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s E c T I 0 N A For Prothonotary Use Only: Lead Plaintiff's Name: H., Ati N S• G ff' ING- Docket No: The information collected on this form is used solely for court administration purposes. This form does not supplement or replace the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law or rules of court. Commencement of Action: ❑ Complaint 0 Writ of Summons 0 Petition Notice of Appeal ❑ Transfer from Another Jurisdiction 0 Declaration of Taking Lead Plaintiff's Name: H., Ati N S• G ff' ING- ad Defendant's Name: O M"Owl0t4 �� 1 stinted (Pro Se) Litigant 7{.if 71.11 ■ Check here ifyou are a Self-Repr Name of Plaintiff/Appellant's Attorney: ?� L. •P Are money damages requested? : 0 Yes No Dollar Amount Requested: within arbitration limits (Check one) outside arbitration limits Is this a Class Action Suit? • Yes 1I► No s E c T I 0 N B Nature of the Case: Place an "X" to the left of the ONE case category that most accurately describes your PRIMARY CASE. If you are making more than one type of claim, check the one that you consider most important. TORT (do not include Mass Tort) ❑ Intentional ❑ Malicious Prosecution ❑ Motor Vehicle ❑ Nuisance ❑ Premises Liability ❑ Product Liability (does not include mass tort) ❑ Slander/Libel/ Defamation ❑ Other: MASS TORT ❑ Asbestos ❑ Tobacco ❑ Toxic Tort - DES ❑ Toxic Tort - Implant ❑ Toxic Waste ❑ Other: PROFESSIONAL LIABLITY ❑ Dental ❑ Legal ❑ Medical ❑ Other Professional: Pa.R.C.P. 205.5 CONTRACT (do not include Judgments) ❑ Buyer Plaintiff ❑ Debt Collection: Credit Card ❑ Debt Collection: Other ❑ Employment Dispute: Discrimination ❑ Employment Dispute: Other O Other: REAL PROPERTY ❑ Ejectment ❑ Eminent Domain/Condemnation ❑ Ground Rent ❑ Landlord/Tenant Dispute ❑ Mortgage Foreclosure ❑ Partition ❑ Quiet Title O Other: CIVIL APPEALS Administrative Agencies ❑ Board of Assessment ❑ oard of Elections Dept. of Transportation ❑ Zoning Board ❑ Statutory Appeal: Other Judicial Appeals ❑ MDJ - Landlord/Tenant ❑ MDJ - Money Judgment ❑ Other: MISCELLANEOUS ❑ Common Law/Statutory Arbitration ❑ Declaratory Judgment ❑ Mandamus ❑ Non -Domestic Relations Restraining Order ❑ Quo Warranto ❑ Replevin ❑ Other: 2/2010 FILED -OFFICE IE rRCTHONOT t_ NOV 2 I PM 12: 1 CUM1BFRLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA Philip L. Zulli, Esq. Zulli Vehicle & Traffic Law 155 Grandview Road Hummelstown, PA 17036 (717) 566-8585 (717) 566-2373 Fax ZulWmsn.com www.zullilaw.com IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY 9T11JUDICIAL DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ANN S. EWING Petitioner v. : NO.: J - 497e . CIVIL ACTION — LAW COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : STATUTORY APPEAL DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION : BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING APPEAL FROM SUSPENSION OF OPERATING PRIVILEGE cud NOW COMES, Petitioner, Ann S. Ewing, by and through her attorney, Philip L. Zulli, Esq., pursuant to Section 1550 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1550 (relating to Judicial review) and 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii) of the Judiciary Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii) (relating to appeals from government agencies), and hereby files this Appeal from Suspension of Operating Privilege, and respectfully avers as follows: 1. Petitioner is Ann S. Ewing, who is a citizen of the Commonwealth and a resident of Cumberland //S. ),c-- re, .4 gAdet ebo 3f3. 7/77? -7 1 County residing at 688 Front Street, Enola, PA 17025, with a current valid Pennsylvania driver's license, number 19220687. 2. Respondent is the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, which is an administrative department of the Executive Department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under Section 61 of the Administrative Code, 71 P.S. §61, (relating to State Government, Administrative Organization) located at 1101 South Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17104-2516 (hereinafter "the Commonwealth"). 3. By Official Notice dated and mailed October 22, 2014, the Commonwealth imposed a one-year suspension of petitioner's operation privilege pursuant to Section 1543 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543 (relating to Driving under suspension) due to petitioner's conviction on February 15, 2005, of violating Section 1543(b) of the Vehicle Code, Driving under DUI -related suspension, on September 4, 2004, in York County. (A true and correct copy of the Commonwealth's Notice of Suspension is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit A.) 4. A delay of nine years and eight months elapsed from the date of the conviction, February 15, 2005, until the date of the Official Notice from the Commonwealth— October 22, 2014. �� Petitioner's r/5- 5. The delay in ng ner s operating privilege is due to the Clerk of Courts of York r County failing to transmit a report of the Vehicle Code violation until October 9, 2014. (A true and correct copy of form DL -21 is attached hereto and incorporated by reference.) 