HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-1286PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT
(Must be typewritten and submitted in duplicate)
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY:
Please list the within matter for the next Argument Court.
CAPTION OF CASE:
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
SHAFFER TRUCKING, iNC.
and CHARLES TRIMMER and
DON MOTTERN, Defendants
No. 01-1286 Civil
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
1. State matter to be argued:
Preliminary Objections of Defendants to Counts IV through VI of
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
2. Identify counsel who will argue case:
(a)
for plaintiff: Scott M. Pollins, Esq.
Address: 1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
(b)
for defendant: Todd B. Narvol, Esq.
Address: 305 N. Front Street, P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0999
3, I will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has been listed
for argument.
Dated:
Argument Court Date: July 25, 2001
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on this day I served a tree and correct copy of the foregoing by
first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP
by
305 N. From Street
POB 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0999
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
Pa. Identification No. 76334
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
(215) 699-5388
Attorney for Plaintiff
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and
CHARLES TRIMMER
and
DON MOTTERN
Defendants
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 01-1286
CERTIFICATE PREREQUISITE TO SERVICE OF A SUBPOENA
PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
As a prerequisite to service of a subpoena for documents and things pursuant to
Rule 4009.22, Scott M. Pollins, Esquire, attorney for Plaintiff, John Doe, certifies that:
1. I spoke with Todd B. Narvol, Esquire, attorney for Defendants on June 25,
2001 and he agreed to waive the twenty (20) day notice requirement of Rule 4009.22
regarding service of a subpoena on the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
("PHRC").
2. Mr. Narvol further stated he had no objection to the subpoena so long as he
received a copy of the subpoena, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A".
3. On June 25, 2001, I sent Mr. Narvol a copy of the subpoena. A copy of my
June 25,2001 letter to Mr. Narvol confirming the above and enclosing the subpoena is
attached as Exhibit "B'.
4. The subpoena which will be served is identical to the subpoena attached to this
certificate and sent to Mr. Narvol.
Attorney for Plaintiff, John Doe
EXHIBIT "A"
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
SUBPOENA TO PRODUCE DOGU~ENYS O~TH[NGS
FOil D[SGOVE~Y PU~O~NYTO ~U~E 400~.2~
~Vdhin twenty (20) days after service of [h~s subpoena, you are ordered by the court to produce the following
~ocuments or things:
(Address)
~bu may deliver or mail legible copies of the documents or produce things requested by this subpoena, together
with the certificate of compliance, to the party making this request at the address listed above. You have the right
t,) seek in advance the reasonable cost of preparing the copies or producing the things sought.
Il you fail to produce the documents or things required by this subpoena within twenty (20) days after its service,
the party serving this subpoena may seek a court order compelling you to comply with it,
'fills SUBP..O, ENA WAS ISSUED ATTHE REQUEST OF THE FOLLOWING PERSON:
Name ~'~
Supreme Court ID
Prothonotary/Clerk,~ivision
Seal of the Court ~ Deputy
(Elf. 7/97)
EXHIBIT "B"
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
Pa. Identification No. 76334
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
(215) 699-5388
Attorney for Plaintiff
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and
CHARLES TRIMMER
and
DON MOTTERN
Defendants
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 01-1286
CERTIFICATE PREREQUISITE TO SERVICE OF A SUBPOENA
PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
As a prerequisite to service of a subpoena for documents and things pursuant to
Rule 4009.22, Scott M. Pollins, Esquire, attorney for Plaintiff, John Doe, certifies that:
1. I spoke with Todd B. Narvol, Esquire, attorney for Defendants on June 25,
2001 and he agreed to waive the twenty (20) day notice requirement of Rule 4009.22
regarding service of a subpoena on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania - Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review.
2. Mr. Narvol further stated he had no objection to the subpoena so long as he
received a copy of the subpoena, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A".
3. On June 25, 2001, I sent Mr. Narvol a copy of the subpoena. A copy of my
Jtme 25, 2001 letter to Mr. Narvol confirming the above and enclosing the subpoena is
attached as Exhibit "B".
4. The subpoena which will be served is identical to the subpoena attached to this
certificate and sent to Mr. Narvol.
