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HomeMy WebLinkAbout11-06-06 . J.A09019j06 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P.65.37 IN RE: ELEANOR U. COOLIDGE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA JULIA ELIZABETH COOLIDGE-STOLZ, Appellant THOMAS EDWARD COOLIDGE AND PHILIP WARREN COOLIDGE, Appellees No. 1016 MDA 2005 Appeal from the Decree of May 19, 2005 In the Court of Common Pleas of CUMBERLAND County Orphans' Court Division at No. 21-03-936, 21-04-301 BEFORE: STEVENS, McCAFFERY, and PANELLA, JJ. MEMORANDUM: FILED: September 22, 2006 Appellant, Julia Elizabeth Coolidge-Stoltz, appeals from the May 19, 2005 decree nisi entered by the Honorable J. Wesley Oler, Jr., of the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing Appellant's appeal from probate.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 1 Appellant properly appeals from the trial court's decree nisi pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 342(1), Pennsylvania Orphans' Court Rule 7.1 and Cumberland County Orphans' Court Rule 3.1-1. Pa.R.A.P. 342 states that orders issued by the Orphans' Court Division which determine an interest in realty or personalty are immediately appealable "upon a determination of finality by the Orphans' Court Division." Cumberland County Orphans' Court Rule 3.1-1 states that "all decrees entered in the Orphans' Court Division shall be final, unless Exceptions shall be filed as permitted or prescribed by Pa.O.C. Rule 7.1." Pa.O.C. Rule 7.1 gives parties twenty days in . J.A09019j06 The factual and procedural background of this matter, as summarized by the trial court and gleaned from the certified record, is as follows.2 Eleanor U. Coolidge ("Decedent") was the mother of three children: Appellant and Appellees, Thomas Edward Coolidge and Philip Warren Coolidge. Decedent died on March 24, 2004. During the last sixteen months of her life, Decedent was a resident of Green Ridge Village, an assisted living facility in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Decedent was diagnosed as suffering from dementia in 2003. In December 2002, Decedent's attorney designated Decedent's son, Appellee Thomas Coolidge, as Decedent's agent. According to the testimony of various individuals, including Decedent herself, Thomas Coolidge exercised his duties as his mother's agent in a manner consistent with his mother's wishes and best interests. Thus, it appears that Decedent and her son, Thomas Coolidge, enjoyed a positive relationship. Unfortunately, it appears that the same cannot be said about Decedent's relationship with her daughter, Appellant. In November 2003, Appellant filed which to file exceptions, after which decrees become final. Further, "failure to file exceptions shall not result in waiver if the grounds for appeal are otherwise properly preserved." Pa.O.C. Rule 7.1(a). See Estate of Rosser, 821 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding that appellant need not file exceptions to preserve appellate rights in an Orphans' Court matter). In this case, Appellant never filed exceptions, and therefore the decree nisi at issue became final and appealable twenty days after its issuance. 2 We rely upon two opinions issued by the trial court, dated May 19, 2005 and August 23, 2005, respectively. - 2 - J.A09019/06 an emergency petition to have her mother declared incompetent. The trial court held an emergency hearing on the petition on November 17, 2003, at which Decedent herself testified. The trial court found her testimony to be "lucid and resolute," and therefore perceived "absolutely no reason to believe that an emergency adjudication of incompetency would be appropriate." (Trial Court Opinion, dated August 23, 2005, at 3). In addition, at this emergency hearing, Decedent testified that "she and her daughter had been estranged for a long time and that she did not want to be visited by her." ld. (quotation omitted). Immediately after her testimony at the emergency hearing, Decedent told Appellees that she intended to omit Appellant from her will. (Notes of Testimony ("N.T."), 3/3/05, at 117-118; N.T., 3/24/05, at 78-79). Within three weeks, on December 8, 2003, Decedent in fact did execute a new will ("Amended Will") which specifically omitted Appellant.3 Whereas in her previous will Decedent had designated all three of her children as equal income beneficiaries of her estate to be held in trust ("Trust"),4 in the Amended Will only Thomas Coolidge and Philip Coolidge remained as income beneficiaries.5 3 We further note that included in the Amended Will is a paragraph specifically acknowledging the omission of Appellant. 4 The corpus of the trust was approximately $1,240,000. 