HomeMy WebLinkAbout15-0295 Supreme Cou ft-U_Pennsylvania
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Court bf Common-Pleas For Protlrorutur)?Use Orrlt?:.
GAITover Sheet
_ , tr:•_ t r Docket Na: ,
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CUMBERLAND /� County
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Commencement of Action:
S Ix Complaint [3 Writ of Summons Petition
Q Transfer from Another Jurisdiction E] Declaration of Taking
E
C Lead Plaintiffs Name: Lead Defendants Name:
T Sophia Underwood Paradigm Properties Group, Inc.
Dollar Amount Requested: Qwithin arbitration limits
I Are money damages requested? x Yes No (check one) ®x outside arbitration limits
N Is this a Class Action Suit? 0 Yes iX No Is this an MDJAppeal? El Yes rX No
A Name of Plaintiff/Appellant's Attorney: Brandon S.O'Donnell, Esquire/Jason P. Kutulakis, Esquire
El Check here if you have no attorney(are a Self-Represented [Pro Se] Litigant)
Nature of the Case: Place an"X''to the left of the ONE case category that most accurately describes your
PRIMARY CASE. If you are making more than one type of claim,check the one that
you consider most important.
TORT(do not include A9ass Tort) CONTRACT(do not include Judgments) CIVIL APPEALS
Intentional Buyer Plaintiff Administrative Agencies
Malicious Prosecution Debt Collection:Credit Card El Board of Assessment
Motor Vehicle 0 Debt Collection: Other 0 Board of Elections
rl Nuisance Q Dept.of Transportation
[] Premises Liability 0 Statutory Appeal: Other
S n Product Liability(does not include Q Employment Dispute:
E muss tort)
Q Slander/Libel/Defamation Discrimination
C rl Other: [� Employment Dispute:Other ® Zoning Board
T El Other:
I Other:'
o MASS TORT
Q Asbestos
N [3 Tobacco
0 Toxic Tort-DES
n Toxic Tort- Implant REAL PROPERTY MISCELLANEOUS
E] Toxic Waste
Other: � Ejectment 0 Common Law/Statutory Arbitration
Bi [3 Eminent Domain/Condemnation [j Declaratory Judgment
0 Ground'Rent Q Mandamus
Landlord/Tenant Dispute Q Non-Domestic Relations
0 Mortgage Foreclosure:Residential Restraining Order
PROFESSIONAL LIABLITY Mortgage Foreclosure:Commercial Quo WalTanto
Q Dental Q Partition El Replevin
Legal Q Quiet Title El Other:
Q Medical Q Other:
Q Other Professional:
Ulydaterl 11112011
OM &
LUTULAKIS
� ,�� �, ,;, rtt,
)anon P.Kutulakis,I(squire ,,lit 't.,. �� �,�1`v;� �,i'
Attorney I.D.#: 80411s � r
Brandon S.O'Donnell,I,squire P E i'�'l Y Jr
.Attornec.LD.#:316575
2 West I ligh Street
Carlisle,PA 17013
(717)349-0900
SOPHIA UNDERWOOD, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V. Civil Action—In Law
PARADIGM PROPERTIES Docket No:
GROUP, INC., DEERFIELD
COMMONS, D.G.P. PROPERTIES, LLC
Defendants
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMPLAINT
AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, Sophia Underwood, by and through her counsel, Jason
P. Kutulakis, Esquire, and Brandon S. O'Donnell, Esquire, of ABOM & KUTULAKIS, L.L.P.,
and respectfully files the within Complaint:
Jurisdiction
1. Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to section 12(c) of the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §962(c).
2. Plaintiff obtained a right to sue letter from the PHRC on August 24, 2014, granting
Plaintiff the right to sue Defendants.
Parties
3. The preceding averments are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
11 s 7 'P�� >
DS 7333
31 s��
5. Defendant is Paradigm Properties Group, Inc., (hereinafter, "Paradigm"), a Pennsylvania
Corporation with a registered address of 2029 Cato Avenue, State College, Pennsylvania
16801.
6. Defendant Paradigm manages Deerfield Commons, (hereinafter "Deerfield"), a planned
residential community located in Shippensburg, Cumberland County,Pennsylvania.
7. D.G.P. Properies, LLC, is a Pennsylvania limited liability company with a registered
address of 2029 Cato Avenue, State College,Pennsylvania 16801.
8. D.G.P. Properties, LLC, managed Deerfield until November 1, 2012, when Paradigm
began managing the Deerfield.
