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Home My WebLink About07-0048MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 07- y8 AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK,: Defendant IN DIVORCE NOTICE TO DEFEND YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a decree of divorce or annulment may be entered against you by the Court. A judgment may also be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, including custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for the divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at the Cumberland County Court House, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF PROPERTY, LAWYERS FEES OR EXPENSES BEFORE A DECREE OF DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP. Cumberland County Bar Association 2 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 717-249-3166 Respectfully submitted, SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY By pcJLt Li, -?'Tl t I Matas, Es "-quire Supreme Court ID # 84919 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-6222 Counsel for Plaintiff I 1 MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, Plaintiff : V AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK,: Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. d 7-H 9 IN DIVORCE COMPLAINT IN DIVORCE UNDER SECTION 3301(c) or (d) OF THE DIVORCE CODE 1. The Plaintiff is Michael Ryan McClintock, an adult individual residing at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013. 2. The Defendant is Agnes Elizabeth McClintock (Schulte), an adult individual residing at, Ballyloughane Strand, Renmore, Galway, Republic of Ireland. 3. The Plaintiff and Defendant both have been bona fide residents in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for at least six months immediately prior to the filing of this Complaint. 4. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on May 23, 2002 in Multnomah County, Portland, Oregon. 5. There have been no prior actions of divorce or for annulment between FLOWER & LINDSAY 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA the parties in this or in any other jurisdiction. 6. The Plaintiff has been advised that counseling is available and that he has the right to request that the court require the parties to participate in counseling. 7. The marriage is irretrievably broken. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests entry of a divorce decree in his favor in accordance with §3301 of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code. COUNT II EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 8. The averments in paragraphs 1 through 7 are incorporated hereto as if fully set forth herein. 9. During their marriage, the parties have acquired certain property, both personal and real. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court to equitably divide the marital property. Respectfully submitted, SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Maryu tas, Esquire Attorney Id. 84919 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-6222 Dated: {/ Z/?•?- Counsel for Plaintiff SAIDIS, FLOWER & LENDSAY E75MEXAPIAW 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing document are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities. .J\1 • I'll ) Michael Rvan FLOWER & LINDSAY 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA DEC14M Iq l # b o p r,- in :;1^ -0 D- ?- 4 Q llq MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, Plaintiff V. AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK,: Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 07-48 IN DIVORCE ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE I, Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, Defendant in the above-captioned matter, accepted service of the Complaint in Divorce on 1'''200 (date). c Ag . s Elizabeth McClintock SAMIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY .?rrowvexsnruw 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA Dated: r--3 0 MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 07-48 ,,GNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK,: Defendant IN DIVORCE PETITION FOR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION AND SPECIAL RELIEF AND NOW, comes Plaintiff, Michael Ryan McClintock, by and through his , Marylou Matas, Esquire, of the law firm of Saidis, Flower & Lindsay, and this Court as follows: 1. Petitioner is Michael Ryan McClintock, Plaintiff in the above captioned divorce action, and an adult individual residing at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Respondent is Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, Defendant in the above captioned divorce action, and an adult individual residing at Ballyloughane Strand, Renmore, Galway, Republic of Ireland. 3. The parties were married on May 23, 2002. 4. There are no children of the marriage. 5. Petitioner filed a Complaint in Divorce on January 3, 2007, in Cumberland County. SAIDIS, FLOWER & LENDS" 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 6. Respondent accepted service of the Complaint on January 14, 2007. 7. The parties separated on or about October 18, 2006, when Respondent moved out of the parties' marital residence and moved to her residence in Ireland. 8. Since the date of separation, Respondent has lived continuously in Ireland, at the address listed above in paragraph 2. 9. Since the date of separation, Petitioner has lived continuously in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, at the address listed above in paragraph 1 . 10. The parties are the owners of the real estate located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, having purchased the property in 2005. 11. The parties do not own any other real estate, of which Petitioner is aware, either jointly or individually. 12. The real estate at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, was purchased for approximately $205,900 in April 2005 and, at the time of separation in October 2006, had a mortgage balance of approximately $202,000. The Cumberland County tax assessment is attached hereto as Exhibit A, to reflect the purchase date and purchase price. The 2006 mortgage account statement for the real estate is attached hereto as Exhibit B, to reflect the mortgage balance as of October 2006. 13. Since the date of separation, Petitioner has maintained all of the monthly mortgage payments, utility payments, maintenance payments, taxes and insurance for the real estate located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, without any financial assistance or contribution from Respondent. 14. Petitioner is employed by an out of state employer and works from his home, having done this since 2004. PETITION FOR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF THE RESIDENCE SIAMILS, FLOWER & LENDS" 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 15. Paragraphs 1 through 13 are incorporated herein as if restated in full. 16. On June 19, 2007, Respondent appeared at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, PA, without any prior contact or notice to Petitioner or his counsel, bringing with her officers from the North Middleton Police Department. 17. Respondent, with the assistance of the officers, demanded that she be allowed entry to the home. 18. Petitioner initially refused Respondent access to the home, since she has not been there for 8 months, has had limited contact with Petitioner, and did not make attempts to contact him in advance to advise him of her trip. 19. When Petitioner refused to open the door for Respondent's entry, the North Middleton Police Officers. contacted the fire department for assistance, at which time, several fire trucks arrived at Petitioner's home to prepare for a forced entry. 20. Petitioner did open the door, at which point the officers advised that Petitioner should leave the home and allow Respondent to stay at the residence. 21. Petitioner indicated to police officers at the scene that he would make arrangements for Respondent to spend the evening at a local hotel if she needed accommodations, so that he could stay in his home, but Respondent refused the offer and police asked Petitioner to leave the residence. 22. Petitioner left the residence at the direction of the North Middleton Police. 23. Respondent has not stayed at the residence for 8 months, has not contributed to any payments for residence, voluntary left the residence and moved to her family's home in Ireland upon separation. SAIDIS, FLOWER SZ LENDS" 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 24. Petitioner is suffering harm by the unnecessary eviction from the residence, in that he is not able to work as he had been, is not able to make payments for the home, and is not able to enjoy the continued use of marital residence that he alone has maintained without contribution from Respondent since the date of separation. 25. Petitioner has been represented by counsel throughout these proceedings and has attempted to maintain contact with Respondent to negotiate a distribution of the marital estate. 26. On or about May 17, 2007, Petitioner's counsel was advised by Harold S. Irwin, III, Esquire, that had been asked to represent Respondent in pending divorce litigation and requested that all documents be forwarded to him. 27. Prior to the filing of this Petition, Petitioner's counsel contacted Mr. Irwin's office to seek a resolution of this matter or his concurrence with this request, to be advised that he no longer represented Respondent in this divorce litigation. 28. Pursuant to Rule 208.3(a), no Judge has been previously assigned to this case. WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests your Honorable Court to enter an Order granting Petitioner exclusive possession of the marital residence located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania and Ordering him to maintain all payments associated with that residence. PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 29. Paragraphs 1 through 24 are incorporated herein as if restated in full. 30. At the time of separation, Respondent removed her personal items, clothing and the like, but took only a few items of household goods from the marital residence, leaving the majority of items, including furnishings and other household items at the residence. 31. Petitioner and Respondent have exchanged correspondence, between each other and through counsel, regarding a distribution of assets, debts, household items, furnishings and personal property in this matter. 32. The distribution of the marital estate includes a listing of personal property and furnishings that Respondent forwarded to Petitioner to detail the property she would like to have. The listing of property is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit C. 33. Petitioner does not know what Respondent's plans may be at this time with regard to living in the house or removing items. 34. Although the parties had exchanged some correspondence, documents and attempted negotiations for a settlement, Respondent's recent actions and behavior convey to Petitioner that she may not be cooperative. 35. Petitioner is concerned that because Respondent arrived at the home without prior notice at all and with police assistance, that she may be planning to remove additional items or even destroy property at the home while he is evicted by the police. 36. Petitioner works from home and has his office equipment stored there; his other personal items are stored at the home; he has purchased other items since the time of separation that Respondent is not entitled to enjoy or use. 37. Petitioner will suffer harm by Respondent's continued use of any items in the marital residence and will suffer harm if Respondent otherwise destroys, takes or diminishes the value of any item in the home or the SAIDIS, FLOWER & LFgDS" 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA home itself. 38. Petitioner is concerned that, without an Order, preventing Respondent from taking action to remove items that are not on the list previously agreed to by the parties, Respondent will remove, destroy or diminish the value of marital items and Petitioner's individual items. WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that neither party be permitted to transfer, sell, dissipate, destroy, encumber or diminish the value of any asset held jointly or individually by either of them pending further of Court or without the express written consent of both parties. Respectfully submitted, SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY s Maf?)6?-Nmatas, Esquire Sup em Court ID # 84919 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-6222 Counsel for Petitioner SAIDIS, SOWER & LINDSAY 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing document are true and correct. understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities. il"'t F? c2r.2mg U*LL??? Michael y M intock SAIDIS, FzwWER I DWS" 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA TaxDB Result Details Detailed Results for Parcel 29-05-0429-100. in the 2004 Tax Assessment Database DistrictNo 29 Parcel ID 29-05-0429-100. MapSuffix HouseNo 63 Direction Street MEADE DRIVE Ownerl MCCLINTOCK, MICHAEL RYAN C/O & AGNES E MCCLINTOCK PropType R PropDesc LivArea 2048 CurLandVal 30000 CurImpVal 171180 CurTotVal 201180 CurPrefVal Acreage .37 C1GrnStat TaxEx 1 SaleAmt 205900 SaleMo 04 SaleDa 12 SaleCe 20 SaleYr 05 DeedBkPage 00268-01838 YearBlt 2004 HF File Date 12/20/2005 HF Approval_Status A Page 1 of 1 ' SUBSTITUTE FORM 1098 2006 DER SNAMEANkADD R SS MORiGAGEACCOUNT M ACCOUNT O ACCOUNrNUYfiER ereign ba * nk -617 FOR PAWTO: NEXT WE MORTGAGE ACCOUNT 2 12/01/06 01/01/07 0826851450 ga ge Servicing IX , 10-6438 -CSS INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES p,M.B.N0.15450901 601 Penn Street Reading, PA 19601 SUMMARY TOTALS PRINCIPAL UNAPPLIED INTEREST PAID BEGINNING BALANCE 204228.00 0.00 GROSS INTEREST 12161 67 PHONE: (800) 232-5 200 PAGE: 2 PAID + AMOUNT Pao 2636.25 0.00 . 00903-4004446713 MTERESTBHORTAGE ADDED 0.00 PLUS PREPAID INT. NOT TO PRIMCfPALAAI + ALLOWED PRIOR YEARS 0.00 AMOUNT DISBURSED 0.00 0.00 ENDING BALANCE 201591.75 0.00 LESS INTEREST - 0.00 RECIPIENT'S FEDERAL IDENT. NO. PAYER'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 'The Information in boxes 1, 2 and 3 Is suaslDV (Buy DOWN) Important tax Information and is being LESS INTEREST - 0 00 23-1237295 189-66-4433 furnished to the Internal Revenue Service. If SHORTAGE . you are required to file a return, a negligence PAYER'SIBORROWER'S NAME AND ADDRESS penalty or other sanction may be Imposed on LESS PREPAID WT. NOT - 0.00 you If the IRS determines that an underpayment ALLOWED THIS YEAR of tax results because you overstated 8 PLUS INTEREST MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCR ,? deduction for this mortgage Interest or for SHORTAGE PAID 0.00 AGNES E MCCLINTOCR these points or because you did not report this PREPAYMENT PENALTY + 0.00 63 MEADE DR refund of interest on your return. The amount shown may not be fully deductible by you on CARLISLE PA 17013 your Federal Income tax return. Limitations 1. based on the cost and value of the secured NET INTEREST PAID 12161.67 property may apply. In addition, you may only 2• POINTS PAID deduct an amount of mortgage interest to the 0.00 extent It was Incurred by you, actually paid by you, and not reimbursed by another person. 3. REFUND OF OVER- PAID INTEREST 0.00 THIS IS A SUBSTITUTE 1098 STATEMENT. BUYDOWN ACCOUNT BALANCE BEGINNING BALANCE 0.00 DISBURSEMENTS 0.00 ADJUSTMENTS 0.00 ENDING BALANCE 0.00 PAYMENT DISTRIBUTION ESCROW /IMPOUND INTEREST SHORTAGE - UNPAID BALANCE BEGINNING BALANCE 0.00 ESCROW ACCOUNT PRINCIPA L + INTEREST 1233.16 BEGINNING BALANCE 1759.85 ADD INT. SHORTAGE 0.00 STATEMENT LESS INT. SHORTAGE PREPAID 0.00 THIS NOTICE CONTAINS ESCROWAMPOUND 446.67 TOTAL ESCROW RECEIPTS 5375.20 ENDING BALANCE 0.00 INFORMATION REAL ESTATE TAXES PAID 3183.34 REGARDING YOUR OPTIONAL INSURANCE 0.00 TOTAL ESCROWDISSURSEMENrs -5558.46 LATE CHARGES PAID 0.00 ESCROW ACCOUNT AS LATE CHARGES DUE BUT UNPAID 0.00 REQUIRED BY THE REAL ANCILLARY 0.00 ESCROW INTEREST 0.00 OPTIONAL INSURANCE 0.00 ESTATE SETTLEMENT AND PROCEDURES ACT FEES PAID 0.00 (RESPA) AND IS A RECAP SERVICE TRANSFER 0.00 FEES DUE BUT UNPAID 0.00 OF YOUR ESCROW ACCOUNT. MISC. 0.00 ENDING BALANCE 1576.59 12 SEE BELOW FOR ITEMIZED 83 TOTAL OF MORTGAGE 20173 1679 TOTAL PA . . YMENT PAYMENTS MADE ESCROW DISBURSEMENTS Z POST TRANSACTION INTEREST PRINCIPALBAIANCE ESCROWIWPOUID BALANCE AFTER TRANS. CHARGE CONSTRUCTION C I L E DUEDATE DATE AMOUNT PAID PAID AFTER TRANSACTI ON PAW CONSTRUCTION M. R ATE UNDISe. ACCT. BA L FUNDS D U AP 01101106 1/ 1 1683 2 1019 213 72 204014 6 450 46 2210 1 0 00 0 00 E40 0.1/01/06 01/ -164 2 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 204014 8 -164 72 2045 9 0 00 0 0 00 AP 02/01/06 01/3 1683 2 1018 7 214 79 203799 9 450 46 2496 5 0 00 0 0 DO E40 02/01/06 02/1 -164 2 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 203799 9 -164 72 2331 3 D OD 0 0 00 90 2 02/01/06 02/2 -83 8 OTHER ESC O TRANS 203799 9 -83 28 2248 5 0 00 0 0 00 AP 03/01/06 03/0 1683 2 1017 0 215 86 203583 3 450 46 2698 1 0 00 0 0 0 940 03/01/06 03/1 -164 2 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 203583 3 -164 72 2533 9 0 00 0 0 0 E20 03/01/06 03/1 -330 D HAZARD IN Jr. ' RANCE 203583 3 -33 00 2203 9 0 00 0 0 0 AP 04/01/0 D4/0 1683 2 1016 2 216 94 203366 9 45 46 2654 5 0 00 0 0 996 04/01/06 D4/1 -703 2 MUNICIPAL T 203366 9 -703 2 1951 3 0 00 0 0 E40 04/01/0 04/1 -164 2 PRIVATE M R GAGS IN 203366 9 -16 2 1786 1 0 00 0 0 0 AP 0510110 5/0 1679 3 1015 4 218 02 203148 7 44 67 2233 8 0 00 D 0 E4 OS/01/0 5/0 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGS IN 203148 7 -162 87 2070 1 0 00 0 0 0 PA 06/01/06 05/3 1679 3 1014 5 219 11 202929 6 44 67 2516 8 0 00 0 0 0 E4 06/01/0 06/0 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGS IN 202929 6 -162 67 2354 1 0 00 0 0 0 AP 07/01/06 06/3 1679 3 1012 6 22C 20 202709 6 446 67 2800 8 0 00 0 0 E40 07/01/06 07/0 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 202709 6 -162 87 2637 1 0 00 D DO AP 08/01/D6 08/0 1679 3 101 6 222 30 202488 6 446 67 3084 8 0 00 0 0 0 E4 D8/01/0 O8/1 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 202488 6 -162 87 2921 1 0 00 0 0 00 E92 08/01/06 08/2 -2480 2 SCHOOL T 202488 6 -2480 22 44 9 0 00 0 0 00 AP 09/01/06 09/0 1679 3 1010 5 222 41 202265 5 446 67 88B 6 0 00 0 00 E40 09/01/06 09/1 -162 7 PRIVATE M OR TGAGE IN 202265 5 -162 B7 725 9 0 00 D O 0 AP 0/01/0 0/0 1679 3 1009 64 223 52 202042 3 446 67 1171 6 0 00 0 0 00 340 10/01/06 10/2 -162 7 PRIVATE M ORT GAGE IN 202D42 3 -162 87 1008 9 0 00 0 0 00 AP 11/01/06 10/3 1679 3 1008 53 224 63 201817 0 446 67 1455 6 0 00 0 0 0 E4 1/01/06 1/D -162 7 PRIVATE M OR TGAGE IN 201817 0 -162 87 1292 9 0 00 0 0 00 AP 2/01/06 12/0 1679 3 1007 41 225 75 201591 5 446 67 1739 6 0 00 0 0 0 E4 2/01/06 2/0 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 201591 5 -162 87 1576 9 0 00 0 0 1 294 NV 2007 15 February, lise sqL Marylou M atas, F I,aw O f5ces dsaY Saidis, Flower & Lin a West High Street 26 Carl'sle 17013 pennsYlvania, U.S.A arital property and debts as per Dear MaxYlou, roposo, for distribution of m please fmd enclosed my 25th 2007. your request of January S nCerelY, , Agnes Schutte HALLYLO[3GHANE STRAND, 'NMORE> Rv - AV - it I As per your request, I would like to list my terms as follows: 1. I would like the opportunity to talk about having possession of the dogs when I'm in a position to secure a place where I could give them a suitable home 2. I would like to split the equity in the house 50:50, either through the sale of the house or a valuation of the home 3. I would like some more help with paying off the car, maybe split the remaining payments and outstanding balance. When the car is sold we can split the proceeds. 4. I would like a split of the Hosts shares accumulated thus far. 5. Personal items left in the house and financial assistance in the removal of same. Those items are as follows: Spare Master Dining Living Office Basement Garage room Bedroom room Room White TV and 2 Wicker Agnes 2 Air bookshelf DVD bookshelves chest Dell conditioning 'Bicycle Player computer units Chest of Wicker Painted TV stand Microwave drawers table, Stools glass top and4 chairs 2 side Mission Swing chair tables side tables Pull bed All 2 space lamps heaters and cushions 2 metal Green Lamps and lams chair shades Christmas Ornaments Box If you are agreeable to these terms, I will not pursue any requests for alimony or other rights that I may have. Please email Nuala and let her know if this looks fair to you. ICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vii. CIVIL ACTION -LAW NO. 07-48 NES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK,: Defendant : IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that in this case, complete copies of all papers contained in the attached document have been served upon the following persons by the following means and on the dates stated: Name & Address Means of Service Date of Service Agnes Elizabeth McClintock First Class Mail June 21, 2007 63 Meade Drive Carlisle, PA Ma as, Es ui Attorney D 4919 26 West Htgti Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-6222 Dated: (,,1Z l/() 7- Counsel for Petitioner SAMIS, FowEit & LIlVDS" 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA V `i,. ? t ! c n --mi D - Answer and New Matter to Plaintiff's Petition for Special Relief Defendant's Cross Petition for Special Relief Prepared By: Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire 3448 Trindle Road, Camp Hill, PA 17011 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Phone: 717-737-0100 • Fax: 717-975-0697 Email: dianeradcliff @comcast.net Attorney for Agnes E. McClintock MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, Plaintiff vs. AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : NO. 07-48 : IN DIVORCE ANSWER AND NEW MATTER TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION AND SPECIAL RELIEF AND DEFENDANT'S CROPS PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF Defendant, Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, by and through her attorney, Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire, files this Answer with New Matter to Plaintiff's, Michael Ryan McClintock's, Petition for Exclusive Possession and Special Relief and Cross Petition for Special Relief as follow: DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF Marital Residence AND SPECIAL RELIEF 1. Admitted. It is admitted that Petitioner is Michael Ryan McClintock, Plaintiff in the above captioned divorce action, and an adult individual residing at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff /Petitioner is hereinafter referred to as "Husband". 2. Admitted in Part and Denied in Part. It admitted that the Respondent is Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, Defendant in the above captioned divorce action and an adult individual. Defendant/ Respondent is hereinafter referred to as "Wife". It is denied that Wife resides at Ballyloughane Strand, Renmore, Galway, Republic of Ireland. On the contrary it is averred that Wife resides at 63 Me; de Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and had only been temporarily staying with her family at Ballyloughane Strand, Renmore, Galway, Ireland as a result of the stress resulting from the failed marriage. -2- 3. Admitted. It is admitted that the parties were married on May 23, 2002. 4. Admitted. It is admitted that there are no children of the marriage. 5. Admitted. It is admitted that Husband filed a Complaint in Divorce on January 3, 2007, in Cumberland County. 6. Admitted. It is admitted that Wife accepted service of the Complaint on January 14, 2007. 7. Denied. It is denied that the parties separated on or about October 18, 2006, when Wife moved out of the parties' Marital Residence and moved to her residence in Ireland. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 8. Denied. It is denied that since the date of separation, Wife has lived continuously in Ireland, at the address listed above in Paragraph 2. On the contrary the Answer and averments set forth in Paragraph 7 above are incorporated by referenced hereto. 9. Admitted. It is admitted that since the date of separation, Husband has lived continuously in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, at the address listed above in Paragraph 1. By way of further clarification, it is averred that Wife has not returned to the Marital Residence since June 19, 2007 even though he is at liberty to do so and Wife has taken no action to exclude him from the Marital Residence. 10. Admitted. It is admitted that the parties are the owners of the real estate located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, havir.g purchased the property in 2005. 11. Admitted. It is admitted that the parties do not own any other real estate, of which Husband is aware, either jointly or individually. 12. Admitted. It is admitted that the real estate at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, was purchased for approximately $205,900 in April 2005 and, at the time of separation in October 2006, had a mortgage balance of approximately $202,000. The Cumberland County tax assessment is attached hereto as Exhibit A, to reflect the purchase date and purchase price. The 2006 mortgage account statement for the real estate is attached hereto as Exhibit B, to reflect the mortgage balance as of October 2006. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at - 3 - length. 13. Admitted. It is admitted that since the date of separation, Husband has maintained all of the monthly mortgage payments, utility payments, maintenance payments, taxes and insurance for the real estate located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, without any financial assistance or contribution from Wife. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 14. Admitted. It is admitted that Husband is employed by an out of state employer and works from his home, having done this since 2004. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF THE Marital Residence 15. Wife incorporates by reference the answers and averments set forth in Paragraph 1 through 14 herein, the same as if fully set forth herein at length. 16. Denied. It is denied that on June 19, 2007, Wife appeared at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, PA, without any prior contact or notice to Husband or his counsel, bringing with her officers from the North Middleton Police Department. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments :yet forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 17. Admitted. It is admitted that Wife, with the assistance of the officers, demanded that she be allowed entry to the home. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 18. Denied. Wife is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of falsity of the averments in Paragraph 18 of Husband's Petition that "Husband initially refused Wife access to the home, since she has not been there for 8 months, has had limited contact with Husband, and did not make attempts to contact him in advance to advise him of her trip.", and said averments are therefore denied. Wife demands proof thereof at the hearing on Husband's Petition, if relevant. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. -4- 19. Admitted. It is admitted that when Husband refused to open the door for Wife's entry, the North Middleton Police Officers contacted the fire department for assistance, at which time, several fire trucks arrived at Hui )and's home to prepare for a forced entry. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 20. Denied. Wife is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of falsity of the averment in Paragraph 20 of Husband's Petition that "Husband did open the door, at which point the officers advised that Husband should leave the home and allow Wife to stay at the residence.", and said averments are therefore denied. Wife demands proof thereof at the hearing on Husband's Petition, if relevant. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 21. Admitted. It is admitted that Husband indicated to police officers at the scene that he would make arrangements for Wife to spend the evening at a local hotel if she needed accommodations, so that he could stay in his home, but Wife refused the offer and police asked Husband to leave the residence. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments : et forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 22. Admitted. It is admitted that Husband left the residence at the direction of the North Middleton Police. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 23. Admitted. It is admitted that Wife has not stayed at the residence for 8 months, has not contributed to any payments for residence, voluntarily left the residence and moved to her family's home in Ireland upon separation. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 24. Denied. It is denied that Husband is suffering harm by the unnecessary eviction from the residence, in that he is not able to work as he had been, is not able to make payments for the home, and is not able to enjoy the continued use of Marital Residence that he alone has maintained without contribution from Wife since the date of separation. By way of further Answer, Wiff- incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. - 5 - Z 25. Admitted. It is admitted that Husband has been represented by counsel throughout these proceedings and has attempted to maintain contact with Wife to negotiate a distribution of the marital estate. 26. Denied. Wife is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of falsity of the averment in Paragraph 26 of Husband's Petition that "On or about May 17, 2007, Husband's counsel was advised by Harold S. Irwin, III, Esquire, that he had been asked to represent Wife in pendin-; divorce litigation and requested that all documents be forwarded to him." and said averments are therefore denied. Wife demands proof thereof at the hearing on Husband's Petition, if relevant. 27. Denied. Wife is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of falsity of the averment in Paragraph 26 of Husband's Petition that "Prior to the filing of this Petition, Husband's counsel contacted Mr. Irwin's office to seek a resolution of this matter or his concurrence with this request, to be advised that he no longer represented Wife in this divorce litigation.", and said averments are therefore denied. Wife demands proof thereof at the hearing on Husband's Petition, if relevant. 28. Admitted. It is admitted that pursuant to Rule 208.3(a), no Judge has been previously assigned to this case. WHEREFORE, Wife requests your Honorable Court to enter an Order denying Husband's request to grant Husband exclusive possession of the Marital Residence located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania and ordering him to maintain all payments associated with that residence. DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF 29. Wife incorporates by reference the answers and averments set forth in Paragraph 1 through 28 herein, the same as if fully set forth herein at length. 30. Denied. It is denied that at the time of separation, Wife removed her personal items, clothing and the like, but took only a few items of household goods from the Marital Residence, leaving the majority of items, including furnishings and other household items at the residence. By way of further Answer, Wife avers that at time of separation when Wife left the Marital Residence, she only took a single suitcase of clothes intending to return to Pennsylvania and the Marital Residence after a temporary stay with her family in Ireland. She did not take all of her personal effects and clothing and took no household goods. Wife further incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of -6- fully set forth herein at length. 31. Admitted. It is admitted that Husband and Wife have exchanged correspondence, between each other and through counsel, regarding a distribution of assets, debts, household items, furnishings and personal property in this matter. 32. Admitted. It is admitted that the distribution of the marital estate includes a listing of personal property and furnishings that Wife forwarded to Husband to detail the property she would like to have. The listing of property is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit C. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 33. Denied. Wife is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the averments in Paragraph 33 of Husband's Petition that "Husband does not know what Wife's plans may be at this time with regard to living in the house or removing items", and said averments are therefore denied. Wife demands proof thereof at the hearing on Husband's Petition, if relevant. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully s,--.t forth herein at length. 34. Denied. Wife is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the averments in Paragraph 34 of Husband's Petition that "Although the parties had exchanged some correspondence, documents and attempted negotiations for a settlement, Wife's recent actions and behavior convey to Husband that she may not be cooperative. ", and said averments are therefore denied. Wife demands proof thereof at the hearing on Husband's Petition, if relevant. 35. Denied. Wife is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the averments in Paragraph 35 of Husband's Petition that "Husband is concerned that because Wife arrived at the home without prior notice at all and with police assistance, that she may be planning to remove additional items or even destroy property at the home while he is evicted by the police", and said averments are therefore denied. Wife demands proof thereof at the hearing on Husband's Petition, if relevant. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 36. Admitted. It is admitted that Husband works from home and has his office equipment stored there; his other personal items are stored at the home; he has purchased other items since the time of separation that Wife is not entitled to enjoy or use. By way of 7- further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the same as of fully set forth herein at length. 37. Denied. It is denied that Husband will suffer harm by Wife's continued use of any items in the Marital Residence and will suffer harm if Wife otherwise destroys, takes or diminishes the value of any item in the home or the home itself. By way of further Answer, Wife incorporates by reference the averments set forth :n Paragraphs 40 through 54 of Petitioner's New Matter, herein, the sarre as of fully set forth herein at length. 38. Denied. Wife is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the trust or falsity of the averments in Paragraph 38 of Husband's Petition that "Husband is concerned that, without an Order, preventing Wife from taking action to remove items that are not on the list previously agreed to by the parties, Wife wilt remove, destroy or diminish the value of marital items and Husband's individual items.", and said averments are therefore denied. Wife demands proof thereof at the hearing on Husband's Petition, if relevant. WHEREFORE, Wife requests your Honorable Court to enter an order granting Husband's requests that neither party be permitted to transfer, sell, dissipate, destroy, encumber or diminish the value of any asset held jointly or individually by either of them pending further of Court or without the express written consent of both parties and to return Wife's premarital dogs to the Marital Residence. DEFENDANT'S NEW MATTER TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FO,t EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF Marital Residence A? D SPECIAL RELIEF 39. Wife incorporates by reference the answers and averments set forth in Paragraph 1 through 38 herein, the same as if fully set forth herein at length. 40. The parties physically separated on or about November 14, 2006, after Husband told Wife he wanted a divorce. 41. Because of the stress she was under as a result of the breakup of the parties' marriage, Wife temporarily left the Marital Residence to stay with her family in Ireland until she was better able to deal with the situation. 42. When it became apparent to Wife that the parties were not able to reconcile and were not able in reaching an agreement to resolve the economic issues in the divorce, Wife decided that she must return to Pennsylvania to deal with those issues. -8- 43. Wife made several attempts to call Husband and advise him that she was returning to Pennsylvania and the Marital Residence, but Husband did not return her calls. 44. Wife no longer had the reasonable option of staying with her family in Ireland and needed to be in the States to assist counsel in her divorce. 45. On June 19, 2005, Wife returned to Pennsylvania to the jointly owned Marital Residence located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania ("Marital Residence"). 46. While Husband was asked to leave the Marital Residence for the evening by the police, he was not excluded from that residence and is at liberty to return at any time. 47. As part of equitable distribution, the parties need to resolve the distribution of the following items: a. Wife's 2 premarital dogs; b. The Marital Residence; C. Wife's leased 2003 Honda Civic LX; d. The $3,034.00 joint income tax refund; e. Household goods and furnishings 48. Since the parties' separation, the parties exchanged communication about the distribution of their marital property in attempts to resolve the property distribution issue. 49. With respect to Wife's pre-marital dogs , Wife avers the following: a. Prior to the parties' marriage Wife was the sole c kvner of two Golden Retrievers: Faeden purchased by Wife prior to June 26, 2001; and Kieran purchased by Wife on 10/23/2001 (hereinafter the "Dogs"). True and correct copies of the documents evidencing Wife's pre-marital ownership of the Dogs is attached hereto marked Exhibit "R-1 "and made a part hereof. b. Wife never transferred ownership of the Dogs to Husband or from her sole name into the parties joint names. -9- 50. C. The Dogs have not increased in value during the marriage. d. The Dogs are clearly Wife's non-marital property and are not subject to equitable distribution. e. When Wife temporarily left the Marital Residence, she did not take the Dogs with her because her stay was only to be temporary in nature and the Dogs would have to have been quarentined if taken to Ireland. She, therefore, decided to leave them temporarily in Husbands's care until her return to the Pennsylvania. f. Husband has taken the position that the Dogs are "Family Dogs" and should be distributed to him and therefore has refused to allow Wife to have the Dogs which re her premarital property and therefore to which he has no legal claim. 9. Wife wants the Dogs and has every right to have them in her possession. h. Alternatively, the Dogs should be returned to the Marital Residence where both parties can enjoy their company pending equitable distribution. With respect to the Marital Residence, Wife avers the following: a. Husband has taken the position that there is no =,quity in the Marital Residence in that he believed that the Marital Residence has no increased in value during the marriage to the date of the filing of the above referenced Petition. b. As a result, thus far Husband has failed and refused to offer Wife any sums for her interest in the Marital Residence. C. The Marital Residence currently has a value of approximately $279,000.00 as demonstrated by the Comparative market Analysis prepared by Norman J. Bellinger, Realtor/Owner of Central States Realty, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "R-2" and made a part hereof. d. It is believed that as of the current date, the Marital Residence mortgage with Sovereign (hereinafter the "Sovereign Mortgage") has a balance owing of approximately $200,000. e. Based upon the aforesaid $279,000 value of the Marital Residence and a $200,000 balance owing on the Sovereign Mortgage, there is approximately $79,000 in equity in the Marital Residence, to which Wife is entitled to a share in equitable -10- distribution ranging between $40,000.00 and $48,000.00 depending upon the percentage of division the Court deems appropriate in equitable distribution. f. Husband has had sole use of the Marital Residence from the 11 /14/07 date of the parties physical separation until 6/19/07 and is chargeable with its fair rental value during that time. g. The fair rental value owed by Husb, nd is offset by the mortgage taxes and insurance he has paid. h. From the 11 /14/07 date of the parties physical separation until the present Husband has failed to support Wife. i. Since Husband earns $80,000 per year and Wife has no income, Husband should have been paying Wife no less than $1,300.00 per month in support, and possibly more now that Wife is living in the Marital Residence. j. Because Husband owed the fair rentai value of the Marital Residence and paid no support to Wife, no financial assistance or contribution from Wife. k. Wife has not excluded Husband from the Marital Residence. 1. Husband is free to enter the Marital Residence and live there jointly with Wife. M. Husband has a new girlfriend who was at the Marital Residence on June 19, 2007. n. Husband's father also came to the Marital Residence on June 19, 2007 and created a scene with Wife. o. Wife does not want either Husband's girlfriend of father to be permitted to come to the Marital Residence during her occupancy. P. Case law indicates that an exclusive possession order would not be appropriate on this case since there are no extraordiary facts which justify the entry of such an order. See the following cases copies of which are attached hereto, marked Exhibit "R-3" and made a part hereof: i. Laczkowski vs. Laczkowski, 344 Pa.Super., 496 A.2d 56 (1985); ii. Uhler v. Uhler, 41 PA PA. D.ftC.3d 3, (1985); iii. Garrison v. Garrison, 43 PA .D.EtC.3d 190, (1986); - 11 - iv. Vuocolo V. Vuocolo, 42 PA. D. EtC. 3d (19E I); V. Merula v. Merula, 19 PA. D.K.4th (1993); 51. With respect to Wife's 2003 Honda, Wife avers that Husband retains a set of keys to that vehicle which Wife wants returned to her. 52. With respect to the 2006 Income Tax Return Wife avers the follow9ng: a. Husband filed that return as a joint return with Wife; b. Husband did not secure Wife's consent to file a joint return. C. Husband has received the total $3,034 refund check as a result of that joint filing and has failed and refused to give Wife her half share thereof unless he agrees to his Property settlement proposal. d. Wife is entitled to 1/2 of the 2006 income tax refund without condition. e. In the alternative Husband should be required co escrow the $3,034 Husband received from the 2006 refund check to be held in escrow by Wife's Attorney. 53. With respect to Husband's employment and his need to work out of the Marital Residence, Wife avers the following: a. Husband can do his job anywhere since it is all done over a computer by email and videoconferencing. b. Husband currently has his lap top computer and can perform all of his work requirements using that computer. C. Alternatively, Husband is free to return to the Marital Residence to use his home office equipment in the home or anywhere else that he would chose, should he not feel comfortable in living in the Marital Residence or working in the Marital Residence while Wife is living there. 54. With respect to the parties' marital and non-marital personal property located at the Marital Residence, Wife avers the following: a. Wife has no intention of removing or destroying any marital property or Husband's non-marital property located at the Marital Residence. -12- b. Wife has not been using Husband's personal property which he acquired after the parties separated. C. Husband on the contrary has removc d the Dogs from the Marital Residence, thereby preventing her from having the use and enjoyment of the Dogs. WHEREFORE, Wife requests your Honorable Court to enter an Order: ? Denying Husband's request to grant Husband exclusive possession of the Marital Residence located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania; ? Permitting both parties to occupy the Marital Residence; ? Requiring Husband to pay all payments associated with the Marital Residence; ? Prohibiting Husband's girlfriend and Husband's father from entering upon the Marital Residence; ? Requiring Husband to give Wife the remaining keys for her 2003 Honda; ? Requiring Husband to give Wife her the pre-marital Dogs. ? In the alternative, requiring Husband to return the Dogs to the Marital Residence where both parties can enjoy them. ? Prohibiting either party from transferring, selling, dissipating, destroying, encumbering or diminishing the value of any marital asset held jointly or individually by either of them pending further of Court or without the express written consent of both parties; ? Requiring Husband to pay Wife 'fz of the 2006 joint income tax refund. DEFENDANT'S CROSS PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF 55. Wife incorporates by reference the answers and averments set forth in Paragraph 1 through 54 herein, the same as if fully set forth herein at length. 56. Wife has no income and cannot afford to pay the Marital Residence mortgage. 57. Husband is employed and earns $80,000 and can afford to make those payments -13- 58. Wife believes that Husband should make the payments on the Marital Residence mortgage if he is permitted to return to the home. Said payments would be in lieu of spousal support during the period of her occupancy. 59. Wife is entitled to'/2 of the 2006 income tax refund without condition. 60. Wife is entitled to sole possession of her 2 premarital Dogs. 61. Husband has a new vehicle and has no need for the keys to Wife's 2003 Honda. 62. Wife is entitled to the keys to that Honda. 63. Husband carries health, dental and vision insurance on Wife. 64. Husband has not yet provided Wife with insurance cards for that coverage. 65. Wife needs the insurance cards to get medical, dental or vision treatment. 66. A copy of this Cross petition has been mailed and faxed to Plaintiff's Attorney prior to filing and she has not consented to the relief requested herein. 67. The Honorable Edgar E. Bayley has previously been assigned to this case, being assigned to hear Plaintiff's Petition for Exclusive Possession of Marital Residence and Petition for Special Relief. WHEREFORE, Wife requests your Honorable Court to enter an Order: ? Permitting both parties to occupy the Marital Residence; ? Requiring Husband to pay all payments associated with the Marital Residence; ? Prohibiting Husband's girlfriend and Husband's father from entering upon the Marital Residence; ? Requiring Husband to give Wife the remaining keys for her 2003 Honda; ? Requiring Husband to give Wife her pre-marital Dogs. ? In the alternative, requiring Husband to return the Dogs to the Marital Residence where both parties can enjoy them. -14- ? Requiring Husband to pay Wife Y2 of the 2006 joint income tax refund; ? Requiring Husband to provide Wife with insurance cards. Respectfully submitted, 'r-? - - - / DCLIFF, ESQUIRE le Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Phone: (717) 737-0100 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Att( rney for Respondent/Wife - 15 - VERIFICATION verify that the statements made in the foregoing document are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 PA. C.S. 54904, relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities. AGNE LIZABETH MCCLINTOCK Dated: June 26, 2007 -16- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire, hereby certify that on June 26, 2007, 1 served a copy of the foregoing Answer and New Matter and Cross Petition upon the Plaintiff's attorney, Marylou Matas, Esquire, by mailing same by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Marylou Matas, Esquire 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 I, Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire, also certify that on June 26, 20071 faxed a copy of the foregoing Answer and New Matter and Cross Petition (w/o Exhibits) to Plaintiff's attorney, Marylou Matas, Esquire, at 717-243-6486. Respectfully submitted, DME G. LIFF, ESQUIRF Trindle Read Camp Hill, PA 17011 Phone: (717) 737-0100 Fax: (717) 975-0697 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Attorney for Agnes E. McClintock -17- EXHIBIT R-1 PROOF OF PREMARITAL OWNERSHIP OF DOGS STEP 6. CHECK REGISTRATION TAPE- STEP S. Full: May be used as i registrable breeding ;,tock. Entry in FULL ? LIMITED i dog events unrestricted..'LIa31TED: Not to be used for breeding stock. If no box is checked, dog will be given full registration. ' Entry in dog events is restricted. Any correction must be accompanied by a written explanation from the litter owner. STEP 7. CHECK OWNERSHIP AND FILL IN TRANSFER DATE: STEP 7. Check one box. Enter I (we) still own this dog and apply for registration and to have ! I ?' the date that new owners took ownership recorded in my (our) name(s). Go to step 10. possession of the dog. It the dog MONTH DAY YEAR is to be registered in the name of I (we) transferred this dog DIRECTLY to the NEW OWNER(S) the litter owner(s), skip steps 8 & 9. on this date. l STEP 8. PRINT NAME(S) OF NEW OWNER/CO-OWNER: I (we) apply to The American Kennel Club to have a registration certificate for this dog issued in my (our) name(s), and certify that I (we) acquired this dog on the date stated directly from the owner(s) of the litter. I (we) agree to abide by all American Kennel Club rules and regulations. I (we) under- stand that if the limited box in Step 6 has been checked by the litter, owner(s), I (we) will receive a limited registration certificate. 1. NEW OWNER NAME i - C .. 4 --? 1 --------------------------------------- -------------------------------------- ------------- -- ----------- 2. ADDRESS 1 J '/ t r/ 1 t_ ,._ 1 _ ______ _ _ ----------- ------ ---- . -- - ----- - 3. CITY (" t STATE f• ZIP / ----------- ----•---------------------=------ --------- -------------------------------------------------- 4.E-MAILADDRESSPHONE 1. NEW CO-OWNER NAME --------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ------------------ ---------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------; 2. ADDRESS ---------------------------------- 3. CITY ---------------- --------- ------------------- 4. E-MAIL ADDRESS STATE I _I I ZIP I I I I I - I I ---------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- PHONE I- I 1 -1 LL - STEP 9. NEW OWNER(S) READ AND SIGN: NEW OWNER SIGNATURE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEW CO-OWNER(S) SIGNATURE(S) ------ ----------------------------------------_- ------------------------------------------- STEP 8. Litter owner must print names as they will appear on Registration certificate and as recorded by litter owner. Print one name per line unless there are more than two co-owners. STEP 9. Each New Owner and Co-owner must sign separately. IF THE NEW OWNERS LISTED ABOVE HAVE TRANSFERRED THIS DOG TO SOME OTHER PERSON(S), A ,SUPREM EffAt APANSFE8 STATEMEfwfT (Form# AXTRND) AND $15.00 FEE MUST ACCOMPANY THIS APPLICATION FOR EACH INTERMEDIATE TRANSFER. THESE FORMS ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB AT THE ADDRESS SHOWN BELOW. STEP 10. LITTER OWNER(S) READ AND SIGN: "I certify by my signature that all the information appearing STEP 10. ALL individuals on this application is correct, and that I am in good whose names appear to the left standing with The American Kennel Club." MUST sign in the space indicated. t? 1 1 SIGNATURE OF CHARLENE HINDERER DATE S N 867384/07 Corrections may cause a delay of registration for explanations. The AKC reserves the right to revoke for cause any registration certificate issued. A misrepresentation on this application is cause for cancellation and may result in loss of all AKC privileges for those individuals who violate the integrity of this application. All submitted applications become the property of the AKC. If you need assistance filling out this application, additional forms or information, call AKC customer service (919) 233-9767 8:30 AM-5:00 PM Eastern Time Monday through Friday. Please send completed form with appropriate fees to: American Kennel Club PO Box 37902 Or Fax both sides of this form to: (919) 233-3627 Raleigh, NC 27627-7902 PLEASE NOTE: Applications take approximately three weeks to process. Please wait before calling AKC to check on the status of your application until after that time period has elapsed, ADREG2 (8/01) 4 Agnes Schutte 10412 Masters Terrace Potomac, MD 20854 Banfield Invoice 20924 Frederick Road Germantown, MD 20876 (301) 540-6251 June 26, 2001 Tuesday 2:52 pm Invoice # 45483 Retail Fee Your Fee Faeden on June 26, 2001 Professional Services Physical Exam: First Pet Office Visit: First Pet 25.95 25.95 Vaccinations/Immunization Corona Virus 11.95 11.95 Canine Cough/Bordetella Vaccines 12.95 12.95 Giardia Vaccine-Canine 13.95 13.95 Distemper-Parvo Combo 17.00 17.00 Lyme Disease Vaccine 18.95 18.95 Laboratory Services Intestinal Parasite Fecal Exam 18.95 18.95 Heartworm Medication HeartGard Plus (26-50 Ibs) - Tab 8.41 8.41 Prescription Flea Products Frontline Top Spot 23-44 Ib 1 Dose 13.74 13.74 Special Pet & Client Sales Tax at 5.00% 0.69 0.69 Subtotal $ 142.54 $ 142.54 Ahove treatments performed as part of the Basic Care Wellness Plan Retail Fee Your Fee would have resulted in an estimated savings of $119.70 Please ask us for details. Total $ 142.54 $ 142.54 Payments Received Date Method of Payment Amount 06126/2001 Visa $142.54 Banfield Hours Mon - Fri Saturday Sunday Holidays 9:00 am - 7:00 pm 9:00 am - 5:00 pm Closed Closed WE WILL BE CLOSED WEDNESDAY JULY 4th If you have any questions about your pet's progress or medication - please call. We treat your pet like family. Thank you for telling your friends about Banfield, The Pet Hospital. Rpt Id: AC_Ash_r Hospital # 0363 Germantown, MD Page - 1 anf*ield THE PET HOSPITAL f SINCE 1955 Examination Report UROGENITAL SYSTEM 0 Normal/nonpainful ? Change in drinking/urination ? Genital discharge ? Mammary lumps ? Enlarged or small ? Other abnormalities noted testicles ANALSACS Q Empty/normal ? Other abnormalities noted ? Full or hard LEGS, JOINTS, & PAWS 0 Normal/nonpainful ? Pain when sitting or rising ? Lame/painful ? Other abnormalities noted NEUROLOGICAL/BEHAVIORAL Q Behavioral: normal behavior and responses ? Neurological: abnormalities noted 0 Bright and shiny ? Parasites present ? Fleas ? Ticks ? Lice ? Tapeworms EYES 0 Bright and clear ? Discharge ? Eyelid problems EARS 2 Clean and odor free ? Red/itchy ? Discharge Nails/dewclaws E Normal length ? Need trimming ? Other lesions noted ? Red ? Trouble with vision ? Abnormalities noted ? Bad smell ? Trouble hearing ? Abnormalities noted NOSE, THROAT, & LYMPH GLANDS 2 Cool, wet nose ? Red tonsils ? Red throat ? Enlarged glands MOUTH, TEETH, GUMS 0 Clean and odor free ? Bite: ? Tartar or inflammation ? Abnormalities noted ? Bad smell or breath FAEDEN'S CURRENT CONDITION Pet Faeden Schutte Date 06/26/2001 LUNGS 