Loading...
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.
Home
My WebLink
About
11-3300
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 11 -.33W 6 Yl I CIVIL ACTION - LAW REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, 1550 Williams Grove Road, Lot 97 Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Plaintiff(s)& Address(es) JARED ADAMS, 502 Williams Grove Road Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Defendant(s) Address(es) :z - rri ter -<> co -'J C ) C n Z -, a Mme --; C) c- JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE FOR WRIT OF SUMMONS TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Kindly issue a Writ of Summons against the Defendant Jared Adams. The Writ of Summons should be delivered to the Sheriff of Cumberland County for service upon Defendant Jared Adams, at 502 Williams Grove Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17055. METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. By < Clark DeVere, Esquire I.D. No. 68768 Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire I.D. No. 93177 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (717) 238-8187 Date: March,; ,, 2011 Attorneys for Plaintiff S aw* %0,9.00 Paal? 464750-1 a *-!571184 g *'X7 137 METZGER, WICKERSHAM, P.C. By: Clark DeVere, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 68768 Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (717) 238-8187 Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff vs. JARED ADAMS, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NOM-3300 15y"' CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED WRIT OF SUMMONS TO: Jared Adams 502 Williams Grove Road Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 You are hereby notified that Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter has commenced an action against you. Dated: 1!? 464750-1 t F ICE EROTHONOT 7.311 APR 1 1 AM 10: 31 CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REBECCA WELSH n/k/a CIVIL DIVISION REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff, NO. 11-3300 V. PRAECIPE FOR APPEARANCE JARED ADAMS, (Jury Trial Demanded) Defendant. Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, P.C. Firm #911 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 (717) 901-5916 #18525 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REBECCA WELSH n/k/a CIVIL DIVISION REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff, NO. 11-3300 V. (Jury Trial Demanded) JARED ADAMS, Defendant. PRAECIPE FOR APPEARANCE TO: THE PROTHONOTARY Kindly enter the Appearance of the undersigned, Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire, of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, P.C., on behalf of the Defendant, Jared Adams, in the above case. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL„ P.C. By: in D° RaYch, Esquire insel for Defendant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PRAECIPE FOR APPEARANCE has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this 7th day of April, 2011. Clark DeVere, Esquire Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C. 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (Attorney for Plaintiff) SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, P.j;. By: n V" v'-' vin D. uch, Esquire C unsel for Defendant i r- t r N'OTA i0! 1 ,? 1 1 114 10: 31 'sUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REBECCA WELSH n/k/a CIVIL DIVISION REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff, NO. 11-3300 V. PRAECIPE FOR RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT JARED ADAMS, Defendant. (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, P.C. Firm #911 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 (717) 901-5916 #18525 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REBECCA WELSH n/k/a CIVIL DIVISION REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff, NO. 11-3300 V. (Jury Trial Demanded) JARED ADAMS, Defendant. PRAECIPE FOR RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT TO: The Prothonotary Kindly rule the Plaintiff, Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter, to file a Complaint in Civil Action within twenty (20) days. Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, P.C. By: R-9. Rakich, Esquire nsel for Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REBECCA WELSH n/k/a CIVIL DIVISION REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff, NO. 11-3300 V. (Jury Trial Demanded) JARED ADAMS, Defendant. RULE AND NOW, this -, day of pr, 2011, upon consideration of Defendant's Praecipe for Rule to File a Complaint, a Rule is hereby granted upon Plaintiff to file a Complaint within twenty (20) days of service, or suffer judgment Non Pros. Rule issued this I- day of Y V 6 1 , 2011. Prothonot ry, pgvr D CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PRAECIPE FOR RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this 7th day of April, 2011. Clark DeVere, Esquire Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C. 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (Attorney for Plaintiff) SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, P.CA By: Kdvift'D. RaPich, Esquire Counsel for Defendant SHERIFF'S OFFICE OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY Ronny R Anderson Sheriff Jody S Smith Chief Deputy Richard W Stewart Solicitor Rebecca Welsh vs. Jared Adams ?un?irpiib ?flt??xtp of Cr FILED-OFFICE OF THE PROT OOTAR? ' 2011 APR I I PM 12= 59 CUMBERLAND COUNTY Case Number 2011-3300 SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE 04/07/2011 04:05 PM - Timothy Black, Deputy Sheriff, who being duly sworn according to law, states that on April 7, 2011 at 1605 hours, he served a true copy of the within Writ of Summons, upon the within named defendant, to wit: Jared Adams, by making known unto himself personally, at 502 Williams Grove Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17055 its contents and at the same time handing to him personally the said true and correct copy of the same. SHERIFF COST: $38.00 April 08, 2011 r.;;? -0e '-t4' TIM B CK, DEPUTY SO ANSWERS, oZ X-OZ2? RON R ANDERSON, SHERIFF ici CcumySute Sheriff. Tieleoseft. Inc. METZGER, WICKERSHAM, P.C. By: Clark DeVere, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 68768 Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (717) 238-8187 11 UP 29 AM 11: 23 CUI"MERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff VS. JARED ADAMS, Defendant TO: Defendant Jared Adams IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 11-3300-CV CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NOTICE TO DEFEND c/o Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, LLP 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within Twenty (20) days after this Complaint and Notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing with the Court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court without further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE. 466747-1 Cumberland County Lawyer Referral Service Cumberland County Bar Association 32 South Bedford Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3166 1-800-990-9108 466747-1 AVISO USTED HA SIDO DEMANDADO EN LA CORTE. Si usted desea defenderse de las quejas expuestas en las paginas siguientes, debe tomar acci6n dentro de veinte (20) dias a partir de la fecha en que recibi6 la demanda y el aviso. Usted debe presentar comparecencia esrita en persona o po abogado y presentar en la Corte por escrito sus defensas o sus objeciones a las demandas en su contra. Se le avisa que si no se defiende, el caso puede proceder sin usted y la Corte puede decidir en su contra sin mas aviso o notificaci6n por cualquier dinero reclamado en la demanda o por cualquier dinero reclamado en la demanda o po cualquier otra queja o compensaci6n reclamados por el Demandante. USTED PUEDE PERDER DINERO, O PROPIEDADES U OTROS DERECHOS IMPORTANTES PARA USTED. LLEVE ESTA DEMANDA A UN ABOGADO MMEDIATAMENTE, SI USTED NO TIENE O NO CONOCE UN ABODAGO, VAYA O LLAME A LA OFICINA EN LA DIRECCION ESCRITA ABAJO PARA AVERIGUAR DONDE PUEDE OBTENER ASISTENCIA LEGAL. Cumberland County Lawyer Referral Service Cumberland County Bar Association 32 South Bedford Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3166 1-800-990-9108 466747-1 METZGER, WICKERSHAM, P.C. By: Clark DeVere, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 68768 Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (717) 238-8187 REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff vs. JARED ADAMS, Defendant Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 11-3300-CV CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED COMPLAINT AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter, by and through her attorneys, Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, and respectfully represents the following: FACTS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS 1. Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter, is an adult individual who resides at 1550 Williams Grove Road, Lot 97, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, PA 17055. 2. Defendant Jared Adams is an adult individual residing at 502 Williams Grove Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, 17055. 3. The facts and circumstances hereinafter set forth occurred on April 30, 2009 at approximately 4:35 p.m. on South York Street, Mechanicsburg Borough, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 4. At the aforesaid time and place, Plaintiff, Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter, was the operator of a 1998 Saturn SL2 bearing Pennsylvania License Plate No. GNA3848. 466747-1 5. At the aforesaid time and place, Defendant Jared Adams was the operator of a 1993 Toyota Corolla DX bearing Pennsylvania License Plate No. GSJ9271. 6. At the aforesaid time and place, Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter was traveling south on South York Street and stopped her vehicle behind a line of traffic which was already stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of York Street and Marble Street, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 7. At the aforesaid time and place, Defendant Jared Adams was also traveling south on South York Street behind the vehicle being operated by Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter. 8. At the aforesaid time and date, Defendant Jared Adams failed to stop the vehicle he was operating and struck the rear of the vehicle being operated by Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter. COUNTI REBECCA WELSH N/K/A REBECCA RITTER V. JARED ADAMS 9. Paragraphs 1 through 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth. 10. Defendant, Jared Adams, owed a duty to Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter and other lawful users of the roadways in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to operate the vehicle he was driving in such a way as not to cause harm or damage to said other persons and to the Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh nWa Rebecca Ritter in particular. 466747-1 11. The aforesaid collision was the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendant Jared Adams in operating his vehicle in a careless and negligent manner as follows: (a) Failing to observe Plaintiffs vehicle on the roadway; (b) Following too closely to Plaintiffs vehicle in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3310 and applicable law; (c) Failing to slow or stop the vehicle he was operating so as to avoid a rear-end collision; (d) Failing to maintain and stop the vehicle he was operating within the assured clear distance ahead in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3361 and applicable law; (e) Failing to apply the brakes to the vehicle he was operating or take other evasive action to avoid the collision with the rear of Plaintiffs vehicle; (f) Failing to maintain adequate control of the vehicle he was operating in order to avoid a collision; (g) Failing to give warning to Plaintiff of his impending collision with her vehicle; (h) Operating his vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons and/or property in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3714(A) and applicable law; (i) Failing to keep his vehicle under proper and adequate control so as not to expose other users to an unreasonable risk of harm; (j) Operating his vehicle too fast for the conditions existing at the aforesaid time and place in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3361 and applicable law; (k) Failing to keep alert and maintain a proper lookout for the presence of other motor vehicles on the streets and highways; (1) Exceeding the applicable maximum speed limit in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3362 and applicable law; 466747-1 (m) In operating the vehicle so as to create a dangerous situation for other vehicles on the roadway; (n) Failing to maintain a safe following distance; (o) Failing to observe stopped traffic; (p) Rearending Plaintiffs vehicle; (q) Failing to stay alert to traffic patterns; (r) Failing to keep his eyes on the roadway; (s) Otherwise operating his vehicle at an unsafe speed and in a careless and negligent manner; (t) In operating his vehicle while being distracted; and (u) In taking his eyes off of the roadway. 12. As a direct and proximate result of the collision and the negligent and careless conduct of Defendant Jared Adams, Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter sustained and in the future may sustain, serious and debilitating injuries, some of which are or may be permanent, an aggravation and/or exacerbation of pre-existing conditions, and which include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Tarsal tunnel syndrome; (b) Left foot pain; (c) Paresthesia/numbness in extremities; (d) Nerve impingement; (e) Shoulder pain; (f) Cervicalgia; (g) Neck pain; 466747-1 (h) Left arm pain; (i) Lumbar strain/sprain; 6) Muscle weakness; (k) Cervical sprain/strain; (1) Lumbar Radiculopathy; (m) Back pain; (n) Left knee pain; (o) Left ankle pain. 13. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid collision, negligence and carelessness of Defendant Jared Adams, Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter has undergone and in the future will undergo physical pain, mental anguish, discomfort, inconvenience, distress, embarrassment and humiliation, past, present and future loss of her ability to enjoy the pleasures of life and limitations in her pursuit of daily activities all to her great loss and detriment. 14. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid collision, negligence and carelessness of Defendant Jared Adams, Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh nWa Rebecca Ritter has and/or may in the future incur expenses for medical treatment, surgery and rehabilitation for which damages are claimed. 15. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid collision, negligence, carelessness of Defendant Jared Adams, Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter has and/or may in the future incur a loss of wages, loss of earning capacity, loss of household services and other economic damages for which damages are claimed. 466747-1 16. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid collision and the negligence and carelessness of Defendant Jared Adams, Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter sustained incidental costs and losses to include, but not limited to, past and future medication costs and medical appliances, for which damages are claimed. 17. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid collision and the negligence and carelessness of Defendant Jared Adams, Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter has sustained or in the future may sustain scarring and disfigurement for which damages are claimed. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter demands judgment in her favor and against the Defendant Jared Adams for the aforesaid damages in an amount in excess of the limits of compulsory arbitration in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania plus interest and/or damages for delay and costs for prosecution. 466747-1 METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. i By Z chary ampbell, Esquire I.D:-N . 