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IN RE:
ESTATE OF LOTTIE IVY DIXON
Deceased
IN RE:
ESTATE OF GEORGE F. DIXON, JR
Deceased
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
NO. 21-07-0686
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
NO. 2 I -1994-0754
OBJECTIONS OF GEORGE F. DIXON, III AND RICHARD E. DIXON TO
AUDITOR'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pursuant to C.C.O.C.R. 8.7-2, George F. Dixon, III and Richard E. Dixon (the
"Brothers"), file the following objections to the Auditor's Report and Recommendations filed on
May 24, 2012.
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trJ~'~
I. Introduction/Objections
A. Conclusions of Law
The Brothers object to the Auditor's Conclusion of Law No. 1 and other conclusory
statements that the conduct of the Brothers in this litigation was dilatory, obdurate and vexatious,
and his recommendation of an award of $73,357.50 in attorneys' fees to the Estate. The Auditor's
conclusions are:
• arbitrary and capricious
• not supported by facts
• not supported by sufficient findings of fact
• without a reasonable basis
• contrary to objective evidence ofrecord
and, therefore, clearly erroneous.
In addition, the Auditor fails to make specific findings with regard to the credibility and
weight of evidence, including hearing testimony, exhibits and evidence ofrecord -making it
impossible for the Court to properly evaluate the Auditor's Report findings and conclusions. The
Auditor seemingly adopts in wholesale fashion large sections of the Executor's counsel's
testimony and the Executor's proposed findings without the slightest scrutiny. At the same time,
the Auditor arbitrarily disregards objective record evidence that both discredits the Executor's
assertions and provides a reasonable basis for both the Brothers' missing assets objection and the
Petition for Appointment of Administrator Pro Tem Pursuant to 20 Pa. C.S. § 4301 filed on
February 12, ?010 (hereafter "Petition"). Moreover, the Auditor reaches conclusions not
supported by evidence ofrecord but, rather, based on unfounded assumptions, speculation and
conjecture. For all of these reasons, as discussed in more detail below, the Auditor's
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Recommendation to impose a sanction against the Brothers in the form of an award of attorneys'
fees should be rejected. The Auditor's conclusions and recommendations in this regard misapply
existing law and demonstrate a manifestly unreasonable judgment.
The Brothers object to Conclusion of Law No. 4 which states that their request for
dismissal of the Executor's motion for attorney fees is waived. The request for dismissal was not
waived -the motion was specifically raised and denied by the Auditor at the hearing (Tr. p. 102).
In addition, the motion to dismiss was reasserted in the Brothers' Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at p. 19.
B. Findings of Fact
The Brothers also object to many of the Auditor's numbered Findings of Fact. In general,
those "findings" represent little more than wholesale adoption of the Executor's proposed
findings. The Auditor arbitrarily and completely disregards the Brothers' Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Further, the Auditor arbitrarily disregards objective evidence of
record, including the QTIP Trust Account, that contradicts and disproves key financial "facts"
the Auditor adopted from the Executor, see especially Auditor's Findings Nos. 124-131. For
example, the QTIP Trust Account (verified and filed in January 2009) shows that "Fees and
Professional Services [$875,000]" as shown on Executor's Exhibit 11B (the "Cash Flow
Summary") should not be deducted from Lottie Dixon's net QTIP income. See QTIP Account,
Disbursements, pp. 250-283. For that reason and because of several other errors, Executor's
Exhibit 11 B is, therefore, incorrect in its statement of "Total Income."
The Brothers specifically object to the following Findings of Fact:
56. The Brothers did advance their position that substantial assets of Lottie
Dixon were "significantly depleted as part of a pattern of conduct engaged in by the
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Executor to benefit himself...." See Brothers' Proposed Finding 58; Executor's Exhibits
3E and SB.
57-58. The Executor could not simply state whether a transfer of decedent's
assets to him or for his benefit was a "gift." There must be clear and independent proof to
establish that such transfers were valid inter vivos gifts.
63. It is unreasonable to suggest that because Marshall Dixon produced certain
statements for a single brokerage account that proves "Lottie had not transferred any
$500,000 brokerage account to him."
77. The Auditor mischaracterizes the purpose of the Petition and the nature of
the conflict of interest. See Footnote 1, itzfra, p. 10.