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
Date:
Attorney for Plaintiff, John Doe
EXHIBIT "A"
COMMONWEAL'I'H OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
SUBPOENATO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS ORTHINGS
FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANTTO RULE 4009.22
VVidU,t [weniy (20) days afie~ servic~ of rids subpoena, yuu are ordered by the cou~l [o p~oduce the following
(Address)
1', ,ti may delive~ ur mail legible copies of the docurrlcrlts or produce tl'fings requested by this subpoena, together
,,~ th tiff:; certilicale of cornpliauce, to the parly making this request at the address listed above. You have the right
k) {;e~;k in ~ldv~.lflct;~ ti'K-; reasonable cost of preparing the copies or producing the things sought.
fail to produce the documents or things required by this subpoena within twenty (20) clays after its service,
pmly selvllLq Ibis s?bpoena may seek a court order compelling you te comply with it,
ii I1!:; ,':;UBPO[ NA WASISSt)ED AT THE REQUESf' OF THE FO. LOWING PERSON;
(Eft. '7/97)
EXHIBIT "B"
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
Pa. Identification No. 76334
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
(215) 699-5388
Attorney for Plaintiff
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKiNG, iNC.
and
CHARLES TRIMMER
and
DON MOTTERN
Defendants
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 01-1286
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
TO COUNTS IV THROUGH VI OF
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, John Doe, by his attorney, Scott M. Pollins, Esquire, responds to
Defendants' Preliminary Objections to Counts IV through V1 of Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint in accordance with the numbering thereof and states as follows:
1. Admitted.
2. Admitted.
3. Admitted.
4. Admitted.
5. Admitted.
6. Admitted. By way of further response, the results of Plaintiff's
unemployment compensation proceeding are irrelevant to the Court's consideration of
Defendants' Preliminary Objections.
7. Admitted. By way of further response, the results of Plaintiff's
unemployment compensation proceeding are irrelevant to the Court's consideration of
Defendants' Preliminary Objections.
8. Admitted.
9. Denied. Neither the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) nor
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) "dismissed" Plaintiff's
complaints. By way of further response, any actions taken by the EEOC or the PHRC
regarding Plainti~ s complaints are irrelevant to the Court's consideration of Defendants'
Preliminary Objections.
10. Admitted.
11. Denied as stated. Counts IV-VI of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
constitute a writing and speak for themselves. Defendants' characterization thereof is
denied.
12. Admitted.
13. Denied as conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pa.R,Civ. P.
14. Denied as conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pa.R.Civ. P. By way of further response, Plaintiff`s Second Amended Complaint pleads
acts of discrimination that are unrelated to Plaintiff's employment at Shaffer Trucking,
Inc., and which, making favorable inferences, could be regarded as outrageous.
Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should not be dismissed
because it is either unrelated to Plaintiff's claims for employment discrimination or is a
function of the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination was
accomplished. Jackson v. Local Union 542, International Union-Operating Eneineers,
2000 Westlaw 1048459 (E.D.Pa. 2000).
15. Denied as conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pa.R.Civ. P. By of further response, see Paragraph 14 of PlaintifFs Response to
Defendants' Preliminary Objections.
16. Denied as conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pa.R.Civ. P.
17. Denied as conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pa.R.Civ. P. By of further response, when considered in the light most favorable to him,
PlaintifFs claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress should not be dismissed.
Preliminary objections should be sustained only in cases that are clear and from doubt.
Harfisbur~ School District v. Hickok, 762 A.2d 398 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Defendants
intentionally avoided having any physical contact with Plaintiff; purposely and repeatedly
sent him on truck delivery runs that prevented him from going to doctor's appointments
despite Defendants previously knowing Plaintiff had those doctor's appointments and
improperly sabotaged his ability to secure new employment by intentionally
misrepresenting his driving history and requesting all potential employers to contact
Shaffer Trucking, Inc. about Plaintiff:
18. Denied. Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
should not be dismissed because when considered in the light most favorable to him, the
facts alleged in support of that claim are sufficiently extreme and outrageous, unrelated to
Plaintiff's employment discrimination claim or a function of the particularly abusive
manner in which Plaintiff was terminated.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffrespectfully requests that this Honorable Court overrule
Defendants Preliminary Objections to Counts IV - VI of Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint and Order Defendants to Answer Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
within twenty (20) days of notice of the Court's Order.
Scott M. Pollil~,~'ffL~'~fi'i~
Pa, Id. No. 76334
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
(215) 699-5388
Attorney for Plaintiff; John Doe
Date:
4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Scott M. Pollins, Esquire, attorney for John Doe, served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Preliminary Objections to Counts IV
- V1 of PlaintifFs Second Amended Complaint by first class mail postage prepaid upon
counsel for defendants at:
Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP
305 N. Front Street
P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0999
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
Pa. Identification No. 76334
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
(215) 699-5388
Attorney for Plaintiff
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, 1NC.
and
CHARLES TRIMMER
and
DON MOTTERN
Defendants
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 01-1286
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
I, Scott M. Pollins, Esquire, duly depose and state:
1. I represent Plaintiff, John Doe, in this action.
2. On May 26, 2001, I mailed by first class U.S. mail postage prepaid a copy of
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint to counsel for Defendants at Todd B. Narvol,
Esquire, Thomas, Thomas & Haler, 305 N. Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17108.
