The URL can be used to link to this page

Home My WebLink About06-3615r William P. Douglas, Esq. Supreme Court L.D. #37926 Douglas Law Office 27 W. High St. Carlisle, PA 17013 Telephone (717) 243-1790_ Edward Fred Davis In the Court of Common Pleas of Plaintiff Cumberland County, Pennsylvania vs No. 06- 3 (p 45 Civil Term Terry Eugene Moyer 811 Willow Grove Rd. Carlisle, PA 17013 Civil action law Defendant Jury Trial Demanded Praecipe to Issue a Writ of Summons Dear Mr. Long: Please issue a writ of summons against the defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer. William P. Dou 1 s, Esq. Attorney for tiff date: June 26, 2006 A ti r? n C m c. c? N -c? W -n .-1 _ -h ?r rc? ?`c? • .% Commonwealth of Pennsylvania County of Cumberland Edward Fred Davis In the Court of Common Pleas of Plaintiff Cumberland County, Pennsylvania vs No. 06 - '?)(. 15 Civil Term Terry Eugene Moyer 811 Willow Grove Rd. Carlisle, PA 17013 Civil action law Defendant Jury Trial Demanded Writ of Summons To: Terry Eugene Moyer 811 Willow Grove Rd. Carlisle, PA 17013 You are hereby notified that Edward Fred Davis has brought an action against you. date: June 26, 2006 William P. Douglas, Esq. Douglas Law Office 27 W. High St. Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 717-243-1790 Attorney for Plaintiff eputy thonotary IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EDWARD FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, NO. 06 - 3615 V. PRAECIPE FOR APPEARANCE TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, L.L.P. Firm #911 1017 Mumma Road, Suite 300 Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 901-5916 #14815 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, V. NO. 06 - 3615 TERRY EUGENE MOYER, (Jury Trial Demanded) Defendant. PRAECIPE FOR APPEARANCE TO: THE PROTHONOTARY Kindly enter the Appearance of the undersigned, Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire, of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, L.L.P., on behalf of the Defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer, in the above case. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, L.L.P. By: for Defendant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PRAECIPE FOR APPEARANCE has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this day of 2006. William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 27 West High Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, L.L.P. By: K in D. Rauch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant r-I 90 N IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EDWARD FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, NO. 06 - 3615 V. PRAECIPE FOR RULE TERRY EUGENE MOYER, TO FILE COMPLAINT Defendant. (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, L.L.P. Firm #911 1017 Mumma Road, Suite 300 Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 901-5916 #14815 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. CIVIL DIVISION NO. 06 - 3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) PRAECIPE FOR RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT TO: The Prothonotary Kindly rule the Plaintiff, Eugene Fred Davis, to file a Complaint in Civil Action within twenty (20) days. Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, L.L.P. By: 0. Rauch, Esquire el for Defendant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PRAECIPE FOR RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT has been mailed by U.S. '1 t;il f record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this day of 2006. William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 27 West High Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, Gl By Counsel for Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, V. NO. 06 - 3615 TERRY EUGENE MOYER, (Jury Trial Demanded) Defendant. RULE AND NOW, this 1?4k, day of « 14 .0 2006, upon consideration of Defendant's Praecipe for Rule to File a Complaint, a Rule is hereby granted upon Plaintiff to file a Complaint within twenty (20) days of service, or suffer judgment Non Pros. Rule issued this '?--day of Qr1 2006. Prothonotary otL p 1 G ? . A William P. Douglas, Esq. Supreme Court I.D. #37926 Douglas Law Office 27 W. High St. Carlisle, PA 17013 Telephone (717) 243-1790_ Edward Fred Davis In the Court of Common Pleas of Plaintiff Cumberland County, Pennsylvania vs Terry Eugene Moyer No. 06 - 3615 Civil Term Civil action law Defendant Jury Trial Demanded NOTICE YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND AGAINST THE CLAIMS SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES, YOU MUST TAKE ACTION WITHIN TWENTY DAYS AFTER THIS COMPLAINT AND NOTICE ARE SERVED, BY ENTERING A WRITTEN APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY ATTORNEY AND FILING IN WRITING WITH THE COURT YOUR DEFENSES OR OBJECTIONS TO THE CLAIMS SET FORTH AGAINST YOU. YOU ARE WARNED THAT IF YOU FAIL TO DO SO, THE CASE MAY PROCEED WITHOUT YOU AND A JUDGMENT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU BY THE COURT WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE FOR ANY MONEY CLAIMED IN THE COMPLAINT OR FOR ANY OTHER CLAIM OR RELIEF REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. YOU MAY LOSE MONEY OR PROPERTY OR OTHER RIGHTS IMPORTANT TO YOU. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE. Cumberland County Bar Association 32 S. Bedford Street Carlisle PA 17013 717-249-3166 DATE: August 23, 2006 BY Complaint 1. The plaintiff, Edward Fred Davis, is an adult individual residing at 1584 Newville Rd., Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. The Defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer, is an adult individual residing at 811 Willow Grove Rd., Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. On or about, June 27, 2004, the plaintiff was operating his motorcycle on Newville Rd. (Pa 641) at/or near the intersection with Meetinghouse Road, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 4. At about the same time and place, the defendant was operating his vehicle on Newville Rd. (Pa. 641) and attempted to turn left on Meetinghouse Rd. immediately into the path of the plaintiff. 5. The defendant failed to yield the right of way to oncoming traffic. 6. The impact occurred as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence. 7. The defendant was negligent in the following respects: a) failing to maintain a proper lookout; b) failing to drive his vehicle in his own lane of travel; c) failing to yield to oncoming traffic; d) failing to drive within the assured clear distance ahead. 8. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendant the plaintiff was injured, her injuries include, but are not limited to: a) injury to his nerves and nervous system; b) injury to his bones, joints, spine and supporting structures; c) chronic pain and discomfort; d) lacerations and contusions. 9. As a result of his injuries, the plaintiff has incurred various expenses including medical expenses in the past and may continue to incur the same in the future. 10. As a result of his injuries, the plaintiff has incurred pain and suffering and may continue to incur the same in the future. 11. As a result of his injuries the plaintiff has incurred aggravation, inconvenience, disability, disfigurement and a loss of life's pleasures, and may continue to incur the same in the future. 12. As a result of the injuries the plaintiff sustained, the plaintiff has lost wages and the plaintiff's economic horizons may be limited. Wherefore it is prayed that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in an amount in excess of that requiring compulsory referral to arbitration. A jury trial is hereby demanded. August 23, 2006 William P. Douglas, Attorney for Pla AFFIDAVIT I hereby swear or affirm that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and/or information and belief. This is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. A=?_ (?\?` William P. Douglas Date: August 23, 2006 d n-1 ,c.? ._1 .... C M r W 2? ?_:: N rn IN THE COURT OF COMW EDWARD FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. TO: Plaintiff You are hereby notified to file Response to the enclosed An New Matter within twenty (20) From service hereof or a judg May be gntereAagaiA you. Guthrie & Skeel, L.L.P. #14815 PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vritten er and CIVIL DIVISION NO. 06 - 3615 ANSWER AND NEW MATTER (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, L.L.P. Firm #911 1017 Mumma Road, Suite 300 Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 901-5916 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. CIVIL DIVISION NO. 06 - 3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) 7 AND NOW, comes attorneys, Summers, Esquire, and files the follows: Defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer, by and through his ell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, L.L.P. and Jason P. Wrona, Nnswer and New Matter and in support thereof avers as ANSWER 1. After reasonab a investigation, the Defendant has insufficient information as to the truth or falsity of aid averments, therefore said averments are denied and strict proof thereof is demand d at the time of trial. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. 5. Paragraph 5 st tes legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent, however, that a r sponse is deemed necessary, said averments are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C. . 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 6. Admitted in p 'rt and denied in part. It is admitted that a collision occurred between the vehicles on th date, time and place of the subject accident. The remainder of the averments of requires. To the extent, are denied generally pu demanded at the time of 1 7. Admitted in negligently operated his veh remainder of Paragraph 7 , that a response is deemed necessary, said averments to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is and denied in part. It is admitted that the Defendant on the date, time and place of the subject accident. The all of its subparts stated legal conclusions to which no response is requires. To th extent, however, that a response is deemed necessary, said averments are denied g nerally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 8. Paragraph 8 and all of its subparts stated legal conclusions to which no response is requires. To th extent, however, that a response is deemed necessary, said averments are denied g nerally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the tirlne of trial. 