Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-01888J Qft Coimuouwealtb Court of 3peuuop1bauia Pennsylvania Judicial Center Kristen Brown 601 Commonwealth Avenue, Suite 2100 Prothonoof tary N.O. Box 69185 Michael Krimmel, Esq. Harrisburg, PA ox6-9185 17 Chief Clerk of Commonwealth Court April 12, 2012 www.pacourts.us CERTIFICATE OF REMITTALIREMAND OF RECORD TO: David D. Buell < 77 Prothonotary RE: Stone v. DOT -wp 1953 CD 2002 Trial Cou Trial Court Docket No: 0011888 Civil Term Annexed hereto pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 2571 and 2572 is the entire record for the above matter. Original Record contents: Item Filed Date Description trial court record September 30, 2002 1 RemandlRemittal Date: ORIGINAL RECIPIENT ONLY - Please acknowledge receipt by signing, dating, and returning the enclosed copy of this certificate to our office. Copy recipients (noted below) need not acknowledge receipt. rs, very *'on ling Office Com lth Court i 444 Stone v. DOT 1953 CD 2002 Letter to: Buell, David D. April 12, 2012 Acknowledgement of Certificate of Remittal/Remand of Record (to be returned): Signature Date Printed Name 1) IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Deanna Rae Stone V. No. 1953 C.D. 2002 , Submitted: February 7, 20gz v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, lv -d ?. r Bureau of Driver Licensing, Appellant BEFORE: HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, President Judge";-' HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE JOSEPH F. McCLOSKEY, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE McCLOSKEY FILED: March 17, 2003 The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial court), sustaining the appeal of Deanna Rae Stone (Licensee) with respect to DOT's requirement that she install an ignition interlock system on all vehicles owned by her as a condition to having her operating privileges restored. We now affirm. The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Licensee was originally arrested and charged with driving under the influence (DUI), in violation of Section 3731(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §3731, on June 26, 1997. Licensee initially accepted admission into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program.' Nevertheless, Licensee was later removed from the ' At the time of her acceptance into the ARD program, Licensee's operating privileges were suspended for a period of 120 days. program and was subsequently convicted of the 1997 DUI offense on April 13. 1998. As a result of this conviction, DOT sent Licensee a notice dated May 12, 1998, suspending her operating privileges for a period of one year. Licensee was again arrested and charged with DUI on October 10, 2001. She was later convicted of her second DUI offense in the trial court's criminal division on February 19, 2002. Nonetheless, following her conviction, the trial court failed to impose upon Licensee the ignition interlock requirement found at Section 7002(b) of the Ignition Interlock Device Act (Act).2 Moreover, there was no appeal by the local district attorney regarding the trial court's failure to impose such a requirement. By notice dated April 11, 2002, DOT informed Licensee that her operating privileges were being suspended for a period of one year. This same notice further informed Licensee that before her operating privileges would be restored, she would have to have an ignition interlock device installed on all vehicles that she owned. Licensee thereafter filed a statutory appeal with the trial court with respect to this ignition interlock requirement. In her appeal, Licensee essentially alleged that DOT could not unilaterally modify a sentence so as to include requirements, such as an ignition interlock device, not ordered by the sentencing judge. The trial court conducted a de novo hearing on July 22, 2002. At this hearing, DOT introduced into evidence a packet of documents, duly certified and under seal, from the Secretary of Transportation. The packet included a copy of 2 42 Pa. C.S. §7002(b). This Section provides that upon a person's second or subsequent violation of Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, the court "shall order the installation of an approved ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned by the person to be effective upon the restoration of operating privileges by [DOT]." 2 4. DOT's April 11, 2002, suspension notice to Licensee as well as a certified copy of a report from the trial court's Clerk of Courts regarding Licensee's second DUI conviction. This report indicated that the trial court did not impose an ignition interlock requirement. DOT then rested. Counsel for Licensee offered no exhibits or testimony. Instead, counsel merely indicated his belief that the case is controlled by this Court's prior decision in Schneider v. Department of Transportation Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).3 By order dated July 25, 2002, the trial court sustained Licensee's appeal concerning the ignition interlock requirement and rescinded any such requirement included in DOT's April 11, 2002, notice. DOT filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. The trial court thereafter issued an opinion in support of its order indicating that the case was indistinguishable from and controlled by our prior decision in Schneider, wherein we held that DOT lacked an independent mandate to impose ignition interlock requirements in the absence of a court order. On appeal to this Court,' DOT argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to conclude that it has an independent mandate under Section 7003 of the Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §7003, to enforce the ignition interlock requirement even in the absence of a court order. We disagree. 