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HomeMy WebLinkAbout12-7470IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, 'i7 -? rte -- rr,cu - / - +TI p o-I r :: V. Nog-lioivil Action Equity • mo.'s--- r..., TIERRE DAVIS, ?`° '?'' n Defendant NOTICE TO DEFEND You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Complaint and notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing with the Court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court without further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 2 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 717-249-3166 4 io3.7s?c?plff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. TIERRE DAVIS, Defendant 4_'7yV No. Civil Action Equity COMPLAINT AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, by and through its undersigned counsel and avers the following in support of this Complaint: 1. This action is brought in the Court's original jurisdiction. 2. Plaintiff is the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections. 3. Plaintiff is an executive agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania responsible for administering the state correctional system, including the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (hereinafter, "SCI-Camp Hill"). 4. Defendant Tierre Davis is a thirty-six year-old inmate who is presently incarcerated in the Special Management Unit at the SCI-Camp Hill. 5. Since December 3, 2012, Mr. Davis has refused to eat; therefore, Mr. Davis has refused to eat approximately forty-one consecutive meals. 6. Mr. Davis refuses to allow anyone to examine him. 7. Mr. Davis refuses to allow anyone to weigh him. 8. Mr. Davis refuses to turn on his light in his cell; therefore, SCI-Camp Hill employees are unable to visually assess Mr. Davis's health. 9. The above-mentioned behavior places Mr. Davis at a great risk for his health. 10. Because Mr. Davis refuses to allow anyone to examine him, it is impossible to be absolutely certain of the status of his health. But, it is the opinion of Mr. Davis's attending physician, Dr. Theodoor Voorstad, that Mr. Davis could be in imminent danger or suffering irreparable harm unless medical treatment, including nutrition, is administered to Mr. Davis. (See Affidavit of Dr. Theodoor Voorstad, attached hereto as "Exhibit A"). 11. Mr. Davis will eventually die or suffer other immediate and severe irreparable harm if medical treatment, including nutrition, is not administered to him. 12. It is impossible to predict the exact point at which Mr. Davis's condition may result in immediate, severe, and irreparable harm; therefore, immediate intervention is necessary to examine Mr. Davis's vital signs, blood, urine, etc. 13. Permitting Mr„ Davis to engage in a suicidal act by refusing nutrition will cause a significant disruption to the orderly administration of SCI-Camp Hill. The effects of his death would demoralize the staff and instill the belief in the inmate population that the prison administration caused and permitted Mr. Davis's death. This will lead to animosity toward the staff and undermine confidence in prison authority. Without the medical treatment described above, Mr. Davis is at great risk for his health, specifically and including, but not limited to, nutrition, hydration, and previously prescribed medication. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, requests this Court to enter an Order: (a) authorizing the Plaintiff, through medical staff, to perform such diagnostic tests, including invasive diagnostic tests, and to involuntarily administer medical treatment, including nutrition, hydration, and previously prescribed medication as may be necessary to preserve the safety, health, and life of Mr. Hill; and (b) providing such other relief as this Court deems proper. Respectfully submitted, Timothy, A olmes Assistant Counsel Attorney I.D. No. 87758 Dated: December 12, 2012 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. : No. Civil Action Equity TIERRE DAVIS, Defendant VERIFICATION I, Edwin A. Shoop, am the duly appointed Acting Corrections Health Care Administrator at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill and am authorized to make this verification. I have reviewed the attached Complaint with respect to the involuntary treatment of Tierre Davis. I hereby verify that the allegations contained in the attached Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I make this verification subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Edwin A. Shoop Acting Corrections Health Care Administrator State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill Dated: December 12, 2012 EXHIBIT A IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. No. Civil Action Equity TIERRE DAVIS, Defendant UNSWORN AFFIDAVIT I, Dr. Theodoor Voorstad state the following: 1. I am a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 2. I am currently the Medical Director at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. 3. I am familiar with Tierre Davis, who is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. 4. Defendant Tierre Davis is a thirty-six year-old inmate who is presently incarcerated in the Special Management Unit at the SCI-Camp Hill. 5. Since December 3, 2012, Mr. Davis has refused to eat; therefore, Mr. Davis has refused to eat approximately forty-one consecutive meals. 6. Mr. Davis refuses to allow anyone to examine him. 7. Mr. Davis refuses to allow anyone to weigh him. . 8. Mr. Davis refuses to turn on his light in his cell; therefore, SCI-Camp Hill employees are unable to visually assess Mr. Davis's health. 9. The above-mentioned behavior places Mr. Davis at a great risk for his health. 10. Because Mr. Davis refuses to allow anyone to examine him, it is impossible to be absolutely certain of the status of his health. But, it is. my opinion that Mr. Davis could be in imminent danger or suffering irreparable harm unless medical treatment, including nutrition, is administered to Mr. Davis. 