9. Paragraph 9 states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent, however, tha a response is deemed necessary, said averments are denied generally pursuant o Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. raph 6 state legal conclusions to which no response is 10. Paragraph 10 sates a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent, however, tha a response is deemed necessary, said averments are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of 11. Paragraph 11 states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent, however, th t a response is deemed necessary, said averments are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of trial. 12. Paragraph 12 tates a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent, however, th t a response is deemed necessary, said averments are denied generally pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d) and (e). Strict proof thereof is demanded at the time of WHEREFORE, D Honorable Court enter judg prejudice imposed. 13. The motor Motor Vehicle Financial Res nt, Terry Eugene Moyer, respectfully requests this it in his favor and against the Plaintiff with cost and NEW MATTER accident in controversy is subject to the Pennsylvania sibility Law and this Defendant asserts, as affirmative defenses, all rights, privilege and/or immunities accruing pursuant to said statute. 14. Some and/or a I of Plaintiffs claims for damages are items of economic detriment which are or could le compensable pursuant to either the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and/or other collateral sources and same may not be duplicated in the present lawsuit. 15. To the extent that the Plaintiff has selected the limited tort option or is deemed to have selected the limited tort option then this Defendant sets forth the relevant provisions of the P nnsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law as a bar to the Plaintiffs ability t recover non-economic damages. 16. This Defenda t pleads any and all applicable statutes of limitation under Pennsylvania Law as a complete or partial bar to any recovery by Plaintiffs in this action. WHEREFORE, Honorable Court enter prejudice imposed. lant, Terry Eugene Moyer, respectfully requests this ent in his favor and against the Plaintiff with cost and Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL,. L.r1P. By: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer and New Matter has been mail d by U.S. =i94- sel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this day of , 2006. William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 27 West High Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEET,., LI.P. By: Q ww?i Ke in D. Rauch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant VERIFICATION Defendant verifies that he is the Defendant in the foregoing action; that the foregoing ANSWER AND NEW MATTER is based upon information which he has fumished to his counsel anld information which has been gathered by his counsel in the preparation of the lawsuit. The language of the ANSWER AND NEW MATTER is that of counsel and not of the Defendant. Defendant has read the ANSWER AND NEW MATTER and to the extent that the ANSWER AND NEW MATTER is based upon information which he has given to his counsel, it is true and correct to the best of his ?I knowledge, information andl belief. To the extent that the content of the ANSWER AND NEW MATTER is that of counsel, he has relied upon counsel in making this Affidavit. I Defendant understands thatfalse statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: Terry Eug e Moyer, efendant II #14815 ? _ ? il ?._ r:- _{ ?!' i SHERIFF'S RETURN - REGULAR CASE NO: 2006-03615 P COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND DAVIS EDWARD FRED VS MOYER TERRY EUGENE SHARON LANTZ , Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of Cumberland County,Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according to law, says, the within WRIT OF SUMMONS was served upon MOYER TERRY EUGENE the DEFENDANT , at 1538:00 HOURS, on the 30th day of June 2006 at 811 WILLOW GROVE ROAD CARLISLE, PA 17013 DONALD MOYER, BROTHER by handing to ADULT IN CHARGE a true and attested copy of WRIT OF SUMMONS together with and at the same time directing His attention to the contents thereof. Sheriff's Costs: Docketing Service Postage Surcharge Sworn and Subscibed to before me this of So Answers: 18.00 , 4.40 .39 10.00 R. Thomas Kline .00 32.79 ? 07/05/2006 DOUGLAS LAW OFFICE By: day Deputy Sherif , A.D. A Z William P. Douglas, Esq. Supreme Court I.D. #37926 Douglas Law Office 27 W. High St. Carlisle, PA 17013 Telephone (717) 243-1790_ Edward Fred Davis In the Court of Common Pleas of Plaintiff Cumberland County, Pennsylvania vs No. 06 - 3615 Civil Term Terry Eugene Moyer Civil action law Defendant Jury Trial Demanded Plaintiffs Reply to New Matter 13. Denied. The allegation is denied as a legal conclusion to which no response is necessary. 14. Denied. The plaintiff was operating a motorcycle and therefore the Pa MVFRL may not apply. 15. Denied. Tort election is not applicable to motorcycles. 16. Denied. The allegation is denied as a legal conclusion to which no response is necessary. Wherefore it is prayed that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in an amount in excess of that requiring compulsory referral to arbitration. A jury trial is hereby demanded. Respectful' submitted, William P. Dougla sq. October 9, 2006 Attorney for P' ff J 4 AFFIDAVIT I hereby swear or affirm that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and/or information and belief. This is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. ?- q ?\ " tl? William P. Douglas Date: October 9, 2006 r-a t"? . C . t-t? r-- r ; y r', _: _ r-.- ? 7? __ _,. ,._ . .. _, , . , t ?? , ` ..?_ ?; IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVI S, Plaintiff, V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. CIVIL DIVISION NO. 06 - 3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS TO THE HONORABLE, THE JUDGES OF SAID COURT: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire, and Erick V. Violago, Esquire, counsel for the Defendant in the above action, respectfully represent that: 1. The above-captioned action is at issue. 2. The claim of the Plaintiff in the action is within the arbitration limits of Cumberland County. 3. The parties have agreed to list this case for arbitration. The following are interested in the case as counsel or are otherwise disqualified to sit as arbitrators: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire; Erick V. Violago, Esquire; and William P. Douglas, Esquire. WHEREFORE, your Petitioner prays your Honorable Court to appoint three (3) arbitrators to whom the case shall be submitted. Respectfully submitted, GUTHRI & SKE MALI.-I By: Kevin Bch, Esquire Erick V. Violago, Esquire Counsel for Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, V. NO. 06 - 3615 TERRY EUGENE MOYER, (Jury Trial Demanded) Defendant. ORDER AND NOW, in consideration of the foregoing Petitioner, Esquire, , Esquire, and Esquire are appointed in the above-captioned action as prayed for. BY THE COURT: J. ` M CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this ? \ day of l.t. , 2008. William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 43 West South Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, L.L.P. By: 1? i?4 Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant ' ? te O -r ± 1 r - wQ (24 m IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, V. NO. 06 - 3615 TERRY EUGENE MOYER, (Jury Trial Demanded) Defendant. ORDER ND NOW, 3( in grisideration of the foregoing Petitioner, Ate. Es ire, Esquire, and E uire are appointed i the above-captioned action as prayed for. BY TH T: /?'Ioo J. ELI CIO LLI i LI > A _ .3 GL 0 u tea ? ? d w IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EDWARD FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, NO. 06 - 3615 V. PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW TERRY EUGENE MOYER, ARBITRATOR Defendant. (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, L.L.P. Firm #911 1017 Mumma Road, Suite 300 Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 901-5916 #14815 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, CIVIL DIVISION V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. NO. 06 - 3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW ARBITRATOR 1. This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred between the parties on June 27, 2004. 2. The arbitration of this case is scheduled to take place on Monday, December 8, 2008. (A true and correct copy of the Notice of Hearing by Board of Arbitrators is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 3. Jeanne B. Costopoulos, Esquire, was appointed as an arbitrator. (See Exhibit "A"). 4. Ms. Costopoulos should be replaced as an arbitrator because her impartiality may reasonably be questioned. 5. Under Pa.R.C.P. 1302(e), a member of a Board of Arbitrators shall immediately withdraw as an arbitrator for any reason that would disqualify a Judge under the Code of Judicial Conduct. 6. Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, subsection C, a Judge should disqualify themselves in a proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 7. In the instant case, Ms. Costopoulos was involved in an accident in Cumberland County, and filed a lawsuit from which she will allege personal injury. Given that she is situated in a position similar to the Plaintiff in this case, and her action is currently still pending, her impartiality may reasonably be questioned. (A true and correct copy of the Writ of Summons filed by Ms. Costopoulos is attached hereto as Exhibit "B") 8. As such, Ms. Costopoulos should be replaced as an arbitrator by another member from the pool of arbitrators. 9. Defense counsel contacted Plaintiffs counsel and discussed the above issues. Plaintiffs counsel is in agreement and has no objection to the appointment of a new arbitrator. WHEREFORE, the Defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer, respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter an Order striking Jeanne Costopoulos as an arbitrator and appoint a new arbitrator in her place. Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, GUTHRIE & $KEEL, ".P. By: LMA in . Ra h, Esquire tc v unsel for Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, CIVIL DIVISION V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. AND NOW, TO WIT this NO. 06 - 3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) ORDER day of 2008, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Jeanne B. Costopoulos is stricken as an arbitrator in the above-captioned matter. In her place Esquire is appointed as an arbitrator for the arbitration scheduled to take place on Monday, December 8, 2008, at 8:30 a.m. BY THE COURT: J. Distribution to: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, L.L.P. 1017 Mumma Road, Suite 300 Lemoyne, PA 17043 William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 43 West South Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW ARBITRATOR has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this day of LxMtL , 2008. William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 43 West South Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, L.L.P. By: r K v D. au h, Esquire ounsel I; Defendant ?