HomeMy WebLinkAbout05-15-14 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS c,
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,PENNSYLVANIA CZ o s m
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 26
IN RE: Docket No. 21-07-0686 `r' can r rn
} r, X o
. r, c�
ESTATE OF LOTTIE IVY DIXON m �'B -'r,'
INSTITUTIONAL TRUSTEE,M&T BANK'S MOTION TOy r
(1) APPROVE SUPPLEMENTAL ACCOUNTING, (2) TAX 1
ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST OBJECTORS GEORGE F. DIXON, III
AND RICHARD E. DIXON AND 3 RESIGN AS TRUSTEE
AND NOW comes Institutional Trustee, M&T Bank ("M&T"), and makes the
following motion to approve its supplemental accounting, tax its attorneys' fees against
George F. Dixon, III and Richard E. Dixon (the"Brothers"), (its co-trustees and the objectors to
M&T Bank's previously filed accounting), and seeking the Court's approval for M&T to resign
in its capacity as trustee of the Lottie Ivy Dixon Irrevocable Trust, stating in support thereof as
follows:
1. On or about March 7,2014,this Court entered an opinion and Order
sustaining limited objections to M&T's first and partial accounting, but overruling the
overwhelming majority of the objections to this account.
1 That Order(attached hereto with its accompanying opinion as Exhibit"A"),
very specifically contemplated the filing of a supplemental account"to provide an explanation
for the purpose of those two distributions (listed as "Lottie I. Dixon —Distribution"). See
Exhibit"A."
3. Contemporaneously with the filing of this motion,M&T has filed the
supplemental accounting contemplated by that court Order.
4. Meanwhile, however, (curiously)the Brothers saw fit to file a purported
appeal of the March 7, 2014 Order to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
1
S L 11'297710v 1 066255.00089
t 1(/
i
5. That appeal is fundamentally improper, inasmuch as the March 7, 2014 Order
is, on its face, interlocutory in nature and, in no sense, is the same immediately appealable.
6. For this reason, M&T has taken the precaution of filing a motion to quash
with the Superior Court, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit `B."
7. M&T's supplemental accounting clarifies, on the face of the record, those
representations previously made in open court by M&T,to the effect that distributions made to
Mrs. Dixon during her lifetime were made from her(then-revocable) trust to her M&T checking
account, upon her own requests, (frequently in writing, although occasionally orally).
8. Based upon the reasoning and rationale in the opinion and Order of March 7,
2014, it is M&T's understanding and anticipation that the supplemental account now conforms
both in form and substance to any applicable requirements, and may be confirmed without
further formal proceedings, whether before an auditor or otherwise.
9. As reflected in the prior account(which,again,the Court has indicated is
suitable for confirmation with the exception of the two clarification items requiring further
description as set forth above),this particular trust is illiquid.
10. Nevertheless,as a result of the Brothers' litigation tactics and posturing,M&T
has been compelled to expend substantial sums in defense of its prior account, and the
(successful) prosecution of its motion to strike the Brothers' objections to same.
11. Through this motion, M&T Bank respectfidly requests that the Court tax the
attorneys' fees incurred (and to be incurred) as a result of this unnecessary litigation against the
parties responsible therefor,the Brothers themselves,namely George F. Dixon, III and
Richard E. Dixon.
2
SIA 1297710vi 066255.00089
12. As the Court surely recognizes, trust litigation is an exception to the
"American Rule,"whereby if a party interested in a trust(whether beneficiary or otherwise)
challenges the actions of another fiduciary (whether by surcharge action or otherwise) and is
unsuccessful, attorneys' fees are appropriately taxed against the trust.
13. Under the circumstances presented here, the trust is unable to stand
answerable for the magnitude of fees incurred.
14. Consequently, it seems only right, fair, and equitable that those parties
actually propounding the ill-taken objections be held accountable for reimbursement of M&T's
fees in this regard.
15. Those attorneys' fees total $27,676.50.
16. Finally, the real estate which was the core holding of the companion
George F. Dixon QTIP trust was distributed following the entry of the court's Order of
December 28, 2012.