0 Normal sounds ? Trouble breathing ? Coughing/congestion ? Other abnormalities noted HEART 2 Normal rhythm ? Tires easily ? Murmur/arrhythmia ? Other abnormalities noted ABDOMEN 2 Normal nonpainful ? Painful ? Change in appetite ? Distended ? Vomiting or diarrhea ? Abnormal mass ? Other abnormalities noted 0 Excellent ? Good ? Needs Improvement Weight ? Thin Q Average ? Overweight At this time 29 . a lbs Preventative Care Due Dates Pordetella 12/25/2001 Heartworm Corona Virus 07/17/2001 Fecal Exam 12/25/2001 Distmp/Parvo 07/17/2001 Lyme Disease 07/17/2001 Giardia 07/17/2001 Parvo Virus Rabies Virus RefLab-Thyro Scheduled Appointments 20924 Frederick Road Germantown, MD 20876 (301) 540-6251 Please call Banfield with your questions! Rpt Id: M_Exm Hospital # 0363 Germantown, MD Page - 1 COAT & SKIN Banfield THE PET HOSPITAL # SINCE 1955 20924 Frederick Road Germantown, MD 20876 (301) 540-6251 Outpatient Therapy Recommendations June 26, 2001 Tuesday 2:52 pm Client: Agnes Schutte Visit Date: 06/26/2001 Patient: Faeden Presenting Complaint: Preventive Care-- Vaccinations/Deworming Treatment: HeartGard Plus (26-50 Ibs) - Tab Topic: HEARTWORM DISEASE AND PREVENTION A mosquito borne parasite called Dirofilaria immitis causes canine heartworm disease. When an infected mosquito bites a Pet, microscopic heartworm larvae can enter the skin and tissues. The larvae migrate in multiple body tissues until they reach the large vessels of the heart and lungs. These parasites then grow up to 12 inches long in the heart and surrounding blood vessels. Heartworm disease can cause heart, lung, kidney, and liver damage. Luckily, this is a preventable disease. Dogs are at most risk for heartworm infection. However, cats, ferrets, wild canines (foxes, etc.), humans, and several other mammals can be infected. Often, infected Pets may show no symptoms until severe tissue damage has already occurred. These signs include coughing, respiratory problems, lack of energy, exercise intolerance, weight loss, fainting, coughing up blood, or sudden respiratory distress and death. Diagnosis is based on signs, history, blood and other laboratory tests, and sometimes x-rays. Treatment usually consists of medications to kill the adult parasites first and later the larval stages. In some cases, Pets may have serious or potentially fatal reactions to treatment medications. Also, the dead or dying adult worms may flow into the lungs, causing life threatening blood vessel blockages. Prevention is the best, easiest, safest, and least expensive medicine. After testing to rule out a pre-existing infection, a monthly dose of heartworm preventative will keep Pets parasite free. Many heartworm preventives also kill some intestinal worms that can cause serious disease. *** IMPORTANT POINTS IN PREVENTION and TREATMENT Have your Pet checked for heartworm disease yearly. Use heartworm preventives or other medications as directed by your veterinarian. If your Pet has been diagnosed with heartworm disease, be sure to discuss treatment and prognosis with your veterinarian immediately. Monitor your Pet carefully and have him/her rechecked as directed by your veterinarian. Please contact the medical team if you have any questions. Treatment: Canine Cough/Bordetella Vaccines Topic: VACCINE REACTIONS Your Pet has received one or more vaccinations today to protect him or her from serious or potentially fatal diseases. Your diligence and care in providing these life-saving vaccines in a timely manner is appreciated by your Pet's doctor, veterinary care staff, and of course, your Pet! Although these vaccines are safe and effective, occasionally Pets may experience one or more of the following conditions due to a general vaccine reaction: Mild lethargy Muscular soreness Decreased appetite Mild fever Mild vomiting or diarrhea Rpt Id: PrtHmNts Hospital # 0363 Germantown, MD Page - 1 i Banfield THE PET HOSPITAL + SINCE 1955 20924 Frederick Road Germantown, MD 20876 (301) 540-6251 Outpatient Therapy Recommendations June 26, 2001 Tuesday 2:52 pm Client: Agnes Schutte Visit Date: 06/26/2001 Patient: Faeden Presenting Complaint: Preventive Care-- Vaccination s/Deworming Treatment: Canine Cough/Bordetella Vaccines Topic: VACCINE REACTIONS These mild reactions usually do not last more than 24 hours. If your Pet exhibits any of these symptoms, or they persist longer than 24 hours, call the medical team to discuss them. Rarely, Pets may experience more serious conditions soon after vaccination including: Swelling of the face or ears Hives or significant itching Difficulty breathing Significant lethargy Significant vomiting or diarrhea Fluid build up or infection at the injection site If your Pet exhibits any of these signs, bring him or her back immediately. He or she may need medications to treat the reaction. Please contact the local emergency veterinary service if a problem occurs after regular business hours. Such reactions cannot be predicted ahead of time. Occasionally, Pets that have received injectable vaccinations develop a localized reaction indicated by a small, hard lump under the skin where vaccines were administered. Please allow us to recheck your Pet if this occurs. These lumps may take 1-3 weeks to appear and 2-6 weeks to resolve. They usually do not require treatment. Pets receiving the nose drop form of Bordetella (Kennel Cough) vaccination may experience a mild upper respiratory reaction approximately 5-7 days later. These Pets may have a very mild sneeze or runny nose for 2-3 days. Please contact the medical team if this occurs. Please contact the medical team if you have any questions or concerns. Rpt Id: PrtHmNts Hospital # 0363 Germantown, MD Page - 1 EXHIBIT R-2 COMPARATIVE MARKET ANALYSIS FOR MARITAL HOME Ju 1 7172431330 DELLINGER, INC. dba n RFALTY June 25, 2007 Mr. and Mrs. McClintock 63 Meade Drive Carlisle, PA 17013 Dear Mr. and Mrs. McClintock As per the request of Agnes E. McClintock I visited your home in "Wertz Run Heights" at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle PA 17013 on Sunday June 24, 2007 for the purpose of ascertaining a fair market opinion of value for the above residence. Your home was constructed by Snider & Miller Builders in 2005 with the following amenities: • Approx. 2000 s.f. 2-story colonial style "Shiloh II" home with brick and vinyl exterior. • 4 bedrooms, 2.5 baths • Full concrete basement • 2"x6" exterior walls • Dining room, Living room, Laundry room • Full, covered front porch • 2-car garage w/openers and double wide asphalt driveway • Ceramic tile flooring in entry, hallway, Powder Room and Kitchen • LR, DR, and all Bedrooms are carpeted. • Full baths and Laundry have vinyl flooring • Gas forced hot air heat and Central Air Conditioning • Public water and sewer, Comcast Cable, Embarq telephone, UGI Natural Gas, PP&L electric and York Waste Disposal. • Cumberland County, North Middleton Township, Carlisle School System. The opinion of value I place on this home, when comparing it to other existing home for sale on the market at present in "Wertz Run Heights" neighborhood would be approximately $279,000.00. *This analysis has not been performed in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice which require valuers to act as unbiased, disinterested third parties with impartiality, objectivity and independence without accommodation of personal interest. It is not to be construed as an appraisal and may not be used as such for any purpose. Thank you for this opportunity, Norman J. Dellinger; Realtor/Owner Central State Realty 710 Riirer Highway . Cari;sle, PA 17013 • (717) 243-6400 • FAX (71 7) ?43-1330 EXHIBIT R-3 CASE LAW - EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION MARITAL HOME 344 Pa.Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Linda Claire LACZKOWSKI V. Edward Thomas LACZKOWSKI, Appellant. 740 Phila. 1983 Submitted July 19, 1984. June 7, 1985. Reargument Denied Aug. 20, 1985. Wife filed complaint in divorce against husband. The Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County, Civil Division, No. 2235-C, Brominski, J., entered an order giving wife and minor child right to reside in marital residence until equitable distribution was made, and further ordered husband to vacate the premises. After being found in contempt of order, husband appealed, arguing that lower cc-irt lacked jurisdiction to enter such an order. The Superior Court, No. 740 Philadelphia, 1983, Tamilia, J., held that: (1) despite failure to take exceptions to order dispossessing husband from marital residence and granting exclusive possession to wife during pendency of divorce proceedings or to perfect an appeal from that order, waiver would not be found in view of facts that the law on filing exceptions was unsettled at the time and issue of temporary award of possession of marital residence was an issue of first impression involving welfare of a child and husband's demonstrated incompatibility with his attorneys could have motivated prior counsel's failure to either take exceptions to or appeal the order, and (2) lower court had authority to temporarily award marital residence, pending equitable distribution of marital property, to wife, the spouse having physical custody of minor child. Affirmed. Beck, J., dissented and filed an opinion. West Headnotes [1] KeyCite Notes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134278 Appeal 134282 k. Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court of Grounds of Review. Despite failure to take exceptions to order dispossessing husband from marital residence and granting exclusive possession to wife during pendency of divorce proceedings or to perfect an appeal from that order, waiver would not be found in view of facts that the law on filing exceptions was unsettled at the time and issue of temporary award of possession of marital residence was an issue of first impression involving welfare of a child and husband's demonstrated incompatibility with his attorneys could have motivated prior counsel's .` ailure to either take exceptions to or appeal the order. [2] KeyCite Notes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134248 Disposition of Property 134252.5 Homestead or Residence, Disposition of 134k252.5(2) k. Effect of Child Custody. Lower court had authority to temporarily award marital residence, pending equitable distribution of marital property, to spouse having physical custody of minor child and to order other spouse to vacate premises. 23 P.S. § 401(c, h). [3] KeyCite Notes 361 Statutes 361 VI Construction and Operation 361 VI (A) General Rules of Construction 361 k223 Construction with Reference to Other Statutes 3611<223.1 k. In General. Where a conflict exists between two statutes, Superior Court must construe the two, if possible, so that both may be given effect. **56 *156 Joseph P. Giovannini, Jr., Wilkes-Barre, for appellant. Charles A. Shaffer, Wilkes-Barre, for appellee. Before CAVANAUGH, BECK and TAMILIA, JJ. **57 TAMILIA, Judge: This case presents the novel, yet important, issue of whether section 401 of the Divorce Code FM empowers our courts to enter an Order giving a wife (and child) the right to reside in the marital residence until equitable distribution is made, and further ordering the husband to vacate said premises. Since this is an issue of first impression in this Commonwealth, we have reviewed the law of two leading jurisdictions which have addressed this question and conclude that the Order of the lower court should be affirmed. FN1. Act of April 2, 1980, P. L. 63, No. 26, 55 101-801; 23 P.S. 55 101-801 (Supp.1984). The appellee, Linda Claire Laczkowski, and the appellant, Edward Thomas Laczkowski, although currently separated, are husband and wife and were married on June 17, 1967. The parties have one child born of this marriage, a daughter, Melissa, age 7. The parties and their minor daughter res ded together in the marital residence located at 123 Oak Street, Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, until May 3, 1982, when the appellee, together with Melissa, left the marital resider,:-.e and went to reside at the appellee's *157 parents' home at 42 Dagobert Street, Wilkes-Barre. Appellee and Melissa resided there until May 16, 1983. The marital residence is jointly owned by the parties, in the form of tenancy by the entirety, and is the only real estate owned by them and the single major asset of their marital estate. On June 24, 1982, the appellee filed a complaint in divorce against the appellant alleging the no-fault grounds of an irretrievably broken marriage as well as the fault grounds of indignities. The complaint further requested that the ancillary matters of permanent alimony, division of property, attorneys fees, temporary alimony, child support and court costs be determined in the divorce proceedings. On September 15, 1982, an inventory and appraisement was filed by the appellee pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. On November 19, 1982, the appellee filed a petition for special relief, requesting that she be placed in possession of the marital residence to the exclusion of the appellant on the basis that she had been subjected to harrassment and mental cruelty by the appel .ant and, in support thereof, cited section 401(h) of the Divorce Code and Pa. R.C.P. 1920.43(a). Along with the petition for special relief, the appellee filed a rule to show cause why the posses-,;ion of the marital residence should not be granted to the appellee. S: id petition and rule were duly served upon the appellant, who filed an answer to the petition on November 29, 1982. After a hearing on December 29, 1982, the lower court issued an Order directing the appellant to leave the marital residence and granting exclusive possession to the appellee. No exceptions were taken to this Order nor was an appeal perfected. On January 27, 1983, appellant's former counsel withdrew his appearance and present counsel entered his appearance on appellant's behalf. On February 7, 1983, the appellant, by and through his new counsel, filed a motion and rule to show cause why the Order of December 29, 1982 should not be vacated for lack of jurisdiction. *158 On February 22, 1983, a rule to show cause and petition for citatioi,i for contempt was filed on behalf of the appellee due to the appellant's failure to relinquish possession of the marital residence. The rule returnable was set for March 7, 1983, the same day on which the appellant's rule was returnable on his motion to vacate the Order for lack of jurisdiction. On March 11, 1983, the lower court, after a hearing, denied the appellant's motion to vacate the December 29th Order. The Order of March 11, 1983 was entered of record on March 16, 1983, whereupon the appellant immediately filed an appeal to this Court. The Order of March 11, 1983, reads as follows: `AND NOW, this 11 th day of MARCH, 1983, at 10:45 o'clock, A.M., upon consideration**58 of the Defendant's Motion, and after Hearing, this Court finds that the issues raised by the Defendant in his Motion to Vacate, could have been raised by the Defendant at the time that the hearing was held on the Plaintiff's Petition for Special Relief, and that they were not raised at that time, and not having raised them previously, the Defendant is barred from raising them now. FURTHER, even if this Court were to consider the issues now raised by ti-le Defendant, the Court is of the opinion that the Order entered Decemb:.!r 29, 1982, was proper under all of the circumstances; and it is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Vacate said Order is DENIED. BY THE COURT, /s/ Brominski, /s/ Brominski, J.' On March 10, 1983, appellant filed a petition for stay and supersedeas of the December 29, 1982 Order, pending the instant appeal. Said petition was denied and on March 11, 1983, after a hearing, the lower court found the appellant in contempt of the December 29, 1982 Order awarding appellee the right to live in the family home to the appellee. On May 12, 1983, after a hearing, the lower court entered a *159 further Order which directed the appellant to purge himself of his contempt of the December 29, 1982 Order by 9:00 a.m. on May 16, 1983. Additionally, the Order stated that upon failure of the appellant to purge himself J his contempt, as provided above, the Sheriff of Luzerne County, upon request by the appellee and without further hearing, would be directed to apprehend and incarcerate the appellant in the Luzerne County Prison, until such time as the appellant assured the court that he had purged himself of his contempt. Appellant argues (1) that the lower court lacked jurisdiction under section 401 of the Divorce Code and Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43(a) to dispossess the appellant from the marital residence and grant exclusive possession to the appellee; and (2) that because the lower court lacked jurisdiction and authority to issue such an order, the appellant cannot be held in contempt of court for noncompliance with an invalid order. At the outset, we note that appellant has phrased the above issues in the context of a jurisdictional attack when, in fact, no such question exists. This appeal stemmed from a divorce action which the lower court clearly had jurisdiction to hear. The question concerning whether the court could dispossess the appellant from the marital residence and grant exclusive possession to the appellee during the pendency of the divorce proceedings is not a jurisdictional matter; rather, it involves the judicial interpretation of section 401 of our Divorce Code. Rephrased, the issue before us is whether the lower court correctly applied section 401 of the Divorce Code. Consequently, we are not concerned with subject matter jurisdiction, which is limited to the question of whether a court has the power to determine controversies of the general class to which the case belongs. See Nagle v. American Casualty Co., 317 Pa.Super. 164, 463 A.2d 1136 (1983). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that appellant, through his new counsel, phrased the above issues in this context because an attack on the court's subject matter jurisdiction can be *160 raised at any time and cannot be waived. Encelewski v. Associated-East Mortgage Co., 262 Pa.Super. 205, 396 A.2d 717 (1978). Obviously, .,his was done in direct response to prior counsel's failure either to take exceptions to the December 29, 1982 Order or to perfect an appeal from that Order. While there is no Pennsylvania case on point regarding a temporary award of the possession of the marital residence, this Court has previously held that the failure to file exceptions to an award of alimony pendente lite or interim counsel fees constitutes a waiver. See, e.g., Sutliff v. Sutliff, 326 Pa.Super. 496, 474 A.2d 599 (1984); Carangelo v. Carangelo, 321 Pa.Super. 219, 467 A.2d 1333 (1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Dewalt v. Dewalt, 309 Pa.Super. 275, 455 A.2d 156 (1983). See **59 also Pa.R.C.P. 1038, 1920.1(b), 1920.52 and 1920.55. However, we believe that a finding of waiver would be unfair in the context of the present case as this area of the law was unsettled during the time period wherein appellant's counsel failed to file exceptions. While Dewalt held that the failure to file exceptions to an Order awarding alimony pendente lite constitutes a waiver, we emphasize that it was not filed until January 21, 1983, more than three weeks after the December 29, 1982 Order. Thus, when the final order awarding the temporary use and possession of the marital home was entered on December 29, 1982, there had been no judicial pronouncement which specifically required the filing of exceptions to an award of alimony pendente lite or interim cc unsel fees (let alone an award involving the temporary use and possession of the marital home). FN2 Due to the uncertainty in the existing law at that time, we conclude that there are sufficient reasons for finding no waiver here. See Commonwealth ex rel. Nixon v. Nixon, 321 Pa.Super. 313, 458 A.2d 976 (1983) (no waiver *161 since at time final support order was entered there existed no judicial pronouncement specifically requiring the filing of exceptions); Jones v. State Automobile Insurance Association, 309 Pa.Super. 477, 455 A.2d 710 (1983) (failure to file exceptions did not constitute waiver due to the considerable confusion in the existing law). See also Pomerantz v. Goldstein, 479 Pa. 175, 387 A.2d 1280 (1978); General Mills, Inc. v. Snavely, 203 Pa.Super. 162, 199 A.2d 540 (1964); Werts v. Luzerne Borough Authority, 15 Pa.Commw.Ct. 631, 329 A.2d 335 (1974); Pa. R.C.P. 126; Pa. R.A.P. 105. FN2. The Order from which this appeal was brought is final since: "(1) it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is suc.?. that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost." Sutliff v. Sutliff, supra, at 499, 474 A.2d at 600, quoting Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 544-45 (1978). [1 ] Moreover, on January 27, 1983, appellant's former counsel withdrew his appearance and present counsel entered his appearance on appellant's behalf. While appellant seems to have a propensity for experiencing difficulty with his attorneys,FN3 we are concerned that this incompatibility could have motivated prior counsel's failure to either take exceptions to or appeal the December 29, 1982 Order. Finally, as we previously stated, this is an issue of first impression which involves the welfare of a child; we believe that the necessity of addressing the merits of this appeal is evident.FN4 We find no waiver in the instant case because of the above reasons. However, we wish to point out that in future cases, counsel must follow the dictates of Sutliff, Carangelo and Dewalt, supra, which require the filing of exceptions to preserve issues on appeal. FN3. The record discloses that appellant's second counsel also withdrew from representing him due to their incompatability and appellant's failure to pay legal fees. FN4. The dissent would quash the instant appeal since appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the December 29, 1982 Order. See Pa.R.A.P. 105(b); Hesson v. Weinrebe, 288 Pa.Super. 216, 431 A.2d 1015 (1981) (appellate courts are without authority to enlarge time period for filing notice of appeal). However, since no exceptions were taken to the December 29, 1982 Order, it was not immediately appealable. In light of the ambiguity surrounding the appealability of the instant Order, (see page 59 text) we feel compelled to reach the merits of this appeal notwithstanding its unusual procedural posture. We conclude that this result is in the interests of judicial economy since the issues have been briefed by both parties and argued before this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 105(a). *162 [2] Turning now to the issue of whether the lower court properly awarded the marital residence to the wife, we point out the broad equitable powers conferred upon courts pursuant to section 401(c) of the Divorce Code, which provides: c. In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction**60 and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act, and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction and who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the cause. Moreover, section 401(h) specifically states: h. The court may award to one, each, or both of the parties the right to live in the family home for reasonable periods of time. Viewing these two sections together, we hold that the lower court had the authority to temporarily award the marital residence, pending equitable distribution of marital property, to a spouse having physical custody of a minor child. Our conclusion is supported by section 102 of the Divorce Code which states in pertinent part: 5 102. Legislative findings and intent (a) The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of the family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to: (1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marria? e effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience. (2) Encourage and effect reconciliation and settlement of differences between spouses, especially where children are involved. (3) Give primary consideration to the welfare of the family rather than the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs. *163 (4) Mitigate the harm to the spouses and their children caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage. (5) Seek causes rather than symptoms of family disintegration and cooperate with and utilize the resources available to deal with family problems.... Our conclusion is supported by the case law of two states vwhose divorce statutes are substantially similar to our Divorce Code. In the recent New Jersey case of Degenaars v. Degenaars, 186 N.J.Super. 233, 452 A.2d 222 (1982), the New Jersey Superior Court held that a spouse may be excluded from the marital residence solely because that spouse had been living apart from the residence for a period of time. The Degenaars court noted that it had the power to grant the relief sought by the wife through its inherent equitable jurisdiction. In Degenaars, the husband voluntarily removed himself from the marital home and for 17 months, the wife and children planned and lived their lives in the absence of the husband as an overnight resident. The Degenaars court emphasized that it was faced with a pendente lite situation, and thus, the mental and emotional health and welfare of the wife and children should not "be compromised by the ever-present knowledge that defendant can move in, out and about the marital home with impunity[.]" Degenaars, supra, 186 N.J.Super. at 235, 452 A.2d at 223. Citing its parens patriae jurisdiction as protecting the interests of children, especially in matrimonial litigation, the Degenaars court noted that the legislature has vested the trial courts with broa i equitable powers during the pendency of matrimonial actions, to make such orders "as to the care ... and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as the circumstances of th.? parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just ..." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. See Davis v. Davis, 184 N.J.Super. 430, 446 A.2d 540 (1982). The Degenaars court found that: ... [i]t would be inimical to the best interests and welfare of the plaintiff and the children to permit their lives, both emotionally and physically, to be traumatically invaded by *164 defendant's unilateral decision to resume residency in the marital home. The interests and welfare of the plaintiff and children will be best served by maintaining the status quo ante as initiated by the defendant himself. **61 Degenaars, supra at 235, 452 A.2d at 223. Another instructive case is Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A. 2d 1052, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807, 101 S.Ct. 52, 66 L.Ed.2d 10, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 10287 101 S.Ct. 601, 66 L.Ed.2d 491 (1980), wh( re the court ruled against the husband's due process challenge to an award of temporary exclusive possession of the marital home to one spouse without requiring said spouse to show that t?