78. The allegations in the Petition do not "contradict" a "counseled
concession" -see Discussion infra, p. 12.
80. The Brothers did not "change their legal theory." There had always been a
claim that assets were missing from the Estate and not accounted for -- going back to the
account objection itself.
89-90. It is not a reasonable or fair reading of the Exhibit List and it is absurd to
suggest that the Brothers were contending that each and every check "represented the
assets that were missing from the Estate."
93-94. It is not true that the Brothers "never suggested that the Executor engaged
in any improper transactions with Lottie during her lifetime." See above regarding No. 56
and Exhibits 3E and SB.
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1 15. The Executor could not establish valid inter vivos gifts by clear and
independent evidence. Since there was a confidential relationship it vas also the
Executor's burden to prove the absence of undue influence, theft, deception. and fraud.
118-131. See Discussion infra, pp. 7-9.
132-136. These are conclusory statements without support and not
appropriate findings of fact.
II. Applicable Leal Standards
An award of counsel fees as a sanction against a litigant pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503 (7)
is an exceptional remedy. The Superior Court recently vacated the imposition of counsel fees
against an estate while noting that "Section 2503 (7) is severely limited in its scope." In re Estate
of Miller, 18 A.3d 1163, 1174 (Pa. Super. 2011). Since the statute sets forth an exception to the
common law rule that litigants are responsible for their own counsel fees, it must be interpreted
narrowly. See Cher-Rob, Inc. v. Art Monument Co , 594 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 1991).
The aim of the statute permitting recovery of counsel fees is to "sanction those who
knowingly raise in bad faith, frivolous claims which have no reasonable possibility of success,
for the purpose of harassing, obstructing or delaying the opposing party." Dooley v. Rubin, 422
Pa. Super. 57, 618 A.2d 1014, 1018 (1993).
It is the burden of the party seeking counsel fees under Section 2503 to prove (by
sufficient evidence) that an adversary engaged in dilatory, obdurate and vexatious conduct.
Wrazien v. Easton Area Sch. Dist. 926 A.2d 585 (Pa. Commw. 2007). In order to find a litigant's
conduct warrants sanction under Section 2503 (7), two se arate findings must be made: 1) the
lawsuit (or pleading) was filed, or the litigation was continued, without sufficient grounds in
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either law or in fact; and 2) the suit served the sole purpose of causing annoyance. Old Fore
Sch. Dist. v. Highmark Inc., 592 Pa. 307, 924 A.2d 1205 (Pa. 2007).
In this estate litigation, the Auditor has essentially singled out the filing of the Brothers'
Petition on February 12, 2010, as the basis for a finding of "vexatious conduct." However, it is
not the case that the Petition had no reasonable possibility of success and there is absolutely no
evidence to support a finding that the Petition was filed for the sole purpose of harassing or
causing annoyance. Therefore, under Pennsylvania case law the Auditor's conclusion must be
rejected.
III. Discussion
THE PETITION HAD A REASONABLE AND SUFFICIENT BASIS IN FACT.
The records and discovery documents in this case, both formal and informal, reflect
hundreds, if not thousands, of transactions involving Marshall Dixon and assets of the decedent -
including the joint checking account, brokerage accounts, credit card accounts, the Rev Trust -
as a result of which Marshall received funds directly or they were paid for his benefit. The
executor of an estate has the fiduciary obligation and duty to investigate, and where appropriate
recover, transfers of decedent's assets where the circumstances surrounding those transfers are
called into question. Here, the Brothers placed those transactions and transfers at issue. It is not
sufficient for an alleged donee such as Marshall to simply suggest there were "gifts." Marshall,
as both alleged donee of decedent's assets and executor of the estate, was in a "position of
conflicting interest" to fully and fairly investigate himself and those transactions. That was the
statutory basis for filing the Petition pursuant to 20 Pa. C.S. § 4301: to have a temporary
fiduciary complete the investigation into the transfers of decedent's assets to or for the benefit of
Marshall.
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6
It was not unreasonable to file the Petition on February 12, 2010 after waiting for
additional records and after a forced change in Brothers' counsel. Discovery -production of
certain of Marshall's brokerage statements -was only concluded in December 2009. Even then,
however, Judge Oler's order of November 25, 2009 compelling production of all of Marshall's
account statements for any and all brokerage accounts was never fully complied with.
