inferred by the last sentence of Pazagraph 7. 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted. 10. Admitted. 11. Admitted. 12. Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. Byway of further response, it is believed and therefore averred that Plaintiffs received "Mullins proposed stipulations of fact" prior to May 12, 2008. 13. It is admitted that Plaintiffs met with Defendant Flower to discuss the facts for the stipulation that was prepazed for plaintiffs. After reasonable investigation, Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to confirm that the meeting took place on May 13, 2008. 14. Denied as stated. On or about May 14, 2008, Defendant Flower had, after several drafts, completed his proposed stipulation, and directed his secretary to forward the revised proposed stipulation to Mullins' counsel. Instead of forwazding the revised proposed stipulation, she inadvertently forwazded Mullins' counsel back his original proposed stipulation. 15. The averments contained in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint aze specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, a detailed proposed stipulation had been prepared which removed the false facts that had been placed in the proposed stipulation by Mullins' counsel. 16. Admitted. 17. Denied as stated. References were made to the stipulation in the azbitration, and it eventually became obvious that the stipulation that had been forwazded to the azbitrator was not the one prepared by Defendant Flower, but was the original proposed stipulation prepazed by Mullins' counsel. Defendant Flower explained to the arbitrator that this was a clerical error, and that the azbitrator should not rely on the accuracy of the document, as it was not a true stipulation. Further discussion along these lines was had by both counsel and the arbitrator at a recess from the formal azbitration proceeding. The azbitrator did not make any specific ruling at that time on Defendant Flower's azgument. 18. Denied as stated. References were made to the stipulation in the azbitration, and it eventually became obvious that the stipulation that had been forwarded to the azbitrator was not the one prepazed by Defendant Flower, but was the original proposed stipulation prepared by Mullins' counsel. Defendant Flower explained to the arbitrator that this was a clerical error, and that the arbitrator should not rely on the accuracy of the document, as it was not a true stipulation. Further discussion along these lines was had by both counsel and the arbitrator at a recess from the formal azbitration proceeding. The azbitrator did not make any specific ruling at that time on Defendant Flower's azgument. 19. Admitted. 20. Admitted. By way of further response, the stipulation that had been forwazded to the arbitrator was not the one prepared by Defendant Flower, but was the original proposed stipulation prepared by Mullins' counsel. Defendant Flower explained to the azbitrator that this was a clerical error, and that the arbitrator should not rely on the accuracy of the document, as it was not a true stipulation. Further discussion along these lines was had by both counsel and the arbitrator at a recess from the formal azbitration proceeding. 21. Admitted. 22. The averments contained in Paragraph 22 are admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that ultimately an arbitration awazd was issued in favor of the Mullins and against the Plaintiffs. The remaining averments, and all inferences to be garnered therefrom, as set forth in Pazagraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Complaint aze specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 23. The averments contained Pazagraph 23 of Plaintiffs' Complaint aze specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, this issue was identified and corrected at the arbitration. It was discussed thoroughly at side bar with both counsel and the arbitrator during the arbitration. The azbitrator was fully aware of the facts concerning the erroneous stipulation during the azbitration. 24. Admitted. 25. Admitted. 26. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that Defendants paid the award. The remaining averments, and all inferences to be garnered therefrom, as set forth in Paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs' Complaint aze specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 27. Defendants aze without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Pazagraph 27 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 28. Defendants aze without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Pazagraph 28 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 29. Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 30. Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Pazagraph 30 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. COUNTI NEGLIGENCE/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFF v. JAMES D. FLOWER, JR.1 31. Paragraphs 1 through 30 aze incorporated herein by reference as if more fully set forth at length. 32. Admitted. 33. The averments contained in Paragraph 33 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Paragraph 33 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 34. (a-i) The averments contained in Pazagraph 34 (a-i) inclusive, represent conclusions of law to which no response is herein provided. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 34 (a-i) inclusive, aze specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 35. (a-c) The averments contained in Pazagraph 35 (a-c) inclusive, represent conclusions of law to which no response is herein provided. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 35 (a-c) inclusive, aze specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court enter judgment in their favor and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice and further grant Defendants all such further relief as is proper and just. COUNT II NEGLIGENCE/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFFS v. SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY 36. Pazagraphs 1 through 35 aze incorporated herein by reference as if more fully set forth at length. 