HomeMy WebLinkAbout06-0577_.....--. .^LTN OF PENNSYLVANIA NOTICE OF APPEAL
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FROM
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DISTRICT JUSTICE JUDGMENT D2t:YXo-J7
COMMON PLEAS Na -, 577
C t ,r o f
NOTICE OF APPEAL ( - a?7 _ 2-0&w
Notice is given that the appellant has filed in the above Court of Common Pleas an appeal from the judgment rendered by the District Justice on the
dare and in the case mentioned below.
LINDA DIEHL
LT
LT LT-0000418-05
?G?yG
This block will be signed ONLY when this notation is required under Pa. R.CPJP. No.
10088,
This Notice of Appeal, when received by the District Justice, will operate as a
SIJPERSEDEAS to the iudgmegt fpr possession in thjs cases
If appellant was CLAIMANT (see Pa. R.C.P.J.P. No.
1001(6) in action before District Justice, he MUST
FILE A COMPLAINT within twenty (20) days after
filing his NOTICE of APPEAL.
PRAECIPE TO ENTER RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT AND RULE TO FILE
(This section of form to be used ONLY when appellant was DEFENDANT (see Pa. R.C.P.JP. No. 1001(7) in action before District Justice.
IF NOT USED, detach from copy of notice of appeal to be served upon appellee).
PRAECIPE: To Prothonotary
Enter rule upon Ran Tee R' krodp , appellee(s), to file a complaint in this appeal
Name of appelleels)
(Common Pleas No 06 - 5 77 C t t) ) within twenty (20) days after service of rule or suffer entry of judgment of non pros.
Signamie o appeant w hrs aano y w agent
RULE: To Randy Lee Rickrode appellee(s).
Name of appelloe(s)
(1) You are notified that a rule is hereby entered upon you to file a complaint in this appeal within twenty (20) days after the date of
service of this rule upon you by personal service or by certified or registered mail.
(2) If you do not file a complaint within this time, a JUDGMENT OF NON PROS WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU.
(3) The date of service of this rule if service was by mail is the date of mailing.
tat: ,Ot w ttovlar'y or amM
COURT FILE TO BE FILED WITH PROTHONOTARY
C 312-90
tea. OF g? ,?q`W }§ F° p?? y ?.. } y? ? ., t 't
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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF: CUMBERLAND
Mag. Dish. No..
09-3-03
MDJ Name: Hon.
SUSAN K. DAY
Aft'ss. 229 MILL ST, BOX 167
MT. HOLLY SPRINGS, PA
TaIepnone: (717) 486-7672 17065
ATTORNEY DEF PRIVATE s
DOUGLAS G. !BILLER
IRWIN Ec MCKNIGH
60 W POMFRET ST
CARLISLE, PA 17013
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT/TRANSCRIPT
PLAINTIFF: RESIDENTIAL LEASE
NAME antl ADDRESS
FRICKRODE, RANDY LEE 7
LOT A3
1150 NORTH PARS AVENUE
LDOTHAN, AL 36303 J
DEFENDANT:
FDIEHL KUHN, LINDA
403 MOUNTAIN VIEW
MT HOLLY SPRINGS,
vs.
NAME and ADDRESS
ROAD
PA 17065
L J
DocketNo.: LT-0000418-05
Date Filed: 1/28/05
THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU THAT:
Judgment: FOR PL•ArNTrgF
® Judgment was entered for. (Name) _RI_CKRODE, RANDY LEE
Judgment was entered against DIEHL KUHN, LINDA in a
® Landlord/Tenant action in the amount of $ 352.59 on 1/20/06 (Date of Judgment)
The amount of rent per month, as established by the Magisterial District Judge, is $. 00.
The total amount of the Security Deposit is $ .00
Total Amount Established by MDJ Less - Security Deposit Appplied
259
73
R
i Adjudicated Amount
ent
n Arrears $ .
- $ . 00 = $ 259.73
Physical Damages Leasehold Property $ $ 00 = $ .00
Damages/Unjust Detention $ oo -$ 00 - $ -00
Less Amt Due Defendant from Cross Complaint - $ .00
Interest (if provided by lease) $ n o
L/T Judgment Amount $ 259 73
? Attachment Prohibited/ Judgment Costs $ 92
86
42 Pa.C.S. § 8127 Attorney Fees $ .
nn
? This case dismissed without prejudice. Total Judgment $ _
352.59
® Possession granted
? Possession granted if money judgment
? Possession not granted.
Post Judgment Credits
Post Judgment Costs
Certified Judgment Total
? Defendants are jointly and severally liable.
IN AN ACTION INVOLVING A RESIDENTIAL LEASE, ANY PARTY HAS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION WITHIN
TEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE PROTHONOTARY/CLERK OF COURTS
OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CIVIL DIVISION. THIS APPEAL WILL INCLUDE AN APPEAL OF THE MONEY JUDGMENT, IF ANY. IN
ORDER TO OBTAIN A SUPERSEDEAS, THE APPELLANT MUST DEPOSIT WITH THE PROTHONOTARYICLERK OF COURTS THE LESSER OF
THREE MONTHS RENT OR THE RENT ACTUALLY IN ARREARS ON THE DATE THE APPEAL IS FILED.
IF A PARTY WISHES TO APPEAL ONLY THE MONEY PORTION OF A JUDGMENT INVOLVING A RESIDENTIAL LEASE, THE PARTY HAS
30 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN WHICH TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE PROTHONOTARY/CLERK OF
COURTS OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CIVIL DIVISION.
THE PARTY FILING AN APPEAL MUST INCLUDE A COPY OF THIS NOTICE OF JUDGMENT/TRANSCRIPT FORM WITH THE NOTICE OF APPEAL.
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGES, IF THE JUDGMENT
HOLDER ELECTS. TO ENTER THE JUDGMENT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ALL FURTHER PROCESS, MUST COME FROM THE COURT
OF COMMON PLEAS AND NO FURTHER PROCESS MAY BE ISSUED BY THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRIC' tYDGE.
UNLESS THE JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ANYONE INTERESTED IN THE JUDGMENT MAY FILE
A REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF SATISFACTION WITH THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE IF TNEVUDGMENT DEBTOR PAYS IN FULL,
SETTLES, OR OTHERWISE COMPLIES WITH THE JUDGMENT.
- - i'?' 1- _ i Date
Date
,,y commission expires first Monday of January, 2010
AO C31SA-05
SEAL
District
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lDGM Linda Diehl Kuhn
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` Sent TO .??.
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---------------- - --....... . .... n ------ -----
T$W.P th Park Avenue
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ott
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NOTICE OF APPEAL
FROM
DISTRICT JUSTICE JUDGMENT
COMMON PLEAS Na
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is given that the appellant has filed in the above Court of Common Pleas an appeal from the judgment rendered by the District Justice on the
date and in the case mentioned below.
CV
LT iir,,..,
This block will be signed ONLY when this notation is required under Pa. R.C.P.JP. No If appellant was CLAIMANT (see Pa. R.C.P.J.P. No.
1008&
This Notice of Appeal, when received by the District Justice, will operate as a 1001(6) in action before District Justice, he MUST
SUPERSEDEAS to the judgment far possession in this case FILE A COMPLAINT within twenty (20) days after
' filing his NOTICE of APPEAL.
.Cinnah of Pr Ihnnntarv or td
PRAECIPE TO ENTER RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT AND RULE TO FILE
(This section of form to be used ONLY when appellant was DEFENDANT (see Pa. R.C.P.J.P. No. 1001(7) in action before District Justice.
IF NOT USED, detach from copy of notice of appeal to be served upon appellee).
PRAECIPE: To Prothonotary
Enter rule upon
(Common Pleas No.
RULE: To
appellee(s), to file a complaint in this appeal
Name of appellee(s)
within twenty (20) days after service of rule or suffer entry of judgment of non pros.
rdJL'4fr r
- Sigifature of eppeH t or r?is'ahomey a agent
Name of appe/1e05)
, appellee(s).
(1) You are notified that a rule is hereby entered upon you to file a complaint in this appeal within twenty (20) days after the date of
service of this rule upon you by personal service or by certified or registered mail.
(2) If you do not file a complaint within this time, a JUDGMENT OF NON PROS WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU.
(3) The date of service of this rule if service was by mail is the date of mailing.
Date:
.. 9' of Pmmoriaary or Deputy
COURT
AOPC 312-90 FILE
NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY ID NO. 87380
WOLF & WOLF
37 SOUTH HANOVER STREET,
SUITES 201-202
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
V. : NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
LINDA DIEHL KUHN, : LANDLORD TENANT
Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW
NOTICE TO DEFEND
You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the
following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this complaint and notice are
served, by entering a written appearance personally or by an attorney and filing in writing with the
court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail
to do so the case may proceed without you and a judgment maybe entered against you by the court
without further notice for any money claimed in the complaint or for any other claim or relief
requested by the plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU
DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE
THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL
HELP.
Cumberland County Bar Association
32 South Bedford Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
717-249-3166
NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY In NO. 87380
WOLF & WOLF
37 SOUTH HANOVER STREET,
SUITES 201-202
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
V. : NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
LINDA DIEHL KUHN, : LANDLORD TENANT
Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW
COMPLAINT
NOW comes the Plaintiff Randy Lee Rickrode, by his attorney, Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire,
and presents the following complaint, representing as follows:
1. The Plaintiff is Randy Lee Rickrode (hereinafter referred to as "Rickrode"), an adult
individual residing at 464 Willie Barnum Road, Dothan, Alabama 36301.
2. The Defendant is Linda Diehl Kuhn (hereinafter referred to as "Kuhn"), an adult individual
residing at 403 Mountain View Road, Mt. Holly Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17065.
3. Rickrode is the record titleholder of real property located at 403 Mountain View Road, Mt.
Holly Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, also identified as Tax Parcel Number 08-33-1936-
010 as evidenced by Deed dated June 29, 2005 and recorded in Deed Book 209, Page 3009 in the
Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania (hereinafter referred to as the
"Property"). A true and correct copy of said deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
4. Kuhn is the lessee identified in a 999 year lease granted on April 3, 1980, for a portion of the
Property which is recorded with the Recorder of Deeds of Cumberland County, at Book 619, Page
1045. A true and correct copy of said lease is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
5. Said lease provides for Kuhn to occupy a certain tract measuring 131 feet by 131 feet, or
approximately 22.7% of the total size of the Property.
6. Kuhn has resided on the leased property since the execution of the lease in 1980, in a mobile
home placed on the property.
7. Rickrode purchased the property subject to the lease identified herein.
8. Inter alia, according to the terms of the lease, Kuhn was "to pay Areal property, special
taxes or assessments, including street improvement liens, if any, and all property taxes on personal
property located on the leased land, levied or assessed upon or against the leased land during the
lease term or any extension."