3. A true and correct copy of the May 26, 200l cover letter is attached as Exhibit
By:
Respectfully submitted,r,~--- ~
Scott M. PolYm§, Esquire[
Attorney for Plaintiff, John Doe
Date:
EXHIBIT "A"
SCOI'T M.
Altorney at l,aw
Member PA, NJ and MD f:lar
620 ,hchoolhouse I,ane
I ~w,,:r (~w~u,,zdd,, PA 19002
Phone: (215) 699.5388
I;ax: (?15 ) 69g. 2337
May 26, 2001
I'(Md Il. Nm'vol. t!squirc
'l'lmmas, Thomas & Ilat'er, I.,I,1'
~orlh I,'r(ml Strcel
Box gg9
hu'risbttrg~ PA I ? 1 (t8
RI';: John Doc v. Shllfl'er 'iYncking, Charles Trimmer and Ilion Moltt'rn
Cmnberland Cou~ty Court of Common Pleas - Civil Action No, it1~1286
I)ca~ I'odd:
Enclosed pNasc find a Second Amended Colnplai~l! Ibr thc above-capfiolicd
I tie o~'igina{ was sent to thc Courl today, lhal~k y~m.
Sincerely yom's,
SMl"Idim
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff
VS.
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and CHARLES TRIMMER and
DON MATTERN,
Defendants
1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
01-1286 CRIMINAL
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, J.J.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ~. '~ ' day of August, 2001, the preliminary objection of the
defendants to the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
OVERRULED.
BY THECOURT,
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
For the Defendants
Hess, J.
:rlm
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff
VS.
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and CHARLES TRIMMER and
DON MATTERN,
Defendants
1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
01-1286 CRIMINAL
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, J.J.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are defendants' preliminary objections to plaintiff's claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant, Shaffer Trucking, Inc (Shaffer), is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and is
in the business of commercial trucking.
According to the second amended complaint, Shaffer employed the plaintiff, John Doe,~
in the capacity of truck driver from June 8, 1998 through March 9, 1999. Doe claims that,
although he was a good and loyal worker, he was terminated on March 9, 1999, because he is
HIV positive. Doe has filed suit against Shaffer and two supervisory employees (Trimmer and
Mottern) for employment discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S.
Section 951 et seq. and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It is with respect to this
latter cotmt that the defendants have filed preliminary objections.
Doe's complaint, as amended, alleges that the defendants directed extreme and
outrageous conduct towards him including: (a) treating Doe in a repugnant, offensive and
While not his real name, the plaintiffreceives this appellation in order to protect his privacy.
01-1286 CIVIL
abusive manner; (b) intentionally avoiding any physical contact with Doe; (c) intentionally and
repeatedly sending Doe on jobs that prevented him from attending numerous doctor's
appointments despite Doe providing prior notice of those doctor's appointments; and (d)
intentionally misrepresenting Doe's driving history and thereby intentionally harming his ability
to secure new employment. It is further asserted that these actions were intended to cause and
did, in fact, cause Doe extreme emotional distress with physical effects.
Preliminary objections resulting in the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained
only in cases that are clear and free from doubt. Bower v. Bower, 531 Pa. 54, 57, 611 A.2d 181,
182 (1992). "To sustain preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, it must appear with
certainty that, upon the facts averred, the law will not permit recovery by the plaintiff." Schott v.
Westinghouse Elec. Com., 436 Pa. 279, 291,259 A.2d 443,449 (1969).
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is outrageous conduct causing severe
emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). "One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965). "It is the conduct that must be
outrageous, not the reaction to that conduct, to support an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress." 19 Smnm. Pa. Jur. 2d Employment and Labor Relations § 1:134 (1994). It
is also said that conduct surrounding employment termination generally does not reach the level
of outrageousness needed to satisfy a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
As a preliminary matter, it is for the court to decide if the defendant's conduct is so
outrageous as to permit recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cox v. Keystone
01-1286 CIVIL
Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3ra Cir. 1988). Pennsylvania courts have been cautious to allow
recovery for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and only if the conduct is
extreme and clearly outrageous will a claim be allowed. Hovv. Aneelone, 554 Pa. 134, 151,720
A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 1998).