_) F..? '" `?"7 `?.? r j ?T ?,__a i .?- +• , ?,-• tr?.. r, :. , ;'r °`°.s ?" EDWARD FRED DAVIS, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : TERRY EUGENE MOYER, DEFENDANT 06-3615 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ay of November, 2008, the appointment of Jeann6 Costopoulos, Esquire, to the Board of Arbitrators in the above-captioned case, IS VACATED. David W. Knauer, Esquire, is appointed in her place. By the Edgar B. Bayley, J. Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire Chairman --?David W. Knauer, Esquire Court Administrator - (2 !y? :sal Cap t1ES,-nu tLfi-L /l qoe y ?3 :T NOV 10 2008 GI IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. CIVIL DIVISION NO. 06 - 3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) ORDER AND NOW, TO WIT this 0 -a day of ?WA&X? , 2008, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Jeanne B. Costopoulos is stricken as an arbitrator in the above-captioned matter. In her place t1) &),? Esquire is appointed as an arbitrator for the arbitration scheduled to take place on Monday, December 8, 2008, at 8:30 a.m. BY THE COURT: G J. Distribution to: Xeevin D. Rauch, Esquire Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, L.L.P. 1017 Mumma Road, Suite 300 Lemoyne, PA 17043 ll/illiam P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 43 West South Street P.O. Box 261 , Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 N r c ) N U r-AM,44eD MiFb ?NAVis Plaintiff ,es, Eus?r? Moy?z Defendant "- conc?_ t ?? PC Law Firm We do solemnly swear (or affirm) that we will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth and that we will discharge the duties of our office with fidelity. %1 - (i , ? gee Signature tA 0AVk4 ?J_ Name (Chairman) Name Name Sr, „„, Law Firm Address ICI G City, zip 310 K - V /I-?,cY/?. Law Firm Address . *_OM' ?s City, p Address c-? ?FA?on-u -n City, Zip In The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania No. OW - 3 Q 15 Civil Action - Law. Oath -A l S 4av ? 104S.3 -* 1889? Award We, the undersigned arbitrators, having been duly appointed and sworn (or affirmed), make the following award: (No damages for(?delay are awarded, they shall beaWarately stated.) Date of Hearing: 1-2-1 Date of Award: low, . Arbitrator, dissents. Notice of Entry of Award .sert name if applicable (Chairman) Now, the -day of 20?, at _.M., the above award was entered upon the docket and notice thereof given by mail to the parties or their attorneys. Arbitr4tors' compensation to be paid upon appeal: $_?`?'!' By: thonotary Deputy co V ? v IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EDWARD FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, NO. 06 - 3615 V. NOTICE OF APPEAL TERRY EUGENE MOYER, FROM AWARD OF BOARD OF Defendant. ARBITRATORS (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, L.L.P. Firm #911 1017 Mumma Road, Suite 300 Lemoyne, PA 17043 (717) 901-5916 #14815 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, V. NO. 06 - 3615 TERRY EUGENE MOYER, (Jury Trial Demanded) Defendant. NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM AWARD OF BOARD OF ARBITRATORS TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Notice is given that the Defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer, appeals from the award of the board of arbitrators entered in this case on December 8, 2008. I certify that the compensation of the arbitrators has been paid. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED. Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, L.L.P. 1- By: J Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM AWARD OF BOARD OF ARBITRATORS has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this CLl32d day of aCelr&-K- , 2008. William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 43 West South Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE $ SKEEL, L.L.P. By. L L t Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Counsel for Defendant 1-4 ? l C • ' W t ?5 00 LA F1LE"L."1--1- -; _ 2GIG FED 2' F1111 3' 25 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EDWARD FRED DAVIS, CIVIL DIVISION Plaintiff, NO. 06 - 3615 V. MOTION FOR PARTIAL TERRY EUGENE MOYER, SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant. (Jury Trial Demanded) Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Counsel of Record for This Party: Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Pa. I.D. #83058 Seth T. Black, Esquire Pa. I.D. #203075 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE and SKEEL, P.C. Firm #911 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 (717) 901-5916 #14815 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, CIVIL DIVISION V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. NO. 06 - 3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NOW, comes the Defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer, by and through his counsel, Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, P.C., and files the following Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in support thereof avers as follows: 1. BACKGROUND FACTS 1. This matter arises from an automobile accident, which occurred on June 27, 2004, at the intersection of Route 641 and Meeting House Road in Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. At that time, the Defendant was traveling northbound on Route 641 and the Plaintiff was proceeding southbound on Route 641. 3. The Defendant turned left in front of the Plaintiff, who was forced to lay down his motorcycle. 4. The Defendant has admitted liability for causing the accident. As a result, the sole issue for trial will be damages. 5. After the accident, the Plaintiff received medical treatment, which was paid by his private health insurer, Pennsylvania Employee Benefit Trust Fund (PEBTF). 6. PEBTF has not asserted a lien; however, the Plaintiff plans to claim these paid medical bills at the time of trial. 7. The Defendant now brings this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking a judicial determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to double recovery for these medical bills. Il. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 8. In Pennsylvania, a Motion for Summary Judgment may be properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, Answers to Interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and expert reports show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hopewell Estates, Inc., v. Kent, 646 A.2d 1192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2. 9. Summary Judgment serves to eliminate a waste of judicial time and resources in cases where a trial would be a useless formality. Lies v. Balmer, 547 A.2d 691 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 10. Partial Summary Judgment is appropriate in this matter as no facts are needed to determine whether the anti-subrogation provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) apply to this suit. Ill. ARGUMENT a. Section 1722 precludes the introduction of paid medical bills 11. Section 1722 of the MVFRL, Preclusion of Recovering Required Benefits, precludes parties from recovering the amount of benefits paid and/or payable by first- party coverage or by private health insurance for medical expenses averred to be consequent from a motor vehicle accident. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1722. 12. The language of Section 1722 specifically states as follows: In any action for damages against a tortfeasor . . . arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, a person who is eligible to receive benefits under the coverages ... as defined in section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits) shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits paid.... 13. Section 1719(b) defines "program, group contract or other arrangement" as "benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation subject to 40 Pa.C.S. Ch. 61 (relating to hospital plan corporations) or Ch. 63 (relating to professional health services plan corporations). 75 Pa.C.S. § 1719(b). 14. As identified above, the Plaintiff is seeking to introduce medical bills paid by PEBTF, who is not asserting a lien against the Plaintiff's recovery. 15. PEBTF is clearly a professional health service corporation. 16. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's paid medical bills should be precluded at trial pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1722. 17. It is anticipated that the Plaintiff will argue that Section 1722 does not apply in this matter because the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle at the time of the accident. 18. There are no binding decisions from the Pennsylvania Supreme or Superior Court on this issue; however, other Courts of Common Pleas have found this argument less than persuasive. See _Ferri v. Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Erie County Court of Common Pleas (July 24, 2002) and Lillev v. Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania, Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas (June 1999) attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 19. As stated above, Section 1722 of the motor vehicle code applies when the accident occurs from maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. 20. The motor vehicle code defines motorcycle as a "motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground." 75 Pa.C.S. § 102 (emphasis added). 21. Accordingly, Section 1722 precludes double recovery of medical bills even when an individual is traveling on a motorcycle at the time of an accident. b. Section 1720 precludes any claim of subrogation by PEBTF 22. The Plaintiff may claim that PEBTF has an automatic right of subrogation and could assert a lien at any time; however, section 1720 of the Motor Vehicle Code precludes subrogation by PEBTF. 23. Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provides: In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to ... benefits paid or payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement whether primary or excess under section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits). 75 Pa.C.S. § 1720. 24. For the same reasons outlined above, section 1720 should apply to a motorcycle as it is defined as a "motor vehicle." C. Preemption of section 1720 25. It is also anticipated that the Plaintiff make argue that PEBTF is a qualified ERISA plan and thus is entitled to recovery under federal law. 26. The United States Supreme Court held in F.M.C. Corp. v. Holiday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) that if the health insurer is fully self-funded then the plan qualifies for reimbursement under ERISA law, which would preempt section 1720 of the MVFRL. 