Facts
9. The preceding averments are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
10. Plaintiff commenced employment with Deerfield on a part-time basis as a Cleaner on or
about September 26, 2011.
11. On or about February 29, 2012, Plaintiff became a full-time Leasing Consultant at
Deerfield.
12. Plaintiff underwent an employee review on or-about September 1, 2012, with Julia Frey,
Property Manager for Deerfield, at which time she was awarded a $.50/hour pay raise,
effective January 1, 2013.
13. Julia Frey was, at all times relevant hereto, either the Plaintiffs immediate supervisor or
in the successive chain-of-command relative to Plaintiff.
14. Plaintiff became pregnant in early 2012.
15. As a result of her pregnancy, Plaintiff was placed on maternity leave on or about
September 24,2012,through November 19, 2012.
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16. Prior to commencing her period of maternity leave, Plaintiff was charged with training
and educating an employee of Deerfield named"Bobbi Jo."
17. Plaintiff trained and educated "Bobbi Jo" in the performance of the duties of Leasing
Consultant for Deerfield.
18. It is believed, and, therefore, averred that"Bobbi Jo"is a single female that does not have
children.
19. When Plaintiff returned to work after maternity leave, she requested reasonable
accommodation from`Deerfield so that Plaintiff could express breast milk for her
newborn child.
20. Specifically, Plaintiff requested two (2) ten-minute breaks per day from the performance
of the duties of her job to express breast milk for her newborn child.
21. Plaintiff in-fact took a ten-minute break at or about 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. daily to
express breast milk for her newborn child.
22. On numerous occasions Plaintiff was chastised and reprimanded by management,
including Julia Frey, for taking two (2) ten-minute breaks during the course of the work-
day.
23. Julia Frey would comment that Plaintiff"missed telephone calls" as a result of her taking
ten-minute breaks to express breast milk for her newbom.child.
24. Plaintiff submits that as a result of her taking periodic, ten-minute breaks to express
breast milk for her newborn child, there was a marked change in the way she was treated
by management of Deerfield.
25. Plaintiff avers that she was treated with anger and hostility by her supervisors and
management of Deerfield for requiring a ten-minute break to express breast milk.
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26. The events and circumstances described above (hereinafter "Unlawful Discriminatory
Practices")were regular and pervasive and occurred on a daily basis.
27. Deerfield was aided in its Unlawful Discriminatory Practices against Plaintiff by virtue of
its position as Plaintiff's employer.
28. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices occurred in.the presence of managers and other
employees employed by Deerfield including, but not limited to, Julia Frey and Becky
Bauknight.
29. Deerfield was aware of the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices but failed to exercise
reasonable care to prevent, correct, and/or remedy same.
30. Deerfield was aware of the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices by virtue of actual
knowledge.
31. Deerfield was aware of the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices by virtue of the fact that
the primary perpetrator of said unlawful practices was Julia Frey, Plaintiff's immediate
supervisor and Property Manager for Deerfield.
32. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices were severe in that they caused Plaintiff to
become emotionally distressed, fearful, and mentally tormented.
33. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices, as more fully described above, were offensive to
Plaintiff and would have been offensive to a reasonable person under similar
circumstances.
34. Plaintiff protested about the mistreatment, hostility, and discrimination in the workplace
stemming from her taking breaks to express breast milk to Deerfield.
35. Plaintiff opposed the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices and otherwise rejected the same
advising that she found the conduct to be offensive and requesting that it cease.
4
36. Deerfield owed a duty to its employees, including Plaintiff, to provide a workplace free
from unlawful discrimination.
37. On or about January 4, 2013, and two (2) business days after Plaintiff's pay raise.went
into effect, Plaintiff's employment with Deerfield was terminated.
38. The person trained and educated by Plaintiff, who does not require time to express breast
milk,was selected to replace Plaintiff as Leasing Consultant for Deerfield.
39. Deerfield possessed no good-faith legitimate basis to discharge Plaintiff's employment.
40. Deerfield terminated Plaintiff's employment because she required two (2) ten-minute
breaks per day to express breast milk for her newborn child.
41. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices, as more fully described above,resulted in
tangible employment action and/or the loss of tangible employment benefits, including,
but not limited to the following:
a. Plaintiff became intimidated and threatened by the management for Deerfield as a
result of the hostility and anger she was subjected to for requiring periodic ten
(10)minute breaks to expel breast milk for her newborn child;
b. Plaintiff's earning potential was substantially detrimentally affected;
c. Plaintiff's working conditions were substantially disrupted;
d. Deerfield subjected Plaintiff's work to overly intense and unreasonable scrutiny;
e. Deerfield terminated Plaintiff's employment effective January 4, 2013,without
cause.