Nevertheless, the extent of the transactions (involving Marshall) reflected in the records
and documents that were made available together with the apparent depletion of estate assets
despite Lottie's frugal existence called for the appointment of an Administrator Pro Tem. In
addition, based upon information from the QTIP Account (of record January 2009), raw data
from the Rev Trust (October 2009) and other general information regarding Lottie's income and
expenses, there was objective evidence to suggest estate assets were missing and/or not
accounted for.
THE BROTHERS TAKE PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO THE AUDITOR'S
FINDINGS OF FACT 118-131.
At the hearing on the executor's motion, the Auditor admitted into evidence -over
objection -Executor's Exhibit 1 1 A (Candy Dixon's Cash Flow 1994 through June, 2007)(the
"Cash Flow Summary" or "Summary"). The Cash Flow Summary had been a Proposed Exhibit
of the Brothers for the original hearing on the account objections. However, it was never used or
introduced at that hearing and never admitted into evidence. It was not part of the record in this
case. There was and has been absolutely no testimony regarding the Summary: it was never
authenticated; it was never established who, how and why it was prepared; there was no
foundation laid; there was no hearsay exception established. Nevertheless, the Auditor admitted
the Summary at the request of the Executor at the hearing on February 24, 2012 -clear error by
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the Auditor -and the Auditor, to a large extent, "hangs his hat" on this document in rendering his
Report.
Not only did the Auditor allow introduction of the Summary, he then permitted the
Executor's counsel -again over objection - to make assumptions as to the nature and source of
information appearing on the Summary as well as the meaning and substance of terms and
headings used. To further compound the error, the Auditor then permitted counsel to offer
"corrections" to the Summary based upon her own misinterpretation of data --resulting in Exhibit
11B, which was also admitted over objection.
In the face of an incorrect and misleading Cash Flow Summary as depicted on Exhibit
11 B, the Brothers set forth detailed Proposed Findings of Fact 80-100 in order to provide
accurate figures, necessary background information and explanation. The Brothers' Proposed
Findings -see especially 85-95 -are based upon objective evidence of record, the QTIP
Account of January 2009 (and the Revocable Trust Account) and must be accepted in order for
the Cash Flow Summary to be true and accurate. The Auditor, however, completely disregards
and fails to even acknowledge the Brothers' Proposed Findings. Rather, in his Findings of Fact
118-131, the Auditor accepts wholesale the obviously and objectively incorrect assumptions and
figures used by the Executor's counsel. The Auditor arbitrarily and erroneously accepts and relies
upon Exhibit 11 B despite objective proof from the QTIP Account that demonstrates its
inaccuracies. The Auditor arbitrarily and erroneously accepts representations asserted by the
Executor that have no basis in fact and no foundation - e.g. the meaning of "Stocks and Funds"
in the Cash Flow Summary. (See Auditor's Finding 130).
While the Executor certainly wants Exhibit 11 B considered, he disputes any attempt to
clarify data or references to the QTIP Account that would render it accurate. The Executor would
4641848 8
rather have the Court simply accept the testimony of his counsel regarding a document she did
not prepare and the faulty Cash Flow Summary depicted in Exhibit 11 B than to have it correctly
revised in accordance with the QTIP Account (evidence of record). The Summary does not even
account for distributions from the Revocable Trust that would substantially raise Lottie Dixon's
average annual income (by approximately $100,000). How the original Cash Flow Summary is
interpreted by the Executor and what his counsel thinks should be reflected by the descriptive
headings is completely irrelevant. The data speaks for itself. The Brothers stand by their
Proposed Findings based on QTIP fact as necessary corrections to the Summary.
Nevertheless, even with its many mistakes and slanted in the Executor's favor, Exhibit
11 B still suggests there maybe missing assets of almost $200,000. Taken together with the fact
that there were hundreds or thousands of unexplained transactions involving transfers of
decedent's assets to and/or for the benefit of Marshall at the time the Petition was filed, there was
more than a reasonable basis to file the Petition.