3177 Clark DeVere, Esquire I.D. No. 68768 3211 North Front Street Date: April t2011 P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (717) 238-8187 Attorneys for Plaintiff 466747-1 VERIFICATION I, Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter, hereby certify that the following is correct: The facts set forth in the foregoing Complaint are based upon information which I have furnished to counsel, as well as upon information which has been gathered by counsel and/or others acting on my behalf in this matter. The language of the Complaint is that of counsel and not my own. I have read the Complaint, and to the extent that it is based upon information which I have given to counsel, it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. To the extent that the content of the Complaint is that of counsel, I have relied upon such counsel in making this Verification. I hereby acknowledge that the facts set forth in the aforesaid Complaint are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904 relating to unworn falsification to authorities. Dated: C-O/ LtLL--' Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter 466747-1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire, of the law firm of Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C., hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Complaint with reference to the foregoing action by first class mail, postage prepaid, this Y ti V day of April, 2011 on the following: Defendant, Jared Adams c/o Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, LLP 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 METZGER, WICV"HAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. Esquire 466747-1 r"Li„U-ur l .t ROT C. I ! JUP -8 PM 12: 275 CUIMBERLA;iD C O!U!JsT`' P1:NNSYLYM41A IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff, CIVIL DIVISION NO. 11-3300 V. JARED ADAMS, Defendant. TO: Plaintiff You are hereby notified to file a written Response to the enclosed Answer and New Matter within twenty (20) days From service hereof or a judgment May be entered against you. ANSWER AND NEW MATTER (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, P.C. Firm #911 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 Guthrie & Skeel, P.C. (717) 901-5916 #18525 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REBECCA WELSH n/k/a CIVIL DIVISION REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff, NO. 11-3300 V. JARED ADAMS, Defendant. (Jury Trial Demanded) ANSWER AND NEW MATTER AND NOW, comes the Defendant, Jared Adams, by and through his counsel, Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, P.C., and Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire, and files the following Answer and New Matter, and in support thereof avers as follows: 1. After reasonable investigation, the Defendant has insufficient information as to the truth or falsity of said averments, therefore said averments are denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that a collision occurred at the date, time, and place of the subject accident. The remaining facts and circumstances alleged in the Complaint are admitted or denied as set forth below. 4. After reasonable investigation, the Defendant has insufficient information as to the truth or falsity of said averments, therefore said averments are denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. Admitted. 8. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that a collision occurred at the date, time, and place of the subject accident. The remaining allegations of paragraph 8 are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. COUNT I REBECCA WALSH N/K/A REBECCA RITTER V. JARED ADAMA 9. In response to paragraph 9, the Defendants reiterates and repeats all his responses in paragraphs 1 through 8 as if fully set forth at length herein. 10. Paragraph 10 states A legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent, however, that a response is deemed necessary, said averments are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 11. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that the Defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle at the date, time, and place of the subject accident. The remaining allegations of paragraph 11 and its subparts are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 12. Paragraph 12 and its subparts state legal conclusionS to which no response is required. To the extent, however, that a response is deemed necessary, said averments are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 13. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that a collision occurred at the date, time, and place of the subject accident. The remaining allegations of paragraph 13 are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 14. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that a collision occurred at the date, time, and place of the subject accident. The remaining allegations of paragraph 14 are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 15. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that a collision occurred at the date, time, and place of the subject accident. The remaining allegations of paragraph 15 are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 16. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that a collision occurred at the date, time, and place of the subject accident. The remaining allegations of paragraph 16 are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 17. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that a collision occurred at the date, time, and place of the subject accident. The remaining allegations of paragraph 17 are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. WHEREFORE, Defendant, Jared Adams, respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Plaintiff with costs and prejudice imposed. NEW MATTER 18. The motor vehicle accident in controversy is subject to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and this Defendant asserts, as affirmative defenses, all rights, privileges and/or immunities accruing pursuant to said statute. 19. Some and/or all of the Plaintiffs claims for damages are items of economic detriment which are or could be compensable pursuant to either the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and/or other collateral sources and same may not be duplicated in the present lawsuit. 20. To the extent that the Plaintiff has selected the limited tort option or is deemed to have selected the limited tort option then this Defendant sets forth the relevant provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law as a bar to the Plaintiffs ability to recover non-economic damages. 21. The Defendant pleads any and all applicable statutes of limitation under Pennsylvania Law as a complete or partial bar to any recovery by the Plaintiff in this action. WHEREFORE, the Defendant, Jared Adams, respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Plaintiff with costs and prejudice imposed. Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, P.C. BY: Kevin D. Rau h, Esquire Counsel for Defendant VERIFICATION Defendant verifies that he is the Defendant in the foregoing action, and that the foregoing ANSWER AND NEW MATTER is based upon information which he has furnished to his counsel and information which has been gathered by his counsel in the preparation of the lawsuit. The language of the ANSWER AND NEW MATTER is that of counsel and not of the Defendant. Defendant has read the ANSWER AND NEW MATTER and to the extent that the ANSWER AND NEW MATTER is based upon information which he has given to his counsel, it is true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. To the extent that the content of the ANSWER AND NEW MATTER is that of counsel, he has relied upon counsel in making this Affidavit. Defendant understands that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: #18525 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND NEW MATTER has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this 7th day of June, 2011. Zachary Campbell, Esquire Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C. 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (Attorney for Plaintiff) SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, P.C. By: Vl'_ o /zn //1 len Kevin D. uch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant METZGER, WICKERSHAM, P.C By: Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (717) 238-8187 REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff vs. JARED ADAMS, Defendant FILED-OFFICE CF THE PROTHONOTARY 2011 JUN 14 AM 11: 17 CUMBERLAND CN kftl?s for Plaintiff P E NN S Y LVA Mecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 11-3300-CV CIVIL ACTION - LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT, JARED ADAMS', NEW MATTER 18. The averments contained in paragraph 18 of Defendant 's New Matter are denied as conclusions of law to which no reply is required. If a reply is required, the averments are specifically denied and denied pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1029(e). By way of further reply, the Defendant has failed to identify the defenses allegedly available to him pursuant to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and, as a result, Plaintiff cannot more specifically reply to Paragraph 18 of Defendant's New Matter. By way of further reply, Plaintiff is not barred by any provision of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and Defendant is not provided any defenses to any of the claims raised in Plaintiff's Complaint which is incorporated herein by reference. Strict proof of the same is demanded. 19. Conclusions of law, no reply required. If a reply is required, the averments are specifically denied and denied pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1029(e). By way of further reply, Defendant has not specified what benefits would be precluded and the specific provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law which would preclude the recovery of 470474-1 r such benefits and Plaintiffs cannot more specifically reply. By way of further reply, it is specifically denied that some and/or all of the Plaintiff's claims for damages are items of economic detriment which are or could be compensable pursuant to either the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and/or other collateral sources and same may not be duplicated in the present law. 20. Conclusions of law, no reply required. If a reply is required, the averments are specifically denied and denied pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1029(e). By way of further reply, Plaintiff is not bound by the Limited Tort Option and is not precluded from recovering damages for non-economic loss by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 21. Conclusions of law, no reply required. If a reply is required, the averments are specifically denied and denied pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1029(e). By way of further reply, the civil action was filed against the Defendant prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. By way of further reply, the accident at issue occurred on April 30, 2009 and the earliest possible statute of limitations expiration would occur on April 30, 2011. The Writ was filed with the Cumberland County Prothonotary on March 28, 2011. The Answering Defendant has no good faith basis to raise the statute of limitations defense in this matter. METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. By: ch D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 3211 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 238-8187 (717) 234-9478 (fax) Dated: 6 13 20 I' Attorneys for Plaintiff 470474-f VERIFICATION I, Rebecca Ritter, hereby certify that the following is correct: The facts set forth in the foregoing Reply to New Matter are based upon information which I have furnished to counsel, as well as upon information which has been gathered by counsel and/or others acting on my behalf in this matter. The language of the Reply to New Matter is that of counsel and not my own. I have read the Reply to New Matter, and to the extent that it is based upon information which I have given to counsel, it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. To the extent that the content of the Reply to New Matter is that of counsel, I have relied upon such counsel in making this Verification. I hereby acknowledge that the facts set forth in the aforesaid Reply to New Matter are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Dated: Rebecca Ritter 470474-1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire, of the law firm of Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C., hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's New Matter with reference to the foregoing action by first class mail, postage prepaid, this 10 day ofV , 2011 on the following: Defendant, Jared Adams c/o Kevin Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, LLP 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. Z char . Campbell, Esquire 470474-1 a It { 1 :a - 1 .,liL 1'}I1J C`Ui'aT7 METZGER, WICKERSHAM, P.C. t E?NSYLVANI By: Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 2321 Paxton Church Road P.O. Box 69200 Harrisburg, PA 17106-9200 (717) 238-8187 Attorneys for Plaintiff REBECCA WELSH n/k/a • IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF REBECCA RITTER, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff • • vs. • NO. 11-3300-CV • CIVIL ACTION - LAW JARED ADAMS, • Defendant • JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE FOR CHANGE OF ADDRESS TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Kindly note the change of address of counsel for the Plaintiff, Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter, from 3211 North Front Street, P.O. Box 5300, Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 to: Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C. 2321 Paxton Church Road P.O. Box 69200 Harrisburg, PA 17106-9200 540222-1 Respectfully submitted, METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. By: Za"D. ampbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 2321 Paxton Church Road P.O. Box 69200 Harrisburg, PA 17106-9200 (717) 238-8187 Attorneys for Plaintiff Dated: ) 112.012, 540222-1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire, of the law firm of Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C., hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of a Praecipe for Change of Address with reference to the foregoing action by first class mail, postage prepaid, this ?4o day of V , 2013, on the following: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, LLP 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire 540222-1 F'' r / -P f ICE CF THEoPROTHONOTARY 22IRRAP'i -I Pi 1 :20 CUB. EI RLANO COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REBECCA WELSH n /k/a CIVIL DIVISION REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff, NO. 11 -3300 v. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT JARED ADAMS, Defendant. (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK & GUTHRIE, P.C. Firm #911 945 East Park Drive, Suite 201 Harrisburg, PA 17111 (717) 901 -5916 #18525 Rebecca Ritter as a "named insured" or an "insured" (A true and correct copy of the Declarations Page and policy information is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".) 6. The Certificate of Title for the 1998 Saturn, issued on March 3, 2009, listed both Roger E. Ritter and Rebecca Welsh as registered owners of the vehicle. (A true and correct copy of the Certificate of Title is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".) 7. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation vehicle registration credential also listed Roger E. Ritter and Rebecca L. Welsh on the proof of registration in effect at the time of the accident. (A true and correct copy of the Registration Credential is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".) 8. Furthermore, in response to Defendant's Request for Admissions, the Plaintiff admitted that she was listed as a co-purchaser on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Certificate of Title. (See Responses to Requests for Admission # attached hereto as Exhibit "D".) 9. The Plaintiff also admitted to believing that she was a "registered owner" of the 1998 Saturn SL 2 involved in the accident. (See Responses to Requests for Admission #4 attached hereto as Exhibit "D".) 10. The Plaintiff has not provided proof of any other type of insurance covering the 1998 Saturn SL 2 or any other private passenger motor vehicle which was in effect at the time of the subject accident. (See Response to Requests for Admission # #6 attached hereto as Exhibit "D".) 