42. The termination of Plaintiff's employment effective January 4, 2013, constitutes adverse
employment action.
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43. On or about April 5, 2013, Plaintiff dual filed a Complaint with the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission (PHRC), subsequently numbered Case No. 201204649 and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), subsequently numbered No.
17F201361308.
44. On or about April 24, 2014, the PHRC issued a Right to Sue letter to Plaintiff since it had
been approximately one year since the Plaintiff had filed a Complaint with the PHRC and
the issue had not been resolved.
- COUNT I-
VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT
43 P.S. § 951, et seq.
Discrimination
45. The preceding averments are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
46. 43 P.S. § 955 states in pertinent part, "it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice...for
any employer because of the...sex...of any individual to discharge such individual...or to
otherwise discriminate against such individual,...if the individual is the best able and
most competent to perform the services required." 43 P.S. § 955(a).
47. After returning to work from maternity leave and through the date of her termination,
Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination in the workplace by the Deerfield, as more fully
described above and incorporated herein by reference.
48. Plaintiff opposed the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices and otherwise rejected same
be offensive and hostile, and requested that it
advising that she found the conduct to
cease.
49. Plaintiff s opposition to the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices was ignored and she
continued to be subjected to the same on a regular and pervasive basis.
6
50. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices were sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the
terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment and created a hostile and abusive work
environment for her.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendant for
discriminating against Plaintiff in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.
- COUNT II -
VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT
43 P.S. § 951, et seq.
Hostile Work Environment
51. The preceding averments are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
52. It is well established that in stating a case for hostile work environment in Pennsylvania
under the PHRA the plaintiff must allege the elements that would be required under a
Title VII Hostile Work Environment framework.
53. Therefore, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the employee suffered intentional
discrimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3)
the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the
existence of respondeat superior. Huston v Procter& Gamble Paper Products Com., 568
F.3d 100, 104 (3d. Cir.2009).
54. After returning to work from maternity leave and through the date of her termination,
Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment in the workplace by Deerfield, as
more fully described above and incorporated herein by reference.
55. Plaintiff opposed the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices and otherwise rejected same
advising that she found the conduct to be offensive and hostile, and requested that it
cease.
56. Plaintiffs opposition to the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices was ignored and she
continued to be subjected to the same on a regular and pervasive basis.
57. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices were sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the
terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment and created a hostile and abusive work
environment for her.
58. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices were committed by management of Deerfield.
WHEREFORE,Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendant for creating a
hostile work environment for Plaintiff in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.
- COUNT III-
VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT
43 P.S. § 951, et seq.
Retaliation
59. The preceding averments are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
60. The PHRA prohibits retaliation in the workplace against employees who have
complained of discrimination in the workplace or opposed unlawful acts, among other
things.
61. To establish a claim for retaliation under the PHRA, a plaintiff must show (1) protected
employee; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the
employee's protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee's
protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Marra v. Philadelphia Housing
Authority,497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d. Cir.2007).
62. As more fully described above, Plaintiff opposed and/or rejected the Unlawful
Discriminatory Practices committed by Deerfield advising that she found the conduct
offensive and inappropriate and requesting that it cease.
8
63. Plaintiff's opposition of, rejection of and/or reports of unlawful discrimination in the
workplace constitute protected activity pursuant to state and federal law.
64. Furthermore, the act of expressing breast milk is a protected activity in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the Freedom to Breastfeed Act, 35 P.S. § 636.1 et
seq.
65. Deerfield retaliated against Plaintiff on account of her protected activities by terminating
her employment January 4, 2013,without cause.
66. Among other things, Plaintiff's termination from employment with Deerfield effective
January 4, 2013, constitutes adverse employment action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendant for
retaliation against Plaintiff in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.
COUNT IV-
VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq.
Discrimination
67. The preceding averments are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
68. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer to "discharge any
individual...because such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1).
69. Additionally, discrimination because of sex or on the basis of sex includes discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condition. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
70. Therefore, an employer violates Title VII "wherever an employee's pregnancy is a
motivating factor for the employer's adverse employment decision." Doe v. C.A.R.S.
Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir.2008).
9
71. After returning to work from maternity leave and through the date of her termination,
Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination in the workplace by the Deerfield, as more fully
described above and incorporated herein by reference.