17. Thus, M&T's role as trustee with respect to that trust has come to an end,
inasmuch as trust administration is complete, and the real estate held within that trust has been
distributed.
18. Similarly, upon the confirmation of the supplemental account filed
contemporaneously herewith(and recovery of its attorneys' fees as requested above), M&T's
role as trustee of the Lottie Ivy Dixon Irrevocable Trust will come to a conclusion.
19. Consequently, M&T(merely as a precautionary measure, and to clarify its
status on the face of the record)respectfully requests that the Court approve its resignation as
trustee of the Lottie Ivy Dixon Irrevocable Trust.
3
SL 11297710v 1 066255.00089
WHEREFORE, M&T respectfully requests that: (1) its supplemental accounting
filed pursuant to the court's Order of March 7, 2014 be confirmed; (2)that M&T's attorneys'
fees made necessary as a result of the Brothers' objections to M&T's original first and partial
accounting and the supplemental accountings be approved and taxed against the Brothers jointly
and severally; and (3) that M&T Bank's resignation as trustee of the Lottie Ivy Dixon
Irrevocable Trust be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: s 7 2014 STEVENS & LEE
Mark D. Bradshaw, Esquire
Attorney I.D. No. 61975
17 North Second Street, 16th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
(717) 255-7357
(610) 371-7362 (fax)
mdb @stevenslee.com
Attorneys for Accountant,
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company
4
SL] ]297710v1066255.00089
is
IN RE: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
ESTATE OF LOTTIE IVY DIXON CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: 21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
IN RE: OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Masland, J., March 7, 2014:--
Background
The Lottie Ivy Dixon Revocable Trust (the Trust) was established in 1985. From 1
1986 to 2007, George F. Dixon lit and Richard E. Dixon (the Brothers)were remainder
beneficiaries and M&T (or its predecessor) was the sole trustee. The Brothers became
co-trustees in 2007 when their mother, Lottie Dixon, died. On June 26, 2013, M&T filed
a first and partial account of the Trust without the signature of either of the Brothers.
Before the court are multiple objections raised by the Brothers to M&T's account, The
objections can be divided into two categories: objections relating to the management of
the trust and objections relating to the format of the account.
M&T filed a motion to strike the objections. Following briefing and argument
thereon, we address not only the threshold issue of whether the.Brothers have standing
to object to the first and partial account, but also we address the merits of the majority of
the objections.
Discussion
The only part of the Uniform Trust Code adopted in Pennsylvania that explicitly
mentions standing is the Uniform Law Comment to the section dealing with remedies for
breach of trust. See 20 PA. Cons.STAT.ANN. § 7781. A breach of trust is defined as "a
violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary." Id. § 7781(a), Simply .
21-07-08 86 ORPHANS' COURT
put, "[b)eneficiaries and cotrusfees have standing to bring a petition to remedy a breach
of trust." Id. at Uniform Law Comment. It is irrelevant if there are multiple trustees; one
trustee can maintain a suit against another trustee, even if the suing trustee participated
t
in the breach. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 200 Comment(e) (1958)
(explaining that "the suit is on behalf of the beneficiary").
The Brothers' objections are primarily based on how M&T allegedly mismanaged
the trust in violation of their duty as trustee over the course of 22 years prior to Lottie .
Dixon's death. Therefore, the bulk of the objections relate to a breach of trust claim. i
Based on the express language of the Uniform Law Comment, as contingent remainder {
beneficiaries and cotrustees of the Trust, the Brothers have standing to bring a petition
to remedy a breach of trust. See 20 PA, CONS.SLAT.ANN. § 7781(a) (Uniform Law ,
c.
F'
Comment).
Although the Brothers have standing, their claims challenging M&T's actions v
while their mother was alive are without merit. in Pennsylvania, the law is clear that
"[r]egardless of the legal capacity of the settlor, the rights of the beneficiaries are subject
to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settior while a
trust is revocable." Id. § 7753(a). As interpreted by the Joint State Government
Commission of the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 2005, "[s]ubsection (a) places a
revocable trust on the same footing as a will, under which no beneficial interest is
effective until the testator's death." Id. at JT. ST. GOB, COMM. COMMENT-2005.
