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HomeMy WebLinkAbout14-0324 Supreme Co irt4Jf�,Pennsylvania COUt' = ' f ,,Commo ''A leas For Prothonotary Use Only: � E i z Docket No: County ° 91733 . The information collected on this form is used solely for court administration purposes. This form does not _ supplement or replace the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law or rules of court. Commencement of Action: El Complaint i Writ of Summons ( Petition S ] Transfer from Another Jurisdiction 0 Declaration of Taking E C Lead Plaintiff's Name: Lead Defendant's Name: RASHEEDA PULLIN, ET AL. FAITH F. DAGGS, M.Q., ET AL. T. ( Yes Dollar Amount Requested: within arbitration limits EX; I Are money damages requested? { No (check one) [@ outside arbitration limits Q N . Is this a Class Action Suit? Q Yes D No Is this an MDJAppeal? _d Yes El No A Name of Plaintiff /Appellant's Attorney: DARYL E. CHRISTOPHER, ESQUIRE - ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF Check here if you have no attorney (are a Self- Represented [Pro Sel Litigant) Nature of the Case Place an' X "-to the left of the ONE case category that most accurately describes your PRIMARY CASE. If you are making more than one type of claim, check the one that you consider most important: TORT (do not include Mass Tort) CONTRACT (do not include Judgments) CIVIL APPEALS 0 Intentional El Buyer Plaintiff Administrative Agencies 0 Malicious Prosecution 0 Debt Collection: Credit Card M Board of Assessment FLIJ Motor Vehicle Debt Collection: Other Q Board of Elections ® Nuisance Dept. of Transportation Premises Liability I_ �' Statutory Appeal: Other S C_:a Product Liability (does not include El Employment Dispute: mass tort) E -i Slander /Libel/ Defamation Discrimination ' C 0 Other: l� Employment Dispute: Other F1 Zoning Board T Other: I Other: O MASS TORT _3 Asbestos N 7-1 Tobacco 0 Toxic Tort - DES rl Toxic Tort - Implant REAL PROPERTY MISCELLANEOUS Q Toxic Waste ED Ejectment F0 Common Law /Statutory Arbitration Other: 0 Eminent Domain /Condemnation 0 Declaratory Judgment B 1 Ground Rent 0 Mandamus El Landlord /Tenant Dispute 0 Non - Domestic Relations Q Mortgage Foreclosure: Residential Restraining Order PROFESSIONAL LIABLITY _.4 Mortgage Foreclosure: Commercial 0 Quo Warranto 0 Dental Partition 0 Replevin Q Legal Quiet Title ( Other: Medical Other: Other Professional: f ' I Updated 1 /1/2011 1 15 ) ' 1` t'r-0 ,JAf'l f ('11 3: ry a ENN$?'LVAtilA� t 1' ANGINO & ROVNER, P.C. Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 -1708 Phone: (717) 238 -6791 Fax: (717) 238 -5610 E -mail: dchristopher@angino- rovner.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS McCLINTOCK, Individually and as OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION — MEDICAL V. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d/b /a CENTER NO. 'q FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NOTICE TO DEFEND You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Complaint and Notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing with the Court your defenses . or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed without you and judgment may be entered against you by the Court without further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you. - 75 I PA �y R-'A 3 66S - 41 536536 ">. 1. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE. Cumberland County Bar Association 32 S. Bedford Street, Carlisle, PA 17013 TELEPHONE 1- 800 - 990 -9108 AVISO USTED HA SIDO DEMANDADO /A EN CORTE. Si usted desea defenderse de las demandas que se persentan mds adelante en las siguientes pdginas, debe tomar accion dentro de los proximos veinte (20) dias despues de la notificacion de esta Demanda y Aviso radicando personalmente o por medio de un abogado una comparecencia escrita y radicando en la Corte por escrito sus defensas de, y objecciones a , las demandas presentadas aqui en contra suya. Se le advi.erte de que si usted falla de tomar accion como se describe anteriormente, el caso puede proceder sin usted y ` un fallo por cualquier suma de dinero reclamada en la deinanda o cualquier otra reclamacion o remedio solicitado por el demandante puede ser dictado en contra suya por la Corte sin mds aviso adicional. Used puede perder dinero o propiedad u otros derechos importantes para used. USTED DEBE LLEVAR ESTE DOCUMENTO A SU ABOGADO INMEDIATAMENTE. SI USED NO TIENE UN ABOGADO, LLAME O VAYA A LA SIGUIENTE OFICR ESTA OFICINA PUEDE PROVEERLE 1NFORMACION A CERCA DE COMO CONSEGUIR UN ABOGADO. SI USED NO PUEDE PAGAR POR LOS SERVICIOS DE UN ABOGADO, ES POSIBLE QUE ESTA OFICINA LE PUEDA PROVEER INFORMACION SOBRE AGENCIAS QUE OFREZCAN SERVICIOS LEGALES SIN CARGO O BAJO COSTO A PERSONAS QUE CUALIFICAN. Cumberland County Bar Association 32 S. Bedford Street, Carlisle, PA 17013 TELEPHONE 1- 800 - 990 -9108 536536 f s s ANGINO & ROVNER, P.C. Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 -1708 Phone: (717) 238 -6791 Fax: (717) 238 -56;0 E -mail: dchristopher@angino-rovner.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS McCLINTOCK, Individually and as OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION — MEDICAL V. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION :FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN, SERVICES, INC. d /b /a CENTER NO. FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants JURY TRIAL DEMANDED COMPLAINT PARTIES 1. Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin is an adult individual and a citizen of the Commonwealth of ;Pennsylvania, who resides in Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff Pullin is the Mother of Kaelyn Pullin. 2. Plaintiff Waleed McClintock is an adult individual and a citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who resides in Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff McClintock is the father of Kaelyn Pullin. 3. Plaintiffs are the Administrators of the Estate of their son, Kaelyn Pullin, by Letters of Adminisiration duly issued by the Register of Wills of Dauphin County under File Number 2214 -0032. A Short Certificate is attached as Exhibit A. 4. Defendant Faith Daggs, M.D. (hereinafter "Defendant Daggs "), is a physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, and is licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania. 536536 Defendant Daggs maintains offices in and regularly conducts business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff is asserting a professional liability claim against Defendant Daggs. A Certificate of Merit is filed herewith, Exhibit B. 5. Defendant Spirit Physician Services, Inc. (hereinafter "Defendant Spirit Physician Services "), is a created under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which at all relevant times employed Defendant Daggs, who was acting within the course and scope of her employment for Defendant Spirit Physician Services. Plaintiff is asserting a professional liability claim against Defendant Spirit Physician Services. A Certificate of Merit is filed herewith, Exhibit C. 6. Defendant Spirit Physician Services, maintains offices in and regularly conducts business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 7. Defendant Spirit Physician Services, regularly does business under the fictitious name of Center for Women's Health & Wellness. FACTS 8. In 2012, Rasheeda Pullin was treating with Defendant Spirit Physician Services, for her obstetrical care. 9. Ms. Pullin was on her 9 th pregnancy. She had a history of seven full -term pregnancies and one premature birth. 10. In 2004, Ms. Pullin had a child die at 40 weeks of pregnancy. Since that time, she had not been allowed by her doctors to have a pregnancy go beyond 37 weeks. 11. In 2010 Ms. Pullin also had an endometrial ablation. 12. In 2012, Ms. Pullin developed gestational diabetes that she controlled with modifications to her diet. 2 13. Ms. Pullin treated regularly at DeferidaAi Spirit Physician Services, and was taking prenatal vitamins, 14. Due to her history of grand multiparity, endometrial ablation, gestational diabetes, and prior fetal demise at 40 weeks, Ms. Pullin was considered to have a moderate -risk pregnancy. 15. Ms. Pullin had an estimated delivery date of October 5, 2012. 16. On September 27, 2012, Ms. Pullin underwent a biophysical profile via transabdominal ultrasound and NST. According to medical records, this showed a fetal heart rate of 130, normal cardiac activity, amniotic fluid within normal limits, normal fetal heart rate, kidneys, stomach, bladder, and umbilical cord, and that fetal breathing and movement were both observed. 