In Hovv. Aneelone the court held that certain acts of sexual harassment, including sexual
propositioning and the telling of off-color jokes, while offensive and unacceptable, was not such
extremely outrageous conduct as would permit a claim for the intention infliction of emotion
distress. Id_~. at 153,720 A.2d at 755. The cot~ said that, in order to support such a claim, "the
conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
society." Id. at 151,720 A.2d at 754 (quoting Buczek v. First National Bank of Mifflintown, 366
Pa. Super. 551,558, 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1987)). The court went on to conclude, among other
things, that sexual harassment alone does not normally arise to the level of outrageousness to
make out a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress absent some sort of
retaliatory behavior against the employee. Id_.~. at 153,720 A.2d 755 citing Bowersox v. P.H.
Gladfelter Co. 677 F.Supp. 307, 312 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
In Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 396 (3ra Cir. 1988) the plaintiff had filed a
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress against his employer who fired him when
he returned to work after undergoing heart surgery. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
maliciously fired him so that he could not obtain employee benefits. The court opined,
examining the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, that the conduct was not so
outrageous as to satisfy the emotional distress claim. Id~. at 396. The court stated that: "While
01-1286 CIVIL
loss of employment is unfortunate and unquestionably causes hardship, often severe, it is a
common event" and cannot provide a basis for recovery for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 395 (quoting Brieck v. Harbison-Walker Refractories, 624 F.Supp. 363,367
(W.D.Pa. 1985), rev 'd on other grounds, 822 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Likewise, the court in Doe v. Kohn Nast and Graf~ P.C. held that there was no basis for
an emotional distress claim even though an employer discharges an employee for an improper
reason. Doe v. Kohn Nast and Graf, P.C., 862 F.Supp. 1310, 1329 (E.D.Pa. 1994). In Doe v.
Kohn the defendant stopped speaking to and avoided physical contact with the plaintiff after
discovering that the plaintiff had HIV. The defendant did not renew the plaintiff's contract of
employment, disseminated false and defamatory information to conceal his discriminatory
purpose, took steps to force the plaintiff to voluntarily leave the firm, and then abruptly
terminated him and threatened to physically remove him from the premises of the firm. I_4d. at
1329. The court reasoned that these actions, while perhaps proving an improper discharge, did
not amount to the outrageous conduct needed for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id.
In Banvas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 238 Pa. Super. 122, 437 A.2d 1236 (1981), however,
a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was allowed. In that case, one Thomas
Lavin was admitted to the emergency room of the Lower Bucks Hospital complaining of injuries
which resulted from an altercation with the plaintiff, Joseph A. Banyas, III. According to the
complaint, Mr. Lavin died during surgery as a result of the negligence of hospital personnel.
Again, according to the complaint, the defendant hospital perso~mel knowingly prepared records
indicating that Mr. Lavin's death was due solely to the injuries inflicted upon him by Mr.
4
01-1286 CIVIL
Banyas. As a result of the wrongful preparation of records, Banyas was charged with crimes
including third degree murder. The Superior Court held that the intentional misstatements in the
medical records supported a mental distress claim.
In Bartanus v. Lis, 332 Pa. Super. 48, 480 A.2d 1178 (1984) the Superior Court found that
the trial court had erred in dismissing a count of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
lower court had sustained a demurrer in a case in which the defendants, consisting of the
plaintiff's sister and brother-in-law and their daughter, enticed and persuaded the plaintiff's son
to stay away from his father, the plaintiff. The Superior Court said:
As recognized by our Supreme Court in Papieves
v. Lawrence, supra, the intentional infliction of
emotional distress is an evolving tort and its
scope has not yet been clearly defined. 437 Pa.
at 378, 263 A.2d at 121. However, under the
principles set forth in those authorities upholding
it, we believe that if appellees did engage in the
conduct described in the complaint in this case,
they could be held liable for emotional and mental
distress suffered by appellant. The complaint
alleges intentional misrepresentations made to an
adolescent by his aunt and uncle concerning the
morals and behavior of his father. The actions
outlined in the complaint may be of the extreme
and outrageous nature contemplated by Comment
d to RESTATEMENT § 46. Accepting appellant's
version of the facts as true, as we must at this time,
it appears that appellees intentionally manipulated
appellant's son in a manner "peculiarly calculated"
to cause appellant serious mental or emotional
distress. Id. If appellees did act intentionally,
there need not be a showing that they were aware
of the natural and probable consequences of their
actions. Rather, it is enough that appellant was
substantially certain to suffer severe mental or
emotional distress as a result of their alleged
tortious [332 Pa. Super. 62] conduct. (emphasis
supplied)
01-1286 CIVIL
Id_~. at 1185.