27. However, PEBTF was not a qualifying plan under ERISA at the time of the accident or when any of the Plaintiff's medical bills were paid. See Scalice v. PEBTF, 883 A.2d 429 (Pa. 2005); Wimer v. PEBTF, 939 A.2d 843 (Pa. 2007). 28. As a result, even if PEBTF was asserting a lien they would be not entitled to preemption of section 1720 under ERISA. WHEREFORE, the Defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer, respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter an Order finding that the Plaintiff is not entitled to claim paid medical bills in this matter. Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, P.C. By: Seth T. Black, Esquire Counsel for Defendant ERIE COUNTY LEGAL JOURNAL 190 Ferri v. Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield TERRY FERRI and DENISE FERRI V HIGHMARK BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD CIVIL PROCEDUREISUMMARYJUDGMENT Summary judgment may be granted only in those cases in which there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law. PERSONAL INJURY/INSURANCE/SUBROGATION The purpose of subrogation is to place the burden of the debt upon the person who should bear it. The equitable doctrine of subrogation places the subrogee in the precise position of the one to whose rights and disabilities he is subrogated. An insurer who indemnifies a party for a loss on which that party has also recovered from a third party should be restored for those costs. In this way, the cost of the harm will be placed on the party who should bear it, and the insured will not enjoy a "double recovery" to the detriment of the insurer. The insurer's restoration should be limited to recovering in subrogation the amount received by the subrogor relative to the claim paid by the subrogee, for equity will not allow the subrogee's claim to be placed ahead of the subrogor's. PERSONAL INJURY/MOTOR VEHICLES/SUBROGATION Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania MVFRA prohibits subrogation in actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a "motor vehicle" with respect to a claimant's recovery of benefits, with respect to worker's compensation benefits, benefits available under section 171 1 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate lira its) or benefits paid or payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement whether primary of excess under section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits). MOTOR VEHICLE CODE/DEFINITIONS Although the term "motor vehicle" is not defined in the MVFRA it is defined in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, as "a vehicle which is self-propelled except one which is propelled solely by human power or by electric power..." "Motorcycle" is defined as "a motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on no more than three wheels in contact with the ground." ST,4TUTORY INTERPRETATION When the language of a statute is free from all ambiguity, the plain language of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. When the language of a statute is ambiguous, statutory interpretation must be performed and may include consideration of the legislative history of the relevant statute, the purpose of the statute, and the consequences of a particular interpretation. Moreover, a Court must construe a statute in a manner to give effect to every word contained in the statute. ERIE COUNTY LEGAL JOURNAL Ferri v. Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield 191 MOTOR VEHICLES/SUBROGATION/STATUTORY INTERPRETATION .Section 1720 states that subrogation is not permitted in actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The Motor Vehicle Code unambiguously states that a "'motorcycle" is a "motor vehicle." In instances where the legislature chose to treat motorcycles differently in the MVFRA, it set forth its intention with specificity. The legislature chose not to make a distinction with regard to the subrogation provision. To conclude that the legislature meant something entirely different would require the court to speculate, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature, and ignore the necessity to give effect to the plain meaning of the relevant statutory provisions. Limitations on the right of subrogation are consistent with the conceptual foundation of the MVFRA. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 13275-2000 Appearances: Kevin C. Jennings, Esquire for the Plaintiffs Gerri L. Sperling, Esquire for the Defendant OPINION Bozza, John A., J. This matter is before the Court on cross Motions for Summary Judgment tiled by plaintiffs, Terry and Denise Ferri, and defendant, Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield (herein "Highmark"). The factual history of the case is as follows. On July 31, 1999, plaintiff Terry Ferri was operating his motorcycle when he collided with an automobile operated by Frank Alvin Moore. Mr. Ferri sustained numerous injuries, requiring extended hospitalization. Mr. Ferri's medical expenses were paid by Highmark through his health care plan with his employer, Dresser Industries, Inc. and the plaintiffs have settled their third party action against Mr. Moore with his insurance carrier, Erie Insurance Exchange. Highmark informed plaintiffs.that it would seek subrogation to recover $32,857.53 from plaintiffs' third party settlement, arguing that because Mr. Ferri was operating a motorcycle at the time of his accident, the anti-subrogation provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act would not be applicable. On September 21, 2000, plaintiffs filed an Action for Declarative Judgment, in which they seek a judicial determination of whether the defendant has a right of subrogation. Summaryjudgment may be granted only in those cases in which there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law. Harleysville Insurance Cos. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co., 795 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2002). The parties agree that the matter is ripe for summary judgment. The purpose of subrogation is to "place the burden of debt upon the person who should bear it." Allstate Ins. Co. v Clarke, 364 Pa.Super. 196, ERIE COUNTY LEGAL JOURNAL 192 Ferri v. F{ighmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield 202, 527 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1987). Further, "the equitable doctrine of subrogation places the subrogee in the precise position of the one to whose rights and disabilities he is subrogated." Id., citing Michel v City of Bethlehem, 84 Pa.Ctnwlth. 43, 478 A.2d 164 (1984). An insurer-who indemnifies a party for a loss on which that party has also recovered from a third party should be restored for those costs. Id. In this way, the cost of the harm will be placed on the party who should bear it, and the insured will not enjoy a "double recovery" to the detriment of the insurer. Id. It should be noted that the insurer's restoration "should be limited to recovering in subrogation the amount received by the subrogor relative to the claim paid by the subrogee, for equity will not allow the subrogee's claim to be placed ahead ofthe subrogor's." Id., 364 Pa.Super. at 201-202, 527 A.2d at 1024 (emphasis in the original). According to the contract between Highmark and Dresser Industries, Inc, Mr. Ferri's employer, Highmark has the right of subrogation to "succeed to any rights or recovery of a Subscriber for expenses incurred against any person or organization except insurers or policies or health insurance issued to and in the name of the Subscriber," and has the right to recover "to the extent that benefits for Covered Services are provided or paid under this Contract." Primary Care Designated Gatekeeper Health Care Contract, p. 64, T. Subrogation (1). The contract specifically mandates that those portions of the contract concerning subrogation "shall not apply where subrogation is specifically prohibited by law." Primary Care Designated Gatekeeper Health Care Contract, p. 64, T. 5ubrogalion (3). Highmark's contract also precludes coverage for treatment associated with injuries received from the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle if such treatment "is paid or payable under a plan or policy of motor vehicle insurance including... any medical benefits payable in any manner under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act." Primary Care Designated Gatekeeper Health Care Contract, p. 59. The Court's analysis must then turn to the relevant portions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act (herein "MVFRA"). Section 1720 prohibits subrogation "in actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" with respect to a claimant's recovery of benefits with respect to workers' compensation benefits, benefits available under section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) or benefits paid or payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement whether primary or excess under section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits). 75 P.S. § 1720 Therefore in order for the anti-subrogation section to be applicable to plaintiffs' situation, the accident must have occurred as the result of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. ERIE COUNTY LEGAL JOURNAL Ferri v. Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield 193 Since it is undisputed that Mr. Ferri was operating a motorcycle at the time of the accident, the Court must determine if the term "motor vehicle" as used in section 1720 includes a "motorcycle". Although the term "motor vehicle" is not defined in MVFRA it is defined in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, as "a vehicle which is self-propelled except one which is propel led solely by human power or by electric power... ", while ``motorcycle" is defined as "a motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on no more than three wheels in contact with the ground." 75 P.S. § 102. Highmark correctly notes that within the MVFRA, motorcycles are treated differently than other motor vehicles with regard to certain benefit provisions. For example, Section 1711 of the MVFRA requires that coverage for medical benefits in the amount of $5,000 be provided for `'any motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title, except... motorcycles" and several other specified vehicles. 75 P.S. §1711(A). First-party benefits for medical treatment, income loss, accidental death, and other similar benefits must also be made available for purchase to cover any motor vehicle, except motorcycles and other specified vehicles. 75 P.S. §1712. An operator of a motorcycle cannot recover first party benefits. 