17. Ms. Pullin had gone in for a checkup because she noticed that her baby was not moving very much. She was told by her treating doctor that everything was okay, but that she could return if she had any problem. 18. The following day, on September 28, 2012, Ms. Pullin went to labor and delivery at Holy Spirit Hospital due to lower abdominal pain and decreased fetal movement. 19. Ms. Pullin presented to the clinic at around 4:00 p.m. 20. According to records, at that time Kaelyn Pullin had a fetal heart rate of 162 beats per minute. 21. Ms. Pullin was treated by Defendant Daggs-who stated that she would induce Ms. Pullin's labor that day rather than wait any longer. 22. At the time, Ms. Pullin was accompanied by her eldest son and daughter. 3 23. Ms. Pullin was started 0 an IV, was given orange juice, and was given paperwork to fill out for her admission to the hospital. 24. Ms. Pullin sent her son home and sent her daughter to get Mr. McClintock. 25. Ms. Pullin's daughter, Keyairah Pinkey, returned with Mr. McClintock at around 5:00 p.m. 26. Ms. Pullin was admitted to Holy Spirit Hospital at 5:38 p.m. on September 28, 2012. 27. Ms. Pullin was followed at the hospital by Defendant Daggs, 28. Ms. Pullin had a cervical exam which showed that her cervix was 4 cm dilated and 70% effaced with -2 station. 29. Ms. Pullin and her baby, Kaelyn, began to be monitored with external cardiotocography. 30. At that time, Ms. Pullin had infrequent uterine contractions. 31. Kaelyn Pullin had a baseline fetal heart rate of 160 beats per minute but showed minimal variability. 32. At this time, Kaelyn Pullin had a Category 2 fetal heart tracing which required constant monitoring:. 33. At 5:49 p.m., Kaelyn's heart rate showed a late deceleration with moderate variability. 34. At 6:43 p.m., Kaelyn's heart rate spontaneously decelerated to a nadir of 80 beats per minute with a slow return to baseline over the next 8 minutes. 35. At 6:57 p.m., there was a loss of adequate fetal heart rate monitoring until 7:05 p.m.. 4 36. At 7:05 p.m., Kaelyn's heart rate was 90 beats per minute and slowly climbed back to. the 120s by 7:12 p.m. 37. At 7:07 p.m., upon loss of fetal heart monitoring, medical records report that an IVF bolus was given and that 02 was started at 1 OL per minute. 38. The fetal heart tracing was again inadequate until 7:14 p.m. when the baseline again appeared at 120 beats per minute. 39: At 7:35 p.m., Defendant Daggs saw Ms. Pullin and repeated the cervical exam. Per the medical records, it was unchanged., 40 - Defendant Daggs attempted to rupture Ms. Pullin's membranes to place a fetal scalp electrode, but the membranes remained intact and no electrode was placed. 41. At around 8:00 p.m., Defendant Daggs returned and indicated that another doctor, Dr. Manning, had told her to perform a C- section. 42. Although Ms. Pullin was given oxygen and was being repositioned, Kaelyn's heart rate never stabilized. 43. Ms. Pullin noticed that there did not seem to be any urgency in performing the C- section. 44. At 8:1.0 p.m., the baby had another late deceleration from a baseline of 140 this time in the presence of minimal variability. 45. At this time, Ms. Pullin began to have more regular contractions. Late decelerations occurred with more than 2/3 of subsequent contractions until delivery. 46. At 8:49 p.m., another deceration occurred with a loss of fetal monitoring for 3.5 minutes followed by a gradual return to a new baseline of 130 over the next 3 minutes. 47. At 9:15 p.m., another late deceleration occurred. 5 a ` 48. Per the medical records,, Defendant Daggs was notified of this late deceleration at 9:20 p.m.. 49. At 9:31 .m. another - late deceration occurred followed b a loss off 1 p � Y eta monitoring for another 17 minutes. 50. At 9:52 p.m., Ms. Pullin was finally moved to the OR for a C- section. Mr. McClintock also went to the OR. 51. Kaelyn Pullin was delivered at 10:15 p.m.. 52. Ms. Pullin was awake, having been given spinal anesthesia. 53. When Kaelyn was delivered, a nurse in the OR began yelling for help. 54. Everyone in the OR appeared to be in shock. 55. Ms. Pullin heard first -hand what was going on, and her blood pressure began to spike. 56. The anesthesiologist told others in the room to calm down because of the stress they were causing to Ms. Pullin. 57. Waleed McClintock was also present in the room and saw and heard everything as it was happening. 58. Kaelyn Pullin had initial Apgars of 0/0/0/2. 59. Mr. McClintock saw Kaelyn and saw that Kaelyn was blue and limp. 60. According to records, Kaelyn Pullin required 17 minutes of CPR. 61. Kaelyn's cord blood taken after his birth showed a pH of 6.58, severe acidosis. 62. Kaelyn was life flighted to Hershey Medical Center. 63. No one told Ms. Pullin or Mr. McClintock how serious the situation was until someone from Hershey stated that Kaelyn might die on the flight to Hershey. 6 64. Ms. Pullin was transferred to Hershey Medical Center where doctors told her and Mr. McClintock that Kaelyn was brain dead. 65. After numerous confirming tests, Ms. Pullin and Mr. McClintock agreed to remove life .support. 66. Kaelyn Pullin died on October 4, 2012, as a result of his severe anoxic brain injury. 67. When Ms. Pullin first presented to Holy Spirit Hospital on September 28, 2012, Ms. Pullin's son showed a Category II fetal heart tracing that required constant monitoring. 68. During a normally progressing labor, a fetus should show increasing variability. 69. Variability is a good indicator of how healthy a fetus is at any point in time because a healthy fetus will constantly be adapting its heart rate to respond to changes in its environment. 70. Kaelyn Pullin showed decreasing variability. 71. Decreasing variability on a cardiotocogram are a sign that the fetus is becoming acidotic. 72. Variable decelerations on a cardiotocogram are usually associated with umbilical cord compression or other interruption in umbilical blood flow. 73. Variable declarations without shoulders of acceleration are more serious than variable declarations with shoulders of acceleration because they are more likely to be associated with fetal hypoxia. 74. At 6:57 p.m., Kaelyn Pullin had a variable deceleration on cardiotocogram without shoulders of acceleration. 75. Kaelyn Pullin needed constant monitoring from at least this point forward. 7 76. Late decelerations on a cardiotocograrn are a sign that the fetus is acidotic. 77. Late decelerations in the presence of decreased variability are a sign of fetal distress that require immediate delivery. 78. At 8:1.0 p.m., Kaelyn Pullin's fetal heart tracing showed a late deceleration with decreased variability. 79. By 8:10 p.m., Kaeyln Pullin's fetal heart tracing had moved from a Category II to a Category III. fetal heart tracing. 80. Defendant Daggs should have ordered a STAT C- section at 8:10 p.m. 8:. By 8:50 p.m., Kaelyn Pullin's fetal heart tracing looked even worse. 82. Defendant Daggs should have ordered a STAT C- section at 8:50 p.m. 83. Whether a STAT C- section was ordered at 8:10 p.m. or 8:50 p.m., Kaelyn Pullin would have been delivered no later than 9:20 p.m., almost an hour before he was actually delivered. 84. There were at least 44 minutes with no fetal heart rate monitoring before Kaelyn Pullin was finally delivered at 10:15 p.m. 85. Had Defendant Daggs ordered a STAT C- section at 8:10 p.m. or 8:50 p.m., Kaelyn Pullin would not have suffered.an anoxic brain injury. COUNT I— NEGLIGENCE ALL PLAINTIFFS v. FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D. 86. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 87. All of the Plaintiff's damages were the result of the negligent, careless, and substandard care provided to Rasheeda Pullin and Kaelyn Pullin by Defendant Faith F. Daggs, 8 M.D., which increased the risk that Kaelyn Pullin would suffer an anoxic brain injury and death, in that she: a. Failed to ensure constant monitoring of Kaelyn Pullin's fetal heart rate once she admitted Rasheeda Pullin to Holy Spirit Hospital; b. Failed to appropriately and timely order a STAT C- section when Kaelyn Pullin's fetal heart tracing began to deteriorate; C. Failed to perform a STAT C- section of Kaelyn Pullin once he developed late decelerations at 2010; d. Failed to perform a STAT C- section of Kaelyn Pullin once his condition further deteriorated at 2050; e. Failed to monitor Kaelyn Pullin for the 44 minutes before he was born; f. Failed to perform a STAT C- section of Kaelyn Pullin once she finally decided to or was told to perform a C- section; and g. Failed to timely respond to Kaelyn Pullin's deteriorating condition and to deliver him as soon as possible once he showed signs of hypoxia and acidemia. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin, Administrator of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, deceased, demands judgment against Defendant Faith F. Daggs, M.D., in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of any amount requiring compulsory arbitration. 9 7 •. COUNT II—= VICARIOUS LIABILITY ALL .PLAINTIFFS v. SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d/b /a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH=& W ELLNESS 88. A]1 preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 89. All of the Plaintiff's damages were caused by the negligent, careless, and substandard care provided to Rasheeda and Kaelyn Pullin by Defendant Spirit Physician Services, Inc. d/b /a Center of Women's Health & Wellness, though its agent, servant, ostensible agent, and employee, Faith F. Daggs, M.D. 90. At all relevant times, Defendant Daggs was acting within the course and scope of her agency or ostensible agency with Defendant Spirit Physician Service. 91. At all relevant times, Defendant Spirit Physician Services, was liable for Defendant Daggs' negligence under the doctrines of Respondeat Superior, agency, ostensible agency, and apparent agency. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin, Administrator of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, deceased, demands judgment against Defendant Spirit Physician Services Inc. d/b /a Center for Women's Health & Wellness, in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of any amount requiring compulsory arbitration. CLAIM I Survival Action RASHEEDA PULLIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF hAELYN PULLIN v. FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D. and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN. SERVICES, INC. d /b /a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS 92. All preceding paragraphs are. incorporated. herein by reference. 93. Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin brings this survival action on behalf of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, deceased, under and pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8302. 10 94. All of Kaelyn's damages were the direct and proximate result of the Defendants' negligence, as alleged above, which increased the risk that he would suffer from and die from an anoxic brain injury. 95. As a result of the Defendants' negligence, Kaelyn Pullin endured pain, suffering, and loss of life's pleasures and enjoyment, and claims are made therefor. 96. As a result of the Defendants' negligence, Kaelyn Pullin suffered disfigurement, and claims are made therefor. 97. As a result of the Defendants' negligence, Kaelyn Pullin suffered a permanent diminution of his earning capacity, and claims are made therefor. 98. Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin hereby files claims on behalf of the Estate for damages suffered by the Estate, including pain and suffering, disfigurement, and loss of life's pleasures and enjoyment Kaelyn suffered prior to his death, Kaelyn's loss of future earning capacity, and all other damages properly recoverable under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8302. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin, Administrator of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, deceased, demands judgment against Defendants Faith F. Daggs, M.D. and Spirit Physician Services, Inc. d /b /a Center for Women's Health & Wellness, in . an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of any amount requiring compulsory arbitration. 11 CLAIM II Wrongful Death RASHEEDA PULLIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF KAE:LYN PULLIN v. FAITH K DAGGS, M.D. and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d /b /a CENTER FOR. WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS 99. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 100. Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin brings this action pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A.' §8301, on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries enumerated below. 101. The following. are the names of all individuals entitled by law to recover damages for the wrongful death of Kaelyn Pullin: Name _ Rel A ddress Rasheeda Pull Mother Harrisb PA Walleed McClintock Father Harrisb PA 102. Defendants' negligence, as alleged herein, was the legal, factual, and proximate cause of Kaelyn Pullin's death. 103. Defendants' negligence, as alleged herein, increased the risk that Kaelyn Pullin would die from an anoxic brain injury. 104. Defendants' negligence, as alleged herein, significantly deceased Kaelyn Pullin's period of survival. 105. As a direct result of the Defendants' conduct, which caused Kaelyn Pullin's death, the wrongful death beneficiaries have incurred medical, funeral, and burial expenses, and. claims are made therefor. 106. As a direct result of the Defendants' conduct, which caused Kaelyn Pullin's death, the wrongful death beneficiaries have been, and will in the future be; deprived of Kaelyn's services, contribution, earnings, support, society, and comfort, and claims are made therefor. 12 107. On behalf of all of the viroigful death beneficiaries, Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin hereby brings claims for all classes of damages allowed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8301. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin, Administrator of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, deceased, demands judgment against Defendants Faith F. Daggs, M.D. and Spirit Physician Services, Inc. d /b /a Center for Women's Health & Wellness, in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of any amount requiring compulsory arbitration. CLAIM III Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress RASHEEDA PULLIN, INDIVIDUALLY v. FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D. and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d /b /a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS 108. All preceding. paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 109. Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin witnessed Defendants' negligence, the injury to her son, and death of her son, Kaelyn Pullin. 110. As a result of witnessing Defendants' negligence, the injury to her son, and the death of her son, Kaeyln Pullin, Ms. Pullin has suffered severe mental anguish, emotional distress, sleeplessness, stress and anxiety, and claims are made therefor. 111. Ms. Pullin has required medical care counseling to help restore herself to health after witnessing the Defendants' negligence, the injury to'her son, and the death of her son, and may require additional treatment in the future, and claims are made therefor. 112. As a result of her emotional distress, Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin has suffered and will in the future suffer, embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of life's pleasures and enjoyment, and claims are made therefor. 13 k 113. As a result of her emotional distress, Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin has suffered lost earnings and may suffer from a diminution of her future earning capacity, and claims are made therefor. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin, Administrator of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, deceased, demands judgment against Defendants Faith F. Daggs, M.D. and Spirit Physician Services, Inc. d /b /a Center for Women's Health & Wellness, in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of any amount requiring compulsory arbitration. CLAIM IV Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress WALEED MCCLINTOCK v. FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D. and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d /b /a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS 114. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 115. Plaintiff Waleed McClintock witnessed Defendants' negligence, the injury to his son, and death of his son, Kaelyn Pullin. 