11. Accordingly, the Plaintiff did not maintain financial responsibility as required by the MVFRL and is therefore bound by the limited tort option as an owner of a currently registered vehicle who did not maintain financial responsibility. 12. In the alternative, if the policy provided by the Permanent General Assurance Company lawfully provides financial responsibility over the Plaintiffs car, then she is bound by the limited tort option selected by her boyfriend. See Schwartzberg v. Greco, 793 A.2d 945 (Pa. Super. 2002) 13. The tort option chosen by her boyfriend should be imputed to the Plaintiff according to the reasoning in Schwartzberg, ",..we find that when Appellant, the owner of a vehicle, gives another person consent and approval to obtain insurance coverage on the vehicle, Appellant is bound by the insurance coverage chosen by that person." Ibid at 949. 14. In conclusion, since the Plaintiff was a registered owner of a private passenger motor vehicle and did not maintain financial responsibility over the vehicle, she is bound by the limited tort option pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(5). 15. In the alternative, the Plaintiff is bound by the limited tort option chosen by her boyfriend Roger Ritter, with the Permanent General Assurance Company. WHEREFORE, Defendant, Jared Adams, respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter an Order declaring that the Plaintiff is bound by the limited tort option. Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK & GUTHRIE, P.C. By: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant DEFENDANT'S I I EXHIBIT Permanent General Assurance Corporation Automobile Insurance Application POLICY NUMBER: 38-PN6931394 POLICY PERIOD: 03/14/09 05:56 PM CDT - 03/14/10 12:01 AM CST POLICY TERM: 12 MONTHS APPLICANT NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE, EMAIL PRODUCER CODE, NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE Name ROGER E RITTER Address 1550 WILLIAMS GROVE RD LOT 97 MECHANICSBURG, PA 17055-5348 Home Phone (717) 802-9245 Work Phone Email Address REBRIT99@AIM.COM Producer THE GENERAL AUTO INS SVCS, INC Address P. 0. BOX 305054 NASHVILLE, TN 37230-5054 Phone (800) 280-1466 Code 998888 Tier P Garaging Address (if different from mailing) COVERAGE AND LIMITS OF LIABILITY Coverage applies only where premium is indicated. WARNING: The policy does not cover loss to equipment not installed by the vehicles original manufacturer unless coverage for equipment is listed below under additional equipment. Include value and description for each item. COVERAGES / LIMITS VEHICLE I VEHICLE 2 VEHICLE 3 VEHICLE 4 VEHICLE 5 VEHICLE Bodily Injury — Property Damage Liability Per Person / Per Occurrence $15,000/$30,000/$5,000 $254.00 Uninsured Motorist Bodily Injury No Coverage Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury No Coverage First Party Benefits Medical $5,000 Income Loss(per month/max) Accidental Death Funeral $93.00 No Coverage No Coverage No Coverage Extraordinary Medical No Coverage Rental Reimbursement No Coverage Towing Labor No Coverage Comprehensive/Collision Deductible No Coverage Premium No Coverage Additional Equipment Coverage Amt No Coverage Premium No Coverage Premium Sub-Total (per Vehicle) $347.00 Selected Payment Plan POLICY FEE $10.00 ANNUAL 12 PAYMENTS 10% DOWNPAY + 11 MONTHLY YOUR FIRST PAYMENT OF $38.40 IS DUE BEFORE 04/14/2009. Make Your Monthly Payments online at www.thegeneral.com TOTAL $357.00 TOTAL DOWNPAYMENT $44.70 Fully earned installment fee included: $10.00 THIS APPLICATION BECOMES PART OF YOUR INSURANCE POLICY PA-039-0808-PA 1 of 8 APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RIT1Lr< POLICY NU D6R: 38-PN6931394 DRIVERS Complete this section for all persons 14 or older living in your household and all other persons who use your vehicle on a regular basis. DRIVING HISTORY Identify all incidents, accidents, license suspensions and expirations during the previous 35 months (Include out of state). DR # DATE DESCRIPTION PTS PA -039-0808-PA 2 of 8 DRIVER NAME DOB GENDER MARITAL STATUS RELATIONSHIP TO NAMED INSURED ROGER E RITTER 04/16/1980 MALE SINGLE NAMED INSURED 2 3 4 5 6 DRIVER LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE STATUS LICENSE STATE SOCIAL SECURITY # OCCUPATION 1 25503553 ACTIVE PA XXX-XX-1397 MECHANIC 2 3 4 5 6 DRIVING HISTORY Identify all incidents, accidents, license suspensions and expirations during the previous 35 months (Include out of state). DR # DATE DESCRIPTION PTS PA -039-0808-PA 2 of 8 APPLICANT NAME:ROGER E RITTER VEHICLES POLICY NUMBER: 38-PN6931394 VEH NO. YEAR MAKE / MODEL / STYLE IDENTIFICATION NO. (VIN) 1 1998 SATURN SL2 1G8ZK5270WZ221749 2 A07 15000 NO 3 • 4 3 5 6 VEH NO. TERRITORY VEHICLE USE SYMBOL ANNUAL MILES PRIOR DAMAGE 1 127 PERSONAL A07 15000 NO 2 3 4 5 6 LIEN HOLDER (S LH = Lien holder Al = Additional Interest VEH NO. NAME _ MAILING ADDRESS TYPE PA-039-0808-PA 3 of 8 APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RITTER POLICY NUMBER: 38-PN6931394 DNSCOUNTG/ SURCHARGES You may be eligible for discounts mandated by 75 Pa.C.S.A.1791.1:i) on first party benefits coverage if, your car is equipped with a passive restraint system; ii) on comprehensive coverage if your car is equipped with a passive anti-theft device; or iii) if all named insured's are 55 or older and have successfully completed a motor vehicle driver improvement course approved by PennDOT. Contact Customer Service for details. LIMITED TORT ENDORSEMENT PASSIVE RESTRAINT 3 VEH:1 STAR LEVEL 25 DRV:1 GENERAL QUESTIONS NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTS — EXPLAIN ANSWERS 1. Are any vehicles garaged outside the Sta for 60 days a year? NO TORT OPTION: LIMITED 2. Are any vehicles owned by anyone other than a listed or excluded driver? NO 3. Are any vehicles used for livery, taxi service, emergency service, racing, show/parade, delivery, auto related business, used commercially, and/or have a commercial license? NO 4. Has the Applicant or Applicant's spouse been previously cancelled by PGAC for loss experience, convicted of Insurance fraud/felony in the last 10 years, and/or employed in illegal enterprise/occupations? NO S. Are any drivers in the household employees of Permanent General, independent agents or their immediate family? NO G. Are all household residents age 14 and older and all persons that may regularly or occasionally operate a vehicle listed or excluded on the application? (Example: military, college student, etc.) If no" list them as operators or excude, YES 7. Do you or any driver require any special equipment on your auto in order to safely operate it? NO 8. Do you or any driver have any physical or mental impairment that may prevent you from safely operating a vehicle? NO Q. Do you or any driver own any other motor vehicles n�t insured by Permanent General? If 'yes" list insurance company and policy number in notes. NO PA-039-0808-PA 4 of 8 APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RITTER DRIVER EXCLUSION POLICY NUMBER: 38'PNGQ313Q4 EXCLUDED DRIVER DOB GENDER RELATIONSHIP ~ TO NAMED INSURED . The undersigned agrees tha such its use while such automobile above. "You" attest that the excluded that these individuals do not and while an auto is being operated must notify the company before appropriate changes can be made. I understand and agree that the this election applies to any nenewa|, unless I revoke this election. SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED insurance as is afforded by the policy shall not apply is in the cane, nuoUody, or control of; or is being operated driver will maintain his/her own insurance. The will not be operating the vehicles listed on the declarations by an excluded driver may be denied for material an excluded driver begins operating the vehicles listed excluded driver endorsement shall apply to this policy. reinstatemant, oubnhtute, mvioed, changed, with respec to any automobile or by any individual designated named insured has herein declared page. Any claim occurring misrepresentation. The named insured on the declarations page, so the I also understand and agree that or modified policy with this company, DATE NOT APPLICABLE AUTHORIZATION FOR BANK DRAFT OR CREDIT CARD PAYMENT I, the above named cunhomer, hereby authorize the Company to originate charges to my bank account or credit card for all payments related to this application for inouronce, endorsements or renewal of the same. Either party may terminate this authorization and payment method at any time upon written notice. SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED NOT APPLICABLE DATE RESTRICTED POLICY ENDORSEMENT — Do not sign if Base Policy coverage is requested. I understand and agree that my premium has been reduced because I am purchasing an endorsement to the policy that excludes comprehensive and collision coverage when my vehicle is operated by anyone other than those persons specifically named on this mpp|ication, declarations or endorsement to this policy as insured drivers. I also understand and agree that an insured driver giving permission to any other person (not listed as insured by this policy) to operate any vehicle, does not extend coverage under this policy to such a person. SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE ACCEPTED ROGER E RITTER DATE 03/14/09 05:56 PM CDT PA-039-0808-PA 5 of 8 APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RITTER POLICY NUMBER:38-PN6931394 DOUBLE DEDUCTIBLE OPTION | understand and agree that my premium has been reduced because I have selected an option to double my comprehensive and collision deductibles. I understand that the deductible amounts requested as shown on this application and policy declarations page will be doubled for the first 45 days of the policy period. This option applies to all vehicles listed on the application where comprehensive and collision coverage has been selected and is not available to any vehicle added after inception of the policy. I also understand that this provision will not apply to any future renewals of my policy. SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED NOT APPLICABLE DATE SELECTION OF UNINSURED I UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE | understand that the state requires that Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists insurance be offered to me under my motor vehicle coverage. [] I select Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists SI coverage at limits lower than Liability BI limits as indicated on the front of this form. NOTE: Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist limits are no available in excess of Liability BI limits. SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED NOT APPLICABLE DATE • UNINSURED COVERAGE LIMITS By signing this waiver, I am rejecting members of my household under insured under the policy. Instead, policy. I knowingly and voluntarily I reject this coverage. SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED stacked limits of uninsured motorist coverage which the limits of coverage available would be the the limits of coverage that I am purchasing shall r ject the stacked limits of coverage. I understand under the policy for myself and sum of limits for each motor vehicle be reduced to the limits stated in the that my premiums will be reduced it DATE NOT APPLICABLE UNDERINSURED COVERAGE LIMITS By signing this waiver, I am rejecting members of my household under insured under the policy. Instead, policy. I knowingly and voluntarily I reject this coverage SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED stacked limits of underinsured motorist coverage which the limits of coverage available would be the the limits of coverage that I am purchasing shall reject the stacked limits of coverage. I understand under the policy for myself and sum of limits for each motor vehicle be reduced to the limits stated in the that my premiums will be reduced if DATE NOT APPLICABLE • PA-039-0808-PA 6 of 8 • APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RITTER POLICY NUMBER: 38- PN6931394 "FRAUD WARNINGS" Any person who knowingly and with intent to defraud any insurance company or other person files an application for insurance or statement of claim containing any materially false information or conceals for the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto commits a fraudulent insurance act, which is a crime and subjects such person to criminal and civil penalties. APPLICANT STATEMENT — READ BEFORE SIGNING .The undersigned represents that best of their knowledge and belief. void from inception if any of presented to the company is not • I state that all persons, age operating any vehicle listed understand and agree that denied because of material changes that occur during • I certify that all vehicles listed for pleasure. It is my duty to I acknowledge that cancellations fees on direct bill policies. I certify date of this application. I understand concerning credit, personal characteristics, quotation or policy. It is not our we will provide the name and request, we will provide you information and your rights to comprehensive and collision coverage conducted at the time of this deductible. I acknowledge that afforded coverage under the application or in the course of that transactions with the Company be conducted wholly or in part understand that this application I have been given notice of the SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED is K THE GENERALAUTO the statements and answers recorded on this application The undersigned agrees that any policy issued these answers are false, incomplete, or given with honored by the bank upon which it is drawn. 14 or over, whether licensed or unlicensed, residing in the application on a regular or occasional basis in the event of an accident involving a driver not listed misrepresentation. I also understand and agree that the policy period. on this policy with an indication of "Personal" in notify the Company if any of these vehicles may later at my request will be cancelled short-rate, including that no accident otherwise insurable under the the Company may order consumer reports driving record, or loss history in connection policy to disclose this information except as permitted address of the consumer - reporting agency that furnished with more detailed information regarding our collection, access and correct such information. I acknowledge is requested must be inspected to ascertain application, the policy will be issued with a minimum losses and damages incurred prior to the receipt of policy. I understand failing to provide information any claim may result in this policy being null and void in connection with this application and any policy by electronic means pursuant to the Pennsylvania forms part of the policy and any subsequent renewal available benefits and limits as set forth on page 8 are true and complete to the from this application shall be null and the intent to deceive; or, if a check in my household and persons are listed on this signed application. I on my policy, my coverage may be I will notify the company of any driver the "Vehicle Use" box are used solely be used for business. non - payment of premium and/or policy requested has occurred on the or personal or privileged information with this application for a premium or required by law. At your request, any of this information. At your use, and disclosure of personal that any vehicle(s) for which prior damage. If no inspection is $1000 comprehensive and collision down payment of premium will not be or providing false information in this 'and/or a denial of coverage. I agree issued in connection herewith may Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. I of the policy. of this application. DATE 03/14/09 05:56 PM CDT ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE ACCEPTED ROGER E RITTER INS SVCS. INC 03/14/09 05:56 PM CDT SIGNATURE OF COMPANY APPROVED AGENT DATE PA- 039 - 0808 -PA 7 of 8 • • APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RITTER POLICY NUMBER: 38- PN6931394 IMPORTANT NOTICE Insurance companies operating in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are required by law to make available for purchase the following benefits for you, your spouse or other relatives or minors in your custody or in the custody of your relatives, residing in your household, occupants of your motor vehicle or persons struck by your motor vehicle: (1) Medical benefits, up to at least $100,000. (1.1) Extraordinary medical benefits, from $100,000 to $1,100,000 which may be offered in increments of $100,000. (2) Income loss benefits, up to at least $2,500 per month up to a maximum benefit of at least $50,000. (3) Accidental death benefits, up to at least $25,000. (4) Funeral benefits, $2,500. (5) As an alternative to paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4), a combination benefit, up to at least $177,500 of benefits in the aggregate or benefits payable up to three years from the date of accident, whichever occurs first, subject to a limit on accidental death benefit of up to $25,000 and a limit on funeral benefit of $2,500, provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to limit, reduce, modify or change the provisions of section 1715(d) (relating to availability of adequate limits). (6) Uninsured, underinsured and bodily injury liability coverage up to at least $100,000 because of injury to one person in any one accident and up to at least $300,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident or, at the option of the insurer, up to at least $300,000 in a single limit for these coverages, except for policies issued under the Assigned Risk Plan. Also, at least $5,000 for damage to property of others in any one accident. Additionally, insurers may offer higher benefit levels than those enumerated above as well as additional benefits. However, an insured may elect to purchase lower benefit levels than those enumerated above. Your signature on this notice or your payment of any renewal premium evidences your actual knowledge and understanding of the availability of these benefits and limits as well as the benefits and limits you have selected. If you have any questions or you do not understand all of the various options available to you, contact your agent or company. If you do not understand any of the provisions contained in this notice, contact your agent or company before you sign. SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED is ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE ACCEPTED ROGER E RITTER 8 DATE 03/14/09 05:56 PM CDT • �� = APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RITTER POLICY NUMBER: 38'PN88313Q4 NOTICE TO NAMED INSU REDS The laws of the Commonwealth of Pannoylvanky, as enacted by the General Aasembly, only require that you purchase liability and first-party medical benefit coverages. Any additional coverages or coverages in excess of the limits required by law are provided only at your request as enhancements to basic coverages. In compliance with 75 Pa. C.S. Section 1791.1(a). we inform you that the minimum motor vehicle insurance coverages and limits mandated by the Commonwealth are: Bodily Injury Liability - $15.000 for one person in any one acddent/$30.000 for two or more persons in any one accident; Property Damage Liability - $5.000; and Medical Benefits - $5.000. The annual premium for these basic coverages are presented below. A. "Limited Tort" Option The laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania give you the right to choose a form of insurance that limits your right and the right of members of your household to seek financial compensation for injuries caused by other drivers. Under this form of inounanoe, you and other household members covered under this policy may seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket axpenoeo, but not for pain and suffering or other nonmonetary damages unless the injuries suffered fall within the definition of "serious injury", as set forth in the policy or unless one of several other exceptions noted in the policy applies. The annual premium for basic coverage as required by law under this "limited tort" option is $ $347.00 Additional coverages under this option are available at additional cost. B. "Full Tort" Option The laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania also give you the right to choose a form of insurance under which you maintain an unrestricted right for you and the members of your household to seek financial compensation for injuries caused by other drivers. Under this form of inmunonoe, you and other household members covered under this policy may seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses and may also seek financial compensation for pain and suffering and other nonmonetary damages as a result of injuries caused by other drivers. The annual premium for basic coverage as required by law under this "full tort" option is $ $466.00 Additional coverages under this option are available at additional cost. C. You may contact your insurance agent, broker or company to discuss the cost of other coverages. O. If you wish to choose the "limited tort" option described in paragraph A, you must sign this notice where indicated below and return it. If you do not sign and return this no8ma, you will be considered to have chosen the "full tort" coverage as described in paragraph B and you will be charged the "full tort" premium. I wish to choose the "limited tort" option described in paragraph A: SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE ACCEPTED DATE 03/14/09 05:56 PM CDT E. If you wish to choose the "full tort" option described in paragraph B. you may sign this notice where indicated below and return it. However, if you do not sign and return this nodca, you will be considered to have chosen the "full tort" coverage as described in paragraph B and you will be charged the "full tort" premium. I wish to choose the "full tort" option described in paragraph B: SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED NOT APPLICABLE DATE APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RITTER POLICY NUMBER: 38-PNG9313S4 REJECTION OF UNINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION By signing this waiver I am rejecting uninsured motorist coverage under this policy, for myself and all relatives residing in my household Uninsured coverage protects me and relatives living in my household for losses and damages suffered if injury is caused by the negligence of a driver who does not have any insurance to pay for losses and damages. I knowingly and voluntarily reject this coverage. SIGNATURE OF FIRST �� NAMED INSURED r~ ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE ACCEPTED ROGER E RITTER DATE 03/14/09 05:56 PM CDT APPLICANT NAME: ROGER E RITTER POLICY NUMBER: 38-PN6931394 REJECTION OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION By signing this waiver I am rejecting underinsured motorist coverage under this pdioy, for myself and all relatives residing in my household. Underinsured coverage protects me and relatives living in my household for losses and damages suffered if injury is caused by the negligence of a driver who does not have enough insurance to pay for all losses and damages. I knowingly and voluntarily reject this coverage. SIGNATURE OF FIRST NAMED INSURED NOT AVAILABLE DATE IV FICATE OF TITLE FOR A VEHIC T. MAKE OF VEHICLE OM. METER STATUS 0 • ACTUAL AF-LEAGE 1 w IMLEAGE EXCEEDS THE LLECHArSCAL LIMITS 2 = IOCIT THE ACTJAL 1.1..EAGE 3 • ACT THE ACTUAL UCEAGE.00011-r.71E1 VERTMD • • DM‘.0.7 MOM °COVET-a DISMOSDFM. TITLE say.cs A • M1TATJE VSACLE Z El AGM vmas. O - COLLECTIBLE voinu - F G ORIGINALLY WOO FOR WW1-S. DISTRBUTFOR H • AGROJLTURAL YEHICZE L L000NG VaDDLE F • EWES A POLE F • REOCk'STRUCTIE) S • SIHEET RCC T • FtEcar.....az V • veriat-ze cot:70,am REISSUED Y.`.1 Itt FLOOD E — X • ISNYAS A TAX/ 1050134 .ROGER E RITTER JR R REBECCA L WELSH 1550 WILLIAMS GROVE RD LOT 97 MECHANICSBURG PA 17055 ALLEN D BIEHLER Sem:Wry of Transportalkin TO BE COMPLETED BY PURCHASER WHEN VEHICLE IS SOLD AND TWA APPROPRIATE SECTIONS OH THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE COMPLETED. spouse is fisted and you Want the 'jokit Tenants With WI of Sunrivorship (On death ol thIn goes to surviving owner.) CHECK HERE 0. OthenWse, the (tile issued as "Tenants in Common' (On death of one owner, iegrest of deceased owner goes to tesfher heirs or estate). r YES, RN REOURED) YES 0 tfOr3 VttiGt;G (.V STATE STORE IN A SAFE PLACE - IF LOST APPLY FOR A DUPLICATE - ANY ALTERATION OR ERASU , rCIN114Y-LVANIA VEHICLE REGISTRATION MV-105A(05-07) 1 PennDOT is proud to provide you with your new registration credential. PLEASE SIGN YOUR CREDENTIAL - To validate your credential, you need to sign your name ' in ink as indicated below. The registration must be available when the vehicle is in use. DID YOU CHANGE YOUR ADDRESS? - It is important that we have your current address, and the law requires that any changes be reported to PennDOT within 15 days. Please notify PennDOT of any address change by writing to: PennDOT, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Harrisburg, PA 17104-2516. Please include the following information with your change of address request: your full street address (including P.O. box number, rural delivery, route number or apartment number, if applicable), city, state and zip code. Please remember P.O. box numbers may be used in addition to the actual address, but cannot be used as the only address. You may also change your address online at Online Services Center at WWW.DMV.STATE.PA.US. PENNSYLVANIA'S LITTERING LAWS - As a reminder, Pennsylvania has laws against littering on our roadways and on public and private property. Under law, PennDOT is required to include this statement on vehicle credentials to remind motorists of littering laws. By signing your registration credential, you acknowledge that you have received notice of this provision. Section 3709 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code provides for a fine of up to $300 for dropping, throwing or depositing, upon any highway, or upon any other public or private property without the consent of the owner thereof or into or on the waters of this Commonwealth from a vehicle, any waste paper, sweepings, ashes, household waste, glass, metal, refuse or rubbish or any dangerous or detrimental substance, or permitting any of the preceding without immediately removing such items or causing their removal. For any violation of Section 3709, you may be subject to a fine of up to $300 upon conviction, including any violation resulting from the conduct of any other persons operating, in possession of or present within the vehicle with your permission, if you do not with reasonable certainty identify the driver of the vehicle at the time the violation occurred. PLEASE DRIVE SAFELY AND REMEMBER TO BUCKLE UP . i.D.ch. _Deiath dace — - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA REGISTRATION CREDENTIAL:: . EXPIRY: SEP 30, 2010 VALID: 10/21/09 ru rUPLATE: GNA3848 =TITLE: 65011379004 RI a-VIN: 1a8ZK5270NZ221799 IL/M/1MM: 1998 SATURN r-TYPE: SON zrirt ID: 09294 1391 000191-001 (..) EMISSIONS INSPECTION REQUIRED/DIESEL VEHICLES EXEMPT COUNTY: CUMBERLAND ROGER E RITTER JR & REBECCA L WELSH 1550 WILLIAMS GROVE RD LOT 97 MECHANICSBURG PA 17055 I hereby acknowledge this day that I have received notice of the provisions ol Section 3709 of the Vehicle Code. METZGER, WICKERSHAM, P.C. By: Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 2321 Paxton Church Road P.O. Box 69200 Harrisburg, PA 17106-9200 (717) 238-8187 Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff VS. JARED ADAMS, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 11-3300-CV CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS TO: Defendant, Jared Adams c/o Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, LLP 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 Attached are Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Request for Admissions Addressed to Plaintiff in the above-captioned action. METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. Dated: 538885-1 By: y . Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 2321 Paxton Church Road P.O. Box 69200 Harrisburg, PA 17106-9200 (717) 238-8187 (717) 234-9478 (fax) Attorneys for Plaintiff DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS Do you admit that your address on April 30, 2009 was 1550 Williams Grove Road, Lot #97, Mechanicsburg, PA? ANSWER: Admitted. 2. Do you admit that you were involved in an automobile accident on April 30, 2009? ANSWER: Admitted. 3. Do you admit that you were driving a 1998 Saturn SL2 with VIN No. 1G8ZK5270WZ221749, on April 30th, 2009, when the subject accident occurred? ANSWER: Admitted. 4. Do you admit that you were named as a registered owner of the 1998 Saturn SL2 with VIN No. 1G8ZK5270WZ221749 when the subject accident occurred? ANSWER: Admitted in part. Plaintiff believes that she was a "registered owner" of the 1998 Saturn SL2 but has been unable to verify this through PennDOT records. It is admitted that Plaintiff is listed as a co- purchaser on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Certificate of Title. See attached as Exhibit "A" documents provided by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. 538885 -1 Page 2 5. Do you admit that on April, 30th, 2009, you were not a named insured or insured as defined in 75 Pa C.S. § 1705(f) under any private passenger vehicle liability insurance covering the 1998 Saturn SL2? ANSWER: Objection. This Request seeks a legal conclusion to which no response is required. See Permanent General Assurance declaration sheet attached hereto as Exhibit "B ". 6. Do you admit that on April, 30th, 2009, you were not a named insured or insured as defined in 75 Pa C.S. § 1705(f) under any private passenger vehicle liability insurance covering any other passenger vehicle? ANSWER: Objection. This Request seeks a legal conclusion to which no response is required. Without waiving said objection, it is admitted that on April 30, 2009, Plaintiff was not a named insured or insured as defined in 75 Pa C.S. § 1705(f) under any private passenger vehicle liability insurance. Dated: 538885 -I METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. By: Z� D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 2321 Paxton Church Road P.O. Box 69200 Harrisburg, PA 17106 -9200 (717) 238 -8187 (717) 234 -9478 (fax) Attorneys for Plaintiff Page 3 VERIFICATION I, Rebecca Ritter, hereby certify that the following is correct: The facts set forth in the foregoing Responses to Request for Admissions are based upon information which I have furnished to counsel, as well as upon information which has been gathered by counsel and/or others acting on my behalf in this matter. The language of the Responses to Request for Admissions is that of counsel and not my own. I have read the Responses to Request for Admissions, and to the extent that it is based upon information which I have given to counsel, it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. To the extent that the content of the Responses to Request for Admissions is that of counsel, I have relied upon such counsel in making this Verification. I hereby acknowledge that the facts set forth in the aforesaid Responses to Request for Admissions are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Dated: Rebecca Ritter CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire, of the law firm of Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C., hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Request for Admissions with reference to the foregoing action by first class mail, A �� postage prepaid, this day of fr V , 2013 on the following: Defendant, Jared Adams c/o Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, LLP 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. Zach'' D. Campbell, Esquire 538885 -1 Page 4 uy `./uuuun- LUUL 3opxr Page 1 of 7 3002 PA Super 48, *; 793 A.2d 945, **; JACOB SCHWARTZBERG, Appellant v. JOSEPH GRECO, STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN AND PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, AppeHees No. 1325 EDA 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 2002 PA Super 48; 793 A.2d 945; 2002 Pa, Super. LEXIS 189 December 11, 2001, Argued February 25, 2002, Filed PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Appeal from the Order dated March 14, 3001, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 3498 April Term 1999. Before SHEPPARD, J. DISPOSITION: Affirmed. CASE SUMMARY: PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff pedestrian appealed the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (Pennsylvania) granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant driver, in the pedestrian's claim to recover personal injury damages from the driver. OVERVIEW: The pedestrian was hit by the driver's car. At the time of the accident, the pedestrian was the owner of a registered vehicle. The pedestrian's driving privileges had been suspended, and he did not have car insurance in his own name. The pedestrian's car was insured under a policy issued to his girlfriend. Under the policy, the girlfriend elected limited tort coverage, and the pedestrian was listed as an excluded driver. The trial court found that the pedestrian was bound by the limited tort coverage chosen by the girlfriend. The appellate court found that the parties conceded that at the time of the accident that the pedestrian did not have financial responsibility with respect to any motor vehicle. As such, the pedestrian was deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative under 75 Pa. Cons. 5tat. Ann. G 1705(a)(5). OUTCOME: The order was affirmed. CORE TERMS: summary judgment, partial, coverage, financial responsibility, motor vehicle, insurance coverage, registered, insured, matter of law..., moving party, threshold, insurance policy, policy issued, burden of proof, citations omitted, inferred, passenger vehicle, driving privileges, issue of material fact, entitled to judgment, abuse of discretion, private passenger, uninsured vehicle', girlfriend, appealable, non-moving, passenger, uninsured, resident, choosing LEXISNEXIS(R) HEADNOTES Insurance Law > Motor Vehicle Insurance > Coverage > No-Fault Coverage > Personal Injury Protection > General Overview httns://p/vvw.lexio. 