6. A delay of nearly 10 years in imposing a suspension of a citizen's operating privilege is a manifestly unreasonable period of time. 2 7. Petitioner will incur substantial prejudice if the suspension were now to be imposed. a. As Petitioner stated to undersigned counsel, "I am not the same person as I was nine years ago" and evidence of such will be produced at trial. b. Petitioner has been completely sober since July 29, 2009, and fully intends to continue her life free of drugs and alcohol. Petitioner went through 90 -day rehabilitation and participated in Alcoholics Anonymous and is now rehabilitated and recovered from the drug and alcohol addiction that she previously had and evidence of such will be produced at trial. c. Due to several vehicle code violations between April 20, 2001, and August 6, 2008, which were primarily related to her prior drug and alcohol issues, Petitioner's operating privileges were under suspension from March 26, 2002, until December 11, 2012. d. After serving more than 10 years of suspensions, Petitioner's operating privileges and driver's license was restored on December 11, 2012. e. Petitioner has been employed part-time by various temporary agencies and assigned to the Navy Depot in Mechanicsburg since May of 2010. f. During her period of suspension while working at the Navy Depot, Petitioner received a ride to and from work with a fellow employee; however, that employee has since been laid off permanently. g. On May 5, 2014, Petitioner became a full time employee at the Navy Depot through NSC Technologies. h. On October 1, 2014, Petitioner's full-time position was reclassified as a forklift operator/materials handler and she received a substantial increase in pay. 3 i. Petitioner now uses and has used her restored operating privilege to not only go to and from work, but also to enjoy her operating privileges to travel to and fro wherever she desires like ever other licensed driver, including vacations and grocery shopping. Petitioner has changed her circumstances in reliance upon the restoration of her operating 0 ra" privileges on December 11, 2012, and for Petitioner now to be subject to aevIe-year license suspension given her changed circumstances is unreasonable state action and highly prejudicial. 8. After having her privileges suspended for 10 years, and now restored for nearly two years, imposition of a We -year suspension nine years and eight months afer the date of conviction is a manifest and palpable injustice contrary to due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Due Process Clause under the Pennsylvania Constitution protects life, liberty and property interests. Diwara v. State Board of Cosmetology, 852 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). The substantive protections of due process are meant to protect citizens from arbitrary and irrational actions of the government. Gresock v. City of Pittsburgh Civil Service Commission, 698 A.2d 163, 169 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 59 A.3d 10 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2012) (citations in original). 9. The delay in this case is so extreme that it shocks the conscience and calls for a complete and total judicial re-evaluation of the Commonwealth Court's decision in Chappell v. Commonwealth, 430 A.2d 377 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981). 10. In Chappell in which the delay between suspension and conviction was but a mere four months, the Commonwealth Court created by caselaw a doctrine that judicial delay is not 4 attributable to the Department of Transportation. 11. Petitioner intends in this appeal to argue for a change in the caselaw and commends to this Court the decision of the Hon. John E. Backenstoe, former President Judge of Lehigh County, in the case of Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Curzi, 30 Pa. D. & C.3d 307 (Lehigh, 1984)1 (A copy is attached as Appendix 1.) As Judge Backenstoe wrote: There must necessarily come a time when the interests of the individual to a proper resolution of his operator's status overrides that of the state's in enforcing the Vehicle Code if due process is to be served. It would certainly offend anyone's sense of fairness if an operator's license is suspended ten or twenty or more years after a conviction; and while we do not set a particular point here we feel that due process would prohibit the state from acting further upon a conviction, we find that notions of fairness and decency, as embodied in the concept of due process, mandate that the state cannot suspend the appellant's license after a four year period of inaction on its part. Cruzi, supra., at 310. (Emphasis added.) 12. Petitioner cannot understand how a citizen is protected from "arbitrary and irrational actions of the government" (see Johnson, supra, quoting Gresock) with respect to an administrative agency of the Executive Department of the Commonwealth, yet the Judiciary, or the Clerk of Courts in this case, may be capricious and arbitrary contrary to the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions;—such is the practical result of the Commonwealth Court's decision in Chappell and the line of cases following Chappell. It makes no difference to the citizen or to Justice as to whom is responsible for the near 10 year delay. An injustice has been done in this case and Petitioner appeals to this Honorable Court for redress. 