116. As a result of witnessing Defendants' negligence, the injury to his son, and the death of his son, Kaeyln Pullin, Mr. McClintock has suffered severe mental anguish, emotional distress, sleeplessness, and stress, and claims are made therefor. 117. As a result of his emotional distress, Plaintiff Waleed McClintock has suffered and will in the future suffer embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of life's pleasures and enjoyment, and claims are made therefor. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Waleed McClintock, demands judgment against Defendants Faith F. Daggs, M.D. and Spirit Physician Services, Inc. d /b /a Center f6r Women's Health & 14 r 5 H ➢ Wellness, in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of any amount requiring compulsory arbitration. ANGINO & ROVNER, P.C. Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire I.D. No. 91895 4503 N. Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 238 -6791 Counsel for Plaintiffs Date: January . 15, 2014 15 VERIFICATION We, Rasheeda Pullin and Waleed McClintock, Plaintiffs, have read the foregoing COMPLAINT and do hereby swear or affirm that the facts set forth in the foregoing are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that this Verification is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Witness Aasheeda Pullin, Date: 11131rq Witness Waleed 04edintock Date: 536536 1 { ♦ ' 1 1 M 1' Dauphin County, Pennsylvania - Register of Wills SHORT CERTIFICATE — LETTERS OFADMLNISTRATION File No: 2214 -0032 I, Jean Marfizo King, Register of Wills in and for the DER OF County of Dauphin, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 5 �V s � 4�V CO � DO HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 10, 2014, LETTERS OF Q' N ADMINISTRATION, on the estate of KAELYN PULLIN, deceased, of HARRISBURG CITY in said county, were granted to € Q RASHEEDA PULLIN, and WALEED MCCLINTOCK, having ` Q first been q ualified well and truly to administer the same. And I ;4 YIN COO q Y , further certify that no revocation of said Letters appears of record in my office. IN TESTTMONYWHEREOF, I have here unto set my hand and affixed the seal of said office at DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, on January 13, 2014. Date of Death: October 04, 2012 Social Security #: 268 -25 -9071 NOT VALID WITHOUT OFFICIAL SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF OFFICE EXPIRES 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF ISSUANCE r . l '100� ANGINO & ROVNER, P.C. Daryl E: Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# :_91895 4503 North Front Street Han•isburg, PA 17110 -1708 Phone: (717) 238 -6791 Fax: (717) 238 -5610 E -mail: dehrist her a wino- rovner.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS McCL]NTOCK, Individually and as OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION — MEDICAL V. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d /b /a CENTER NO. FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Certificate of Merit as to Faith F. Daggs, M.D. 1, Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire, certify that: ( X ) an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by this defendant in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional: standards and that such conduct was a cause. in bringing about the harm; AND /Ole'. ( ) the claim that this defendant deviated from an acceptable professional standard is based solely on allegations that other licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible deviated from an acceptable professional standard and an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill . or knowledge exercised or exhibited by the other licensed professionals in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint,. fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm; OR ( ) expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the claim against this defendant. Date: January 15, 2014 Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Exhibit B ANGINO & ROVNER, P.C. 357036 G rrr G t 1 EXHIBIT C Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 -1708 Phone: (717) 238 -6791 Fax: (717) 238 -5610 E-mail: dchristoopher (c_angino- rovner.com Attorneys fo Plainti RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED I IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS McCLINTOCK, Individually and as OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION — MEDICAL V. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN=SERVICES, INC. d/b /a CENTER NO. FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Certificate of Merit as to Spirit Physician Services, Inc. d /b /a Center for Women's Health & Wellness I, Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire, certify that: ( ) an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by this defendant in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm; AND /OR ( X ) the claim that this defendant deviated from an acceptable professional standard is based solely on allegations that other licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible deviated from an acceptable professional standard and an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement to the undersigned that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by the other licensed professionals in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm; OR ( ) expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the claim against this defendant. ti Date: January 15, 2014 Daryl istopher, Esquire Exhibit C 357036 1944883.doc DICKIE,MCCAMEY&CHILCOTE,P.C. BY:Thomas M.Chairs,Esquire ATTORNEY FOR: DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY I.D.NO. 78565 FAITH F.DAGGS,M.D.;AND SPIRIT BY:Aaron S.Jayman,Esquire PHYSICIAN SERVICES,INC.,D/B/A CENTER ATTORNEY I.D.NO.85651 FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH&WELLNESS Plaza 21,Suite 302 425 North 21st Street Camp Hill,PA 17011 717-731-4800 (Tele) 888-811-7144 Fax RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MCCLINTOCK, Individually and as CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, NO. 14-324-CIVIL Plaintiffs, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION V. FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D.; and SPIRIT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED -, -1 PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., d/b/a =-" CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & 7J - - WELLNESS, -<> Defendants. ENTRY OF APPEARANCE TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Please enter the appearance of the undersigned as counsel for Defendants, FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D.; and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., d/b/a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH &WELLNESS,in the above-captioned matter. Respectfully submitted, DICKIE,MCCAMEY&CHIL TE,P.C. Date: January 23, 2014 By: Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire Attorney'I.D. No. 78565 I 1r Date: January 23, 2014 By: Aaron /Jay YEsquire Attorn y I. . No. 85651 Plaza 2 uite 302 425 North 21st Street Camp Hill, PA 17011-2223 717-731-4800 Attorney for Defendants, FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D.;and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., d/b/a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH& WELLNESS 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOW, January 23, 2014, I, Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire, hereby certify that I did serve a true and correct copy of the foregoing ENTRY OF APPEARANCE upon all counsel of record by depositing, or causing to be deposited, same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: By First-Class Mail: Daryl Christopher, Esquire ANGINO & ROVNER, P.C. 