5oub}f7o8bll5f6fl600}7Cl382d74& bro... 4/28/7011 uetauocnment -UyCitu ton -Z0U2 PA Super 48 Page 2 of 7 I-IN See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1705(d). Civil Procedure > Discovery > Methods > General Overview Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > General Overview Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Supporting Materials > Discovery Materials Hm2+8unnrnaryjudgrnent is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether to grant summary judgment a trial court must resolve all doubts against the moving party and examine the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment may only be granted in cases where it is clear and free from doubt the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Burdens of Production & Proof > Movants Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > Genuine Disputes m/Nr�+Pa. R. Civ. P. 1035.2 states that where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to its case and on which it bears the burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. []v/| Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > General Overview Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review HN4+ln examining an entry of summary judgment, an appellate court examines a trial court's determination for error of law or abuse of discretion. As with all questions of law, appellate review is plenary. Insurance Law > Motor Vehicle Insurance > Coverage > No-Fault Coverage > Personal Injury Protection > General Overview Hiv5+See75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1705(a)(5). Insurance Law > Motor Vehicle Insurance > Coverage > No-Fault Coverage > Personal Injury Protection > General Overview Hmo+ See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1702. Insurance Law > Motor Vehicle Insurance > Coverage > No-Fault Coverage > Personal Injury Protection > General Overview Insurance Law > Motor Vehicle Insurance > Vehicle Ownership > Legal Title Hm7+The legislature never entitled or described 75 Pa. Cons, Stat. Ann, § 1705(a)(5) as the uninsured vehicle exception, and there is no basis for such title or description. Insurance Law > Motor Vehicle Insurance > Coverage > No-Fault Coverage > Personal Injury Protection > General Overview Hms+The unambiguous language of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat Ann. § 1705(a)(5) states that the owner of a registered private passenger vehicle who does not have financial responsibility shall be deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative, the proper emphasis being on the vehicle owner's lack of financial responsibility and not the vehicle's lack of financial responsibility. Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation HN9-4- When the owner of a vehicle gives another person consent and approval to obtain httn3://vvpmw.le%io.cOo/rc3eurc}/IetreneY_Dz=745ucblf7c8bll566fl6oa}7c}]87d2g& _ brO— 9/28/2011 wCL-a uocm/lelu' oyuauon - zuuz t'A up-er Page of 7 insurance coverage on the vehicle, the owner is bound by the insurance coverage chosen by that person. COUNSEL: Steven D. Janel, Philadelphia, for appellant. Charles P. Menszak, Philadelphia, for Greco, appellee. JUDGES: Before JOYCE, OLSZEWSKI and MONTEMURO *, JJ. OPINION BY JOYCE, J. * Retired Justice assigned to Superior Court. OPINION BY: JOYCE OPINION [**946] OPINION BY JOYCE, J. (*Pi] Appellant, Jacob Schwartzberg, appeals from the March 14, 3001 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which granted partial summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Joseph Greco. 1 We affirm. FOOTNOTES 1 Appellant made claims for first-party benefits against Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, and against State Farm Insurance Company. These claims were ultimately settled. Reply Brief for Appellant, at 3. Thus, Progressive, and State Farm are not directly involved in this appeal. [*P2] On October 11, 1997, Appellant was injured when he was struck by a motor vehicle operated by Appellee while Appellant was a pedestrian on a roadway in Philadelphia. Specifically, the outside passenger mirror of (***2] the vehicle driven by Appellee stuck Appellant's left elbow as Appellee drove by. [*P3] On the date of the accident, Appellant was the owner of a 1985 Dodge Caravan. On that date also, Appellant's driving privileges had been suspended by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As a result of the license suspension, Appellant did not have motor vehicle insurance in his own name. The Dodge Caravan was insured by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company under a policy issued to Appellant's resident girlfriend, Karen Miller. Under the insurance policy, Karen Miller elected the "limited tort" coverage, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1705(d), 2 and Appellant was listed as an "excluded driver." FOOTNOTES 2 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1705(d) provides as follows: Hm1T-"(d) Limited tort alternative.-- Each person who elects the limited tort alternative remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to applicable tort law. Unless the injury sustained is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort election shall be precluded from maintaining an action for any noneconomic loss ^" httns://wvvvv.le:xis. 5ccblf7c8bll5f6fl6ca}7cl382d346t bI0— 4/28/2011 iNA_* to,.3 rage7+01/ [***3] [*P4] On April 28, 1999, Appellant filed a civil complaint against Appellee and other defendants, stemming from the October 11, 1997 accident. The complaint alleged that Appellee's negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Appellant. [*PS] On February 23, 2000, Appellee filed an Answer and New Matter, alleging, as a defense, that Appellant was bound by the limited tort coverage chosen by Karen Miller. On July 18, 2000, the case was heard by an arbitration panel, which found in favor of Appellee and held that Appellant has a limited tort status. Thereafter, Appellant appealed from the arbitration award. � AL, [*P6] At the trial court level, both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment on the basis of the limited tort coverage: Appellant argued that the limited [**947] tort coverage did not apply to him while Appellee argued that Appellant was bound by the limited tort coverage elected by Karen MiUer, On May 14, 2001, the trial court entered two orders: one granting Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, the other denying Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment on the limited tort issue. In essence, the court held that Appellant was bound by the limited [***4] tort coverage. [*P7] At a pre-trial conference held on March 21, 3001, Appellant conceded that in view of the grant of summary judgment on the issue of the limited tort coverage, Appellant would be unable to sustain its burden of proof. As a result of this concession, on March 23, 2001, the trial court issued an order dismissing Appellant's claims against Appellee. Subsequently, on April 4, 2001, the court entered an order discontinuing Appellant's action, thereby making the March 14, 2001 order (granting partial summary judgment in favor of Appellee) final and immediately appealable. s FOOTNOTES 3 See Triffin v. Janssen, 455 Pa. Super. 513, 688 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1997) (an order in which the trial court sua sponte imposed discovery sanctions against both parties in a legal malpractice action, which was entered while action was pending, was rendered final and appealable by the discontinuation of the action). A ?Pe-AB., [*PS] On April 10, 2001, Appellant timely appealed to this Court. The solitary question judgment [***5] is "whether it was proper for the lower court to enter partial summary favor of [Appellee,] Joseph Greco and against [Appellant,] Jacob 5chvvartzberg[,] deeming [Appellant] to be bound by the 'limited tort' threshold." Brief for Appellant, at 3 (full capitalization omitted). ummary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In determining whether to grant summary judgment a trial court must resolve all doubts against the moving party and examine the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment may only be granted in cases where it is clear and free from doubt the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Piluso v. Cohen, 2000 PA Super 335, 764 A.2d 549, 550 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations omitted). Consistent with our Supreme Court, in examining the trial court's determination, we focus our attention on the legal https://www.lexis.comiresearchiretrieve?_m=745ccblf7c8b115f6f16cal7c1382d29&_bro... 9/28/2011 standard articulated in the summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. HN37That rule states [***6] that where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment. We have stated quite plainly that failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to its case and on which it bears the burden of proof ... establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Manzetti v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 565 Pa, 471, 776 A.2d 938, 944-945 (Pa. 2001) �� (footnote and citations omitted). Vln examining an entry of summary judgment, we examine the trial court's determination for error of law or abuse of discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary. Id. at 944 (citations omitted), ply, Appellant h the | court erred in holding that Appellant was bound by the limited tort threshold. We disagree. "'=547 [**9481 Under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5), ''an owner (***7] of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle who does not-ia7Thancie| responsibility �hall be deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative." HN6FFinancia| responsibility is defined as "the ability to respond in damages for liability on accouht of accidents arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in the amount of $ 15,000 because of injury to one person in any one accident, in the amount of $ 30,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident and in the amount of $ 5,000 because of damage to property of others in any one accident. The financial responsibility shall be in a form acceptable to the Department of Transportation." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. [*P10] In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time of the accident, Appellant was the owner of a 1985 Dodge Caravan; that the Dodge Caravan was a registered vehicle; and that the Dodge Caravan is a private passenger vehicle, The parties also concede the fact that at the time of the accident, Appellant did not have financial responsibility with respect to the Dodge Caravan or any other motor vehicle. Based on these facts, we conclude that at the time of [***8] the accident, Appellant was the owner of a registered vehicle who did not have financial responsibility. As such, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5), Appellant is deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative. [*P11] Appellant argues that at the time of the accident, he was not the owner of a registered private passenger motor vehicle, which does not have financial responsibility. Appellant argues that since at the time of the accident his Dodge Caravan was insured under a policy issued by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5) is inapplicable to him. In support of this interpretation of the statute, Appellant describes the above statutory section as the "'uninsured vehicle' exception." Brief for Appellant, at 11. Appellant also construes the statute as follows; " 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(m)(5) binds a plaintiff with the 'limited tort' threshold if he or she is the owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle which is uninsureU." Brief for Appellant, at 11 (emphasis added). [*P12] Appellant's interpretation and construction of the statutory section [***9] is seriously flawed. First, "°^ithe legislature never entitled or described the section as the "uninsured vehicle exception," and there is no basis for such title or description. Secondly, Appellant replaces the word "who" in the section with the word "which," thereby, changing the meaning of the section. With this change, the emphasis of the section becomes the insured or uninsured status of the vehicle in question. [*P13] However, e unambiguous language of the section states that the "owner of a registered private passenger vehicle who does not have financial responsibility shall be deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative"(id), the proper emphasis being on the lttpo://wvvw]cxis. m=745ccb}f7c8bll5f6f16c4l7cl382d29&_bro... 9/28/2011 = uet a vocuoenu-Uyutounn --ZV0z r wiper 48� -� -- �� y8geh0l7 vahide owner's lack of financial responsibility and not the vehicle's lack of financial responsibility. Accordingly, we reiterate that pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5)/ Appellant iS deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative, and the trial court properly concluded that Appellant is bound by the limited tort threshold. The above statutory section sufficiently supports the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Appellee. [*P14] Apart from [***10] the application of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(n)(5), we also agree with the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the basis that under the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable to conclude that Ms. Miller [**949] had Appellant's consent and approval in choosing the limited tort coverage. [*P1S] The following facts and circumstances of this case, when viewed cumulatively, support the imputation of limited tort coverage to Appellant even though Appellant was not a named insured under the policy issued to Karen Miller, the named insured. At the time of the accident, Appellant was the owner the Dodge Caravan, and the title was listed in Appellant's name. Being the owner of the vehicle, no one, including Appellant's resident girlfriend, Karen Miller, could use, dispose of, or insure the vehicle without Appellant's consent and approval. It strains credulity to argue that Karen Miller obtained the insurance on Appellant's vehicle without Appellant's consent and approval. * We were not privy to any conversations Appellant may have had with Karen Miller regarding whether to obtain insurance coverage or what type of coverage for [***11.] Appellant's vehicle. Nevertheless, we find that*Ng7when Appellant, the of a vehicle, gives another person consent and approval to obtain insurance coverage on lhevehidc, Appellant is bound by the insurance coverage chosen by that person FOOTNOTES 4 See Ridley v. Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 1999 PA Super 313, 745 A.2d 7, 14 (Pa. Super. 