13. The doctrine established in the Chappell case transforms the doctrine of separation of powers ' Undersigned counsel was not able to find in his research a reversal by the Commonwealth Court of this Lehigh County case. 5 from a shield against tyranny into a sword against the individual rights, privileges and liberties of the individual citizen by essentially declaring that no matter how egregious the delay between conviction and imposition of suspension the individual citizen has absolutely no recourse, no redress against the wrong; this is patently contrary to due process of law made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 14. Although there are three co -equal departments or powers of government within our Commonwealth, each department exercises its specific delegation of power as part of the one Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. a. Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. (Emphasis added.) b. Article IV, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: The Executive Department of this Commonwealth shall consist of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Auditor General, State Treasurer, and Superintendent of Public Instruction and such other officers as the General Assembly may from time to time prescribe. (Emphasis added.) c. Article V, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: The judicial flower of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace. All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system. (Emphasis added.) 6 d. As James Madison wrote in Federalist Paper No. 51, February 6, 1788: In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. e. Regardless of whether the near 10 year delay came from the Clerk of Courts or the Department of Transportation the injustice wrought upon this Petitioner is from a single government: the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—notwithstanding its division into distinct and separate departments. 15. To the individual citizen whether an act be by the Legislative branch, the Executive branch or the Judicial branch, that act is correctly perceived by the citizen as an act by the Commonwealth. 16. Recent legislation enacting Senate Bill No. 1239 of 2014 is only applicable to drug-related convictions and is not applicable to the violations of the Vehicle Code.' 17. Petitioner hereby invokes her statutory right to appeal the Commonwealth's Notice of Suspension of Operating Privilege (see Exhibit A), pursuant to Section 1550 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1550 (relating to Judicial review). 18. Petitioner may have additional claims of errors of law, including a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 under the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction', which undersigned counsel has 2 In all Internet press reports read by undersigned counsel, York County Clerk of Courts Don O'Shell only mentioned drug-related violations as being reported late, and obviously, as shown by this case, other violations also were not reported to the Commonwealth, Department of Transportation in a timely manner. Petitioner may also have a civil rights claim against the York County Clerk of Courts. 7 not yet fully researched and explored and therefore Petitioner respectfully preserves the right to raise any such issues at trial or within pre-trial or post -trial briefs.' WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Suspension of her operating privilege by the Commonwealth be stayed pending appeal and that this appeal be sustained. Respectfully submitted: November 21, 2014 8 •Philip L. Zulli,-Esq. Atty. ID. No.47499 Zulli Vehicle & Traffic Law, 155 Grandview Road Huminelstown, PA 17036 (717) 566-8585 (717) 566-2373 (Fax) Zulli@msn.com 2014-1,1-20 11:24 PennDOT OCC ROC 142886032157895 123 » 7175662373 P 4/10 letter why you are unable to return your driver's license. Remember: You may not retain your driver's license for identification purposes. Please send these items to: Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Bureau of Driver Licensing P.O. Box 68693 Harrisburg, PA 17106-8693 2. Upon receipt, review and acceptance of your Pennsylvania driver's license(s), learner's permit(s), and/or a sworn notarized letter, PennDOT will send you a receipt confirming the date that credit began. If you do not receive a receipt from us within three (3) weeks, please contact our office. Otherwise, you will not be given credit toward serving this suspension. PennDOT phone numbers are listed at the end of this letter. 