3 Counsel for DOT conceded that Schneider may be on point but noted that a petition for allowance of appeal is pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in that case. Moreover, counsel for DOT indicated that it would not contest Licensee's appeal at the trial court level with respect to the ignition interlock requirement. 4 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, whether errors of law had been committed or whether the trial court's determination demonstrated a manifest abuse of discretion. Mazza v. Department of Transportation Bureau of Driver Licensing, 692 A.2d 251 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 551 Pa. 172, 709 A.2d 887 (1998). 3 This issue has been squarely addressed by our recent decision in Watterson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, A.2d (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1055 C.D. 2002, filed February 7, 2003). The facts in Watterson are nearly indistinguishable from the facts of the present case, with the exception that DOT had filed a motion to quash the licensee's appeal in Watterson. In Watterson, we indicated that the trial court properly relied on our previous decision in Schneider in striking the ignition interlock requirement imposed on licensee by DOT. We held in Watterson that Section 7002 of the Act provides the trial court with the sole authority to impose such a requirement and that DOT had no unilateral authority to impose the same.s Moreover, in Watterson, we rejected the identical argument that DOT posits in the present case, i.e., that Section 7003 of the Act provides it with an. independent mandate to impose the ignition interlock requirement.' Citing 5 We noted in Schneider that in criminal proceedings where the trial court fails to impose this requirement, the local district attorney has the right to appeal "as it would if the trial court failed to impose any other mandatory sentence." Schneider, 790 A.2d at 367; see also Turner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 805 A.2d 671 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). 6 Section 7003 of the Act provides as follows: In addition to any other requirements established for the restoration of a person's operating privileges under 75 Pa. C.S. §1548 (relating to requirements for driving under the influence offenders); (1) Where a person's operating privileges are suspended for a second or subsequent violation of 75 Pa. C.S. §3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance), or a similar out-of-State offense, and the person seeks a restoration of operating privileges, the court shall certify to [DOT] that each motor vehicle owned by the person has been equipped with an approved ignition interlock system. (2) A person seeking restoration of operating privileges shall apply to [DOT] for an ignition interlock restricted license under 75 Pa. (Footnote continued on next page...) 4 Schneider, we reiterated that the "ignition interlock requirement may only be imposed by an order of the court of common pleas." Watterson, slip op. at 4. Further, we specifically held in Watterson that DOT lacks the authority to impose the requirement under Section 7003 "absent a court order issued pursuant to Section 7002." Id. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.' JO Judge Leadbetter dissents. (continued...) C.S. §1951(d)...which will be clearly marked to restrict the person to operating only motor vehicles equipped with an approved interlock ignition system. (3) During the year immediately following restoration of the person's operating privilege and thereafter until the person obtains an unrestricted license, the person shall not operate any motor vehicle on a highway within this Commonwealth unless the motor vehicle is equipped with an approved ignition interlock system. (4) One year from the date of issuance of an ignition interlock restricted license under this section, if otherwise eligible, a person may apply for an additional replacement license under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1951 (d) that does not contain the ignition interlock system restriction. (5) A person whose operating privilege is suspended for a second or subsequent violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731 or a similar out-of- State offense who does not apply for an ignition interlock restricted license shall not be eligible to apply for the restoration of operating privileges for an additional year after otherwise being eligible for restoration under paragraph (1). 42 Pa. C.S. §7003. ' in its brief to this Court, DOT essentially concedes that Schneider and Turner are controlling. However, as petitions for allowance of appeal are pending in those cases before our Supreme Court, DOT's present appeal is merely an attempt to preserve the issue. 5 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Deanna Rae Stone V. No. 1953 C.D. 2002 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, Appellant ?. ORDER AND NOW, this 17th day of march , 2003, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County is hereby affirmed.