9. Additionally, Kuhn, as lessee was required, at her "own cost and expense at all times during
the tern of this lease, agrees to keep and maintain, or cause to be kept and maintain, all buildings
and improvements which maybe erected upon the leased land in a good state of appearance and
repair, reasonable wear and tear excepted."
10. The Tax Assessment Office of Cumberland County assessed taxes on Kuhn's mobile home
which is located on the leased property.
11. Said mobile home is thus personal property which taxes have been assessed upon and which
Kuhn was responsible to pay under the lease.
12. For all tax years since 1995, Kuhn paid a total of $100.00 in property taxes on the mobile
home which payment was made on September 12, 1997.
13. The mobile home was listed at tax sale in 2005 by the Cumberland County Tax Claim
Office, showing an outstanding tax bill of $3,791.71 on the mobile home.
14. Rickrode purchased Kuhn's mobile home at tax sale, for which he has received a bill of sale
from the Tax Claim Bureau of Cumberland County dated November 18, 2005. A true and correct
copy of said bill of sale is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
15. Kuhn has failed to make payments on the real properly taxes assessed on the property since
she made a payment in 2003 on the outstanding property taxes.
16. Kuhn received tax bills for the mobile home and for the real property taxes from the
Dickinson Township Tax Assessor Carol McQuillen in the past and the tax assessor's office is
located in Dickinson Township at 1044 Pine Road.
17. Kuhn failed to make any payments on any taxes due since 2003.
18. Rickrode has, either personally or through other relatives, paid the property taxes on the
Properly and said taxes are now paid current.
19. Kuhn's failure to pay the taxes due on her mobile home and on even a portion of the real
property taxes are a breach of the lease conditions as cited herein.
20. Kuhn and her family members have four vehicles on the leased properly which are not in
running condition, and which do not have current registration or inspection so as to be legally
operated on the highways of the Commonwealth.
21. Kuhn and her family members or guests have allowed the leased property to become in a
state of disrepair and of poor appearance.
22. At some point in 2005, Kuhn was forced to have a portable toilet brought to the property
because the septic system ceased operating.
23. Since October of 2005 and as recently as January of 2006, Kuhn's leased properly had
appliances in the yard around her mobile home, and garbage and metal throughout the yard.
24. Said conditions were in violation of the lease provisions cited herein which require Kuhn to
keep the property in a good state of repair and appearance.
25. As a result of the violations of the lease conditions, Rickrode decided to terminate the lease
and executed a Notice to Quit addressed to Kuhn on or about November 14, 2005. A true and
correct copy of said notice is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
26. Rickrode served a Notice to Quit upon Kuhn by service through a constable on or about
November 15, 2005. A true and correct copy of the return of service is attached hereto as Exhibit
E.
27. Rickrode filed an action before Magisterial District Judge Susan K. Day on November 28,
2005.
28. A hearing was held Rickrode's complaint on or about January 20, 2006 and the District
Court entered judgment in favor of Rickrode for possession and in favor of Rickrode in the amount
of $352.59 including court costs. A true and correct copy of said judgment is attached hereto as
Exhibit F.
29. Rickrode, as owner of the Property, is entitled to possession and monies due for real
property taxes due in accordance with the provisions of the lease due to the breach of lease by
Kuhn.
30. Rickrode is entitled to recover possession in accordance with the provisions of the Landlord
Tenant Act of 1951, (68 P.S. §250.501 et xeq.).
31. Rickrode has complied with notice requirements under said Act and should be entitled to an
order for possession from this Honorable Court and judgment declaring the lease agreement
breached and thus no longer valid.
32. Rickrode likewise is entitled to possession of the mobile home in which Kuhn resides by
virtue of his purchase of said mobile home at tax sale as stated aforesaid.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Randy L. Rickrode., prays that this Honorable Court enter
judgment for the Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $352.59, enter judgment of
possession of the leased properly to Plaintiff and against Defendant declaring the lease agreement
breached and no longer valid, and to enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant for
possession of the mobile home located on the Property which Plaintiff purchased at tax sale,
together with costs of litigation, counsel fees and any other relief that the Court deems appropriate
and just.
Respectfully Submitted,
WOLF & WOLU
February 17, 2006 By?,-?
NATHAN CA<OLF
A e r Plaintiff
,SUPREME COURT ID NO. 87380
37 South Hanover Street, Suite 201
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
(OOa JUN 2v Aft I1 213
EE
PARCEL. N®.; 08-33-1936-010
MADE THE 29th day of June in the year Two Thousand Five (2005),
BETWEEN STANLEY RICKRODE, widower, of 8 Cabin Lane, Shippensburg,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, hereinafter called Grantor,
AND RANDY LEE RICKRODE, single man, of 2901 Griffin Drive, Dothan, Alabama
36303, hereinafter called Grantee:
WITNESSETH, that in consideration of the sum of One and no/100 ($1.00) Dollar, in
hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the Grantor hereby grants and
conveys unto the Grantee, his heirs and assigns,
ALL that certain tract of land and the improvements thereon situate in Dickinson
Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, bounded and described, as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the corner of lands now or formerly of William R. Wharton;
thence along the latter, North 69 degrees East, a distance of 1 perch to a point; thence
along the same, South 71 degrees East, a distance of 4.9 perches to a point; thence
along the same, South 62 1/2 degrees East, a distance of 9 perches to a point; thence
along the same, North 67 degrees East, a distance of 3.5 perches to a corner of land
now or formerly of Julia Gitt; thence along the latter, North 18 1/2 degrees West, a
distance of 8.9 perches to a point; thence along the same, North 67 degrees East, a
distance of 8.55 perches to a point; thence along lands now or formerly of James
Danner and the Heirs of James Diven, North 20 degrees West, a distance of 10.5
perches to a point; thence along the same, South 64 1/2 degrees West, a distance of
17 perches to a point; thence along the same, South 12 degrees West, a distance of
1.5 perches to a point; thence along the same, South 69 degrees West, a distance of 2
perches to a point; thence along lands now or formerly of said Wharton, South 7
degrees West, a distance of 8.2 perches to the point, the Place of BEGINNING.
CONTAINING 1 acre and 166 perches, more or less.
BEING the same property which STANLEY RICKRODE, et al., granted and conveyed
to STANLEY RICKRODE, widower, by deed dated June 11, 2004 and recorded in the
office of the Recorder of Deeds for Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, in Deed Book
264, Page 991.
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the terms of a certain lease from Harry A. Rickrode, Jr.,
executor of the estate of Ella M. Rickrode, to Linda K. Diehl, her heirs and assigns.
AND the said grantor hereby covenants and agrees that he will warrant specially the
property hereby conveyed.
THIS CONVEYANCE IS A NONTAXABLE TRANSFER FROM FATHER TO SON.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal the day,
month and year first above written.
Signed, Sealed and Delivered
in the presence of
t'
(SEAL)
8TANLEY'RICKRODE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND
:ss:
On this, the 29'x' day of June, 2005, before me the undersigned officer, personally appeared
STANLEY RICKRODE, known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the person whose name Is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged that he executed same for the purposes
therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereu
F30UJS 14VON IV! NG FAHI F UHU
AIIIISt-«,?19?ilit?,rr'1'TY?'FC!R?i_?[/,i„ ±
7Y.COMh41 0 i,,VITP n iQFEI .
ito set my hand and seal.
t I (SEAL)
Notarv Public
I do hereby certify that the precise residence and complete post office address of the
within named Grantee is: 2901 Griffin Road, Dothan, AL 36303.
June 29, 2005
Attorney for Grantee N.T.S.
HAROLD S. IRWIN, III
r .?
7 _$ iiwi tl _? l
GROUND LEASE
Made.- this Dal of - ttaah,._ A.D 1930, between Hi+FRY
RICERODE, JR., of Mounted Route, Mount Holly Springs, Cumberland
Rickrode,
Coliu*,y, Pennsylvania, executor o£ the estate or' Ella 711.
decrased, refereed to as "Lessor", and LINDA K. DIEHL, of Di.,kinson
`Pownshijr, Cumberland Oeunty, Pennsylvania, referred tc as "Lessee"._
Lessor for and in consideration of the rents, covenants and
condir.iono herein contained to be kept, performed and observed by
lessee, does lease and demise to lessee her heirs and assigns, and
lessee does rent and accept from lessor-, the real proaer'y, referred
n as "leased land", situate in the Township cf Dickinson, Cumberland
Coant.y, Pennsylvania, bounded and described as follovas:
EEI1'JG a tract o; land measuring approximately 131.00 feet
on each side, the corners being marked by stakes, upon which
is situated lessee's trailer home, garden, chicken house, etc;
ana
HET116 part of Tract No. 2 of the same property which
Heien Laxons, et a_, granted and conveyed to Harry A. ;iicl;rode
ar,d Ella M. Rickrode, his wife, by deed dated Febr<<ary 4, i9481
and -,eccrded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds for
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, in Deed Book. "?", volume 1„
Page Sib. Said Harry A. Rickrode died in 1959, vesting title
in fee simple in Ella M. Rickrode. Ella M. Rickrode died
January 5, 1980, having first made leer last, will and testainent
naming Harry A. Rickrode, Jr., executor.
This lease shall be for a terau of 999 years, referred to as
"lease term", commencing on j\? 1980 and expiring at
11:59 P.M. on ?,?yr.i 2979
Lc-ssee agrees to pay lessor rental for the use and occupancy
of leased land in the ram of One Dollar ($l .00) payable in advance.
Lessee agreeas to pay all real property taxes, special taxes,
o assessments, including street improvement Siens, if any, and all
i c; err taxes mr personal prr;Ferty located on the leased land,
levied 15v assessed upon or against the leased land daring the lease
tern, of ii ext .rnsicr • ; i,?4r
_1_ [?Wi8/ 1 3
Lessee shall pay or cause to be paid all charges for water,
heat, as, e:.ectricityf sewers and any and all other utilities asea
,pon the leased land throughout the term of this lease, including
any co?;neci;ioe; fees.
In order to provide for the more orderly development of the
;.eased land, it may be necessary, desirable or required that street,
water, aew?:r, drainage, gas, power line and other easements and
dedications and similar rights be granted or dedicated over or 1,iithin
portions of said leased land. As one of the moving considerations to
lessee for the e.cecution of this lease, lessor, shall, upon request o'
lessee, join with lessee in executing and delivering suc),, documents,
from I;ime to time and throughout- the term of this lease, as magi be
appropriate, necessary or required by the several governmental agencies,
public utilities and companies for the purpose of granting such ease-
ment.9 and uedications.
it _s expressly understood and agreed that any and all buildings,
improvements, fixtures, machinery acid equipment of whatsoever nature
at any time constructed placed, or maintained upon any part of the
leased land shall be and remain the property of lessee, or its sublessee,
as their interests may appear.