Furthermore, the Brothers anticipated that an evidentiary hearing on the Petition would
be conducted - at which they might further develop evidence in support of the Petition in a
forum where they would be able to support the Petition free from the unreasonable constraints
imposed by the Auditor on their ability to present evidence at the hearing on the objections. The
Auditor's view of the case, including his ruling that transactions/checks from the joint account
were immediate gifts to Marshall and not relevant, made it virtually impossible for the Brothers
to advance their theory that Marshall could not prove valid inter vivos gifting and could not
prove that he acted in the best interests of Lottie while under the duty of a confidential
relationship.
4641848 9
The critical issue here for purposes of this motion is not whether the Brothers proved that
Marshall defrauded Lottie Dixon but whether there was a reasonable basis to file the Petition in
light of evidence that supported the likelihood of missing assets in conjunction with the
Executor's inability to investigate the transfers of assets to and/or for his benefit.
THE PETITION HAD A REASONABLE AND SUFFICIENT BASIS IN LAW.
The Petition was filed on the basis of the history and language of the statute itself (20 Pa.
C.S. ~ 4301) where the fiduciary is in a "position of conflicting interest." With respect to the
transfers of decedent's assets to and/or for his benefit, Marshall obviously had a conflict of
interest to investigate himself .The Brothers did not seek the wholesale removal of Marshall as
Executor but rather the temporary appointment of a neutral fiduciary who could resolve this
portion of the case - as contemplated by 20 Pa. C.S. § 4301. The Brothers have previously
pointed the Court to Pennsylvania cases supporting the appointment of an Administrator Pro
Teen under analogous circumstances. For example, in Francis Estate, 11 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 52 (O.C.
Allegh. 1985), an administrator pro tem was appointed to investigate and track down checks and
other assets of the estate because of a conflict of interest on the part of co-administrators even
though objections to an account had been pending for two years.
This case is nothing like Thunberg v. Strause, 545 Pa. 607, 682 A.2d 295 (1996); Miller
v. Nelson, 768 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 782 A.2d 547 (Pa. 2001); or In re Estate of
Liscio, 638 A.2d 1019 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 652 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1994), where clearly
baseless claims against well-settled law were filed and pursued despite knowledge that they had
no legal merit. Nor is this a case like Wrazien v. Easton Area School District, 926 A.2d 585 (Pa.
Commw. 2007) where the defendant continued to assert "meritless defenses" that had previously
~ The Auditor leas regularly mischaracteriaed the basis of the Petition as "an alleged conflict of interest between
Marshall and Lottie" (.Auditor's Finding 77). The basis of the Petition, however, was Marshall's position of
conflicting interest as both Executor and alleged donee of decedent's assets.
4641 ft4R 1 0
been found to lack merit by both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court prior to trial, or
Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 471 A.2d 909 (Pa. Commw. 1984), where "entirely meritless
defenses" were again asserted despite ample warning from the court and in the face of prior
decisions rejecting those defenses.
The Petition here was not presented in the face of settled law or in contravention of clear
court rulings that it was without merit. To the contrary, the Petition was filed consistent with the
purpose of the statute. There are but a handful of cases interpreting the appointment of an
administrator pro tem and those few cases supported the filing of the Petition. Moreover, there
were no prior court rulings holding the Petition to be devoid of merit. In fact, when the Petition
was ultimately denied, it was denied on the basis that it would cause delay, not that it was
frivolous or lacking in merit.
THERE HAS BEEN NO FINDING AND NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING
THAT THE PETITION WAS FILED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE TO HARASS OR
CAUSE ANNOYANCE.
The Petition was filed to request the appointment of an administrator pro tem who could
complete investigation of the transfers of decedent's assets and determine whether Marshall
misappropriated assets - a duty of the Executor that Marshall could not fulfill. The Auditor,
however, attempts to find fault with the timing of the Petition and assign some ulterior motive to
the Brothers. In so doing, the Auditor impermissibly engages in speculation and conjecture and
makes assertions contrary to the facts of record:
• The Petition itself set forth that the Brothers had not previously been advised
regarding the possible appointment of an administrator pro tent by their prior
counsel (Petition ¶ 52). While acknowledging this fact (see Report p. 35), the
Auditor, nevertheless, unfairly chastizes the Brothers for not filing the Petition
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sooner (see Report, e.g. p. 29). The fact is that the Brothers were simply not aware
of the option of tiling a Petition under 20 Pa. C.S. § 4301 until the Obennayer
attorneys entered the case in late January 2010. Therefore, the fact that the
Petition was not filed until February 2010 cannot be used to ascribe bad faith on
the part of the Brothers or to claim that there was a lack of a reasonable basis to
tile. Moreover, it cannot be used to assert that tiling the Petition could be viewed
"as reflecting a material purpose to annoy Marshall," as the Auditor suggests.