_rounds exist for a divorce. The Pitsenberger court noted that the trial court had referred the pendente lite issues to a master, who recommended that the wife, who was given pendente lite custody of the parties' five children, also be given pendente lite possession of the family home so that the children could continue to attend their former school without being forced to travel a greater distance. The authority upon which the Pitsenberger court issued the use and possession award of the family home to the wife is section 3-6A-06 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article from the Annotated Code of Maryland which, in relevant part, provides: (a) The authority conferred by this section shall be exercised to permit the children of the family to continue to live in the environment and community which is familiar to them and to permit the continued occupancy of the family home and possession and use of family use personal property by a spouse with custo,j'y of a minor child who has a need to live in that home.... In exercising its authority under this section, the court shall consider each of the following factors: (1) The best interests of any minor child; (2) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to use the family use personal property or occupy or use the family home or any portion of it as a dwelling place; *165 (3) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to use the family use personal property or occupy or use the family home or any part of it for the production of income; (4) Any hardship imposed upon the spouse whose interest in the family home or family use personal property is infringed upon by an order issue under this section.... In Pitsenberger, supra, 287 Md. at 31, 410 A.2d at 1058, the Maryland Court of Appeals lucidly stated that the legislative purpose and intent of section )'-6A-06 in the context of a pendente lite use and possession award is to i :ve "special attention to the needs of minor children to continue to live in a familiar environment" and "to avoid uprooting the children from the home, school, social and community setting upon which they are dependent." Id. See also, Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md.App. 299, 462 A.2d 1208 (1983); Strawhorn v. Strawhorn, 49 Md.App. 649, 435 A.2d 466 (1981), vacated on other grounds, 294 Md. 322, 450 A.2d 490 (1982). We adopt the rationale of Degenaars and Pitsenberger, and hold that the lower court acted properly in awarding temporary use and possession of the marital home to the appellee. Appellant's claim that Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43(a), which is a procedural arm of section 403(a) of the Divorce Code, precludes the award of the marital home in the instant case since the appellee did not allege that the property would be sold, removed, alienated or encumbered in any way, has no bearing on the issues before us. Appellant's claim is belied by the manifest language of section 102(a), which, as we have already indicated, is concerned with preserving the family unit and protecting the welfare of children in marital disputes. Appellant's attempt to override such a humane policy by arguing that our Divorce Codc, can only grant relief when there is harm to the property involved is contrary to the dictates of our Divorce Code, as well as being offensive to the societal needs of children caught in the crossfire of domestic disputes. While common law *166 jurisdictions have traditionally treated property rights **62 as both unique and omnifarious, we believe that in the instant case such rights must yield to the common law doctrine of parens patriae, the goal of which is to provide the child with a permanent home. Since the cases relied on by the appellant involve different situations, such as the award of the marital home as a form of child support or permanent alimony after a divorce and pursuant to equitable distribution, we need not consider them as they are totally inapposite. [3] Furthermore, appellant's contention that the Protection From Abuse Act, 35 P.S. 5 10181 et seq., preempts any alternative procedure by which one spouse may dispossess another spouse from the marital residence is untenable. Where a conflict exists between two statutes, the Superior Court must construe the two, if possible, so that both may be given effect. Young v. Young, 320 Pa.Super. 269, 467 A.2d 33 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 507 Pa. 40, 488 A.2d 264 (1985). A protection from abuse proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature and seeks to protect the abused spouse and children from physical violence, whereas the relief awarded in the instant case is equitable in nature and is concerned with stabilizing the family unit. As such, this statute must be construed in pari materia with the Divorce Code, since they were enacted for different but not incompatible purposes. Since recourse was not had to a proceeding under the Protection From Abuse Act, we find that it has no bearing on our decision. The equitable powers of the courts under our Divorce Code are extremely broad, and since the Code unequivocally recognizes the right of one spouse to live in the family residence after divorce, there is no discernible reason for precluding such an award in a pendente Lite situation. While our decision may appear to have wide reaching ramifications, we are mindful that the exclusion of a spouse from the marital home during the pendency of a divorce proceeding is a harsh remedy that will not be awarded *167 cavalierly. The need for such an award must be clearly evident in the facts of each case. Our review of the record leads us to conclude the lower court acted properly in ruling that the appellee, Linda Claire Laczkowski, met her burden of proof regarding the petition for special relief wherein she alleged: 1. The Plaintiff and the Defendant are the owners of a family home, which home is known as 123 Oak Street, Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. 2. The Plaintiff and the Defendant, and their minor daughter, resided together in the family home, prior to May 3, 1982, at which time, the Defendant engaged in such harassment and mental cruelty and intimidation, and threats of violence, as to cause Plaintiff and her minor daughter, to leave the family home. 3. The Defendant, since May 3, 1982, has had possession of the family home, and has excluded the Plaintiff from the family home. 4. The Plaintiff, and her minor daughter, are residing with the Plaintiff's parents, and have been residing with the Plaintiff's parents since May 3, 1982. 5. The present situation is not conducive to a harmonius home life for the Plaintiff and her minor daughter; nor is it fair to the Plaintiff's parents. The situation is progressing to the point where it will no longer be tolerable for the Plaintiff and her minor daughter, and the Plaintiff's parents, to share the home of the Plaintiff's parents. 6. The Plaintiff has tried to rent suitable living accommodations for hers;etf and her minor daughter, but she has been unsuccessful because of her lack of a credit rating, and because of insufficient income. 7. The Defendant earns an excess of Twenty-three Thousand ($23,000.00) Dollars a year; he can easily rent an apartment, or he can live with his father, who lives alone and has adequate room for the Defendant. **63 WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays this Honorable Court to enter an Order, awarding to the Plaintiff, the right to live in the family home until such time as this Court *168 makes equitable distribution of the marital property of the Parties. (Appellee's Petition for Special Relief, filed November 19, 1982). Accordingly, the March 11, 1983 Order denying appellant's motion to vacate the December 29, 1982 Order is affirmed. FNS FNS. Appellant contends that he cannot be held in contempt of court fo?- noncompliance with a court order since the court lacked jurisdiction and authority to issue said order. However, since we have already concluded that the lower court had adequate jurisdiction pursuant to the Divorce Code to entertain this matter, we need not address this issue as it is totally meritless. BECK, J., dissenting. BECK, Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that appellant has properly appealed to this court. I would quash the instant appeal on the ground that the trial court's order of December 29, 1982,FN1 was interlocutory and non-appealable. FN2 Moreover, even if the trial court's order had been final and appealable, I would nevertheless quash the present appeal because appellant did not timely appeal the December 29 order. FN1. The trial court's December 29, 1982, order, allowed appellee and the parties' daughter to reside in the marital residence during the pendency of the divorce action. FN2. I note that, technically, the instant appeal is from the trial court's order of March 11, 1983, which denied appellant's petition to vacate the court's previous order of December 29, 1982. That is, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's order of March 11 but did not file a notice of appeal from the trial court's order of December 29. However, my analysis of the ir. terlocutory nature of the December 29 order applies equally to the trial court's March 11 order. See further discussion infra of appellant's petition to vacate the December 29 order. Where, as in the case sub judice, an order does not terminate the parties' litigation or resolve the parties' entire dispute, the order may be deemed final and appealable only if it bears the following three aspects of finality: " `(1) it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; *169 (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost.' " Sutliff v. Sutliff, 326 Pa.Super. 496, 499, 474 A.2d 599, 600 (1984) (citation omitted). I conclude that the third aspect of finality is not satisfied by the trial court's December 29 order. It is necessary to construe the mandate of Sutliff strictly. For this court to do otherwise would result in an undue number of piecemeal appeals from a single case. "[I]t would permit the party with greater resources to exhaust the resources of the party with less by taking repeated appeals." Id. at 504, 474 A.2d at 603 (Beck, J., dissenting). An appeal of an order stays the entire proceeding. Appeals from interim orders create undue delay in the ultimate resolution of the parties' mar;,',-al and economic status. "Justice is best served and harm to both parties is minimized by proceeding directly and expeditiously to a final disposition of the entire case at which a complete and fair resolution of all the economic issues may be made." Id. at 504, 474 A.2d at 603 (Beck, J., dissenting). The Divorce Code FN3 empowers a court to adjust the parties' ultimate financial settlement (equitable division and distribution of marital property; permanent alimony) to reflect interim relief afforded either party during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Sutliff (Beck, J., dissenting). Accordingly, an award of interim relief such as temporary occupancy of the marital residence, does not irreparably disadvantage the non-receiving party. Id. Since appellant's claimed right will not be irretrievably lost if review of the December 29 order is postponed until final disposition of the parties'**64 divorce action, the December 29 order does not meet all three criteria of finality and is an interlocutory, non-appeL,able order. FN3. Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, 23 P.S. 55 101-801. However, assuming arguendo that the December 29 order was final and appealable as the majority holds, I would still *170 quash the instant appeal. The majority states, and I agree, that appellant's petition to vacate the December 29 order constituted an effort to circumvent appellant's failure to file either timely exceptions to or a timely notice of appeal from the December 29 order. For the following reasons, I conclude that appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal from the December 29 order requires us to quash this appeal. Citing Commonwealth ex rel. Nixon v. Nixon, 321 Pa.Super. 313, 458 A.2d 976 (1983); Jones v. State Automobile Insurance Association, 309 Pa.Super. 477, 455 A.2d 710 (1983); Pomerantz v. Goldstein, 479 Pa. 175, 387 A.2d 1280 (1978), and General Mills, Inc. v. Snavely, 203 Pa.Super. 162, 199 A.2d 540 (1964), the majority contends that appellant's failure to file exceptions to the December 29 o.-der should not constitute a waiver of issues for appellate review. My reading of Nixon, Jones, Pomerantz, and General Mills, Inc. persuades me that the case at bar is sufficiently distinguishable to necessitate a different result. In Nixon and Jones the respective appellants did not file exceptions to the challenged court orders, but the appellants did file timely,.iotices of appeal from the orders in question. In Pomerantz the appellant timely filed a document contesting a court order, but the document was captioned motion for a new trial rather than exceptions. Finally, in General Mills, Inc. the appellant duly filed an answer, new matter, and counterclaims containing contradictory averments, but his pleadings were not accompanied by a Pa. R.C.P. No. 1024 verification of inconsistent allegations. The common thread in Nixon, Jones, Pomerantz, and General Mills, Inc. is that the appellant in each case took timely, affirmative action to assert his viewpoint even though the action in each instance was not in strict accordance with the applicable procedural rules. Most similar to the case sub judice are Nixon and Jones wherein the appellants neglected to file exceptions to contested court orders. Notably, however, the appellants in Nixon and Jones did file prompt notices of appeal from the disputed *171 orders whereas the instant appellant permitted the appeal period to expire before he took any action challenging the December 29 order. While the "rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every matter," Pa.R.A.P. 105(a), I would not liberally interpret the rules to justify an appellant's complete inaction. Since appellant wished to treat the December 29 order as a final and appealable order, he should, at the very least, have filed a notice of appeal from same. See Nixon; Jones. Nor am I convinced that a different result should obtain because appellant later filed a petition to vacate the December 29 order. FN4 Appellant's belated challenge to the December 29 order cannot serve to enlarge the time period for appealing the December 29 order. See Pa.R.A.P. 105(b). FN4. Appellant's petition to vacate was filed well after the expiration of the period for appealing the December 29 order. Therefore, I would in any event quash the appeal now before us. Pa. Super., 1985. Laczkowski v. Laczkowski 344 Pa.Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 END OF DOCUMENT Laczkowski v. Laczkowski 344 Pa.Super. 154, *,,71, 496 A.2d 56, **64) (Pa.Super.,1985) 41 Pa. D. & C.3d 3, 1985 WL 5795 (Pa.Com.Pl.) 1. Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Lancaster County. Uhler V. Uhler No. 39. March 15, 1985 ** 1 *4 Petition for special relief. West Headnc tes KeyCite Notes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k248 Disposition of Property 134k252.5 Homestead or Residence, Disposition of 134k252.5(1) k. In General. Under section 401(c) of the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. § 401(c), a court has the authority to make an award of exclusive possession of the marital residence while a divorce action is pending. KeyCite Notes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k248 Disposition of Property 134k252.5 Homestead or Residence, Disposition of 134k252.5(1) k. In General. In the absence of a spouse's voluntary removal from the marital residence, a signs "scant amount of time in absence and the presence of children in the marital hon ?- who are negatively affected by a spouse's return, a court will not award exclusive possession of the marital residence to one spouse. John W. Beyer and James F. Coho, for plaintiff. John F. Pyfer, Jr., for defendant. HUMMER, J. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Presently before the court is a petition for special relief filed by Gloria T. Uhler, defendant in the above-captioned divorce action. Respondent is Irvin Uhler, plaintiff in the divorce action. Petitioner seeks an award of exclusive possession of the premises located at 2610 Old Orchard Road, Lancaster County, Pa. Respondent requests that the petition be dismissed. Also before the court is a request by petitioner for a list of marita? and premarital assets allegedly taken by respondent from a storage area. In addition, petitioner requests an opportunity to inspect these items. Respondent's answer alleges that a list of the property has been or will be provided; respondent's memorandum of law in response to defendant's petition for special relief states that inspection of the *5 property will be permitted, provided that the inspection is done at a reasonable and convenient time. FACTS The home located at 2610 Old Orchard Road was purchased by respondent in 1960, three years before the parties' marriage. The parties resided together in the marital home until September 1983, when respondent vacated the premises. Petitioner resided alone in the home until February 1984, when it was destroyed by fire. The residence is now being rebuilt with the home insurance proceeds and will soon be ready for occupation. According to testimony produced at two support hearings, respondent has indicated his desire to move into the residence at 2610 Old Orchard Road, even though he is now residing in a trailer in New Providence. Respondent is presently living with his nurse and friend, Esther Rankin, and respondent intends to permit Ms. Rankin to live at the 2610 Old Orchard Road residence as well. Petitioner, who is presently residing in a townhouse at the Chateau D'Eden, also ?,vishes to return to the residence, and further asks that she be granted possession o L the residence to the exclusion of respondent. In support of her claim, petitioner contends that she is only receiving $1,200 per month in spousal support and $218 per month in Social Security benefits. She argues that respondent's financial position is much better than hers, and contends that, since she resided in the residence alone for the five months before the fire, the status quo should be maintained and she should be awarded exclusive possession of the home. Petitioner has brought this action under the Divorce Code, and has made no allegations of abuse on the part of respondent. Petitioner is 62 years old. **2 *6 Respondent is over 70 years old, and has retired. He has had several illnesses, including cancer and a heart condition and, at the time of the support hearings, was taking several medications. Respondent contends that petitioner has no right to reside in the residence, as it is his alone, contending that he permitted petitioner to reside there during the five-month period prior to the fire. Respondent also notes that the spousal-support order entered on petitioner's behalf already took into consideration the amount which petitioner pays each month for rent. Further, respondent contends that the $1,200 spousal-support order is one-third of his income, and is, therefore, the legal limit allowed. Respondent further contends that petitioner improper.y raised factual allegations in her brief and notes that there are several allegations made by petitioner which have been denied by respondent, raising factual issues which must be addressed in a hearing. The cowl, however, will address the petition and answer without a prior hearing, as even accepting as true all of the factual allegations made by petitioner, the court is not convinced that petitioner is entitled to her requested relief. DISCUSSION Under §401(c) of the Divorce Code, Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, P.S. § 401 (c), Pennsylvania courts are given the following power: "In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act, and may grant sue.. other relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third party over *7 whom the court has jurisdiction and who is involved or concerned with the disposition of the cause." This provision grants extraordinary powers to the court, and has been applied in several ways. For example, in Lazovitz v. Lazovitz, 307 Pa. Super. 341 453 A.2d 615 (1982), the Superior Court confirmed the trial court's power to enter an injunction under this section in order to protect a party's rights to equitable distribution of property. In Lynne v. Lynne, 44 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 290 (1984), the court, using its extraordinary powers under section 401(c) of the code, granted the wife's request for equitable relief and ordered that the husband pay delinquent mortgage and tax payments in order to preserve the marital assets for equitable distribution. Section 401(c) of the code has also been used to enforce personal .rights; Laxton v. Laxton, 71 Dell Co. 424 (1984). In Laxton, the court exercised its extraordinary power and entered a decree of divorce. Plaintiff refused to proceed with the divorce, even though a master's report recommending divorce had been filed five and one-half years earlier. Because of plaintiffs "deliberate inaction," the court found that plaintiff had in fact attempted to "delay the entry of a final decree for the selfish purpose of effectively preventing defendant from continuing his personal life and holding him hostage under her economic demands." The court found that equity and justice demanded the entry of the final decree. **3 Under § 102 of the Divorce Code, 23 P. S. § 102, a declared policy of the Commonwealth is to: "(4) Mitigate the harm to the spouses and their children caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage." Finally, and perhaps the most important statutory section in the case presently before the court, is section *8 401(h) of the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. §401(h), which provides: "The court may award to one, each or both of the parties the right to live in the family home for reasonable periods of time." This section grants the court the power to make an award, after a complete hearing, at the close of the action. Several Pennsylvania common pleas courts have determined, and this court is in cautious agreement, that §401(h), in conjunction with the provisions of §401(c) and § 102, permits the court to make an award of exclusive possession of the marital residence when the divorce action is still pending. In Glick v. Glick, 37 Berks Co. L. Rep. 326 (1981), the court set the stage for an interim award of exclusive possession of the marital home when it denied defendant's preliminary objection to plaintiffs claim for exclusive possession of the marital home. Defendant contended that the court had no power to award plaintiff the exclusive possession of the home. In denying defendant's demurrer, the court noted on page 327: "Since the court's equitable powers under the code are so broad and since the code clearly recognizes the right of one spouse to live in the family home after the divorce, there is clearly no reason why such relief may not be granted during the pendency of a divorce proceeding." In Smith v. Smith, 18 Pa. D. & C.3d 703 (1981), the court held a hearing to examine allegations made by the wife under the Protection From Abuse Act, Act of October 7, 1976, P.L. 1090, as amended; 35 P. S. § 10181 et seq. Upon a review of the pleadings and the testimony, the court found that the husband's actions did not amount to the type of behavior addressed by the act. However, the court still *9 excluded the husband from the marital residence pending the final divorce property distribution (1) because the husband had voluntarily removed himself from the residence leaving the wife and the children there, and (2) in order to avoid physical contact and confrontation between the parties. In so ordering, the court relied on the Divorce Code generally, stating that under the code, the court had "broad equity power to award temporary exclusive possession of the marital home to one of the parties," 18 Pa. D. & C.3d at 709. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas has also entered an order awarding exclusive possession of the marital home to a spouse, Wood v. Wood, 131 Pittsburgh L.J. 123 (1983). The court had previously awarded custody of the children to the wife and had entered a bifurcated divorce decree. Upon determining that (1) the children would be subjected to continued strife should the parties continue to reside together, and (2) the wife was without the means to provide another home in which she and the children could reside, the court held that the wife should be granted exclusive possession of the marital residence. In making this award, the court reviewed the stated policy of the Commonwealth under § 101 of the Divorce Code, 23 P. S. § 101(a)(3) and (4), regarding the welfare of the family and the mitigation of harp t to the parties and their children caused by the dissolution of the marriage. It also relied on §401(c) of the code, 23 P.S. §401(c), which grants broad equity power, and 401(h) of the code, 23 P. S. §401(h), which permits the court to award possession of the residence to one of the parties as part of a final decree. 131 Pittsburgh L. J. at 124. **4 Recently a Berks County court permitted the exclusive possession of the marital residence to the *10 wife in spite of the fact that she had previously vacated the marital residence. Thomas v. Thomas, 76 Berks Co. L. Rep. 212 (1984). The Thornas court reviewed a situation where the divorce complaint was fill -d in February, 1984, and a protective order was entered on April 24, 1984, enjoining each party from abusing or harassing the other. The wife had previously left the marital residence with the children, but returned after a court order was entered requiring the wife to return all the household goods and furnishings which she had moved when she established a separate residence. There was also an indirect criminal contempt petition against the husband with respect to altercations which occurred between the parties after the wife and children returned to the marital residence. Following these incidents the wife vacated the residence and was residing with the children in a woman's shelter. The Thomas court cited § 102 of the Divorce Code, w.iich sets forth the legislative policy of giving "primary consideration to the welfare of the family rather than the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs," and to "mitigate the harm to the spouses and their children caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage." It noted that the children would be subjected to "continued acrimony" should both parties and the children reside in one residence. 