11. Mr. Davis will eventually die or suffer other immediate and severe irreparable harm if medical treatment, including nutrition, is not administered to him. 12. It is impossible to predict the exact point at which Mr. Davis's condition may result in immediate, severe, and irreparable harm; therefore, immediate intervention is necessary to examine Mr. Davis's vital signs, blood, urine, etc. I understand that this statement is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. : ? VUjWr-/-) Theodoor Voorstad, M.D. Medical Director State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill Dated: December 12, 2012 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. No. Civil Action Equity TIERRE DAVIS, Defendant PROOF OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint was served on the person and in the manner indicated below: Personal service by hand-delivery Tierre Davis, DY1710 SCI-Camp Hill 2500 Lisburn Road Camp Hill, PA 17001-8837 Edwin A. Shoop Acting Corrections Health Care Administrator State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill Dated: December 12, 2012 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, FARVIEW STATE HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH KALLINGER, Respondent No. 239 Misc. Dkt. 1990 Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 134 Pa. Commw. 415; 580 A. 2d 887, 1990 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 501 July 18, 1990, Heard August 14, 1990, Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***I] Publication Ordered September 10, 1990. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner commonwealth filed a request seeking a declaratory judgment authorizing the involuntary administration of necessary nutrition and medical treatment to preserve the health and safety of respondent prisoner, who sought to starve himself to death. OVERVIEW: Petitioner commonwealth, through its department of public welfare, filed a request seeking a declaratory judgment to force respondent prisoner to involuntarily receive food through a nasogastric tube and other medical treatment. The trial court determined that the prisoner was competent and could reject nutrition and hydration. Petitioner appealed, offering evidence that if respondent was allowed to starve to death, major negative repercussions on the prison and mental health systems would result. Recognizing that prisoners' rights were extremely limited because of the unique nature of prison custody, the court granted petitioners' request, and authorized involuntary administration of necessary medical treatment. The court concluded that petitioner had an overwhelming interest in maintaining prison security, order, and discipline, as well as preserving life and preventing suicide. OUTCOME: The court granted petitioner commonwealth's request for declaratory relief, and authorized the involuntary administration of nutrition and medical treatment to preserve the health of respondent prisoner; petitioner had an overwhelming interest in the orderly administration of its prison system. CORE TERMS: prisoner, nutrition, medical treatment, prison, suicide, patient, starve, staff, nasogastric tube, right to privacy, die, prison system, human life, preserving, inmate, medical care, A psychiat:-ic, discipline, hydration, sentence, custody, right of privacy, preservation, prison security, involuntary, feeding, suffering, convict, orderly, duty CORE CONCEPTS Criminal Law & Procedure : Postconviction Proceedings : Imprisonment & Prisoner Rights Maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the detained constitutional rights of convicted prisoners. Criminal Law & Procedure : Postconviction Proceedings : Imprisonment & Prisoner Rights Prison officials are given a wide range of discretion in the promulgation and enforcement of rules to govern the prison community in order to maintain security, order and discipline. Individual freedoms may be curtailed whenever prison officials, in exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that their exercise possesses the likelihood of disrupting prison order or stability or otherwise interfering with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment. Criminal Law & Procedure : Postconviction Proceedings : Imprisonment & Prisoner Rights Compelled nutrition and medical treatment is proper because of the strong state interest in orderly prison administration outweighs any convict's residual rights. Criminal Law & Procedure : Postconviction Proceedings : Imprisonment & Prisoner Rights The obligation of the commonwealth to provide for the health and safety of the inmates in their custody is derived from two very important interests: the preservation of human life and the prevention of suicide. The preservation of human life is of great interest to the state. Criminal Law & Procedure : Postconviction Proceedings : Imprisonment & Prisoner Rights The commonwealth has a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect the health and welfare of those persons in its custody, and may be cast in civil damages for its failure to observe such duty. Furthermore, the commonwealth has a duty to provide appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others. Constitutional Law : Substantive Due Process : Privacy American law has always accorded the state the power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide -- including suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life. COUNSEL: Thomas Blazusiak, with him, Howard Ulan, Asst. Counsel, and John A. Kane, Chief Counsel, for petitioner. Jeffrey J. Wander, Honesdale, for respondent. David Ferleger, Philadelphia, Guardian Ad Litem, for Joseph Kallinger. JUDGES: Pellegrini, Judge. t 1 OPINIONBY: PELLEGRINI