37. The averments contained in Paragraph 37 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 37 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 38. Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the averments contained in Pazagraph 38 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and as such strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 39. The averments contained in Pazagraph 39 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 39 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 40. The averments contained in Pazagraph 40 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 40 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 41. The averments contained in Pazagraph 41 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Paragraph 41 are denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 42. (a-i) The averments contained in Paragraph 42 (a-i) inclusive, represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 42 (a-i) inclusive, aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 43. The averments contained in Pazagraph 43 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 43 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court enter judgment in their favor and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice and further grant Defendants all such further relief as is proper and just. COUNT III BREACH OF CONTRACT (PLAINTIFF v. JAMES D. FLOWER. JR., and SAIDIS FLOWER & LINDSAY 44. Pazagraphs 1 through 43 aze incorporated herein by reference as if more fully set forth at length. 45. The averments contained in Pazagraph 45 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 45 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 46. The averments contained in Paragraph 46 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Paragraph 46 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial 47. The averments contained in Pazagraph 47 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 47 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 48. The averments contained in Pazagraph 48 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 48 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 49. The averments contained in Pazagraph 49 represent conclusions of law to which no response is required. If it is later judicially determined that a response is so required, the averments contained in Pazagraph 49 aze denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court enter judgment in their favor and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice and further grant Defendants all such further relief as is proper and just. NEW MATTER 50. Defendants respectfully incorporate the responses set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 49, inclusive, hereinabove as if more fully set forth herein at length. 51. Any and all claims asserted by the Plaintiffs against Defendants in this matter aze barred by the statute of limitations to the extent that facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 52. Plaintiffs' alleged damages, if any, were not proximately caused by the actions or inactions of Defendants, to the extent facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 53. The negligent acts and/or omissions of other individuals or entities constitutes an intervening and/or superseding cause of the damages alleged, if any, to have been sustained by the Plaintiffs in this matter to the extent facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 54. Plaintiffs' alleged damages, if any, were caused by the acts and/or omissions of a person or persons other than Defendants to the extent that facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 55. Plaintiffs' alleged damages, if any, were caused by acts, omissions or factors beyond Defendants control or legal right to control to the extent that facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 56. Plaintiffs may have already entered into a release and/or voluntary dischazge with other individuals, entities or judicial bodies which may have the effect of discharging any liability of Defendants to the extent that facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 57. Plaintiffs' claims aze barred and/or limited under the doctrine of consent to the extent that facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 58. Plaintiffs' claims aze barred and/or limited under the doctrine of estoppel to the extent that facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 59. Plaintiffs' claims are barred and/or limited under the doctrine of waiver to the extent that facts as developed in future discovery may implicate. 60. Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to set forth any claim for which relief maybe granted. 61. Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to allege cognizable damages. 62. Plaintiffs have not sustained any damage. 63. Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are not ripe for judicial determination 64. Inasmuch as the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 1032, provides that a party waives all defenses not presented by way of answer, Defendants, upon advise of counsel, hereby asserts all affirmative defenses as set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1030 those defenses to include in addition to the defenses already enumerated above, assumption of the risk, consent, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel, failure of consideration, illegality, immunity from suit, impossibility of performance, justification, latches, license, payment, privilege, release, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, truth and waiver, with these said affirmative defenses being subject to demonstration during the discovery process and proof, as relevant, at the time of trial. Respectfully submitted, MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN Date: ~2a ~ o By: EDWIN A.D. SCHWAR SQUIRE Attorney ID 75902 LAUREN M. BURNETTE, ESQUIRE Attorney ID 92412 4200 Crums Mill Road, Suite B Harrisburg, PA 17112 (717) 651-3700 easchwartz@mdwcg. com VERIFICATION The undersigned hereby verifies that the statements in the foregoing Answer and New Matter to Plaintiffs' Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. The undersigned also understands that the statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. DATE: ~~ j g- j ~' J ES D. FLOWER, JR. VERIFICATION The undersigned hereby verifies that the statements in the foregoing Answers and New Matter to Plaintiffs' Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. The undersigned also understands that the statements therein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: By: OBERT .