In this case, the defendant's conduct included harsh treatment of Doe, intentionally
avoiding physical contact with him and preventing him from attending doctor's appointments by
sending him on assignments. These actions, standing alone, would perhaps be insufficient to
support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint, however, goes
on to allege that the defendants misrepresented Doe's driving history in order to harm his ability
to secure new employment. It is alleged that, not only was the misrepresentation intentional, but
it was expressly designed to cause emotional distress. We cannot say, at least at this stage of the
proceedings, that, on the facts averred, no recovery is possible.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ~ ;~' day of August, 2001, the preliminary objection of the
defendants to the plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
OVERRULED.
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
For the Defendants
:rlm
BY THE COURT,
Hess, J.
6
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
Pa. Identification No. 76334
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
(215) 699-5388
Attorney for Plaintiff
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and
CHARLES TRIMMER
and
DON MOTTERN
Defendants
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NO. 01-1286
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS' NEW MATTER
Plaintiff, John Doe, by his attorney, Scott M. Pollins, Esquire, hereby replies to
Defendants' New Matter to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint in accordance with
the numbering thereof and states as follows:
42. No answer to an incorporation paragraph is required under the Pa. Rules of
Civil Procedure.
43. Denied. Plaintiff denies that Defendants were unaware of his medical
condition.
44. Denied. Plaintiffdenies that his termination from employment with Shaffer
was wholly unrelated to his medical condition. On the contrary, Plaintiff was
discriminatorily terminated based on his disability,
45. Denied. ]'he allegations contained in Paragraph 45 of Defendants' New
Matter constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
46. Denied. The allegations contained in Paragraph 46 of Defendants' New
Matter constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. By way of further response, Defendant's alleged
"good cause" to terminate Plaintiff was a pretext for an unlawful discriminatory
discrimination.
47. Denied. The allegations contained in Paragraph 47 of Defendants' New
Matter constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
48. Denied. The allegations contained in Paragraph 48 of Defendants' New
Matter constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
49. Denied. The allegations contained in Paragraph 49 of Defendants' New
Matter constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. On the contrary, Plaintiff has properly pled a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
50. Denied. The allegations contained in Paragraph 50 of Defendants' New
Matter constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
51. Denied. The allegations contained in Paragraph 51 of Defendants' New
Matter constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. On the contrary, Plaintiff's termination from
employment by Shaffer was against public policy and was motivated by a desire(s) to
harm Plaintiff.
2
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, John Doe, demands judgment in his favor and against
Defendants, Shaffer Trucking, Inc., Charles Trimmer and Don Mottern, in an amount in
excess of $25,000.00 together with costs, interest, delay damages, attorney's fees and
such other relief as the Court may deem proper.
By:
Attorney for Plaintiff
3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Scott M. Pollins, hereby certify' that I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' New Matter via first class U.S. mail on
September 27, 2001 upon the following:
Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
Thomas, Thomas & Hafer
305 N. Front Street
P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0999
IAR ]
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and CHARLES TRIMMER and
DON MOTTERN, Defendants
1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 01-1286 Civil
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER
ANDNOW, this /~'- dayof
Stipulation as its Order of this date.
,2002, the Court adopts the following
BY THE COURT..' /
AND NOW, the parties, by and through their attorneys, stipulate to the entry of a confidentiality order
by the Court which will provide that:
Shaffer Trucking, Inc.'s business documents, which have been provided in discovery to the Plaintiff,
will remain confidential. The Defendant and his attorney, and his attorney's representatives, and consultants,
shall not disseminate these materials at any time to any persons outside the litigation. The documents may be
used only for purposes of this litigation, and may be used for no other purpose, including but not limited to
sharing these documents with counsel in other cases or with any of Shaffer's competitors. The Defendant, his
counsel, his counsel's representatives and any expert consultants shall be bound by this Order. The Court will
retain.jurisdiction over this matter for purposes of this Confidentiality Order, after this case has been resolved
and discontinued, and the Court will have the authority to issue sanctions for violations of this Order while
litigation is pending and at any time thereafter.