OPINION: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION [*4161 [**8881 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, (Department), Farview State Hospital (Farview), files this Request for Special Emergency Relief asking this Court for a Declaratory Judgment authorizing the involuntary administration of necessary nutrition and medical 1*4171 treatment in order to preserve the safety, health and life of Joseph Kallinger (Kallinger). We are called upon to decide a sensitive matter which is without precedent in this Commonwealth. Joseph Kallinger wants to starve himself to death. n1 The Department, who has custody, wants to force him to involuntarily receive food through a nasogastric tube and other medical treatment. We must decide if the Department has such right. n I Kallinger, a convicted murderer, is currently serving two consecutive life sentences consecutively with a thirty to eighty year sentence in Pennsylvania. He also must serve a life sentence and a forty-two to fifty-two year sentence in New Jersey. He also must serve other sentences which are too numerous to mention. Needless to say, Joseph Kallinger will spend the rest of his natural life behind bars. [***21 The current dilemma developed after Kallinger was recently readmitted to Farview on May 17, 1990, from the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (Huntingdon). n2 On June 22, 1990, he stated, as a result of his vision of Christ in a toilet bowl telling him to join him, that he would refuse to eat or drink, and that he desires to "meet his maker." He has also refused treatment for an abscess on his foot. On June 30, 1990, Kallinger agreed to be transferred to Wayne Memorial Hospital in Wayne County, Pennsylvania, in order to have intravenous fluids, including antibiotics, administered to him. However, he continued in his refusal to accept nutrition and other medical treatment. n2 Kallinger began serving his Pennsylvania sentences at Huntingdon following his convictions in 1976. However, in 1977, he was committed to Farview where he stayed for over ten years, until 1988. Since 1988, he was recommitted once for a short period of time and then returned to Huntingdon. This recent recommittment was his second since returning to Huntingdon. His current recommittment is scheduled to expire on August 17, 1990. [***31 On July 3, 1990, the Department filed an action for Declaratory Relief in the Court [**8891 of Common Pleas of Wayne County, seeking authority to provide necessary treatment, nutrition and hydration to Kallinger. On that day, the trial court entered a preliminary order permitting the Department to do so. However, on July 10, 1990, after holding a hearing on the matter, the trial court dissolved its preliminary order and determined that Kallinger was competent 1*4181 and could reject nutrition and hydration necessary to preserve his health, safety and life. The Department filed a Petition For Review seeking Special Emergency Relief pursuant to the original jurisdiction of this Court, and seeking review of the trial court's Order pursuant to our appellate jurisdiction. Sections 761 and 762 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S J § 761, 762. n3 n3 By order dated July 13, 1990, this Court directed that the Petition For Review shall be regarded as a Complaint In Equity directed to our original jurisdiction, and that the appeal from the trial court's Order shall be dismissed without prejudice. [***41 On July 13, 1990, this Court granted the Department's request for a preliminary injunction, ordering that Kallinger may be involuntarily administered medical treatment, nutrition and hydration, pending further adjudication. On July 18, 1990, following a hearing, a second Order was issued continuing the involuntary medication and feeding of Kallinger pending final adjudication of this matter. The Department offered testimony and evidence that if Kallinger is allowed to starve to death, this would have major negative repercussions on the prison and mental health systems; that Kallinger's death would have adverse effects on other patients, their families and the staff of the mental hospital; and other patients may also "copy-cat" Kallinger's actions. Kallinger contends that despite such adverse repercussions to the Commonwealth, he should be allowed to die if he so chooses. He argues that his right to privacy overrides any interests of the Commonwealth because the use of a nasogastric tube to feed him is an overly intrusive procedure which could last a number of years. We note at the outset that Kallinger is committed to Farview, a mental hospital for the criminally insane. He suffers [***51 from a serious mental illness, diagnosed by Mokarram Jafri, M.D., as a Borderline Personality Disorder. (Notes of Testimony (N.T.), July 10, 1990, p. 35; July 18, 1990, pp. 27-29). However, he is competent in the sense that he fully understands his decision and realizes that [*4191 death will result if he continues to refuse nutrition and medical treatment. (N.T. July 10, 1990, pp. 36, 70-71). We also recognize that Kallinger, through this action, may be attempting to manipulate the system in order to stay at Farview rather than return to Huntingdon. His authorization of his attorneys to enter appearances on his behalf -- one to say that he has the right to die, the other to say the state had an obligation to make him stay alive -- is certainly part of that manipulation. Although Kallinger has in the past and is now manipulating the system in which he finds himself, if the Department is not allowed to involuntarily provide him with nutrition and medical care, we assume that Kallinger will indeed starve himself to death. While Kallinger is sufficiently competent to make a decision to starve himself to death, this is not a "right to die" case in the usual sense. There has been [***61 much public debate and court activity over whether such a right exists and in what circumstances it exists, and these cases involve decisions made by enfranchised citizens or someone acting on their behalf, that their substantial rights of privacy allows them to make that decision. See e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, U.S. , 110 S Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). Kallinger is a convict and any rights that he may have are extremely limited and severely restricted because of the unique nature and requirements of prison custody. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 97 S. C1. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, [**890] 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948). What this case concerns is whether the Commonwealth's interest in an orderly administration of the prison system is paramount over any residual right of privacy that Kallinger has which would make it an invasion of privacy on the part of [***7] the Commonwealth to force feed him. The narrow issue then presented to us is whether the Commonwealth has a right to force a competent prisoner within the Commonwealth's penal system to receive involuntary [*420] medical treatment and nutrition and hydration through a nasogastric feeding tube. To decide this issue, a balancing test is employed, balancing the Commonwealth's interests against the prisoner's remaining right to privacy. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 SC1. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Kallinger argues that his right to privacy is superior to the interests of the Commonwealth, no matter what effect it may have on the prison system. He argues that as a prisoner, he did not give up his right to starve himself, citing the Supreme Court of Georgia decision in Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982). In that case, the Georgia court held that a competent prisoner had a right to starve himself to death. The court, in ruling that the state does not have the right to force medical treatment and food on a competent prisoner, stated: A prisoner does not relinquish his constitutional [***8] right to privacy because of his status as a prisoner. The state has no power to monitor this man's physical condition against his will; neither does it have the right to feed him to prevent his death from starvation if that is his wish .... The state can incarcerate one who has violated the law and, in certain circumstances, even take his life. But it has no right to destroy a person's will by frustrating his attempt to die if necessary to make a point. Zant, 248 Ga. at 833-834, 286 SE.2d at 716-717. Kallinger further argues that the procedure for forcing nutrition and hydration into him is overly intrusive. The procedure which the Department has been and wishes to continue using is a nasogastric tube which is inserted through the nose into the stomach. This tube will remain in his body and will have to be frequently removed and replaced. Kallinger correctly points out that there are several risks involved in this procedure, including internal bleeding and possibly even death. (N.T. July 10, 1990, pp. 42-43, 56-57; July 18, 1990, p. 23). [*421] While admitting that there are risks to Kallinger as a result of his forced feeding, the Commonwealth [***9] argues that its interest in prison security and discipline, the morale of medical and custodial staff, as well as the law of this Commonwealth, far outweigh any right of privacy that Kallinger may have. We agree. The Commonwealth has an overwhelming interest in maintaining prison security, order and discipline. The Supreme Court has stated that "maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the detained constitutional rights of ... convicted prisoners." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S.O. at 1878. This lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy deprives the convicts of Fourth Amendment rights in their prison cells. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U .S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Prison officials are given a wide range of discretion in the promulgation and enforcement of rules to govern the prison community in order to maintain security, order and discipline. Bell V. Wolfish; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 SCt. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). [***10] U.S. ex rel. Silverman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 527 F.Supp. 742 (W.D.Pa.1981), affd Appeal of Silverman, 707 F.2d 1395 (3rd Cir.1983). Individual freedoms may be curtailed whenever prison officials, in exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that their exercise possesses the likelihood of disrupting prison order or stability or otherwise interfering [**891] with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment. St. Clair v. Cuyler, 634 F. 2d 109 (3rd Cir.1980), rehearing denied 643 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir.1980); See also Bell v. Wolfish; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Union; Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F.Supp. 9 (W.D.Pa.1971), aff d 463 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir.1972). Other jurisdictions confronted with the same situation have held that compelled nutrition and medical treatment is proper because of the strong state interest in orderly prison [*422) administration outweighs any convict's residual rights. In Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.YS.2d 623 (1982), Mark David Chapman, serving a twenty year [***11] to life term for the murder of former Beatle John Lennon, attempted to starve himself to death while in a mental institution. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, in allowing involuntary feeding through a nasogastric tube, found that the legitimate interest in prison security and administration clearly included the right to prevent a prisoner's suicide. In Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979), the Massachusetts Supreme Court allowed forced hemadialysis to a prisoner suffering a kidney condition on the basis of maintaining prison order. The court stated that imprisonment imposed severe limitations on the prisoner's right to privacy and bodily integrity. In the present case, the uncontradicted testimony shows that if KaIlinger would be permitted to die, other patients at Farview would almost certainly copy the same tactic, manipulating the system to get a change of conditions, possibly resulting in their death. (N.T. July 10, 1990, pp. 13-14, 25- 26, 49; July 18, 1990, pp. 16-17, 31). Allowing a prisoner to die will cause other patients to become angry and lose faith in the system and make treatment [***12] more difficult; it may even spawn rioting at Farview or from prisoners at Huntingdon or other state institutions. (N.T. July 10, 1990, pp. 13-14, 20, 26; July 18, 1990, pp. 17-20, 36). It is clear that allowing a prisoner to starve to death while in state custody would have an unpredictable negative effect on the security and order within the prison system. Besides preserving order with the prison system, the Commonwealth has a strong interest in maintaining the health of prisoners in its custody. The obligation of the Commonwealth to provide for the health and safety of the inmates in their custody is derived from two very important interests: the preservation of human life and the prevention of suicide. The preservation of human life is of great interest to the state. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital [*423] v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). In Commonwealth v. Root, 191 Pa.Super. 238, 244, 156 A.2d 895, 900 (1959), revd. on other grds. 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961), the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that "[t)he policy of the law is to protect human life, even [***13] the life of a person who wishes to destroy his own." The Commonwealth has a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect the health and welfare of those persons in its custody, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), and may be cast in civil damages for its failure to observe such duty, Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 728 F.Supp. 352 (E.D.Pa.1990); Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir.1981). Furthermore, the Commonwealth has a duty to "provid[e] appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others." Washington V. Harper, 494 U.S. , , 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1030, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990). The United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper allowed the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to a prisoner on the basis that the state's interest in providing appropriate medical treatment outweighed the inmate's liberty interest. [***141 The Supreme Court found that the state has not only an interest, but an "obligation to provide prisoners with medical treatment consistent not only with their own medical interests, but also with the [**8921 needs of the institution." Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. at , 110 S.Ct. at 1039. Other courts have also considered the state's interest in the preservation of human life. In State ex. rel. White v. Narick, W. Va. , 292 S.E.2d 54 (1982), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals allowed the force feeding of an inmate who had begun a hunger strike to protest conditions of his prison. The court found that "[a] state must preserve human life, a concern at the very core of civilization .... West Virginia's interest in preserving life is superior to [the prisoner's] personal privacy (severely [*4241 modified by his incarceration)." Narick, W.Va. at , 292 A.2d at 58. See also Commissioner of Correction v. Myers (forced hemadialysis treatment on prisoner suffering kidney condition based on preservation of life and maintaining prison order); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). [***151 The Court in Narick criticized the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Zant by stating: The Georgia court failed to consider compelling reasons for preserving life, not the least being civility. What sense does it make for a state to allow a prisoner to kill himself, urging as its justification his right-of-privacy right to refuse medical treatment for his voluntary debilitation; and yet preserve unto itself the right to kill him, the ultimate violation of his privacy right. We doubt that Georgia would allow him to raise his right of privacy against being put to death, as a defense against the death penalty! Narick, W.Va. at , 292 S.E.2d at 57. The second related state interest is the Commonwealth's duty to prevent suicide. "American law has always accorded the State the power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide -- including suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, U.S. at , 110 S.Ct. at 2859, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). (Scalia, I concurring). Pennsylvania public policy strongly opposes the commission of suicide. Commonwealth v. 1***161 Root. Pennsylvania law makes it a crime to aid or solicit another person to commit suicide. Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2505. A police officer also has the right to use force to prevent a suicide from occurring. 18 Pa. C.S. § 508(d)(1). By asking the Commonwealth to stand by and watch him die while it has custody and control over him, Kallinger is asking it to aid and abet his suicide. [*425] The leading case in support of a state's duty to prevent suicide is Von Holden v. Chapman. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, in rejecting Chapman's right to privacy claim, held that "it is self-evident that the right of privacy does not include the right to commit suicide .... To characterize a person's self-destructive acts as entitled to Constitutional protection would be ludicrous." Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. Since Kallinger is a patient at Farview, the Commonwealth's interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical and psychiatric professions is also of great importance. Several courts have held that the integrity of the medical profession is an interest which should be balanced against [***171 a person's privacy right to refuse medical treatment or nutrition. Cruzan; Narick; Saikewicz. If Kallinger is allowed to starve himself to death, repercussions would be felt throughout the medical and psychiatric professions. (N.T. July 10, 1990, pp. 19-20, 24-25, 40; July 18, 1990, pp, 16-17). Dr. Jafri, Chief of Psychiatric Services at Farview, stated that Kallinger's death would "have a negative impact upon the staff [in] that we could not carry out a moral and ethical obligation of keeping a patient alive." (N.T. July 10, 1990, p. 41). Jack Wolford, M.D., Psychiatric Director for the Department, testified that "it would be devastating to the staff and the staff morale if they had to allow someone to cease living, virtually by their own hand, while under our care." (N.T. July 18, 1990, p. 10). [**8931 Furthermore, if he is allowed to die, other patients and their families would have serious doubts about whether the psychiatric staff is providing their patients with proper psychiatric treatment and medical care. (N.T. July 18, 1990, pp. 26-27, 40; July 18, 1990, pp. 19, 36). Dr. Jafri testified that his death "will not encourage the confidence of their patients in our ability to [***181 manage and take care their needs, as [well as] the moral confidence of the public." (N.T. July 10, 1990, p. 41). Dr. Wolford stated that the patients [*4261 "would lose trust in the system of care." (N.T. July 18, 1990, p. 17). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has an overwhelming interest in the orderly administration of its prison system. The Commonwealth must maintain prison security, order and discipline. It must also fulfill its duty to provide proper medical care to the inmates, thus preserving life and preventing suicide. These vital interests, along with the need to preserve the integrity of the physicians and psychiatrists working within the penal system, clearly outweigh any diminished right to privacy held by Kallinger. Accordingly, we order that Farview can and must continue to provide appropriate nutrition through a nasogastric tube and appropriate medical care to Joseph Kallinger so long as he continues to refuse nutrition and medical treatment. Kallinger shall remain committed to Farview until such time as the medical and psychiatric staff feel it's appropriate for him to return to a State Correctional Institution. ORDER No. 239 Misc. Dkt. 1990 AND NOW, this [***191 14th day of August, 1990, it is ordered that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, Farview State Hospital, must provide appropriate nutrition through a nasogastric tube and appropriate medical care to Joseph Kallinger as long as he continues to refuse either. Joseph Kallinger's commitment to Farview State Hospital is extended indefinitely until such time that the medical and psychiatric staff determines that such feeding can be carried out at an appropriate State Correctional Institution. ORDER AND NOW, this 10th day of September, 1990, it is ordered that the opinion filed August 14, 1990 shall be 1*4271 designated OPINION rather than MEMORANDUM OPINION and that it shall be reported. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. TIERRE DAVIS, No. Civil Action Equity Defendant ORDER AND NOW, this day of , 2012 at o'clock --M., following a hearing and in light of the facts found and conclusions by the Court it is hereby ORDERED Plaintiff s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. Plaintiff or Plaintiff's designee, wherever located, may involuntarily examine Defendant and administer medical treatment to him, including performing invasive diagnostic tests, providing medication, and supplying nutrition and hydration intravenously or otherwise, as may be deemed necessary by Plaintiff s medical staff, to preserve Defendant's health and life should Defendant refuse such treatment and nutrition/hydration. BY THE COURT J. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. TIERRE DAVIS, : No. Civil Action Equity Defendant ORDER AND NOW, this day of , 2012, after a hearing, it appearing to the court that the Defendant, TIERRE DAVIS, was duly served with the foregoing documents, the Court finds as a fact and as a matter of law that an indefinite injunction is necessary to preserve the health and life of the Defendant. The Plaintiff or Plaintiff's designee, through its medical staff, is permitted, when it appears that immediate relief is necessary to preserve the health or life of the Defendant to: I . Involuntarily examine and perform invasive diagnostic tests, including blood and urine tests, on Defendant and administer medical treatment, including nutrition, hydration, and prescribed medication as may, in the opinion of medical staff, be necessary to preserve Defendant's health and life. 2. This ORDER shall remain in effect as long as Defendant is committed to the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. BY THE COURT: J. f I IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. ; TIERRE DAVIS, Defendant Cra w NoaLl%ivil Action Equit}Y'?' -- y MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 1. Plaintiffs Complaint in this matter is incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 2. Defendant will suffer immediate, severe, and irreparable harm possibly resulting in death if ongoing, involuntary medical treatment is not provided, including, but not limited to, nutrition and hydration. 