1999) (It can be inferred that an unmarried couple was acting as one in determining the insurance coverage for the 1984 Mercury they owned together). If action in concert can be inferred when there is joint ownership of the vehicle, in the case at bar where Appellant is the sole owner of the vehicle, it can definitely be inferred that Appellant played a leading role in choosing the type of insurance coverage or, at the very least, participated in the decision to choose the type of insurance coverage. (*P16] Parenthetically, we note that although it is not determinative, it is interesting that when Appellant's driving privileges were reinstated, he was added to the insurance policy issued (***12] to Karen MiUer(onAppeUant'svehic|c) and they retained the limited tort option. [*P17] Based on the foregoing discussion, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5), Appellant is deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative. Further, although Appellant was not a named insured on the insurance policy issued to Karen Miller on Appellant's vehicle, under the circumstances of this case, Appellant must be deemed to have consented to the limited tort option chosen by Karen Miller. We therefore affirm the order of the trial court granting Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, and we also affirm the trial court's order denying Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment. r P18] Orders affirmed. Service: Get by LEXSEE® Citation: 793 a.2d 945 View: Full DatefTime: Wednesday, September 28, 2011 - 11:23 AM EDT * Signal Legend: httnx://vvv"w.lonim.cooz/researoh/retrcvs?_ol=745 ccb1f7o8b]}5f6f}6co]7c1382d29& bro... 9/28/2011 �� ' '� ' .� Warning: Negative treatment is indicated Questioned: Validity questioned by citing refs Caution: Possible negative treatment Positive treatment is indicated Citing Ref ,VVith4na|ysisAvai|ab|e Citation information available * Click on any Shepard's signal to Shepardizeg that case. In rage / u// About LexisNexis I Privacy Policy I Terms 8+. Conditions I Contact Us Copyright © 2011 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Partial Summary Judement has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this 31st day of March, 2014. Zachary Campbell, Esquire Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C. 3211 North Front Street P.O. Box 5300 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0300 (Attorney for Plaintiff) SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK & GUTHRI P.C. By: r Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant METZGER, WICKERSHAM, P.C. By: Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 2321 Paxton Church Road P.O. Box 69200 Harrisburg, PA 17106 -9200 (717) 238 -8187 APR PrN, SY! VAr:tA Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff vs. JARED ADAMS, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 11- 3300 -CV CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter, by and through her attorneys, Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C. and submit the following response in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Conclusions of law, no response required. If a response is required, Section 1705(a)(5) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law speaks for itself. 5. Admitted in part. It is admitted that the vehicle Plaintiff was driving at the time of the accident was insured under a policy with Permanent General Assurance Corporation, listing Roger E. Ritter as a named insured. It is also admitted that the policy does not specifically list Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter's name anywhere in the policy documents. 549651 -1 6. Admitted in part. Denied in part. It is admitted that Roger E. Ritter and Rebecca Welsh are listed as the owners /purchasers of the 1998 Saturn. It is denied that the Certificate of Title attached to Defendant's Motion is a true and correct copy as Plaintiff is unaware when and where this document was obtained by Defendant. 7. It is admitted that the document speaks for itself. 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted in part. In her Responses to Request for Admissions, Plaintiff acknowledged that she believed that she was a "registered owner" of the 1998 Saturn SL2, but had been unable to verify that information through the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation records. 10. Denied. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff has not provided proof of any other type of insurance covering the 1998 Saturn SL2 involved in the accident. The vehicle Plaintiff was operating at the time of the accident was insured under the policy issued by Permanent General Assurance Corporation, which satisfied the requirements of the MVFRL. 11. Conclusions of law, no response required. If a response is required, the averments are specifically denied. It is denied that Plaintiff did not maintain financial responsibility as required by the MVFRL and is bound by the limited tort option. The vehicle Plaintiff was operating at the time of the accident was insured under the policy issued by Permanent General Assurance Corporation. Therefore, Plaintiff maintained financial responsibility as required by the MVFRL. 12. Conclusions of law, no response required. If a response is required, the averments are specifically denied. It is denied that Plaintiff is bound by the limited tort selected by Roger Ritter. Plaintiff was not an insured and /or "named insured" under the Permanent General 549651 -1 Assurance Corporation policy and therefore, is not bound by the limited tort option. See McWeeney v. Estate of Janet R. Strickler, 61 A.3d 1023 (Pa. Super. 2013). (Attached hereto as Exhibit "A "). 13. Conclusions of law, no response required. If a response is required, the averments are specifically denied. It is denied that Plaintiff should be bound by the tort option chosen by Roger Ritter. The facts in Schwartzberg v. Grego, 793 A.2d 945 (Pa. Super. 2002) are distinguishable from the case at hand. In Schwartzberg, the "named insured" was not the owner or co -owner of the vehicle in question. In the instant case, Plaintiff is considered the "co- owner/co- purchaser" of the vehicle involved in the accident. The co -owner of the vehicle was a named insured on a policy maintained for the jointly owned vehicle involved in the accident and the co- owners maintained financial responsibility as required by the MVFRL. Since Plaintiff was a co- owner, she did necessarily have to consent and approve to Roger Ritter obtaining coverage and selecting the limited tort option, as he could make the decision alone as a co- owner. 14. Conclusions of law, no response required. If a response is required, the averments are specifically denied. It is denied that Plaintiff was a registered owner and did not maintain financial responsibility over the vehicle and therefore, is bound by the limited tort option. Plaintiff was co- owner /co- purchaser of the vehicle that she was operating. The co- owners of the vehicle maintained the financial responsibility as required by the MVFRL. The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law should be construed liberally in favor of the insured. Progressive Halcyon Insurance Company v. Anthonay Kennedy, 2006 Pa. Super 262, 908 A.2d 911 (2006). 15. Conclusions of law, no response required. If a response is required, the averments are specifically denied. It is denied that Plaintiff is bound by the limited tort option. 549651 -1 Plaintiff was co -owner /purchaser of the vehicle which she was operating. The co- owners of the vehicle maintained the financial responsibility as required by the MVFRL. Plaintiff was not a "named insured" and /or "insured" under the automobile policy carried by the owner of the vehicle as required by 75 Pa.C.S. 1705. The Court in McWeeney noted that: "only one who is identified by name as an insured on the face of the policy is a "named insured" for the purposes of tort election." Id. at 1029. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Rebecca Welsh n/k/a Rebecca Ritter, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an Order denying Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. B Dated: i 549651 -1 ary D. Campbell, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 93177 2321 Paxton Church Road P.O. Box 69200 Harrisburg, PA 17106 -9200 (717) 238 -8187 (717) 234 -9478 (fax) Attorneys for Plaintiff CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Zachary D. Campbell, Esquire, of the law firm of Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss & Erb, P.C., hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summaryy Judgment with reference to the foregoing action by first class mail, postage prepaid, this / 0 day of ijpyf ( , 2014 on the following: Defendant, Jared Adams c/o Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonnell, Hudock & Guthrie, P.C. 945 E. Park Dr., Ste. 201 Harrisburg, PA 17111 METZGER, WICKERSHAM, KNAUSS & ERB, P.C. 549651 -1 D. Campbell, Esquire 1 I McWeeney v. Estate of Strickler, 61 A.3d 1023 (2013) 2013 PA Super 17 61 A.3d 1023 Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Sally McWEENEY, Appellee v. ESTATE OF Janet R. STRICKLER, Appellant. Argued Aug. 21, 2013. Filed Jan. 30, 2013. Synopsis Background: Automobile accident victim who was driving insured's vehicle when collision occurred sued driver of other car involved in collision for personal injuries. The Court of Common Pleas, York County, Civil Division, No. 2009 -SU- 6582-01, Thompson, J., granted summary judgment against victim and dismissed her claims, finding that she was bound by insured's limited tort recovery election in automobile insurance policy. Accident victim appealed. Holdings: The Superior Court, 98 MDA 2012, Stevens, J,, held that: [1] accident victim was not a "named insured" who was bound to insured's limited tort election, and [2] as a motorist who owned no vehicle and was unrelated to the owner of the car she drove, victim could seek non- economic damages under another section of motor vehicle financial responsibility statute. Vacated and remanded. West Headnotes (7) [1] Automobiles 0- Vehicles, persons or occurrences within restrictions Designation of accident victim who was driving insured's vehicle when a collision occurred as a "principal driver" in insured's automobile insurance policy did not make victim a "named insured" or "insured" within meaning motor of vehicle financial responsibility statute, and thus did not bind her to insured's limited tort recovery election or bar her from seeking non - economic damages against third -party tortfeasor in her action for personal injuries from the collision. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(b)(3), (f). 1 Cases that cite this headnote [2] Automobiles 0- Vehicles, persons or occurrences within restrictions Only one who is identified by name as an insured on the face of the policy is a "named insured" for purposes of the binding full or limited tort election that a named insured may make pursuant to the motor vehicle financial responsibility statute. 75 Pa,C,S.A. § 1705(0. 1 Cases that cite this headnote [3] Automobiles 0- Vehicles, persons or occurrences within restrictions Where an automobile insurance policy's enlargement of the term "insured" binds more drivers to a limited tort recovery than would be so bound under the motor vehicle financial responsibility statute's definition, the policy contravenes the legislative intent of the motor vehicle financial responsibility law. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(0. Cases that cite this headnote [4] Automobiles 40- Vehicles, persons or occurrences within restrictions Where an automobile insurance policy would bar more drivers from claiming non - economic damages against third party tortfeasors than was contemplated in motor vehicle financial responsibility statute, it runs afoul of the statute and is not enforceable. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(0. Cases that cite this headnote [5] Automobiles 0- Vehicles, persons or occurrences within restrictions Sa rN 2 Thomson Reuters. No claim to o gtn U.S. Government Works, McWeeney v. Estate of Strickler, 61 A.3d 1023 (2013) 2013 PA Super 17 The phrase "insured under any private passenger motor vehicle policy" as it is used in motor vehicle financial responsibility statute, regarding who is precluded from seeking economic and non - economic damages against a third party tortfeasor, is limited in scope to include only a spouse, family members sharing a household with the named insured, and children in their custody. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(b)(3). Cases that cite this headnote [6] Automobiles 40- Vehicles, persons or occurrences within restrictions A motorist who owns no vehicle and is unrelated to the owner of the car she drives may seek non- economic damages against a third -party tortfeasor pursuant to motor vehicle financial responsibility statute, even if she was a permissive driver otherwise insured for first party benefits and liability to others under the terms of the owner's limited tort policy. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(b)(3), (f). Cases that cite this headnote [7] Automobiles Cr, Vehicles, persons or occurrences within restrictions Automobile insurance policy provision stating that all permissive drivers were insureds for purposes of both liability and first party benefits was unenforceable to extent it precluded pennissive drivers from filing full tort claims against third party tortfeasors when they otherwise would have the express right to do so under the motor vehicle financial responsibility law. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(f). Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *1024 Steven D. Stambaugh, York, for appellant. Erick V. Violago, York, for appellee. BEFORE: STEVENS, P.J., BENDER, J., and GANTMAN, J. Opinion OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J. This is an appeal from the order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of York County granting Appellee/ Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Appellant's personal injury claim. The *1025 question before us asks whether the court erroneously deemed Appellant either a "named insured" or, in the alternative, an "insured" under her fiance's automotive insurance policy, as those terms are defined in the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, such that she was bound by his election of the limited tort alternative therein. We vacate and remand. The trial court has provided an apt summary of facts and procedural history as follows: This action arose out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on January 9, 2008. Plaintiff [hereinafter Appellant], Sally McWeeney, was traveling eastbound on Market Street, York, Pennsylvania, when Defendant, Janet Strickler, 1 traveling westbound on Market Street, made a left turn in front of Appellant. A collision between the parties' vehicles then followed. When the collision occurred, Appellant was [permissively] operating a vehicle owned by Richard D. Brandt, her fiance' at the time. Progressive Insurance Company insured Mr. Brandt's vehicle under the limited tort option ( "Progressive policy ") and listed Mr. Brandt as the "Named Insured" on the policy declarations page. See DefendantlAppellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B. Both Appellant and Mr. Brandt are listed as principal drivers on the policy declarations page. Additionally, Appellant was a permissive driver of the vehicle on the date of the collision. As a result of the collision, Appellant aver[ed] she sustained personal injuries resulting in serious impairment of bodily function, "which include, but are not limited to, the following: a) physical pain and suffering resulting from injuries to her left shoulder, arm, and back; b) mental anguish; c) discomfort; d) inconvenience; e) distress; f) loss of life's pleasures; g) embarrassment and humiliation; h) an impairment of health and sense of well- being; and i) disfigurement." See Complaint at 12. WestlavwNexr O 2014 Thomson Reuters. No clai Io original U.S. Government Works. 