Lessee, at lessee's awn cost and expense at all times during
the term of this lease, agrees to keep and maintain, or cause to be
kept and maintained, all buildings and improvements which may be
erected -spun the leased land in a good state of appearance and repair,
reasonable wear and tear excepted.
In the event the Icased land or any hart thereof shall be taken
for public purposes by condesuiation as a result o' any action or
proceeding in eminent domain, or shall be transferred in lieu of
mndennaticn to any authority entitled to exercise the polder of
en?inent domain, the interests of lessor and lessee in the award or
_onsiaeratior for such transfer and the effect of the taking or transfer
?n?n,, this lease shall be as provided by this article.
in the event the entire leased land is taker, or so transferred,
this lease and all of the i,ight, title and interest thereunder shall
cease on the date title to such land so taken or transferred vests
in the oondemnin:, authority and the proceeds of such condemnation
shall not be divided but shall go in its entirety to the iossee. __.
the event of the taI<in_ or transfer of only a part of the leased land,
Cris lease shall continue in full Force and effect.
A11. of the provisions of this lease shall be deemed as rt:nning
with the land and construed to be "conditions" as well as "covenants"
as th,mer, ,he words specifically eapressinE or imparting covenants
and cond?_t Ions were used in each separate provision.
Each ana all of' the covenants, conditions and restric`iorts in
th's lease shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon
thr= sc ssors in interest of lessor and the assignees, transferees,
subtenants, licensees and other successors in interest of lessee.
'Phis lease contains the entire agreement of the Dar'aiea with
r°esl:ea{. to the matters covered by this lease and no other agreement,
•?r promise made by any party, or tc any employee, officer,
i ag,nt of any party, which is not contained in this lease shall be
binding or valid.
II'J 'oJITHESS WHEREOF, the parties aforesaid have hereunto set
their hands and seals the day and year first above written.
IH THE t°E3Eldhf: OF
5rn rc i+ Ye0ai, r uta -?I,c
$ou%, IAitldlalon Imp. Cunbodand County
My Commislon Expires Aug. 10, 1902
Ml bei Pennrylvania Asswiellw, of tlolare[
.Clicl,y,t, SELL)
-s- I-'RRY A. HICKHODL', JR.
(SEAL)
LIPIDA DIEP.L
w
L f.l ro
r
N
r`J
N ? O
-3-
ArE LIT' PEcl,]SYTXANIA
SS:
COUTITY OF CUMBERLMID
<r
On this, the ZlCK day of ?hh./%' 1980,
before me, tl:e undersigned officer, personally appeared
HARRY A. RICKRODE, JR., executor of The estate of
Ella M. Hickrode, }clown to me (or, satisfactorily proven)
to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within
lease and acknowledged that he executed same for the
purposes therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and
official seal.
Tittle o," Officer
South Mltltll al Iwc=, I;urL'O N L:.?1•j7i
My commleaian byres Aug. 10. 1S1i21
Member, Pennsylrnia 'SwIltIUP nr Gut1r',as
I do hereby certify that the precise residence and
complete post office address of the within named lessee is
, 1980
?.;? ter
] 5
n f \ rn (,
4
?a?? G4,9
TAX CLAIM BUREAU
OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY
BILL OF SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the TAX CLAIM BUREAU
OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, Trustee, under the provisions
of the Act of July 6, 1947, P.L. 1368, and amendments thereto, hereinafter
referred to as Seller, for a consideration of the sum of
Three thousand seven hundred ninety one dollars and 71/1
($ 3,791.71), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby bargain,
sell, transfer, assign and deliver the following goods, chattels, and property:
1974 Buddy, single wide mobile home
location: 403 Mountain View Road
Dickinson Twp. Cumberland County, PA
To Randy I Rickrode
of 2901 Griffin Road Dothan AL 36303
i eieinafter referred to as Buyer, his/her/their heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns to have and to hold forever.
BEING the same property offered for sale for delinquent taxes/costs in
accordance with and subject to all the provisions of the Act of Assembly
hereinbefore recited under Tax Map and Parcel Number 08-33-1936-010
TRO4733 as the property of Ray and Linda Diehl whose last known address as of
date of sale is 403 Mountain View Road Mt. Holly Springs PA 17065.
AWN
This Bill of Sale is executed and acknowledged by Melissa F. Mixell,
acting in the capacity of Director of the Tax Claim Bureau of Cumberland County.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Seller has caused this Bill of Sale to be
executed in its name and its official seal to be affixed hereto this day of
A, 20 (
TAX CLAIM BUREAU OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
} SS
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND }
On this 10;'h day of it&t" -u ,20 0 before me, the
subscriber, perosnally appeared Melissa F. Mixell, acting as Director of the Tax
Claim Bureau of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, who in due form of law
acknowledged the foregoing document to be her act and deed.
IN' W1T"+E53 LA.' HEREOF, I llerbulito set my hand and official seal.
NOTICE TO QUIT
To: Linda Diehl Kuhn
403 Mountain View Road
Mt. Holly Springs, PA 17065
You are hereby notified that you have thirty (30) days from service of this notice to remove
yourself and your personal property from the mobile home known as tax parcel 08-33-1936-010
TRO4733 and from the real property known as 403 Mountain View Road, Dickinson Township,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, Tax Parcel 08-33-1936-010. This notice applies to you and any
other individual whom you have given permission to enter, or reside on the property.
IF YOU FAIL TO REMOVE YOURSELF FROM THE PROPERTY WITHIN THIRTY
(30) DAYS OF SERVICE OF THIS NOTICE, AN ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF
REAL PROPERTY WILL BE FILED WITH THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE
HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THIS PROPERTY.
This notice is being furnished to you to remove yourself from the property by the owner of
said real property, Randy Lee Rickrode, who acquired the property by Deed dated June 29`h, 2005,
and recorded at Deed Book 269, Page 3368 in the Recorder of Deeds Office of Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania, subject to the Ground Lease executed by Harry A Rickrode, Jr. and you,
Linda K. Diehl, on or about April 3, 1980, recorded at Deed Book 619, Page 1045 in the Recorder
of Deeds Office of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. You are hereby notified that you are in
breach of the conditions of the lease, which require you as lessee to pay all Real Property Taxes and
Special Taxes levied against the leased land, which you have failed to do.
You are further notified that you are to move out of the mobile home located on said
property as a result of your forfeiture of legal title to the mobile home by virtue of the sale of the
mobile home at tax sale by the Cumberland County Tax Claim Bureau on September 22, 2005.
IF YOU FAIL TO REMOVE YOURSELF AND YOUR POSSESSIONS FROM THE
PROPERTY, AN ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY WILL BE
FILED WITH THE DISTRICT JUDGE.
BE ADVISED YOU WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO THE
PROPERTY AND TO THE MOBILE HOME THEREON.
NOVEMBER 14, 2005 7ZCu-.? r ?Z z'?
RAND LEE RICKRODE
C/O WOLF & WOLF, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
37 SOUTH HANOVER STREET, SUITE 201
CARLISLE, PA 17013-3307
717-241-4436
Irving Wallace
Pennsylvania State Constable
3'/Z East Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
November 21, 2005
Randy Lee Riekrode
C/O Wolf & Wolf, Attorneys at Law
37 S. Hanover Street Suite 201
Carlisle, PA 17013
RE: Notice To Quit
Linda Diehl Kuhn
REMARKS: Served Linda Kuhn at 403 Mountain View Road, Mt. Holly Springs,
PA 17065 on November 15, 2005 at 4:55 PM.
PLEASE REMIT FEE OF: $35.00 Paid by Ck# 1541
C
Irving Wallace
Pennsylvania State Constable
3 % East Louther Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Phone 717-243-6778 Cell 717-877-8588 Fax 717-243-7937
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNY"- VANIA
COUNTY OF: CUMBERLANI
Man
09-3-03
MDJ Name Hon
SUSAN K. DAY
Add"' 229 MILL ST, BOX 167
MT. HOLLY SPRINGS, PA
Teiepnone: 1717) 486-7672 17065
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF :
NATHAN C. WOLF
SUITE 201
37 S HANOVER ST
CARLISLE, PA 17013-3307
NOTICE C- JUDGMENT/TRANSCRIPT
PLAINTIFF: RL.,IDENTIAL LEASE
NAME and ADDRESS
fiICKRODE, RANDY LSE
LOT A3
1150 NORTH PARK AVENUE
LDOTHAN, AL 36303 J
vs.
DEFENDANT: NAME and ADDRESS
FDIEHL KUHN, LINDA
403 MOUNTAIN VIEW ROAD
MT HOLLY SPRINGS, PA 17065
L J
Docket No.: LT-0000418-05
Date Filed: 1/28/05
asa
THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU THAT:
Judgment: FOR PLAINTIFF
® Judgment was entered for: (Name) RICKRODE, RANDY LEE
® Judgment was entered against DIEHL KUHN, LINDA in a
Landlord/Tenant action in the amount of $ 352.59 on 1/20/06 (Date of Judgment)
The amount of rent per month, as established by the Magisterial District Judge, is $ .00.
The total amount of the Security Deposit is $ .00
Total Amou $ Established by 59 J73ess$Security Deposit Applied
Rent in Arrears 2 .6
Physical Damages Leasehold Property $ 00 - $ 00 =
Damages/Unjust Detention $ .00 - $ -00
=
Less Amt Due Defendant from Cross Complaint -
Interest (if provided by lease)
L/T Judgment Amount
? Attachment Prohibited/ Judgment Costs
42 Pa.C.S. § 8127 Attorney Fees
? This case dismissed without prejudice.
L°_I Possession granted.
? Possession granted if money judgment
? Possession not granted.
Total Judgment
Post Judgment Credits
Post Judgment Costs
Certified Judgment Total
$ Adjudicated Amount
259.73
$ .00
$ _00
$ .00
$ .00
$ 259.73
$ 92.86
$ 00
$ 352.59
? Defendants are jointly and severally liable.
IN AN ACTION INVOLVING A RESIDENTIAL LEASE, ANY PARTY HAS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION WITHIN
TEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE PROTHONOTARY/CLERK OF COURTS
OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CIVIL DIVISION. THIS APPEAL WILL INCLUDE AN APPEAL OF THE MONEY JUDGMENT, IF ANY. IN
ORDER TO OBTAIN A SUPERSEDEAS, THE APPELLANT MUST DEPOSIT WITH THE PROTHONOTARY/CLERK OF COURTS THE LESSER OF
THREE MONTHS RENT OR THE RENT ACTUALLY IN ARREARS ON THE DATE THE APPEAL IS FILED.
IF A PARTY WISHES TO APPEAL ONLY THE MONEY PORTION OF A JUDGMENT INVOLVING A RESIDENTIAL LEASE, THE PARTY HAS
30 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN WHICH TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE PROTHONOTARY/CLERK OF
COURTS OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CIVIL DIVISION.