75 P.S. § 1714. In addition, in any action for damages against a tortfeasor, or in any uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeding, arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, a person who is eligible to receive benefits under the coverages set forth in this subchapter... or any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits) shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits paid or payable under this subchapter... or any program, group contact or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719.1 75 P.S. § 1722. Highmark argues that by making these distinctions that the legislature intended to treat operators of motor vehicles differently with regard to the right to subrogation. When the language of a statute is free from all ambiguity, the plain language of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of ' Section 1719 defines the term "program, group contract or other arrangement" to include "benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation subject to Pa.C.S. Ch. 61." 75 P.S. § 1719. Defendant is a hospital plan corporation governed by 40 P.S. §61, since it is an entity that provides benefits in the Commonwealth for medical and other like expenses, provides these benefits by reimbursement, and is not subject to the jurisdiction of another agency of the Commonwealth or the Federal Government with respect to financial solvency. 40 P.S. §61(a). ERIE COUNTY LEGAL JOURNAL 194 Ferri v. Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield pursuing its spirit. 1 P.S. § 1921(b). When the language of a statute is ambiguous, statutory interpretation must be performed and may include consideration ofthe legislative history ofthe relevant statute, the purpose of the statute, and the consequences of a particular interpretation 1 P.S. § 1921(c); Oberneder a Link Computer Corp., 548 Pa. 201, 696 A.2d 148 (1997). Moreover, a Court must construe a statute in a manner intended to give effect to every word contained in the statute. Robson a EMC Ins. Cos., 785 A.2d 507 (Pa.Super. 2001). In this case, the plain language of section 1720 states that subrogation is not permitted in actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The Motor Vehicle Code unambiguously states that a "motorcycle" is a "motor vehicle." In those instances where the Pennsylvania legislature chose to treat motorcycles differently in the MVFRA, it set forth its intention with specificity. The legislature chose not to make such a distinction with regard to the subrogation provision. To conclude that the legislature meant something entirely different would require the court to speculate, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature, and ignore the necessity to give effect to the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions. While the Court is most cognizant of Highmark's conceptual arguments, limitations on the right of subrogation are consistent with the conceptual foundation of the MVFRA. Preventing double recovery by an injured party and limiting the financial exposure of third party liability carriers are important components of a legislative scheme intended to control the costs of motor vehicle insurance. So even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that the statutory language is not sufficiently clear, the intent of the legislature is not thwarted in any way by including motorcycles in the definition of.motor vehicles in section 1720. Insurers of persons operating motorcycles would receive the same financial benefits as insurers of operators of other motor vehicles which would result in lower costs to the consumer. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it must be concluded that Highmark's subrogation claim cannot stand and an appropriate order shall follow. ORDER AND NOW, to-wit, this 2411 day of July, 2002, upon consideration of the plaintiffs' and defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment, and argument thereon, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED and defendant's Motion is DENIED. Signed this 24'h day of July 2002. By the Court, /s/ John A. Bozza, Judge IN THE COURT OF COMMON PL§EAS OF LYCOMING COUNTY, PA FRED LILLEY & KAREN LILLEY, Plaintiffs V. NO.: 98-00,805 BLUE CROSS OF NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA OPINION and ORDER In this declaratory judgment action the court is asked to determine whether Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania has a right of subrogation against the proceeds of a settlement received by its insured, Fred Lilley, in his third party action against Emily Barr, the driver who injured him. That settlement contained only a lump sum amount, with no indication whether any portion was attributable to medical expenses. The court finds that § 1720 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §1701 et seq., does not prevent Blue Cross from subrogation because Mr. Lilley was driving a motorcycle when the accident occurred. Therefore, if Mr. Lilley had recovered medical benefits from Ms. Barr, Blue Cross would have a right to reimbursement for those expenses.' However, the court finds that the settlement does not contain a recovery for medical expenses because §1722 of the MVFRL law prevents a plaintiff from recovering damages in a tort action which were already paid by the plaintiffs own insurance company. This prohibition exists to further one of the primary purposes of the MVFRL: to hold down the skyrocketing costs of automobile insurance in the ' Subrogation normally permits an insurance company to recover benefits it has paid from the tort-feasor who caused the harm. However, the theory of equitable subrogation applies here, which permits the insurance company to be reimbursed by an insured who has already recovered from a tort-feasor. Allstate Insurance Company v. Clarke 364 Pa. Super. 196, 201, 527 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1987). Commonwealth. Since Mr. Lilley could not recover from Ms. Barr the amount of medical expenses paid by Blue Cross, the settlement must be deemed to contain no recovery for those medical expenses. Therefore, there is nothing to subrogate, and Blue Cross is entitled to no funds from. Mr. Lilley. Factual Background On May 20, 1997 a motorcycle operated by Mr. Lilley collided with an automobile operated by Ms. Barr and insured by Allstate Insurance Company. Mr. Lilley incurred medical expenses as a result of that accident and Blue Cross paid those expenses pursuant to his health insurance policy with the company. That policy contained a subrogation provision allowing Blue Cross to recover medical payments made to Mr. Lilley if he recovered from a tort-feasor. Mr. and Mrs. Lilley sued Ms. Barr and Allstate in a third party action. On 10 March 1998 Blue Cross informed them it was seeking subrogation. The Lilleys then filed this declaratory action against Ms. Barr, Allstate, and Blue Cross, requesting the court to decide whether they could recover medical benefits from the tort-feasor and whether Blue Cross had a right to subrogation. The third party action was settled, with a lump sum payment made to the Lilleys. Allstate and Ms. Barr were released from this declaratory action, leaving the Lilleys and Blue Cross to fight over the proceeds. Both parties have filed motions for summaryjudgment and agree summary judgment is now appropriate.' Discussion The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. ' A motion for summaryjudgment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1035.1 et seq. may be granted when, as here, there is no dispute as to any material fact. -2- § 1701 et seq., has two primary purposes: to reduce the escalating costs of purchasing motor vehicle coverage in the Commonwealth and to provide prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims. Danko v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 428 Pa. Super. 223, 630 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1993). The attempt to hold down costs clashes with an injured victim's desire to receive multiple benefits when more than one insurance policy applies to a motor vehicle accident. This collision threatens one of the most basic principles of American tort law: that a wrongdoer should not benefit from the fact that his victim has purchased an insurance policy to cover his injuries. This policy is embodied in the "collateral source" rule, which has traditionally prevented the introduction of evidence of compensation from a source other than the tort-feasor because it is irrelevant to the damages the tort-feasor owes the victim.' The collateral source rule is also based on the standard contract law principle that when an individual pays for a policy he or she is entitled to the benefits due under that policy, regardless of how many other policies the insured purchased. The carriers who have promised to pay certain expenses-and who have received premiums in exchange-will be held to their promises. The MVFRL, as interpreted by this court, strikes a balance between the policies served by the collateral source rule and the legislature's desire to hold down automobile insurance costs. It does this by permitting individuals injured in an automobile accident to recover from multiple policies which they have purchased. See § 1719. However, it also prohibits plaintiffs from recovering those same benefits from another person's insurance policy. See § 1722. Although Blue Cross argues that this ' This is the flip side of the "eggshell plaintiff' rule, under which a tort-feasor must take his victim as he is-if the victim is unusually fragile and incurs greater injury than the average person, the tort-feasor must nonetheless pay the damages. -3- prohibition applies to automobile insurance policies only, and not health insurance policies, the court finds it is a broad prohibition covering health insurance policies, as well. The bottom line is that a plaintiff is entitled to all applicable benefits from the policies he or she has purchased-automobile insurance as well as health insurance-but a plaintiff cannot command a double recovery by receiving those same benefits from someone else's insurance policy. From this basic plan the legislature, for whatever reason, has exempted motorcycles. Under the MVFRL, motorcycle insurance policies are not required to provide the same first party benefits as automobile insurance policies. See § 1711, § 1712, § 1715. And the Act also does not prohibit subrogation when the insured was driving a motorcycle. See § 1720. However, the Act prevents all plaintiffs-including motorcyclists-from recovering from the tort-feasor benefits already received under a plaintiffs own insurance policies. § 1722. Therefore, the Lilleys' settlement could not include payment for those medical expenses and so there are no medical expenses from which Blue Cross may obtain reimbursement. The court reached this conclusion from the following analysis. 