5 The removal of Appellant as an income beneficiary resulted in approximately $5,810 in additional annual income for each Appellee. In addition, the language of the Amended Will indicated that the children of the income beneficiaries were to be the ultimate recipients of the trust. Therefore, - 3 - J.A09019/06 Further, Appellant was removed both as a co-executor of the Amended Will and as a co-trustee of the Trust, leaving Appellees as the only executors/trustees.6 Decedent called upon her long time attorney and family friend, Robert M. Frey, Esquire, to effectuate the desired changes to her will. At the time of signing, Mr. Frey procured the attendance of a psychiatrist, Dr. Herbert E. Myers. Within four months of the execution of the Amended Will, Decedent died at the age of 75. After Decedent died, the Amended Will was admitted to probate via a, decree dated March 29, 2004. Appellant filed an appeal seeking a vacating of the decree on the grounds that Decedent had lacked testamentary capacity and had been unduly influenced by her sons, Appellees. Both Appellant's request for a jury trial and Appellees' motion for summary judgment were denied, and hearings were held regarding the will contest on February 28, 2005, March 3, 2005, and March 24, 2005, respectively. After considering all of the evidence, the trial court determined that Appellant and Decedent had become estranged.7 Judge Oler found that it was this estrangement that was Decedent's removal of Appellant as an income beneficiary also effectively disinherited Appellant's son. 6 In addition, Decedent also eliminated a speCific bequest of two lamps which had been designated for Appellant under Decedent's previous will. 7 Appellees presented testimony to this effect from Robert M. Frey, Esquire; Joseph F. Brazel, M.D. (Decedent's primary care physician); Renee Kreamer (assisted living administrator at Green Ridge Village); and Judith Foster Wali (Decedent's niece). - 4 - J.A09019j06 the cause of Appellant's disinheritance, not any undue influence perpetrated by Appellees. As a result, the trial court issued a decree nisi dismissing Appellant's appeal from probate, and the instant appeal followed wherein Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. Is the trial court's factual finding that [Decedent] did not suffer from a weakened intellect supported by the evidence? 2. Is the trial court's factual finding that [Appellee] Thomas E. Coolidge, [Decedent's] attorney-in-fact, was not in a confidential relationship with [Decedent] supported by the evidence? 3. Is the trial court's factual finding that [Appellees] did not acquire a substantial benefit from the [Amended Will] supported by the evidence? 4. Assuming that [Appellant] has proven (1) weakened intellect, (2) confidential relationship, and (3) substantial benefit, have [Appellees] met their burden of proving no undue influence?8 (Appellant's Brief at 5). As a prefatory matter, we note: With respect to this Court's standard and scope of appellate review in will contests, the Orphans' court decision will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in applying the correct principles of law. If the record supports the court's factual findings, we will defer to these findings and will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. We are not constrained, however, to give the same deference to the court's legal conclusions. Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 951 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citations omitted). In addition, "[b]ecause the Orphans' Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines 8 Due to our disposition of Appellant's first two issues, we need not address her third and fourth. - 5 - J.A09019/06 the credibility of the witnesses, and on review, we will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion." Estate of Angle, 777 A.2d 114, 122-123 (Pa.Super. 2001) (citation omitted). It is well settled that once a will is probated, it is presumed to be valid, and the burden lies with the contestant to prove undue influence. Estate of Luongo, supra at 963. Further, in order to present a legally sufficient prima facie case of undue influence, a contestant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that "(1) the testator was of weakened intellect at the time the will was executed; (2) the proponent of the will stood in a confidential relationship with the testator; and (3) the proponent received substantial benefit under the will." Id. (quotation omitted). A testator's "weakened intellect" for purposes of proving undue influence does not have to rise to the level of testamentary incapacity. Estate of Angle, supra at 123. In other words, one could have the legal capacity to execute a will and still be of "weakened intellect" for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of undue influence. Further, "[a]lthough our cases have not established a bright-line test by which weakened intellect can be identified to a legal certainty, they have recognized that it is typically accompanied by persistent confusion, forgetfulness and disorientation." Owens v. Mazzei, 847 A.2d 700, 707 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). To establish a "confidential relationship" for purposes of undue influence, a contestant must show that the "parties [did] not deal on equal terms, but, on - 6 - J.A09019j06 one side there [was] an over-mastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or trust, justifiably reposed." Id. at 709. (citation and emphasis omitted). Moreover, "the existence of a power of attorney given by one person to another is a clear indication that a confidential relationship exists between the parties." Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1383 (Pa.Super. 1995). However, "[a] parent-child relationship does not establish the existence of a confidential relationship nor does the fact that the proponent has a power of attorney where the decedent wanted the proponent to act as attorney-in-fact." Estate of Angle, supra at 123 (citation omitted). Finally, there is no "hard and fast" rule to define exactly what a "substantial benefit" constitutes for . purposes of undue influence. Estate of Stout, 746 A.2d 645, 648 (Pa.Super. 2000). Instead, analysis of what comprises a "substantial benefit" must be done on a case-by-case basis. Estate of LeVin, 615 A.2d 38, 42 (Pa.Super. 1992). In her first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by concluding that Decedent did not suffer from a "weakened intellect." Specifically, Appellant argues that her mother's diagnosed dementia rendered her mentally compromised to the degree necessary to establish a prima facie case of undue influence. (Appellant's Brief at 12-15). After thorough review, we disagree. Rather, we conclude that the trial court properly placed considerable emphasis on Decedent's own testimony rendered during the emergency hearing held only three weeks before she executed the Amended Will. - 7 - . J.A09019/06 Indeed, it is very significant that Judge Oler had the rare opportunity to personally observe Decedent's mental state so close in time to the execution of the Amended Will. Judge Oler concluded that Decedent was "lucid and resolute." It is hard to imagine a more ringing endorsement of Decedent's competent mental capacity. Further, both Appellees and Robert Frey, Esquire, testified that shortly after Appellant's attempt to get her mother declared incompetent, Decedent declared her clear intention to disinherit her daughter which resulted in the Amended Will. (N.T., 3/3/05, at 117-118; N.T., 3/24/05, at 78-79, and N.T., 2/28/05, at 94-95.) Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly concluded that Decedent did not suffer from a "weakened intellect" at the time of the execution of the Amended Will to the extent necessary to present a prima facie case of undue influence. In her second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not finding that Decedent was in a "confidential relationship" with Appellee Thomas Coolidge. After careful review, we disagree. While we recognize that Appellee Thomas Coolidge did serve as Decedent's agent pursuant to her power of attorney, we note that the granting of a power of attorney is not a dispositive factor in the determination of whether a "confidential relationship" can be established. Estate of Angle, supra. Indeed, in the case sub judice, ample evidence established that Appellee Thomas Coolidge served at Decedent's specific behest, not the other way around. For example, Decedent's accountant, Michael B. Devlin, CPA, - 8 - . J.A09019/06 testified that based on his review of Appellee Thomas Coolidge's report as the power of attorney for Decedent, he could find "no evidence of any misappropriation or misuse of the assets." (N.T., 3/3/05, at 32). Further, Decedent herself testified at her competency hearing in November 2003, that she "couldn't be more content" with the service Appellee Thomas Coolidge gave her as her agent pursuant to her power of attorney. (N.T., 11/17/03, at 10). Thus, substantial evidence supported the trial court's credibility determinations regarding Decedent's relationship with her son: [A]s to a confidential relationship, the credible evidence in the form of testimony of [Decedent], [Appellee] Thomas E. Coolidge, Michael B. Devlin (certified public accountant), [Appellee] Philip W. Coolidge, and Judith Foster Wali (niece of [Decedent]), revealed a relationship between [Appellee] Thomas E. Coolidge and [Decedent] which was characterized by a solicitous execution of her wishes on his part and an absence of subservience on her part. It did not lead to a conclusion that the parties did not deal on equal terms or that the son exerted an over-mastering influence upon the mother. (Trial Court Opinion, dated August 23, 2005, at 7). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that Decedent did not stand in a "confidential relationship" with her son as required to establish a prima facie case of undue influence. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Appellant did not establish a prima facie case of undue influence in connection with the Amended Will. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decree nisi dismissing Appellant's appeal. - 9 - ." . J.A09019/06 Decree affirmed. Judgment Entered: Date: September 22, 2006 - 10 -