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
Attorney for Plaintiff
D~eO~' ~dB. Narvol, Esquire
Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP
305 N. Front Street, P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0999
(l~Zl..~fl~. / Attorneys for Defendants
tlst/o
Date
James K. Thomas, 11, Esquire
Identification Number: 15613
Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
Identification Number: 42136
Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP
305 N. Front SUoeet
P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0999
(717) 237-7100
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and CHARLES TRIMMER and
DON MOTTERN, Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 01-1286 Civil
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
To:
Plaintiff
c/o Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
NOTICE TO PLEAD
You are hereby notified to plead to the enclosed New Matter within twenty (20) days
of service hereof or the relief requested may be entered against you.
THOMAS, THOMAS & HAFER, LLP
By:-~~
Todd B. Narvol
I.D. No. 42136
305 North Front Street
P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108
James K. Thomas, Il, Esquire
Identification Number: 15613
Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
Identification Number: 42136
Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP
305 N. Front Street
P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0999
(717) 237-7100
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and CHARLES TRIMMER and
DON MOTTERN, Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 01-1286 Civil
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND NEW MATTER TO
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND NOW, Defendants Shaffer Trucking, Inc., Charles Trimmer and Don Motteru, by
and through their attorneys, Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP, file this Answer & New Matter in
response to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, and in support thereof aver the following:
1. After reasonable investigation, Defendants are without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters averred in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's
Seconded Amended Complaint, and proof thereof is demanded.
2-3. Admitted.
4. Denied as stated. Generally speaking, Shaffer does act by and through its
employees, agents, workers, officers, and representatives who are acting within the course and
scope of their employment and authority, when those employees, agents, workers, officers and
representatives are acting within the course and scope of their employment and authority. To the
extent that Plaintiff in this case alleges wrongdoing on the part of Shaffer and the individual
Defendants, such wrongdoing is strictly denied, and therefore, it is not germane to discuss
whether such alleged actions were committed within the course and scope of the employees'
employment and authority. The alleged wrongdoing never occurred.
5. Denied as stated. Defendant Trimmer is an adult individual, who, in early 1999,
was employed by Shaffer as a fleet manager, and who had supervisory authority over Plaintiff.
6. Denied as stated. Admitted that Defendant Mottem was employed in early 1999
by Shaffer as a Safety Director.
COUNT I--Alleged Disability Emoloyment Discrimination
Doe v. Shaffer
7. Defendants incorporate by reference as though fully set forth herein the averments
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 6 of this Answer and New Matter.
8. Admitted that on or about June 8, 1998, Shaffer hired Plaintiff as a truck driver.
9. Denied that Plaintiff"worked in a loyal and satisfactory manner, consistently
performing at or above the level of his co-workers." To the contrary, Plaintiff performed his job
in an unsatisfactory mamaer.
10. After reasonable investigation, Defendants are without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a believe as to the truth of the matters averred in Paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint, and proof thereof is demanded.
11. Denied that "a certain individual or certain individuals employed by Shaffer
became aware that [Plaintiff] was inflicted with HIV."
12. Admitted that Shaffer fired Plaintiff on or about March 9, 1999. Denied that
Plaintiffs termination had anything to do with his alleged medical condition.
13. Denied that "Shaffer's actions in terminating [PlaintilTs] employment were
unjust, without privilege, unlawful, solely intended to cause injm? to [Plaintiff] and violated the
public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."
Denied that Shaffer terminated Plaintiff because of Plaintiff' s alleged medical
14.
condition.
15.
After reasonable investigation, Defendants are without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the troth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, and proof thereof is demanded. As previously stated,
Defendants were unaware of Plaintiff's alleged medical condition, and did not fire him as a result
of that condition or any perceived inability on the part of the Plaintiffto perform his job duties as
a result of the alleged medical condition.
16. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ. P. 1029(e), and denied as a conclusion of law to
which no response is required.
17. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ. P. 1029(e).
WHEREFORE, Defendants demand judgment in their favor, together with all applicable
Court costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT I1--Allel~ed Disability Eml~lovment Discrimination
Doe v. Trimmer
18. Defendants incorporate by reference as though fully set forth herein the averments
and denials contained in Paragraphs 1 through 17 of this Answer and New Matter.
19. Denied that Defendant Trimmer "aided, abetted, incited, compelled and/or caused
the unlawful discriminatory termination of [Plaintiff]" and denied that he "obstructed or
prevented Shaffer from complying with the provisions of the Permsylvania Human Relations
Act, and/or.., attempted directly or indirectly to discriminate against [Plaintiff] because of his
disability." Denied further pursuant to Pa.R.Civ. P. 1029(e). To the contrary, Defendant
Trimmer was unaware of Plaintiff's alleged medical condition, and denied that Plaintiff's alleged
medical condition had anything to do with his termination from employment by Shaffer.
20. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ. P. 1029(e), and denied as a conclusion of law to
which not response is required.
21. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ. P. 1029(e).
WHEREFORE, Defendants demand judgment in their favor, together with all applicable
Court costs, and attorney's fees.
COUNT III--Alleged Disabilit~ Employment Discrimination
Doe v. Mottern
22. Defendants incorporate by reference as though fully set forth herein the averments
and denials contained in Paragraphs 1 through 21 of this Answer & New Matter.
23. Denied that Defendant Mottern "aided, abetted, incited, compelled and/or caused
the unlawful discriminatory termination of [Plaintiff]" and denied that he "obstructed or
prevented Shaffer from complying with the provisions of the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act, and/or.., attempted, directly or indirectly to discrimination against [Plaintiff] because of
his disability." Denied further pursuant to Pa.R.Civ. P. 1029(e). To the contrary, Defendant
Mottem was unaware of Plaintiff s alleged medical condition. Moreover, Plaintiff's termination
from employment by Shaffer had nothing to do with his alleged medical condition.
24. Denied pursuant to Pa.R. Civ. P. 1029(e), and denied as a conclusion of law to
which no response is required.
25. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ. P. 1029(e).
4
WHEREFORE, Defendants demand judgment in their favor, together with all applicable
Court costs, and attorney's fees.
COUNT IV--Alleged Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Doe v. Shaffer
26. Defendants incorporate by reference as though fully set forth herein the averments
and denials contained in Paragraphs 1 through 25 of this Answer and New Matter.
27. Denied as stated. See Paragraph 4 of this Answer and New Matter, which
Paragraph is incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
28. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1029(e). More particularly, denied that Shaffer
engaged in "extreme and outrageous conduct direct toward [Plaintiff}."
Denied that Shaffer treated Plaintiff in a repugnant, offensive and abusive
(c)
Denied that Shaffer intentionally avoided physical contact with Plaintiff;
Denied that Shaffer intentionally, knowingly, purposefully and repeatedly
sent Plaintiff on jobs that prevented him from attending numerous doctors appointments,
despite Plaintiff providing prior notice of those doctor's appointments; and
(d) Denied that Shaffer intentionally misrepresented Plaintiff's driving history
to DAC Services through the unwarranted use of the terms "excessive complaints" and
"personal contact requested" and thereby intentionally harming Plaintiff's ability to
secure new employment.
To the contrary, neither Shaffer nor the individual Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's allege~
medical condition, nor did they treat Plaintiff in any particular way as a result of such alleged
medical condition, and they did not misrepresent Plaintiff's driving history.
29. Denied that Shaffer intended its actions to cause Plaintiff to suffer extreme
emotional distress.
30. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1029(e).
31. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1029(e).
WHEREFORE, Defendant's demand judgment in their favor, together with all
applicable Court costs.
COUNT V--Alleged Intentional Inffiction of Emotional Distress
Doe v. Trimmer
32. Defendants incorporate by reference as though fully set forth herein the averments
and denials contained in Paragraphs 1 through 31 of this Answer and New Matter.
33. Denied that Defendant Trimmer engaged in "extreme and outrageous conduct
directed towards [Plaintiff]."
(a) Denied that Trimmer treated Plaintiff in a repugnant, offensive and
abusive manner;
(b) Denied that Trimmer intentionally avoided physical contact with Plaintiff;
(c) Denied that Trimmer intentionally, knowingly, purposefully and
repeatedly sent Plaintiff on jobs that prevented him from attending numerous doctors
appointments, despite Plaintiff providing prior notice of those doctor's appointments; and
(d) Denied that Trimmer intentionally misrepresented Plaintiff's driving
history and intentionally harmed Plaintiff' s ability to secure new employment.
34. Denied that Defendant Trimmer intended his actions to cause Plaintiff to suffer
extreme emotional distress.
35. Denied pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1029(e).
6
VF.~/.FICATI ON
Don Mottem, hereby v~fify tlmt tha avarmcnts m~e in the foregoing doeumen~ are true
c0rrec~. I understand ~hal f~lse statements he~¢i~ are made subiect 'co ff~e penalties o~ x~ ~'~.
-- Da~e
v~ERIFICATION
Don Mottem, hereby verify that the averments made in the foregoing document ~re true
*-nd correct. I undersm-nd that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of lg Pa.
C.S.A. 4904 relahng '[o unswoln falsilieation to authorities.