The Trust was revocable until Lottie Dixon died in 2007. Therefore, as long as
i
Lottie Dixon was alive, M&T only owed a duty as trustee to her and no other beneficial
1
interest was effective until she died. Arguably, the Brothers were not true `beneficiaries"
-2-
i
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21-07-0656 ORPHANS' COURT ;
until 2007, Furthermore, until 2007, the rights of the beneficiaries, including their right to
file a breach of trust action, were subject to the control of Lottie. As such, Brothers'
claims regarding the alleged mismanagement of the Trust while their mother was alive
mustfaiLt
Similarly, the Brothers' objection to M&T not requiring Lottie Dixon to request
distributions in writing is irrelevant. "A trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for breach of
trust if the beneficiary consented to the conduct constituting the breach." Id. 3 7789.
Additionally, "[a]n approval by the settlor of a revocable trust. . . binds all the
beneficiaries." Id. at Uniform Law Comment. M&T claims that Lottie telephoned them
requesting distributions from the Trust. This affirmative action is enough to show that
she consented to M&T not requiring her to submit a written request. Furthermore, as
settlor of a revocable trust, Lottie's consent binds all beneficiaries. Therefore, the
Brothers' claims regarding M&T's failure to require Lottie to submit a written request for
distributions are immaterial, because she clearly consented to M&T's behavior.
It is possible thatthe Brothers also lack standing to raise this objection
altogether. The Uniform Law Comment further explains that:
Mollowing the death of the settior, the
beneficiaries would have a right to maintain an action
against a trustee for breach of trust. However, with
respect to actions occurring prior to the settlor's death
or incapacity, an action by the beneficiaries could be
The following example illustrates the logic of this argument. Assume Mom writes a will in 1985
containing provisions for her two kids including a gift of a checking account containing$5 million. Mom
dies in 2007. Even if the checking account only has$5 remaining in 2007,the kids cannot challenge
what their mother did with the money from 1985 through 2007. Similarly,the kids cannot challenge
changes made to the will from 1985 to 2007(other than claims of undue influence,fraud,duress,etc.),
The reason is because the kids'beneficial interest was not effective until their Mom died. Their tom was
free to spend her money and change herwili while she was alive. The same logic applies in this case.
Lottie Dixon was free to spend her money in any way she wanted while she was alive and M&T had no
duty to preserve her money for her children.
3
21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
barred bVthe settlor's consent or by other events
such as approval of the action by a successor trustee. -
ld% 7753-(Uniform Lava Comment) (emphasis added). There are two possible
interpretations of this Comment. One interpretation is that if the settlor consents,
the entire action by the beneficiaries is barred, meaning the beneficiaries lack
standing to raise the claim to begin with. On the other hand, the Comment could
simply mean that the beneficiaries still have standing to raise the claim but the
i
claim must nevertheless fail if consent is proven. In either event, the claim fails.
The Brothers' remaining objections relate to the contents of the actual account.
Generally, accounts in trust matters are subject to the same rules as accounts in
general estate matters. See id § 7799.2. Any party in interest has standing to file a
petition to review any part of the account. Sea ld. §3521. Therefore, the Brothers have
standing to raise their claims regarding the actual format and contents of the account.
{
Orphans' Court Rule 6.1(a) provides, in relevant part, that an account must
specify"[t]he dates of all receipts, disbursements and distributions, the sources of the i
receipts, and the persons to whom disbursements and distributions are made and the
purpose thereof shall be stated ..." (emphasis added). Here, there are two substantial
distributions listed as "Lottie L Dixon —Distribution" in the amounts of$1,504,230.00
and $167,700.00 with no explanation of the purpose of the distributions. In accordance
with the Rules, the court will sustain the Brothers' objections to these two entries in the
accounting and refer the matter back to M&T to provide an explanation for the purpose
of those two distributions. Following this minor correction, the accounting may be
confirmed without the appointment of an auditor.