1. Right to Subrogation Section § 1720 of the MVFRL upholds the collateral source rule by prohibiting subrogation, and thus reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery, in four instances. Both parties agree that the first'three4 do not apply in this case because Mr. a (1) Benefits available under § 1711 (relating to required benefits), (2) benefits available under § 1712 (relating to availability of benefits), and § 1715 -4- Lilley was driving a motorcycle. The final instance, however, is at issue. That portion of §1720 states that there is no right to subrogation for "benefits paid or payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement whether primary or excess under section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits)." The Lilleys argue that this provision applies to Blue Cross. The court does not agree. As its heading suggests, § 1719 addresses "Coordination of benefits," and it applies only where an individual has received first party benefits from more than one insurance policy. When that has occurred, § 1719 directs how the benefits are to be coordinated.' Here, however, Mr. Lilley is not entitled to any first party benefits from his automobile insurance policy because he was driving a motorcycle. See § 171.4. The Lilleys argue that § 1720 applies to Blue Shield simply because § 1720 refers to § 1719, and § 1719 includes the phrase, "Any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits," which is defined in §1719(b) to include - hospital corporation plans such as Blue Cross.' But just because Blue Cross is a (relating to availability of adequate limits). All three specifically exempt policies covering motorcycles. ' § 1719(a) states: Except for workers' compensation, a policy of insurance issued or delivered pursuant to this subchapter shall be primary. Any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits such as described in section 1711 (relating to required benefits) 1712(1) and (2) (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) shall be construed to contain a provision that all . benefits provided therein shall be in excess of and not in duplication of any valid and collectible first party benefits provided in section 1711, 1712, or 1715 or workers' compensation. ' Blue Cross advances the weak argument that § 1720 does not apply to it because that section does not "specifically refer and apply to" a hospital plan -5- hospital plan corporation does not mean the statute applies to the instant case. On the contrary, the language of § 1720 indicates it does not. Section 1720 states that subrogation is prohibited for benefits paid or payable under § 1719. The medical benefits Blue Cross provided were not paid under § 1719 because there were no benefits to coordinate with. The benefits were paid without ever referring to § 1719 for direction. Therefore, none of the provisions set forth in § 1720 apply to Blue Cross and Blue Cross is not prevented from subrogation under that section.' II Tort Recovery In the complaint requesting declaratory judgment the plaintiffs asked this court to determine whether they could recover medical benefits in its third party action. In their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs state that this issue has now been resolved. But although the third party action has been settled, the issue is still relevant in this case because the answer to that question guides the court in determining whether the settlement may be construed as containing medical expense corporation, as required under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1720 (1999) in order for a statute to apply to a hospital plan corporation. This argument must fail because § 1720 refers to § 1719, and § 1719(b) specifically mentions hospital plan corporations. To require § 1720 to also specifically mention hospital plan corporations would be a hyper- technical application of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1720 (1999), not to mention a waste of space in Purdon's. ' This conclusion is supported by the Superior Court's memorandum decision in Blue Cross/Blue Shield v. Platt, No. 69 Harrisburg 1989 (Pa. Super. 1990), in which the court stated that because the insureds were on a motorcycle at the time of the accident, subrogation would not be precluded under any section of the Act. -6- reimbursement.' As discussed above, although the WFRL permits individuals to benefit from all the policies they have purchased, it prohibits them from benefitting from other individual's policies at the same time. Thus § 1722 precludes plaintiffs in a motor vehicle tort action from recovering money they have already received under another policy, including benefits defined in § 1719.9 Blue Cross makes a valiant attempt to wriggle out of § 1722 by trotting out the same argument it used to explain why § 1720 does not apply: no benefits were received under § 1719. However, this time the argument must fail because the language in § 1722 is quite different from the language in §1720. Whereas § 1720 applies to benefits paid or payable under § 1719, § 1722 applies to a person who is eligible to receive benefits under any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in §1719.10 That statement obviously refers to the It is interesting to note that although the plaintiffs originally maintained they could recover medical benefits from the tort-feasor, they abruptly changed their tune once that action was settled and Blue Cross requested reimbursement. 9 Section 1722 states: In any action for damages against a tort-feasor, or in any uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeding, arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, a person who is eligible to receive benefits under the coverages set forth in this subchapter, or workers' compensation, or any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defimed in section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits) shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits paid or payable under this subchapter, or workers' compensation, or any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719. 10 § 1719(b) states: Definition.-As used in this section the term "program, group contract or other arrangement" includes, but is not limited to, benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation subject to 40 Pa.C.S. Ch. 61 (relating to hospital plan -7- definition set forth in § 1719(b), which specifically mentions benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation subject to 40 Pa.C.S. Ch. 61. Therefore, the prohibition of § 1722 applies to Blue Cross medical benefits received-whether or not the insured also received first party benefits from another policy. The reference to § 1719 is merely a shortcut to include the benefits already described in that section. Rather than restating those benefits, § 1722 merely refers to the definition already given in § 1719. Nor does § 1722 exclude plaintiffs who were driving motorcycles. When the legislature wanted to exclude motorcycles it knew exactly how to do so; it specifically stated "except ... motorcycles." See § 1711 and § 1712. By contrast, § 1722 states that it applies to actions arising out of "the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." "Motor vehicle" is defined in § 102 of the Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.A. as, "A vehicle which is self-propelled except one which is propelled solely by human power or by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails." "Motorcycle" is defined as "A motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on no more than three wheels in contact with the ground." Id. The legislature's intent in §1722 was clear: to prevent individuals who have received first party benefits from recovering the same benefits in a tort action. And not just first party automobile insurance benefits-all benefits defined in § 1719, which includes health insurance benefits. One need only look at the former version of the law to affirm this conclusion. The old statute only precluded double recovery of benefits set forth in § 1711 and § 1715(a)(1.1). The new law, by contrast, precludes all medical bills paid by any insurance program defined in ¢1719. See Stroback v. corporations) or 63 (relating to professional health services plan corporations). -8- Camaioni, 674 Pa. Super. 257, 674 A.2d 257 (1996) ([A]s a result of the Act 6 amendments effective July 1, 1990, the right to recover such excess medical expenses was extinguished where those expenses were paid by any entity identified in the amended Section 1722."). Blue Cross has pointed to the case of Carroll v. Kephart, 717 A.2d 554 (Pa. Super. 1998) to support their position that plaintiffs are not prohibited from recovering medical expenses received under a medical insurance policy. In that case the Superior Court held that benefits a plaintiff has paid for or earned through his or her employment are not included in the category of benefits paid or payable under "any program, group contract or other arrangement" language in § 1719, and thus § 1722 does not apply to these benefits. That decision is not pertinent to this case, however, because sick pay is not mentioned in § 1719, whereas benefits provided by a hospital plan corporation or professional health service corporation are specifically listed in § 1719(b). One could argue that the prohibition should be interpreted to cover only benefits received under motor vehicle insurance policies because the MVFRL is directed solely toward automobile insurance. However, that would be to ignore the reality behind automobile accident torts. As every plaintiffs attorney knows, when one sues an automobile driver, the ultimate payer will probably be that driver's automobile insurance carrier. Therefore, the inclusion of medical benefits paid by a health insurance provider directly affects automobile insurance companies too, and will hopefully help hold down insurance rates. Section § 1922 is, no doubt, the Pennsylvania Legislature's way of striking a balance between the conflicting policies of the collateral source rule and the desire to -9- reign in auto insurance rates. Under the compromise embodied in the MVFRL one is free to purchase as many policies as one likes, and may recover from all of them. However, one may not recover first party benefits under these policies and also recover those same benefits from someone else's policy. The legislature has obviously decided that an automobile accident should not be an open-ended opportunity for profiteering by a plaintiff or a plaintiffs attorney. Instead of allowing a few individuals to benefit from this sort of double recovery, the legislature chose to allow all Pennsylvania auto owners to benefit from lower auto insurance rates. Because the Lilleys could not recover from Ms. Barr or her insurance company the medical benefits they had received from Blue Cross, the settlement must be deemed to not include those medical benefits. Therefore, although Blue Cross is not precluded from subrogation because Mr. Lilley was driving a motorcycle, Blue Cross may not subrogate for the simple reason that there is no medical expense payment to subrogate from. -10- ORDER AND NOW, this day of June, 1999, the motion for summary judgment filed by Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania is denied. The motion for summary judgment filed by the Fred and Karen Lilley is granted, and Blue Cross is precluded from subrogation or reimbursement from the settlement proceeds of the tort action in the case filed to Lycoming County Docket Number 97-00,929. BY THE COURT, Clinton W. Smith, P.J. cc: Dana Stuchell, Esq., Law Clerk Hon. Clinton W. Smith Timothy Shollenberger, Esq. 1820 Linglestown Rd. Harrisburg, PA 17106-0545 Charles Gelso, Esq. 120 South Franklin St. Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701 Gary Weber, Esq. -11- IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EUGENE FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. AND NOW, TO WIT, this CIVIL DIVISION NO. 06 - 3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) ORDER - day of 2010, it-is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Plaintiff is hereby precluded from recovering paid medical bills in this matter. BY THE COURT: Distribution to Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Seth T. Black, Esquire Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, P.C. 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 43 West South Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 J. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT has been mailed by U.S. Mail to counsel of record via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this 24th day of February, 2010. William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas Law Office 43 West South Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 SUMMERS, McDONNELL, HUDOCK, GUTHRIE & SKEEL, P.C. By: . B ac , Esquire Counsel for Defendant CA/AL PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR ARGUMENT (Must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate) TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: Argument Court.) CAPTION OF CASE (entire caption must be stated in full) Edward Fred Davis vs. (List the within matter for the next ------------------------------------ 06-3615 -- '< Term Terry Eugene Moyer No. 1. State matter to be argued (i.e., plaintiffs motion for new trial, defendant's demurrer to complaint, etc.): Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 2. Identify all counsel who will argue cases: (a) for plaintiffs: William P. Douglas, Esq. (Name and Address) 43 West South Street, Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 (b) for defendants: Seth T. Black, Esq. (Name and Address) 100 Sterling Parkway, Suite 306, Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 3. 1 will notify all parties in writing within two days that this case has been listed for argument. 4. Argument Court Date: May 12, 2010 Date: 3/12/10 Seth T. Black, Esq. Print your name Defendant Attorney for INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Two copies of all briefs must be filed with the COURT ADMINISTRATOR (not the Prothonotary) before argument. 2. The moving party shall file and serve their brief 12 days prior to argument. 3. The responding party shall file their brief 5 days prior to argument. 4. If argument is continued new briefs must be filed with the COURT ADMINISTRATOR (not the Prothonotary) after the case is relisted. t ~~ EDWARD FRED DAVIS, PLAINTIFF V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 06-3615 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER, J , GUIDO, J. AND MASLAND, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~ ~ day of August, 2010, the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, IS GRANTED. By the Court, _ ~~~ Albert H. Masland, J. ~ William P. Douglas, Esquire For Plaintiff ~h T. Black, Esquire For Defendant sal ~~'~ 1, E S I ~~~./~~ =~ /YL~ l ~~ t ~ ~ -;' f U J ~ ' I . _ = N f`v` '~ ~'- -. . ~ .- -. EDWARD FRED DAVIS, PLAINTIFF V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, DEFENDANT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 06-3615 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OILER, J., GUIDO, J. AND MASLAND, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Masland, J., August 2, 2010:-- Before the court is defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer's motion for partial summary judgment against plaintiff, Edward Fred Davis. Defendant seeks to preclude plaintiff from introducing paid medical bills at trial so as to prevent a double recovery. Following briefing by the parties and argument en banc, we grant defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. 1. Background This matter arises from a 2004 automobile accident in which defendant turned left in front of plaintiff forcing him to lay down his motorcycle to avoid a more serious collision. Defendant concedes liability for the accident but disputes plaintiffs asserted damages. Specifically, defendant contends the Motor Vehicle 06-3615 CIVIL TERM Financial Responsibility Law (Law) precludes plaintiff from receiving compensation for medical bills already paid by his private health insurer. See 75 Pa. C.S. §1722 (Preclusion of Recovering Required Benefits). For his part, plaintiff contends because he "is not eligible to receive benefits under the [Law] he is not precluded by the provision of the same." Pl.'s Br. at 2. We disagree. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is properly granted only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and affidavits establish there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1035. Here, defendant's motion for partial summary judgment presents a question of statutory interpretation where the relevant facts are not in dispute. As such, the instant matter is ripe for resolution via summary judgment. B. Statutory Offset Section 1722 of the Law prevents a party from recovering damages from a tortfeasor when a collateral source has already compensated the party for his injuries. The Law reads, in relevant part: In anv action for damages against a tortfeasor, or in any uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeding, arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, a person who is eligible to receive benefits under the coverages set forth in this subchapter, or workers' compensation, or any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits) shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits paid or payable under this subchapter, or workers' compensation, or any program, group contract or other -2- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1722 (emphasis added). Restated, this subsection allows an insured's recovery from a tortfeaser to be offset by the amount of compensation he receives from certain collateral sources of benefits so long as they are not subject to subrogation. Tannenbaum v. Nationwide Insurance Co., Pa. 992 A.2d 859, 869 (2010). C. Statutory Interpretation Plaintiff claims the statutory offset does not apply to motorcyclists because motorcyclists are ineligible for first-party benefits under the law. See 75 Pa. C.S. §1711. We disagree. Section 1711 reads, in relevant part: Required benefits (a) Medical benefit.--An insurer issuing or delivering liability insurance policies covering any motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title, except recreational vehicles not intended for highway use, motorcycles, motor- driven cycles or motorized pedalcycles or like type vehicles, registered and operated in this Commonwealth, shall include coverage providing a medical benefit in the amount of $5,000. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1711(a) (emphasis added). Although the General Assembly chose to exclude motorcyclists from the requirement that first-party benefits be provided, it does not follow that motorcyclists are exempt from the statutory offset provision. In fact, a plain reading of the Law compels the conclusion that motorcyclists are not exempt. "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it -3- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). We must "listen attentively to what a statute says[; however, we] must also listen attentively to what it does not say." Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 525, 788 A.2d 955, 962 (2001) (citation omitted). "[I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a court has no power to insert a word into a statute if the legislature has failed to supply it." Vlasic Farms, Inc. v. Pa. Labor Rels. Bd., 734 A.2d 487, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), aff'd, 565 Pa. 555, 777 A.2d 80 (2001); see also Girgis v. Bd. of Physical Therapy, 859 A.2d 852 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (we may not insert a word the legislature failed to supply into a statute). Here, our General Assembly applied the statutory offset broadly to damages "arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1722 (emphasis added). A motor vehicle is defined as "[a] vehicle which is self-propelled except an electric personal assistive mobility device or a vehicle which is propelled solely by human power." 75 Pa. C.S. §102. Specifically, a motorcycle is defined as "[a] motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground. 