3. Based upon the facts set forth in the Complaint and in Plaintiffs concurrently filed Application for Ex Parte Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff has a clear right to administer ongoing involuntary medical treatment. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, Farview State Hospital v. Joseph Kallinger, 134 Pa. Cmwlth. 415, 580 A.2d 887 (1990). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court to enter a Preliminary Injunction permitting Plaintiff or Plaintiffs designee to involuntary examine and perform invasive diagnostic tests on Tierre Davis and to administer the medical treatment that may, in the opinion of medical staff, be necessary to preserve Tierre Davis's health, safety, and life including, but not limited to, involuntarily providing him nutrition and hydration. Respectfully submitted, Timoth Imes Assistant Counsel Attorney I.D. No. 87758 PA Department of Corrections Office of Chief Counsel 1920 Technology Parkway Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 (717) 728-7747 Dated: December 12, 2012 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. No. Civil Action Equity TIERRE DAVIS, Defendant PROOF OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction was served on the person and in the manner indicated below: Personal service by hand-delivery Tierre Davis, DY1710 SCI-Camp Hill 2500 Lisburn Road Camp Hill, PA 17001-8837 '-/ JA Edwin A. Shoop Acting Corrections Health Care Administrator SCI- Camp Hill Dated: December 12, 2012 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff N ? , ?y7D ... . V. No. 1 Civil Action Equi <,, --- c- N) TIERRE DAVIS, c, Defendant APPLICATION FOR EX PARTS PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1531, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, petitions this Honorable Court to issue an Order ex parse granting the concurrently filed Motion for a Preliminary Injunction pending a hearing because of the following: 1. Plaintiffs Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this matter are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 2. Defendant will suffer irreparable harm, possibly resulting in death, if the relief sought is not granted. 3. Immediate relief, as requested, is necessary to sustain the life and health of the Defendant pending the adjudication of this matter. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court to ex parse order a Preliminary Injunction permitting Plaintiff or Plaintiffs designee to involuntarily examine and perform invasive diagnostic tests on Tierce Davis and to administer the medical treatment that may, in the opinion of medical staff, be necessary to preserve Tierre Davis's health and life, including, but not limited to involuntarily providing him nutrition and hydration pending the adjudication of this matter. IOL Respectfully submitted, PA Department of Corrections Office of Chief Counsel 1920 Technology Parkway Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 (717) 728-7747 Dated: December 12, 2012 Attorney I.D. No. 87758 ? s IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Plaintiff, V. No. Civil Action Equity TIERRE DAVIS, Defendant PROOF OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Application for Ex Parte Preliminary Injunction was served on the person and in the manner indicated below: Personal service by hand-delivery Tierre Davis, DY1710 SCI-Camp Hill 2500 Lisburn Road Camp Hill, PA 17001-8837 Edwin A. Shoop Acting Corrections Health Care Administrator SCI-Camp Hill Dated December 11, 2012 COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, ) Plaintiff ) V. j AARON R. SIGEL, ) Defendant ) No. I -7/ G 0 CV?i Petition for Waiver of Costs M W C:1 r Nr ... . , r w t -1 :z C, C,n 1. I am the Defendant in the above matter and because of my financial condition, I am unable to pay the fees and costs of prosecuting or defending this action or proceeding. 2. 1 am unable to obtain funds from anyone, including my family and associates, to pay the costs of litigation. I represent that the information below relating to my ability to pay the fees and costs is true and correct: (A) NAME: Aaron R. Sigel ADDRESS: 127 Tower Circle, Carlisle, Pa 17013 (B) EMPLOYMENT: If you are presently employed, state: EMPLOYER: (Not applicable) ADDRESS: SALARY OR WAGES PER MONTH: TYPE OF WORK: If you are presently unemployed, state: DATE OF LAST EMPLOYMENT: 05/01/2011 SALARY OR WAGES PER MONTH: $ 2,250 TYPE OF WORK: Comcast Cable Company (C) OTHER MONTHLY INCOME WITHIN THE LAST TWELVE (12) MONTHS: BUSINESS OR SELF-EMPLOYMENT: $ 0 INTEREST OR DIVIDENDS: $ 0 PENSION OR ANNUITIES: $ 0 SOCIAL SECURITY OR S.S.I.: $ 0 SUPPORT: $ 0 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: $ 0 WORKER'S COMPENSATION: $ 0 Petition for Waiver of Costs Page 2 of 4 WELFARE: $ 0 OTHER (Please specify): $ 0 (D) OTHER MONTHLY CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOUSEHOLD SUPPORT: SPOUSE'S NAME (if living together): (Not applicable) If your spouse is employed, state: EMPLOYER: SALARY OR WAGES PER MONTH: TYPE OF WORK: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CHILDREN: (None) CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PARENTS: (None) OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS: (None) (E) PROPERTY OWNED: CASH: (None) CHECKING ACCOUNT: $ 7 SAVINGS ACCOUNT: $ 5 CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT, STOCKS, BONDS: (None) REAL ESTATE / HOME: PRESENT VALUE: $ 40,000 AMOUNT STILL OWED: $ 39,000 MOTOR VEHICLE: Year Make and model 2006 Subaru Impreza Cost Amount still owed $ 23,000 $ 14,000 OTHER: (None) (F) DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS PER MONTH: MORTGAGE/RENT: $ 373.15 WATER/SEWER: $ 55 ELECTRIC: $ 120 TELEPHONE: $ 242 OIUGAS/HEAT: $ 200 CABLE: $ 0 FOOD: $ 200 CLOTHING: $ 0 CHILD SUPPORT: $ 0 CHILD CARE: $ 0 TRANSPORTATION: $ 0 MEDICAL EXPENSES: $ 0 LOAN PAYMENTS: $ 0 CREDIT CARD PAYMENTS: $ 0 INSURANCE: $ 0 MISCELLANEOUS: $ 0 (G) PERSONS DEPENDENT UPON YOU FOR SUPPORT: CHILDREN (STATE NAMES AND AGES): Name Age Caine Sigel 17 years Petition for Waiver of Costs Page 3 of 4 OTHERS (STATE NAME, AGE AND RELATIONSHIP): Name Age Relationship (None) 3. 