76 Berks Co. L. Rep. at 213. Observing that the children were to remain with the mother, the court felt that it would be unnecessary and possibly injurious to uproot them from their familiar surroundings. In awarding the home to the wife, the court compared the employment of the parties and noted that while the wife was employed near the home, the husband was unemployed and there was no evidence that any of * 11 husband's prospective future employment would be in the immediate area of the home. The Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas has had two opportunites to examine situations where a spouse sought possession of the marital home to the exclusion of the other spouse. In Martinez v. Martinez, no. 248 February term 1981, tr ° Honorable Paul M. Mueller, Jr., entered an order dated February 14, 1983, which granted exclusive interim possession of the marital home to the wife and children. In Martinez, Judge Mueller examined a situation where the husband had voluntarily removed himself from the marital home in May 1981. Daring the period between May 1981 and February 1983, the husband resided with 'iis girlfriend. At the time of the hearing he admitted that the woman with whom he had previously resided was still his girlfriend. The husband testified that he had no desire to reconcile with the wife, but had moved back into the residence solely for economic reasons. Judge Mueller found that the parties' children, ages 13 and 9, were affected by the husband's presence in the house, and ordered him to remove himself from the residence. **5 In Hoover v. Hoover, no. 4 September term 1983, the Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter entered an order dated February 17, 1984 which granied exclusive possession of the marital home to the husband. The facts, as alleged in the husband's petition to exclude the wife, were that she had voluntarily vacated the residence in August 1983, and moved to Indiana. The wife had not stayed overnight in the home since August 1983 until February 13, 1984, when she moved her possessions back into the residence. The parties had already signed an agreement regarding custody and visitation and negotiations concerning the property division and marital dissolution * 12 were ongoing. The husband contended that the wife had moved back into the home in order to harass him and to keep him from getting a divorce. Even more importantly, he alleged that the wife's unwelcome, unilateral return would be harmful and disruptive to the parties' child. After a hearing on the matter, Judge Bu&walter ordered the wife to vacate the premises. Although the Pennsylvania appellate courts have not had an opportunity to address this issue, the New Jersey Superior Court has reviewed the issue whether a spouse can be exclu-pied from the marital premises absent a showing of actual physical danger or emotional injury to the remaining spouse and children. In Degenaars v. Degenaars, 186 N.J. Super. 223, 452 A.2d 222 (1982), the New Jersey Superior Court held that a spouse may be excluded from the marital residence merely because that spouse has been living apart from the marital residence for a period of time and for no other reason. In Degenaars, the husband had moved out of the home voluntarily and had absented himself as an overnight resident for approximately 17 months. During this time the wife and children remained in the home and planned and lived their livc;s as if the husband were no longer a resident of the home. The husband then moved back into the marital residence without prior warning and took over the master bedroom, compelling the wife to move into another bedroom with one of the children. The Degenaars court noted that the situation presented was pendente lite and framed the following issue: "Should the mental and emotional health and welfare of the [wife] and children be compromised by the ever present knowledge that defendant can * 13 move in, out and about the marital home with impunity?" In answering this question in the negative, the court f fund that it would be inimical to the best interests of the wife and children to permit their emotional and physical lives to be traumatically invaded by the husband's unilateral decision to resume residency in the marital h, !me. It determined that the best interests and welfare of the wife and children would be best served by maintaining the status quo ante as initiated by the husband himself. The court ruled that it had the power and jurisdiction to make the order, both by legislative fiat and through its inherent equitable jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the wife. **6 In deciding the case, the New Jersey Superior Court relied on the broad powers vested in the court by the legislature: "Pending any matrimonial action brought in this state or elsewhere, ... the court may make such order ... as to the care ... and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just...." N.J.S.A.2A:34- 23. The court also paid particular attention to the welfare of the children. It noted that the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court protected the interests of the children, especially in matrimonial litigation. Voluntary removal from the residence, a significant amount of time in absence, and the presence of children in the marital home who are negatively affected by a spouse's return, are all common factors of the cases above in which it was determined that the spouse should be excluded from the marital premises during the pendency of the divorce. Although each case must be considered individually, the most important consideration is the presence of * 14 children in the home, and their emotional welfare. Although the court does not intend to foreclose exclusive pendente lite possession of the home to a spouse who has no children, a spouse without childre a will have to present an even more compelling situation in order to persuade th-: court that exclusive possession is in order. Further, the presence of children in the home will not, in and of itself, sway the court to award exclusive possession. As stated by the Honorable Harriet J. Mims in Glick v. Glick, supra, "[E]xcluding a spouse from his or her residence [during the pendency of a divorce proceeding] is not a remedy that will be awarded lightly." 37 Bucks L.Rep. at 329. The case at bar does not present a situation which would compel this court to enter an award of exclusive possession of the home. The "marital" residence has been unoccupied by either party since it was destroyed by fire in February 1984. Accurding to the record in the domestic relations hearing, it was originally respondent's desire to exclude petitioner from the residence (Domestic Relations 1881-1983, October 31, 1984; N.T. 151-152). Both parties have now expressed a desire to return to the residence. Petitioner further requests that her return to the residence preclude respondent's return. Although it may be true that respondent presently has more money available to him, petitioner has been awarded an adequate sum for spousal support. Upon review of the record, it is clear that petitioner has not brought to the court's attention any circumstances to convince the court that exclusive possession of the home is in order. The court feels that the allegations presently before it are in the realm of equitable distribution and should be addressed by the special divorce master. There is some question regarding the extent to * 15 which the residence purchased by respondent three years prior to tr marriage is marital property; this can be determined by the special master. **7 Upon a review of the case law, and for the reasons stated above, the court will refuse to grant petitioner's request for exclusive possession of the residence located at 2610 Old Orchard Road. The equitable remedy of exclusive pendente lite possession of the "marital" home is an award which is to be used sparingly. The situation presented by petitioner does not give rise to the protections afforded by the Divorce Code. It appears from respondent's answer to petition for special relief and memorandum of law, that respondent is willing to comply with petitioner's request for a list of personal property in respondent's possession and for an opportunity to view the personal property. Accordingly, respondent will be directed to comply with petitioner's request regarding the personal property. ORDER And now, this March 15, 1985, upon review of Gloria T. Uhler's petition for special relief and Irvin V. Uhler's answer to petition for special relief and the briefs :submitted thereon, it is hereby ordered and decreed: (1) Petitioner's request for exclusive possession of the residence located at 2610 Old Orchard Road is denied; (2) Petitioner's request for a list of all items removed from the storage area, and for an opportunity to view these items is granted. Respondent is directed to provide petitioner with a list of these items within 10 days. Respondent is further directed to provide petitioner with access to inspect the property at a time reasonable and convenient for both parties. Pa.Com.Pl. 1985. Uhler v. Uhler 0 #3 2060 END OF DOCUMENT Uhler v. Uhler 43 Pa. D. & C.3d 190, 1986 WL 15930 (Pa.Com.Pl.) 1. Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Monroe County. Garrison V. Garrison No. 1908 of 1986. May 14, 1986 ** 1 * 190 Petition for interim relief pursuant to 23 P.S. §401. West Headnotes KeyCite Notes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k248 Disposition of Property 134k252.5 Homestead or Residence, Disposition of 134k252.5(2) k. Effect of Child Custody. The marital residence will be temporarily awarded to a spouse, pending equitable distribution of marital property pursuant to section 401(h) of the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. § 401(h), where the spouse had physical custody of the minor children and the other spouse's drug addiction requires spouse's exclusion from the marital residence. Michael R. Muth, for plaintiff. H. Alan Vican, for defendant. O'BRIEN, J. 1. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Margaret Garrison and Brent C. Garrison were married on March 3, 1968. * 1912. In an effort to resolve marital differences, the parties participated in four different episodes of marriage counseling, the most recent being in the fall of 1983. 3. The parties have not engaged in marital relations since January 1985 and plair„ iff wife filed a complaint for divorce on August 22, 1986. 4. The parties have four children, Heather Marie Garrison born August 25, 1973; Theresa Anne Garrison born September 12, 1975; Mary Elizabeth Garrison born May 1, 1978; and Andrew Coleman Garrison born April 20, 1981. 5. For a continuous period commencing as early as February 1985 and continuing as recently as April 25, 1987, defendant husband has purchased under various names, and used, illegal drugs, including but not limited to marijuana, cocaine, LSD, peyote and methamphetamines. 6. The marital premises, which is jointly owned by the parties, is presently subject to a lien by the Internal Revenue Service because defendant husband has not filed a tax return since 1975 because he believes the federal tax laws are unconstitutional. 7. The marital premises is a four-bedroom farmhouse in Effort, Monroe County, Pa. which is subject to a mortgage in favor of East Stroudsburg Savings Association requiring a monthly amortization of $139. 8. Plaintiff wife has been the primary caretaker for the children of the marriage and is primarily responsible for the purchase of groceries, clothing and other hous„ hold needs. 9. Defendant husband does not agree with the types of food purchased by plaintiff wife and in protest thereof nailed a sandwich prepared by plaintiff * 192 wife to the wall with a note complaining about her choice of bread. 10. Since plaintiff wife is primarily responsible for the caretaking of the children, her only employment is part time as a substitute teacher at a per diem rate of $52.50. 11. Defendant husband, a college graduate, is employed during the summer seasons by the National Park Service at the rate of $8.73 per hour and expects to be recalled to that position shortly. During the winter months he receives unemployment compensation. **2 12. The communications between the parties is very poor and the presence of both parties in the marital residence has created an atmosphere of tension and conflict for the children of the marriage. II. DISCUSSION The Pennsylvania Divorce Code provides in pertinent part as follows: "§ 102. Legislative findings and intent (a) The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of the family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to: (1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience. (2) Encourage and effect reconciliation and settlement of differences between spouses, especially where children are involved. (3) Give primary consideration to the welfare of the family rather than the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs. * 193 (4) Mitigate the harm to the spouses and their children caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage. (5) Seek causes rather than symptoms of family disintegration and cooperate with and utilize the resources available to deal with family problems." (23 P.S. § 102) In the implementation of the foregoing legislative findings and intent, the Divorce Code further provides: "The court may award to one, each or both of the parties the right to live in the family home for reasonable periods of time." 23 P.S. §401(h) In Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 (1985), a case of first impression, our Superior Court held that a court of common pleas has authority to temporarily award a marital residence, pending equitable distribu*,.on of marital property, to the spouse having physical custody of the minor children and to order the other spouse to vacate the premises. In its decision, the Superior Court emphasized that such an issue is pendente lite and that the common law doctrine of parens patriae should be the paramount consideration of a court in resolving such issues. It is hard to envision a more suitable case for invoking section 401(h) of the Divorce Code than the case at bar. Although defendant husband refused to admit at hearing that he is a "habitual" drug user, his continued use of various illegal substances over a period in excess of two years is undoubtedly a major contributor to the atmosphere of tension and conflict existing in the marital home. The children of this marriage should not be subject to this influence of resulting tension particularly where, as in this case, defendant husband has summer employment available which will provide him a means for other accommodations. * 194 III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Section 401(h) of the Divorce Code authorizes this court to grant a spouse having physical custody of the children of the marriage, the exclusive use of the marital premises. 2. Plaintiff wife has physical custody of the children of the marriage who reside iii the marital premises. **3 3. The welfare of the family requires the temporary exclusior, c)f defendant husband from the marital premises. ORDER And now, this May 14, 1987, it is ordered as follows: 1. Pending adjudication of Count II of the complaint in divorce seeking equitable distribution of marital property, the exclusive possession of the marital premises situate in Effort, Monroe County Pa. is granted to plaintiff Margaret Garrison, and defendant Brent C. Garrison is excluded therefrom effective June 1, 1987; 2. Defendant shall pay the costs of these proceedings. Pa.Com.Pl. 1986. Garrison v. Garrison 0 #3 2060 END OF DOCUMENT Garrison v. Garrison 23 Pa.C.S.A. 5 3502 The decision to allow one spouse exclusive possession of the marital residence is based upon the needs of minor children, the age and health of the parties, and the financial needs and resources. Vuocolo v. Vuocolo, 42 Pa. ). Et C.3d 398 (1987). Divorce 252.5(1); Divorce 252.5(2) 23 Pa.C.S.A. 9 3502 42 Pa. D. Et C. 3d 398, 1987 WL 5098 (Pa. Com. Pl. ) Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Lawrence County. Vuocolo V. Vuocolo No. 552 of 1985. January 7, 1987. **1 *399 Divorce proceeding. West Headnotes KeyCite Notes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134248 Disposition of Property 134252.5 Homestead or Residence, Disposition of 134k252.5(1) k. In General. 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134248 Disposition of Property 1341<252.5 Homestead or Residence, Disposition of 134k252.5(2) k. Effect of Child Custody. The decision to allow one spouse exclusive possession of the marital residence is based upon the needs of minor children, the age and health of the parties, and the financial needs and resources. KeyCite Notes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134248 Disposition of Property 134252.5 Homestead or Residence, Disposition of 134k252.5(3) k. Attendant Expenses and Liabilities; Compensating Payments. In a divorce proceeding in which equitable distribution of marital property is at issue, once the parties' residence has been deemed to be marital property and one party is permitted to reside there to the exclusion of the other, the rights of the nonresident party must be considered and property vindicated. KeyCite Notes 373 Tenancy in Common 3731 Creation and Existence 373k3 k. Creation of Cotenancy. In a divorce proceeding in which the wife is granted exclusive possession of the marital residence during her lifetime, the property is awarded to the parties as joint tenants with the right of survivorship rather than as tenants in common, so that the husband may be able to obtain his share of the value of the home when the wife's right to sole possession ceases. Alfred V. Papa, for plaintiff. Paul W. Johnson, for defendant. CAIAZZA, J. The matter which is presently before the court on argument and briefs is the progeny of a complaint in divorce filed on July 27, 1984. An absolute divorce was entered by order of court dated November 17, 1984. The issues of equitable distribution of the marital property, alimony, counsel fees, costs, and expenses were bifurcated from the divorce action and thereby reserved for subsequent resolution. On April 11, 1985, defendant filed a petition requesting possession of the family home. The matter was referred to a master for a hearing. At the hearing it was agreed by all sides that the master would hear, in addition to the question of possession of the marital home, the other issues preserved by the bifurcation. Testimony was taken on June 21, 1985, and the master prepared and filed a report on August 8, 1985. Plaintiff filed his exceptions to the master's report on August 12, 1985. Briefing was completed on the exceptions by July 31, 1986, and oral argument was held August 7, 1986, before this court. The parties were married on April 22, 1969. It is evident from the testimony received at the master's hearing that marital bliss never visited this union and, although they were not divorced until November *400 27, 1984, the pair quickly established separate lives, albeit, for the most part, under the same roof. They were not sufficiently separate, however, as to preclude offspring; a son was born on August 4, 1971. Plaintiff-husband, now 68 years old, is a retired employee of Associated Box and has a fixed monthly income consisting of $419 in Social Security benefits and a net pension income of $161, totalling $580. He testified to several health complaints for which he takes medicine; however, he is not currently under a doctor's care. Defendant-wife, 61 years of age, never completed high school. While a teenager she worked for three years as a nurses' aide, but has no other work experience outside the home; she has no skills saleable in the market place. Her income is limited to $464 from Social Security for herself and the parties' son. Plaintiff is under order of court, dated February 4, 1985, to pay child support in an amount equal to the monthly utilities bill of the marital residence. Although varying, the average utilities bill is between $200 and $220 per month. Defendant is and has been treated on an ongoing basis for a nervous condition. **2 The parties, by mutual agreement, divided the bulk of their persona' property between themselves, leaving for the master only the mari}al residence, a life insurance policy and plaintiff's pension, as well as the issues of alimony, costs, and expenses. By way of summary, the master recommended that defendant be allowed to remain in the marital residence as a life tenant, rent free, that she be awarded permanent alimony of one dollar per year, that plaintiff retain the life insurance policy and his pension, and that he be responsible for all costs and expenses, including $50 of defendant's attorney fees. *401 Plaintiff's exceptions to the master's report, numbering 16 separate allegations of error, encompass four separate issues. Exceptions one through nine concern the disposition of the marital residence; 10 and 11 concern alimony; 12 and 13, personal property; 14 and 15, costs and fees; and 16 is a general assertion that the entire report is contrary to law. Plaintiff's brief in support of his exceptions represents an exercise in vituperation. 1. MARITAL RESIDENCE The first exception raised by plaintiff in regard :o the marital residence is that it should not have been deemed marital property at all, and therefore should not have been subject to equitable distribution. In support of this he asserts that :he real property deed is in his name only, and that he paid for the property with his own funds. However, in his brief, at page 4, plaintiff admits that "[d]efendant has an equitable interest in the marital residence.... and suggests that the property should be sold and the proceeds divided between the parties. This solution would be lawful only if the home is classified as marital property. The master correctly held that it is marital property. The issue apparently is not contested; consequently, we shall move on. ainti next asserts that the master erred by recommending that sole possession of the marital residence be awarded to defendant, rent free, and that title to the property be transferred to both parties to be held jointly, with a right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common. The master limited his recommendation of sole possession to the occurrence of the first of the following events: (1) defendant's death; (2) her abandonment of the property; (3) her remarriage; or (4) her cohabitation in lieu of remarriage. *402 Plaintiff stresses in his brief the mandate of the Divorce Code that it is the court's duty to "[e]ffectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced ... and [to] insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights." 23 P.S. 9102(a)(6) (relating to legislative intent). He points to plaintiff's age (68 years), his health, and his limited and fixed income as factors overlooked by the master. He frequently returns to the allegation that the house was bought and paid for solely by plaintiff. He also recites from the Divorce Code that an equitable division of marital property is to be effectuated "without regard to marital misconduct," 23 P. S. S401 (d), apparently hoping to minimize the effect of a protection from abuse order entered against plaintiff in 1984. Later in the brief, however, he attempts to persuade the court that defendant's misconduct should be considered against her in the ultimate decision with respect to the house. **3 We find that, although the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. 5101 et seq., grants the court sufficient equity powers to allow sole possession of the marital residence by one party under certain circumstances, Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 (1985), the facts as found by the master do not support his recommended disposition of the marital residence under the circumstances of this case. The Divorce Code directs that "the court shall ... equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors...." 23 P.S. S401 (d). Once the parties' residence has been deemed to be marital property, as is the case here, and one party is permitted to reside there to the exclusion of the other, the rights of the *403 nonresident party must be considered and properly vindicated. In Gee v. Gee, 314 Pa. Super. 31, 460 A.2d 358 (1983), it was stated that a petition for equitable distribution requires "the court to equitably dispose of all the rights and interests of the parties in all of the marital property." Id. at 35 n. 2, 460 A.2d at 360 n.2 (Emphasis in original). The court went on to hold that, where real marital property is being used by one party alone, the nonresident party's rights and interests in the property can be properly vindicated by fair rental payments from the party in physical possession. Id. In King v. King, 332 Pa. Super. 526, 481 A.2d 913 (1984), the Superior Court restated its holding in Gee susbstantially as we have stated it here. See King at 536, 481 A.2d at 918. The court there, though, found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to order rental payments where the nonresident party's rights and interests had been adequately protected through mea.,s other than rent. Id. However, the time frame for sole possession in both of the cases discussed supra was the period between the separation of the parties and the eventual equitable distribution of the marital property. In the case sub judice the period of sole possession would extend beyond equitable distribution, where the master has recommended that title to the property be transferred to both parties, held jointly with the right of survivorship, and that defendant be awarded sole possession for her life, or until at least one of several contingencies occurs. The master supports this recommendation by noting at pages three and four of his report that the marital residence is the only home the minor son of the parties has known since birth, that the residence is close to the church attended by both defendant *404 and her son, that the residence is close to a store and close to defendant's parents. Proximity, he asserts, is important because defendant does not have an automobile, nor can she afford to purchase one. Section 401(h) of the Divorce Code, 23 P. S. 5401(h), provides that, """"The court may award to one, each, or both, of the parties the right to live in the family home for reasonable periods of time." (Emphasis supplied). We must determine whether, under the circumstances of this case, the equivalent of a life tenancy is a "reasonable period of time." **4 No Pennsylvania cases interpreting this section of the Divorce Code have been brought to the court's attention, nor have we found any cases. As we appear to be dealing with an issue of first impression in the Commonwealth, and are called upon to interpret a statutory section, we look for guidance to the Statutory Construction Act of December 6, 1972, No. 290, S3, 1 Pa. C.S. S 1501 et seq. We need search no further than section 1921(a), 1 Pa. C.S. 5 1921(a), which provides: "The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly." The relevant legislative intent of the Divorce Code is expressed at 5102, 23 P.S. 5102, as follows: "(a) The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of the family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to: (1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience. (2) Encourage and effect reconciliation and settlement of differences between spouses, especially where children are involved. *405 (3) Give primary consideration to the welfare of the family rather than the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs. (4) Mitigate the harm to the spouses and their children caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage. (6) Effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced ... and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights. (b) The objectives set forth in subsection (a) shall be considered in construing provisions of this act and shall be regarded as expressing the legislative intent." Reducing this expressed intent to one sentence, we conclude that the divorce law of Pennsylvania, within the context of the realitie, of the matrimonial experience, and absent reconciliation or settlement of differences, seeks to protect the children of the marriage from harm caused by its dissolution, [FN1] and to work economic justice in settling the affairs of the embattled spouses. We therefore know that in determining what constitutes a "reasonable period *406 of time" to allow defendant to occupy the marital residence to the exclusion of plaintiff, we must look to the needs of any minor children and to the economic status of the parties. FN1. Our conclusion with respect to the protection of the children of a marriage is consistent with, and is partially derived from, the reasoning of our Superior Court in Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 (1985). There the court held "that the lower co; rt had the authority to temporarily award the marital residence, pending equitable distribution of marital property, to a spouse having physical custody of a minor child." Id. at 162, 496 A.2d at 50. It bottomed its decision on the legislative intent quoted in the text, supra, and on two decisions from sister states also dealing with pendente lite situations. Quoting from one of these cases, the court determined that part of the legislative intent and purpose was "'to avoid uprooting the children from the home, school, social and community setting upon which they are dependent."DDD' Id. at 165, 496 A.2d at 61 (Citation omitted). **5 Our conclusion is supported by case law in other jurisdictions where the issue has arisen. The decision to allow one spouse exclusive possession of the marital residence has frequently turned on the needs of minor children, on the age and health of the parties, and on their financial needs and resources. See generally A. Oldfather, J.E. Kosel, Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, 512.03 (1984) and the cases cited therein. In In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal.App. 3d 152, 161 Cat.Rptr. 444 (1980), the California Court of Appeals held that the trial c )urt had erred in ordering the immediate sale of the marital residence rather than deferring the sale during the minority of the children. The court acknowledged "the unique relationship of that asset to the family," Id. at 158, X61 Cal.Rptr. at 447, and reasoned that its significance "cannot be measured solely by its value in the marketplace," and that "a move to a new environment [would be traumatic and disruptive] to children whose roots have become firmly entwined in the school and social milieu of their neighborhood." Id. at 155-56, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 446. In the instant case the parties have a son 15 years old. While the record is silent as to any adjustments to the joint legal custody of the parents, it is not disputed that defendant has sole physical custody of the child. The marital residence is the only home the son has known and, although there is ample evidence to suggest the family life within this home has been anything but tranquil, his relationships within the "social milieu" of the neighborhood must be considered. Also, the house is within walking distance *407 of the church where the son serves as an altar boy. In the course of his 15 years living in the same house it is reasonable to assume that he has made friends both at his school and generally in the community. We therefore find that the reasoning developed supra, applied to the facts as just stated, justifies the master's recommendation that sole possession of the marital home be awarded to defendant for the duration of the son's minority. In Pennsylvania a minor is defined as "An individual under the age of 21 years." 