75 Pa. C.S. §102 (emphasis added). Thus, because the Section 1722 statutory offset provision applies to motor vehicles, and motorcycles are a subset of motor vehicles, the provision applies to motorcycles. In drafting Section 1722, our General Assembly omitted exclusionary language regarding motorcycles; as such, we decline to supply it. Vlasic Farms, 734 A.2d at 490. Notably, elsewhere in the Law, where our General Assembly -4- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM sought to treat motorcycles differently, they did so explicitly.' We find further support for our conclusion in our Supreme Court's interpretation of "motorcycle" under the Law's predecessor, the No Fault Act. There, our Supreme Court reasoned that motorcycles were motor vehicles required to be registered under the Act and, [t]his conclusion is not altered in this case by the provisions of § 103 of the No-Fault Act that preclude the operator or passenger of a motorcycle from recovering basic loss benefits. The exclusion was established because of the greater risk of injury attendant to operating or riding on a motorcycle. It was not intended to exclude a motorcycle from the definition of a motor vehicle or to release a motorcycle insurer from the responsibility for the payment of basic loss benefits to a person injured in an accident involving a motorcycle. Mitchell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 522 Pa. 545, 553, 564 A.2d 1232, 1236 (1989) (emphasis added). The same reasoning applies to the Law now in effect. Where the Law excludes motorcyclists from receiving a certain class of benefits, it does not then relieve motorcyclists of all obligations arising from the Law. This is essentially what plaintiff would have us conclude. As he states in his brief, 'See 75 Pa. C.S. §1711(a) ("An insurer issuing or delivering liability insurance policies covering any motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title, except ... motorcycles ....") (emphasis added); 75 Pa. C.S. §1712 ("An insurer issuing or delivering liability insurance policies covering any motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title, except ...motorcycles ....") (emphasis added); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1714 ("An owner of a currently registered motor vehicle who does riot have financial responsibility or an operator or occupant of a recreational vehicle not intended for highway use, motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, motorized pedalcycle or like type vehicle required to be registered under this title cannot recover first party benefits.") (emphasis added); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1752 ("A person is eligible to recover benefits from the Assigned Claims Plan if the person meets the following requirements:... (7) Is not the operator or occupant of a ... motorcycle, motor-driven cycle or motorized pedalcycle or other like type vehicle required to be registered under this title and involved in the accident.") (emphasis added). -5- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM "[b]ecause the plaintiff is not eligible to receive benefits under the [Law] he is not precluded by the provision of the same. It simply does not apply to him or his claim of damages." Pl.'s Br. at 2. To be sure, the beauty of plaintiff's argument lies in its simplicity. Nevertheless, absent clear statutory language to that effect, we cannot endorse such a broad exemption for motorcyclists under the Law. Finally, we note our Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the policy goals reflected by the enactment of Section 1722. In Tannenbaum v. Nationwide Insurance Company, __ Pa. , 992 A.2d 859 (2010), our Supreme Court concluded Section 1722, on its face, reflects the Legislature's intent to shift a substantial share of the liability for injuries caused by uninsured and underinsured motorists from automobile insurance carriers to collateral source providers ... obviously with the aim to reduce motor vehicle insurance premiums. Whether or not this is wise social policy, manifestly, it is the policy presently reflected on the face of the [Law]. Id. at 866 (emphasis added). Though our Supreme Court's holding dealt with uninsured (UM) and underinsured motorists (UIM), the same reasoning applies to the instant matter because, by its terms, the statutory offset applies equally in the tort context. Thus, plaintiff's suggested interpretation of the Law not only goes against the plain language of the Law, but would directly frustrate our General Assembly's intent to divert liability from a tortfeasor's automobile insurer to a victim's collateral sources of medical benefits. III. Conclusion In sum, we conclude that, on its face, the Section 1722 statutory offset applies to all actions for damages against a tortfeasor, "arising out of the -6- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM maintenance or use of a motor vehicle," including those arising from the use of a motorcycle. 75 Pa. C.S. §1722. We also note this interpretation is in accord with that section's clearly expressed public policy goal as described by our Supreme Court. Accordingly, we conclude plaintiff is precluded from recovering medical expenses already paid by his own health insurance policy and grant defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on this issue. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this _ day of August, 2010, the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, IS GRANTED. By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. William P. Douglas, Esquire For Plaintiff Seth T. Black, Esquire For Defendant sal -7- Print Name: Seth T. Black, Esquire PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE FOR TRIAL (Must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate) TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY Please list the following case: X? for JURY trial at the next term of civil court. ? for trial without a jury. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CAPTION OF CASE (entire caption must be stated in full) Edward Fred Davis jt?t 1?? 0 . iJ t j ? (check one) X? Civil Action - Law ? Appeal from arbitration (other) (Plaintiff) vs. Terry Eugene Moyer The trial list will be called on November 2 and Trials commence on December 6, 2010 (Defendant) Pretrials will be held on November 10, 2010 vs. (Briefs are due S days before pretrials No. 3615 2006 Term Indicate the attorney who will try case for the party who files this praecipe: Seth T. Black, Esquire Indicate trial counsel for other parties if known: William P. Douglas, Esquire This case is ready for trial. Date: 9/2/10 CAI 7L Attorney for: Defendant *,1b. m P0 Am/ C*'14i9 p,v aLill7210 EDWARD FRED DAVIS, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v CIVIL ACTION - LA TERRY EUGENE MOYER,, Defendant 06-3615 CIVIL TER IN RE: CASE STRICKEN FROM LIS ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 2nd day of Novem er, 2010, upon consideration of t]e call of the civil trial list, and Plaintiff's counsel, William P. Douglas, Esqui=e, having moved to strike the case from the trial list due to his unavailability during the forthcoming trial term, and. Defenda.t's counsel, Seth T. Black, Esquire, having indicated no ob'ection thereto, Plaintiff's motion is granted, and the case is stricken from the trial list. Counsel are requested to relis? the case for trial at: such time as they deem it appropriate By the Court, J L,/ William P. Douglas, Esquire 43 W. South Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013 For Plaintiff r,,h T. Black, Esquire 100 Stealing Parkway Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 For Defendant Court Administrator sley Oyr, _J Jr., J. r 3 cj ?=. C:) C:j -a; mae C4 (-r- F iLED-O FIC?A, THE ?,. Q 1 (S JAt(1T r; - PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE F ID I It I, tutu ur-1, -9 AM II.- I (Must be typewritten and submitted ' to LID COU"N" `- V, TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY FENNSYI_V! ,.N , Please list the following case: X? for JURY trial at the next term of civil court. ? for trial without a jury. --------------------------------------------------------------------- CAPTION OF CASE (entire caption must be stated in full) Edward Fred Davis (check one) X? Civil Action - Law ? Appeal from arbitration (other) vs. Terry Eugene Moyer vs. (Plaintiff) (Defendant) The trial list will be called on 1/4/10 and Trials commence on 1/31/10 Pretrials will be held on 1/19/10 (Briefs are due S days before pr ttrials No. 3615 2006 Indicate the attorney who will try case for the party who files this praecipe: Seth T. Black, Esquire Term Indicate trial counsel for other parties if known: William Douglas, Esquire This case is ready for trial. Date: 12/8/09 Print Name: Seth T. BI Attorney for: Defendant ire -Pb ?? 9.sa,g? EDWARD FRED DAVIS, PLAINTIFF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, DEFENDANT : 06-3615 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT ____zzv - AND NOW, this I !-! day of January, 2011, upon agreement of counsel, the case is removed from the civil trial list and relisted for the May term. The Prothonotary is directed to relist the case for the May term commencing the week of May 2, 2011. By the Court, Albert H. Maslan J. William P. Douglas, Esquire , n For Plaintiff z "; F (_J ? Seth T. Black, Esquire _4 D For Defendan t /Court Administrator - in bin C- :saa OFFICE OF PROTHONOTARY David D. Buell, Prothonotary Cumberland County Carlisle, PA 17013 717-240-6195 Date: March 14, 2011 Seth T. Black, Esq. Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, P.C. 100 Sterling Parkway Suite 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 This is to notify you that: Edward Fred Davis vs. Terry Eugene Moyer, Docket Number 06-3615 Civil Term, in The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County has It hagxn lietarl fnr Trial at thn Mox, Tavm Wil 1 _ Pre-Trial date is April 20, D. Buell onotary SES Pflsr ?p terland county Fes' ?o o? courthouse Square A INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS ? gTMEy 5 DTTEMPTED NOT KNOWN 400 OC ? NOS SUCH NUMBER/ S REET ? OTHER $00-440 11e, PA 17013 S ? NOT DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED 02 1A X\ UNABLE TO FORWARD 0004631598 MAR 1 5 2011 MAILED FROM ZIPCODE 1 701 3 cl: v? Seth T. Black, Esq. o?_ Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, I CD ?CQ Guthrie & Skeel, P.C. Q COW 100 Sterling Parkway N = Suite 30.6 a EDWARD FRED DAVIS, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant 06-3615 CIVIL TERM PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND NOW, this 20th day of April, 2011, upon consideration of the pretrial conference scheduled for today's date in the above-captioned matter, and counsel for the Plaintiff in the person of William P. Douglas, Esquire, and counsel for Defendant in the person of Seth T. Black, Esquire, having indicated that this case is being amicably resolved, the case is stricken from the trial list:, and the pretrial conference scheduled for today's date is cancelled. By the Court, William P. Douglas, Esquire 43 West South Street P.O. Box 261 Carlisle, PA 17013-0261 For the Plaintiff L? J. 'resley 01 r, J J. Seth T. Black, Esquire 100 Sterling Parkway, STE 306 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 For the Defendant Court Admin Prothonotary Cy rq 00 M -C < Cr3 _C:) ?C --f N N 2s .Z", CA :v O ? --tp -n O -r1 M .aJ pcb 1A b- tau r 11 ,?R 2 ? \r Oki" IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA EDWARD FRED DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. TERRY EUGENE MOYER, Defendant. CIVIL DIVISION NO. 06-3615 (Jury Trial Demanded) PRAECIPE TO SETTLE AND DISCONTINUE TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Kindly mark the docket in this matter Settled and Discontinued. Respectfully submitted, DOUGLAS LAW OFFICE By:? ?S William P. Douglas, Esq ire Counsel for Plaintiff April 20, 2011