(Report p. 28).
• The Auditor also somehow assigns culpability to the Brothers because they
"chose to discharge their former attorneys" (Martson Law Offices). (Report p.
27). The record is clear, however, that Martson filed a Petition to withdraw their
representation based on an undisclosed conflict of interest. (See Petition to
Withdraw as Counsel filed December 10, 2009). The evidence is clear, therefore,
that the withdrawal of Martson was not "the choice of the Brothers," contrary to
the Auditor's statement on p. 27. There is absolutely nothing in the record to
support the Auditor's conclusion that the Brothers "voluntarily discharged"
Martson such that they should bear responsibility for all that transpired thereafter.
• The Auditor next faults the Brothers alleging that they "decided to renege on their
counseled concession that their mother was not subject to incapacity or undue
influence during her lifetime." (Report p. 27). There are a number of problems
with this statement. First, the "concession" was alleged to have been made by
Martson and it would have been made shortly before their withdrawal from the
case. The Brothers were not aware of any such concession at the time it was made
4641848 1 2
and certainly did not authorize it or consent to it. They could not take steps to
refute a concession they had no knowledge of -certainly not prior to the filing of
the Petition. Second, even if the concession was made, an allegation in the
Petition that Lottie's "mental health began to deteriorate in 1999" does not
demonstrate a "reneging" on the concession. (Report p. 28). Third, and most
importantly, as the Auditor found in his original report, a confidential relationship
existed between Marshall and Lottie. As a result, as the alleged donee of lifetime
transfers of Lottie's assets, it was Marshall's burden to prove the absence of undue
influence or incapacity. See Estate of Clark, 467 Pa. 628, 359 A.2d 777 (1976);
Estate of Buriak, 342 Pa. Super. 371, 492 A.2d 1166 (1985). Thus, the "counseled
concession" is not material to a determination of the validity of intey~ vivos
transfers received by Marshall. There is nothing "vexatious" in the Brothers'
argument about the concession.
• The Auditor seeks to find support for sanctioning the Brothers on the basis of the
fact that "they never made any attempt to challenge the probate of [Lottie's] Will."
(Report p. 28). However, the potential grounds for challenge to probate and the
bases for the filing of the Petition because of the executor's "position of
conflicting interest" do not necessarily have anything to do with one another.
There could have been many reasons not to challenge probate. Moreover, the
Brothers did not realize and could not have known the extent of the alleged gifting
of Lottie's assets to Marshall -and so the extent of Marshall's position of
conflicting interest - at the time of probate or even at the time of the estate
accounting. Furthermore, the point of the Petition was not to challenge Lottie's
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capacity but to establish that Marshall was in a position of a confidential
relationship that required scrupulous adherence to the best interests of Lottie. See
Estate of Clark; Estate of Buriak. The Auditor's big question as to why the
Brothers did not raise objections at the probate level (including Lottie's capacity)
is not the "smoking gun" the Auditor apparently believes it is. Rather, the Auditor
is again disregarding the facts, speculating and attempting to draw an
unsupportable adverse inference.
• The Auditor suggests particular fault with the Brothers' contentions "where the
Brothers had full and direct access to information in their roles as co-trustees of
the QTIP Trust... to establish, to all reasonable satisfaction, that the Executor did
not defraud their mother or fail to include assets in the Estate Accounting," citing
Thunberg v. Strause and Miller v. Nelson. (Report 29-30). Once again, the
Auditor engages in speculation and makes a manifestly unreasonable judgment.
The Brothers' access to information in their roles as co-trustees of the QTIP Trust
had nothing to do with knowing whether the countless transactions using the joint
account funds, the brokerage accounts or credit card accounts were legally valid
inter vivos gifts - or reflected abuse of a confidential relationship. While the QTIP
Account information is of great value to determine that there were assets missing,
it would be of little, if any, help to evaluate inter vivos transfers involving other
accounts to establish whether Marshall defrauded Lottie or failed to account for
those assets. There is no objective evidence in this case to prove that Marshall did
not defraud or failed to include assets such that there was no reasonable basis to
4641848 1 4
file the Petition or to suggest that the Petition was completely devoid of merit.