THE PARTY FILING AN APPEAL MUST INCLUDE A COPY OF THIS NOTICE OF JUDGMENT/TRANSCRIPT FORM WITH THE NOTICE OF APPEAL.
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGES, IF THE JUDGMENT
HOLDER ELECTS TO ENTER THE JUDGMENT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ALL FURTHER PROCESS MUST COME FROM THE COURT
OF COMMON PLEAS AND NO FURTHER PROCESS MAY BE ISSUED BY THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICL,JUDGE.
UNLESS THE JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ANYONE INTERESTED IN THE JUDGMENT MAY FILE
A REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF SATISFACTION WITH THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE IF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR PAYS IN FULL,
SETTLES, OR OTHERWISE COMPLIES WITH THE JUDGMENT.
Date / ?- , Maoisterial District Jud
Date Magisterial District Judge
M commission expires first Monday of January, 2010 SEAL ) f = j`
Ao c31sA-os L I I
VERIFICATION
I do hereby verify that I am counsel for the plaintiff in the instant action and that the facts
set forth in this petition are true and correct to the best of my information and belief based upon the
information provided to me. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the
penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities.
February L` , 2006
NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY ID NO. 87380
WOLF & WOLF
37 SOUTH HANOVER STREET,
SUITES 201-202
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
V. : NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
LINDA DIEHL KUHN, : LANDLORD TENANT
Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire, have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing complaint
upon the following person and in the matter indicated:
SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL:
Linda D. Kuhn
Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
c/o Irwin & McKnight
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorneys for Defendant
Respectfully Submitted,
WOLF & WOLF
February 17, 2006
41; COURT ID NO. 87380
Hanover Street, Suite 201
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
.?> -
: ?,
,
,
t
,.
,? ? ? ,_
NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY ID NO. 87380
WOLF & WOLF
10 WEST HIGH STREET
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICKRODE,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant
To: Linda D. Kuhn
c/o Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
Irwin & McKnight
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Date of Notice: April 19, 2006
: NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
: LANDLORD TENANT
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
IMPORTANT NOTICE
YOU ARE IN DEFAULT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FAILED TO ENTER A
WRITTEN APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY ATTORNEY AND FILE IN WRITING
WITH THE COURT YOUR DEFENSES OR OBJECTIONS TO TIC CLAIMS SET FORTH
AGAINST YOU. UNLESS YOU ACT WITHIN TEN DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS
NOTICE, A JUDGMENT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU WITHOUT A HEARING
AND YOU MAY LOSE YOUR PROPERTY OR OTHER IMPORTANT RIGHTS.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE',. IF YOU DO
NOT HAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE; SET FORTH BELOW.
THIS OFFICE', CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A
LAWYER.
IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE
TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER
LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.
Cumberland County Bar Association
32 South Bedford Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
717-249-3166
WOLF & WOLF
SIJPF
E COURT ID NO. 87380
1 EST HIGH STREET
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL
Linda D. Kuhn
NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY to NO. 87380
WOLF & WOLF
10 WEST HIGH STREET
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICKRODE,
Plaintiff
Y.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
: LANDLORD TENANT
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire, hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Default judgment upon the following and in the matter indicated:
April -4_1 2006
c/o Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
Irwin & McKnight
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
WOLF &
By:
Att ey t Plaintiff
PR E COURT ID NO. 87380
1 ST HIGH STREET
CARLISLE, PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
-? ;'i
?._ ?.
??
?'
r:` ..
i .,:
RANDY LEE RICKRODE,
Plaintiff,
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant,
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
NOTICE TO PLEAD
You are hereby notified to file a written response to the enclosed Answer with New
Matter within twenty (20) days from service hereof or a judgment may be entered against you.
IRWIN & McKNIGHT
DouglagG. Miller, Esquire
Supreme Court I.D. No. 83776
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-2353
Attorney for Defendant,
Linda Kuhn
Date: May 1, 2006
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V. NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
LINDA DIEHL KUHN, CIVIL ACTION - LAW
Defendant, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER
TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
AND NOW this 1St day of May, 2006, comes the Defendant, Linda Kuhn, by and through
her attorneys, Irwin & McKnight, and respectfully files this Answer with New Matter to the
Plaintiff's Complaint, and in support thereof aver as follows:
1. After reasonable investigation, Defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained in paragraph one (1) so they
are therefore specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
2. The averments of fact contained in paragraph two (2) are admitted.
3. The Deed referenced by Plaintiff in paragraph three (3) and identified as Exhibit
"A" speaks for itself and therefore no response is required. To the extent that a response is
required, the averments in paragraph three (3) are conclusions of law.
4. The Ground Lease referenced by Plaintiff in paragraph four (4) and identified as
Exhibit "B" speaks for itself and therefore no response is required. To the extent that a response
is required, the averments in paragraph four (4) are conclusions of law.
5. The Ground Lease referenced by Plaintiff in paragraph five (5) and identified as
Exhibit "B" speaks for itself and therefore no response is required. To the extent that a response
is required, the averments in paragraph five (5) are conclusions of law.
6. The averments contained in paragraph six (6) are specifically denied and strict
proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer, Defendant has resided on the
property since 1974, prior to the passing of her mother. Defendant was specifically devised the
subject real estate by her mother, but because of subdivision difficulties was subsequently
granted a 999 year lease to the property.
7. The averments of fact contained in paragraph seven (7) are admitted.
8. The Ground Lease referenced by Plaintiff in paragraph eight (8) and identified as
Exhibit "B" speaks for itself and therefore no response is required. To the extent that a response
is required, the averments in paragraph eight (8) are conclusions of law. By way of further
answer, Defendant has for many years paid all of the real estate taxes for the entire property, not
just the portion leased to her.
9. The Ground Lease referenced by Plaintiff in paragraph nine (9) and identified as
Exhibit "B" speaks for itself and therefore no response is required. To the extent that a response
is required, the averments in paragraph nine (9) are conclusions of law. Any inference that
Defendant has not kept the property and improvements in a state of good repair is specifically
denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
10. The averments of fact contained in paragraph ten (10) are admitted.
2
11. The averments contained in paragraph eleven (11) are conclusions of law to
which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments are
specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
12. After reasonable investigation, Defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained in paragraph twelve (12) so
they are therefore specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
13. After reasonable investigation, Defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained in paragraph thirteen (13) so
they are therefore specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
14. The Ground Lease referenced by Plaintiff in paragraph fourteen (14) and
identified as Exhibit "C" speaks for itself and therefore no response is required. To the extent
that a response is required, the averments in paragraph fourteen (14) are conclusions of law.
15. The averments contained in paragraph fifteen (15) are specifically denied and
strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By of further answer, Defendant has for many years
paid all of the real estate taxes for the entire property, not just the portion leased to her. In
addition, Defendant paid the portion of real estate taxes awarded Plaintiff by Magisterial District
Judge Susan K. Day. Defendant has repeatedly requested Plaintiff and his legal counsel provide
her with copies of the recent real estate tax bills, with calculations for the portion she owes,
which Plaintiff and his legal counsel have failed and refused to provide.
16. The averments contained in paragraph sixteen (16) are denied as stated. It is
admitted that in the past Defendant directly received tax bills at her residence. The remaining
3
averments in paragraph sixteen (16), including any inference that Defendant was obligated to pay
taxes on the entire property to the benefit of Plaintiff and his predecessors in title, is specifically
denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
17. The averments contained in paragraph seventeen (17) are specifically denied and
strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
18. After reasonable investigation, Defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained in paragraph eighteen (18) so
they are therefore specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
19. The averments contained in paragraph nineteen (19) are conclusions of law to
which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments are
specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
20. The averments contained in paragraph twenty (20) are specifically denied and
strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
21. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-one (21) are conclusions of law to
which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments are
specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
22. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-two (22) are denied as stated. It is
admitted that at one time Defendant had a portable toilet on the property while repairs were made
to the septic system. The remaining averments in paragraph twenty-two (22) are specifically
4
denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer, Defendant's
septic system has been repaired and the portable toilet removed.
23. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-three (23) are specifically denied
and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
24. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-four (24) are conclusions of law to
which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments are
specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
25. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-five (25) are conclusions of law to
which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments,
including any inference that Plaintiff was entitled to terminate Defendant's lease, are specifically
denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
26. The return of service referenced by Plaintiff in paragraph twenty-six (26) and
identified as Exhibit "E" speaks for itself and therefore no response is required.
27. The averments of fact contained in paragraph twenty-seven (27) are admitted.
28. The notice of judgment referenced by Plaintiff in paragraph twenty-eight (28) and
identified as Exhibit "F" speaks for itself and therefore no response is required. To the extent a
response is required, Plaintiff sought rent and attorney fees in his complaint of over $1,600.00,
but received only a judgment of $352.29, which included court costs. Defendant promptly paid
those funds which primarily represented her portion of real estate taxes.
5
29. The averments contained in paragraph twenty-nine (29) are conclusions of law to
which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments are
specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
30. The averments contained in paragraph thirty (30) are conclusions of law to which
no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments are specifically
denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
31. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-one (31) are conclusions of law to
which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments are
specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
32. The averments contained in paragraph thirty-two (32) are conclusions of law to
which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the averments are
specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further answer,
Defendant has offered to allow Plaintiff to remove the existing mobile home so that she can
replace it with another home.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Linda Kuhn, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to
enter a judgment in her favor and against Plaintiff in this matter, together with reasonable costs
and attorney fees, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just.
6
NEW MATTER
33. The averments of fact contained in the Answers to the Plaintiff's Complaint are
hereby incorporated by reference and are made part of this New Matter to the Complaint of the
Plaintiff.
34. In 1974, the Defendant started living at the property known as 403 Mountain
View Road, Mt. Holly Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, which was prior to the
passing of her mother.
35. In her mother's will, Defendant was specifically devised the portion of the
property where she resides.
36. As the property was not able to be subdivided, Defendant was subsequently
granted the 999 year Ground Lease from Harry A. Rickrode, Jr., as Executor of the Estate of Ella
M. Rickrode.
37. The remaining property not subject to the Ground Lease was conveyed to
Defendant's siblings.
38. Defendant's property is therefore more in the nature of a conveyance than a lease.
39. Since 1980, Defendant has paid almost all of the real estate taxes imposed on the
entire real estate, not just the portion granted to her in the 999 year Ground Lease.
7
40. Neither Plaintiff nor his predecessors in title have reimbursed Defendant for the
additional real estate taxes paid by her.
41. Plaintiff and his predecessors in title benefited from the payment by Defendant of
the real estate taxes on the entire property.
42. Plaintiff was not required to pay any of the taxes assessed against Defendant's
mobile home, but did so only in an attempt to terminate her 999 year conveyance.
