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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-4611ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-~/!.~/i CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO DEFEND AND CLAIM RIGHTS You have been sued in Court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case will proceed without you and a decree in divorce or annulment may be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for the divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at the First Floor, Cumberland County Courthouse, South Hanover Street, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, LAWYER'S FEES, OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DIVORCE IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 2 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 249-3166 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01- c~: ti CIVIL TERM : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE 1. Plaintiff is Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., an adult individual, currently residing at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Defendant is Barbara Kay Bradshaw, an adult individual, currently residing at 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Plaintiff and Defendant are bonafide residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and have been so for at least six months immediately previous to the filing of this complaint. 4. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on August 29, 1970 in King County, Washington. 5. There have been no prior actions for divorce or annulment between the parties. 6. The Defendant is not a member of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, or its Allies. 7. The Plaintiff has been advised of the availability of counseling and the right to request that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. Knowing this, the Plaintiff does not desire that the Court require the parties to participate in counseling. 8. Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of the United States of America. 9. The parties have lived separate and apart since July 15, 2001 and continue to live separate and apart as of the date of this Complaint. 10. The parties' marriage is irretrievably broken. 11. Plaintiff desires a divorce based upon the belief that Defendant will, after ninety days from the date of the filing of this Complaint, consent to this divorce. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests your Honorable Court to enter a decree in divorce. Respectfully Submitted TURO LAW OFFICES Robert J.~Mulc~er~g, Esquire ~'~' 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Divorce Complaint are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of Pa.C.S. ~4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. ,~rt~u~' L. Bradshaw, Jr. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 01- 0/r~ {{ CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I served a true and correct copy of the Divorce Complaint filed in the above captioned case upon Barbara Kay Bradshaw, by certified mail, retum receipt requested on August 3, 2001 addressed to: Barbara Kay Bradshaw 1364 Kuhn Road Boiling Springs, PA 17007 and did thereafter receive same as evidenced by the attached Post Office receipt card dated August 4, 2001. I VERIFY THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE FOREGOING AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION AND BELIEF, I UNDERSTAND THAT FALSE STATEMENTS HEREIN MADE ARE SUBJECT TO THE PENALTIES OF 18 PA.C.S. SECTION 4904 RELATING TO UNSWORN FALSIFICATION TO AUTHORITIES. Date TURO LAW OFFICES 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff Z 452 476 238 US Postal Sen/ice Receipt for Certified Mail No Insurance Coverage Provided. Do not use for Interna~nal UaJl 1~ 5l~f;i~ ~[~BI~'6F Street · Car£is£e, ~ 17o~3 · 717-241-3o3o ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION - LAW · IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF SAID COURT: Please enter the appearance of Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, on behalf of the Defendant in the above-captioned case. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE Date Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 241-3030 ID #78269 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO RULE 1920.33(B) PERSONAL DATA: A. Husband's Date of Birth: 3/2/49 B. Wife's Date of Birth: 8/20/49 C. Date of Marriage: 8/29/70 D. Date of Separation: 7/15/01 E. Number of Children: 3 F. Number of Children Under Eighteen: 0 LIST OF MARITAL ASSETS: A. Marital Residence: 1364 Kuhn Road, Boiling Springs, PA. from sale: $82,167.26 (included below in savings accounts). B. Investments: 1) KeyCorp Dividend Reinvestment Acct No. 3005577024/3000557025 Current Value: $132.83 3/20/02 (024) $163.76 (.Andrew's Account) 3/20/02 (025) $137.98 2) Merrill Lynch Wife's Account: 86Q-61966 Current value: $20,075.75 DOS value: $31,714.00 Husband's Account: 86Q-62059 Current value: $23,405.57 DOS value: $36,837.00 3) Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. Husband has at least one current client. Net proceeds 4) American Funds Wife's Account Current value: $988.13 DOS value: (end 2001) $1,203.31 5) 6) 7) Pentagon Federal Credit Union Joint Account Account No: 405308-01-6 Current value: $7,416.11 (what caused increase?) DOS value: $ 869.78 PNC Checking Account Joint Account Current value: $1,742.07 (what caused decrease?) 3~22/02 value: $10,827.90 10/24/02 value:S6,185.23 DOS value: (need proof- Husband has DOS info) PNC Checking Account Wife's Account: 50~0363-6058 Current value: 5,713.26 **Not in existence at DOS. Wife opened account on 9/01 with $100.00. $2,000.00 from sale of home was placed in this account and is still there. 8) 9) PNC Savings Account Wife's Account: 50-0365-8417 Current value: 13,071.84 **Not in existence at DOS. Wife opened account on 9/01. $13,000.00 from sale of home was placed in this account and is still there. M&T Checking Account Joint Account: 00000001144308 Current value: $3,916.60 DOS value: (need proof- Husband has DOS info) 10) M&T Savings Account Joint Account: 15004200939485 Current value: $60,164.18 DOS value: (need proof- Husband has DOS info) 11) C. Insurance: 1) 2) 3) L-3 Communications Master Savings Plan Joint Account: #BWNFXTG Current value: $39,516.10 DOS value: $23,000.00 Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (listed at Veterans Group Life Insurance) Term Insurance on Husband $ (need proof and amount- Husband has this information) Is Wife covered on this policy? No cash surrender value Mass Mutual Policy No. 8,211,311 Term insurance on Husband $125,000.00 No cash surrender value Liberty National Life Ins. Policy No. A5101349 Whole life insurance on 'Wife $25,000 Cash surrender value: Husband has this information) (need proof and amoun 4) Old Line Life Insurance Co. Policy No. 1381912 Whole Life on Husband $50,000.00 Cash surrender value: $6,746.59 Husband has this information) (need proof and amounl 5) AAA Life Insurance Co. Policy No. ADP93 Term Insurance on Husband and Wife $150,000.00 No cash surrender value 6) 7) 8) 9) 11) Continental Casualty Co. (PNC Bank) Certificate No. ID77989108 Term Insurance on Husband $1,000.00 No cash surrender value Life Insurance Co of North America (NRA) Term insurance on Husband $2,500.00 No cash surrender value USAA Group Insurance Trust Cert. No. 69M-0102964 Term Insurance on Husband $1,000.00 No cash surrender value Fortis Benefits Insurance Co. (Pentagon FCU) Policy NO. ID697454231 Term insurance on Husband $21,000.00 No cash surrender value Armed Forces Insurance Exchange Acct # 0254718 Personal Property Insurance No cash surrender value Army Mutual Aid Association Number T-55089XOL Whole life on Husband Coverage: (need proof and amount Husband has this information) Cash Surrender value at DOS: $8,480.21 (need proof and amount Husband has this information) Current Cash surrender value: $9,454.81 (need proof and amount Husband has this information) 12) Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company 4850 Street Road Trevose, PA 17049 1-800-373-5927 Effective: 1-13-97 Policy No. A9123 Family Financial Group Insurance Trust Term Insurance on Husband and Wife for $70,000.00 No cash surrender value **This was missing from Husband's statement D. United States Army Military Pension: $43,899.12 per year ($4,079.00 gross per month). E. Time Share: Williamsburg, VA Value as of 7/1995: $17,100. See attached deed Current value: $17,100.00 RCI credits: (need Husband has this information) proof and amounl F. Art Collection: 1) In Wife's possession: $5,200.00 (need proof and detailed list) 2) In Husband's possession: $8,480.21 (need proof and detailed list) NOTE: Some of the art prints were gifts to the Husband and Wife. These prints should not be listed as marital assets and the amounts above will change based on that. 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT (Husband's) Purchase price: $16,811.40 Current value: $5,000.00 2001 PT Cruiser (Wife's) Purchase price: $20,910.00 Current value: $15,000.00 3. EXPERTS TESTIFYING: No experts will be called to testify. ALL OTHER TESTIMONY BY WITNESSES: called to testify. No other witnesses will bE EXHIBITS: A. Deed for time share B. HUD1 Settlement Sheet from sale of marital home C. Pay stubs for Husband (Husband to provide) D. Pay stubs for Wife E. Proof of values listed (Husband to provide where indicated) F. Other G. Other GROSS INCOME OF THE PARTIES: A. Husband's Gross Income: $82,500.00 (need proof and breakdown from all sources) B. Wife's Gross Income: 2002 total $5,239.25. Currently $9.50 per hour at approximately 40 hours per week. No benefits. ANY DISPUTED ITEMS: All amounts listed as needing proof and details. MARTIAL DEBTS: Children's Student Loans: $14,706.39 (need proof and details since all loans are in the children and Husband's name, not in Wife name) = PROPOSED RESOLUTION: A. All marital property shall be divided as previously agreed (each party took what household items they desired except for what is specifically listed in this statement.) B. Wife shall receive via QDRO 50% of Husband's disposable military retirement income. C. Husband to pay attorney fees and costs for Husband and Wife D. Husband to maintain Survivor Benefit Plan for benefit of Wife. E. Husband to pay for Wife's education in the amount of $16,000.00. F. Husband to pay Wife permanent alimony in the amount of $1,200.00 per month. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE Date Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 241-3030 ID #78269 Contract No. 2(}-9423711 Sales Price: 17,100.00 This Instrumeni'Prepared by: FAIRFIELD COMMUNITIES, INC. PHASEIV Little Rock, Arkansas FAIRFIELD WILLIAMSBURG AT KINGSGATE A Virginia Time-Share Estate Project DEED OF CONVEYANCE AND AFFIDAVIT T_HIS DEE~D and Affidavit, made this 12th day of_ July ., 19 95 , by and between Fairfield Communities, Inc a Delaware Corporation, as beneficial owner, hereinafter either the 'Grantoi> or 'Party of the First Part', La ' " Insurance Corporation A Virginia co~oration hereinac~ ............ ers TI C. om. munifies Inc un~Jer ,~- ....... ~F~ .~-., ';L .~t~r me tarry trine ~econo I-'art' no~; ......... wy,~ fie A~"~r~:~;:~a I~:~erat-t~e~lari~,g Agreement dated January 27, 1983: as a~n;~n~cle~ arna~ rmee~ated' and hereinafter the 'Grantees', wh0s~Vcurrent address-is · W4'I T N E S S.E F H: That the Grantor, in consideration ofTen DoliiUZs $10 00 and by,.the Grantees, the receipt of which is hereb- -aFcn~· -' 9)._. pther good and valuable consideration to it in hand s_eu and convey unto the afores~;a ~ ....... y '.4_, .a.~ lc, age. o, nas oargained sold, and bv these n ............. pa,,?. r~a~--~, uu~ grant, Oargaln .... antrt::5, as tenants t>y.:the entireties with the rights ot6 survivorship as at common law, ' trom 4:00 o'clock p.m. on the first Saturday upor~.3athid}t.t~e Pt:eceeding.time-share estate terminates until 4'00 o'clock m on the Saturday upon which the succeeding firile-sl{al;e'~tat~ ~'$mmenc~s the foIlowin d ' ' ' P' ' ce~kt~/Lr::l :state time-share project known as Fairfi;ld.~rillfhms~-tre~ -. }-~. . _g .es~cabed ~,e-share estate at that "train ....... u g at r, angsgate, ~or~c t~ounty, v,rginia, to wit: fime-shaze estate week number._ $1 in time-share estate unit number in time-share estate building number 15 in Fairfield Wi/liamsburg at Kingsgat~Time.Share Project - Phase Four as such time-share estate is defined ih--the 'Project and Time-Share Instrumer,l for Fairfield Williamsburg at Kings ate dated March 21, t990, recorded March 27 1990 in t.be Cler ~ Book 578 at Pa e 169 a , . _ . k'.. Office of the Circuit Cou · g- · . .g , s may be amended- and as ~fl .... . rt of York Count , Vir lma in of Fmrfield Wflhamsbur~, at Kiw's,-ate T:.~Z ...... c.h .u.n_~.t ts depicted on lat entitled 'Plat showin P y . , Deed Plat o ~ e, ·----~-~ndre fro ec, uated . g hase I~ Section II . _ Bo. ok 11 at Page 614. The time-share estate s,~o~.." _ .M. ay 2.8, 1 ~2 and last re,asea April 28, 1993, record · esm. te_s. in consecutive and chrono~,,,,;-o~ ^--~- - "~,'Soy c°nveye9 is to oe succeeded forthwith by ........... 2 .... ed ana rime-Share Instrument in or'~6-'~'~.'~.'~,~-'-' .r.e?.~vm.g. a .mo. ng thee .other estate weeks desa-ibed i~n- ......... y, ome. r~sucn se ara de, ,-,,u,my, it oe~n me intent o . . . the aforesmd Prole,.t _ p .te. estate held separately and independentb, b- ~le r ....... t_~_~_s ,ns.w, umenotothat e,ac.h estate, shall be considered a to each in such Project and 'l~ime-Share Instru~?.._[J ..... ~_~,.,uy.~. own. ers ,m:ereor for ant outing the eriod of tame a un,til 4:00 o'clock p m on the firs* ~ ........ ~.~at, a~_~t~q~ e-snare .es~te oeing succeeded by the ,-~?*: ......... ssagne, d . ' ' ~ oatcsluay lO uae ear U.~ · . , , , ~, as*at iai UlI~iILIIII succession umess extended m the manner provided bv s 'd P?~' Z .~..a.s o~fw.hich da.? smd time-share estate shall terminag _ ~ aL --~.Iect and Tim~-Share Instrument as executed or as amended, te, ~TOGETH_ER with a vested remainder over on "-~ '-;~' -:~ :: ": -,. ''~:" ' ' - - , m~ nrs~ am~raay m-'~e, year 2030 at 4:00 o'clock p m Eastern Standard ~ime m lee simple absolute as .a teqant in corem? wi..~ all .9,*..fi. 9.r. Ume=ihare owners m the aforesaid time-share unit, as allowed and provided by Amcle XIV, of the af0resa2d P-~olc~:t ahd ~Tirr~:e-Sh~re Instrument. The time of such remainder over may be amended however, as, provided by ti'lc terms~o~such~ pr6 c~an&'T or as subsequently amended. -; . : ~ .... . ~ :._ ~ ': trne-Share Instrument as origin~'' ...... ~ - ' . ' ' 8 any =xecutea BEING as to Phase Four and the time-share unit a/~U'-=l~hi~'ding af~re~a~d)0f~hich it is a part, a portion of the same re conveyed unto Fairfield Communities Inc b Warra ~ dated March 21. 199 .......... '- -: y nt~D/~l'from W:H:;Burr ~ ..a ,,,:r ..... ~ al estate in Deed Book 5~/g ,t06;;~'~u lv~arcn 27, 1990 in the Clerk~ OiT'e-e df tb~ F:~:~.~:'-',:-'~ '7'%-~.na,r°n.. L. l~urruss, tJrantor, ......... &,. xua.. ...... - ....... --~mt ~ourt Ol¥orK L. ounty, Virginia, This conveyance is made subject to covenants, restrictio.ns,afid easements of record applicable to and legally binding upon the land hereby conveyed. The streets, yards, walkways, and all real estate wittt~-,ea:¢h-phasiL. less ~ll. time-share estates therein, as shown on Plat relattv to each phase, will, no later than the termination of/.h~., 5 ~ .' ~T, me-S. har~e Instrument and the Virginia Real F ..... Dev~.el2p. e_L Co.n?ol .Period, (as that term is defi-~a :~ ,~-~ n ...... e rroperty uwners Asso~;-*:~- · ~ .~ -7--- .~?~te ! maeoiaare/~ct/be-6W~,-a ^c ..... a t ~ -- . .,~.~,.~.,~ ut,~ rzvl~Ct aha ~,~u,J., mc., a virginia Nt)nstdcl~-'.C"t;,4.,,.~:~,~.iJ5 . ~ .,,-~ ,~-t~.uru uy lne rmrnela lq. ingsl~ate ~ '~-r ....... s.arlu wm not, at such time, belong to Grat~t~r. As to such streets, yards, walkways, etc., Granto} an p,,art~'~;f ~h-~ Secold P~, t ma whatsoever. ': x ~'-' ' - - -4 ~ " ke no warranties or representations This conveyance is subject to and by accentim, ~ti~i,'l~eed ,d~ ';k" _ ./,... :. . the following: ,- o . -'.. . ~,,~ ,-sramees at nere~y agree to assume and/or abide by 1. Taxes for the current .......... ",~ 5'"'"" ....... ' ' "" 2. o^..~:,: ...... .},~a~ anu sunsequent years; "% ",-g ';-.--~ c .,&~ ........... ,,~,a~, easements,, mid other matters of record in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of York County, Virginia; and . - 3. The Project and Tirne-Share Instrument as originally executed and, if ap licable, the Fairshare Vacation Plan Use Management Trust Agreement and Use Restriction as might be amendeT~i-om time to time. The Grantor covenants that it is seized of the time-share estate hereby conveyed and has the fight to convey the same unto the Grantees in fee simple; that it has done no act quiet possession of said ti ....... to ,'- ~ to encumber smd T~me-Share estate; th the me sh,~,. ~a._, tree xrom encumbrances- o-.~ ,*.