72. Plaintiff opposed the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices and otherwise rejected same
advising that she found the conduct to be offensive and hostile, and requested that it
cease.
73. Plaintiffs opposition to the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices was ignored and she
continued to be subjected to the same on a regular and pervasive basis.
74. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices were sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the
terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment and created a hostile and abusive work
environment for her.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendant for
discriminating against Plaintiff in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- COUNT V-
VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq.
Hostile Work Environment
75. The preceding averments are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
76. To establish a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of
their sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a
reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat
superior. Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d.
Cir.2009).
10
77. After returning to work from maternity leave and through the date of her termination,
- Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment. in the workplace by Deerfield, as
more fully described above and incorporated herein by reference.
78. Plaintiff opposed the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices and otherwise rejected same
advising that she found the conduct to be offensive and hostile, and requested that it
cease.
79. Plaintiff's opposition to the Unlawful Discriminatory Practices was ignored and she
continued to be subjected to the same on a regular and pervasive basis.
80. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices were sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the
terms and conditions of Plaintiffs employment and created a hostile and abusive work
environment for her.
81. The Unlawful Discriminatory Practices were committed by management of Deerfield.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendant for creating a
hostile work environment for Plaintiff in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- COUNT VI -
VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq.
Retaliation
82. The preceding averments are incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
83. Title VII prohibits retaliation in the workplace against employees who have complained
of discrimination in the workplace or opposed unlawful acts, among other things.
84. To establish a claim for retaliation under the PHRA, a plaintiff must show (1) protected
employee; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the
employee's protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee's
11 '
protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Marra v. Philadelphia Housing
Authority, 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d. Cir.2007).
85. As more fully described above, Plaintiff opposed and/or rejected the Unlawful
Discriminatory Practices committed by Deerfield advising that she found the conduct
offensive and inappropriate and requesting that it cease.
86. Plaintiff s opposition of, rejection of and/or reports of unlawful discrimination in the
workplace constitute protected activity pursuant to state and federal law.
87. Furthermore, the act of expressing breast milk is a protected activity in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the Freedom to Breastfeed Act, 35 P.S. § 636.1 et
seq.
88. Deerfield retaliated against Plaintiff on account of her protected activities by terminating
her employment January 4, 2013, without cause.
89. Among other things, Plaintiffs termination from employment with Deerfield effective
January 4, 2013, constitutes adverse employment action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendant for
retaliation against Plaintiff in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.
Respectfully Submitted,
ABOM& KUTULAKIS,LLP
Date:
Jason P. Kutulakis, Esquire_
ID No. 80411
Brandon S. O'Donnell, Esquire
ID No. 316575
2 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-0900
Attorney for the Plaintiff
12
`'ERIFICATION
1, Sophia L. Underwood, the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, hereby verify that
the statements contained herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information,
and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 P.S.
§4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
121
Soph IaL. Underwood Date
13
eOM '
fULAKIS 1 ,3P
Cason 1'.Kutulakis,I?syuirc
Attorney l.1 D.#: 841 1
Brandon S.O'llonncll,I isyuirc 7 id C'y l i 1
\ttorncc I.D.#:316575
2 West I ligh Street
Carlisle,P. 17013
(717)240-001u1
SOPHIA UNDERWOOD, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v. : Civil Action—In Law
PARADIGM PROPERTIES : Docket No: 2015-00295
GROUP, INC., DEERFIELD
COMMONS, D.G.P. PROPERTIES, LLC :
Defendants
: JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
NOTICE TO PLEAD
TO: Paradigm Properties Group, Inc.
2029 Cato Avenue
State College, PA 16801
Deerfield Commons
100 Deerfield Commons
Shippensburg, PA 17257
D.G.P. Properties, LLC
2029 Cato Avenue
State College, PA 16801
YOU I LAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth
in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Complaint and Notice
arc served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing with the
Court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail
to do so the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court
without further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or relief
requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you.
YOU SI IOULD TAhE TI IIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO
NOT ILAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR'HAITI IONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW.
TIIIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER.
IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TO
s
PROVIDE YOU WI'T'H INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES TI I AT MAY OFFER LEGAL
SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.
Pennsylvania Bar Association
Lawyer Referral Service
1-800-692-7375 (PA ONLY)
or 717-238-6715
Respectfully Submitted,
ABOM&KUTULAKIS, LLP
•
Date: i512Oi 5
ason P. Kutulakis Esquire
ID No. 80411
Brandon S. O'Donnell, Esquire
ID No. 316575
2 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 249-0900
Attorney for Plainti/j
2