43. Defendant has offered to repay the funds expended by Plaintiff for taxes upon
Defendant's mobile home, or in the alternative is willing to allow Plaintiff to remove the mobile
home in order to permit her to purchase a replacement mobile home for the conveyed site.
44. The real estate tax bills for the property are now being mailed directly to Plaintiff
in Alabama.
45. Defendant has requested that Plaintiff provide her with a prorated real estate tax
bill for the portion of property that she was conveyed.
46. Plaintiff has failed and refused to provide any such prorated real estate tax bill,
and despite repeated requests continues to fail and refuse to provide such necessary information.
47. Plaintiff, or one of his agents with Plaintiff's express or implied permission, has
caused a camper to be parked on a portion of the ground subject to the 999 year conveyance.
8
48. Plaintiff has failed and refused to remove said camper from the subject property,
to provide any rents to Defendant for said camper, or to advise as to individual who owns the
camper.
49. Defendant has paid for or caused to performed numerous improvements to the
conveyed property.
50. These improvements include the repair and improvement of the septic system for
the mobile home.
51. Defendant has kept and continues to keep the property and improvements in a
state of good repair.
52. Defendant has paid to the Office of the Prothonotary of Cumberland County the
amount of outstanding prorated taxes and filing fees awarded to Plaintiff by Magisterial District
Judge Susan K. Day.
53. Payment of the outstanding prorated real estate taxes and filing fees to the
Prothonotary was required for Defendant to file the instant appeal in this matter.
54. Plaintiff is not entitled to terminate the 999 year conveyance to Defendant, and is
not entitled to recover possession.
55. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state claims or causes of action upon which relief
can be granted.
9
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Linda Kuhn, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to
enter a judgment in her favor and against Plaintiff in this matter, together with reasonable costs
and attorney fees, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just.
Respectfully Submitted,
IRWIN & McKNIGHT
Dated: May 1, 2006 '?V? By; 4
Douglas A. Miller, Esquire
Supreme Court ID # 83776
West Pomfret Professional Building
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-2353
Attorney for Defendant,
Linda Kuhn
10
VERIFICATION
The foregoing document is based upon information which has been gathered by my
counsel and myself in the preparation of this action. I have read the statements made in this
document and they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I
understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section
4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN
Date: April 28, 2006
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, do hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document upon the persons indicated below by facsimile and by first class
United States mail, postage paid in Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013, on the date set forth below:
Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire
Wolf & Wolf
37 South Hanover Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(Attorney for Plaintiff)
Date: May 1, 2006 IRWIN & McKNIGHT
Douglas Miller, Esquire
Supreme Court ID # 83776
West Pomfret Professional Building
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-3222
(717) 249-2353
Attorney for Defendant
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NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY ID NO. 87380
WOLF & WOLF
10 WEST HIGH STREET
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICKRODE,
Plaintiff
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
: NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
: LANDLORD TENANT
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S NEW MATTER
AND NOW comes the Plaintiff Randy Lee Rickrode, by his attorney, Nathan C. Wolf,
Esquire, and presents the following reply to defendant's new matter, representing as follows:
33. No reply necessary.
34. Admitted.
35. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Plaintiff is without sufficient knowledge of the truth
of this averment and as such specifically denies the same. Strict proof thereof is demanded at trial
36. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Plaintiff is without sufficient knowledge of the truth
of this averment and as such specifically denies the same. Strict proof thereof is demanded at trial.
37. Denied. Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that the entire property was devised to the
siblings, subject to the Defendant's right to occupy the property under the Lease, provided the
conditions of the Lease were met by Defendant.
38. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response
may be required, Plaintiff submits that the writing upon which he relies speaks for itself in that it
imposes conditions upon the Defendant as a condition of her continued residency.
Z)
39. Denied as stated. It is specifically denied that the Defendant has paid almost all of the real
estate taxes upon the entire real estate and not just the portion granted to her in the 999 year
Ground Lease. Byway of further response, the Defendant allowed the real estate to go to tax sale in
2002 because of her failure to pay the taxes on the property whatsoever for a period of years and a
neighboring property owner purchased the property at said tax sale, requiring Plaintiff's
predecessors in interest to purchase the property back from said individual in exchange for an access
easement to his property. Moreover, Plaintiff has paid all of the taxes due on the property without
contribution from Defendant since tax year 2003.
40. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that neither Plaintiff, nor his predecessors in
interest, have reimbursed Defendant for additional taxes paid over and above the amounts
previously paid by Defendant. However it is denied that such reimbursement was lacking for any
reason other than because Plaintiff has not been provided with any specific records of payments
made by Defendant, and therefore Plaintiff is unaware of the difference between that amount and
Defendant's portion of real estate taxes which went unpaid and led to the tax sale on the property or
which were paid in full by Plaintiff.
41. Denied as stated. Plaintiff denies that the benefit enjoyed as the result of Defendant's
payments of property taxes for the entire property outweighs the detriment suffered by having to
repurchase the property following the tax sale in exchange for giving an easement to a neighbor
which burdens the property and after Plaintiff has had to pay the entire taxes due for several tax
years. In fact, since tax year 2000, Defendant has only paid for one tax year, that being 2003.
42. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff was under no obligation to pay
the property taxes on Defendant's mobile home. However it is denied that said tax payments were
made solely to terminate her 999 Ground Lease.
43. Admitted.
44. Admitted.
45. Denied as stated. It is denied that Defendant was conveyed any portion of the property, and
that her interest is solely in the form of a lessee subject to the terms and conditions of the Ground
Lease. Moreover, only after Plaintiff initiated the instant action did Defendant make such requests.
Byway of further response, in the absence of having the tax bills, Plaintiff avers that with minimal
effort, Defendant could have obtained copies of the tax bills directly from the taxing authorities and
made payments accordingly. Plaintiff only acquired the property in 2005 and Defendant had not
sought to make said payments through the tax collector for that tax year or the previous tax year.
46. Denied as stated. Plaintiff incorporates his response of paragraph 45 herein by reference
and by way of further response submits that said requests occurred only after the instant action was
initiated by Plaintiff and therefore reveal that Defendant's desire to fulfill her obligations under the
lease are disingenuous at this stage and are designed only to preserve her interest now that she
realizes it is at risk.
47. Denied as stated. The camper was placed on the property prior to the acquisition of the
property by Plaintiff, and is only partially on the land believed to be identified as the leased portion
of the property in the ground lease. However, the Defendant's suggestion that the camper is
interfering with her enjoyment of the leased portion of the property is disingenuous, as Defendant
has vehicles and other personal property on areas outside what is believed to be the leased portion
of the premises that intrude far more on Plaintiff's propertythan the camper intrudes on
Defendant's leased property. Byway of further response, since the property was acquired by
Plaintiff, no clear markings delineating the extent of leased area have been found.
48. Denied as stated. Plaintiff has made Defendant aware of who owns the camper, and she has
been aware of the same since January of 2006. Byway of further response, Plaintiff incorporates his
response to paragraph 47 herein.
49. Denied as stated. With the exception of the septic system repairs, which were required by
South Middleton Township Code Enforcement, after reasonable investigation, Plaintiff is without
sufficient information to admit or deny the truth of this remainder of this allegation and therefore
specifically denies the same and demands strict proof thereof at trial.
50. Admitted.
51. Denied. For the reasons set forth in paragraphs 20, 21, 22, and 23 of Plaintiff's complaint,
which are incorporated herein, Plaintiff avers that the property was not kept in a state of good repair
or appearance and as such, these conditions are in violation of the lease. By way of further
response, Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Defendant has only recently begun to attempt to
improve the condition of the property, but that such efforts are not relevant as to her previous
violation of the conditions of the ground lease.
52. Admitted.
53. Admitted.
54. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response
maybe required, the Ground Lease set forth specific terms and conditions under which the
Defendant could continue to reside on the leased premises. Other than termination of the lease,
Plaintiff would be without recourse for violations of said terms and conditions, which would result
in a manifest injustice to Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that based upon Defendant's
numerous violations of the terms of the lease, that Plaintiff is entitled to both terminate the lease
and an award of possession of the property.
55. Denied as a conclusion of law to which no response is required. To the extent a response
may be required, it is denied that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or causes of action upon which
relief can be granted. On the contrary, Plaintiff submits that he has properly pled a claim and cause
of action against the Defendant under the Landlord Tenant Act of 1951 based upon her multiple
violations of the conditions of the lease, including failure to pay taxes levied upon the real estate,
failure to pay taxes levied upon her personal property (namely the mobile home) and her failure to
keep the property in a state of good repair and appearance. Therefore the relief sought in the form
of a termination of the lease and an order for possession should be granted to Plaintiff.
Respectfully Submitted,
WOLF & WOLF
May 22, 2006 BY:
SUPREME COURT ID NO. 87380
10 Vest High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
VERIFICATION
I do hereby verify that I am the Plaintiff in the instant action and that the facts set forth in
this reply to new matter are true and correct to the best of my information and belief. I understand
that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to
unswom falsification to authorities.
May 22, 2006
r
Randy L 'ckrode
NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY ID NO. 87380
WOLF & WOLF
37 SOUTH HANOVER STREET,
SUITES 201-202
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
V. : NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
LINDA DIEHL KUHN, : LANDLORD TENANT
Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire, have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing reply to
new matter upon the following person and in the matter indicated:
SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL:
Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
Irwin & McKnight
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Defendant
Respectfully Submitted,
WOLF & WODF
May 22, 2006
for Plaintiff
1E COURT ID NO. 87380
10 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
(717) 241-4436
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PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR TRIAL
(Must be typewritten and submitted in duplicate)
TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY
Please list the following case:
(Check one) ( ) for JURY trial at the next term of civil court.
( X ) for trial without a jury.
-----------------------------------------------------------
CAPTION OF CASE
(entire caption must be stated in full)
RANDY LEE RICKRODE
(Plaintiff)
VS.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN
(Defendant)
(check one)
(X) Civil Action - Law
( ) Appeal from Arbitration
(other)
The trial list will be called on August 22, 2006
and
Trials commence on September 18. 2006
Pretrials will be held on August 30. 2006
(Briefs are due 5 days before pretrials.)
(The party listing this case for trial shall
Provide forthwith a copy of the praceipe to
all counsel, pursuant to local Rule 214.1.)
No. 577 Civil Term 2006
Indicate the attorney who will try case for the party who files this praeeipe:
Indicate trial counsel for other parties if known:
This case is ready for trial.
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
DEFENDANT 06-0577 CIVIL
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 10m day of August, 2006, the non-jury trial in the above
referenced case has been assigned to this Court. Prior to setting an actual trial date
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the parties in this case file a pre-trial
memorandum with the Court on or before August 30, 2006 in the following format:
1. A concise statement of factual issues to be decided at trial.
If. A list of witnesses the party intends to call at trial along with a concise
statement of their anticipated testimony.
III. A list of all exhibits each party anticipates presenting at trial.
IV. A statement of any legal issues each party anticipates being raised at trial
along with copies of any cases which may be relevant to resolution of the stated issue.
V. An estimate of the anticipated time needed for the parry to present its case.
Upon receipt and review of these memorandums, the Court will set a trial date for
this case.
By the Court,
'ki UJ (I
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
ti
Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff p, f? - 06
Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
Attorney for Defendant
Court Administrator -
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RANDY LEE RICKRODE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
DEFENDANT 06-0577 CIVIL
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2006, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
AND DIRECTED that the non-jury trial in the above captioned case shall be held
on Friday, December 15, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom No. 5 of the
Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
By the Court,
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
than C. Wolf, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff
Jabuglas Miller, Esquire
Attorney for Defendant
Court Administrator
bas "q /?o'
bs? S
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN, CIVIL ACTION - LAW
Defendant NO. 06-577 CIVIL TERM
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 15th day of December, 2006, after
trial in the above-captioned case, the parties are directed
to file findings of fact, limited to approximately eight
findings of fact, and memorandum of law in support of their
position on or before Friday, January 12th, 2007.
By the Court,
V% A "
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J
Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire
For the Plaintiff Syr
Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
For the Defendant
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42
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 23rd day of May, 2007, having considered the testimony and evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds that Defendant Linda Diehl Kuhn has breached the
material contractual terms of the lease by failing to maintain the leased property and failing to
pay the appropriate taxes, thereby forfeiting her rights under the lease.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that Judgment is entered for the
Plaintiff and Defendant Linda Diehl Kuhn must vacate the property previously leased to her by
Plaintiff Randy Lee Rickrode. Plaintiff shall be awarded possession of Defendant's mobile
home previously bought by Plaintiff at tax sale, September 22, 2005.
By the Court,
Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff
f/_ _uglas G. Miller, Esquire
Attorney for Defendant
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M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
LU1
44 J
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL
Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Ebert, J., May 23, 2007 -
Plaintiff, Randy Lee Rickrode, brings this Landlord Tenant Action against Defendant,
Linda Diehl Kuhn, on the grounds that she has breached the lease affording her tenancy on a
small piece of Rickrode's property in Dickinson Township. Due to Defendant's alleged failure
to pay taxes and to keep and maintain the leased property in a good state of appearance and
repair, Rickrode has sought to terminate the lease. Defendant denies that she has breached any
terms of the lease and contends that Plaintiff has no grounds to evict her from the property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about April 3, 1980, as part of the settlement of the Estate of Ella M. Rickrode,l
Defendant received a 999 year "ground lease" of a tract of land 131 ft. x 131 ft. at 403 Mountain
View Road, Mount Holly Springs, Dickinson Township, Pennsylvania.2 The leased tract of land
constituted a small portion (about 22.7%) of a larger piece of property which Plaintiff received
title to by Deed on June 29, 2005.3 Plaintiff owns the totality of the main 2 acre tract of land, but
his ownership is subject to the 999 year lease described above.4
' Def. Ex. 4
2 Pl. Ex. 2; The lease commenced on or about April 3, 1980 and was projected to expire on April 2, 2979.
s Pl. Ex. 1
4 Notes of Testimony (Hereinafter "N.T. -") 9-10
According to the lease terms, Kuhn was responsible to pay all real and personal property
taxes and maintain the grounds and buildings on the leased property throughout her occupancy.5
Unfortunately, Kuhn has failed to pay property taxes on the mobile home since 1995, apart from
$100.00 paid on September 12, 1997.6 Kuhn testifies that she was unable to pay the taxes on the
home, because she was shouldering the entire real property tax burden - which according to the
lease was not hers to bear.' However, tax documentation reveals that Kuhn was not punctual,
nor consistent in paying the real property taxes. Defendant made tax payments up to 2003, but
all payments merely contributed to unpaid, former taxes. She made no payments on the 2000 to
2002 taxes.g Subsequently the real property was posted for tax sale in 2002, where it was
purchased by James B. Small for $999.64.9 Kuhn was only permitted to stay on the property
after her brother, Stanley Rickrode, redeemed the property from Mr. Small.10 In order to retain
the property, Stanley Rickrode entered into a stipulation agreement with Small whereby he
conveyed to Small a 25 feet-wide access easement across his property at 8 Cabin Lane
Shippensburg, Pennsylvania.) l Essentially, in order to redeem the property and allow Kuhn to
stay in her home, Stanley Rickrode was required to give up a portion of his property rights. 12
Not long after redeeming the property, Stanley Rickrode attempted to evict Kuhn. 13 In June,
2005, Stanley Rickrode granted the full property parcel to his son, Plaintiff Randy Lee
Rickrode.14
s Pl. Ex. 2
6 Pl. Ex. 17, p. 1
N.T. 129; 135
8 Def Ex. 2; N.T. 137
9 N.T. 136; Pl. Ex. 18.
10 Pl. Ex. 16 & 18
" Pl. Ex. 18 Stipulation and Agreement.
12 N.T. 129-30
"N.T. 115; 131
14 Pl. Ex. 1; N.T. 48
2
Beyond her failure to pay taxes, Kuhn has allowed the property to fall into a state of
disrepair and poor appearance. Inoperable vehicles, campers, boats, garbage, metal, and broken
appliances clutter the property. 15 The inner workings of the home are also in likely disrepair as
evidenced by the fact that in 2005, Defendant was forced to install a temporary, portable toilet
for several months because the septic system stopped f inctioning.16
The Tax Assessment Office of Cumberland County assessed taxes on Kuhn's mobile
home located on the leased property. The mobile home was listed at a tax sale in 2005, showing
an outstanding tax bill of some $3,791.71.17 Defendant testified that the home had previously
been put up at tax auction nine or ten times, but no one ever purchased it. 18 At a tax sale in
September 2005, Rickrode purchased Kuhn's mobile home. 19 Defendant did not appear at the
sale because she thought no one would care to buy it. 20
After purchasing the mobile home, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Quit, seeking to terminate
Defendant's lease and evict her from the property due to her failure to pay taxes and maintain the
property. 21 Defendant refused to leave the property, contending that Rickrode had no right to
terminate the lease. 22 Plaintiff subsequently brought this suit.
DISCUSSION
The analysis of the present situation requires a two step inquiry. Primarily, we must
determine whether material terms of the contract were breached, justifying the termination of the
contract. Secondly, we must consider whether the breach of the terms entitles Rickrode to
possession of the Defendant's home.
15 See Pl. Ex. 13 & 14
16 N.T. 132
Pl Ex. 7
18 N.T. 142-43
19 Pl. Ex. 8-10
2° N.T. 143
21 Pl. Ex. 11; N.T. 26
22 N.T. 28
I. Materiality of Breached Terms
According to Pennsylvania law, "Any material failure of performance by one party to a
contract not justified by the conduct of the other discharges the latter's duty to give the agreed
exchange; but if the alleged breach was an immaterial failure of performance, and the contract
was substantially performed, the provisions of the contract are still effective." Cimona v.
Bronich, 517 Pa. 378, 384, 537 A.2d 1355, 1358 (1998). "Whether a breach is so substantial as
to justify an injured party's regarding the whole transaction as at an end `is a question of
degree;... Widmer Engineering, Inc. v. Dufalla, 2003 Pa. Super 391, 837 A.2d 459, 468 (2003),
citing Gray v. Gray, 448 Pa.Super. 456, 468, 671 A.2d 1166, 1172 (1996) (citations omitted). In
determining materiality for purposes of breaching a contract, a court must consider such factors
as: the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably
expected; the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for that part of the
benefit of which he will be deprived; the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform will suffer forfeiture; the likelihood that the party failing to perform or offer to
perform will cure his failure; taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable
assurances; the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or offer to perform
comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241
(1981).
After applying the applicable factors to this case, it is clear that Defendant's failure to
adhere to the conditions of the ground lease constitutes material failure justifying Rickrode's
termination of the lease. According to the language of the contract, the property owner's only
reasonable expectation in the bargain would be that the lessee maintain the leased property in
good condition and pay the appropriate taxes. Defendant's continuous failure to perform these
4
tasks deprived Rickrode of the only expectations he logically anticipated from the contract, (i.e.
tax payments and cleanliness). Considering Defendant's poor financial situation, Rickrode will
likely never be adequately compensated for that part of the benefit of which he has been denied.
Minimal financial resources aside, Defendant's apathetic attitude regarding the
impending possibility of losing her home for failure to pay her taxes suggests that she was not
planning on paying her taxes any time in the near future. The facts reveal that Defendant was
aware of how poorly she had maintained the property. So much so that she failed to appear at the
tax upset sale because she expected no one to bid on such an unappealing piece of property.
Defendant testified that she thought no one would want the mobile home, as they had not
purchased it at previous tax sales. Apathy so great as to neglect the care of one's property after
having previously escaped potential eviction on multiple occasions cannot be rewarded by law or
equity. Despite the fact that Defendant had agreed to maintain the property and pay the
appropriate taxes, she clearly had no intention of doing so. Her behavior thus deprived the
owner of his only reasonable expectations and materially breached the contractual terms to the
point that the contract was unperformed.
The outcome of this analysis would be different if, for example, the evidence would have
suggested that Kuhn had merely fallen behind in her taxes or had small maintenance issues
around the leased property. Unfortunately, such is not the case at bar. Kuhn has not paid taxes
for years, as is evidenced by the fact that her mobile home has been posted at tax sale nine or ten
times and was in such a poor state that no one cared to purchase it. Photographic and
documentary exhibits indicate that the home and property are undoubtedly in serious disrepair.
This is not a case of immaterial breach, but of substantial failure to adhere to the terms and
conditions of the lease.
II. For eiture
Defendant has argued with some fervor that since the ground lease document contains no
provision identifying grounds for forfeiture, or even reserving the right to seek eviction by the
lessor, then the terms must be construed as covenants (as opposed to conditions subsequent)
which do not provide for forfeiture of the ground lease. Defendant thus concedes under this
argument that Plaintiff has a right to the mobile home,23 which he purchased, but contends that
he has no right to evict her from the real property. We shall consider both common law and
statutory arguments in regards to the issue of whether Kuhn's breach of the contractual terms
entitles Rickrode to possession.
A. Common Law
Defendant's argument requires an examination of the common law doctrines of
conditions and covenants. Both parties have relied on Williams v. Notopolos, 259 Pa. 469, 475-
76, 103 A. 290 (1918), as a basis for their arguments. The facts of this case center on a three-
story brick building which was leased to Notopolos for a term of five years with an option to
renew. The lease terms contemplated that the lessee would be responsible for any alterations and
improvements to the building and would be required to submit any such plans to the lessor for
approval before construction could begin. Lessee Notopolos submitted plans for proposed
alterations to the leased building but the lessor did not approve them. Notopolos proceeded to
make the alterations without the required approval and a legal suit resulted.