-. :..,- .. ~ at Grantees shall have , ,,~,u mat tt, uae salt LJrantor, will execute such further assurance of the title as may be requisite. The Party of the Second Part does hereby transfer, convey, and .quitcl.am u.nto .the Laid grantees and their successors assigns forever, all of its fights, title and interest, equity and ~atate m and to the hme-srmre estate hereby conveyed, and Page 1 In executing this Deed and Affidavit, Robert E Bland , Attorney-in-Fact for said Party of the Se duly sworn, makes oath and says hereb~ at the time of executing this Deed and A tonal. Part, who being first ower of attorney given by Lawyers Title lnsuranc · . _~ook. 84.9, V.age 2~24 ,n the Clerk's Office ,~ r.::_e_ ~ oration,..A Virgmm co oration, record ttidavtt, pursuan, t to a .. or actual not~ce ot the rev c~*: ..... of ~.. ,.-a_umt ~--~urt for the Coun of . . ed .on June 14, 1995 m Deed o ,,~,, or termmanon o[ smd power of attorney,ty r~ork, Virginia, rece:ved actual knowledge The plural number as used herein shall equally include/he singular and vice versa The masculine or used herein shall equally include the neuter, feminine gender IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF Grantor has ca ' ' ' ' as .Deed, Grantor hereby authori-~-' ...... u. sedjts name to be signed by its du au ' - me purpose of conve,~iw, I~,-,~,~,~,~'.~-u .r, equ,ests t'a. rty o! the Second Part b,, its At,,,~dY., :- ~_o~z. ed omcers. In executin ~ ~ ~-, -u~ to me aoove described time-share esta~ ...... I-re-tact ~o execute this Deed fo~g this CORPORATE SEAL ATTEST: ,,.~ ,/ ., Assistant S~c:retar~ .... ~ -.... STATE OF ARKANSAS ) ) ss. COUNTY OF PULASKI ) SEAL FAIRFIELD COMMUNITIES, INC. Grantor~. Vice President LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPO~a~T.~O~minee. Attorney-in-Fact I, the undersigned Notary Public, in and fc~r Kimberly R Thompson Vice President the jurisd..:ction aforesaid; do hereby certify that Robert E Bland ~iagvn:de::hSaUcCkhdjw?e~l~7~omg Deed and Affidavia'g~eaAt~i~t~natteS~r~etet~l ?.r. esPdeaC~ti~ie, ly of Fairfield Communities, Inc, whose ~r~ g me same before me in my iudsdicfion afores~id.-~L Y ct------Jll~ , 19 '-'~-", es are Given under my hana ........ ~2th ,~tTc~ oW/; ~o,. . . . . ..'~.-' o o ~-- ,19 STATE OF ARKANSAS ) ~,UUN'I'y OF PUL ASKI ..... un.n-:.,- Subscribed and sworn to by Robert ~s/h.er statements made herein~-~?PSrt-E ?and, Attorney-in-Fact for La e - has acknowledged the same before me m ?,~,fiq~,o,n, aforesaid.9~,an M- · _ ..,., _ NJ". - --' Y ~-ommission Expires- Notary Public In the Cler ' ---._________ day of 19 · This deed was presented with the certificate annexed and admired to record, at ' o'clock ~ .M. The taxes imposed by Sect. 58.54 and 58.54.1 of/he Code of Va. have been paid. STATE TAX $ LOCAL TAX $ RETURN THIS DEED TO: Francis T. Eck, Attorney at Law 16 South Second Street Richmond, VA 23219 1-(804)-788_4457 SELLER'S TAX $ Teste: Nar,cy B. Kane, Clerk By: ~ Deputy Clerk .,3,. ~ ........ OMB NO. 2502-0265 ~ B.~ FHA 2 FmHA 3 r'~ ...... -....-._- .... U'S' DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT ~ ~E~CONV. iNS Jo. Mt.Jt'(I~A[jE ! CASE NUM . C. NOTE: This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are shown. ~ items marked '[POC]" were paid outside the closing; they are shown here for informa§onal pu~ ~oses and are not included in the totals 1.0 3/98 (STUART. PFD/STUART D. NAME AND ADDRESS OF BORROWER: E. NAME AND ADDRESS OF SELLER: r F. NAME AND ADDRESS OF LENDER: Darry J. Stuart G. PROPERTY LOCATION: 1364 Kuhn Road Boiling Springs, PA 17007 Arthur,. Bradshaw, Barbara K. Bradshaw H. SETTLEMENT AGENT: Washington Savings Bank 4201 Mitchellville Road, Suite 300 Bowie, MD 20716 23-2015480 Residential Commerc a Abstract, Inc. PLACE OF SE3-1'LEMENT 3631 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 I. SETTLEMENT DATE: October 5, 2001 101. Contract Sales Price 102. Personal Pm~ 103. Settlement ~s to Borrower 104. 105. 11,334.74 114.1: 1,487.36 201 ~wn Taxes to 107. Coun_..~Taxes 10/06/01 to 01101/02 I08. School Tax 10/06/01 to 07/01/02 109. Sewer 1___.0./06/01 to 01/01102 I10. ~11. 12. ~UE FROM BORROWER ~r earnest money 0~2. Principal Amount of New Loan(s) 03. ExJstin loan s taken sub'ect to 95. 36. 251,137.64 5,000.00 12,600.00 )8. )9. Ad'ustments or Items Un aid B eller ~ Taxes to ~ Taxes to 2. School Tax to 3. 8. 9. ~ BORROWER I. Gross Amount Due Fro~ -~. Less Amount Paid By/For Borrower (Line 220)~ 251,137.64 208,000. 401. Contract Sales Price 402. Personal Pro_~erty · 403. 404. 405. to 407. Count/Taxes 10/06/01 to 01/01/02 408. School Tax 10/06/01 to 07/01/02 409. Sewer 10/06/0~to 01/01/02 410. 411. 412. 420. GROSS AMOUNT DUE TO St:/I ~R 114.1 20~ 239,802.9O 500. 501. Excess Deposit (See Instructions) 502. Settlement Cha~es to Seller (Line 1400) 503. Mortgage to Mortgage Service Cente 506. d Mortgage to Pentax)on Federal Cred 508. 509. as proceeds) ~ts For Items Un aid B eller Taxes to 511. Count)/Taxes to 512. School Tax to 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. TOTAL REDUCTION AMOUNT DUE SELLER 19,351.81 114,696.39 601. Gross Amount Due To Seller~ 602. Less Reductions Due Seller (Line 520) 603. FROM) SELLER 157,635.64 HUD-1 (3-86) RESPA, HB4305.2 01/23/03 REISSUED STATEMENT D CORRECTEI:) (if checked) PAYER'S name, street address, city. state, and ZiP code 1 Gross distribution OMB No. 1545-0119 Defense Finance and Accountin9 Service Distributions From US MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY $ 43899. 12 Pensions, Annuities, PO BOX 7t30 2a Taxable amount Retirement or LONDON KY 40742-7130 Profit-Sharing Plans, $ 4389E). 12 2002 IRAs, Insurance PAYER'S Federal identification number RECIPIENT'S {dentif~cation number 2b Total [] Contracts, etc. distr;but~on 34-0727612 532-52-7420 4 Federal income tax withheld 7 Distribution code RECIPIENT'S name. address and ZIP code Copy 2 $ 282~. 73 7 File this copy 9 Your percentage of totat distribution with your state, % city, or local ARTHUR L BRADSHAW 10 State income tax 11 State/Payer's state income tax 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 withheld number return, when CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 $ required· $ RETIRED 010102- 123102 Form 109SI--R ~_oo~ ~ . Department of the Treasury-Internal Revenue Service Cut Here 01/23/03 REISSUED STATEMENT D CORRECTED (if checked) PAYER'S name, street address, city, state, and ZIP code 1 Gross distribution OMB No. 1545-01 Defense Finance and Accounting Service Distributions From US MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY $ 43899 12 · Pensions. Annuities, PO BOX 7130 2a Taxable amount Retirement or LONDON KY 40742-7130 $ 43899. 12 2002 Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance PAYER'S Federal identification number RECIPIENT'S identification number 2b Total Contracts, etc. distribution L--J 34-07276 12 532-52-7420 4 Federal income tax withheld 17 OJstributlon code RECIPIENT'S name. address and ZIP codeI Copy B $ 2822.73 7 R.po. this 9 Your percentage of lotal distribution income on your % Federal tax return. ARTHUR L BRADSHAW lo State income tax l] State/Payer's state If this form shows 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 withheld number Federal Income CAMP HILL $ tax withhe{d in PA //~'// /--Ork~'Z Box 4, attach this copy to your return. $ Th~s ~nf0rmatian is being furnished to the )nternal Revenue Service. RETIRED 010102- 123 102 Form Department of the Treasury-Internal Revenue Serv~c Cut Here 01/23/03 REISSUED STATEMENT E] CORRECTED (if checked) PAYER'S name. street address, city, state, and ZIP code i 1 Gross distribution OMB No. 1S Defense Finance and Accounting Service/ 43899. 12 Distributions From US MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY $ PO BOX 7130 Pensions, Annuities LONDON KY 40742-7130 2a Taxable amount Retirement or $ 43899. 12 2002 Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, insurance PAYER'S Federal identificatio, number RECIPIENT'S identification number 2b Total [] Contracts, etc. distribution 34-0727612 532-52-7420 4 Federal income tax wthhetd 7 Distribution code RECIPIENT'S name. address and ZiP code Copy C $ 2822 73 7 For Recipient's · Records 9 Your percentage of total distribution This information % is being furnished ARTHUR L BRADSHAW lo State raceme tax Il State/Payer's state to the Internal 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 withheld number CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 $ Rave.ua $ Keep this copy for your records. RETIRED 010102- 123102 Form 1099-R Department of /he Treasury-Internal Revenue Service NCOAAUTO CALL 1-800-321-1080 IF YOU HAVE A 0 ~o~ © P.R.O.B.E. BARBAP~A K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 Hourly Rate 1 (72@$9.501 Federal Withholding Social Security Employee Medicare Employee PA - Withholding LOCAL TAX 2 12/27/2002 684.00 -76.00 -42.40 -9.92 -19.15 -2.00 103E 5,239.25 -587.00 -324.83 -75.97 -146.70 -16.00 P.R.O.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAW ~447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 C[rM!~Rr SUITE 201/202 LEBANON. PA 17042 12/08/2002 - 12/21/2002 Hourly Rate I (40.00~,$9.50) Federal Withholdine Social Securily Eml~ioyee Medicare Employee PA- Withholding PA - Unemployment Employee LOCAL TAX 2 OPT-Stee!to,~ 534.53 1/10/2003 380.00 -30.00 -23.56 -5.51 -10.64 -0.08 -2.00 -!0.00 103~ YTD 380.00 -30.00 -23.56 -5.51 -10.64 -0.08 -2.00 -!0.00 P.R.O.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA ] 7042 2/22/2002 - 01/04/2003 Pay Period Hourly Rate 1 (80.00659.50) Eederal Withholding Social Security Emplo.vee Medicare Employee PA - Withholding PA- Unemployment Employee LOCAL TAX 2 OPT-Steelton 298.21 1/24/2003 760.00 -87.00 -47.12 -11.02 ~21.28 -0.15 -2.00 0.00 104 YTD 1,140.00 -117.00 -70.68 -16.53 -31.92 -0.23 -4.00 -10.00 1 01/05/2003 - 01 / l 8/2003 Pay Period 591.43 P.R.O.B.£. BARBARA K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, ?A 17042 Hourly Rate 1 (80@$9.50) Federal Withholding Social Security Employee Medicare Employee PA - Withholding LOCAL TAX 2 11/15/2002 760.00 -87.00 -47.12 -11.02 -21.28 -2.00 92' YTD 3,111.25 -348.00 -192.90 -45.11 -87.12 -I0.00 10/27/2002 - 11/09/2002 591.58 P.R.O.B.E. BARBABA K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 Hourly Rate 1 (80@$9.50) Federal Withholding Social Security Employee Medicare Employee PA - Withholding LOCAL TAX 2 11/29/2002 760.00 -87.00 -47.12 -11.02 -21.28 -2.00 1033 3,871.25 -435.00 -240.02 -56.13 -108.40 -12.00 11/10/2002 - 11/23/2002 591.58 P.R.O.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 Hourly Rate 1 (72@$9.50) Federal Withholding Social Security Employee Medicare Employee PA - Withholding LOCAL TAX 2 12/13/2002 684.00 -76.00 -42.41 -9.92 -19.15 -2.00 1034~ 4,555.25 -511.00 -282.43 -66.05 -127.55 -14.00 11/24/2002 - 12/07/2002 534.52 P.R.O.B.£. BARBARA. K BP~DSHAW 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 Hourly Rate 1 (80@$9.50) Federal Withholding Social Security Employee Medicare Employee PA - Withholding LOCAL TAX 2 10/4/2002 760.00 -87.00 -47.12 -11.02 -21.28 -2.00 92: YTD 831.25 -87.00 -51.54 -12.05 -23.28 -4.00 P.R.O.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 09/15/2002 - 09/28/2002 Hourly Rate i (80@$9.50) Federal Withholding Social Security Employee Medicare Employee PA - Withholding LOCAL TAX 2 591.58 10/18/2002 760.00 -87.00 -47.12 -11.02 -21.28 -2.00 YTD 1,591 25 -174 00 -98 66 -23 07 -44 56 -6 00 09/29/2002 - 10/12/2002 591.58 P.R.O.B.E. BARBARA K BRADSHAW 1447 HILLCREST COURT APT 303 CAMP HILL, PA 17011 532-54-8206 PROBE 834 CUMBERLAND STREET SUITE 201/202 LEBANON, PA 17042 Hourly Rate 1 (80@$9.50) Federal Withholding Social Security Employee Medicare Employee PA - Withholding LOCAL TAX 2 10/3i/2002 760.00 -87.00 -47.12 -11.02 -21.28 -2.00 926 YTD 2,351.25 -261.00 -145.78 -34.09 -65.84 -8.00 10/13/2002 - 10/26/2002 591.58 o o 0 0 o 0 oo~~ 0 .~ :: ~ i Year-End Statement Page 1of 2 .... - : -:':' january i - December 31, 2002 2560 VA 23501-2560 CB&T CUST FOR BARBARA K BRADSHAW/SEP 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 Your finax~ci'al adviser HERSHEY MML INVESTORS SERVICES, INC. C/O W SHORE OFFICE CTR 214 SENATE AVE STE 308 CAMP HILL PA 170~1-23~6 Best wishes for the New Year This statement shows all account activity for 2002, so please keep it for your tax records. ~e! our website help make this rex season a little easier. ~o to the Ta~t Center at americanfunds.com for your tax-rela~ed needs: seven years ut account history, duplicate statements and tax forms, average cost information, our interactive Tax Guide, and more. Summary For more account information I Call your financial adviser I Automated information and services Websi[e - americanfunds.com American FundsLine" - 800/325-3590 I Persmml assistance - 8 a.m. - 8 p.m. Eastern time M-F Shareholder S~rvices -- 800/42]-0~80 Fund Account Type of Shares t~eld Share price Account value .......... number uumbof fund as of t2,/31 as of 1~31 as of 1~2t CB&T CUST FOR B~2~ I~ BP~S~VSEP The New Economy Fund-A 14 59870184 gro~h 38.531 $13.54 $521.71 The Income Fund of Amer~ca-A 05 59870184 equity-.income 32.503 $14.35 $466.42 Total Your investment portfolio I Growth 52.80% ~:.: ~, Eqmty-incorne 47.20% $988.13 About the pie ,.'hart at/~j~ k'~cl~ shoe o/the pie chart represents a type o/fund. A slice stands for m~e fund or more, depending o/7 your parricularAmericun Funds holdings. The ]ege~d m the right of the p~e shows' the percentage of esch sfice; in o~her words, how much you own of each type of fund. Year-to-date dividends and capital gains Fund Ac c oum Short-term Long-term numbe~ number D;vidends capira~ gains capital gains CB&T COST FOR BARBAIL& K BRADSHAW/SEP The New Economy Fund-A 14 59870184 $0.00 $0.00 $0.OO The Income Fund of America-A 06 59870184 $24.87 $0.00 $0.69 Total $24.87 $0.00 $0.69 · -' ' ' ~ : January 1 - December 31, 2002 American Funds )s required to provide the value of your IRA to Zhe tntemal Revenue Service. Transactions liar CB&T CUST FOR BARBARA K BIL&J)SHAW/SEP The New Economy Fund- ClassA Fund number 14 Account number ~9870~84 Dividends and capital gains reinvested Simms rh~x Trade date 5escnpbot~ Dollar amoont Share price transaction Share balance No a ctivity thzs period 12131/02 Ending sha~e balance 38,531 The Income Fund of America - Class A Fund number 06 Account number 59870!84 Dividends and cap~taJ gains reinvested Sbares this Trade date rJe~cnpt~on Dollar amount ~:bare price transaction Share balance 01/01/02 !3eginning share balance 31.491 03/15102 !ncome Dividend 0,20 $6.30 $!6.16 0.390 3! .88! 06t14102 income Dividend 0.20 $6.38 $15.49 0.412 32,293 09113102 income Dividend 0.20 $6.46 $14.23 0.454 32,747 12/13102 ~ncorne Dividend 0.175 $5.73 $14.20 0.404 33.151 12113/02 Capital Gain 0.021 $0.69 $i4.20 0.049 33.200 12120102 2003 Annual Fee -$10.00 $14.35 -0.697 32.503 12131102 Ending share balance 32.503 Beginning with ihe December payment, tim fund's quarterly dividend decreased 2.5 cents to 17.5 cents per share in response to continued declines in interest rates. To add to your investment Make check payable to CB&Tot Capita/Bank and Trust Company. Please write your account number on your check. Do not send cash. Capital Bank and Tcust PO Box 2560 NoefOlk VA 23501-2560 Company J,,J,l,,JJ,,J,J,JJ.,,,,JJ,,J,J,l,J,,JJ,,JJ,,,Jl,,,Jj,,,,ij,,j CB&T CUST FOR BARBARA K BRADSHAW/SEP If invesUng m a new fund, please obtain a prospectus from your financial adviser or our websire. Fund Accounc Investment Tax year hind number number amount lIRA only) !-!!~..r~t'z_~':~.~.~!'.r!¥..~!!'.'.~ 3 ............................ I3 ................ ~p.?..o.!.8:~:_, $ ..................................................... .T!]~..t.,.~.o.~.t ~u..o ~.~t..A.m~.,!~,:.A. ............................ 0.6 ................ ~.~.7..0.!~.4.... $ .................................................... Check total $ ODO0000U tvu,§s z~ccounr ~[a[ement C Bank PNCBAN( For the period 10/01/2002 to 12/31/2002 BARBARA K BRADSHAW lqq7 HILLCREST CT APT 50S CAMP HILL PA 17011-8D22 Primary account nm'nber: 50-0365-8417 Page 1 of 1 Number of enclosures: 0 For 24-hour customer service or current rates: Call 1-888-PNC-BANK Mouing? Please contact tis at 1-888-PNC-BANK 17~ Write to: Customer Se~¥ice PO Box 609 Pittsburgh PA 15230-9738 Vm~t tis at www.pncbank.com TDD terminah 1-800-531-1648 For hc:~rmg impaked clients only C Bt. ink wouh:[ like to extend to you :_tnd yom' f'amily our best wishes for ~t wonderful holiday season. Thank you for your iness, ;tnt[ for mrtking 2002 it success! Here's to a happy, heahh)' and prospercm., new )'ear together. LYings Account Summary ~unt number: 50-0365-8417 Account Link ® number: 0532548206 lance S.mmary Begirmin9 Deposits and Checks and other Ending balance other additions deductions balance 'l 3,05 S.so 13.28 .00 l 3,071_84 erest Summary Annual Percentage Number of days Average collected In!erest Earned Yield Earned (APYE) in Interest period balance lor APYE this period 0.40Z 92 13,003.54 13.~$ posits and Other Additions Amount Description 3i -1.99 Intm'est Pz~yment 30 q-q] !ntcvc~t Payment 31 %3¥ interest Payment Barbara K Bradshaw As of 12/31, a total of $57.15 in interest was earned this year. There were 3 Deposits and Other Additions totaling $1 3.28. ily Balance Detail Balanca Date O1 1S,058.56 10/'S1 ll/30 E~alance 1 ~,00 /.96 Date Balance 12/31 13,071.84 FORM953R Basic Checking Accotmt Statement PNCB] PNC Bank For the period 12/07/2002 to 01/0812003 BARBARA K BRADSHAW 1~7 HILLCREST CT APT 303 CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 Basic Checking Account Summary Account number: 50-0363-6058 Account Link ® number: 0532548206 Balance Summary Beginning Deposits and balance other additions 5,062.21 1,219.05 Checks and other deductions 568.00 Average monthly balance 5,413.16 Transaction Summary Checks paid/ Bank card/POS Account information withdrawals transactions assistance calls 3 0 0 Total ATM PHC Bank MAC Other MAC ATM transactions ATM transactions transactions 0 0 0 Ending 5,713_26 Charges and fees .00 Tetler transactions O Othe: ATM transactions 0 Primaw account number: 50-0363-6058 Page I of 1 Number of enclosures: 0 '~ For 24~hour customer service or current rates: Call 1-888-PNC-BANK Moving? Please contact us at 1-888-PNC-BAN[ Write to: Customer Service PO Box 609 Pittsburgh PA 15230-9738 Visit us at www.pncbank, com TDD terminal: 1-800-531-1648 For hearing impaired clients only Barbara K Bradshaw Please see the Activity Detail section for additional information. Activity Detail Deposits and Other Additions Date Amount Description 12/19 684.52 Deposit Reference No. 0~/016,93 01/08 534.53 Deposit Reference No. 024903039 There were 2 Deposits and Other Additio~ totaling 01.21 9.05. Checks Check Date Reference number Amount paid number 106 60.00 12/09 o2~6o82,s.~ 107 60.00 12//23 02557%t21 Gap in check sequence Check r~umber ].09 * Date Reference Amount paid number 448.00 01/08 o~=to788~ There were 3 checks listed totaling Ss~.oe. Daily Balance Detail Date Balance Date 12/07 5,062_21 12/19 12/'09 5,002.21 12/23 Balance 5,686.73 5,626.73 Date Balance 01/08 5,713.26 UNDER WR IT-'I"EN BY Union Fidelity Life insurance Company (Herein ca!led the Company) Chicago. Hlinois Administrative Office: 4850 Street Road ~revose, Pennsylvania 19049 SCHEDULE A1-FACHED TO: M805248 EFFECTIVE DATE: 0~/!3/97 INSURED: Mr. Ar(hut L Bradsha~ Jr ~36~ Kuhn Rd Boiling Sprin, PA 17007 PREMIUM: iNCLUDED iN MONTHLY PREMIUM FACE AMOUNT' $70,000 'FAMILY COVERAGE: SPOUSE BENEFIT AT 50% OF INSURED'S FACE AMOUNT; CHILD BENEFIT AT 10% OF INSURED'S FACE AMOUNT. AT TiME OF ACCIDENT: iF THERE tS NO SPOUSE INSURED, THE CHILD BENEFIT AMOUNT IS iNCREASED 25% TO A MAXIMUM $5,000 BENEFIT; IF THERE ARE NO CHILDREN !NSURED, THE SPOUSE BENEFIT AMOUNT iS INCREASED 20%. iF NO SPOUSE OR CHILDREN REMAIN INSURED, THE MAIN INSURED MUST NOTIFY THE COMPANY !MMEDIATELY. ALL BENEFITS REDUCE BY 50% ON THE INSURED'S 80THBiRTHDAY. PFen;iom for .... ' ,,,(.n~:;:, Of co','erz~e i* p:-~id h,, The GF4 Card, the group spnnso~ S6396 - - 766969q - O! - - 02 - 8OllO - - BS~ - SEAT BELT BENEFIT RIDER If the above prem um '.s paid cc.. or before !he Efiective Dale o! fhis Rider. if. will be in force. The renewal premium forth~s Rider is lo be pa~d ~n the ~ar'~ way ,~ -' - .~ a ,, al the same~¢rne asthe premium for your Cedificate. The Insured and each family member covered under the Cerlifica~e w~ll stsc be covered by ~his Rider unless excluded by endorsemen~ SEAl- BELT BENEF!T For Acc denial D;:aih a~; the 't,,;,, it el A(,,.- '.!er~l.:~! Bodll'> inli¢! y, d,,:(: t(; ;: L::n(} i'vtotor Vehjci(: A(:.qid(:P,l while Accidental Death 211oz~rls ~,( ~,r, Wrl!Ch ~¢)SU!I% (]ir(~{.liy ffOlll ;i~ Ac:c~denta~ Bodily h'~jury and independently of all other causes and may not b(:. caused by or contributed to by smkr~ess or disease Dealh must occur wilhin 120 days h-om lhe date of ,t~f~ ~ ,~;.~ ..... ~.,.~ ,, ~ccidentai Bodily Injury means only h,~r¢;m ~njdry suslained as a re~;.~ of an accideni which occurs while coverage is ~n force afl ~o !he Covered Person The in)u~y must result direcUy ¢rom thai accidenl and independently et all olher causes Land Motor Vehicle Accident menns u(:a,n h(}rl~ ~r; A(:cid(~nia~ Bodily Injury to a Covered Person )l(J )1 ' r)l r ' ¢~, ~,-,- , . . ' Form 1-521:~R ......... Page 1 f 52 ) 3NEW CERT~FICATE SCHEDULE POLICYHOLDER: FAMILY FINANCIAL GROUP INSURANCE TRUST GROUP POLICY NUMBER: A91230 CERTIFICATE NUMBER: M805248 EFFECTIVE DATE: 01/13/97 INSURED: Mr. Arthur L Bradshaw Jr 136~ Kuhn Rd Bo_~ing Sprin PA M~ONTHLY PREMIUM: ¢!0.21 INSURED FAMILY MEMBERS Spouse Name: ~rbar~ Covered Children: YES BENEFIT AMOUNT FOR ACCIDENTAL DEATH BY: COMMON CARRIER MOTOR VEHiCLE/PEDESTRiAN ALL OTHER ACCIDENTS ~nsured's Coverage' $350.0O0 $ 30.000 $ 30.000 Famiiy coverage' S po~'se' Each Child $175,000 $ 35.000 $ 15.000 $ 3.000 $ !5.000 $ 3,000 BENEFIT AMOUNT FOR ACCIDENTAL DISMEMBERMENT: For toss of any two or more members: ~,A_, ,.o of the Accidenial Death Benefit For loss o! any one member: 50% of the Accideniat Death Benefit Premiun'~ for the first tvv',~: r~,:.)r:'i!'~s of covera~ie is pa~d by The GM C'~..'d. the group sponsor ' BENEFITS WiLL BE REDUCED B'r 5~:' ()N -i~E itffSURED S ~¢)TH ~',iR'I'HDAY UNDER F&M L.¢ COVERAGE A~ .... fL.~ O~-~ ACCIDENT '~F THERE iq~ NO SP~,uS~' '- .... iNSURED THE DEATH/DiSMEMBERMENT COVERAGE AMOUNT EXCEPT FOR COMMON CARRIER ACCIDENTS. FOR EACH CHILD !S INCREASED 25qb TO A MAXIMUM OF $5.OUO FOR MOTOR VEHICLE AND ALL OTHER ACCIDENTS. IF THERE ARE NO CHILDREN INSURED. THE SPOUSE'S DEATH/DiSMEMBERMENT COVERAGE AMOUNT. EXCEPT FOR COMMON CARRiER.ACCIDENTS iS iNCREASED 20<~'o . , , NSU,,~D MUST NOTIFY THE COMPANY iF NO SPOUSE OR CHILDREN REMAIN ~NSURED THE MAiN i ' ,r~¢~ IMMEDIATELY PHONE (717) 612-3200 OR 888-508-2525 FAX (717) 612-3250 DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY CAPITAL REGION CAMPUS 1007MUMMA ROAD · WORMt. E:YSBUR% PA ° 17043 February 6, 2002 To Whom It May Concern: The Duquesne University Master of Arts in Corporate Communication degree consists of 36 credits. The cost presently per credit is $395.00. That means that at today's tuition prices it would cost $14, 220 to finish the degree; however, there will probably be a 5% increase in tuition beginning in the fall of 2002, which will then bring 'the cost of the degree to $14, 931 approximately. In addition there is a cost for textbooks, which runs about $50.00 per course or $600.00. The only other fees are the cost to take the Graduate Record Exam at about $100.00. If I can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact me at (717) 612-3201. Sincerely, Evelyn J. McClay Coordinator of the; Capital Region Education for the Mind, the Heart, and the Soul The Eastern College Fast-Track MBA--Management Program Application Fee (non-refundable) Tuition Deposit (non-refundable) (Tuition per credit = $595; includes the cost of a computer) 35.00 500.00 Program Costs Term Orte Prindples of Continuous Education (MNGT 500) Foundations - Word, Power Point Management Communication (MNGT 550) Introduction to New Venture Project Issues in Management (MNGT 510) Foundations - Statistics Research Design (MNGT 520) Foundations - Economics Executive Seminar (MNGT 630) Total Tuition for Term One Total Books for Term One Total Fees for Term One Less Tuition Deposit Already Paid TOTAL COSTS FOR TERM ONE Term Two Strategic Thinking (MNGT 541 ) Foundations - Excel Foundations ~ Accounting Financial Thinking I (MNGT 531) Business Ethics (MNGT 560) Executive Seminar (MNGT 630) Total Tuition for Term Two Total Books for Term Two Total Fees for Term Two TOTAL COSTS FOR TERM TWO Term Three Strategic Thinking 11 (MNGT 542) Quantitative Decision Making (MNGT 650) Leadership (MNGT 600) Executive Seminar (MNGT 630) Total Tuition for Term Three Total Books for Term Three Total Fees for Term Three TOTAL COSTS FOR TERM THREE ]'erm Four Foundations- Finance Financial Thinking il (MNGT 532) Business Policy Capstone (MNGT 680) New Venture Project (MNGT 690) Executive Seminar (MNGT 630) Credits J~ooks Tuition Fees I $ 65.00 $ 595.00 0 $ 60.00 $ - 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 0 $ 130.00 $ - 2 $ 95.00 $ 1,190.00 0 $ 30.00 $ 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 0 $ 30.00 $ 0.5 $ 30.00 $ 297.50 9.5 3 $ 130.00 0 $ 30.00 0 $ 130.00 3 3 $ 130.00 0.5 $ 30.00 9.5 3 $ 130.00 3 $ 130.00 3 $ 130.00 0.5 $ 3O.OO 9.5 $ 1,785.00 $ $ $ 1,785.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 297.50 $ 1,785.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 1,785.00 $ 297.50 0 $ 130.00 $ - 4 $ $ 2,380.00 3 $ 130.00 $ 1,785.00 3 $ $ 1,785.00 0.5 $ 30.00 $ 297.50 - 30.00 - 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 $ 30.00 $ 30.00 $ 30.00 $ 30.00 $ $ 61.25 $ 61.25 $ 61.25 $ 61.25 5,652.50 700.00 120.00 (500.00) 5,972.50 5,652.5O 450.00 120.00 6,222.50 5,652.50 420.00 120.00 6,192.50 Total Tuition for Term Four 10.5 $ 6,247.50 Total Books for Term Four $ 290.00 Total Fees for Term Four $ 245.00 TOTAL COSTS FOR TERM FOUR $ 6,782.50 Grand Total Tuition 39 $ 23,205.00 Grand Total Books $ 1,860.00 Grand Total Fees $ 605.00 IGrand Total Costs for Entire Program $ 25,670.00 Effective for groups starting 7/1/2001 - 6/30t2002 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff vs. BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAiqD COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01 - 4611 CIVIL IN DIVORCE conclude transmit parties so that a final decree R T day of_~. , 2003, the parties and counsel having entered~into an agreement and stipulation resolving the economic issues on June 3, 2003, the date set for a four-.party conference, the agreement and stipulation having been transcribed, and subsequently signed by the parties and counsel, the appointment of the Master is vacated and counsel can the proceedings by the filing of a praecipe to the record with the affidavits of consent of the in divorce can be entered. BY THE COURT, cc: /.obert J. Mulderig Attorney for Plaintiff .~isa M. Greason Attorney for Defendant Geor~ This IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01 4611 CIVIL ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., : Plaintiff : Vs. : BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, : Defendant : IN DIVORCE THE MASTER: Today is Tuesday, June 3, 2003. is the date set for a conference with counsel and the parties. After negotiations, the Master has been advised that the parties have reached an agreement with respect to all of the outstanding economic issues. Present in the hearing room are the Plaintiff, Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., and his counsel Robert J. Mulderig, and the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, and her counsel Lisa M. Greason. A complaint in divorce was filed on August 2, 2001, raising grounds for divorce of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. A counterclaim was filed on December 16, 2002, on behalf of the Defendant, raising economic issues of equitable distribution, alimony, alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees and expenses. with respect to the grounds for divorce, the Master has received from the parties signed affidavits of consent and waivers of notice of intention to request entry of divorce decree so that the divorce can concluded under Section 3301(c) of the Domestic Relations Code. The affidavits and waivers will be filed by the Master's office with the Prothonotary. economic claims, with respect to the settlement of the counsel are going to place on the record an agreement in the presence of the parties at this time. The agreement as stated on the record will be considered the substantive agreement of the parties not subject to any changes or modifications except for correction of typographical errors made during the transcription. After the agreement has been transcribed, counsel and the parties have indicated they are going to return later today to review the draft for typographical errors, make any corrections as necessary, and then affix their signatures affirming the terms of settlement as set forth in the agreement. When the agreement has been completed, the Master will be provided two signed copies and the Master will then prepare an order vacating his appointment. Upon the Master's appointment being vacated counsel can file a praecipe transmitting the record to the Court requesting a final decree in divorce. Mr. Mulderig. MR. MULDERIG: 1. Husband is entitled to a military pension due to his service in the United States Army. The parties agree that they will split this pension in half to each party. The split will be accomplished through a QDRO giving 50% to each party of the disposable military income. Husband also recognizes that he will carry the survivor benefit plan at the current level on the pension. He will continue the SBP at the maximum level and this SBP will be deducted from the gross pension prior to the 50/50 split. Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the QDRO and present it to Defendant's counsel for review within seven (7) days of today's date. Until the QDRO goes into effect, the pension shall continue to be paid into the wife's M&T checking account. She shall pay to the husband the difference between the pension payment to the account and the $1,854.80 which is her share. 2. The following accounts and assets of husband: shall be the property KEYCORP dividend reinvestment account; Pentagon Federal Credit Union account; PNC checking account, Acct. No. 50-8021-0931; L-3 Communications Master savings account; The Old Line Life Insurance Company insurance policy; Army Mutual Aid Association insurance; 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT; Merrill Lynch account, 86Q-62059; The following accounts and assets shall be the property wife: Merrill Lynch account, 86Q-61966; American Funds account; PNC checking account, Acct. No. 50-0363-6058; PNC savings account; Liberty National Life Insurance Company policy; Time-share in Williamsburg, Virginia; RCI credits; 2001 PT Cruiser; M&T checking account. 4. There is an M&T savings account which shall be divided as follows: $14,353.26 thereof shall be the property of the husband; $42,210.78 shall be the property of the wife. 5. The husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $1,200.00 a month in alimony. Said alimony shall continue until one of the following events: The death of either party, the remarriage of the wife or the cohabitation of the wife with a member of the opposite sex. The alimony can be modified in accordance with the provisions in the divorce code relating to changed circumstances of a continuous and substantial nature. 6. The military pension shall be considered a division of the marital property and not as part of the alimony. 7. Any title transfers that need to be accomplished to effectuate the terms of this agreement shall be done within ten (10) days. 8. Ail of the tangible personal property currently in the possession of the party shall be the property of that party. 9. The Defendant waives any claim to attorney fees, costs, and expenses. 10. Husband shall be responsible for paying the children's student loans. 11. Except as herein otherwise provided, each party may dispose of his or her property in any way and each party hereby waives and relinquishes any and all rights he or she may now have or hereafter acquire under the present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property or the estate of the other as a result of the marital relationship including without limitation, statutory allowance, widow's allowance, right of intestacy, right to take against the will of the other, and right to act as administrator or executor in the other's estate. Each will at the request of the other execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all instruments which may be necessary or advisable to .carry into effect this mutual waiver and relinquishment of all such interest, rights, and claims. MR. MULDERIG: Colonel, you have heard the agreement that has been dictated today? Do you understand this agreement? MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: Do you have any questions relating to this agreement? MR. BP, ADSHAW: No. MR. MULDERIG: Are you agreeing to this knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily? MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: And this agreement encompasses all that you wish to have to resolve this marriage? MR. BPJkDSHALW: Yes. the reading of THE MASTER: Ms. Greason. MS. GREASON: Mrs. Bradshaw, the asset division? you have heard MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. MS. GREASON: And are you in agreement with the division as stated? MS. BRADSHAW: MS. GREASON: Yes. And you make this decision knowingly and -- off the record. (A discussion was held off the record.) MR. MULDERIG: agreement as it was dictated? MRS. BRADSHAW: MR. MULDERIG: Mrs. Bradshaw, you heard the Yes. Are you in agreement with that agreement? agreement? MRS. BR3%DSHAW: MR. MULDERIG: MRS. BP~ADSHAW: MR. MULDERIG: relating to that agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: MR. MULDERIG: knowingly, I am. Did you understand the Yes. Do you have any questions No. Are you making this agreement intelligently, and voluntarily? MRS. BP~kDSHAW: Yes. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement, that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to the methods and procedures of enforcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: Attorney fo~/Defendant Arthur L Bradshaw J Barbara K~y B~adshaw ~ ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1. A Complaint in Divorce under §3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed or August 2, 2001. 2. The marriage of Plaintiff and Defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety (90) days have elapsed from the date of the filing of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of the final Decree in Divorce after service of Notice of Intention to request entry of the decree. I VERIFY THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE FOREGOING AFFIDAVIT ARE TRUE AND CORRECT. I UNDERSTAND THAT FALSE STATEMENTS HEREIN ARE MADE SUBJECT TO THE PENALTIES OF 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 RELATING TO UNSWORN FALSIFICATION TO AUTHORITIES. Date ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE WAIVER OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER § 3301(c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. I consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce without notice. 2. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division o 3roperty, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divome is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divomed until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. I VERIFY THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE FOREGOING AFFIDAVIT TRUE AND CORRECT. I UNDERSTAND THAT FALSE STATEMENTS HEREIN ARE MADE SUBJECT TO THE PENALTIES OF 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 RELATING TO UNSWORN FALSIFICATION TO AUTHORITIES. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF CONSEN? 1. A complaint in divorce under § 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed on Augu,' 2, 2001. 2. The marriage of plaintiff and defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety day~ have elapsed from the date of the filing of the Complaint. 3. I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce. 4. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of propertl lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand the false statements are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 490 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. RBARA k. BRA'DSHAW ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff BRADSHAW Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER 3301(C) OF THE DIVORCE CODE I consent to the entry of a final decree of divorce without notice. !. I understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. I understand that I will not be divorced until a divorce decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. I understand false ,nts herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 relating to msworn falsification to authorities. BARBARA K. BRADSHAW ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff V= BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE TO TRANSMIT RECORD TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Transmit the record, together with the following information to the court for entry of a Divorce Decree: 1. Ground for divorce: irretrievable breakdown under §3301(c) of the Divorce Code. = 2001. Date and manner of service of the complaint: Certified mail on August 3, 3. Date of execution of the Affidavit of Consent required by §3301(c) of the Divorce Code. By Plaintiff: June 3, 2003 4. Related claims pending: None. 5. Date the Waiver of Notice in Prothonotary: By Plaintiff: June 3, 2003 By Defendant: June 3, 2003 §3301(c) divorce was filed with the By Defendant: June 3, 2003 Robert I~..ul'deri~l, Esqui~ Attorne~for Plaintiff Arthur L. Bradshaw Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OFCUMBERLANDCOUNTY STATE OF ~,, PENNA. VERSUS Barbara Kay Bradshaw Defendant N O. 01-04611 AND DECREED THAT DECREE IN DIVORC ~4:24 _ · -- ' , IT IS ORDERED AND Arthur L. Bradshaw _, PLAINTIFF, AND Barbara Kay Bradshaw __,DEFENDANT, ARE DIVORCED FROM THE BONDS OF MATRIMONY. THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OF THE FOLLOWING CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED OF RECORD IN THIS ACTION FOR WHICH A FINAL ORDER HAS NOT YET BEEN ENTERED; PROTHONOTARY ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE Petition For Special Relief AND NOW comes the Plaintiff Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., by and through his counsel Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire and petitions the court to issue a rule to show cause why the attached QDRO should not be signed and states: 1. On June 3, 2003 the Plaintiff and Defendant and their respective counsel met for a settlement conference at the Divorce Masters office. As a result of that conference the parties entered into a settlement agreement which was signed the same day. The copy of said agreement is attached hereto and incorporated herein as exhibit one. 2. The settlement agreement states on page two the following: "the split will be accomplished through QDRO giving 50% to each party of the disposable military income." 3. On page three of said agreement it states "Plaintiffs counsel will prepare the QDRO and present it to the Defendants counsel for review within seven days of today's date." 4. Plaintiffs counsel prepared the attached QDRO and sent it to Lisa Greason, Esquire. 5. On June 9, 2003 Ms. Greason objected to first two paragraphs on page two of the QDRO. A copy of her letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein as exhibit two. 6. On June 12, 2003 Plaintiffs council responded to Ms. Greason's Letter. A copy of the response is attached hereto and incorporated herein as exhibit three. On June 19, 2003 Judge Hoffer of this Honorable Court signed a degree in divorce, divorcing the parties. 8. The parties' counsel have not been able to reach an agreement concerning the wording of the QDRO. 9. The Former Spouse Protection Act 10USCS § 1408(a)(4) that the term disposable retired pay means the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled. Less amount which..."(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeiture of retired pay ordered by a Court Martial or as a result of the waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38 ..." A copy of the Act is attached thereto and incorporated herein as exhibit four. 10. The agreement in this case states that the Defendant is entitled to 50% of the disposable military income. This is what is defined in the Former Spouse Protection Act. 11. This Honorable Court, Judge Bayiey presiding found in the case of Adams v. Adams which was subsequently appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania at 1999PA Supra36; 725a 2nd 824 that if the parties agree to a more restrictive reading of definition of eligible military retirement pay than the one recognized by the federal government the court will uphold such agreement. However in absence of such agreement Plaintiff feels that the definition in the Former Spouse Protection Act is binding on this Court. 12. A retiree account statement with a effective date of April 8, 2003 attached hereto and incorporated herein as exhibit five shows a gross pay of $4,079.00 a VA waiver of $104.00 and SBP cost of $265.41 leaving a taxable income of $3,709.59. 13. 50% of $3,709.59 is $1,854.80. 14. On the third page of the agreement signed by the parties it states until the QDRO goes into effect, the pension shall be continued to be paid to the wife's M&T checking account. She shall pay to the husband the difference between the pension payment to the account and the $1,854.80 which is her share." 15. It is clear based on the agreement signed by the parties on June 3, 2003 that the language in the QDRO clear reflects that agreement and the language proposed by Ms. 'Greason does not. VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Petition For Specia Relief are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Arthur L. Bradshaw Act of September 8, 1982 (Public Law 97-252). · The sharing of Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay shall commence upon July 1,2003 and shall continue until the death of either party. Pending the implementation of this Order by the Army Finance Service, the Retiree shall pay the Former Spouse's entitlement directly to the Former Spouse. Retiree shall elect the maximum Survivor's Benefit Plan annuity. Under the terms of the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act, the United States Army, as the paying authority is required to directly pay Former Spouse her monthly percentage share of Retiree's monthly disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because of the following. In the course of the parties' marriage,, Retiree performed at least ten years of service credible in determining his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay. The parties were married on August 29, 1970 and were divomed on . Retiree began service credible and determined his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay with the United States Army in June 1971, has performed active duty until his retirement from active duty on July 1, 1995. Neither Retiree nor Former Spouse will do or cause to be done any act which will cause this provision to become null and void, and each party agrees that this will be the final Order pertaining to the division of the Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree and Former Spouse agree that the Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay is and shall be accruing as a result of his service in the United States Army and that the Military Retired/Retainer pay is marital property subject to equitable distribution by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Retiree and Former Spouse further agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is competent to divide the parties' marital property incident to their divorce pursuant to Section 301(c), of the Divorce Code. Retiree and Former Spouse finally agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over the Retiree for the purpose of dividing his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because Retiree specifically consents to the Court's jurisdiction to divide his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree acknowledges and agrees that he has been afforded his rights under the ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., : Plaintiff : Vs. : BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, : Defendant : THE MASTER: This is parties. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01 - 4611 CIVIL that the parties have reached an agreement with respect of IN DIvoRcE Today is Tuesday, June 3, 2003. the date set for a conference with counsel and the After negotiations, the Master has been advised to all the outstanding economic issues. Present in the hearing room are the Plaintiff, Arthur Lo Bradshaw, Jr., Mulderig, and the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, and his counsel Robert J. and her 2001, raising grounds for divorce of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. A counterclaim was filed on December 16, 2002, on behalf of the Defendant, raising economic issues of equitable distribution, alimony, alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees and expenses. With respect to the grounds for divorce, the Master has received from the parties signed affidavits of consent and waivers of notice of intention to request entry of divorce decree so that the divorce can concluded under Section 3301(c) of the Domestic Relations Code. The affidavits and waivers will be filed by the Master's office with the counsel Lisa M. Greason. A complaint in divorce was filed on August 2, Prothonotary. economic claims, With respect to the settlement of the counsel are going to pi. ace on the record an agreement in the presence of the parties at this time. The agreement as stated on the record will be considered the substantive agreement of the parties not subject to any changes or modifications except for correction of typographical errors made during the transcription. After the agreement has been transcribed, counsel and the parties have indicated they are going to return later today to review the draft for typographical errors, make any corrections as necessary, and then affix their signatures affirming the terms of settlement as set forth in the agreement. When the agreement has been completed, the Master will be provided two signed copies and the Master will then prepare an order vacating his appointment. Upon the Master's appointment being vacated counsel can file a praecipe transmitting the record to the Court requesting a final decree in divorce. Mr. Mulderig. MR. MULDERIG: 1. Husband is entitled to a military pension due to his service in the United States Army. The parties agree that they will split this pension in half to each party. The split will be accomplished through a QDRO giving 50% to each party of the disposable military income. Husband also recognizes that he will carry the survivor benefit plan at the current level on the pension. He will continue the SBP at the maximum level and this SBP will be deducted from the gross pension prior to the 50/50 split. Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the QDRO and present it to Defendant's counsel for review within seven (7) days of today's date. Until the QDRO goes into effect, the pension shall continue to be paid into the wife's M&T checking account. She shall pay to the husband the difference between the pension payment to the account and the $1,854.80 which is her share. 21 The following accounts and assets shall be the property of husband: KEYCORP dividend reinvestment account; Pentagon Federal Credit Union account; PNC checking account, Acct. No. 50-8021-0931; L-3 Communications Master savings account; The Old Line Life Insurance Company insurance policy; Army Mutual Aid Association insurance; 1995 Pontiac Grand AM GT; Merrill Lynch account, 86Q-62059; The following accounts and assets shall be the property of wife: Merrill Lynch account, 86Q-61966; American Funds account; PNC checking account, Acct. No. PNC savings account; 50-0363-6058; Liberty National Life Insurance Company policy; Time-share in Williamsburg, Vir§inia; RCI credits; 2001 PT Cruiser; M&T checking account. 4. There is an M&T savings account which shall be divided as follows: $14,353.26 thereof shall be the property of the husband; $42,210.78 shall be the property of the wife. 5. The husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $1,200.00 a month in alimony. Said alimony shall continue until one of the following events: The death of either party, the remarriage of the wife or the cohabitation of the wife with a member of the opposite sex. The alimony can be modified in accordance with the provisions in the divorce code relating to changed circumstances of a continuous and substantial nature. 6. The military pension shall be considered a division of the marital property and not as part of the alimony. 7. Any title transfers that need to be accomplished to effectuate the terms of this agreement shall be done within ten (10) days. 8. All of the tangible personal property currently in the possession of the party shall be the property of that party. 9. The Defendant waives any claim to attorney fees, costs, and expenses. 10. Husband shall be responsible for paying the children's student loans. 11. Except as herein otherwise provided, each party may dispose of his or her property in any way and each party hereby waives and relinquishes any and all rights he or she may now have or hereafter acquire under the present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property or the estate of the other as a result of the marital relationship including without limitation, statutory allowance, widow's allowance, right of intestacy, right to take against the will of the other, and right to act as administrator or executor in the other's estate. Each will at the zequest of the other execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all instruments which may be necessary or advisable to carry into effect this mutual waiver and relinquishment of all such interest, rights, and claims. MR. MULDERIG: Colonel, you have heard the agreement that has been dictated today? Do you understand this agreement? MR. BRADSFIAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: Do you have any questions relating to this agreement? MR. BRADSMAW: No. MR. MULDERIG: Are you agreeing to this knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily? MR. BRADSMAW: Yes. MR. MULDERIG: And this agreement encompasses all that you wish to have to resolve this marriage? MR. BRADSHALW: Yes. the reading of the division as knowingly and -- THE MASTER: MS. GREASON: Ms. Greason. Mrs. Bradshaw, you have heard the asset division? MR. BRADSHAW: MS. GREASON: stated? MS. BP~ADSHAW: MS. GREASON: agreement MR. as it was dictated? MRS. BRADSHAW: MR. MULDERIG: Yes. And are you in agreement with Yes. And you make this decision off the record. (A discussion was held off the record.) MULDERIG: Mrs. Bradshaw, you heard the Yes. Are you in agreement with that agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: MR. MULDERIG: I am. Did you understand the agreement? MRS. BRADSHAW: MR. MULDERIG: relating to that agreement? MRS. BRADSFIAW: knowingly, Yes. Do you have any questions No. MR. MULDERIG: Are you making this agreement intelligently, and voluntarily? MRS. BPdkDSHAW: Yes. I acknowledge that I have read the above stipulation and agreement, that I understand the terms of settlement as set forth herein, and that by signing below I ratify and affirm the agreement previously made and intend to bind myself to the settlement as a contract obligating myself to the terms of settlement and subjecting myself to the methods and procedures of enforcement which may be imposed by law and in particular Section 3105 of the Domestic Relations Code. WITNESS: DATE: AttOrney for Plaintiff Attorney fo~/Defendant Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. ' Barbara Kay Bradshaw :Posy (717) 241-~03o June 9.2003 Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire Carlisle, PA '17013 Re: Bradshaw v. Bradshaw Dear Bob: I have reviewed the QDRO [haL yuu hav~ prepared in the above matt~. I will forward It onto my client for her review. On page 2, replace the first two paragraphs with the following language: Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay as used herein means Retiree's gross Military Ratil'~d/R~teiner pay less onlY those amounts deducted for the Survivor uenetit Plan premium for the Former Spouse, and before any waiver for benefits reduced in lieu of Retiree',, Military I:~timm~t beneff~, together w'f~h any costs of living increases or similar increases that _oco_,r or w~utd have occurred but for the Retiree's acueptance of reduced benefits after Retirement. The sharing of Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay shall cemmence upon JulY I, 2003 and shell continue until the death of either party. If the amount payable directly from the United States Army Is or becemes less than the Former Spouse's entitlement, the Retiree shall pay the differenCe to the Former Spouse directly or through the Domeetio Relations Office of Cumberland County. Pending the implementation to this Order by the Army Finance Service, the Retiree shall pay the Former Spouse's entitlement directly to the Former Spouse. Retiree shall eleot the maximum Survivor's Benef~ Plan annuity and the Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan which will insure that the Former Spouse's coverage shall not drop below fifty five (55%) percent at the age of 62 and for the rest of the Former Spouse's life. The Retiree shall pay f'~y five (55%) of the Survivor Benefit Plan and Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan premiums and the Former Spouse shall pay terry twa (45%) percent of said premiums. After Mm. Brad~haw reviews the QDRO, I will contact you with any changes she may request In the meantime, if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contacl /T~e. LISA M. 3~d 3DI~ t~d9 ~0S~3~9 Ot'O~:TP[I.T/- Turo Law Offices RON TURO, Esquire ROBERT J. MULDERIG, Esquire GALEN R. WALTZ, Esquire JAMES M. ROBINSON, Esquire DANIEL D. WORLEY, Esquire www. TuroLaw. com 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013 (717) 245-9688 (800) 562-9778 Fax (717) 245-2165 June 12, 2003 Lisa M. Greason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 Via Mail and Fax Fax # 241-3040 Re: Bradshaw v. Bradshaw Dear Lisa: I will not agree to the replacement of the two paragraphs you requested. The QDRO was drawn up to reflect the agreement signed by both parties. The language you are now requesting is a change to what was agreed upon. It is too late to argue over this matter. If you wanted such conditions incorporated in the QDRO you should have raised the issue at the Master's Office and we could have resolved it there. Sincerely, Rmulderig@TuroLaw.com RJM/jah c.c. Art Bradshaw LeydsNexis(.TM) l$aslc Case Law & Statutes I Search - 10 Results - FORMER 8}'LIU~IC. V... rage ~ ot o Source: A Sources > Statutes & Regulations · United States Code Service - Titles I through 50 Terms: FORMER SPOUSE PROTECTION ACT E(~Search) 10 USCS § 1408, * UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE Copyright © 2003 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing (TM) companies All rights reserved *** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-30, APPROVED 5/29/03 *** TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW PART II. PERSONNEL CHAPTER 7:[. COMPUTATION OF RET]iRED PAY 10 USCS § 1408 (2003) § 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders (a) Definitions. in this section: The term "court" means-- (ilA) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin islands, the Northern Mariana islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; (B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 451 of title 28) having competent jurisdiction; (C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country with which the United States has an agreement requiring the United States to honor any court order of such country; and (D) any administrative or judicial tribunal of a State competent to enter orders for support or maintenance (including a State agency administering a program under a State plan approved under part D of title IV of the Social Security Act [~ et seq.]), and, for purposes of this subparagraph, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. (2) The term "court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued decree), or a support order, as defined in section 453(p) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 653(p)), which-- (A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of that court; (B) provides for-- (i) payment of child support (as defined in section 459(i)(2) of the Social Security Act ~(i)(2))); (ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 459(i)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 6590)(3))); or (iii) division of property (including a division of community property); and (C) in the case of a division of property, specifically provides for the payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay, from the disposable retired pay of a member to the spouse or former spouse of that member. (3) The term "final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be taken or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a decree from which timely appeal has been taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals. (4) The term "disposable retired pay" means the total monthly retired pay to which a LexlsNeX~s(l M) k~aslc Case Law & ~tatutes I ~earcn - ~u ~esu;L~ - r'v~,~,,~,~ o ........... o- - member is entitled less amounts which-- (A) are owed by that member to the United States for previous overpaymentS of retired pay and for recoupments required by law resulting from entitlement to retired pay; (B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; (C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 6:[ of this title [1~0 ~ et seq.], are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that chapter computed using the percentage of the member's disability on the date when the member was retired (or the date on which the member's name was placed on the temporary disability retired list); or (D) are deducted because of an election under chapter 7:3 of this title [10 USC~§ 1431 et seq.] to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order under this section. (5) The term "member" includes a former member entitled to retired pay under section 12731 of this title. (6) The term "spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date of a court order, was married to that member. (7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer pay. (b) Effective service of process. For the purposes of this sect:ion-- (1) service of a court order is effective if-- (A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated for receipt of service court orders under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i) or, if no agent has been so designated, the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by facsimile or electronic transmission or by mail; (B) the court order is regular on its face; (C) the court order or other documents served with the court order identify the member concerned and include, if possible, the social security number of such member; and (D) the court order or other documents served with the court order certify that the rights of the member under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 50 U.S.C. A . 501 et seq.) were observed; and (2) a court order is regular on its face if the order-- (A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; (B) is legal in form; and (C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice that it is issued without authority of law. (c) Authority for court to treat retired pay as property of the member and spouse. (1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court. A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding to divide or partition any amount of retired pay of a member as the property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse if a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation (including a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such decree) affecting the member and the member's spouse or former spouse (A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any amount of retired pay of the member as property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse. (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not create any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Payments by the Secretary concerned under subsection (d) to a spouse or former spouse with respect to a division of retired pay as the property of a member and the member's spouse under this subsection may not be treated as LexisNeYds('l'M) Basic Case Law & Statutes I Search - 10 Results - I~'L}RMER SPOUSE P... Page 3 ot 8 amounts received as retired pay for service in the uniformed services. (3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to effectuate any payment under this section. (4) A court may not treat the disposable retired pay of e member in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court. (d) Payments by Secretary concerned to (or for benefit of) spouse or former spouse. (1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order providing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of property, specifically providing for the payment of an amount of the disposable retired pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Secretary shall make payments (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable retired pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse (or for the benefit of such spouse or former spouse to a State disbursement unit established pursuant to section 4546 of the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 654b] or other public payee designated by a State, in accordance with part D of title IV of the Social Security Act [42 USCS ~ et seq.], as directed by court order, or as otherwise directed in accordance with such part D) in an amount sufficient to satis~ the amount of child support and alimony set forth in the court order and, with respect to .a division of property, in the amount of disposable retired pay specifically provided for in the court order. In the case of a spouse or former spouse who, pursuant to section 408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act ~ U.S.C. 608(a)[(3)](4)), assigns to a State the rights of the spouse or former spouse to receive support, the Secretary concerned may make the child support payments referred to in the preceding sentence to that State In amounts consistent with that assignment of rights. In the case of a member entitled to receive retired pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date of effective service. In the case of a member not entitled to receive retired pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which the member first becomes entitled to retired pay. (2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired pay, payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they include an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of the member as property of the member or property of the member and his spouse. (3) Payments under this section shall not be made more frequently than once each month, and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to vary normal pay and disbursement cycles for retired pay in order to comply with a court order. (4) Payments from the disposable retired pay of a member pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the date of the death of the member or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are being made, whichever occurs first. (5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of property (including a division of community property) in addition to an amount of child support or alimony or the payment of an amount of disposable retired pay as the result of the court's treatment of such pay under subsection (c) as property of the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable retired pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property ,upon effective service of a final court order of garnishment of such amount from such retired pay. (6) In the case of a court order for which effective service is made on the Secretary concerned on or after August 22, 1996, and which provides for payments from the disposable retired pay of a member to satisfy the amount of child support set forth in the order, the authority provided in paragraph (1) to make payments from the disposable retired pay of a LexlsNexls(l'M) Basle Case Law & Statutes [ Search - It) Results - .FDRMER ~POUSE la... Iaage 4 oI 8 member to satisfy the amount of child support set forth in a court order shall apply to payment of any amount of child support arrearages set forth in that order as well as to amounts of child support that currently become due. (7) (A) The Secretary concerned may not accept service of a court order that is an out-of- State modification, or comply with the provisions of such a court order, unless the court issuing that order has jurisdiction in the manner specified in subsection (c)(4) over both the member and the spouse or former spouse involved. (B) A court order shall be considered to be an out-of-State modification for purposes of this paragraph if the order-- (i) modifies a previous court order under this section upon which payments under this subsection are based; and (ii) is issued by a court of a State other than the State of the court that issued the previous court order. (e) Limitations. (1) The total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable under all court orders pursuant to subsection (c) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired pay. (2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more than one former spouse the disposable retired pay of the member shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, first-served basis. Such court orders shall be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of that amount of disposable retired pay which remains after the satisfaction of all court orders which have been previously served. (3) (A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a month to the same spouse or former spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall-- (i) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired pay the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any such conflicting court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired pay which remains available for payment of such courts orders based on when such court orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); (ii) retain an amount of disposable retired pay that is equal to the lesser of-- (I) the difference between the largest amount required by any conflicting court order to be paid to the spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under clause (i); and (II) the amount of disposable retired pay which remains available for payment of any conflicting court order based on when such court order was effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (0) of paragraph (4); and (iii) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount of that member's disposable retired pay (less any amount paid during such month pursuant to legal process served under section 459 of the Social Security Act ~42 U.S.C. 659)_ and any amount paid during such month pursuant to court orders effectively served under this section, other than such conflicting court orders) minus-- (I) the amount of disposable retired pay paid under clause (i); and (II) the amount of disposable retired pay retained under clause (ii). (B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is provided with a court order which has been certified by the member and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being provided with such an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained amount in accordance with the order. (4) (A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this section and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of which provide for payments during a month from the same member, satisfaction of such court orders and legal process from the retired pay of the member shall be on a first-come, Lex~sNexis('lM) 13asic Case Law & Statutes [ ~earch - l0 Results - F~)ILMER 81~OU~E P... t'age 5 oI 8 first-served basis. Such court orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to such orders and legal process and which remain available in accordance with the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this paragraph during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal process which have been previously served. (B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total .amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (~ U.S.C. 659) with respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of the amount of the retired pay payable to such member that is considered under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment that is payable by the United States. (5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders provides for the payment of an amount which exceeds the amount of disposable retired pay available for payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously served court orders or legal process previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act ~42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. However, such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section by' the payment to the spouse or former spouse of the maximum amount of disposable retired pay permitted under paragraph and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). (116) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid. (f) Immunity of officers and employees of United States. (1) The United States and any officer or employee of the United States shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from retired pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse pursuant to a court order that is regular on its face if such payment is made in accordance with this section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i). (2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to interrogatories shall not be subject under any law to any disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of, any disclosure of information made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories. (g) Notice to member of service of court order on Secretary concerned. A person receiving effective service of a court order under this section shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of such court order (together with a copy of such order) to the member affected by the court order at his last known address. (h) Benefits for dependents who are victims of abuse by members losing right to retired pay. (1) If, in the case of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in the manner applicable to a division of property) for the payment of an amount from the disposable retired pay of that member or former member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to an eligible spouse or former spouse of that member or former member, the Secretary concerned, beginning upon effective service of such court order, shall pay that amount in accordance with this subsection to such spouse or former spouse. LexisNexls(TM) Basic Case Law 8, Statutes I Search - 10 Results - I~'{)ICMER ~POUSE P... Page 6 oI 13 (2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces is eligible to receive payment under this subsection if-- (A) the member or former member, while a member of the armed forces and after becoming eligible to be retired from the armed forces on the basis of years of service, has eligibility to receive retired pay terminated as a result of misconduct while a member involving abuse of a spouse or dependent child (as defined in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of Homeland Security); and (B) the spouse or former spouse-- (i) was the victim of the abuse and was married to the member or former member at the time of that abuse; or (ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a dependent child of the member or former member who was the victim of the abuse. (3) The amount certified by the Secretary concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that member or former member for the purposes of this subsection. (4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil action for the issuance of a court order in the case of that member or former member, the Secretary concerned shall determine and certify the amount of the monthly retired pay that the member or former member would have been entitled to receive as of the date of the certification-- (A) if the member or former member's eligibility for retired pay had not been terminated as described in paragraph (2)(A); and (B) if, in the case of a member or former member not iR receipt of retired pay immediately before that termination of eligibility for retired pay, the member or former member had retired on the effective date of that termination of eligibility. (5) A court order under this subsection may provide that whenever retired pay is increased under section 1401a of this title (or any other provision of law), the amount payable under the court order to the spouse or former spouse of a member or former member described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same time by the percent by which the retired pay of the member or former member would have been increased if the member or former member were receiving retired pay. (6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall have no ownership interest in, or claim against, any amount payable under this section to a spouse or former spouse of the member or former member. (7) (A) If a former spouse receiving payments under this subsection with respect to a member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) marries again after such payments begin, the eligibility of the former spouse to receive further payments under this subsection shall terminate on the date of such marriage. (B) A person's eligibility to receive payments under this subsection that is terminated under subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall be resumed in the event of the termination of that marriage by the death of that person's spouse or by annulment or divorce. The resumption of payments shall begin as of the first day of the month in which that marriage is so terminated. The monthly amount of the payments shall be the amount that would have been paid if the continuity of the payments had not been interrupted by the marriage. (8) Payments in accordance with this subsection shall be made out of funds in the Department of Defense Iqilitary Retirement Fund established by section 1461 of this title or, in the case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security for payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard. (9) (A) A spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), while receiving payments in accordance with this subsection, LexisNeXas(TM) Basic Case Law ~ Statutes [ Search - 10 Results - FORMER SPOUSE P... Page 7 ot 8 shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use commissary and exchange stores, and to receive any other benefit that a spouse or a former spouse of a retired member of the armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis of being a spouse or former spouse, as the case may be, of a retired member of the armed forces in the same manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pa,/. (B) A dependent child of a member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) who was a member of the household of the member or former member at the time of the misconduct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use commissary and exchange stores, and to have other benefits provided to dependents of retired members of the armed forces in the same manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pay. (C) If a spouse or former spouse or a dependent child eligible or entitled to receive a particular benefit under this paragraph is eligible or entitled to receive that benefit under another provision of law, the eligibility or entitlement of that spouse or former spouse or dependent child to such benefit shall be determined under such other provision of law instead of this paragraph. (10) (A) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of a member of the armed forces who has been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a punishment that will terminate the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay if executed, the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay may, as determined by the Secretary concerned, be considered terminated effective upon the approval of that sentence by the person acting under section 860(c) of this title (article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military .]ustice). (6) If each form of the punishment that would result in the termination of eligibility to receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside, or mitigated to a punishment that does not result in the termination of that eligibility, a payment of benefits to the eligible recipient under this subsection that is based on the punishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall cease. The cessation of payments shall be effective as of the first day of the first month following the month in which the Secretary concerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in writing that payment of the benefits will cease. The recipient may not be required to repay the benefits received before that effective date {except to the extent necessary to recoup any amount that was erroneous when paid). (il) In this subsection, the term "dependent child", with respect to a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legitimate child, including an adopted child or a stepchild of the member or former member, who-- (A) is under 18 years of age; (6) is incapable of self-support because of a mental or physical incapacity that existed before becoming 18 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for over one-half of the child's support; or (C) if enrolled in a full-time course of study in an institution of higher education recognized by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this subparagraph, is under 23 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for over one-half of the child's support. (i} Certification date. It is not necessary that the date of a certification of the authenticity or completeness of a copy of a court order for child support received by the Secretary concerned for the purposes of this section be recent in relation to the date of receipt by the Secretary. (j) Regulations. The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the administration of this section. (k) Relationship to other laws. In any case involving an order providing for payment of child support (as defined in section 459(0(2) of the Social Security Act [~(i)(2)]) by a member who has never been married to the other parent of the child, the provisions of this section shall not apply, and the case shall be subject to the provisions of section 459 of such Act [~ Lex~sNex~s(l'M) Bamc Ease Law & :Statutes I Search - 10 Kesults - I~UlqMi~K ~l'toU:~/~ t'... gage ~ or ~ Source: All Sources > _Statutes & Regu_!~tions > United States Code Service -Titles 1 through 50 Terms: FORMER SPOUSE PROTECTION ACT E(~dit Search) View: Full Date/Time: Fdday, July 11, 2003 - 3:46:33 PM EDT Products & Sen/ices I_L_exi~Nexis Bookstore [LexisNexis by Credit Card I_F~edbac_k I S_iqn Off I He~ About LexisNexisl Terms and Conditionsl S_ upport Identifier Cgpyriqht © 2002 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. All rights reserved. STATEMENT EFFECTIVE DATE NEW PAY DUE AS OF APR 08, 2003 MAY OI, 2003 PLEASE REMEMBER TO NOTIFY DFAS IF YOUR ADDRESS CHANGES COL ARTHUR L BRADSHAW USA 1447 HILLCREST CT APT 303 CAMP HILL PA 17011-8022 RET ITEM -- LD~ DIRECT DEPOSIT NEW ~ 4,079.00 104.00 265.41 3,709.5E 3,709.59 ssN 532 52 7420 ,;DF;AS P'.OI :N~,~ OF C;ONT-ACT DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE US MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY COMMERCIAL (216) 522-5955 TOLL FREE 1-800-321=1080 TOLL FREE FAX 1-800-469'-6559 ITEM FITW ALLOTMENTS/BONDS NET PAY TAXABLE INCOME: FEDERAL INCOME TAX WITHHELD: OLD NEW 235.1 235.1 ] 771.2 775.0b 2,703.28 2,699.42 14,838.36 940.44 FEDERAL WITHHOLDING STATUS: MARRIED TOTAL EXEMPTIONS: FEDERAL INCOME TAX WITHHELD: 235.?~ SBP COVERAGE TYPE: SPOUS~6~NLY ANNUITY BASE AMOUNT: 4,083.20 SPOUSE ONLY COST: .41 553 ANNUITY AMOUNT: AMOUNT: 1,429.12 35~ ANNUIT~ 2,245.76 SPOUSE DOB. AUG 20, 1949 THE ANNUITY PAYABLE IS 55g OF YOUR ANNUITY BASE AMOUNT UNTIL YOUR SPOUSE REACHES AGE 62. AT AGE b2, THE ANNUITY MAY BE REDUCED DUE TO SOCIAL SECURITY OFFSET, OR UN~ER THE TWO-TIER FORMULA. THAT REDUCTION MAY R 5g ($1429.12) AND ~ 2 ESULT IN AN ANNUITY TH ~BP ANNUITY AND THES~oc($ 245.76) OF THE ANNUITY BASE AMOUNT. THE C AT RANGES BETWEEN THE SOCI IAL SECURITY BENEFITS WILL PROW - OMBINATION OF THE AL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF AT LE DE TOTAL.P~TS FROM DFAS AND AST 55~ OF YOUR BASE A~UUNT. THE ACTUAL ANNUITY PAYABLE IS DEPENDENT ON FACTORS IN EFFECT WHEN THE ANNUITY IS ESTABLISHED. DFAS-CL 7220/148 (REV 03-01) ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant .' IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : IN DIVORCE RULE TO SHOW CAUSF NOW, this _~_Lday of ~[~~, 2003, upon receipt of the AND Petition For Special Relief, a Rule to Show- I~l~isC~ issued upon Defendant to show cause, if any she has, why the relief requested therein cannot be granted. This Rule is returnable ~ days from service BY THE COURT, ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. ' IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff . CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant · NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO PLEAD TO: Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. Cio Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire 28 S. Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 You are hereby notified to file a written response to the enclosed New Matte~ within twenty (20) days from service hereof or a judgment may be entered against you. Respectfully Submitted GREASON LAW OFFICE Date G P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 241-3030 Attorney for Respondent ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant · CIVIL ACTION - LAW 'IN DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF AND NOW COMES Barbara Kay Bradshaw, by and through her attorney, Lisa M. Greason, Esquire and responds to Plaintiff's Petitioner for Special Relief and answers as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. Admitted. 8. Admitted. Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that the Former Spouses' Protection Act does provide a definition for disposable retired pay as summarized in this paragraph and in full in exhibit four, however, it is denied that this definition of disposable retired pay was agreed to by the parties. 10.Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that the agreement states that Defendant is entitled to 50% of the disposable military income. By way of further answer, the agreement states "the parties agree that they will split this pension ~n half to each party" and further states only the SBP is to be deducted prior to the 50/50 split. It is denied that this agreement incorporated the definition of disposable military income in the Former Spouses' Protection Act. 11.Admitted in part, denied in part. The first sentence of the pleading is admitted. Defendant is not in the position to admit or deny what the Plaintiff feels. By way of further answer, Defendant disagrees that the absence of which definition the parties agreed to, that it defaults to the Former Spouses' Protection Act. No definitions were agreed to at the time of the conference. Further, Plaintiff knew or should have known that Defendant would only agree to the language as proposed by the Defendant. 12. Admitted. 13.Admitted. 14.Admitted. 15. Denied. The Agreement is not clear as to what language and definitions should be reflected in the QDRO. By way of further answer, the Agreement only reflected generally that there would be a QDRO to delineate the split in the military retirement. The terms of the QDRO were never discussed during the conference at the Divorce Master's Office. Further, if Plaintiff's counsel wished to have the definitions of the Former Spouses' Protection Act as the controlling definitions, he should have discussed that at the conference. NEW MATTER 16. Paragraphs 1-15 are hereby incorporated as if set forth in their totality herein. 17. Plaintiff's counsel was aware of the language as requested by Defendant's counsel due to his involvement in the Adams v. Adams case cited in his Petition. 18. Plaintiff's counsel knew or should have known that Defendant's counsel would request that language in the QDRO. 19. Defendant's counsel's draft QDRO is a copy from the Adams case that was drafted by Plaintiff. 20. Given Plaintiff's counsel's knowledge of Defendant's Counsel's use of the draft QDRO, Plaintiff's counsel should not be permitted to purposely omit his request for definitions different then those in his draft QDRO during the conference in order to benefit later from such omission. 21.Had Plaintiff's counsel wished to use the definitions in the Former Spouses' Protection Act, he should have said so at the conference. 22. Defendant's counsel did not request different definitions during the conference since it was believed that Plaintiff's counsel would use his own draft QDRO and all language included therein. 23. Plaintiff only stated that the cost of the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) would be deducted from gross military pension before the 50/50 split. At no time did Plaintiff state in the agreement that other deductions would be made to the gross military pension before the 50/50 split occurred. 