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (Counsel for Plaintiffs) Thomas . C airs, squire SHERIFF'S OFFICE OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY Ronny R Anderson f, . -OF Ic , Sheriff r1 I-hE P 07'HA I 7 tx��txa at �r�far� Jody S Smith Chief Deputy COQ��1 JAN 21 P 2M ' Richard W Stewart "` CUM8,ERLAN0 C—DU�4Ty Solicitor OPFi U OF T"ESHERIFF PENNSYLVANIA Rebecca Pullin Case Number vs. Faith F Daggs, M.D. (et al.) 2014-324 SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE 01/16/2014 10:15 AM - Deputy William Cline, being duly sworn according to law, served the requested Complaint& Notice by handing a true copy to a person representing themselves to be Mauran Mannie, Office Clerk, who accepted as"Adult Person in Charge"for Faith F Daggs, M.D. at Center for Wo en's Health & Wellness, 423 North 21 st Street, East Pennsboro, Camp Hill, PA 17011. LIAM CLINE, DEPUTY 01/16/2014 10:15 AM - Deputy William Cline, being duly sworn according to law, served the requested Complaint& Notice by handing a true copy to a person representing themselves to be Mauran Mannie, Office Clerk, who accepted as"Adult Person in Charge"for Center for Women's Health &Wellnes at 423 North 21st Street, East Pennsboro, Camp Hill, PA 17011. WtLIAff C INE, DEPUTY 01/16/2014 11:00 AM - Deputy William Cline, being duly sworn according to law, served the requested Complaint& Notice by handing a true copy to a person representing themselves to be Sara Rothenburger, Office Assistant, who accepted as"Adult Person in Charge."for Spirit Physician Services, Inc. t 205 Grandview Avenue, Suite 210, East Pennsboro, Camp Hill, PA 17011. WI A C INE, DEPUTY SHERIFF COST: $94.36 SO ANSWERS, January 17, 2014 RbNW R ANDERSON, SHERIFF (c;CountySw;e Sheriff,Toleosoff,inc. SCHMIDT KRAMER Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 P(717) 232 -6300 F(717) 232 -6467 dchristopher@schmidtkramer.com 21.OJ1MAR 24 Rai 1: 23 CIMBERLIINO COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA Attorneys for Plaintiff RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED McCLINTOCK, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, Plaintiffs v. FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d/b /a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION — MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION NO. 14 -324 CIVIL TERM JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE FOR WITHDRAWAL/ENTRY OF APPEARANCE Please withdraw my appearance on behalf of the Plaintiffs as: Daryl Christopher, Esquire Angino & Rovner, P.C. 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Please enter my appearance on behalf of the Plaintiffs as: SCHMIDT KRAMER Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 dchristopher @schmidtkramer.com Respectfully Submitted, SCHMIDT KRAMER Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 (717) 232-6300 FAX (717) 232-6467 Attorneys for Plaintiffs dchristopher@schmidtkramer.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Daryl Christopher, an employee of the law firm of Schmidt Kramer, P.C., do hereby certify that I am this day serving a true and correct copy of Withdrawal/Entry of Appearance upon all counsel of record via United States first class mail, addressed as follows: Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21St Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 -2223 Counsel for Defendants Date: 34/11 SCHMIDT KRAMER Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 P(717) 232-6300 F(717) 232 -6467 dclristopher@schmidtkramer.com ; fu MONO rf-l!. 2014 APR -4 All : 03 CUMBERLAND 1'Et� 'COUN T,�: Attorneys for Plaintiff RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED McCLINTOCK, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, Plaintiffs v. FAITH F. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d/b /a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION — MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION NO. 14 -324 CIVIL TERM JURY TRIAL DEMANDED STIPULATION TO AMEND CAPTION AND NOW come all Parties, by and through their respective counsel, and enter in to this Stipulation to correct the middle initial for Faith Daggs, M.D. All Parties Stipulate and Agree to change the caption to: RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED McCLINTOCK, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, Plaintiffs v. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION — MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d/b /a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants Date: % / 1 Date: NO. 14 -324 CIVIL TERM JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Respectfully Submitted, . SCHMIDT KRAMER Daryl E: hristopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 (717) 232 -6300 FAX (717) 232 -6467 Attorneys for Plaintiffs dchristopher @schmidtkramer.com DICKIE MICA E & HILCOTE Thomas Chairs, Esquire Attorney ID #: Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21st Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 -2223 Counsel for Defendants CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Daryl Christopher, an employee of the law firm of Schmidt Kramer, P.C., do hereby certify that I am this day serving a true and correct copy of the Stipulation to Amend Caption upon all counsel of record via United States first class mail, addressed as follows: Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21st Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 -2223 Counsel for Defendants Date: N l Daryl istopher DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C. BY: Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire ATTORNEY I.D. NO. 78565 BY: Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire ATTORNEYLD. NO. 85651 Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21st Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-731-4800 (Tele) 888-811-7144 (Fax) ATTORNEY FOR: DEFENDANTS FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D.; AND SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., D/B/A CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED MCCLINTOCK, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, Plaintiffs, v. FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D.; and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., d/b/a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 14 -0324 -CIVIL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION rri �. r n Up c JURY TRIAL DEMANDED > -0 _-rcp; Dc ,v T=, - a=- - . NOTICE TO PLEAD YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED TO PLEAD TO THE WITHIN ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS OF THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS PLEADING OR JUDGMENT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU. Respectfully Submitted, Date: May 19. 2014 DICKIE, MC AMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C. By: Thomas 5��''airs, Esquire Aaron S. J.yman, Esquire Attorney For Defendants, Faith D. Daggs, M.D.; And Spirit Physician Services, Inc., D/B/A Center For Women's Health & Wellness 2044099.doc DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C. BY: Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire ATTORNEY I.D. NO. 78565 BY: Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire ATTORNEY I.D. NO. 85651 Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21st Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-731-4800 (Tele) 888-811-7144 (Fax) ATTORNEY FOR: DEFENDANTS FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D.; AND SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., D/B/A CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED MCCLINTOCK, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, Plaintiffs, v. FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D.; and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., d/b/a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS, Defendants. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 14 -0324 -CIVIL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION n JURY TRIAL DEMANDED rri r-; Cr) r" c) -4 w Y •N DEFENDANTS' ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT :Er' AND NOW, come Defendants, FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D. and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., d/b/a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS (collectively referred to hereinafter as "Answering Defendants"), by and through their counsel, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. and file the within Answer with New Matter to Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows: 1. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Answering Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations set forth in this paragraph and they are therefore deemed denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 2. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Answering Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations set forth in this paragraph and they are therefore deemed denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 3. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that a short certificate is attached at Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Complaint. The remaining allegations are denied as conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 4. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that Dr. Daggs is a physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania. It is further admitted that Dr. Daggs maintains an office in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania and that Plaintiffs are asserting a professional liability claim against Dr. Daggs. It is specifically denied that Plaintiffs' professional liability claim against Dr. Daggs has any merit whatsoever. At all relevant times, Dr. Daggs met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. The remaining allegations are denied as conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 5. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that Spirit Physician Services, Inc. employed Dr. Daggs and that Plaintiffs are asserting a professional liability claim against Spirit Physician Services. It is specifically denied that Plaintiffs' professional liability claims against Spirit Physician Services and/or Dr. Daggs have any merit whatsoever. At all relevant time, Spirit Physician Services and/or Dr. Daggs met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as 2 alleged. The remaining allegations contained in this paragraph of Plaintiffs' Complaint are denied as conclusions of to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 6. Denied as a conclusion of law to who which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 7. Denied as a conclusion of law to who which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 8.-66. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 67. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 68. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 69. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 70. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the 3 time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 71. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 72. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 73. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 74. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 75. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 4 76. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 77. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 78. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 79. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 80. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 81. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the 5 time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 82. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 83. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 84. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 85. Denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e) and/or as legal and medical conclusions to which no responses are required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. COUNT I 86. Answering Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 84 above as if fully set forth herein. 87(a. -v.) Denied. This paragraph and corresponding subparagraphs of Plaintiffs' Complaint are denied as medical and legal conclusions to which no responsive pleading is 6 required and strict proof thereof is demanded at that time trial. By way of further response, to the extent that this paragraph and corresponding subparagraphs contain averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.P. 1029(e). In addition, Dr. Daggs was not negligent and careless and did not provide substandard care in this case. At all relevant times, Dr. Daggs met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time accused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. WHEREFORE, Answering Defendants demand judgment in their favor and against Plaintiffs with all allowable costs and attorneys' fees. COUNT II 88. Answering Defendants hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 87 above as if fully set forth herein. 89. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Defendant Daggs and/or Defendant, Spirit Physician Services D/B/A Center for Women's Health and Wellness were negligent and careless and provided substandard care in this case. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. 90. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required. It is admitted that Defendant Daggs was employed by Spirit Physician Services, Inc. 91. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Defendant, Spirit Physician Services and/or Defendant Daggs was 7 negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded and at no time caused or contributed to the injuries as alleged. WHEREFORE, Answering Defendants demand judgment in their favor and against Plaintiffs with all allowable costs and attorneys' fees. CLAIM I SURVIVAL ACTION 92. Answering Defendants hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 91 above as if fully set forth herein. 93. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 94. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 95. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 96. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 97. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 98. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). WHEREFORE, Answering Defendants demand judgment in their favor and against Plaintiffs with all allowable costs and attorneys' fees. 9 CLAIM II WRONGFUL DEATH 99. Answering Defendants hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs through 98 above as if fully set forth herein. 100. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time trial. 101. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time trial. 102. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 103. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 104. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, 10 Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 105. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 106. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 107. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, it is specifically denied that Answering Defendants were negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and at no time cause or contributed to the injuries as alleged. To the extent that his paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). WHEREFORE, Answering Defendants demand judgment in their favor and against Plaintiffs with all allowable costs and attorneys' fees. 11 CLAIM III NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 108. Answering Defendants hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 107 above as if fully set forth herein. 109. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants were not negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to the injuries as alleged. 110. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants were not negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to the injuries as alleged. By way of further response, to the extent this paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 111. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants were not negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to the injuries as alleged. By way of further response, to the extent this paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 112. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, 12 Answering Defendants were not negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to the injuries as alleged. By way of further response, to the extent this paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 113. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants were not negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to the injuries as alleged. By way of further response, to the extent this paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). WHEREFORE, Answering Defendants demand judgment in their favor and against Plaintiffs with all allowable costs and attorneys' fees. CLAIM IV NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 114. Answering Defendants hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 113 above as if fully set forth herein. 115. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants were not negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to the injuries as alleged. 116. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, 13 Answering Defendants were not negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to the injuries as alleged. By way of further response, to the extent this paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). 117. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. By way of further response, Answering Defendants were not negligent. At all relevant times, Answering Defendants met or exceeded the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to the injuries as alleged. By way of further response, to the extent this paragraph contains averments of fact, they are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(e). WHEREFORE, Answering Defendants demand judgment in their favor and against Plaintiffs with all allowable costs and attorneys' fees. NEW MATTER By way of further answer, Answering Defendants aver the following New Matter directed to Plaintiffs: 118. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 119. Nothing Answering Defendants did or failed to do was the cause in fact or the proximate cause of any alleged injury or loss to Plaintiffs. 120. Plaintiffs' claims may be barred by the doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence or reduced by comparative negligence. 121. Plaintiffs' Complaint is barred or reduced by the provisions of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, the relevant provisions of which are 14 incorporated herein by referenced as though same were more fully set forth at length herein. 122. At all times material hereto, Answering Defendants provided treatment in accordance with the applicable standard of medical care at the time and place of treatment. 123. Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate any damages allegedly sustained. 124. Plaintiffs' claims and/or request for damages herein are limited and/or precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. 125. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 126. Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient to toll the applicable statute of limitations. 127. Plaintiffs' cause of action may be barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. 128. Plaintiffs' cause of action is subject to, and barred by the "Two Schools of Thought" Doctrine. 129. To the extent that discovery and/or investigation may reveal, Plaintiffs have granted accord and satisfaction to a judgment thereby barring a subsequent suit against any other defendant for the same injuries. 130. In accordance with Pennsylvania law, including the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act, Plaintiffs shall have no right to recover any amount, which was paid by a collateral source of compensation or benefits. 131. Plaintiffs may have entered into a release which has the effect of discharging Answering Defendants from this matter. 132. Upon information and belief, certain of Plaintiffs' bills for which Plaintiffs seeks to recover in this action that were paid or are payable under accident and health 15 insurance, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Worker's Compensation insurance, or other insurance. 133. Plaintiffs shall have no right to recover for any amount which was paid by a private, public, or gratuitous collateral source of compensation or benefits under such as instituted or amended by the Pennsylvania Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act. 134. Plaintiffs' claims and/or request for damages is barred or limited by the provisions of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, Act. No. 13, House Bill No. 1802, 2202 Pa. ALS 13; 2002, Pa. Laws 13; 2001 Pa. HB 1802, as amended. 135. The general allegations of agency in the Complaint are incapable of further response and are specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 136. By way of further answer, Answering Defendants specifically reserve the right to plead hereafter as further New Matter those additional affirmative defenses, including, without limitation, those set forth in Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030, that continuing investigation, discovery in accordance with court rules, and the introduction of evidence at trial may render applicable to claims and causes of action declared upon Plaintiffs in the Complaint. WHEREFORE, Answering Defendants demand judgment in their favor and against Plaintiffs with all allowable costs and attorney's fees. 16 Respectfully Submitted, DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C. Date: May 19. 2014 By: / Thomas . airs, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 78565 Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. 85651 Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21st Street Camp Hill, PA 17011-2223 717-731-4800 Attorney for Defendants, FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D.; and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., d/b/a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH & WELLNESS 17 HBG Verification General VERIFICATION I, Faith D. Daggs, M.D., hereby verify that the facts set forth in the foregoing Answer with New Matter are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. er--, Li L Fait D. Daggs, M. WA''-'7 HBG Verification General VERIFICATION I, Ellen Feidt, R.N., Director, Risk Management, on behalf of Spirit Physician Services, Inc., D/B/A Center For Women's Health & Wellness, hereby verify that the facts set forth in the foregoing Answer with New Matter are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Ellen Feidt, R.N., Director, Risk Management CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOW, May 19, 2014, I, Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire, hereby certify that I did serve a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT upon all counsel of record by depositing, or causing to be deposited, same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: By First -Class Mail: Daryl Christopher, Esquire SCHMIDT KRAMER, P.C. 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 (Counsel for Plaintiffs) Aaron S. Jayman, Esqu Tt " ' y MA Y 30 P1112: CLIMBERL ND CQL+ ( PENNSYLVANIA SCHMIDT KRAMER Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 P(717) 232 -6300 F(717) 232 -6467 dchristopher@schmidtkramer.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED McCLINTOCK, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin, Plaintiffs v. FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d /b /a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH 86 WELLNESS, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACTION NO. 14 -324 CIVIL TERM JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS - SET 1 TO: SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire Dickie, McCamey 85 Chilcote, P.C. Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21st Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 -2223 Counsel for Defendants Please take notice that you are hereby requested to admit for the purposes of this action only, the truth of the following matters within thirty (30) days after service of this request in accordance with Pa. R.C.P. 4014: Please Admit the following: 1. Defendant Spirit Physician Services, maintains offices in and regularly conducts business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Admit Deny 2. Defendant Spirit Physician Services, regularly does business under the fictitious name of Center for Women's Health & Wellness. Admit Deny Date: 5A-11/ Respectfully Submitted, SCHMIDT KRAMER aryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 (717) 232 -6300 FAX (717) 232 -6467 Attorneys for Plaintiffs dchristopher@schmidtkramer.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Laura Trimble, an employee of the law firm of Schmidt Kramer, do hereby certify that I am this day serving a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Request for Admissions upon all counsel of record via postage prepaid first class United States mail addressed as follows: Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire Dickie, McCamey 86 Chilcote, P.C. Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21St Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 -2223 Counsel for Defendants Date: -5 - 9- ) ` ) Laura Trimble s: u Ir' ((`� r t'.IN I,',! SCHMIDT KRAMER Daryl E. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 P(717) 232-6300 F(717) 232-6467 dchristopher@schmidtkramer.