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21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
Postscript
The court believed that this matter had been resolved with our order of December 28,
2012, and assumed (after no appeals were filed) that the parties had reached an armistice with
respect to their war to end all wars.Although we are compelled at present to permit the
Brothers to proceed, we do so with the admonition that we will not permit this engagement to
rise tc the level of a second world war—a battle over the same borders is not legally tenable. t
Thus;we cite the introduction of the preeminent World War I novel, wherein the
I
author, observed *hat his story N%lill try simply to tell of a generation of men who, even
though they may have escaped shells, were destroyed by the war."2 Although the
I
parties are standing, they have not escaped the shells. Before they are utterly
decimated, we enter the following:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this Illy of March, 2014 after review of the objections filed by
George F. Dixon III and Richard E. Dixon to the First and Partial Account of the Trust
Under Revocable Agreement with Lottie Ivy Dixon, we find that the objectors have
standing with respect to two distributions listed as "Lottie 1; Dixon —Distribution" in the
amounts of$1,504,230.00 and $167,700.00 and, in accordance with the Rules, the
court SUSTAINS the objections to these two entries in the accounting and refers the
matter back to the Accountant, Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company to provide
2 Erich Merin Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front(is' ed. 1929).
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21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
an explanation for the purpose of those two distributions. In all other respects,
the objections are OVERRULED.
By the Court,
ZVI
Albert H. Masland, J.
Kimberly M. Colonna, Esquire
10D Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1168
Kevin J. Kehner, Esquire
Obermayer Rebmann Idlaxwell & Hippel LLP
200 Locust Street, Suite 400
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Mark D. Bradshaw, Esquire
Stevens & Lee, P.C.
17 North Second Street
16`h Floor
Harrisburg, PA 171D1
Daniel L. Sullivan, Esquire
26 W. High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Charlotte Ivy Dixon
323 Bayview Street
Camden, ME 04843
-6-
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN RE: ESTATE OF LOTTIE NY DIXON
591 MDA 2014
MOTION TO QUASH OBJECTOR'S PURPORTED APPEAL
OF AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER ENTERED MARCH 10, 2014,
DIRECTING FURTHER AMENDMENT OF ACCOUNTANT'S
PREVIOUSLY FILED FIRST AND PARTIAL ACCOUNT
ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION, File No. 21-07-0686
STEVENS &
Date: May , 2014 By.
ark D. Bradshaw
Attorney I.D. No. 61975
17 North Second Street, 16th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Tel: (717) 234-1090
Fax: (717) 234-1099
Email: mdb @stevenslee.com
Received in Supreme Court
SLl 1294944v1066255.00089 MAY � 5 2014
�1i6t6�
ACCOUNTANT'S M&T BANK APPLICATION
FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO PA.R.A.P. RULE 123 AND
PA.R.A.P. RULE 342(A)(1) IN THE NATURE OF A
MOTION TO QUASH OBJECTORS' PURPORTED APPEAL
I. On or about June 26, 2013, M&T Bank filed a first and partial
account of the Lottie Ivy Dixon Revocable Trust.
2. Two of Mrs. Dixon's sons, George. F. Dixon, III and Richard E.
Dixon (the `Brothers") filed objections to M&T's account.
3. On March 7, 2014 following briefing and argument, the Orphan's
Court of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania entered an Order and Opinion of Court
dismissing numerous (but not all) of the objections filed by the Brothers, and,
importantly, sustaining certain objections.
4. The Order and Opinion are attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and
affirmatively directed the Accountant, M&T Bank, to file a further and
supplemental account for review and possible confirmation.
5. The Order states, in pertinent part, "We find that the Objectors have
standing with respect to two distributions listed as "Lottie I. Dixon—Distribution"
in the amounts of$1,504,230 and $167,700 and, in accordance with the Rules, the
Court SUSTAINS the objections to these two entries in the accounting and refers
the matter back to Accountant, Manufacturers and Traders Trust Comparw to
provide an explanation for the purpose of those two distributions. In all other
respects, the OBJECTIONS ARE OVERRULED, See Exhibit "A".