1 Pa.C.S. 51991 (relating to definitions). [FN2] Our inquiry into the proper disposition of the marital home does not end here, however, as there remains the question of what to do with this asset after the son's 21st birthday. At that point the only considerations will relate to the parties themselves and will be much more in the nature of a pure equitable distribution of marital property. FN2. In the cases reviewed by the court in reaching this decision the age reference used most frequently was 18 years. We are disinclined to find an effect on those courts' rationale based on this distinction. For example, if the minor child in this case chooses to go to college after high school (the aefendant has expressed a desire to see her son enter the seminary), he will have a familiar place to consider home, at least for the first few years away. **6 In Taylor v. Taylor, 381 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 1980), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to award to the wife use, possession and occupancy of the marital home until remarriage or death, even though there were no minor children. The court looked to the fact that the parties had been married for 24 years, that the wife was 56 years old and in poor health, that -She had only an eighth-grade education, extremely limited employment experience and no marketable skills, and, tying *408 all these facts together, concluded that "'[t]he critical question is whether the award is equitable and just given the nature of the case."DDD' Id. at 1354 (Citation omitted). With this reasoning in mind, we now look to the relevant factors delineated in section 401(d) of the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. 5401(d) (relating to equitable distribution) and note that the parties were married from April 1969, to November 1984, a period in excess of 15 years. Plaintiff puts great weight on the assertion that he paid for the house with his own money. While defendant does not claim to have used any of her own money, it is undisputed that title passed to plaintiff alone after the nuptials [FN3] and that at least $3,000 of the $4,800 purchase price was borrowed from plaintiff's sister and repaid with marital funds during the c:,urse of the marriage. [FN4] The evidence is clear that defendant has lived in the marital residence from the date of its purchase until the present, and that during this time she has made significant contributions to its upkeep both as a homemaker and in the form of physical improvements made at her own expense. Therefore, in terms of investment in the home, the parties can assert an equal interest. FN3. The form of the title to property, if acquir ?d after the marriage, is not dispositive of its status as marital property because this determination is to be made "regardless of whether title is held individually or by the parties in some form of co-ownership...." 23 P.S. 5401(f) (relating to the presumption of marital property). FN4. The source of the remaining $1,800 was never explained by plaintiff. With respect to other factors listed in section 401(d), however, the parties do not stand in equal stead. Both parties are in their 60s, plaintiff being 68 years old and defendant 61 years old. Plaintiff is *409 retired from Associated Box and has a net monthly income of $580. He lists on his income and expense statement total monthly expenses of $766, yet shows no liabilities on his inventory and apprisement. No evidence was offered at the master's hearing to verify the claimed expenses. Plaintiff currently is under order of court to pay child support in an amount equal to the cost of utilities at the marital residence. According': :) defendant's brief, at page 4, plaintiff has requested a reduction of this order and a hearing is pending. Defendant has no employment history (except for a three-year stint as a nurses' aide during her teen years) and has only a 10th-grade education. Her monthly income is limited to Social Security benefits of $232 each for herself and her son. She also receives support from plaintiff in the amount previously described in this opinion. Although plaintiff states that "monies are about equal in retirement income," plaintiff's brief at p. 1, such is clearly not the case when it is realized that defendant's income must meet the needs of two people. The discrepancy in income will be even greater when the income tied to the son's minority is lost. **7 It was established at the master's hearing that the location of the residence is of particular importance to defendant because of its proximity to her church, to stores and to her parents. Neither party is in good health, but only the wife is currently under a physician's direct care. For all of these reasons we agree with the master's recommendation that the marital residence be held by the parties as co-owners, and that defendant be awarded sole possession without an obligation to pay rent. The conditions of this sole possession will be as stated in the master's report at pages 4 and 5, and defendant's rights and duties shall be as detailed in the master's report at pages 5 *410 and 6. This we conclude is equitah'e and just under the circumstances of this case. We disagree, however, with the master's conclusion that the property should be held as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common. Under this proposal, upon the death of either party, the survivor would get full title to the property. The equity of this seems obvious until it is considered that plaintiff is seven years defendant's senior and defendant's life expectancy, as a woman, is greater than that of plaintiff. The master's recommendation, then, effectively forecloses plaintiff, or his heirs or assigns, from receiving anything of his investment in this asset. It also seems unlikely that the plaintiff could gain capital by encumbering his interest in the property as it would take quite an adventuresome creditor to extend funds based on property held jointly with a right of survivorship, especially under these circumstances. On the other hand, if the property is held in undivided one-half shares as tenants in common, the parties will then possess estates "'in which there is a unity of possession but separate and distinct titles ...' 14 P.L.E. Estates in Pro'-erty S41 (1950)." Werner v. Quality Service Oil Company, Inc., 337 Pa. Super. 264, 270, 486 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1984). [FN5] By holding separate and distinct titles, plaintiff and/or his heirs or assigns can be assured of receiving their share of the value of the home when defendant's right to sole possession ceases. Also, plaintiff will be free to attempt to recoup his undivided one-half interest through immediate conveyance *411 or by encumbrance. Id. ("[A] tenant in common may, without the consent of his co-tenant, sell, convey, or dispose of his undivided interest in the property.") Any such conveyance prior to the termination of the defendant's right to sole possession will, of course, be subject to that right of possession. FN5. As distinquished from joint tenancy with right of survivorship, which is characterized "by co-existence of the four unities of interest, title, time and possession." Allison v. Powell, 333 Pa. Super. 48, 51, 481 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1984). Our reasoning here is consistent with that of the Florida court in Robinson v. Robinson, 340 So.2d 935 (Fla.App. 1976), where the trial court was found to have abused its discretion when it attempted to forbid either party from encumbering or disposing of his or her interest in the marital home during the pendency of the order granting sole possession and occupancy to the wife until the youngest child reached the age of 18 years. The appellate court reasoned that appellant-husband's right to encumber or dispose of his undivided one-half interest does not jeopardize appellee-wife's right to possession and occupation because any purchaser of the husband's interest would take subject to this right. Id. at 937. **8 Should defendant's right to live in the marital residence terminate under any of the conditions set forth in the master's report, the equities discussed above will no longer prevail and the house shall be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties, or their heirs or assigns. For any period that defendant remains in the home after she has forfeited her right to sole possession, she shall pay to plaintiff monthly rent equal to the then current market rental value of the property. The marital home was subjectively valued by plaintiff to be worth $15,000 while defendant felt it was worth $8,000. The master accepted plaintiff's valuation. We do not disturb this determination, but *412 note that the exact value is less relevant when the property is divided equally between the parties. The value of sole possession to defendant was not developed at the master's hearing, and we accept the master's conclusion that awarding the life insurance policy on the life of plaintiff to plaintiff adequately balances the scales in light of the other reasons militating in favor of allowing the defendant a "life tenancy" in the home. II. PERMANENT ALIMONY Plaintiff's next two exceptions allege error in the awarding of permanent alimony. He argues that the master ignored plaintiff's limitations (fixed income, retirement and advanced age), and improperly tied the alimony award to a separate order of court concerning child support. We disagree and accept the master's recommendation that defendant is entitled to permanent alimony. In discussing alimony under section 5Cl of the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. 5501, our Superior Court concluded that alimony can be of unlimited duration if the circumstance of the party seeking alimony, as developed in a discussion of the factors listed in section 501(b), make it evident that she will not be able to meet her "reasonable needs," as developed in section 501(a). Pacella v. Pacella, 342 Pa.Super. 178, 189-190, 492 A.2d 707, 713-714 (1985). The master considered and weighed the factors listed in section 501(b), giving special expression to those factors touching defendant's health, wealth, education and skills. He rightly concluded that defendant's chances of ever being able to support herself and to provide for her reasonable needs are virtually nonexistent and therefore reasoned that an *413 award of permanent alimony was proper. [FN6] The fact that defendant has some income of her own, the Social Security benefits of $232 per month does not make an award of permanent alimony inappropriate if that income alone is insufficient to meet her reasonable needs. See Madden v. Madden, 336 Pa.Super. 552, 486 A.2d 401 (1984) (if employment alone will not meet reasonable needs, alimony is proper). FN6. The exact language of the statute provides that alimo.iy shall be limited in duration "[u]nless the ability of the party seeking the alimony to provide for his or her reasonable needs through employment is substantially diminished by reason of age, physical, mental or emotional condition, custody of minor children, or other compelling impediment to gainful employment...." 23 P.S. 5501(c). **9 Finally, plaintiff argues that the master improperly left the amount of alimony unspecified and speculative. We find no error. The master awarded permanent alimony based on the only income guaranteed to the defendant, viz., the $232 per month in Social Security benefits, but recognized that her current needs were aided in being met by the support paid to her son (an addition of $232 per month from Social Security and approximately $200 per month support from plaintiff). However, when this support ends, as it inevitably will upon the son reaching maturity, her needs for alimony will be greatly increased. The master acknowledges this by setting the current award at a deminimus one dollar per year, thereby preserving the defendant's rights to proceed under section 501(e) to have the award re-evaluated when her circumstances change, while not overtaxing plaintiff's admittedly limited resources in the meantime. The master further demonstrated wisdom by refusing to attempt to guess today what the *414 parties' needs and abilities to pay will be some years hence. III. PERSONAL PROPERTY Plaintiff next asserts error by the master in purporting to assign a life insurance policy to plaintiff in exchange for the award of sole possession of the house to defendant, where it was never determined that the life insurance policy was in fact marital property. While this may have been error, [FN7' it is not necessary, and therefore improper, to so decide here because we conclude that the master could properly consider the life insurance policy in making his recommendation concerning equitable distribution even if it is not marital property. FN7. We note that the presumption of marital property does not arise until it is shown that the property was acquired during the marriage. 23 P.S. 5401(e) and (f). No such showing was ever made here. Section 401(d)(3), 23 P.S. §401(d)(3), directs the court to consider as a factor relating to equitable distribution the respective estates of each of the parties. Equating estate with assets and net worth, it is clear that the insurance policy, if not marital property, is a part of plaintiff's assets and net worth. It therefore was properly considered in deciding equitable distribution and the master's error, if any, in purporting to "assign" it to plaintiff, was harmless. On the question of the disposition of the retirement plan, plaintiff argues that the master erred when he recommended that it remain intact, but provides the court with no guidance as to why this recourse was incorrect. No evidence was presented at the master's hearing as to what portion of the retirement plan was *415 earned during the marriage, nor was there any evidence pertaining to the present value of the plan. Additionally, no testimony was offered to aid the master and this court in determining whether the retirement plan was in the form of a pension, based on a principal fund in which plaintiff held an interest, and which could be subject to equitable distribution, or in the form of an annuity, in which plaintiff's interest is limited solely to the monthly payments themselves. [FN8] Finally, neither party claimed the retirement plan as marital property. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the master's recommendation that the plan be considered income to plaintiff, and not marital property subject to equitable distribution. [FN9] FN8. This distinction was made by the trial court in Braderman v. Braderman, 339 Pa. Super. 185, 191, 488 A.2d 613, 616 (1985) (trial court reversed on facts not present in the instant case). FN9. All remaining personal property was divided by agreement between the parties in approximately equal shares. IV. COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEE **10 Lastly, plaintiff takes exception to the master's recommendation that plaintiff pay $50 of defendant's counsel fees, costs of the action and the master's fee, but fails to brief these issue for the court. We find no error in the master's recommendations and accept them. In the absence of extrinsic ev 'dence as to defendant's legal fees, the master properly limited the amount of attorney fees to that time spent by defendant's counsel at the maser's hearing. Also, the facts in this case make it clear that equity is best served by assessing costs and the master's fee against plaintiff, who is in a better position to bear the burden. *416 V. CONCLUSION We therefore accept the recommendations of the master's report except to the extent that the master would transfer title of the marital residence to both parties as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. On this issue we conclude that title shall be transferred to both parties to be held as tenants in common. ORDER OF COURT Now, January 7, 1987, in the matters of equitable distribution of marital property, alimony, counsel fees and costs, for the reasons stated in the appended memorandum opinion, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1. Exclusive possession of the marital residence located at 311 Newell Avenue, New Castle, Lawrence County, Pa., is awarded to defendant without payment of rent to plaintiff until the occurrence of the first of the `ollowing events: (a) Defendant's death; (b) Abandonment of the premises by defendant, which shall be deemed `.o have occurred if she vacates the premises without intention to return for a consecutive period of thirty (30) days; (c) Defendant's entry into cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex, with or without a marriage ceremony, who is not a member of her immediate family within the degrees of consanquinity." Within 30 days of the date of this order, the parties shall execute a deed for the purpose of placing title in themselves as tenants in common, subject, however, to defendant's aforesaid right to exclusive possession. In the event the parties fail to execute the deed as aforesaid, upon application to this court, an appropriate order to effectuate the same shall be issued. Upon the t,.rmination of defendant's right to *417 sole possession, the marital residence shall be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties or their heirs or assigns. Defendant's duties with respect to income and the upkeep and maintenance shall be that of a life tenant. Defendant shall be entitled to retain as her sole property all of the rental income earned from the property. Defendant shall pay all of the property taxes, make all ordinary and necessary repairs to preserve the property and she shall maintain fire insurance in an amount equal to 80 percent of the replacement value. Failure on the part of defendant to perform these duties shall be a basis for plaintiff to seek relief in this court to protect his interest in the property and accordingly this order may be modified as necessary to accomplish that end. **11 2. Defendant is awarded alimony for an unlimited duration in the amount of one dollar per year. This particular order is being made with the understanding that the order entered February 4, 1985, at no. 442 of 1970, Domestic Relations Office, Court of Common Pleas, Lawrence County, Pa., is in full force and effect. Upon a substantial change in circumstances, this order may be modified for the purpose of providing defendant with reasonable alimony. 3. The following personal property, together with any insurance theron, is awarded to plaintiff: (a) 1977 Cadillac (b) 25" RCA color television (c) Two pictures (d) One cabinet (e) One table (f) Apartment stove on second floor (g) One 2-door cabinet (h) One cedar chest (i) One steamer trunk *418 (j) Garage tools, hand tools, mechanics tools and all ladders except one (k) Miscellaneous lumber 4. Except for the above described property, all of the tangible personal property contained in the marital residence, together with any insurance thereon, is hereby awarded to defendant. 5. All right, title and interest in and to the life insurance policy in the face amount of $1,300 owned by plaintiff is left with him. 6. Plaintiff's retirement plan is not affected by this order. 7. Counsel for defendant is awarded $50 as his iee, to be paid by plaintiff. 8. Costs of suit and of the master's fee are asses sed against plaintiff. 9. The prothonotary shall pay to the master the sum of $225 out of the $400 deposit made by plaintiff and remit the balance to counsel for plaintiff. Pa.Com.Pl. 1987. Merola v. Merola, 19 Pa. D. 8t C.4th 538, 1993 WL 760147, Unreported (1993). The marital home will be temporarily awarded to wife pending equitable distribution of marital property under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 5 3502(c), where wife is disabled and confined to a wheelchair and has limited income while husband is gainfully employed and lives in an apartment located near employment. November 1, 1993 *1 **538 Petition for exclusive possession of marital residence. Divorce and separation -- Equitable distribution of property -- 23 Pa.C.S. 53502(c) -- Wife disabled with limited income -- Temporary award of marital residence to wife The marital home will be temporarily awarded to wife pending equitable distribution of marital property under Section 3502(c) of the Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S. 53502(c), where wife is disabled and confined to a wheelchair and has limited income while husband is gainfully employed and lives in an apartment located near employment. Frank J. Skokoski, for plaintiff. Anthony J. Ciotola, for defendant. STEVENS, J. FACTS In April, 1993, plaintiff filed a complaint in divorce seeking, inter alia, equitable distribution of the marital property, temporary and permanent alimony, and attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff and defendant have a long-standing marriage, and the parties own a residence in the city of Hazleton. Plaintiff has resided in that residence for approximately **539 20 years while defendant, who is employed in Harrisburg, has maintained a separate apartment in Harrisburg for the past ten years but returns to the marital residence on weekends, depending upon weather conditions and his personal schedule in Harrisburg. Plaintiff is a 54 year old female who has various serious medical problems, including severe rheumatoid arthritis, resulting in her being confined to a wheelchair. Although the parties have several grown children who do not reside in the marital residence, one of their children, Sandra, does reside with plaintiff, along with Sandra's young child. Sandra remains at the residence full-time with her mother, plaintiff, and assists plaintiff in everyday needs and activities, such as washing, dressing; generally, Sandra takes care of plaintiff's daily needs. On or about August 9, 1993, plaintiff filed the within petition seeking exclusive possession of the marital residence pursuant to :he Divorce Code. Several requests for continuance were made on behalf of defendant, by and through his then counsel, who himself had an illness and was unavailable. The matter was heard on October 29, 1993. OPINION In Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 (1985), the Superior Court specifically found that the court of common pleas had authority to temporarily award the marital residence, pending equitable distribution of marital property, to one spouse pursuant to the Divorce Code, 53502(c). See Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, supra at 162, 496 A.2d at 60. In Laczkowski the factual situation was slightly different than in the instant case in that there was a minor child, and temporary possession of the marital real property **540 was granted to the spouse having physical custody of the minor ch-;ld. The Superior Court went on to state, that "... The equitable powers of the courts under our Divorce Code are extremely broad ..." even though "... the exclusion of a spouse from the marital home during the pendency of a divorce proceeding is a harsh remedy that will not be awarded cavalierly...." See Laczkowski, supra, at 166-167, 496 A.2d at 62. *2 The Superior Court thoroughly reviewed the legislative history of the Divorce Code, as well as case law of two states whose divorce statutes are substantially similar to the Pennsylvania Divorce Code. The Superior Court, for example, in reviewing the law of those two states, specifically cited a New Jersey case, Degenaars v. Degenaars, 186 N.J. Super. 