The reference to Thunber~ and Miller is misplaced.
Unlike Thunber;;, here there does not exist sufficient evidence of record for Orphans'
Court to find that the Petition had no supportable basis in law or in fact and that it had no
reasonable possibility of success. This is especially true because the Brothers acted pursuant to
statute and cited at least one case (Francis Estate) where, under analogous circumstances, an
administrator ps~o tem was appointed more than two years after objections to an account.
Moreover, contrary to the Auditor's Report, the information available to the Brothers, including
the QTIP Account, provided a reasonable basis to support the allegations of the Petition that
there was an unexplained depletion of estate assets, that there were substantial transactions
involving Lottie's funds and accounts that resulted in missing assets.
Furthermore, the Auditor failed to make either sufficient or supported findings of fact
necessary to reach a conclusion of dilatory and vexatious conduct. The Auditor seeks to hold the
Brothers "responsible" for events occurring after February 9, 2010, primarily the filing of the
Petition. There is no specific finding, however, and absolutely nothing of record to support a
finding, that the Petition was filed solely for the purpose of annoyance or delay. The Auditor
does suggest that there was delay in the easel rior to February 9, 2010, but did not find
sanctionable conduct sufficient to impose attorneys' fees. And while the Auditor reaches beyond
fact and reason and offers speculation that because the Brothers did not challenge probate the
tiling of the Petition may have been for the purpose of annoyance, such baseless conjecture
cannot support an award of attorneys' fees.
The Auditor repeatedly finds fault with the Brothers for not having advanced allegations
such as those set out in the Petition until 2% years after Lottie's death -despite the fact that the
4641848 15
Brothers did not have sufficient information at the time of her death - and sanctions them for
advancing "unsupportable" allegations. The Auditor is blinded by his view of the case that the
Brothers failed to prove that the Executor misappropriated assets or gained benefit from the
estate by theft, deception or fraud. However, the Auditor has found in this case (in the original
Report) that a confidential relationship existed between Marshall and Lottie. As a result, under
Pennsylvania law, it is actually Marshall's burden to prove the validity of inter vivos receipt of
Lottie's assets and the absence of undue influence. The Auditor chooses to completely disregard
this circumstance in his analysis.
The Auditor wholly adopts the Executor's Proposed Findings without question, without
evaluating the reasonableness or veracity of the statements, without evaluating the credibility of
the statements made or the documents relied upon, and without making specific findings on
credibility -providing no basis for the court to make an informed adjudication of the Auditor's
Report and Recommendations.
As outlined above, the Auditor's Conclusion of Law No. l and the related discussion at
pp. 27-31 indicates the absence of a rational connection between facts/evidence of record and the
conclusions reached. Conclusion No. l is not supported by adequate findings of fact. Rather, it is
based on speculation and conjecture and should be rejected.
IV. Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, the Auditor's Recommendation of an award of attorneys'
fees to the Executor in the amount of $73,357.50 is in error and should be rejected.
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16
Date: June 12, 2012
OBERMAYER REBMANN MAXWELL
& HIPPEL LLP
R
BY:
Walter W. ohen, Esquire
Attorney ID # 12097
Kevin J. Kehner, Esquire
Attorney ID # 33539
200 Locust Street, Suite 400
Harrisburg, PA 17101
717-234-9730
717-234-9734 (fax)
Counsel, for George F. Dixon, III
and Richard E. Dixon
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, KEVIN J. KEHNER, certify that on this date, I have served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Objections to Auditor's Report and Recommendations by first-class mail,
addressed as follows:
Elizabeth P. Mullaugh, Esquire
Kimberly M. Colonna, Esquire
McNEES, WALLACE & NURICK
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1 166
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-1166
Mark D. Bradshaw, Esquire
STEVENS & LEE
Harrisburg Market Square
17 North Second Street, 16`I' Floor
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101
Date: June 12, 2012
4641848 1 g
Daniel L. Sullivan, Esquire
SAIDIS, SULLIVAN & ROGERS
26 West High Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
Wayne F. Shade, Esquire
53 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
Kevin . Kehner, Esquire