1
SLl 1294944v1 066255.00089
By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J.
6. Inasmuch as the Court's Order and Opinion dated March 7, 2014
very clearly and expressly provide for further proceedings and filings prior to the
confirmation of the account, the March 7, 2014 Order is plainly interlocutory.
7. Otherwise stated, the March 7, 2014 Order is, in no respects, a
"Final" Order as contemplated by Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
8. Neither is the March 7, 2014 Order an order which is designated as
immediately appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 342 (creating certain exceptions to
Rule 341's finality requirement with regard to Orders entered in Orphans' Court
matters).
9. More specifically, because the Order contemplates further
proceedings prior to confirmation of the account, the Order cannot possibly be one
from which an appeal may be taken as of right, inasmuch as the Order is not one
"confirming an account or authorizing or directing a distribution from an estate or
trust". See Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(1).
10. Similarly, the March 7, 2014 Order does not fall within any of the
other expressly recognized orders appealable as of right pursuant to Rule 342.
11. Furthermore, it bears mention that the Order of March 7, 2014
does not (either on its face or inferentially), enter an order confirming the account.
2
SLi 1294944v1066255.00089
12. Instead, the Order obviously and on its face, contemplates
supplemental filings and proceedings prior to confirmation.
13. As a result, this Order is plainly interlocutory and unappealable at
this juncture, and the Objectors' purported the Appeal from this Order should be
summarily quashed.
14. It bears mention in this regard, that this would represent the
second unappealable Order that the Objectors (the Brothers) have attempted to
pursue before this Court in this litigation over their parents' estates. See e.g., 818
MDA 2012 (quashed as constituting an appeal from interlocutory order on April 5,
2010).
WHEREFORE, M&T Bank respectfully requests that this purported
appeal of a clearly interlocutory order be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVilk
Date: May �, 2014 By:
Mark D. BrI
Attorney I.D. No. 61975
17 North Second Street, 16th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Tel: (717) 234-1090
Fax: (717) 234-1099
Email: mdb @stevenslee.com
3
SLl 1294944v1 066255.00089
IN RE: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
ESTATE OF LOTTIE IVY DIXON CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
IN RE: OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Masland, J., March 7, 2014:--
Back_qround
The Lottie Ivy Dixon Revocable Trust (the Trust) was established in 1985. From
1985 to 2007, George F. Dixon III and Richard E. Dixon (the Brothers) were remainder
beneficiaries and M&T (or its predecessor) was the sole trustee. The Brothers became
co-trustees in 2007 when their mother, Lottie Dixon, died. On June 26, 2013, M&T filed
a first and partial account of the Trust without the signature of either of the Brothers.
Before the court are multiple objections raised by the Brothers to M&T's account. The
objections can be divided into two categories: objections relating to the management of
the trust and objections relating to the format of the account.
M&Tfiled a motion to strike the objections. Following briefing and argument
thereon, we address not only the threshold issue of whether the.Brothers have standing
to object to the first and partial account, but also we address the merits of the majority of
the objections.
Discussion
The only part of the Uniform Trust Code adopted in Pennsylvania that explicitly
mentions standing is the Uniform Law Comment to the section dealing with remedies for
breach of trust. See 20 PA. CoNs.STAT.ANN. § 7781. A breach of trust is defined as "a
violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary." td. § 7781(a), Simply .
21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
put, "[b]eneficiaries and cotrustees have standing to bring a petition to remedy a breach
of trust." Id. at Uniform Law Comment. It is irrelevant if there are multiple trustees; one
trustee can maintain a suit against another trustee, even if the suing trustee participated
in the breach. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)of TRUSTS§ 200 Comment (e) (1959)
(explaining that "the suit is on behalf of the beneficiary").