233, 452 A.2d 222 (1982), which held that a spouse may be excluded from the marital residence solely because that spouse had been living apart from the residence for a period of time. See Laczkowski, supra, at 163, 496 A.2d at 60. In the instant case, the facts as testified to show that plaintiff is a specially vulnerable woman in that she has a serious illness, is confined to a wheelchair, and needs daily assistance from her daughter to perform everyday duties such as dressing and washing. Moreover, plaintiff has no income other than a $350 per month rental from a property and resides in a home which has been customized to accommodate her use of a wheelchair. For example, an outside deck has been installed with a ramp to the driveway for the entrance and exit of plaintiff. On the other hand, the husband is and has been gainfully employed in Harrisburg, earning approximately $30,000 per year, and he lives in his own apartment in Harrisburg five days per week. He acknowledged **541 that he does not necessarily come home every weekend in that his travel depends on "weather conditions" and his "personal schedule" in Harrisburg. This court finds that the Superior Court in Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, supra, did not specifically confine its ruling solely to cases in which there is a minor child. Where there is, as in the within case, a woman who is vulnerable because of her serious illness, and her mental and emotional health and welfare is compromised by the ever- present knowledge that defendant can move in and out of khe marital home on weekends at defendant's own pleasure and whim, there is good reason to award temporary exclusive possession to said woman. Thus, in the instant case and under the specific facts as testified to, plaintiff has shown enough to justify granting temporary, exclusive possession of the marital property in plaintiff, during the pending equitable distribution of marital property. Although the court is convinced that defendant does indeed love his wife and does not want to be divorced from her, the sole issue before this court is whether or not plaintiff is entitled to exclusive possession of marital residence as stated supra. Accordingly, the court grants the petition of the plaintiff for a period not to exceed one year. ORDER It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: (1) The petition of plaintiff for exclusive possession of the marital residence located at North Wyoming Street, Hazleton, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, is hereby granted for a period not to exceed one year; and **542 (2) The prothonotary of Luzerne County is directed to mail notice of entry of this order to all counsel of record pursuant to Pa. R. C. P. 216. Pa.Com.Pl. 1993. Merola v. Merola MLU cr.? MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER V. AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK, DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA :07-0048 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 21 day of June, 2007, a hearing shall be conducted on the within petition in Courtroom Number 2, Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, Pennsylvania at 2:00 p.m., Thursday, July 5, 2007. Pending that hearing, neither party shall transfer, sell, dissipate, destroy, encumber or diminish the value of any asset held jointly or individually by either of them pending further order of court or without the express written consent of both parties. This specifically includes, but is not limited to, all property located in, around and near the real estate located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. By the Edgar B. Bayley, J. , f' rylou Matas, Esquire For Petitioner Anes Elizabeth McClintock, Pro se 63 Meade Drive Carlisle, PA 117013 sal N Z r- cp t C%j tt: N .c 41 owelpm Prepared By: Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire 3448 Trindle Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Phone: 717-737-0100 Email: dianeradcliff @comcast.net Attorney for Defendant MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, Plaintiff VS. AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 07-48 : IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE TO ENTER APPEARAKE To the Prothonotary: Please enter the appearance of Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire, Supreme Court ID No. 32112, on behalf of the Defendant, Agnes ? lizabeth McClintock. Papers may be served at the address set forth below: Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire 3448 Trindle Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Date: June 26, 2007 DIANE G. DCLIFF, ESQUIRE __,!? rn r 6 9 O` "61 ORIGINAL Petition for Economic Claims Prepared By: Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire 3448 Trindle Road, Camp Hill, PA 17011 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Phone: 717-737-0100 • Fax: 717-975-0697 Email: dianeradcliff @comcast.net Attorney for Agnes Elizabeth McClintock MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, Plaintiff Vs. AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : NO. 07-48 : IN DIVORCE NOTICE YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to de'and against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take prompt action. You are warned that if you fail to do so, the case may proceed without you and a decree of divorce or annulment may be entered against you by the court. A judgment may also be entered against you for any other claim or relief requested in these papers by the Defendant. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you, inc.uding custody or visitation of your children. When the ground for divorce is indignities or irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, you may request marriage counseling. A list of marriage counselors is available in the Office of the Prothonotary at the Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY, DIVISION OF PROPERTY, COUNSEL FEES OR EXPENSES BEFORE THE FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT IS GRANTED, YOU MAY LOSE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM ANY OF THEM. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE. Cumberland County Bar Association 32 South Bedford Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Telephone No. (717) 249-3166 Petition for Economic Claims Prepared By: Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire 3448 Trindle Road, Camp Hill, PA 17011 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Phone: 717-737-0100 • Fax: 717.975-0697 Email: dianeradcliff Ccomcast.net Attorney for Agnes Elizabeth McClintock MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, Plaintiff VS. AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 07-48 IN DIVORCE PETITION FOR ECONOMIC CLAIMS Petitioner, Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, by her attorney, Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire, files this Petition for Economic Claims and represents that: 1. Petitioner is Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, )efendant in the above captioned case. 2. Respondent is Michael Ryan McClintock, Plaintiff in the above captioned case. 3. This action was commenced by the filing of a Divorce Complaint by the Respondent on January 3, 2007. 4. In the Divorce Complaint the Respondent raised the following claims: Equitable Distribution of Marital Property. 5. Petitioner wishes to raise the following economic claims in this Petition as permitted by the Domestic Relations Law. -2- PETITIONER'S COUNT I EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 6. Petitioner incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 1-5 herein as fully as though the same were set forth at length. 7. Respondent and Petitioner have acquired property and debts, both real and personal, during their marriage from the date of marriage to the date of separation, all of which is "marital property". 8. Respondent and/or Petitioner have acquired, prior to the marriage or subsequent thereto, "non-marital property" which has increased in value since the date of marriage and/or subsequent to its acquisition during the marriage, which increase in value is "marital property". 9. Respondent and Petitioner have been unable to agree as to an eq:.<itable division of said property as of the date of the filing of this Complaint. WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Honorable Court to equitably divide all marital property and debts of the parties. PETITIONER'S COUNT it ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE. ALIMONY 10. Petitioner incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 1-09 herein as fully as though the same were set forth at length. 11. Petitioner tacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable means and is unable to support herself through appropriate employment. 12. Petitioner requires reasonable support to adequately maintain herself in accordance with the standard of living escablished during the marriage. WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Honorable Court to enter an award of alimony pendente lite until final hearing and hereafter enter an award of alimony permanently thereafter. - 3 - PETITIONER'S COUNT III COUNSEL FEES AND COSTS 13. Petitioner incorporates by reference the averments set forth in Paragraphs 1-12 herein as fully as though the same were set forth at length. 14. Petitioner has employed legal counsel but is unable to pay the necessary and reasonable attorney's fees for said counsel. 15. Petitioner is in need of hiring various experts to appraise the parties' marital assets and does not have the funds to pay the necessary and reasonable fees. WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Honorable Court to enter an award of interim counsel fees, costs and expenses and to order such additional sums hereafter as may be deemed necessary and appropriate and at final hearing to further award such additional counsel fees, costs and expenses as are deemed necessary and appropriate. Respectfully submitted, IANE G. RAD LIFF, ESQURE 3 rin r Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Supreme Court ID #32112 Phone: (717) 737-0100 Attorney for Petitioner Date: June 26, 2007 -4- VERIFICATION i verify that the statements made in this Petition are true and correct. Petitioner understands that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. ? 1 Agnes Et' abeth McClintock Date: June 26, 2007 - 5 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire, hereby certify that on June 26, 2007, 1 have served a copy of the within PETITION FOR ECONOMIC CLAIMS upon the Plaintiff's attorney, Mary Lou Matas, Esquire, by mailing same by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Marylou Matas, Esquire 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Respectfully submitted, E G. RA CLIFF, ESQUIRE le Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Phone: (717) 737-0100 Fax: (717) 975-0697 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Attorney for Petitioner -6- a 4 1 4 PT`f 4 'i i?f k,T ?k 11? cr% 'All , 9 ;?_ -, YOUR HAVE THE RIGHT TO A LAWYER, WHO MAY ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AND REPRESENT YOU. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU MAY GET LEGAL HELP. CUMBERLAND COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 2 LIBERTY AVENUE CARLISLE, PA 7013 (717) 249-3166 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County is required by law to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. For information about accessible facilities and reasonable accommodations available to disabled individuals having business before the court, please contact our office. All arrangements must be made at least 72 hours prior to any hearing or business before the court. You must attend the scheduled conference or hearing. FOR THE COURT: COURT ADMINISTRATOR - 2 - Petition for APL Order Prepared By: Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire 3448 Trindle Road, Camp Hill, PA 17011 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Phone: 717-737-0100 • Fax: 717-975-0697 Email: dianeradcliff @comcast.net Attorney for Agnes E. McClintock MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, Plaintiff VS. AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW : NO. 07-48 : IN DIVORCE PETITION FOR ORDER FOR ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE TO THE HONORABLE, THE JUDGES OF SAID COURT: AND NOW, this day of , 2007, comes the 2? Petitioner, Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, who f es the this Petition for Alimony Pendent Lite and respectfully represents that: 1. Petitioner, Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, is an adult individual residing at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and is the Defendant in the above captioned divorce action. 2. Respondent, Michael Ryan McClintock, is an adult individual residing at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania and is the Plaintiff in the above captioned divorce action. 3. Petitioner and Respondent were married on 5/23/2002, and separated on 11/14/2006. 4. Respondent has not sufficiently provided support for the Petitioner. 5. Petitioner is not on a financial par with Respondent in prosecuting and/or defending this Divorce Action, and is unable to support herself in accordance with the standard of living established during the marriage. - 3 - 6. The within action was instituted by the filing of a Divorce Complaint by Plaintiff, Michael Ryan McClintock, on January 3, 2007. 7. Respondent filed an Petition raising Economic Claims on 6/26/2007. 8. In the Petition raising Economic Claims filed on 6/26/2007, Petitioner raised a claim for Alimony Pendente Lite. 9. This Petition is filed to secure the entry of an order for alimony pendente lite on the Defendant's claim for Alimony Pendente Lite. 10. A background information sheet pertaining to this claim for Alimony Pendente Lite was previously filed in the spousal support action previously filed by Defendant, Agnes Elizabeth McClintock. 11. The amount of Alimony Pendente Lite requested by the Petitioner is the maximum amount provided for under the guidelines. WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court enter an Order: a. Requiring the Respondent to pay the Petitioner Alimony Pendente Lite in the maximum amount provided for by law under the state support guidelines; b. Requiring the Respondent to provide medical insurance and support for the Petitioner. Respectfully submitted, -4- Camp Hill, PA 17011 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Phone: (717) 737-0100 Fax: (717) 975-0697 Attorney for Petitioner VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in this Petition for Alimony Pendent Lite are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. R A,,,,, Agnes Eliz eth McClintock DATE: 6 2 r' - 5 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire, hereby certify that on June 26, 2007, 1 served a copy of the within PETITION FOR ECONOMIC CLAIMS upon the Respondent's attorney, Marylou Matas, Esquire, by mailing same by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Marylou Matas, Esquire 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 F espectfully submitted, D NE G: RA CLIFF, ESQUIRE 1 3 Trind oad Camp Hill, PA 17011 Phone: (717) 737-0100 Fax: (717) 975-0697 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Attorney for Agnes E. McClintock -6- C cam„ (r w 0 Defendant's Answer and New Matter to Plaintiff's Petition for Exclusive Possession and Special Relief Defendant's Cross Petition for Special Relief Prepared By: Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire 3448 Trindle Road, Camp Hill, PA 17011 Supreme Court ID # 32112 Atv ORIC"R? Phone: 717-737-0100 • Fax: 717-975-0697 Email: dianeradcliff @comcast.net Attorney for Agnes E. McClintock MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCK, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBFRLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : NO. 07-48 AGNES ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK, Defendant : IN DIVORCE ORDER/RULE RE: DEFENDANT'S CROSS PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF AND NOW, this day of , 2007 upon consideration of the within Petition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a Rul is issued upon the Plaintiff, Michael Ryan McClintock, to show cause why Defendant, Agnes Elizabeth McClintock, is not entitled to the relief requested in the within Cross Petition for Special Relief. Rule Returnable at a hearing scheduled for the J` day of at a•ob o'clockI m. in Courtroom Courthouse, Carlisle, PA . E COURP. Distribution to: JUDGE torney for Petitioner: rney for Respondent: Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire Marylou Matas, Esquire 3448 Trindle Road, Camp Hill, PA 17011 26 West High Street, Carlisle, PA 17013 Phone: 717-737-0100 • Fax: 717-975-0697 Phone: 717-243-5513 • Fax: 717-243-6486 Email: dianeradcliff@comcast.net Email: mmatas@sfl-law.com , 2007) umberland County -1 - }ice t li:5 -` LL- C c.c MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff/Respondent CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. CIVIL ACTION - DIVORCE NO. 07-48 CIVIL TERM AGNES E. SCHUTTE-McCLINTOCK, : IN DIVORCE Defendant/Petitioner PACSES CASE NO: 916109264 ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 26th day of June, 2007, upon consideration of the Petition for Alimony Pendente Lite and/or counsel fees, it is hereby directed that the parties and their respective counsel appear before R.J. Shadday on July 30, 2007 at 10:30 A.M. for a conference, at 13 N. Hanover St., Carlisle, PA 17013, after which the conference officer may recommend that an Order for Alimony Pendente Lite be entered. YOU are further ordered to bring to the conference: (1) a true copy of your most recent Federal Income Tax Return, including W2's as filed (2) your pay stubs for the preceding six (6) months (3) the Income and Expense Statement attached to this order, completed as required by Rule 1910.1 IC (4) verification of child care expenses (5) proof of medical coverage which you may have, or may have available to you if you fail to appear for the conference or bring the required documents, the Court may issue a warrant for your arrest. BY THE COURT, Edgar B. Bayley, President Judge Copies mailed to: Petitioner Respondent Diane G. Radcliff, Esq. Marylou Matas, Esq. Date of Order: June 26, 2007 erence Officer Conf 4Sd?y, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO A LAWYER, WHO MAY ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AND REPRESENT YOU. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU MAY GET LEGAL HELP. CUMBERLAND COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 2 LIBERTY AVE. CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17013 (717) 249-3166 cc361 1' A?b 01- Ll k CAAr SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT, made this S+day of 2007, by and between MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, party of the first part, hereinafter referred to as "Husband", AND AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK, of Galway, Ireland, party of the second part, hereinafter referred to as "Wife", WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, the parties hereto are Husband and Wife, having been married on May 23, 2002, Multnomah County, Oregon, and WHEREAS, diverse unhappy differences, disputes and difficulties have arisen between the parties and it is the intention of Wife and Husband to live separate and apart, and the parties hereto are desirous of settling their respective financial rights and obligations as between each other, and to finally and for all time to settle and determine their respective property and other rights growing out of their marital relations; and wish to enter into this Separation and Property Settlement Agreement; and WHEREAS, both and each of the parties hereto have had the opportunity to be advised of their legal rights and the implications of this Agreement and the legal consequences which may and will ensue from the execution hereof; and WHEREAS, Wife acknowledges that she has had the opportunity to be thoroughly conversant with and know accurately the size, degree, and extent of the estate and income of Husband and Husband acknowledges that he has had the opportunity to be thoroughly conversant with and know accurately the size, degree, and extent of the estate and income of Wife; NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration and of the mutual promises, covenants and undertakings hereinafter set forth which are hereby acknowledged by each of the parties hereto, --Page 1 of 16-- Wife and Husband, each intending to be legally bound hereby, covenants and agree as follows: 1. Advice of Counsel: The parties acknowledge that they have received independent legal advice from counsel of their own selection or that they have elected not to seek independent legal advice and that they fully understand the facts and have been fully informed as to their legal rights and obligations and they acknowledge and accept that this Agreement is, in the circumstance, fair and equitable and that it is being entered into freely and voluntarily after having received such advice and with such knowledge that execution of this Agreement is not the result of any duress or undue influence and that it is not the result of any collusion or improper or illegal agreement or agreements and the parties hereto state that he/she, in the procurement and execution of this Agreement, has not been subject to any fraud, concealment, overreaching, imposition, coercion, or other unfair dealing on the part of the other, or on the part of the other's counsel. The provisions of this Agreement and their legal effect have been fully explained to Husband by his counsel, Marylou Matas, Esquire. The provisions of this Agreement and their legal effect have been fully explained to Wife by her counsel, Diane Radcliffe, Esquire. 2. Warranty of Disclosure: The parties warrant and represent that they have made a full disclosure of all assets and their valuation prior to the execution of this Agreement. This disclosure was in the form of an informal exchange of information by the parties but also reflects the fact that the parties had personal knowledge before their separation of their various assets and debts all of which form the basis of this Agreement between the parties. 3. Personal Ri hts and Separation: Wife and Husband may and shall, at all times hereafter, live separate and part. They shall be free from any control, restraint, interference or authority, direct or indirect, by the other in all respects as if they were unmarried. They may reside at such place or places as they may select. Each may, for his or her separate use or benefit, conduct, carry on and engage in any business, occupation, profession or employment which to him or her may seem advisable. Wife and Husband shall not molest, harass, disturb, nor malign each other or the respective families of each other nor compel or attempt to compel the other to cohabit nor dwell by any means or in any manner whatsoever with him or her. --Page 2 of 16-- 4. Date of Execution: The "date of execution" or "execution date" of this Agreement shall be defined as the date upon which it is executed by the parties if they have each executed the Agreement on the same date. Otherwise, the "date of execution" or "execution date" of this Agreement shall be defined as the date of execution by the party last executing this Agreement. 5. Tangible Personal Property: Husband and Wife do hereby acknowledge that they have previously divided their tangible personal property, with Wife retaining the items listed on Exhibit A attached hereto and Husband retaining the items listed on Exhibit B hereto. Husband also shall retain possession and ownership of the family dogs, which are presently in his possession and for which he has maintained possession, care and maintenance of since the date of separation. Wife agrees that all of the property, including the family dogs, in the possession of Husband shall be the sole and separate property of Husband and Husband agrees that all of the property in the possession of Wife shall be the sole and separate property of Wife. The parties do hereby specifically waive, release, renounce and forever abandon whatever claims, if any, he or she may have with respect to the above items which shall become the sole and separate property of the other, with full power to him or her to dispose of the same as fully and . It, 4U e LiCOIt 4Uit e-il/( i S ryu ( nl f c, uL effectually, as though he or she were unmarried." Cmr- Cf 4w d oqc, , k SGlaq ( 9 i Ue ?t t I e -?e nu.u n ?A ?.r ?? ,? +"y aop g p ten C? cty 6. After-Acquired Personal Property: Each of the parties shall hereafter own and 3? ??c« < enjoy, independently of any claim or right of the other, all items of personal property, tangible or S intangible, hereafter acquired by him or her, with full power, in him or her to dispose of the same (AyM as fully and effectively, in all respects and for all purposes, as though he or she were unmarried. 7. Motor Vehicles: With respect to the motor vehicles owned by one or both parties, the parties agree as follows: a.) Wife shall retain sole and exclusive possession of the parties' 2003 Honda Civic. This vehicle is encumbered with a loan with an approximate monthly payment of $318. From the date of execution of this Agreement forward, Wife shall be solely and exclusively responsible for the payment of this loan. Wife shall make all --Page 3 of 16-- such payments in a timely fashion as- they are due. Wife shall hold Husband harmless from and against all claims and action for collection activity whatsoever related to this loan/lease. This vehicle is titled in Wife's name individually and is owned pursuant to a lease agreement. Wife, or an authorized person on her behalf, shall remove the vehicle from the former marital residence at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, PA, within fifteen (15) days of execution of this Agreement. Wife bears all responsibility for liability for this vehicle from the date of separation forward and understands her responsibilities regarding insurance and liability. b.) Since the date of separation, Husband has purchased a vehicle for his own personal use. Wife shall make no claim to access to or use of that vehicle and waives any interest she has or may have in that vehicle. 8. Real Estate: During their marriage, the parties owned real estate located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. This property was purchased in 2005 for $205,900 and has an approximate date of separation mortgage balance of $201,818. A copy of the 2004 Cumberland County tax assessment is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "C" which reflects the purchase price and approximate date of separation value. A copy of the 1098 federal tax form for 2006 is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "D" which reflects the approximate date of separation balance for the mortgage. A market analysis was performed on or about June 24, 2007, at which time it was determined that the property may sell for $279,000. A copy of the market analysis is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "E." This property is encumbered with a first mortgage due and owing to Sovereign Bank requiring the monthly payment of $1,708. From the date of separation forward, Husband shall maintain sole and exclusive responsibility for the repayment of the aforesaid mortgage and indemnify Wife and hold Wife harmless from any demand for payment or collection activity whatsoever. Husband shall retain excl si e possession and ownership of the property. Wife shall vacate the premises within 4G*ca4I)_lays --Page 4 of 16-- of execution of this Agreement. The parties agree that Husband shall make a payment to Wife for her interest in the S MM property. Wife shall receive S?°? ?4 $43, 450, at the time that Husband refinances the mortgage or obtains a home equity loan. Husband shall make that payment to Wife within 60 days of execution of this Agreement. If Husband does not qualify for financing, then Husband shall list the home for sale with a realtor of his choosing and Wife shall receive 55% of the proceeds received after payment of all settlement costs. Husband shall be responsible for all aspects of the sale and Wife shall cooperate with the sale, signing all documents necessary for listing and settlement. Wife shall execute a deed transferring her interest in the property to Husband's name VU (pt ,s VS PAM individually upon execution of this Agreement. This deed shall be held by I OMrdis attorney in escrow and released to Husband or Husband's mortgage company to be filed contemporaneously with the filing of Husband's refinanced mortgage documents. Wife's name shall not be removed from the deed so long as her name is listed as a responsible party on the mortgage documents, but shall be promptly removed from the deed upon the refinancing of mortgage. For so long as Wife's name is listed on the mortgage as a responsible party, Husband and Wife shall be listed on the deed as joint owners with the right of survivorship. 