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HomeMy WebLinkAbout10-18-06 F:\FILESIDA T AFILElGenerallCurrentl1201 I. I .petitiontostrike Created: 3129106 8:34AM Revised: 10118106 1O:49AM IN RE: ESTATE OF DALE A. BRITTEN IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ,...." (") g ::IJ ORPHAN'S COURT DIVISIO~~ ~ ~i ~ 'm '"' ("') G) 0 m ~ C") -4 c.~-j ::0 ::0 F;; f,:i ~ PETITION TO STRIKE JUDY S. BRITTEN'S PETITION~u5~ CO :1:] CJ FOR INTERPRETATION OF INTER VIVOS TRUST ~8~ -0 ~~3 ~ ,'--...c :x ::-,~ -;0"- '.J _ .._ C ) :::0 N r'.-- rn AND NOW, comes Ronald H. Britten, by and through his attorneys, MARTS~i5EARD~F z:; ~~ U1 WILLIAMS & OTTO, and moves as follows: NO: 21-06-0145 1. On November 29,2005, Dale A. Britten, deceased, allegedly signed ~ document titled "Directive." A true and accurate copy of said document has been filed by Respondent with the Register of Wills Office. 2. The Directive purports to transfer assets from decedent to Respondent Judy S. Britten (hereinafter "Respondent") at the time of the execution of the document. 3. Decedent died on February 5, 2006. 4. On February 14,2006, the Directive was admitted for probate, despite the factthatthe Directive was not testamentary in nature. 5. On March 8, 2006, Petitioner Ronald H. Britten (hereinafter "Petitioner") filed a Petition to Strike the Directive from Probate. 6. On June 17,2006, the Court issued an Opinion and Order declaring as a matter oflaw that the Directive was not a testamentary instrument and reversing the probate ofthe same as a "codicil." 7. After the Directive was stricken from probate, estate distribution of assets must be accomplished by following the testamentary scheme of the Will. 8. The Will in the current case, executed on May 28, 1986, essentially directs that half of the estate will go to Respondent and the other half will go to Petitioner. 9. Thus, to the extent that decedent held any assets at the time ofms death, they should be distributed pursuant to the testamentary scheme of the Will, which in this case is halfto fetitioner, halfto Respondent. 10. There are at least three estate assets at this point, a coin collection, a Cambria County property, and decedent's residence. 11. Allegedly, decedent intended on transferring the coin collection and Cambria County property to Petitioner and decedent's residence to Respondent. These transfers, however, were not made during the life of decedent and so must pass through the estate and be distributed consistent with the Will. 12. It is believed and therefore averred that this result is not pleasing to Respondent. 13. On September 20,2006, despite the fact that the Court struck the Directive from Probate, Respondent filed a Petition for Interpretation of Inter Vivos Trust. 14. In this Petition, Respondent asks the Court to set up a trust for the benefit of Respondent, so she can enjoy the proceeds of the sale of decedent's home pursuant to the Directive. Essentially, Respondent, while noting that the Directive has been stricken from probate, is asking this Court to permit the distribution of estate assets consistent with the Directive anyway. 15. It is Petitioner's position that the relief requested in Respondent's Petition is barred by collateral estoppel. Even ifthe doctrine of collateral estoppel does not operate to bar Respondent's Petition for Interpretation of Inter Vivos Trust, this Court should decline to entertain such a Petition on ripeness grounds consistent with basic principles of judicial efficiency. I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 16. Paragraphs 1-15 are incorporated herein by reference. 17. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prohibits the re-litigation of a legal issue or a question of fact that was adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction in a prior suit despite the fact that it is based on a cause of action different from the one previously litigated. In re: Estate of Ellis, 460 Pa. 281, 287 (1975); Spisakv. Margolis Edelstein, 768 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. 2001); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).1 1 The elements of collateral estoppel are as follows: 1) the issue decided ill a prior case is identical to one presented in a later case; 2) there was a final judgment on the merits; 3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case; 4) the party or person in privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding and; 5) the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment. Spisak at 876-7. All the elements of collateral estoppel have been met in the case, 18. The Court should strike Respondent's Petition for Interpretation ofInter Vivos Trust, because it already considered whether the Directive evidenced testamentary intent, adjudicated as a matter of law that it did not, and struck the Directive from probate. II. RIPENESS 19. Paragraphs 1 - 19 are incorporated herein by reference. 20. It is also Petitioner's position that seeking a court declaration regarding beneficiary's rights of inheritance before the filing of a First and Final Accounting is premature. 21. The Supreme Court and local Orphans' Court Rules provide a mechanism for objecting to a proposed estate distribution scheme.2 Once the First and Final Accounting is filed, beneficiaries will have a right to review the same and file a formal objection to the same. 22. Ruling on Respondent's Petition now is not going to obviate the need to review the estate's accounting in the future. Therefore, holding a full evidentiary hearing and issuing a judicial declaration at this point is simply a waste of judicial resources.3 sub judice. Respondents are asking this court to set up a distribution scheme consistent with the Directive despite the fact that the Directive has been stricken from probate. The previous adjudication, which involved the reversal of the Register of Wills admission of the Directive into probate, was a final judgment on the merits. The case is the same, the parties are the same, and Respondent had an opportunity to brief and argue the merits of her position. Respondent should not be permitted to take a second bite at the apple just because she does not like the result of the Court's determination. In fact, the proper mechanism to ask the Court to revisit its determination is a Motion for Reconsideration, which Respondent never filed. 2 See Pennsylvania Orphan's Court Rules, Rule 6.1, et seq.; Cumberland County Orphans' Court Local Rule 6.9, et seq. 3 See In re: Siemen's Estate, 42 Pa. D. & C. 708, 1942 WL 2570 (O.C. Tioga), quoting Petition of Kariher, 284 Pa. 445, 131 A. 265 (1925) (declining to award declaratory relief to a petitioner where there are adequate statutorily-provided procedural mechanisms for seeking that relief and where a declaratory judgment will not be a practical help in ending the controversy). Here there are adequate procedural opportunities (resolution of objections to final accounting) for considering Respondent's proposed distribution scheme. Additionally, declaratory judgment will not be a practical help in ending this controversy; there still may be objections made to the final account. Thus, the relief requested in Judy S. Britten's Petition for Interpretation ofInter Vivos Trust must be denied. 23. If Respondent is confident in her legal position with respect to distributing the proceeds of decedent's residence to herself, she should be ready to defend her position when a formal objection is made. WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Honorable Court enter an Order striking Respondent's Petition for Interpretation of Inter Vivos Trust and cancelling the hearing currently scheduled for November 27,2006, at 11 :00 a.m. Respectfully Submitted, By Carl C. Risch, Esquire J.D. No. 75901 Michael J. Collins, Esquire J.D. No. 200427 Ten East High Street Carlisle, P A 17013 (717) 243-3341 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Date: October 18,2006 IN RE: ESTATE OF DALE A. BRITTEN : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO: 21-06-0145 ORPHAN'S COURT DIVISION CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Petition to Strike Petition for Interpretation of Inter Vivos Trust was served this date by depositing same in the Post Office at Carlisle, P A, first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Michael A. Scherer, Esquire 19 West South St. Carlisle, PA 17013 Atty. for Respondent MARTSON DEARDORFF WILLIAMS & OTTO By Dated: October 18, 2006