1 understand that I have a continuing obligation to inform the court of any improvement in my financial circumstances which would permit me to pay the cost incurred with this case. 4. 1 verify that the facts stated in the foregoing Petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Petitioner understands that false statements therein are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4904 relating to unswom falsification to authorities. Date: 1 AARON R. S ML, Defendant Petition for Waiver of Costs Page 4 of 4 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN% COURT OF COMMON PLEAS gth Judicial District, County Of Cumberland NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE JUDGMENT t ? COMMON PLEAS No. ?; NOTICE OF APPEAL Notice is given that the appellant has filed in the above Court of Common Pleas an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Magisterial District Judge on the date and in the case referenced below. 127 Carlisle Midland Funding LLC MJ-090201 -CV-00001 15-2012 R.C.P.D.J. No. 1008B. This Notice of Appeal, when received by the Magisterial District Judge, will operate as a SUPERSEDEAS to the judgment for possession in this case. svnw- of Plod- WY or Do" was Claimant (see Pa. M PA before a Magisterial District Judge, A COMPLAINT MUST BE FILED within twenty (20) days after filing the NOTICE of APPEAL. PRAECIPE TO ENTER RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT AND RULE TO FILE (This section of form to be used ONLY when appellant was DEFENDANT (see Pa. R.C.P.D.J. No. 1001(7) in action before Magisterial District Judge. IF NOT USED, detach from copy of notice of appeal to be served upon appellee. PRAECIPE: To Prothonotary Enter rule upon Midland Funding LLC appellee(s), to file a complaint in this appeal Name of app90e43) (Common Pleas No. 2 . ` / Q ( ) within twenty (20) days afters ice of rule or suffer entry of judgment of non pros. 1-1 Signature of appellant or attorney or agent RULE: To Midland Funding LLC appellee(s) Rim s (1) You are notified that a rule is hereby entered upon you to file a complaint in this appeal within twenty (20) days after the date of service of this rule upon you by personal service or by certified or registered mail. (2) If you do not file a complaint within this time, a JUDGMENT OF NON PROS MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU. (3) The date of service of this rule if service was by mail is the date of the mailing. Date: .20 _ Signaturo of ProthorWay or Deputy YOU MUST INCLUDE A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF JUDGMENTITRANSCRIPT FORM WITH THIS NOTICE OF APPEAL. AOPC 312-05 Notice of Appeal Page 1 of 2 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Notice of Judgment/Transcript Civil COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND Case Mag. Dist. No: MDJ-09-2-01 MDJ Name: Honorable Paul M Fegley Address: 2260 Spring Road, Suite 3 Carlisle, PA 17013 Telephone: 717-218-5250 Aaron Sigel 127 Tower Circle Carlisle, PA 17013-9628 Disposition Summary Docket No Plaintiff Defendant MJ-09201-CV-0000115-2012 Midland Funding LLC Aaron Sigel Judgment Summary Participant Joint/Several Liability Individual Liability Aaron Sigel $0.00 $1,102.63 Midland Funding LLC $0.00 $0.00 Midland Funding LLC V. Aaron Sigel Docket No: MJ-09201-CV-0000115-2012 Case Filed: 10/5/2012 Disposition Disposition Date Default Judgment for Plaintiff 11/13/2012 Amount $1,102.63 $0.00 Judgment Detail ('Post Judgment) In the matter of Midland Funding LLC vs. Aaron Sigel on 11/13/2012 the judgment was awarded as follows: Judgment Component Joint/Several Liability Individual Liability Deposit Applied Amount Civil Judgment $0.00 $1,005.13 $1,005.13 Filing Fees $0.00 $97.50 $97.50 Grand Total: $1,102.63 ANY PARTY HAS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE PROTHONOTARY/CLERK OF COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CIVIL DIVISION. YOU MUST INCLUDE A COPY OF THIS NOTICE OF JUDGMENTITRANSCRIPT FORM WITH YOUR NOTICE OF APPEAL. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGES, IF THE JUDGMENT HOLDER ELECTS TO ENTER THE JUDGMENT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ALL FURTHER PROCESS MUST COME FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND NO FURTHER PROCESS MAY BE ISSUED BY THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE. UNLESS THE JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ANYONE INTERESTED IN THE JUDGMENT MAY FILE A REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF SATISFACTION WITH THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE IF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR PAYS IN FULL, SETTLES, OR OTHERWISE COMPLIES WITH THE JUDGMENT. l I3 z-- Date Magisterial District Judge Paul M Fegley ./w. Z.n! .. -.¢ certify that this is a true an correct copy o the record o the proceedings containing the judgment. Date Magisterial District Judge MDJS 315 Page 1 of 2 Printed: 11/13/2012 12:47:09PM N . Midland Funding LLC V. Aaron Sigel Docket No.: MJ-09201 -CV-00001 15-2012 Participant List Plaintiff(s) Midland Funding LLC c/o Burton Neil & Associates, P.C. 1060 Andrew Drive Suite 170 West Chester, PA 19380 Defendant(s) Aaron Sigel 127 Tower Circle Carlisle, PA 17013-9628 Complainant's Attorney(s) Yale D Weinstein, Esq. Burton Neil & Associates, P.C. 1060 Andrew Drive, Suite 170 West Chester, PA 19380 MM r r- r C=' Ww U l MDJS 315 Page 2 of 2 Printed: 11/13/2012 12:47:09PM