3. If you do not return all current driver license products, we must refer this matter to the Pennsylvania State Police for prosecution under SECTION 1571(a)(4) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. PROVIDING PROOF OF INSURANCE Within the last 30 days of your suspension/revocation, we will send you a letter asking that you provide proof of insurance at that time. This letter will list acceptable documents and what will be needed if you do not own a vehicle registered in Pennsylvania. IMPORTANT: Please make sure that PennDOT is notified if you move from your current address. You may notify PennDOT of your address change by calling any of the phone numbers listed at the end of this letter. APPEAL You have the right to aooeal this action to the Court of Common Pleas (Civil Division) within 30 days of the mall date, OCTOBER 22, 2014, of this letter. If you file an appeal in the County Court, the Court will give you a time -stamped certified copy of the appeal. In order for your appeal to be valid, you must send this time -stamped certified copy of the appeal by certified mail to: Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Office of Chief Counsel 1101 South Front Street Third Floor, Riverfront Office Center Harrisburg, PA 17104-2516 2014-11-20 11:25 PennDOT OCC ROC 142886032157895 123 » 7175662373 P 5/10 Remember, this is an OFFICIAL NOTICE OF SUSPENSION. You must return all current Pennsylvania driver license products to PennDOT by 11/26/2014. SEND FEE/LICENSE/DL-16LC/TO: Department of Transportation Bureau of Driver Licensing P.O. Box 68693 Harrisburg, PA 17106-8693 Sincerely, Kara N. Templeton, Director Bureau of Driver Licensing INFORMATION (8:00 AM TO 5:00 PM) IN STATE 1-800-932-4600 OUT•OF-STATE 717-412-5300 TDD IN STATE 1-800-228-0676 TOD OUT-OF-STATE 717-412-5380 2014-11-20 11:24 PennDOT OCC ROC 01:21 (3.08) NO OPERATOR NUMBER REPORT OF THE CLERK OF COURTS SHOWING THE CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL OF ANY VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE CODE 123 » 7175662373 P 2/10 DAIAENDED REPORT DDEFENDANT REQUESTS ADDRESS CHANGE Under Section 8323 of the Vehicle Code. it is mandatory that the Clerk 01 Courts report all violations of Oto Vehicle Code, e ANN DEFENDA MILE. S. ADt1RESS: IA P.O. Bon number may to usac ICf.E INFORMATION (TYPE OR PRINT CLEAR4Y) 8EX T GATE OF DI ddttlon 540 FISHING CREEK RD NEW CUMBERLAND COL NO&UER Ores ID No LA6T EWING e. YMN YAV 0 VkNI 60 DRIVER NUMB OFFENSE OCCURRED WHILE ORIVINOITRANSPOATINO 0 Hazardous Materials L. Conanorolol School Vehicle 0 7e,* Passenger vehlete Cl Other VIOLATION INFORMATION • (Th Vohtde Coda - Act o►Juno 17. IOT6 RL.162 as amended) SECTION (SUi3SECTIONlCIAUSi2 9LOGD ALCOHOL CONTENT Dnense name In Actin Oma► submitted eeewent mai? 1543 ' """" rano B 0 TE OA 0 Y DA OF CO O. 09 04 2004 02 CHARGE DAY. 15 vesCi NOM YEECI No N I Box: Lt DATE OF ACQUITTAL ri NOLLE PROSEQUI DEAR 2005 MONTH DAY VIOLATION COMMITTED it speed vltfhlIlan, enter trovelIng speed and lepal speed: DECLXC SUS/REV PUBS r0 SEC 373111 OBI 'omit ono) ASummery O F-Ungroded tI M -Ungraded 0F1 II MI 0 F2 OM2 0F3 OM3 6A 1 OATS LICENSE OR ACKNOWL!DI SURRENDERED TO COURT OR 0 MONTH QDAY ENT WAS 1ICY ATTORNEY. COURT INFORMATION couRr OF COMMON PLEAS NUMOER 0Th COUNTY OF 67 YORK COUNTY YEAR 0005430 L2065921 2004 SIGNATURE AND DATECE TtFIED THE UNDERSIGNED CERTIFIESTHATTHE FOREGOING IS A CERTIFIED RECORD OF A CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL/NOME PROSEOUI SEAL ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED 10/0912014 TREATMENT ORDERED (CHECK ONE) Q YES ZS NO • SENTENCING INFORMATION ,o• (ahegt ono) rr+ OdMhPlmogul to►Aroe RIO U YES ® NO O TIME SERVER' CP — (chock one) Must (J) for sections 3802(A)(Th nd 3802(A)(2) was the defendant sentenced under Section 3e0oI�Nt). Title 75 of the Vehicle Code? co O YES J NO z;w ,., Send Thls Form To: t3ur0au of Driver Licensing, Clerk of Courts, P.O. Box 60037. Harrisburg, PA 17106-0037 PO BOX 644 -4)( 1.1 Fr APPENDIX 1 APPENDIX 1 Corn. Dept. of Transp. v. Curzl, 30 Pa. D. & C.3d 307 (1984) Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Thigh County. Commonwealth Dept. of Trans. v. Cnrzi No. 83-C-3248. j Apn118,1984 Attorneys and Law Firms RichelleD. Sanders, assistant counsel for Department of Transportation. Thomas D. Aristide, for appellant Opinion BACKENSTOE, J. The issue before this court is whether a delay of four years between the date of a conviction for a traffic offense and the service of a notice of suspension of driver's license should prohibit the suspension for the reason that such an inordinate length of delay in the procedure violated appellant's due process rights. On October 23, 1979, appellant pled guilty before a district magistrate to the charge of driving under the influence. Though section 6323 of the Vehicle Code (75 Pa. C.S.A. §101 et seq.) provides that the magistrate is to send a report of the conviction to the Department of Transportation (DOT) within ten days of the disposition, the report was nit actually mailed until Septem r, 1983 and not received by DOT until the 14th of t month. The delay in sending out th report was atly because of an oversight Acting upon the certified report, DOT mailed the notice of suspension to the appellant on October 7, 1983. 