2 McWeeney v. Estate of Strickler, 61 A.3d 1023 (2013) 2013 PA Super 17 Appellant also aver[ed] she "has suffered, is suffering, and in the future will continue to suffer financial injuries which include, but are not limited to, the following: a) past, present, and future medical expenses which have or may in the future exceed applicable legal limits; b) incidental costs resulting from dealing with said injuries; and c) loss of earnings and earning capacity." See id. at 13. Defendant/Appellee denie[d] that Appellant suffered any serious injury or financial loss as a result of the collision. On August 8, 2011, Defendant/Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support. Defendant/ Appellee argue[d] that Appellant was insured under the limited tort option elected by Mr. Brandt in his Progressive policy and, as such, cannot recover for pain and suffering because she did not sustain a serious injury. Additionally, Defendant/Appellee argue[d] that Appellant suffered no financial injuries. Therefore, Defendant/Appellee argue[d], there is no genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. On August 26, 2011, Appellant filed an Answer to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and a Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Appellant filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendant's /Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and a Brief in Support of *1026 Plaintiffs [Appellant's] Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on September 6, 2011. In these four submissions, Plaintiff /Appellant argue[d] that she is not bound by the Limited tort option in the Progressive policy because she is not a "named insured" or "insured" within the definition provided by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705. Therefore, Appellant argue[d], the full tort option applies to her. On September 12, 2011, Defendant/Appellee filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiffs [Appellant's] Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 15, 2011, Defendant/Appellee filed an Answer to Appellant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and a Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. In all three submissions, Defendant /Appellee argue[d] that Appellant was a "named insured" and /or an "insured" within the meaning of § 1705, and, therefore, the limited tort option applie[d] to her. On October 11, 2011, Defendant/Appellee filed a Praecipe to List for One –Judge Disposition. On November 3, 2011, th[e] matter was assigned to the Honorable John W. Thompson, Jr. for One –Judge Disposition. Opinion of the Lower Court, dated December 15, 2011 at 1 -3. By its order of December 15, 2011, the lower court granted Defendant/Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding no issue of material fact regarding Appellant's status as an insured driver under Mr. Brandt's limited tort policy with Progressive, when read against the MVFRL. Specifically, the court reasoned: The MVFRL states in relevant part, "Where there are two or more named insureds on a policy, any named insured may make the full or limited tort election provided for in this section for all named insureds on the policy." 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(2). The MVFRL goes on to define "named insured" for purposes of. § 1705 as "[a]ny individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of private passenger motor vehicle insurance." 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(0. We therefore look to the language of the Progressive policy to determine Appellant's status as a named insured. Appellant is listed on the Progressive policy declarations page as a principal driver, and Appellant has also admitted that she was a permissive driver on the date of the collision. The Progressive policy provides section - specific definitions for "insured person" in three separate sections. However, while the classes of persons defined as "insured" varies by section, one class of persons consistently defined in every applicable section as "insured persons" are those operating the covered vehicle with the owner's permission. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C. Further, it seems only common sense to the Court that an individual specifically named as a principal driver would also be a permissive driver. Therefore, because Appellant, a permissive driver, is an "insured person" under the Progressive policy definition, and she is also specifically named as a principal driver on the declarations page, Appellant falls under the § 1705(0 definition of a "named insured." As a named insured, then, Appellant is held to the same tort option selected by another named insured on the policy. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(2). In this case, Mr. Brandt — specifically Westlaw,vNext" © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to origina U.S. Government Works. McWeeney v. Estate of Strickler, 61 A.3d 1023 (2013) 2013 PA Super 17 designated on the declarations page as "Named Insured" *1027 —elected the limited tort option binding himself and [Appellant]. Therefore, according to the MVFRL § 1705(d), Appellant is precluded from recovering noneconomic damages unless she sustained serious injury as a result of the collision. [The lower court then went on to find Appellant did not sustain serious injury for purposes of Section 1705(d).] Opinion of the Lower Court at 5-6. Judgment was subsequently entered and Appellant timely appealed. Appellant raises the following issues for our review: I. WHETHER APPELLANT IS A "NAMED INSURED" UNDER 75 PA.C.S. § 1705 AND THEREFORE BOUND TO THE LIMITED TORT ELECTION OF A NON— SPOUSE /NON- RELATIVE CO— RESIDENT? H. WHETHER APPELLANT IS AN "INSURED" UNDER 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705 AND THEREFORE BOUND TO THE LIMITED TORT ELECTION OF A NON — SPOUSE/NON— RELATIVE CO- RESIDENT? III. WHETHER THE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS OF A MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE POLICY TAKE PRECEDENT OVER THE 75 PA.C.S.A. § 1705 STATUTORY MANDATES AND SAFEGUARDS PREREQUISITE TO SOMEONE BEING BOUND TO THE RESTRICTED RIGHTS OF LIMITED TORT STATUS? Brief of Appellant at 4. When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment, we adhere to the following standard and scope of review: We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court's order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Shipp v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 51 A.3d 219, 221 (Pa.Super.2012) (citations omitted). 111 We first examine the court's determination that Appellant was a "named insured" under Mr. Brandt's policy as that term is defined in the MVFRL. As this issue is one of statutory construction, we note "[t]he Statutory Construction Act provides that the object of interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). The General Assembly's intent is best expressed through the plain language of a statute. Commonwealth v. Fithian, 599 Pa. 180, 961 A.2d 66, 74 (2008). As we have repeatedly stated, "when statutes have a bearing on the outcome of a case, we begin by analyzing the express words of the statutes. When the statute is clear, we need go no further to discern the intent of the legislature." Kmonk— Sullivan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 567 Pa. 514, 788 A.2d 955, 959 (2001) (internal citations omitted). Hoffman v. Troncelliti, 576 Pa. 504, 511 -512, 839 A.2d 1013, 1017 (2003). *1028 In the definitions subsection of Section 1705,2 which relates to election of tort options, a "named insured" is "any individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of private passenger motor vehicle insurance." Section 1705(f). Appellant's designation by name as a "principal driver" on the declarations page was enough to convince the lower court that she was a "named insured" as that term is defined in Section 1705(0 of the MVFRL. It is "common sense," the lower court reasoned, that a named principal driver who by the terms of the policy is an insured driver obtains the designation of a "named insured" pursuant to Section 1705(0 and, consequently, becomes subject to Brandt's election of limited tort pursuant to Section 1705(a)(2). We disagree. A plain reading of the definition of "named insured" in Section 1705(0 yields that only one identified by name as an insured on the policy is, in fact, a "named insured." Nowhere WestlawNext 0 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 McWeeney v. Estate of Strickler, 61 A.3d 1023 (2013) 2013 PA Super 17 in Mr. Brandt's policy is Appellant identified by name as an insured. Her name appears just once in the policy, in a section of the policy declarations page in which Mr. Brandt was required to list all regular drivers of his insured vehicles, residents of his household aged 16 years and older, and all children who live away from home who occasionally drive his cars. He listed himself and Appellant, and he labeled each a "principal driver." Though not binding upon this Court, a decision of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in a related context informs on this issue of whether one named as a driver on an insurance policy assumes the designation of a "named insured." In Erie Insurance Co. v. Insurance Dept., 705 A.2d 937 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, who found that an automobile insurer violated *1029 Act 78, amended as 40 P.S. §§ 1008.1 —.11, by cancelling a policy due to license suspensions of the named insured's spouse. The spouse had not been listed on the declarations page as a "named insured," but the policy contained language defining the term as including a spouse residing in the same household. The Insurance Commissioner determined that in enacting Act 78, "[t]he General Assembly did not intend ... the term `named insured' to include those other persons who are listed as additional insureds in an endorsement or merely listed as additional drivers of the insured vehicle," Id. at 939. The Commonwealth Court agreed, and relied on what it described as [a]n extensive body of secondary authority, including insurance law treatises, indicat[ing] that the phrase "named insured" is used as a technical term in the insurance industry referring only to individuals designated as "named insureds" on the face of or in the declarations section of the policy. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary at 1023 (6th ed. 1990) ( "Named insured. In insurance, the person specifically designated in the policy as the one protected and, commonly, it is the person with whom the contract of insurance has been made." (emphasis added)); Barry D. Smith et al., Property & Liability Insurance Principles 216 (2d ed. 1994) ( "The declarations page of a policy has a space labeled `named insured(s).' Only parties whose names appear in that space (or on an attached endorsement listing `additional named insureds' are, in fact, 'named insureds.' Often, the spouse of a named insured receives the same coverage as a named insured, even if the spouse is not named (and is not, therefore, a named insured))." (emphasis in original)); John Alan & Jean Applebaum, Insurance Law & Practice 51 (1979) ( "Whenever the term `named insured' is employed, it refers only to the person specifically designated upon the face of the contract. "); see also 7 Am Jur. Automobile Insurance § 236 (1980); Words & Phrases, "Named Insured" (1955 & Supp.1997). Id. at 940. [2] We discern no persuasive reason to depart from such authority to adopt a different interpretation of the term "named insured" as it is used in Section 1705. Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, only one who is identified by name as an insured on the face of the policy is a "named insured" for purposes of tort election. As Appellant was not identified by name as an insured, but only as another driver of Mr. Brandt's covered vehicles, we conclude that she was not a "named insured" as that term is defined under the governing statute. [3] We turn, then, to the remaining issue of whether Appellant's status as a permissive driver under the policy qualified her as an "insured" driver under Section 1705 such that she was bound by Mr Brandt's election of limited tort. A review of controlling authority leads to the conclusion that her status under the terms of the policy did not preclude her from claiming full tort damages against a third party tortfeasor. Limited to the "election of tort options" context, we hold that where a policy's enlargement of the term "insured" binds more drivers to a limited tort recovery than would be so bound under the MVFRL's definition, the policy contravenes the legislative intent of Section 1705.3 *1030 Mr. Brandt's policy states that all permissive drivers are insured under its terms for both liability to others and first party benefits. Because Appellant was a permissive driver both in fact and under the policy, which lists her as a principal driver on the policy declaration page, it follows that she was insured for such purposes. [4] Within the same policy, Mr, Brandt elected the limited tort alternative, which in accordance with the MVFRL precludes him and all "insureds" from recovering non- economic damages absent a showing of serious injury. The question becomes, therefore, whether the policy may properly define an "insured" more broadly than does the MVFRL for purposes of binding permissive drivers to the owner's election of limited tort, Where, as here, the insurance policy would bar more drivers from claiming non - economic damages against WestlawNexf © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works, 5 McWeeney v. Estate of Strickler, 61 A.3d 1023 (2013) 2013 PA Super 17 third party tortfeasors than was contemplated in Section 1705, it runs afoul of the statute and is not enforceable. As indicated above, Section 1705(0 defines the term "insured" as it is used throughout Section 1705 as any individual residing in the household of the named insured who is (1) a spouse or other relative of the named insured or (2) a minor in the custody of either the named insured or relative of the named insured. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(f). 4 Because Appellant met neither part of this definition, we find she did not qualify as an insured under Mr. Brandt's policy's "election of tort options" section, which comes under Section 1705's ambit. [5] Moreover, the record demonstrated that Appellant did not own a motor vehicle. Given her status, therefore, as an uninsured motorist who owned no vehicle, Appellant's eligibility for third party, non - economic damages would be governed by Section 1705(b)(3), which provides that non - owner, uninsured motorists may seek both economic and non- economic damages against a third party tortfeasor: (a) Application of tort options. —(3) An individual who is not an owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle and who is not a named insured or insured under any private passenger motor vehicle policy shall not be precluded from maintaining an action for noneconomic loss or economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to applicable tort law. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(b)(3). 5 [6] 171 From this statutory scheme, we infer the clear legislative intent to allow a *1031 motorist, who owns no vehicle and is unrelated to the owner of the car she drives, to seek non - economic damages against a third -party tortfeasor, even if she was a permissive driver otherwise insured for first party benefits and liability to others under the terms of the owner's limited tort policy. Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Brandt's policy would preclude permissive drivers from filing full tort claims against third party tortfeasors when they otherwise have the express right to do so under the MVFRL, the policy is unenforceable. Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court so held under quite similar facts in Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002). In Colbert, the policy's restrictive definition of "insured" worked to provide coverage to fewer drivers than intended by the MVFRL and its definition of an "insured." Guided by the general rule that stipulations in a contract of insurance in conflict with, or repugnant to, statutory provisions must yield to the statute and are invalid, 6 the Court concluded: "As a result, the policy's more restrictive definition of an `insured' is in conflict with the MVFRL. Nothing in the MVFRL permits Prudential or any other insurer to diminish the MVFRL's definition of an `insured' and thereby provide coverage to a lesser scope than the MVFRL requires." Colbert at 88 -89, 813 A.2d at 751. See also Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 763 A.2d 401 (Pa.Super.2000) (holding that, where policy terms conflict with MVFRL, court cannot give effect to contractual provision, even if those terms are clear and unambiguous). It is likewise so in the case sub judice that the Progressive policy would provide access to full -tort coverage to a lesser scope of persons than the MVFRL requires. As we cannot give such effect to the policy's definition of an insured, we must reverse the lower court and hold that the policy may not be used to bar Appellant from seeking non economic damages against a third party tortfeasor, as is her right under Section 1705(b)(3). Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished. Parallel Citations 2013 PA Super 17 Footnotes 1 Ms. Strickler passed away at some time prior to the filing of the present action, making her estate the Defendant/Appellee in the case sub judice. Nevertheless, we shall use the lower court's nomenclature in referring to Ms, Strickler as the Defendant/Appellant in the recitation of facts. 2 Section 1705. Election of tort options, provides in pertinent part. (b) Application of tort options. — (1) The tort option elected by a named insured shall apply to all private passenger motor vehicle policies of the named insured issued by the same insurer and shall continue in force as to all subsequent renewal policies, replacement policies and any other private 1NestiawNe ' © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 McWeeney v. Estate of Strickler, 61 A.3d 1023 (2013) 2013 PA Super 17 passenger motor vehicle policies under which the individual is a named insured until the insurer, or its authorized representative, receives a properly executed form electing the other tort option. (2) The tort option elected by a named insured shall apply to all insureds under the private passenger motor vehicle policy who are not named insureds under another private passenger motor vehicle policy. In the case where more than one private passenger motor vehicle policy is applicable to an insured and the policies have conflicting tort options, the insured is bound by the tort option of the policy associated with the private passenger motor vehicle in which the insured is an occupant at the time of the accident if he is an insured on that policy and bound by the full tort option otherwise. (3) An individual who is not an owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle and who is not a named insured or insured under any private passenger motor vehicle policy shall not be precluded from maintaining an action for noneconomic loss or economic Toss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to applicable tort law. (t) Definitions. —As used in this section, the following words and phrases when used in this section shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection unless the context clearly indicates otherwise: "Insured." Any individual residing in the household of the named insured who is: (1) a spouse or other relative of the named insured; or (2) a minor in the custody of either the named insured or relative of the named insured. "Named insured." Any individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of private passenger motor vehicle insurance. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705 3 In this regard, we do not address the circumstance where the named insured has elected full tort. It appears, however, that no public policy concern would have arisen had Mr. Brandt elected full tort coverage. Appellant, as an uninsured motorist who did not own a vehicle, would have been entitled to pursue non - economic damages either under Section 1705(b)(3), see infra, of the MVFRL or under Mr. Brandt's policy as an insured permitted driver. Stated another way, a full tort election under Mr. Brandt's policy would have averted the problem of unilaterally binding a non - relative, uninsured permissive driver to a limited tort recovery where the MVFRL would have also permitted a full tort recovery. 4 In defining who qualifies as an "insured" for purposes of the election of tort statute, the legislature was perfectly capable of including all permissive drivers of the named insured's covered car within the definition; it did not do so. Instead, the class of "insureds" under this provision includes only a spouse or other relative residing in the household and minors in the custody of either the named insured or his or her relatives. Appellant did not fall within this class. 5 Again, consistent with the Section 1705(f)'s definition of an "insured," the phrase "insured under any private passenger motor vehicle policy" as it is used in Section 1705(b)(3) must be limited in scope to include only a spouse, family members sharing a household with the named insured, and children in their custody. 6 Citing George J. Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev. ed.) § 13.7 at 827 (1984). End of Document © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WesftawNtt" © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 On A PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT (Must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate) TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: (List the within Argument Court.) August 15, 2014 CAPTION OF CASE (entire caption must be stated in full) REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER vs. JARED ADAMS No. 11-3300 matter for the; next- niOD r—� n 2 c_r Term 1. State matter to be argued (i.e., plaintiff's motion for new trial, defendant's demurrer to complaint, etc.): DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CD N) 2. Identify all counsel who will argue cases: (a) for plaintiffs: Zachary D. Campbell (Name and Address) Metzger, Wickersham et. al. 2321 Paxton Church Rd, P.O. Box 69200, Harrisburg, PA 17106 (b) for defendants: Kevin Rauch, Anthony DelGrosso (Name and Address) Summers McDonnell et. al. 945 East Park Dr, Harrisburg, PA 17111 3. I will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has been listed for argument. 4. Argument Court Date: , = August 15, 2014 Date: 06/17/14 Print your name Defendant Attorney for INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Original and two copies of all briefs must be filed with the COURT ADMINISTRATOR (not the Prothonotary) before argument. 2. The moving party shall file and serve their brief 14 days prior to argument. 3. The responding party shall file their brief 7 days prior to argument. 4. If argument is continued new briefs must be filed with the COURT ADMINISTRATOR (not the Prothonotary) after the case is relisted. a K-4 -6(9 7pc-344, c12_* g6-7von REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff v. JARED ADAMS, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 11-3300 : CIVIL ACTION — LAW : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS, P.J., EBERT, J., AND PECK, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2014, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's response, the briefs filed by the parties, and argument held on August 15, 2014; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Plaintiff is by operation of law, a limited tort selector, and thereby precluded from recovering noneconomic damages pursuant to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. By the Court, Zachary Campbell, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff i Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Attorney for Defendant &o p; es oma, `/e f12-411 c7 r_ rn r o U.) r- 5 REBECCA WELSH n/k/a REBECCA RITTER, Plaintiff v. JARED ADAMS, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 11-3300 : CIVIL ACTION — LAW : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS, P.J., EBERT, J., AND PECK, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Ebert, J., September 25, 2014 — Defendant has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to bind Plaintiff to the limited tort option under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (hereinafter "MVFRL"). Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted for the following reasons. Statement of Facts This action stems from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 30, 2009, in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, when Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff's vehicle. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was driving a 1998 Saturn SL 2. Plaintiff admitted that she was a co-owner of the Saturn vehicle with her boyfriend Roger E. Ritter. The vehicle's Pennsylvania Certificate of Title listed both Plaintiff and Roger E. Ritter as the registered owners of the 1998 Saturn. At the time of the accident, the vehicle was insured under a policy with Permanent General Assurance Corporation (hereinafter "Policy"). The Policy listed 1 Since the time of the accident, Plaintiff has married Roger Ritter. 2 Roger E. Ritter as a named insured, but did not specifically list Plaintiff as a "named insured" or an "insured". Roger Ritter selected the limited tort coverage for the Policy. Plaintiff had no other insurance policy on the vehicle. Defendant has filed this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to prevent Plaintiff from pursuing any claims of noneconomic damages and limit Plaintiff to the limited tort option. Discussion Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits on file demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1), see also Weiner v. American Honda Motor, Co., 718 A.2d 305, 307 (Pa. Super. 1998). The court must construe the facts in the Tight most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts and reasonable inferences as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact in favor of the non- moving party. Talega v. Security Bureau, Inc., 719 A.2d 372, 374 (Pa. Super. 1998). The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials and to "eliminate the waste of time and resources of both litigants where a trial would be a useless formality". Curan v. Children's Service Center of Wyoming County, Inc., 578 A.2d 8, 9 (Pa. Super. 1990). Defendant argues that Plaintiff should be bound by the limited tort option for two reasons. Defendant's first argument is that Plaintiff failed to maintain financial responsibility on the vehicle. Secondly, that even if it is found that Plaintiff had the proper financial responsibility she is bound by the Policy selected by her boyfriend. In 3 both cases, Defendant argues, Plaintiff would be restricted to the limited tort coverage and partial summary judgment should be granted to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for noneconomic damages. Plaintiff counters that she should not be bound by the limited tort option because she maintained proper insurance on the vehicle through the Policy, but because she was not a named insured on the Policy, the limited tort option does not apply to her. The MVFRL states that an owner of a vehicle who does not have financial responsibility shall be deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5). However, an individual who is not an owner of a currently registered vehicle and who is not a "named insured" or insured shall not be precluded from bringing an action for noneconomic loss. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(b)(3). A "named insured" is defined as any individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of private passenger motor vehicle insurance. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(f). An "insured" is any individual residing in the household of the named insured who is either a spouse or relative of the named insured or is a minor in the custody of the named insured or relative of the named insured. Id. It is clear that Plaintiff was not a named insured on the Policy nor fits the definition of an insured, as Plaintiff and the co-owner of the vehicle were not married at the time of the accident. .Plaintiff argues that since she was not a named insured or an insured, she should not be bound by the limited tort option. Plaintiff relies on McWeeny v. Estate of Strickler, in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the plaintiff, McWeeny, was not precluded from claiming full tort damages because she was not a named insured on the policy. McWeeny, 61 A.3d 1023, 1029 (Pa. Super. 2013). 4 In McWeeny, the plaintiff was driving a vehicle owed by her fiance when she was involved in an accident. Her fiance had a limited tort coverage policy on the vehicle. The plaintiff was not listed as a named insured on the policy, but was listed as a principal driver. The Superior Court held that to bind the plaintiff to the limited tort recovery would expand the definition of an insured or a named insured under the MVFRL. Since the plaintiff was not an insured or a named insured of the policy, but was only a principal driver, and she did not own the vehicle, she was not bound by the limited tort option selected by her fiance. Instead, the Superior Court found that Section 1705(b)(3) of the MVFRL applied to the plaintiff and she was able to bring her noneconomic claims. Id. McWeeny is different from Plaintiff's situation in one important respect. In McWeeny, the plaintiff was not an owner of the vehicle and therefore § 1705(b)(3) of the MVFRL applied to her. However, in this case, Plaintiff was a co-owner of the vehicle and § 1705(b)(3) does not apply to her. Instead, Plaintiff's situation is closer to that of the plaintiff in Schwartzberg v. Greco, 793 A.2d 945 (Pa. Super. 2011). In Schwartzberg, the plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a vehicle while he was walking. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was the owner of a vehicle. The plaintiff's girlfriend had an insurance policy on the vehicle and the plaintiff was specifically listed as an excluded driver, because his driving privileges had been previously suspended. The girlfriend elected the limited tort coverage when she purchased the policy. Id. at 946. The Superior Court found that because the plaintiff was an owner of a vehicle and did not have an insurance policy, he did not have financial responsibility as required by the MVFRL and was therefore, deemed to have 5 chosen the limited tort alternative. Id. at 948; see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5). The Court stated that the proper emphasis is on the vehicle owner's lack of financial responsibility and not the vehicle's lack of financial responsibility. Schwartzberg, 793 A.2d at 948. Plaintiff argues that § 1705(a)(5) should not apply to her because it would not make sense for her to purchase an extra insurance policy in addition to the Policy her boyfriend had purchased for the vehicle. This Court agrees that Plaintiff was not required to have purchased an additional policy on the vehicle. Schwartzberq can be distinguished in that respect because in that case, the purchaser of the insurance policy on the vehicle was not an owner of that vehicle. In this case, both Plaintiff and the purchaser of the Policy were owners of the vehicle. However, the inquiry does not end there. In Schwartzberg, our Superior Court went on to say that the granting of summary judgment against the plaintiff was still appropriate "on the basis that under the circumstances..., it is reasonable to conclude that [plaintiff's girlfriend] had [the plaintiff's] consent and approval in choosing the limited tort coverage." Schwartzberg, 793 A.2d at 948-49. Here, it can also be assumed, and perhaps even more so, that since Plaintiff was a co-owner of the vehicle with Roger Ritter, she consented to his selection of the limited tort coverage. See Ridley v. Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 745 A.2d 7, 14 (Pa. Super. 1999)(inferring that an unmarried couple was acting as one in determining the insurance coverage for one of their vehicles they owned together). In any case, Plaintiff cannot claim that she had proper financial responsibility on the vehicle but that 6 she is not bound by that Policy. Plaintiff is therefore bound by the Policy and the limited tort coverage selected by the co-owner of the vehicle. Conclusion Plaintiff is bound by the limited tort coverage selected by the co-owner of the vehicle. Since Plaintiff is an owner of a vehicle, § 1705(b)(3) of the MVFPL does not apply to her. Rather, Plaintiff is assumed to have consented to the selection of the limited tort coverage by her boyfriend and co-owner, Roger Ritter. Therefore, Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is granted and Plaintiff will be precluded from bringing any noneconomic claims. Accordingly, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2014, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's response, the briefs filed by the parties, and argument held on August 15, 2014; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Plaintiff is by operation of law, a limited tort selector, and thereby precluded from recovering noneconomic damages pursuant to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. By the Court, 7 Zachary Campbell, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 8