After deciding that the lessor was entitled to the benefits of the lease provisions, the
Notopolos court analyzed whether the breached terms should be construed as conditions or as
zs Def. Ex. 3.
6
covenants. In its analysis the court provided a general explanation of the difference between the
two terms.
"`The underlying principle of all conditions subsequent in grants of land is that
they prescribe terms upon which the land shall revert to the grantor. The condition
may be that subsequent to receiving the land the grantee must not do some
particular thing or it may be that he must do some required thing. But in either
case, if the grantee fails to perform the condition, his right to the land ceases, and
the estate reverts to the grantor as a matter of right; and he may enter or bring
ejectment.': Sims on Covenants with Run with the Land, p. 20. `A condition, on
breach of which the tenant's interest may be terminated, is to be distinguished
from a covenant, a breach of which cannot, in the absence of a statutory provision
to the contrary, affect the tenant's interest, but merely gives the landlord a right of
action for damages, or occasionally, a right to an injunction, or a decree for
specific performance... Mere words of agreement, not contemplating a termination
of the lessee's interest upon his default, create a covenant, and not a condition.': 2
Tiffany on Landlord & Tenant, Sec. 194(b), p. 1364."
Williams v. Notopolos, 259 Pa. 469, 475-76, 103 A. 290, 291-92 (1918).
The court went on to state that the language of the lease, "Lessee also agrees," could
fairly be regarded as merely a covenant but found it noteworthy that covenants, agreements, and
conditions were placed substantially upon the same basis in the lease, and that a breach of any
such constructions could give the lessor the right to declare forfeiture. The deciding factor in this
case did not turn on an interpretation of whether the terms of the lease were covenants or
conditions, but rather on the requested remedy. Plaintiff requested the extraordinary remedy of
confession of judgment in ejectment. Under the specific terms of the lease, such a remedy could
only be provided for breach of any conditions of the lease. Id. at 476. Therefore, even though
the language of the lease could have been interpreted as conditional the court chose not to so
interpret it in order to avoid the extraordinary remedy of confession of judgment in ejectment.
This was so because there existed a real factual issue of whether the lessor acted in good faith in
refusing to approve the renovation plans submitted to him by the lessee. It was the lessor's
failure to act that created the crisis leading to potential ejectment.
7
We will now apply the principles of Notopolos to the instant case. While it is true that
the language, "Lessee agrees" may constitute a covenant, the language of the lease at bar clearly
states that, "All of these provisions of this lease shall be...construed to be `conditions' as well as
`covenants' as though the words specifically expressing or imparting covenants and conditions
were used in each separate provision." The clause establishes that language typically considered
"covenantary" in nature, not only can be but should be interpreted as a condition and vice versa.
In Notopolos, the lease specifically stated that the lessor was authorized to confess judgment in
ejectment against the lessee only upon a breach by the lessee of any of its "conditions." In the
case at bar, there is no provision stating that forfeiture can only occur upon the breach of any of
the conditions of the lease. Thus, breach of the terms of this lease could logically result in
forfeiture of the lease.
Not only does the legal analysis allow for forfeiture, but the factual distinctions between
the two cases support such a finding. In Notopolos, the lessor was asking for ejectment because
the tenant was changing the building - albeit it for the better. This was an extraordinary remedy
to request when there were other less dramatic options to pursue - for example an injunction or
payment of damages for restoration of the building to its former condition. Unlike Notopolos,
here the lessee's total failure to comply with any of the key terms of the lease has created the
forfeiture crisis.
Generally, judicial inclination is adverse to forfeiture. However, in this case, forfeiture is
the only appropriate remedy. If the terms were to be construed as covenants, the only possible
remedy would be damages. But the Defendant can not afford to pay her taxes or maintain her
property. To have the Defendant's small square in the middle of Plaintiff's whole property in a
constant state of disrepair depreciates the value of the land. To award damages will only add to
8
list of things the Defendant cannot pay. Eventually the case will return to court for judgment
and execution. Once more the Defendant will be in the courtroom bringing forth the same
arguments as today and maintaining, "regardless of what I fail to do this 131 foot square is mine
until 2979 A.D." Under these circumstances, the law is not opposed to construing these terms to
be conditional in nature, and it is proper and just to rule in favor of forfeiture.
B. The Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951
The Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 provides:
"A landlord desirous of repossessing real property from a tenant except real
property which is a mobile home space as defined in the act of November 24,
1976 (P.L. 1176, No. 261) known as the "Mobile Home Park Rights Act," may
notify, in writing, the tenant to remove from the same at the expiration of the time
specified in the notice under the following circumstances, namely, (1) Upon the
termination of a term of the tenant, (2) or upon forfeiture of the lease for breach
of its conditions, (3) or upon the failure of the tenant, upon demand, to satisfy any
rent reserved and due."
68 P.S. § 250.501(a) (emphasis added).
The emphasized language in this statute is pertinent to the case at bar. The language of
the ground lease between the two parties clearly dictates that Kuhn pay both her personal and
property taxes as well as keep the leased grounds and other property on the grounds in a state of
good repair. She has indisputably failed to satisfy either provision. The contract unambiguously
states that the provisions of the lease should be construed as both "conditions" and "covenants."
Considering the above discussion, we find no logical reason to believe that the failure to fulfill
these fundamental and material responsibilities should result in anything other than forfeiture as
provided by the Landlord and Tenant Act. Thus common law and statutory law both favor our
decision today.
9
CONCLUSION
This Court finds that Defendant's failure to pay the appropriate taxes and keep her
personal property in a state of good repair constitutes a material breach of the parties' contractual
agreement. Considering common law doctrines of contractual interpretation in conjunction with
the language of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, this Court finds that the contractual
language allows for forfeiture of the lease rights as an appropriate remedy for material breach of
terms. Plaintiff Rickrode is thereby entitled to evict Defendant from the property as well as to
take possession of Defendant's mobile home purchased at tax sale.
Accordingly, the following order shall be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 23rd day of May, 2007, having considered the testimony and evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds that Defendant Linda Diehl Kuhn has breached the
material contractual terms of the lease by failing to maintain the leased property and failing to
pay the appropriate taxes, thereby forfeiting her rights under the lease.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that Judgment is entered for the
Plaintiff and Defendant Linda Diehl Kuhn must vacate the property previously leased to her by
Plaintiff Randy Lee Rickrode. Plaintiff shall be awarded possession of Defendant's mobile
home previously bought by Plaintiff at tax sale, September 22, 2005.
By the Court,
Nx, A-
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
10
Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff
Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
Attorney for Defendant
11
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V. NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
LINDA DIEHL KUHN, CIVIL ACTION - LAW
Defendant. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
MOTION BY DEFENDANT FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
AND NOW, this 4th day of June, 2007, comes the Defendant, Linda Diehl Kuhn, by and
through her legal counsel, Irwin & McKnight, and respectfully moves the Court for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in the above-captioned case, pursuant to Pa. R.Civ.P. No. 227.1(a),
and in support avers the following:
I. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
1. On or about May 23, 2007, an Order of Court was issued in favor of Plaintiff and
against Defendant directing Defendant to vacate the subject property and awarding possession of
the mobile home thereon to Plaintiff.
2. As a matter of law, the evidence presented by Plaintiff was insufficient to create
an issue of fact, and the Defendant is entitled to a verdict in her favor.
3. The evidence presented at trial proved that rather than a traditional residential
lease, the "Ground Lease" with a term of nine hundred and ninety-nine (999) years was an
alternative to a grant of title to the portion of land owned by Defendant's mother, on which
Defendant resided.
4. The Court was incorrect in stating in its Order that the property was leased to
Defendant by Plaintiff, when in fact the subject property was to be devised directly to Defendant
in accordance with her mother's will. (Def. Ex. 4)
5. The evidence presented at trial also proved that only nominal consideration of
$1.00 was paid for the entire term of nine hundred and ninety-nine (999) years.
6. The Court was incorrect in determining that Defendant materially breached the
terms of the "Ground Lease" by allowing the property to fall into a state of disrepair and poor
appearance.
7. First, the "Ground Lease" specifically states that reasonable wear and tear is
permitted for condition of the property and its improvements.
8. The testimony from all of the witnesses was that the original home located on
Plaintiff s larger portion of the property is dilapidated and uninhabitable.
9. Defendant, by contrast, has maintained her portion of the property and mobile
home thereon as she testified that improvements to the structure and septic system have been
performed and paid for by Defendant.
10. The portable toilet referenced by Plaintiff and the Court in its decision, was only
placed temporarily on the property until completion of the repaired septic system and is no
longer present, as clearly testified to by Defendant.
11. The uncontradicted testimony of Defendant also proved that much of the personal
property located on the subject property was placed there by other individuals, including
Plaintiffs father.
12. Defendant has resided on the subject property for more than twenty-five (25)
years and she testified, its condition has either improved or at a minimum stayed the same during
that time, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
13. The Court was also incorrect in determining that by failing to pay the personal
property taxes on the mobile home, Defendant materially breached the terms of the "Ground
Lease."
14. While the "Ground Lease" states the Defendant is to pay all property taxes on
personal property located on the leased land, the document does not state that the failure to pay
personal property taxes entitles the lessor to eviction or forfeiture of the leased land.
2
15. Conditions that could result in forfeitures are not favorites of the law, and
"nothing less than a clear expression of intention that a provision shall be such" will make a
lease provision a condition whose breach results in loss of an estate. Williams v. Notopolis, 259
Pa. 469, 476,103 A. 290, 292 (1918).
16. No action for recovery of possession of the leased premises can be commenced
for the tenant's breach of a lease covenant, and the remedy for breach of a lease covenant is an
action for damages, not eviction. See R. Friedman, Pennsylvania Landlord-Tenant Law and
Practice, § 4.11, p. 269 (3rd Ed. 2001).
17. Furthermore, the remedy of forfeiture must be expressly created, will not be
implied, and if two constructions of an instrument are reasonable, then the interpretation favoring
damages and not forfeiture is the one to be adopted. B. C. & H. Corp. v. Acme Markets, Inc.,
19 Pa. D.&C.3d 4199 430 (C.C.P. Somerset 1980).
18. Defendant's failure to pay her personal property taxes did not otherwise affect
Plaintiffs legal ownership of the subject real estate.
19. While the payment of all personal property taxes is referenced in the "Ground
Lease," there is no remedy provision allowing for eviction or ejectment on such grounds, and
there is no harm to Plaintiff's ownership of the remaining real estate.
20. Defendant has preserved the issues raised by asserting them at trial, in pre-trial
proceedings, and in post-trial proposed findings of fact and brief.
21. Plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing breach of a material term of the
contract.