D~e
SEP-1~-2081 15:14
P. ~2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on this day I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by
first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP
by
asper, Secretary
/17/0 1
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff
V.
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC.
and CHARLES TRIMMER and DON
MOTTERN,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 01-1286 Civil
CIVIL ACTION -LAW
As a prerequisite to service of subpoena for documents and things pursuant to
Rule 4009.22, Defendant certifies that:
1, A Notice of Intent to Serve the Subpoena with copies of the subpoena
attached thereto was mailed or delivered to each party;
2. A copy of the Notice of Intent, including the proposed subpoena, is attached
to this Certificate;
3. Opposing counsel did not object to the subpoena and waived the 20 days;
4. The subpoena which will be served is identical to the subpoena which
is attached to the Notice of Intent to Serve a Subpoena.
THOMAS, THOMAS & HAFER, LLP
TODD B. NARVOL, ESQUIRE
305 NORTH FRONT STREET - 6TH FLOOR
HARRISBURG, PA 17108
(717) 237-7133
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS
~OHN DOE,
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC. and
CHARLES TRiMMER and DON
MOTTERN,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 01-1286 Civil
CIVIL ACTION- LAW
TO: Counsel and Parties of Record
Defendant intends to serve a subpoena identical to the one attached to this notice. You
have twenty (20) days from the date listed below in which to file of record and serve upon the
undersigned an objection to the subpoena. If no objection is made, the subpoenas may be served.
THOMAS, THOMAS & HAFER, LLP
Date:
Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
Attorney I.D. # 42136
305 North Front Street
P. O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108~0999
(717) 255-7632
Attorneys for Defendant
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
JOHN DOE,
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Plaintiff
NO. 01-1286 Civil
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC. and
CHARLES TRIMMER and DON
MOTTERN,
Defendants
SUBPOENA TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS OR THINGS
FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO RULE 4009.22
TO: Glen Moore Truckinq, Inc., c/o Pamela Pierson Perrault, CDS, Vice-President of
Safety, 1711 Shearer Ddve, Carlisle, PA 17403
(Name of Person or Entity)
Within twenty (20) days after service of this subpoena, you am ordered by the court to produce the following documents
or things:
Complete copies of all deposition transcripts in civil or administrative actions involvinq Glen
Moore Truckina, Inc. and Michael Marcantonio, either as a party or a witness.
at: Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP, 305 N. Front St., P.O. Box 999, Harrisburq, PA 17108
(Address)
You may deliver or mail legible copies of the documents or produce things requested by this subpoena, together with the
certificate of compliance, to the party making this request at the address listed above. You have the dght to seek in
advance, the reasonable cost of preparing the copies or producing the things sought,
If you fail to produce the documents or things required by this subpoena, within twenty (20) days after its service, the
pady serving this subpoena may seek a court order compelling you to comply with it.
THIS SUBPOENA WAS ISSUED AT THE REQUEST OF THE FOLLOWING PERSON:
NAME: Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
ADDRESS: P.O. Box 999, Harrisburg, PA 17108
TELEPHONE: (717) 255-7632
SUPREME COURT ID#: 42136
ATTORNEY FOR: Defendants
DATE: ..~ 19, ~
Seal of the Court
BY THE COURT: /')
Prothonotary/Clerk, Civil Divis~C--
Deputy
I, Todd B. Narvol, Esquire of the law firm of THONIAS, THOMAS, & HAFER, LLP
do certify that I served the foregoing document on the following person(s), by depositing the same
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania addressed as follows:
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
Date:
THOMAS, THOMAS & HAFER, LLP
Todd B. Narvol, Esquire
I, TODD B. NARVOL, ESQUIRE of the law firm of THOMAS, THOMAS, &
HAFER, LLP do certify that I served the foregoing document on the following person(s),
by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania addressed as follows:
Scott M. Pollins, Esquire
1620 Schoolhouse Lane
Lower Gwynedd, PA 19002
THOMAS, THOMAS & HAFER, LLP
TODD B. NARVOL, ESQUIRE
JOHN DOE
Plaintiff
SHAFFER TRUCKING, 1NC.
and CHARLES TRIMMER and
DON MOTTERN, Defendants
1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 01-1286 Civil
CWIL ACTION - LAW
PRAECIPE TO SETTLE AND DISCONTINUE
TO THEPROTHONOTARY:
Please mark the above cased as settled, discontinued and ended with prejudice,
Respectfully submitted,
16 Plaza East Lancaster Avenue
Suite 104
Ardmore, PA 19003-2228
(610) 896-9909
Date: