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HomeMy WebLinkAbout04-24-06 J. A40033/05 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P.65.37 IN RE: ESTATE OF ROBERT M. MUMMA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA (') No. 856 MDA 20~S3 cu-oo Appeal from the Orders in the Court of ~i~ Common Pleas of Cumberland County, ~~5~~ Orphans' Court Division, No. 21-86-398 ~3g'" . :0 :0-4 )> APPEAL OF: ROBERT M. MUMMA, II BEFORE: JOYCE, ORIE MELVIN and TAMILIA, JJ. MEMORANDUM: FILED: March 7, 2006 ,...." c;:) c;:) C7" > -0 ;0 N .s::- :D =u D=)' fTl \.. - t~~~ ~~ ;-nm XoO :;p. :x C!!! o -rl -" o _._ (11 ~-./) ~~ 0"\ Robert M. Mumma, II, decedent's son, appeals pro se from the April 21, 2005 and April 29, 2005 Orders denying his request for a jury trial and referring his motion to compel inspection of all books and records of the decedent's estate to an auditor. After careful review, we affirm. The trial court set forth the lengthy factual and procedural history as follows. On January 6, 1999, Robert M. Mumma II . . . petitioned this court for an accounting of the estate of his father, Robert M. Mumma Sr. . . ., who died testate on April 12, 1986. The decedent's will and the codicil thereto were probated on June 5, 1986. The will appoints Mrs. Barbara McK. Mumma, decedent's widow, and Lisa M. Morgan. . . as executrices thereof and as trustees of a Marital Trust and a Residuary Trust created thereunder .... Under the will, the presumptive remaindermen of the Trusts, if they survive Mrs. Mumma, are the decedent's children: petitioner Robert M. Mumma II, Linda M. Mumma, Barbara M. Mumma and Mrs. Morgan. The decedent bequeathed to his testamentary trustees an amount equal to fifty J. A40033/0S percent of his total gross estate to be held in trust excl usively for the benefit of h is wife d u ri ng her lifetime, the principal to be distributed to the decedent's children upon her death. In addition, the decedent gave his residuary estate to his testamentary trustees to be held in trust exclusively for the benefit of his wife during her lifetime, the principal to be paid to the decedent's children upon her death. Decedent's widow and Mrs. Morgan filed interim accounts of their acts and transactions as executrices and as trustees on August 9, 1991.... Robert M. Mumma, II, disclaimed his interest under the will in 1987. In 1989, former President Judge Harold E. Sheely of this court granted petitioner's motion to revoke his disclaimer. Robert M. Frey, Esq., who was appointed guardian ad litem for the minor persons interested in the Estate in 1988, appealed the revocation of the disclaimer. The Superior Court ruled that Mr. Frey's representation of the estate with respect to the revocation of the disclaimer was beyond the scope of his limited appointment and therefore he lacked standing to appeal. Robert M. Mumma, II, eventually asked for a complete accounting of the Estate, including an accounting of the Trusts in which he claimed an interest. Decedent's widow and Mrs. Morgan claimed in response that they could not provide an accounting to Robert M. Mumma, II because he did not have standing, and the issue of the revocation of his disclaimer had not been fully litigated.... This position of the executrices/trustees was rejected by the court, and an accounting by the executrices/trustees was ordered on February 23, 2000. Thereafter, a procedural morass developed as accounts, objections to accounts, supplemental objections to accounts, motions to quash subpoenas, motions of counsel to withdraw, motions to require notice of property dispositions, petitions to remove executrices/trustees, exceptions to orders, motions to stay, petitions for injunctions, motions to compel discovery, etc., were filed. - 2 - J. A40033/05 Among these filings was a motion entitled "Objector's Motion to Compel Discovery," submitted by Robert M. Mumma, II, on December 21, 2004. In an attempt to bring this matter, which commenced in 1986, under control, the undersigned judge appointed an auditor in the person of the distinguished Cumberland County attorney Taylor P. Andrews, Esq. The order appointing Mr. Andrews was dated January 6, 2005. Within several weeks of the appointment, Robert M. Mumma, II, filed a motion to have the auditor replaced. Following a hearing on March 11, 2005, at which a record was made on this motion, it was denied as devoid of merit. An oral motion made at this proceeding by Robert M. Mumma, II, that the court also recuse itself from further participation in the case was similarly denied. Another oral motion made at the proceeding by Robert M. Mumma, II - for a jury trial -was also denied. Another oral motion made by Robert M. Mumma, II, at the proceeding - for a stay pending completion of discovery - was also denied, and a formal motion to this effect was later denied by order dated March 30, 2005. On March 24, 2005, Robert M. Mumma, II, filed a "request for Jury Trial on Objections to Inventory and Accounting Pursuant to PEF Code 777(a). " A rule was issued on the request for a jury trial on March 30, 2005, and a response to the request was filed by Decedent's widow and Mrs. Morgan on April 8, 2005. This response, inter alia, denied the existence in this case of any unresolved material dispute as to the decedent's title to the property. The request for a jury trial was denied, for a second time, by order dated April 21, 2005. This denial is apparently one of the interlocutory orders being appealed by Robert M. Mumma, II. - 3 - J. A40033/05 Meanwhile, on April 4, 2005, the court held a conference on the motion to compel discovery that had been filed by Robert M. Mumma, II. The on-the- record conference, which the auditor attended and participated in, resulted in the following order of cou rt: AND NOW, this 4th day of April, 2005, upon consideration of the Motion To Compel Discovery filed on behalf of Robert M. Mumma, III, ... and following a conference ... in which Brady L. Green, Esquire, Michael J. Riffitts, Esquire, and Ivo V. Otto, III, Esquire, represented Barbara McK. Mumma and Lisa M. Morgan, Ralph A. Jacobs, Esquire, represented Barbara Mann Mumma, and Robert M. Mumma, II, appeared pro se, it is ordered and directed that the executrixes/trustees, within 20 days of today's date, file responses to the Objector's First Set of Request for Probation of Documents to the Executrixes/Trustees, the Objector's First Set of Interrogatories to Executrixes, Robert M. Mumma, II's, Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents to the Executrixes/Trustees, and Robert M. Mumma, II's, Third Set of Requests for Production of Documents to the Executrixes/Trustees, and that the auditor, within 45 days of today's date, hold a pre- hearing conference among the interested parties for purposes of recommending an order with respect to any further discovery in the case and with respect to any issues presented by the responses of the executrixes/trustees to the discovery req u ests. Shortly thereafter, Robert M. Mumma, II, filed a Motion To Compel Inspection of All Books and Records. As had been done with his earlier discovery motion, this matter was referred to the auditor in the first instance for purposes of proposing a - 4 - J. A40033/05 recommended order. This order of court, dated April 29, 2005 (docketed April 29, 2005), referring the motion to the auditor for review, is apparently one of the interlocutory orders being appealed by Robert M Mumma, II. Mr. Andrews, in his capacity as auditor, conducted the pre-hearing conference referred to in this court's order dated April 4, 2005, quoted above, and, in accordance with his recommendation, the court entered the following order dealing, for the moment, with the various outstanding discovery issues in the case: AND NOW, this 19th day of May, 2005, upon recommendation of the Auditor in this case, it is hereby ordered as follows with regard to discovery pertaining to the objections that have been fi led to the accounts filed at the docket: Any party expressing one or more objections to one or more of the accounts shall serve his or her discovery request upon counsel for the estate and related trusts no later than June 13, 2005. Past discovery requests that have not been answered shall be served again. Copies of all discovery requests shall be sent to the Auditor and docketed of record with the Clerk of the Orphans' Court. The Estate and related trusts shall file a response to the requested discovery no later than July 13, 2005, and any discovery that is not subject to an objection shall be provided by July 28, 2005. All objections to the discovery shall be copied to the Auditor and docketed of record with the Clerk of the Orphans' Court, and shall be supported with a brief setting forth the legal authorities supporting the objections to the discovery. Any response that the requested discovery has been previously provided sha II specifically state the time, manner and context of the previous delivery. - 5 - J. A40033/05 A party seeking discovery that is resisted by the estate or trusts shall file a brief with legal authorities in support of the requested discovery by August 27, 2005. This brief shall be served upon the Auditor as well as all other parties. Meanwhile, Robert M. Mumma, II, filed a "Request for Order That Estate Has Waived Its Right To Contest a Disclaimer Filed and Revoked, or, Alternatively, Request for Immediate Hearing To Determine Whether the Estate Has Waived Its Right," on April 20, 2005. By order of court dated April 22, 2005, this question was included among the issues to be reviewed by the auditor in the course of his duties relating to the objections to the accounts. The date of docketing this latter order (April 25, 2005) suggests that it may be one of the interlocutory orders from which Robert M. Mumma, II, has appealed. However, it does not seem to be encompassed by his statement of matters complained of on appeal. Trial Court Opinion, Oler, J., 7/15/05, at 2-3, 6-10 (quotations, citations and footnotes om itted). Appellant raises two issues for our review: 1. Does an Estate beneficiary possess a property interest that creates a right to review records and papers of the Estate? 2. When a substantial question exists concerning the ownership of assets listed in the inventory of an Estate, is the questioning party entitled to a jury trial? Appellant's brief at 4. Prior to consideration of the merits of appellant's argument, we must first address appellees' contention that this appeal is interlocutory in nature - 6 - J. A40033/05 and, therefore, not appealable. Appellees' brief at 9. See Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796 (pa. Super. 2000) (it is incumbent upon this Court to determine, sua sponte when necessary, whether an appeal is taken from an appealable Order). Generally, "an appeal may be taken of right from any final order of an administrative agency or lower court." Pa.R.A.P. 341, Final Orders; Generally, (a) General rule. A final order is that which "disposes of all claims and of all parties; or...that is expressly defined as a final order by statute." Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) Definition of final order. "Conversely phrased, an order is interlocutory and not final unless it effectively puts the litigant out of court." T. C. R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 337, 372 A.2d 721, 724 (1977) (citations and internal quotations omitted). One exception to the general rule that an interlocutory order is not appealable is the collateral order doctrine, as codified in Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313, Collateral Orders. Pursuant to the rule, "[a]n appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of an administrative agency or a lower court." Id. (a) General rule. Collateral orders are appealable, and are recognized as final even if they do not dispose of all parties or claims. Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 725 A.2d 1209 (1999). Under this rule, an otherwise interlocutory order can be considered final and appealable if the order is: (1) collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) postponement of - 7 - J. A40033/05 review until final judgment will cause the claim to be irreparably lost. Pa.R.A.P. 313(b), Definition. To benefit from the collateral order doctrine, this Court consistently has held that the order must satisfy all three elements listed above. See Kovatch Enterprises v. Hazleton, 714 A.2d 464 (Pa. Super. 1998). "These prerequisites to appealability are narrowly construed to prevent the collateral order doctrine from subsuming the fundamental precept that only final orders are appealable." Van der Laan v. Nazareth Hosp., 703 A.2d 540, 541 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations omitted). After careful review, we agree with appellant's contention that the Orders in question satisfy the requirements set forth in Rule 313, and are therefore appealable. In the present case, the issue of whether appellant is permitted to inspect and review the inventory and accounting of decedent's Estate is clearly separate from and collateral to the main cause of action, the probate of the Estate. Similarly, this Court has long-recognized that the right to inspect and review the records of an Estate is an important power bestowed upon a beneficiary who possesses a property interest in that Estate. See In re Rosenblum's Estate, 459 Pa. 201, 328 A.2d 158 (1974) (a beneficiary's right of inspection has an independent source in his property interest in the estate, and this right may be exercised provided it is done in good faith and with due regard for the rights of other interested parties). - 8 - J. A40033/05 Moreover, to satisfy the third element of the collateral order doctrine, appellant must demonstrate his issue will actually be lost if review is postponed. Orders that make a trial inconvenient for one party or introduce potential inefficiencies are not considered irreparably lost. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 550 Pa. 298, 705 A.2d 830 (1998). An interest or issue must actually disappear due to the processes of trial. See In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that an order permitting the discovery of materials allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege will be lost if an immediate appeal is not allowed). Given the protracted nature of appellant's claims in this matter, we find collateral review is necessary to prevent further loss of appellant's due process rights in his property interests in decedent's estate. Accordingly, we now turn to appellant's claims. Appellant first argues the court erred in referring discovery matters in this case to an auditor and maintains that as "a beneficiary of his father's Estate... [he] is entitled to review the papers and records of the Estate." Appellant's brief at 14. We disagree. The "stewardship of the trial, including discovery rulings, are uniquely within the discretion of the trial judge, and, consequently, the court's rulings will not be reversed unless they are deemed to represent an abuse of discretion." George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 204 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). An abuse of discretion is "[n]ot merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or - 9 - J. A40033j05 misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record." Bowser v. Blom, 569 Pa. 609, 615-616, 807 A.2d 830, 834 (2002) (citations omitted). "Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or...does not follow legal procedure." Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 487 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations omitted). Here, we find the trial court did not err by referring the discovery matters to an auditor for initial review. It is well-settled that the Orphans' court division possesses a broad statutory authority to refer complicated discovery and factual investigations to an auditor or master. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. 9 751, Appointment; purpose, (1) Masters (2) Auditors of accounts of fiduciaries. Appellant has cited virtually no case law challenging this authority, and has failed to provide any evidence that he suffered prejudice, bias or ill-will as a result of the court's decision. Accordingly, appellant's claim of trial court error must fail. Appellant also maintains he "is entitled to a jury trial regarding the ownership of assets of his father's estate," and the trial court erred in denying him this right. Appellant's brief at 16. - 10 - J. A40033/05 "When a substantial dispute of fact shall arise concerning the decedent's title to property, real or personal, any party in interest shall be entitled to a trial of such issue by a jury." 20 Pa.C.S.A. g 777, Right to jury trial; discretion of orphans' court division, (a) Title to property. The determination of whether a substantial dispute exists is to be made only after consideration of the audit and the evidence in its entirety. More than 50 years ago in In re Rogers Estate, 379 Pa. 494, 108 A.2d 924 (1954), our Supreme Court stated: In the settlement of a decedent's estate disputed title to property should not be determined upon exceptions to an inventory and appraisement which happens not to include the property claimed on behalf of the estate. ...Such listing does not affect the true ownership and value. The question of ownership is of interest to creditors, federal and state taxing authorities, and others. Such title, therefore, should not be finally determined until after an audit, with due statutory notice, and the determination by the orphans' court whether or not a substantial issue of fact exists. Id. at 495-496, 108 A.2d at 924-925 (citations omitted); see also In re Nunnamaker's Estate, 452 Pa. 467, 308 A.2d 96 (1973). Similarly, a party's exceptions alone are insufficient to establish a substantial dispute. Id. In this case although almost 20 years have passed since decedent's death, the court has not yet had the opportunity to fully evaluate the disputes that may exist with regard to the decedent's property interests, and - 11 - J. A40033j05 it has assigned discovery matters to the auditor for clarification and review.1 As the trial court wisely noted: "[s]hould the auditor's hearings reveal otherwise, the matter of a jury trial on that issue can be revisited." Trial Court Opinion at 13. Accordingly, the Order denying appellant's request for a jury trial at this juncture of the proceeding was proper. Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered: March 7, 2006 Date: 1 We note there is some dispute over whether appellant actually possesses a legitimate property interest in decedent's Estate. As the trial court noted, one threshold question in this proceeding is whether appellant remains a beneficiary in light of his January 6, 1987 filing of an irrevocable disclaimer of his interest under the decedent's will. The trial court initially referred this issue to the auditor on April 22, 2005. See Trial Court Opinion at 10. - 12 -