~AII7IS' L or the firm of SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I am this day serving a copy of the foregoing document upon the person(s) and in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, by depositing a copy of same in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Leslie D. Jacobson, Esquire 8150 Dairy Street, Suite A Harrisburg, PA 17111 MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN Date: ~,~~a/moo By: EDWIN A.D. SCHWARTZ, DIRE Attorney ID 75902 4200 Crums Mill Road, Suite B Harrisburg, PA 17112 (717) 651-3700 easchwartz@mdwcg. com • OF THE PROTi►C OO' TA Main Street Adoption Services,et al.,Plaintiffs 20 13 OCT 25 PM 1: Li 2 CUMBERLAND cw 2010-3183 vs PENNSYLVANIA- James D.Flower,Jr.&Sadis,Flower,Lindsay,Defendants Statement of Intention to Proceed To the Court: Mainstreet Adoption Services, et al., Planitiffs intends to proceed with the ..ove captioned matter. Chad J.Julius, Esq // Print Name Sign Name j� Main Street Aoption Services,et.al.,Plaintiffs Date: pi90//a96 3 Attorney for Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment. I.Rule of civil Procedure New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The termination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform statewide practice, preempting local rules. This rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v.Eagle,551 Pa.360,710 A.2d 1104 (1998) in which the court held that"prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case may be dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901." Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b)has been amended to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of matters set forth in subdivision(a)of that rule continues to be applicable. II Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity,the course of the procedure is with the parties. If the parties do not wish to pursue the case,they will take no action and"the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of course terminating the matter with prejudice for failure to prosecute." If a party wishes to pursue the matter,he or she will file a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action has been terminated If the action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been terminated, that party may proceed under Rule230(d)for relief from the order of termination. An example of such an occurrence might be the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the filing of the petition to reinstate the action is important. If the petition is filed within thirty days of the entry of the order of termination on the docket,subdivision(d)(2)provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period,subdivision(d)(3)requires that the plaintiff must make a showing to the court that the petition was promptly filed and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty-day period under subdivision(d)(2). B. Where the action has not been terminated An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the filing of a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggrieved party may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2. t_f�reJ"Lk'aaUr°�'{ Y t MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN By: Edwin A.D. Schwartz, Esquire PA Attorney ID# 75902 100 Corporate Center Drive, Suite 201 Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-651-3700 Email: easchwartz(a�mdwcg.com Attorney for Defendant MAIN STREET ADOPTION SERVICES, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NINA HELLER and ROBERT : CUMBERLAND COUNTY McCLENAGHAN, : PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs : DOCKET NO. 10-31+83 v. : CIVIL ACTION—LAW JAMES D. FLOWER, JR., and SAIDIS FLOWER& LINDSAY, : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendants. PRAECIPE FOR CHANGE OF ADDRESS TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Please be advised that the new address for the undersigned counsel is as follows: Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin Suite 201 100 Corporate Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17001. [THE REMAINDER OF THIS SECTION IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] All notices and orders should be served on the undersigned counsel for the Defendants at this address as of October 28, 2013. Respectfully submitted, MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN Date: /z, h /.T By: 4001,..r�. _ a EDWIN A.D. SCHWART -■∎UIRE Attorney ID 75902 NICOLE M. EHRHART, ESQUIRE Attorney ID 200538 Suite 201 100 Corporate Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 651-3700 easchwartz @mdwcg.corn (Counsel for Defendants) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I am this day serving a copy of the foregoing document upon the person(s) and in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, by depositing a copy of same in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Leslie D. Jacobson, Esquire Chad Julius, Esquire Jacobson, Julius & McPartland, Law Offices 8150 Dairy Street, Suite A Harrisburg, PA 17111 MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN Date: .."2A!/3 By: EDWIN A.D. SCHW -4k , ESQUIRE Attorney ID 75902 NICOLE M. EHRHART, ESQUIRE Attorney ID 200538 Suite 201 100 Corporate Center Drive Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717) 651-3700 easchwartz a mdwcg.corn (Counsel for Defendants)