11(1111111); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Parr,. 56 Pa. Commw. 203, 424 A2d 604 (1981); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Lyons, 70 Pa. Commw. 604, 453 Aid 730 (1982). The Commonwealth Court has not, however, had occasion to apply this rule when the delay between conviction and suspension exceeded two years. Nor has the court concretely explained the distinction it had drawn between administrative delay and judicial delay. t In general, the court has simply held, without further explanation, that DOT cannot be held accountable for the court's delay. Lyons, supra; Chappell, supra. While it may be a perfectly reasonable proposition that DOT should not be held accountable for delays caused in the judiciary, we must also be mindful that there are also limitations on how the state may proceed against the interests of an individual. Such limitations may stem from the power of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Due process of law, the principle by which the application of the power of the state against the rights of an individual is held in some check, is a concept escaping an exact definition or definitions. *30911116 M3. The concept is rooted in notio fairness (seeMISIBMINNIMMINFIN and, in general, d its measure is often determined by the facts and circumstances of each jaws In Douglas, an extensive analysis, a definition of due process issues not purely procedural which we find to be both persuasive and relevant The Commonwealth Court has held that while a delay between conviction and suspension caused by DOT may require that the order of suspension be *308 vacated if the operator can show that he was prejudiced by the delay, a delayspt#riibutable only to the judiciary will have no effect on DOTS power to suspend a license under the Vehicle Code regardless of any prejudice caused by the. , ay. or [Due process is] a legal or more accurately, a philosophical concept as to the extent to which the state, in the exercise of its sovereign power, should be permitted to deprive individuals within its jurisdiction of their lives, liberty or property. Its application to the facts of a particular case is purely a matter of judgment and therefore solely a question of law. The most, therefore that the pleader is required to do .. . WlestiawNe ct 0 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Com. Dept. of Transp. v. Curzi, 30 Pa. D. & C.3d 307 (1984) is to set out those facts upon which he relies to prove a deprivation of life, liberty or property by the state and to aver that the deprivation was beyond that which, under our Constitution, is allowable to the state in the exercise of its sovereign power, or in the language of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, that it was without due process of law (Footnotes omitted). 130 F.2d at 653-659.2 Under the Constitution, a *310 state is forbidden to act against an individual in a manner that is "flagrantly unjustVIN" C4,1,”tit vy. or in a manner that does not comport with "traditional ideas of fair play and decency" We find that the appellant herein has set out such facts as to demonstrate that the Commonwealth, in imposing the suspension of his license four years after his conviction, has acted in a manner beyond that allowable by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Notwithstanding the rule of the Commonwealth Court that delays caused by the judiciary are not to be chargeable to DOT, we believe that the period of delay between conviction and suspension may become so great Oat due process requires that the state be prohibited from securing the suspension regardless of the source of delay. To permit the state to proceed in the suspension of an operator's license many years beyond the time when it may legally act by virtue of a conviction offends traditional notions of fair play and justice, particularly when the operator has been prejudiced by the delay. There must necessarily come a time when the interests of the individual to aproperresolution ofhis operator's status overrides that of the state's in enforcing the Vehicle Code if due process is to be served. It would certainly offend anyone's sense of fairness: if an operator's license is suspended ten or twenty or more years after a conviction; and while we do not set a particular point where we feel that due process would prohibit the state from acting further upon a conviction, we find that notions of fairness and decency, as embodied in the concept of due process, mandate that the state cannot suspend the appellant's license after a four year period of inaction on its part. Footnotes *311 In so holding, we take note that the four year period of delay by the Commonwealth contributed to the appellant's prejudice. Expecting the suspension of his license, the appellant, an unemployed individual in his late forties or early fifties, restricted his search for new employment to areas that did not require the operation of his vehicle. After a period of close to three years after his conviction, the appellant, still unemployed but now under the impression that his license would not be