24.The only way to have avoided this issue would have been to read the entire QDRO into the record at the conference, at which time, any change in the definitions from the draft QDRO to the Former Spouses' Protection Act by Plaintiff's counsel would have been discovered and not agreed to. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court deny Plaintiff's Petition and to issue a rule on Plaintiff to show cause as to why the language in the draft QDRO should not be signed. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE Date .~-~isa I~1. Gireason, Esquire, Post Office Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 241-3030 ID #78269 VERIFICATION. I, Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, attorney for the Defendant herein, have sufficient knowledge of the facts contained in this Response and New Matter and verify that the statements made in the foregoing Response and New Matter are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, based upon information received from the Defendant. I understand that false statements herein made are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. {}4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. A verification executed by the Plaintiff will be filed of record as soon as it becomes available. Date ~/~.-~{SA ~. GREASON, Esqui~_.~ Post Off~e Box385 · Carl~k, PA 17013 · 717-241-3030 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AND NOW, this/_~ ~"~'~day of~3~l~~,'/~'~ '~ 2003, upon receipt of the Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Petition' ~3fo .pecial Relief, a Rule to Show Cause is issued upon Plaintiff to show cause, if any he has, why the relief requested therein cannot be granted. This Rule is returnable ~ days from service BY THE COURT, ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : :NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : : CWIL ACTION -- LAW : IN DIVORCE PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S NEW MATTER 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. Admitted. 8. Admitted. 9. Admitted. It is admitted that Former Spouses' Protection Act forms the legal definition of disposable retired pay. It is further admitted that this definition was not agreed to by the parties. It is the position of the plaintiff that under the Adams v. Adams case, 1999 PaSupra 36, 1725 A.2 1824, and Ledenduski v. Ledenduski, 120 Dauphin 305 (2001), the definition of retired Military pay in the Former Spouses' Protection Act is the definition of retired pay unless a deviation is agreed upon by the parties. No deviation was agreed to by the parties in this case. 10. Admitted in part/Denied in part. It is admitted that the agreements states that the defendant is entitled to 50% of the disposable military income. It is also agreed that the agreement states the parties agree that they will split this pension in half to each party. This pension again refers back to the disposable military income. It is denied that the agreement states that only the SBP is to be deducted prior to the 50/50 split. Furthermore the agreement state that the wife's share shall be $1,854.80. That amount is 50% percent after deduction of both SBP and the VA waiver. 11. Denied. See paragraph nine be $1,854.80. That amount is 50% percent after deduction of both SBP and the VA waiver. 11. Denied. See paragraph nine 12. Admitted. 13. Admitted. 14. Admitted. 15. Denied in part/Admitted in part. It is denied that the agreement is not clear as to what language and definition should be reflected in the QDRO. Except for the agreement by the parties, the statute controls. It is admitted that the definition of what constituted Military pension was never discussed at the conference. However if defendant's counsel wished to depart from the law by agreement it was her obligation to raise such departure. 16. Answers 1-15 are hereby incorporated as if set forth in the entirety herein. 17. It is admitted that plaintiff's counsel was involved in the Adams v. Adams case, cited in the petition. It is further admitted that plaintiff's counsel recognized the language as requested by the defendant's counsel after the agreement was made. However is denied that plaintiff's counsel was able to discern what was in defendant's counsel mind during the negotiation at the Master's Office since she never brought up this point. 18. It is denied that plaintiff's counsel knew or :should of known that defendant's would request the language in the QDRO since she never raised the issue during negotiations. Plaintiff's counsel was well aware of the law in this matter. 19. Admitted. However plaintiff's counsel also states that when he drafted the QDRO in the Adams case it was to fulfill an agreement that explicitly expanded on the definition as used in the Former Spouse Protection Act. Plaintiff' s counsel has drafted QDRO's in many cases having various terms tailored specifically to those cases and does not feel having drawn a docunaent specific to a case he is bound to draw every other document with the exact same language. 20. Denied. The draft QDRO fi.om the Adams case was never discussed in the JOEL E. LEVENDUSKI, Plaintiff VS. LAURA A. LEVENDUSKI, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 357 S 1998 OPINION Defendant Laura Levenduski (hereinafter "Mrs. Levenduski") and Plaintiff Joel LeVenduski (hereinafter "Mr. Levenduski") were married on May 31, 1980 and diVorced on March 23, 1999. The parties are the parents of three children, Nicholas, bom April 12, 1981; Renee, bom February 23, 1983; and Matthew, bom December 20, 1991. Since December 9, 1997, Nicholas and Renee have resided with Mr. Levenduski ,and Matthew has resided with Mrs. Levenduski. On March 10, 1999, the parties executed a Property Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") which both believed would resolve all issues pertaining to the divorce. At the time, the parties were represented by counsel. Presently before this court is Mrs. Levenduski's Petition For Enforcement And Contempt Of Property Settlement Agreement. She argues that her former husband has violated several provisions of their Agreement, including those dealing with child support, life insurance and the division of Mr. Levenduski's pension. This court's anal sis y of her arguments and the relevant law is set forth below. Mrs. Levendusk~ s main contention pertmns to Paragraph 10 of the'Agreement which states in pertinent part: : . FFB 0 2 I heraby c~rlif'j ~'-' ·, '--' t,,., ~J.e foregoing is a Proth~aota~ 10..PENSION AND RETIREMENT Wife will receive thirty (30%) of husband's military retirement. Husband agrees to apply for retirement no later that June 30, 1999 .... Wife further waives the military survivor benefit plan. The United States Code defines "disposable retired pay" in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. ~1408, as the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less amounts which...(B) are deducted fi'om the retired pay of such member as a result of...a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under Title 5 or Title 38. I0 USCS §1048(A)(4)(B). Testimony at the hearing revealed that Mr. Levcnduski began receiving military pension of $2,406 in August of 1999. However, Mrs. Levenduski did not begin receiving her 30% share until September of 1999. Therefore, this court finds that Mrs. Levenduski is entitled to be reimbursed by her former husband for August of 1999 in the amount of $721.80, plus interest. Subsequently, Mr. Levenduski applied for and was approved for veteran's disability compensation. Those payments, which started in July of 2000, are offset against his military retirement benefits and are tax-free. Accordingly, M:r. Levenduski maintains that the disability benefit is a separate benefit that Mrs. Levenduski is not entitled to. lie further argues that the terms of the Agreement are clear and unambiguous. 'llae parties agreed that Mrs. Levenduski would receive 30% of Mr. Levenduski's military pay, not an actual monetary amount, no matter what dollar figure Mrs. Levenduski contemplated at the time of the Agreement's execution. 2 intent of the parties clear. Based on the specific language of their property settlement agreement, Judge Bayley required husband to pay the full mount of military retirement pay to his ex-wife as calculated under the agreement without deductions for the veteran's disability benefit. Adams, at p. 4-5. Husband did not appeal from this determination. Several years later, Mr. Adams attempted to again reduce his wife's portion of his retirement. This time, Mr. Adams accepted a federal civil service position, which, like disability, operated to reduce his spouse's monthly pension benefit due to a federally mandated pay-cap ordered for dual government compensation of military retirees. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Adams v. Adams, 725 A.2d 824 (Pa. Super. 1999), affirmed the lower court's ruling that Mr. Adams reimburse his wife the difference due between what she should receive pursuant to the terms of their property settlement agreement and what she received after her husband's deduction due to the civil service employment. The Superior Court explained: The trial court noted in its opinion that it previously had determined in the divorce action that the parties had agreed to a more restrictive definition than that made by the federal government. They did so without regard to the federal government's requirement that a reduction in Husband's military retirement pay was a precondition to receipt of veteran's disability benefits. The trial court applied the same reasoning to deny Husband a reduction in retirement pay owed to Wife to reflect the reduction in his pension benefits required to meet the pay-cap imposed for dual government compensation of military retirees. Indeed, the trial court noted Husband voluntarily elected to reduce his pension payments rather than his em'rent salary. Adams, 725 A.2d at 827. The Superior Court went on to reject Mr. Adam's latter argument and found that the trial court's conclusion was supported by the record. The Court further discussed: Husband agreed to a more restrictive definition of eligible military retirement pay than the one recognized by the t~deral government. He promised not to make a waiver or accept any offset of his pension eligibility other than the amount deducted to fund one-half the survivor's benefit plan insurance. Consequently, the trial court correctly decided Husband is bound to this mutually agreed upon and more restrictive definition of"elioible" dis ....~-'- -' - ~, vu~m~ reuremem pay. He agreed to pay based on that definition without regard to unilateral subsequent waivers or offsets he initiated that the federal government then deducted to make its calculation of his eligible monthly military retirement pay. Husband is bound under the agreement to the terms as def'med in the agreement. Adams, 725 A.2d at 828. This court f'mds that it is this more restrictive definition of military retirement pay as found in the property settlement agreement in the .Adams case that distinguishes the result from the instant case. In the Levendnski's Agreement, there is no restrictive definition or limiting language as to what offsets that which Mr. Levenduski is entitled to receive as pension money. Mr. Levendnski agreed to provide 30% of his military retirement pay to his wife, subject to the application of the federal law that controls the distribution and administration of his pension. To read a more restrictive definition as to what constitutes his military.retirement pay with that which appears in their Agreement is impermissible. Unfortunately for Mrs. Levenduski, the drafters of the Agreement should have considered such a result when creating an instrument intended to protect her future interest in her husband's retirement pay. Therefore, this court declines to improperly consider the intent of the parties at the time of the Agreement's execution. Of further note, the United States Supreme Court in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989), has interpreted the applicable provision of the U.S. Code holding that the USFSPA does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 595. In addressing the potential unfairness in such a rationale, Justice Marshall explained: We realize that reading the statute literally may infiict economic harm on many former spouses. But we decline to misread the statute in order to reach a sympathetic result when such a reading requires us to do violence to the plain language of the statute and to ignore much of the legislative history. Congress chose the language that requires us to decide as we do, and Congress is free to change it. Two more issues are raised with regard to Mrs. Levenduski's Petition, including proof of beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy and reimbursement for child support. This court finds that although Mr. Levenduski demonstrated at the hearing in this case that he had in fact obtained a life insurance policy with a face amount of $50,000, he has yet to designate Mrs. Levenduski as the beneficiary or provide proof of the same. This court orders that proof of such designatiori be provided to Mrs. Levenduski with/n twenty (20) days from the date of this Opinion and Order. Finally, Mrs. Levenduski is requesting child support and babysitting expenses incurred during 1999. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides that Mr. Levenduski agrees to pay $600 in child support for Matthew directly to Mrs. Levenduski through December 3 I, 1999 and one-half the babysitting costs for Matthew during that summer. The Agreement also provided that neither party could apply for a modification of tlaat amount until January 1, 2000. Evidence revealed that upon petition filed by Mr. Levenduski, in October of 1999, Dauphin County Domestic Relations entered an Order requiring him to pay $134.32 per month to Mrs. Levenduski. Presently, Mrs. Levenduski requests the difference between the amount she should have received under the Agreement and the amount she actually received based on the Domestic Relations Order from September of 1999 through December of 1999, or $1,862.72. Further, she asks for $400 representing half of the babysitting expenses for Matthew during the 6 Summer of 1999. Since neither party presented proof that the: mounts at issue were factored into the Domestic Relations Order, this court finds that Mrs. Levenduski is entitled to those amounts covered by their g~greement. Therefore, the total due Mrs. Levenduski toward the support of Matthew is $2, 262.72. Accordingly, the following is entered: JOEL E. LEVENDUSKI, Plaintiff VS. LAURA A. LEVENDUSKI, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 357 S 1998 ORDER AND NOW, this ~'~day of February, 2001, the following is hereby ordered with respect to Defendant Laura Levenduski's Petition For Enforcement And Contempt Of Property Settlement Agreement: 1. Defendant's request for reimbursement of pension money not received as a result of plaintiff's receipt of disability compensation is DENIED. 2. Defendant's request for reimbursement of $721.80 plus interest representing pension money not received for August of1999 is GRANTED. 3. Defendant's request for reimbursement of $2,262.72 representing babysitting costs not received for the Summer of 1999 and child support not received from September of 1999 through December of 1999 is GRANTED. 4. Counsel fees are not awarded to e~i~tlaer~. Distribution: Madeline R. Kaufman, Esq., Four Greenwood Square, Ste. 200, Bensalem, PA 19020 Max J. Smith, Jr., Esq., POB 650, Hershey, PA 17033 VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's New Matter are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date ~obert J.'l~lderig, Esqu' Turo Law Offices CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that i served a true and correct copy of the Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's New Matter upon Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, by depositing same in the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the /~'"~ day of/~'~ ~ , 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Lisa M. Greason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 TURO LAW OFFICES Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : IN DIVORCE Motion To Make Rule Absolute AND NOW, comes the Movant, Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr., by and through his attorney, Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire, and makes this Motion To Make Rule Absolute. 1. On July 17, 2003 a Petition for Special Relief was filed on behalf of Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. in the above caption case. 2. On July 21, 2003 A Rule to Show Cause was issued upon Defendant. 3. On August 12, 2003, Defendant filed! a response with new matter. 4. On August 14, 2003 A Rule to Show Cause was issued upon Plaintiff. 5. On August 15, 2003, Plaintiff filed a response. 6. There is no dispute between the parties that there were no agreements to use the language that Defendant's counsel now desires. 7. The only issue in contention is whether the definition of "disposable retired pay" as stated in "The Former Spouse Protection Act" is binding in the absence of an agreement of the parties. This is purely a question of law. 8. RCP 206.7(b) states that if the pleadings raise no dispute of material fact, the Court on petition of the plaintiff will rule based on the pleadings. THEREFORE, Movant requests this Honorable Court to make the July 21. 2003 Rule to Show Cause absolute and Sign the QDRO attached to Plaintiff's August 15, 2003 Response. Respectfully Submitted TURO LAW OFFICES Date Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245-9688 Attorney for Plaintiff CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the Motion To Make Rule Absolute upon Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, by depositing same)n the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the /'~__~ day of ..~¢,.~, 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: ///~ Lisa M. Greason, Esquire P.O. Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 TURO LAW OFFICES 2R~)s~cr~'u tJl.; pM??t S~[?t E s q u ' re Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 245.-9688 Attorney fi3r Plaintiff ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant : IN THE COURT Of COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBF-'RLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 01.-4611 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION - LAW 'IN DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO MAKE RULE ABSOLUTF AND NOW, comes the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, by and through her attorney, Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, and makes these Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Motion to Make Rule Absolute. 1. Plaintiff's Motion to Make Rule Absolute, signed September 10, 2003 does not accurately reflect Defendant's position on this matter. 2. There is no dispute that the parties did not agree on the definition of "disposable retired pay" in the settlement agreement. 3. There is a dispute as to whether the definition appearing in "The Former Spouses Protection Act" is binding in the, absence of such agreement. 4. There is a dispute as to the meaning of the "disposable retired pay." Plaintiff is trying to have "The Former Spouses Protection Act" apply when he failed to ask for that at the agreement conference,. 5. "The Former Spouses Protection Act", at no time, is even mentioned in the agreement· 6. The separation agreement specifically states only the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) shall be deducted from the military retirement prior to a 50/50 split between the parties. Plaintiff is now trying to incorporate other deductions r specifically asked for. 7.It is well known authority, that any ambiguity in the definitions or shall be construed against the writer, which was the Plaintiff's counsel. 8. Plaintiff's counsel inappropriately attached authority on his Motion for Rule to Show Cause and in his Answer to Defendant's Motion for Rule to Show Cause. These are improper forums for authority. 10. Defendant's counsel has not been given the opportunity to present authority, evidence or argument to this Honorable; Court. Plaintiff's Motion fails to include a paragraph of Defendant's nonoccurrence and response to this Motion. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests this Honorable Court to deny Plaintiff's Motion to Make Rule Absolute and to permit argument either orally or by briefs in this matter. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE Date Post Office Box 31~5 ) Carlisle, PA 17013''~----~ (717) 241-3030 ID #78269 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a true end correct copy of the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Make Rule Absolute upon Robert J. Mulderig, Esquire, by.d~epositing same in the United States Mail, first class, postage pre-paid on the J<~ day of September, 2003, from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, addressed as follows: Robert J. Mulderig 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 GREASON LAW OFFICE ~reason, Esq e (717) 241-3030 ID #78269 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVC)RCE ORDER OF COURT raised in Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs 2003, based upon the issues to Make Rule Absolute, it is hereby ordered that: Argument shall be held on ~C~-~:,~z.,, ~ 7, 2003 in Courtroom # ,,~ of the Cumberland County Courthouse; ¢ ~' 3 ~ /%//)1 ! Plaintiff shall submit a brief in this matter in accordance with Local R.C.P. 210.6 due twelve (12) days prior to oral argument; Defendant shall submit a brief in this matter in accordance with Local R.C.P. 210.6 due five (5) days prior to oral argument. BY THE COURT, ,'f~'obert J. Mulderig, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Gsa M. Greason, Esquire Attorney for Defendant ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Mo · NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM BARBARA KAY iBRADSHAW Defendant before the Cour different form fo informed that thc ORDER OF COURT NOW, October 27, 2003, the parties having appeared on their respective rules to show cause, each requesting a a "Qualified Domestic Relations Order", and the Court being Master reduced to a typed agreement the positions of the parties on this interpretation Court requests recommended ;sue, the Court refers the matter back to the Master for his which QDRO best represents the agreement of the parties. :he Master to furnish to the Court a short written opinion and a (~rder vlS, obert Mulderi§, Esquire For the Plaintiff //~isa M. Grease For the Defend ~, Esquire ant Esquire Robed Elicker ! Divorce Master within thirty days of today's date. ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR. Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION - LAW :IN DIVORCE DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S MEMORANDUM AND NOW, comes the Defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw, by and through her attorney, Lisa M. Greason, Esquire, and makes these replies to Plaintiff's exceptions to Master's Memorandum. 1. Admitted. 2. Denied. By way of further response, this Honorable Court sent this matter to the Master for his interpretation of which QDRO best represents the agreement of the parties and to present an opinion to this Court. The Master's Memorandum fulfills this order. The Master's Memorandum reflects the QDRO as proposed by the Defendant. 3. Denied. The Master's decision is supported in law and is not a direction contravention of Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) as cited by opposing counsel. 4. Denied. It is admitted that the Former Spouses Protection Act does give a definition of "disposable retired pay." However, Mansell does not require the states follow the federal definition. Further, Mansell and the Former Spouses Protection Act only limits the direct payments mechanism and is not intended to limit substantively what the court may order. 5. Neither admitted or denied. If this statement is correct, then a meeting of the minds never occurred and the parties have no agreement in which case this matter would be sent to the Divorce Master for a hearing on the matter. Since there is no dispute as to the facts and assets, Defendant believes and therefore avers that the Master, upon hearing, would come to the same conclusion he has already reached in his memorandum to the Court. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests this Honorable Court to deny Plaintiff's Exceptions and to sign the Defendant's QDRO which reads in accordance with the Master's Memorandum as the correct understanding of the parties agreement. Respectfully Submitted, GREASON LAW OFFICE Date Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 241-3030 ID #78269 ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION-LAW · IN DIVORCE Hoffer, P.J.; IN RE: Qualified Domestic Relations Order Facts Before the Court is the matter regarding the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) for the plaintiff, Arthur L. Bradshaw, and the defendant, Barbara Kay Bradshaw. Both parties and their respective counsel met on June 3, 2003 for a settlement conference at the Divorce Master's office. At this conference, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which was signed the same day. The settlement agreement provides that the "split will be accomplished through QDRO giving fifty percent to each party of the disposable military income." The agreement further states, "Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the QDRO and present it to the Defendant's counsel for review within seven days of today's date." Counsel for plaintiff prepared a QDRO and sent it to the defendant's counsel. The defendant's counsel objected to the first two paragraphs on page two of the proposed QDRO, and replaced the two paragraphs with other language. On June 19, 2003, the Court signed a decree in divorce, divorcing the parties. The parties have been unsuccessful in reaching an agreement concerning the wording of the QDRO. As each party has proposed its own version of the QDRO, the issue in this case is whether the proposed language of the QDRO conforms to the written agreement signed by both parties at the Divorce Masters office on June 3, 2003. Discussion The settlement agreement states that "the split will be accomplished through QDRO giving 50% to each party of the disposable military income." The plaintiff provided a QDRO stating that 50% of his pension, less the survivor benefit plan deduction, be paid to wife. Wife wanted to include additional language in the QDRO using the definition of "Disposable Retirement Pay." The defendant argues that the request for change did not alter the agreement of the parties as reached in the Divorce Master's office, although the defendant concedes that the language which she is requesting was not even discussed, let alone agreed to. As such, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's QDRO contains language that does not conform to the written agreement signed by the parties at the Master's office. The plaintiff also argues that the defendant's proposed language is a departure from the language of the written agreement because it changes the definition of "Disposable Retired/Retainer pay." 2 Congress passed the Former Spouse Protection Act~ which defines disposable retired pay as the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled, less amounts which "...(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeiture of retired pay ordered by a Court Martial or as a result of the waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38." In the Cumberland County Common Pleas Court, the Honorable Judge Bayley, in the case of Adams v. Adams,2 found that if the parties agree to a more restrictive reading of definition of eligible military retirement pay than the one recognized by the federal government, the Court will uphold the agreement of the parties. However, in the present case, defendant concedes that there was not an agreement. Therefore, when there is an absence of such agreement, the language of the statute is controlling? The other matters raised by the defendant are simply speculation on what would have been the result had the issue been raised and negotiated. Conclusion The definition of Disposable Military Retirement Pay is established by the Former Spouse Protection Act, unless modified by mutual agreement of the ~ 10 USCA §1408. 2 This case was subsequently appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. See 1999 PA Super 36. ~ See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) and Levenduski v. Levenducski, 120 Dauphin 305 (2001). parties. The defendant has agreed that there was no agreement between the parties. As such, the language of the plaintiff's proposed QDRO is accepted. March 22,2004 ,,,R'~obert J. Mulderig, Esquire Turo Law Offices 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 For the Plaintiff ~ Greason, Esquire PO Box 385 Carlisle, PA 17013 For the Defendant Bythe Court, 4 ARTHUR.L. BRADSHAW, JR., Plaintiff BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUTNY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 01-4611 CIVIL TERM : CIVIL ACTION-LAW · IN DIVORCE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER AND NOW, March 22, 2004, WHEREAS, BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, hereinafter referred to as Former Spouse, and ARTHUR L. BRADSHAW, JR, hereinafter referred to as Retiree, have entered into a comprehensive property settlement agreement dated June 3, 2004; and WHEREAS, as part of the settlement agreement Retiree agrees that the Former Spouse receive fifty (50%) percent of his U.S. Army Pension; and WHEREAS, counsel for Retiree and counsel for Former Spouse have acknowledged that this Qualified Domestic Relations Order is being made pursuant to the Domestic Relations Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as it relates to the provisions being made by the Former Spouse relating to her marital property rights; and WHEREAS, it is intended that this Order will qualify as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, as defined in Section 414(p)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the provisions hereof shall be administered and interpreted in conformity with the Code. Pursuant to Section 414(p)(2) of the Code, the following facts are hereby specified: 1. The Act to which this Order applies is the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982. 2. The name of the Service member is ARTHUR L. BRADSAHW, JR., whose current mailing address is 1402 Bradley Drive, A-213 (Pheasant Run), Carlisle, PA 17013, and whose social security number is 532-52-7420. 3. The name and address of the alternate payee is BARBARA KAY BRADSHAW, whose current mailing address is 1447 Hillcrest Ct., Apt. #303, Camp Hill, PA 17011-8022, and whose social security number is 532-54-8206. Military Retired/Retainer Pay. Former Spouse shall be awarded a monthly fifty percent share of the Retiree's U.S. Army Disposable Retired/Retainer pay. Said award shall be in accordance with and construed by the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act of September 8, 1982 (Public Law 97-252). The sharing of Disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay shall commence upon July 1, 2003 and shall continue until the death of either party. Pending the implementation of this Order by the Army Finance Service, the Retiree shall pay the Former Spouse's entitlement directly to the Former Spouse. Retiree shall elect the maximum Survivor's Benefit Plan annuity. Under the terms of the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act, the United States Army, as the paying authority is required to directly pay Former Spouse her monthly percentage share of Retiree's monthly disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because of the following. In the course of the parties' marriage, Retiree performed at least ten years of service credible in determining his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay. The parties were married on August 29, 1970 and were divorced on June 19, 2003. Retiree began service credible and determined his eligibility for Retired/Retainer pay with the United States Army in June 1971, has performed active duty until his retirement from active duty on July 1, 1995. Neither Retiree nor Former Spouse will do or cause to be done any act which will cause this provision to become null and void, and each party agrees that this will be the final Order pertaining to the division of the Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree and Former Spouse agree that the Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay is and shall be accruing as a result of his service in the United States Army and that the Military Retired/Retainer pay is martial property subject to equitable distribution by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Retiree and Former Spouse further agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is competent to divide the parties' marital property incident to their divorce pursuant to Section 301 (c) of the Divorce Code. Retiree and Former Spouse finally agree that the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, has jurisdiction over the Retiree for the purpose of dividing his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay because Retiree specifically consents to the Court's jurisdiction to divide his disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay. Retiree acknowledges and agrees that he has been afforded his rights under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.S. Appendix 501-591). The Court shall retain jurisdiction over Retiree's Military Retired/Retainer pay for as long as the parties both shall live. The Court shall also have the authority to make every just and equitable Order not inconsistent with the other provisions hereof. The Court shall also have the specific authority to make any Orders it deems just and equitable as a result of the income tax consequences which flow from the division and distribution of the Retired/Retainer pay. The Court shall also have continuing jurisdiction to make every Order reasonably necessary to implement and accomplish the direct payment to the Former Spouse by the United States Army of her percentage share of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay, including the right to advise the United States Army of the precise amount or percentage of Retiree's disposable Military Retired/Retainer pay to be payable to the Former Spouse. By the court, 4