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs RASHEEDA PULLIN and WALEED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS McCLINTOCK, Individually and as OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn PENNSYLVANIA Pullin, Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION - MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY V. ACTION FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D., and SPIRIT NO. 14-324 CIVIL TERM PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. d/b/a CENTER FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH 8s JURY TRIAL DEMANDED WELLNESS, Defendants PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S NEW MATTER TO: SPIRIT PHYSICIAN SERVICES FAITH D. DAGGS, M.D. Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21St Street Camp Hill, PA 17011-2223 Counsel for Defendants AND NOW come Plaintiffs Rasheeda Pullin and Waleed McClintock, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Kaelyn Pullin and filled the following answer to New Matter: 118. Denied. This paragraph is denied as a conclusion of law. To the extent this paragraph is deemed to contain any averments of fact they are specifically denied. By way of further answer, Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations set forth in their Complaint as stated herein. 119. Denied. Defendant's actions caused the death of Kaelyn Pullin and the injuries to Plaintiff Rasheeda Pullin and Waleed McClintock. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations set forth in their Complaint as stated herein. 120. Denied. At all times relevant hereto Plaintiffs conducted themselves as reasonable persons under the circumstances. Plaintiffs did not assume the risk that they or their son would be injured by Defendant's malpractice. By way of further answer, Kaelyn Pullin was legally incapable of assuming any risk, or being contributorily or comparatively negligent due to his age. 121. Denied. Plaintiffs incorporate their answer to Paragraph 120. By way of further answer this paragraph is denied by conclusion of law. To the extent this Paragraph is deemed to contain any averments of fact they are specifically denied. 122. Denied. It is specifically denied that the Answering Defendant's provided care that was within the applicable standard of medical care at the time and place of treatment. By way of further, answer Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations set forth in their Complaint as stated herein. 123. Denied. It is specifically denied that Plaintiffs failed to mitigate any of their damages and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. 124. Denied. This paragraph is denied as a conclusion of law. By way of further answer Plaintiffs have not brought any other action which could possibly bar claims in this lawsuit by collateral estoppel or res judicata. 125. Denied. Plaintiffs' claims have been brought within applicable statute of limitations. 126. Denied. Plaintiffs have brought this action within the applicable statute of limitations. Any claim that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts should be addressed as a preliminary objection. 127. Denied. This paragraph is denied as a conclusion of law. By way of further answer Plaintiffs brought this action well within the applicable statute of limitations and there is no basis for the Defendants to assert the defense of latches. 128. Denied. It is specifically denied that the two schools of thought doctrine has any applicability to the present case. No reasonable OBGYN would have ignored the clear indications of fetal distress the way Dr. Daggs did in this case. 129. Denied. It is specifically denied that Plaintiffs have granted accord and satisfaction to any Judgment which has any effect in the present lawsuit. All averments in this paragraph are specifically denied. 130. Denied. This paragraph is denied as a conclusion of law. By way of further answer it is denied as an incorrect statement of Pennsylvania Law which fails to account for the numerous exceptions the MCARE Act's, prohibition against recovery of damages payed by collateral sources. 131. Denied. It is specifically denied that Plaintiffs have entered in any release regarding the present case or the facts on which the present case is based, Plaintiffs have not taken any action that has the effect of discharging the answering Defendants from this matter. 132. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that some of Plaintiff's medical bills were paid for by DPW. However it is believed and therefore averred that those payments fall within an exception to the MCARE Act's prohobition against recovery of medical bills. It is specifically denied that the payment of Plaintiff's medical bills by insurance in any way precludes the ability recovery of said medical bills in this lawsuit. 133. Denied. This paragraph is denied as a conclusion of law and as an incorrect statement of Pennsylvania law. 134. Denied. This paragraph as a conclusion of law and as an incorrect statement of Pennsylvania law. 135. Denied. Plaintiffs' Complaint is very specific and if Defendant's believe there are any allegations within Plaintiffs' Complaint to which they cannot reasonably respond, the proper pleading to file is a Preliminary Objection. 136. Denied. This paragraph is denied as a conclusion of law and as an incorrect statement of law. Defendants cannot preserve additional defenses by simply stating that they reserve the right to plead such defenses. Defendants have plead no facts which would form the basis for any additional defenses, and any attempt to plead additional defenses at a later date would fall outside the exception created by Conner v. Allegheny General Hospital, 501 Pa. 306, 461 A.2d 600 (1983), and its progeny. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment in an amount in excess of $50,000 exclusive of interest and cost and in excess of any amount requiring compulsorily arbitration. Respectfully Submitted, SCHMIDT KRAMER Date: /IV& Daryl It. Christopher, Esquire Attorney ID# : 91895 209 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 (717) 232-6300 FAX (717) 232-6467 Attorneys for Plaintiffs dehristopher@schmidtkramer.com VERIFICATION BASED UPON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY COUNSEL I, Waleed McClintock, verify that I am the Plaintiff in the foregoing action and that the attached Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' New Matter are based upon the information which has been gathered by my counsel in preparation of this lawsuit. The language of the Responses is that of counsel and is not mine. I have read the Responses and to the extent that they are based upon information that I have given to counsel, they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. To the extent that the contents of the Responses are that of counsel, I have relied upon counsel in making this Verification. I understand that intentional false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsifications made to authorities. A DATED: Waleed McClintock VERIFICATION BASED UPON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY COUNSEL I, Rasheeda Pullin, verify that I am the Plaintiff in the foregoing action and that the attached Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' New Matter are based upon the information which has been gathered by my counsel in preparation of this lawsuit. The language of the Responses is that of counsel and is not mine. I have read the Responses and to the extent that they are based upon information that I have given to counsel, they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. To the extent that the contents of the Responses are that of counsel, I have relied upon counsel in making this Verification. I understand that intentional false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsifications made to authorities. DATED: 61011 P-W— Ralsheeda Pullin CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Laura Trimble, an employee of the law firm of Schmidt Kramer, do hereby certify that I am this day serving a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants New Matter upon all counsel of record via postage prepaid first class United States mail addressed as follows: Thomas M. Chairs, Esquire Aaron S. Jayman, Esquire Dickie, McCamey 8s Chilcote, P.C. Plaza 21, Suite 302 425 North 21 st Street Camp Hill, PA 17011-2223 Counsel for Defendants Date: TY�I�I I Laura Trimble