suspended as the Commonwealth had thus far not taken any action against him, began to seek employment outside of his immediate vicinage and ultimately obtained a position some miles away requiring that he drive to and from work. His economic position is such that it would be unlikely for him to be able to afford to live near his place of employment as he is surviving by residing in the house of his mother. We find that the appellant would not have secured employment beyond an area where he would have had access without a car if he had not been lulled by the inaction of the Commonwealth into believing that his license would not be suspended. To suspend the appellant's license at this point, four years after the conviction, we feel would be unfair and unjust and a violation of his rights to due process. Accordingly, the appeal is sustained. ORDER Now, this April 18,1984, for the reasons expressed in the accompanying opinion, It is ordered that appellant's appeal of his driver's license suspension is hereby sustained. It is further ordered that defendant's operating privileges be restored by the Department of Transportation. Parallel Citations 1984 WL 266 (Pa.Com.Pl.) WesttaviNext © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Corn. Dept of Transp. v. Curzi, 30 Pa. D. & C.3d 307 (1984) 1 In Chappell, however, the court did note that section 6324 of the Vehicle Code provides for sanctions for officials who fall to meet the provisions of section 6323, which the court observed to be a suitable enforcement mechanism for that section. 2 While a driver's license has not been held to be a property right, it is an entitlement and one of such importance that due process provides that proper notice and a hearing are required before the state may take away the entitlement Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 LEd. 2d 90 (1971); Reese v. Kassab, 334 F. Supp. 744 (WD. Pa. 1971). We therefore feel that the protections afforded by due process should necessarily extend to the situation before u's. End of Document © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. t2stiawN€xt © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 VERIFICATION The undersigned having read the forgoing Appeal from Suspension of Operating Privilege states that the language within is based on information furnished to counsel, or such information has been gathered by counsel in the course of preparing this Appeal from Suspension of Operating Privilege, and that it is true and correct to the best of the undersigned signer's knowledge, information and belief. This Verification is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4904 of the Crimes Code (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities). November 21, 2014 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY V" JUDICIAL DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ANN S. EWING Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION : BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING NO.: CIVIL ACTION — LAW STATUTORY APPEAL CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Philip L. Zulli, Esq., certify that I will serve a time -stamped copy of this Appeal from Suspension of Operating Privilege upon the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing on the date indicated below by Personal Service: Donald J. Smith, Esq. Assistant Chief Counsel Pa. Department of Transportation Office of Chief Counsel Riverfront Office Center, Third Floor Harrisburg, Pa 17104-2516 DATED: November 21, 2014 Philip L. Zulli, E Atty ID.: 47499 Zulfi Vehicle & Traffic Law 155 Grandview Road Hummelstown, PA 17036 Phone: 717-566-8585 Zulli@msn.com 0 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY 91' JUDICIAL DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ANN S. EWING Petitioner . NO.: Pt- WG? Z/ Lam✓ v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION : BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING CIVIL ACTION - LAW STATUTORY APPEAL SCHEDULING AND SUPERSEDEAS ORDER AND NOW, this o/S4 day of k1 , 2014, a hearing de novo is scheduled on this appeal of Petitioner for the eV -4 day of jliA41,,64/2/y. 2065 , at 9 : 79. M, in Courtroom No. of the Cumberland County Courthouse, One Courthouse Square, 4th Floor, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 17013, at which time testimony will be taken and argument heard. The action of the Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, in suspending the driver's license and operating privilege of the Petitioner is hereby stayed pending a final decision of the Court to the extent provided under § 1550(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1550(b). DISTRIBUTION: BY THE COURT: Judge ry crt !`J t-� ; -- 1- C,7) -rCD CD 6- /11 7 i" Philip L. Zulli, Esq., Zulli Law Office, 155 Grandview Road, Hunnnelstown, PA 17036-9269— Attorney for Petitioner Donald J. Smith, Esq., Assistant Chief Counsel, PA Dept. of Transportation, Office of Chief Counsel, 1101 South Front Street, Riverfront Office Center- Third Floor, Harrisburg, PA 17104-2516— Attorney for the Commonwealth /z41 /ed bety/