The Brothers' objections are primarily based on how M&T allegedly mismanaged
the trust in violation of their duty as trustee over the course of 22 years prior to Lottie
Dixon's death. Therefore, the bulk of the objections relate to a breach of trust claim. '
Based on the express language of the Uniform Law Comment, as contingent remainder
beneficiaries and cotrustees of the Trust, the Brothers have standing to bring a petition
to remedy a breach of trust. See 20 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN. § 7781(a) (Uniform Law
k:
Comment). F
Although the Brothers have standing, their claims challenging M&T's actions
while their mother was alive are without merit. In Pennsylvania, the law is clear that
"[r]egardless of the legal capacity of the settlor, the rights of the beneficiaries are subject
to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor while a
trust is revocable." Id. § 7753(a). As interpreted by the Joint State Government
Commission of the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 2005, "[s]ubsection (a) places a
revocable trust on the same footing as a will, under which no beneficial interest is
effective until the testators death." Id. at JT. ST. GOVF. COMM. COMMENT-2005.
The Trust was revocable until Lottie Dixon died in 2007. Therefore, as long as
Lottie Dixon was alive, M&T only owed a duty as trustee to her and no other beneficial
i
interest was effective until she died. Arguably, the Brothers were not true `beneficiaries"
-2-
i
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21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
until 2007. Furthermore, until 2007, the rights of the beneficiaries, including their right to
file a breach of trust action, were subject to the control of Lottie. As such, Brothers'
claims regarding the alleged mismanagement of the Trust while their mother was alive
MUST Tall. '
Similarly, the Brothers' objection to M&T not requiring Lottie Dixon to request
distributions in writing is irrelevant. "A trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for breach of
trust if the beneficiary consented to the conduct constituting the breach." Id. § 7789.
Additionally, "ja]n approval by the settlor of a revocable trust. . . binds all the
beneficiaries." Id. at Uniform Law Comment. M&T claims that Lottie telephoned them
requesting distributions from the Trust. This affirmative action is enough to show that
she consented to M&T not requiring her to submit a written request. Furthermore, as
settlor of a revocable trust, Lottie's consent binds all beneficiaries. Therefore, the
Brothers' claims regarding M&T's failure to require Lottie to submit a written request for
distributions are immaterial, because she clearly consented to M&T's behavior.
It is possible that the Brothers also lack standing to raise this objection
altogether. The Uniform Law Comment further explains that:
jf]oilowing the death of the settlor, the
beneficiaries would have a right to maintain an action
against a trustee for breach of trust. However, with
respect to actions occurring prior to the settlor's death
or incapacity, an action by the beneficiaries could be 1
The following example illustrates the logic of this argument. Assume Thom writes a will in 5956
containing provisions for her tv✓o kids including a gift of a checking account containing$5 million. Morn
dies in 2007. Even if the checking account only has$5 remaining In 2007, the kids cannot challenge
what their mother did with the money from 1985 through 2007. Similarly, the kids cannot challenge
changes made to the will from 1985 to 2007(other than claims of undue influence,fraud,duress,etc.).
The reason is because the kids' beneficial interest was not effective until their Mom died, Their Mom was
free to spend her money and change her will while she was alive. The same logic applies in this case.
Lottie Dixon was free to spend her money in any way she wanted while she was alive and M&T had no
duty to preserve her money for her children.
I
3
21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
barred by the settlor's consent or by other events
such as approval of the action by a successor trustee.
id. § 7753 (Uniform Law Comment) (emphasis added). There are two possible
interpretations of this Comment. One interpretation is that if the settlor consents,
the entire action by the beneficiaries is barred, meaning the beneficiaries lack
standing to raise the claim to begin with. On the other hand, the Comment could
simply mean that the beneficiaries still have standing to raise the claim but the
claim must nevertheless fail if consent is proven. In either event, the claim fails.
The Brothers' remaining objections relate to the contents of the actual account.
Generally, accounts in trust matters are subject to the same rules as accounts in
general estate matters. See id. § 7799,2. Any party in interest has standing to file a
petition to review any part of the account. See id. § 3521. Therefore, the Brothers have
standing to raise their claims regarding the actual format and contents of the account.