22. The verdict was against the evidence in that there was insufficient evidence by
Plaintiff that the property was not maintained in the same or better condition, or that Plaintiff
suffered actual harm to his real estate interest by Defendant's failure to pay personal property
taxes such that forfeiture of her real estate interest should be extinguished without a less harsh
remedy.
3
23. As a matter of law, given the lack of evidence by Plaintiff at trial and the
uncontradicted facts adduced at trial, Defendant is entitled to judgment.
II. LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT MOTION
24. Defendant respectfully requests leave to supplement this Motion in a timely
fashion after reproduction of the transcript.
III. TRANSCRIPT
25. Defendant requests that all of the record of this one day trial be transcribed in
order to enable the Court to dispose of the instant Motion.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Linda Diehl Kuhn, respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court enter judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict.
Respectfully Submitted,
IRWIN & McKNIGHT
Douglas turt Mil er, Esquire
Supreme I.D. No. 83776
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 249-2353
Date: June 4, 2007 Attorney for Defendant
4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, do hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document upon the persons indicated below by first class United States mail,
postage paid in Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013, on the date set forth below:
Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire
10 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Honorable M.L. Ebert, Jr.
Cumberland County Courthouse
One Courthouse Square
Carlisle, PA 17013
Office of Court Reporter
Cumberland County Courthouse
One Courthouse Square
Carlisle, PA 17013
Date: June 4, 2007 IRWIN & McKNIGHT
A, T f
v
Douglas turt Miller, Esquire
Supreme I.D. No. 83776
West Pomfret Professional Building
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-3222
(717) 249-2353
Attorney for Defendant
7
RANDY LEE RICKRODE,
Plaintiff
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 6th day of June, 2007, upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the record taken at trial be
transcribed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict is DENIED.
,,Xathan Wolf, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff
X ?%.,uglas G. Miller, Esquire J
Attorney for Defendant
bas
By the Court,
M. L. Ebert, Jr.,
x
RANDY LEE RICKRODE,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUN'T'Y PENNSYLVANIA
: NO. 2006-577 Civil Term
V.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
PETITION FOR THE RELEASE OF
FUNDS FROM COURT
AND NOW comes the plaintiff, Randy Lee Riclmde, by and through his attorney, Nathan C.
Wolf, Esquire, sets for the following Petition for the Release of Funds Paid into Court, representing as
follows:
(1) Plaintiff commenced this action initially before Magisterial District Judge Susan K. Day on
October 28, 2005, which was disposed of by the entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
for possession of real property and damages in the amount of $352.59, the date of said
judgment was January 20, 2006.
(2) Defendant appealed decision of the District Court by the filing of a notice of appeal on or
about January 27, 2006, said notice was accompanied by the payment into Court of the
damages ordered by the Magisterial District Court in the amount of $352.59.
(3) The parties subsequently filed pleadings in the matter and the case was assigned to the
Honorable M.L. Ebert, Jr. for disposition.
(4) This action was tried before judge Ebert on December 15, 2006, and the parties submitted
briefs to the Court on January 12, 2007.
(5) The Court issued judgment in favor of Plaintiff on May 23, 2007, awarding possession of
the property to Plaintiff.
(6) Defendant filed a motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on June 4, 2007,
which was disposed of in favor of the plaintiff by Order of Court issued June 6, 2007.
1
(7) Defendant has not filed an appeal of the Court's final Order to the Superior Court and all
applicable appeal periods have now run.
(8) Plaintiff seeks an Order authorizing the Prothonotary to release the funds paid into Court
to him by the issuance of a check in the amount of $352.59 made payable to Nathan C.
Wolf, Esquire for Randy Lee Rickrode.
(9) Plaintiff's counsel has sought concurrence from Defendant's counsel in the person of
Douglas G. Miller, Esquire, and Counsel indicated the defendant neither concurs with, nor
objects the Court's granting of the relief requested.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Randy Lee Rickrode request that the Court issue an Omer authorizing and
directing the Prothonotary to release the sum of $352.59 paid into Court on behalf of the Defendant in
connection with this matter to the Plaintiff by issuing a check in the amount of $352.59 to Nathan C
Wolf, Esquire for Randy Lee Rickrode, along with any additional relief that the Court may be
appropriate and just.
Respectfully submitted,
WOLF &,WOLF, Attomeys at Law
Dated: September 4, 2007 B
oll; Esquire
10 b Street
Ca sle, PA 17073
Supreme Court I.D. No. 87380
(717) 241-4436
Attorney for Plaintiff
2
4 10
RANDY LEE RICKRODE,
Plaintiff
v.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
NO. 2006 - 577 CIVIL TERM
: LANDLORD TENANT
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire, have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing petition upon
the following persons and in the manner indicated
Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
Irwin & McKnight
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorneys for Defendant
Linda D. Kuhn
403 Mt. View Road
Mt. Holly Springs, PA 17065
Respectfully submitted,
WOLF & WW, Attorneys at Law
Dated: September 4, 2007
By:
10
Supreme Court I.D. No. 87380
(717) 241-4436
Attorney for Plaintiff
4
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NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY ID NO. 87390
10 WEST HIGH STREET
CARLISLE PA 17013
(711) 241-4436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION -LAW
V. .
NO. 2006-0577 CIVIL TERM
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant
To the Prothonotary:
Kindly reduce the Order of Court dated May 23, 2007, issued by the Honorable M .L. Ebert,
to judgment in favor of Randy Lee Riclffode, Plaintiff, in the above-captioned matter.
Respectfully submitted,
WOLF &ADOLF
Date: September 4, 2007
N?tha? Off, Esquire
10 We h Street
Carlin e, PA 17073
(717) 241-4436
Supreme Court ID # 87380
Attorney for Plaintiff
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NATHAN C. WOLF, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY W NO. 87380
10 WEST HIGH STREET
CARLISLE PA 17013
(717) 2414436
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
RANDY LEE RICffitODE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
V.
NO. 2006-0577 CIVIL TERM
LINDA DIEHL KUHN,
Defendant :
To the Prothonotary:
Issue writ of possession in the above matter,
(1) directed to the sheriff of Cumberland County to deliver possession of the following
property described to Randy Lee Rickrode, Plaintiff,
being (Premises as follows):
131 Feet by 131 Feet located at 403 Mountain View Road, Dickinson Township,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania (mailing address of Mt. HDUy Springs, PA 17065)
Along with possession of the mobile home on said lot, purchased by the plaintiff at
tax sale.
To satisfy the costs against the defendant(s) you are directed to levy upon any properly of the
defendant(s) and sell his/her (or their) interests therein.
Respectfully submitted,
WOLF & WOLF
Date: September 4, 2007
Supreme Court ID # 87380
Attorney for Plaintiff
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WRIT OF POSSESSION (Ejectment Proceedings PRCP 3160 - 3165 etc.)
Randy Lee Rickrode
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 577 Civil Term 200-6:
VS.
Linda Diehl Kuhn
403 Mountain View Rd.
Mt. Holly Springs, PA 16065
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND:
No.
Att' y. _
Pl'ff (s)
Prothy.
$ _V'D0
$ a-oo bue
To the Sheriff of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
(1) To satisfy the judgment for possession in the above matter you are directed to deliver possession of the
following described property to:
Randy Lee Rickrode
Plaintiff (s)
being: (Premises as follows):
131 Feet by 131 Feet located at 403 Mountain View Road,
Dickinson Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
Along'.iwith possession of the mobile home located on said lot,
purchased by the plaintiff at tax sale.
(2) To satisfy the costs against the defendant (s) you are directed to levy upon any property of the defen-
dant (s) and sell his/her (or their) interest therein.
Gam- 'e-'*ZWO
Prothonotary, Common Pleas Aft of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
Costs
Nathan C. Wolf
Term
Date :?d - ti, C;2w? By: ?&-
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By virtue of this writ, on the day of
I caused the within named
have possession of the premises described with the appurtenances, and
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Sworn and subscribed to before me this
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SEP 0 52007
RANDY LEE RICKRODE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 2006-577 Civil Term
v.
LINDA DIEHL KUHN, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW
Defendant
F
NOW this .? day of S 4t ^w g,,r 2007, upon consideration of the petition, the
Prothonotary is hereby ORDERED and DIRECTED to release the funds paid into Court by the
Defendant in the amount of $352.59, to the Plaintiff, Randy Lee Rickrode, by issuance of a check in
said amount payable to Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire, for Randy Lee Rickrode.
BY THE COURT,
M.L. Ebert, Jr., J.
Distribution:
Prothonotary
Douglas G. Miller, Esquire
For the Defendant
+15athazi C. Wolf, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
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Distribution
Cumberland County Prothonotary's Office
Manual Release Check Register
Escrow
Case No Accounting Amount
9/06%2007
Tran Date
Date Release
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3920 WOLF NATHAN C ESQ Check Date: 09/06/2007 Check No.: 1728
RENT 2006- 00577 PYMT/CHECK 352.59 1/27/2006
Payee total: 352.59
Grand total: 352.59
WRIT OF POSSESSION (Ejectment Proceedings PRCP 3160 - 3165 etc.)
Randy Lee Rickrode
vs.
Linda Diehl Kuhn
403 Mountain View Rd.
Mt. Holly Springs, PA 16065
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
No. 577 Civil Term 2006.
No. Term
Costs
Att y Nathan C. Wolf $. bn
.
Pl'ff (s) $
Prothy. $ a - oo bu e-
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND:
To the Sheriff of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
(1) To satisfy the judgment for possession in the above matter you are directed to deliver possession of the
following described property to:
Randy Lee Rickrode
Plaintiff (s)
being: (Premises as follows):
131 Feet by 131 Feet located at 403 Mountain View Road,
Dickinson Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
Along'.,with possession of the mobile home located on said lot,
purchased by the plaintiff at tax sale.
TRUE COPY FROM RECORD
In Testimony whereof, l here unto set my hand
and the seal of said Court at Carlisle, Pa.
This ........Y.A day of.4ar ......, ?7
................• . •...... ?I.../.I
ProthwoWy
(2) To satisfy the costs against the defendant (s) you are directed to levy upon any property of the defen-
dant (s) and sell his/her (or their) interest therein.
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Prothonotary, Common Pleas D of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
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By virtue of this writ, on the -12th day of Sg; &Mkk&j- 2907
I caused the within named Randy Lee Rickard , to
have pos"ipn xhip,pr is?as cr' 403 Mountain
Vie', .'Roij, M .. PA, 17065
Sheriff's Re-turn:.:
Docka-ing 18.00 Advance Costs: 150.00
Surcharge- .20-i 00, Sheriff's eas-cs .-85 :11
Prothy 2.00 64.89
Poundage 1.67
Possession 30.00
Miiage 13.44 Refunded to Att:y 9/13/07
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So Answers,
Sworn and subscribed to before me this -
day of
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