I
Orphans' Court Rule 6.1(a) provides, in relevant part, that an account must
specify"[tjhe dates of all receipts, disbursements and distributions, the sources of the i
receipts, and the persons to whom disbursements and distributions are made and the
purpose thereof shall be stated ..." (emphasis added). Here, there are two substantial
distributions listed as `Lottie 1. Dixon —Distribution" in the amounts of$1,504,230.00
and $167,700.00 with no explanation of the purpose of the distributions. In accordance
with the Rules, the court will sustain the Brothers' objections to these two entries in the
accounting and refer the matter back to M&T to provide an explanation for the purpose
of those two distributions, Following this minor correction, the accounting may be
confirmed without the appointment of an auditor.
4
' f
1
21-07-00$6 ORPHANS' COURT
Postscript
t
The court believed that this matter had been resolved with our order of December 28,
2012, and assumed (after no appeals were filed) that the parties had reached an armistice with
respect to their war to end all wars,Although we are compelled at present to permit the
Brothers to proceed, we do so with the admonition that we will not permit this engagement to
rise to the level of a second world war—a battle over the same borders is not legally tenable. I
i
Thus,'we cite the introduction of the preeminent World War I novel,wherein the
author, observed that his story "twill try simply to tell of a generation of men who, even
though they may have escaped shells, were destroyed by the war.,2 Although the
parties are standing, they have not escaped the shells. Before they are utterly
decimated, we enter the following:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this day of March, 2014 after review of the objections filed by
George F. Dixon Ill and Richard E. Dixon to the First and Partial Account of the Trust
i
Under Revocable Agreement with Lottie Ivy Dixon, we find that the objectors have
I
standing with respect to two distributions listed as "Lottie 1. Dixon —Distribution" in the
amounts of $1,504,230.00 and $167,700.00 and, in accordance with the Rules, the
court SUSTAINS the objections to these two entries in the accounting and refers the
matter back to the Accountant, Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company to provide
z Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front(1"ed, 1929).
-5-
21-07-0686 ORPHANS' COURT
an explanation for the purpose of those two distributions. In all other respects,
the objections are OVERRULED.
By the Court,
Albert H. Masland, J.
Kimberly M. Colonna, Esquire
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
Kevin J. Kehner, Esquire
Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel LLP
200 Locust Street, Suite 400
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Mark D. Bradshaw, Esquire
Stevens & Lee, P.C.
17 North Second Street
16`h Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Daniel L. Sullivan, Esquire
26 W. High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
i
Charlotte Ivy Dixon
323 Bayview Street
Camden, ME 04843
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, MARK D. BRADSHAW, ESQUIRE, certify that on this date, I
served a certified true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the
following counsel of record, by depositing the same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
The Honorable Albert H. Masland Charles E. Wasilefski, Esquire
Cumberland County Court of Peters & Wasilefski
Common Pleas 2931 North Front Street
One Courthouse Square Harrisburg, PA 17110
Carlisle, PA 17013-3387
Kimberly M. Colonna, Esquire Charlotte Ivy Dixon
100 Pine Street 323 Bayview Street
P.O. Box 1166 Camden, ME 04843
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
Daniel L. Sullivan, Esquire
26 W. High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Date: May--7-1 2014 r
S L 1 1294944v 1 06625 5.00089
w
I
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, MARK D. BRADSHAW, ESQUIRE, certify that on this date, I served a
certified true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following counsel of record,
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Daniel L. Sullivan, Esquire
Saidis, Sullivan & Rogers
26 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Kim Colonna, Esquire
Elizabeth Mullaugh, Esquire
McNees, Wallace &Nurick LLC
100 Pine Street, PO Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
Charles E. Wasilefski, Esquire
Peters & Wasilefski
2931 North Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Charlotte Dixon
323 Bayview Street
Camden, ME 04843
Date: 7 2014 Mark D. Bradshaw
SL 1 1297710v 1 066255.00089