9. Bank Accounts: For the mutual promises and covenants contained in this Agreement, Husband and Wife hereby waive all right, title, claim or interest they may have by equitable distribution in their respective bank accounts, checking or savings, if any, and each party waives against the other any duty of accounting for disposition of any jointly held funds. More specifically, Wife waives, relinquishes or transfers any right, title or interest she may have to the checking account or funds held therein in the parties' joint names with Orrstown Bank. Husband shall forward any documents necessary to close or otherwise remove Wife's name from this account to Wife's attorney within fifteen (15) days of execution of this Agreement. Wife shall promptly sign all necessary documents and return them to Husband or Husband's attorney. If it is discovered that other joint accounts exist, the parties shall divide --Page 5 of 16-- equally any funds in those accounts and promptly close those accounts within fifteen (15) days of execution of this Agreement. The parties waive and transfer any interest they have in the other's individual accounts, checking or savings that may have been established during the marriage. 10. Pension Interests: Husband hereby waives, relinquishes and transfers any and all of his right, title and interest he has or may have in Wife's pension or retirement account, as well as other accounts that Wife may have in her individual name or may have secured through her present or prior employment. Wife hereby waives, relinquishes and transfers any and all of his right, title and interest he has or may have in Husband's pension or retirement account, as well as other accounts that Husband may have in his individual name or may have secured through his present or prior employment. Husband and Wife maintain that neither of them have established, maintained or have an interest in any pension or retirement account through present or prior employment that may have been earned during the marriage. Each party is satisfied with the disclosure of the other as it relates to all interests of this paragraph and the terms of this document. 11. Investment Accounts: Each party waives any and all right, title or interest they have or may have in the other's investment accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and the like, that are not previously identified as bank accounts or pension interests. Specifically, Wife waives any interest she has or may have in Husband's HOSTS equity grants he earned through his employment with HOSTS Learning. The approximate date of separation value of those grants is $0, as shown on the attached statement attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "F." Husband and Wife maintain that neither of them have established, maintained or have an interest in any other investment account during the marriage or that may have earned interest during the marriage. Each party is satisfied with the disclosure of the other as it relates to all interests of this paragraph and the terms of this document. --Page 6 of 16-- 12. Marital Debt: a. Post Separation Debt: Each party hereby confirms that they have not incurred any additional debt since their separation that has, in any way, obligated the other party. In the event that either party contracted or incurred any debt since the date of separation on October 18, 2006, the party who incurred said debt shall be responsible for the payment thereof regardless of the name in which the debt may have been incurred. Husband shall be responsible for the credit card debt incurred by him on the Orchard Bank Master Card since the date of separation. Husband shall make payment for that account and indemnify Wife and hold Wife harmless from any demand for payment or collection activity whatsoever. Husband shall remove Wife's name from said credit card as quickly as possible. b.. Future Debt From the date of this Agreement forward, neither parry shall contract or incur any debt or liability for which the other party or his or her property or estate might be responsible and shall indemnify and save the other party harmless from any and all claims or demands made against him or her by reason of debts or obligations incurred by the other party. C. Marital Debt: Husband and Wife do not believe there exists any obligations in their names jointly, other than the Orchard Bank Master Card listed above. Husband agrees to maintain responsibility for any debts that are listed in his name individually. Wife agrees to maintain responsibility for any debts that are listed in her name individually. 13. Warranty as to Post Separation and Future Obligations: Husband and Wife each covenant, warrant, represent and agree that each will now and at all times hereafter hold harmless and keep the other party indemnified from all debts, charges and liabilities incurred by the Husband or Wife, respectively. 14. Life Insurance: Each party agrees that the other party shall have sole ownership and possession of any life insurance policies owned by the other. Each party shall have the right to borrow against, cash in policies, change beneficiaries, and exercise any other incidents of ownership of the respective policies free of any right or claim by the other party. Each party --Page 7 of 16-- C Yu? Y'?-?`l ?? S r ?C?".?, ? ?'_ ?Y?t%.?'_Q N? ? f '--?.;5?? r,'w'?r?, -!t, l,'?,? : ? ? , ?° r ?-r l ? ',l?'M.I?O ?S /'. %? ? ?r. t ? ? -?- ifl pa-?1,-Q-1l? 'Am *Cur\ C culS «CCcu'S trl L,I-46C_UL -t Jc-;l'f 4(k Sbtc„ll ?ae i4k- ivl'lS shall sign any documents necessary to waive, relinquish or transfer any rights in such policies to the respective party who presently owns such policies. 15. Tax Re und: The parties filed a joint return for the 2006 tax year and received a refund in the amount of $3034. After deducting the filing costs, there remains $2994. This refund shall be divided so that Wife receives *14q7.'- 2R1d c1;1 0 .e ? CZ?{1cYYl d?'i mOY\ 16. a.) Husband shall pay to Wife, as alimony, the sum of krS ?0w? Maintenance: P._ beginning 6+"eluc oz) the , for -sir consecutive months, at t which time all payments shall cease if they have not previously terminated as provided herein. These payments are not modifiable. Husband's obligation to pay under this paragraph will end and he ,.w,. ill be released from the obligation of c payment upon the deathor remarriage of Wife, or upon the p yment ? ? $756 Zik woccurs first. Wife's estate, successors or heirs shall have l' M Rty no right to payments scheduled to be made subsequent to the Wife's death ® r lit ?5' b.) Husband hereby waives any right or claims of any nature whatsoever relative to alimony, alimony pendente lite, spousal support, spousal maintenance, counsel fees and expenses against Wife. 17. Insurance: From the date of separation forward, Husband and Wife shall each be responsible for the cost of any unreimbursed medical expenses for all medical, dental, eye, and/or any other health related costs, to include and not be limited to psychological and counseling expenses. Husband maintains coverage for Wife's health insurance and shall maintain that coverage until the time a final decree in divorce is entered. 18. Mutual Releases: Husband and Wife each do hereby mutually remise, release, quitclaim, and forever discharge the other and the estate of such other, for all times to come and for all purposes whatsoever, of and from any and all right, title and interest, or claims in or against the property (including income and gain from property hereafter accruing) of the other or --Page 8 of 16-- against the estate of such other, of whatever nature and wheresoever situate, which he or she now has or at any time hereafter may have against such other, the estate of such other, or any part thereof, whether arising out of any former acts, contracts, engagements, or liabilities of such other as by way of dower or curtesy, or claims in the nature of dower or curtesy or widow's or widower's rights, family exemption, or similar allowance, or under the intestate laws, or the right to take against the spouse's Will; or the right to treat a lifetime conveyance by the other as testamentary, or all other rights of a surviving spouse to participate in a deceased spouse's estate, whether arising under the laws of (a) Pennsylvania, (b) any state, commonwealth or territory of the United States, or (c) any other country, or any rights which either party may have or at any time hereafter have for past, present, or future support or maintenance, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, costs or expenses, whether arising as a result of the marital relation or otherwise, except and only except, all rights and agreements and obligations of whatsoever nature arising or which may arise under this Agreement or for the breach of any thereof. It is the intention of Husband and Wife to give to each other by execution of this Agreement a full, complete, and general release with respect to any and all property of any kind or nature, real or personal, or mixed, which the other now owns or may hereafter acquire, except and only except, all rights and agreements and obligations of whatsoever nature arising or which may arise under this Agreement or for the breach of any thereof. 19. Divorce: At the time of execution of this Agreement, Husband has commenced an action for divorce against Wife. It is understood and agreed that any Decree in Divorce which may be issued between the parties shall incorporate this Agreement. Further: a.) This Agreement represents a complete and final agreement as to their respective property rights which arose from the marital relation and therefore mutually waive any and all rights they may have under §3502, et. seq. of the Pennsylvania Code, Act. No 1980-26. b.) This Agreement may be offered in evidence in the action for divorce and may be incorporated by reference in the decree to be granted therein. Notwithstanding --Page 9 of 16-- such incorporation, this Agreement shall not be merged in the decree, but shall survive the same and shall be binding and conclusive to the rights of all parties. 20. Legal Fees: In the review and preparation of this Agreement each party shall bear his or her own legal fees. 21. Non-Compliance: If either party fails to comply any provision of this Agreement, the other party shall have the right, at his or her election, either to sue for damages for such failure, in which event the non-complying party shall be responsible for payment of legal fees and costs incurred by the other in enforcing their rights hereunder, whether through formal court action or negotiations, or to seek such other remedies or relief as may be available to him or her. 22. Equitable Distribution: It is specifically understood and agreed that this Agreement constitutes an equitable distribution of property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by Husband and Wife or either of them during the marriage as contemplated by The Act of April 2, 1980 (P.L. No. 63, No. 26) known as "The Divorce Code," 23 P.S. 101 et seq. of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and as amended. 23. Summary ofEffect of Agreement: It is specifically understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto, and each party accepts the provisions herein made in lieu of and in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all of the said parties' rights against the other for any past, present and future clams on account of support, maintenance, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, costs and expenses, equitable distribution of marital property and any other claims of each party, including all claims raised by them in the divorce action pending between the parties. 24. Tax Consequences: By this Agreement, the parties have intended to effectuate and by this Agreement have equitably divided their marital property. The parties have determined that such equitable division conforms to a right and just standard with regard to the rights of each party. The division of existing marital property is not, except as may be otherwise expressly provided herein, intended by the parties to institute or constitute in any way a sale or exchange of assets and the division is being effected without the introduction of outside funds or other --Page 10 of 16-- property not constituting a part of the marital estate. 25. Mutual Co_peration/Duty to Effectuate Agreement: Each party shall at any time and from time to time hereafter, take any and all steps and execute, acknowledge and deliver to the other party any and all further instruments and/or documents that the other party may reasonably require for the purpose of giving full force and effect to the provisions of this Agreement. 26. Reconciliation: The parties shall only effectuate a legal reconciliation which supersedes this Agreement by their signed agreement containing a specific statement that they have reconciled and that this Agreement shall be null and void; otherwise, this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. Further, the parties may attempt a reconciliation, which action, if not consummated by the aforesaid agreement, shall not affect in any way the legal affect of this agreement or cause any new marital rights or obligations to accrue. 27. Severability: If any term, condition, clause or provision of this Agreement shall be determined or declared to be void or invalid in law or otherwise, then only that term condition, clause or provision shall be stricken from this Agreement and in all other respects this Agreement shall be valid and continue in full force, effect, and operation. Likewise, the failure of any party to meet her or his obligations under any one or more of the paragraphs herein, with exception of the satisfaction of the conditions precedent, shall in no way void or alter the remaining obligations of the parties. 28. No Waiver of Default: This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect unless and until terminated under and pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. The failure of either parry to insist upon strict performance of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall in no way affect the right of such party hereafter to enforce the same, nor shall the waiver of any breach of any provision hereof be construed as a waiver of any subsequent default of the same or similar nature, nor shall it be construed as a waiver of strict performance of any other obligations herein. 29. Integration: This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding of the parties and supersedes any and all prior agreements and negotiations between them. There are no --Page 11 of 16-- representations or warranties other than those expressly set forth herein. This Agreement shall survive integration by any court into any judgment for divorce and shall continue to have independent legal significance as a written contract separate from such judgment for divorce and may be enforced as an independent contract. 30. Effect of Divorce Decree: The parties agree that unless otherwise specifically provided herein, this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect after such time as a final Decree in Divorce may be entered with respect to the parties. 31. Waiver or Modification to be in Writing: No modification or waiver of any of the terms hereof shall be valid unless in writing and signed by both parties and no waiver of any breach hereof or default hereunder shall be deemed a waiver of any subsequent default of the same or similar nature. 32. Captions: The captions of this Agreement are inserted only as a matter of convenience and for reference and in no way define, limit or describe the scope and intent of this Agreement, nor in any way effect this Agreement. 33. Agreement Bindinz on Heirs: This Agreement shall be binding and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executor, administrators, successors and assigns. 34. GoverninzLaw: This Agreements shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. --Page 12 of 16-- IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set forth their hands and seals to two counterparts of this Agreement, each of which shall constitute an original, the day and year first above written. WITNESSES: Dat MICHAEL R MCCLINTOCK o? C a, C-?C. / - D e A 'S ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK --Page 13 of 16-- COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY OF On this day of , 2007, before me, the undersigned officer, personally appeared, MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, known to me (or satisfactory proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within Agreement and acknowledged that he executed the same for the purpose therein contained. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and official seal. Notary Public COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY OF : On this day of , 2007, before me, the undersigned officer, personally appeared AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK, known to me (or satisfactory proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within Agreement and acknowledged that she executed the same for the purpose therein contained. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and official seal. Notary Public --Page 14 of 16-- PERSONAL PROPERTY OF WIFE 1. White bookshelf from spare room 2. Chest of drawers from spare room 3. 2 side tables from spare room 4. full bed from spare room 5. 2 metal lamps from spare room 6. TV and DVD player from master bedroom 7. Wicker table, glass top and 4 chairs from master bedroom 8. 2 bookshelves from dining room 9. painted stools from dining room 10. Wicker chest from living room 11. TV stand from living room 12. mission side tables from living room 13. all lamps and cushions from living room 14. green chair, couch and loveseat set from living room 15. Agnes' Dell computer and desk from office 16. 2 air conditioning units from basement 17. microwave from basement 18. swing chair from basement 19. 2 space heater from basement 20. lamps and shades from basement 21. Christmas ornaments box from basement 22. bicycle from garage EXHIBIT A --Page 15 of 16-- PERSONAL PROPERTY OF HUSBAND 1. All remaining items of furnishings and household items in the residence located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, PA 2. family dogs EXHIBIT B --Page 16 of 16-- ?? C3 f? .-.._, i I"' f?'t .. ? ?;.? '7'; . i? -..y r a'R. ?.?) •_ _;. .:i .Ly ?? / "'? MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. :NO. 07-48 AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT A Complaint in Divorce under § 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed 01/03/07.. 2. The marriage of plaintiff and defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety days have elapsed from the date of filing and service of the Complaint. 3. 1 consent to the entry of a final Decree in Divorce after service of notice of intention to request entry of the Decree. I verify that the statements made in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to rities. Date: S D Michae R McClintoc PLAINTIFF'S WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDER4 3301 W OF THE DIVORCE CODE I consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce without notice. 2. 1 understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. 1 understand that I will not be divorced until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the Decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. I verify that the- statements made in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY ATTORNEVS,M-LAW 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: 5 ` Michael Rya McClintock C ra 0t M r, C- --4 X - n M C-71 Vy1 ?? MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. :NO. 07-48 AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 1. A Complaint in Divorce under § 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was filed 01/03/07. 2. The marriage of plaintiff and defendant is irretrievably broken and ninety days have elapsed from the date of filing and service of the Complaint. 3. 1 consent to the entry of a final Decree in Divorce after service of notice of intention to request entry of the Decree. I verify that the statements made in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: 4AgnElizaUeth McClintock 'WAIVER OF NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST ENTRY OF A DIVORCE DECREE UNDERG 3301 (c) OF THE DIVORCE CODE I consent to the entry of a final Decree of Divorce without notice. 2. 1 understand that I may lose rights concerning alimony, division of property, lawyer's fees or expenses if I do not claim them before a divorce is granted. 3. 1 understand that I will not be divorced until a Divorce Decree is entered by the Court and that a copy of the Decree will be sent to me immediately after it is filed with the Prothonotary. I verify that the* statements made in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my SAMIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY ,?TUw 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. Date: ? oz? ` Agne Elizabeth McClintock M {.=- MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. :NO. 07-48 AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE TO TRANSMIT RECORD To the Prothonotary: Kindly transmit the record, together with the following information, to the Court for entry of a Decree in Divorce: Grounds for Divorce: Irretrievable breakdown under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code. 2. Date and manner of service of the Complaint: Defendant signed an Acceptance of Service on January 14, 2007.. Proof of service was filed with the Court on January 25, 2007. 3. Date Affidavit of Consent required under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was executed: By Plaintiff: July 5, 2007 and filed with Prothonotary contemporaneously herewith By Defendant: July 5, 2007 and filed with Prothonotary contemporaneously herewith 4. Related claims pending: The terms of the Property Settlement and Separation Agreement dated July 5, 2007 are incorporated, but not merged, into the Decree in Divorce. 5. Date Waiver of Notice under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code was executed: By Plaintiff: July 5, 2007 and filed with Prothonotary contemporaneously herewith By Defendant: July 5, 2007 and filed with Prothonotary contemporaneously herewith SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY 4 ?rat:VaA4 M atas, uire Supre ourt ID # 84919 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-6222 Counsel for Plaintiff Dated: July 5, 2007 ?? 6.,. --?? ? , c?. ? -z-r T ? r ?:,.. r-?-s f? -a ?, r_?' ? ? ? ?? - ?« yy V f ? _.? t:"?% ..? MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. :NO. 07-48 AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK, : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendant : IN DIVORCE PRAECIPE To the Prothonotary: Please attach the following exhibits to the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement dated July 5, 2007 executed by the parties and incorporated to the within divorce matter: Exhibit C 2004 Cumberland County Tax Assessment Exhibit D 1098 Federal Tax Form for 2006 Exhibit E Market Analysis - Authored by Norman J. Dellinger, Realtor/Owner, Central State Realty Exhibit F HOSTS Equity Grants Statement dated March 8, 2007 Respectfully Submitted, SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Marylou Matas, Esquire Supreme Court ID # 84919 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717) 243-6222 Counsel for Plaintiff Dated: _]lq/o ? SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA .. TaxDB Result Details Page 1 of 1 Detailed Results for Parcel 29-05-0429-100. in the 2004 Tax Assessment Database DistrictNo 29 Parcel ID 29-05-0429-100. MapSuffix HouseNo 63 Direction Street MEADE DRIVE Ownerl MCCLINTOCK, MICHAEL RYAN C/O & AGNES E MCCLINTOCK PropType R PropDesc LivArea 2048 CurLandVal 30000 CurImpVal 171180 CurTotVal 201180 CurPrefVal Acreage .37 CIGrnStat TaxEx 1 SaleAmt 205900 SaleMo 04 SaleDa 12 SaleCe 20 SaleYr 05 DeedBkPage 00268-01838 YearBlt 2004 BY-File-Date 12/20/2005 HF_Approval_Status A -?-p p2 GL?ZcC?kr? ?l f 12( a C,?x r DER'S NAME ` ADDREI.SSS overeign ank -617 , Mortgage Servicing, 10-6438-CSS 601 Penn Street Reading, PA 19601 SUBSTITUTE FORM 1098 2006 H NORTGI1riEA000UNT ACCOUNT NLRIBER PAD TO: NEXT DUE: 12/01/06 01/01/07 0826851450 NO. 1545A901 _ PRINCIPAL UNAPPLtED INTERE! PHONE: (800) 232-5200 PAGE: 2 BEGINNING BALANCE 204228.00 0.00 GROSS INTEREST + AMOUNT PAID 2636.25 0.00 P"D 00903-4004446713 RITEP26T SHORTAGE AWED To PRINCFALAGI O. DD PLus PRE NDW.NOT + AMOUNT DISBURSED 0.00 0.00 ALLOWEDPRIOR`rElR6 ENDING BALANCE 201591.75 0.00 LESSRIrEREST _ RECIPIENT'S FEDERAL (DENT. N0. PAYER'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 'The Information In boxes 1, 2 and 3 is su"Ov levy Om"0 Important tax inforna8on and is being LESS INrERPST 23-1237295 189-66-4433 furnished to the internal Revenue Service. If SHORTAGE PAYER'S/SORROWER'S NAME AND ADDRESS you are required to file a return, a negligence LEas PREP D D AI W. Penalty or other sanction may be Imposed on W. Nor AI ALLOWED YOU If the IRS determines that an underpayment A MICHAEL RYAN MCCLINTOCR of tax results because you overstated a mw wTERes., + deduction for this mortgage interest or for "cRTAGEPAD S AGNES CLZNTOCK M these Palms or because you did not report this PREPAY4EM PENALTY + 63 ME ME ADS DR 63 D refund of interest on YOM return. The amount CARLISLE PA 17013 shown may not be fully deducObla by you on your Federal income fax slum. Umitatbrrs 1. based an the cost and value of the secured NET INTEREST PAID Property may apply. In addition, you may only - Pao POI deduct an amount of mortgage Interest to the P extent It was I ncurred by ylw, actually paid by you, and not reimbursed by another person. OFGVE . EREST THIS IS A SUBSTITUTE 1098 STATEMENT. UY13OWN ACC BEGINNING BALANCE DISBURSEMENTS ADJUSTMENTS ENDING BALANCE PAYMENT DI STRIBUTION ESCROW / IMPOUND INTEREST SHORTAGE - ESCROW ACCOUNT BEGINNING BALANCE STATEMENT PRINCIPAL-INTEREST 1233.16 BEGINNING BALANCE 1759.85 ADD INT. SHORTAGE LESS INT. SHORTAGE PREPAID THIS NOTICE CONTAINS ESCROWIIMPOUND 446.67 TOTAL ESCROW RECEIPTS 5375.20 ENDING BALANCE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR REAL ESTATE TAX TAxES PAID ESCROW ACCOUNT AS OPTIONAL INSURANCE 0.00 TOTAL ESCROW OreauRAMENT6 -8888.46 LATE CHARGES REQUIRED BY THE REAL LATE CHARGES DUE BUT UNPAID ESTATE SETTLEMENT AND ANCILLARY 0.00 ESCROW INTEREST 0.00 OPTIONAL INSURANCE PROCEDURES ACT FEES PAID (RESPA) AND IS A RECAP SERVICE TRANSFER 0.00 FEES DUE BUT UNPAID OF YOUR ESCROW ACCOUNT. MISC. 0.00 ENDING BALANCE 1576.59 TOTALPAYMENT 1679.83 TOTAL OF MORTGAGE 20173.12 SEE BELOW FOR PAYMENTS MADE ESCROW DISBUR m• POST T,...S.erN., ' TRANSACTION INTEREST PRINCIPAL PRWCwAL SAtANCE EseRw-DurD E c7 `T 0 LATE GPnoNAL INBUawc ME DUE DATE DATE AMOUNT PAID PAID AFTERTRANaACnaN PAID , E, AFTER TRANS. G]NSTRUCTION W. RATE CHARGE coNamucnGN DNOL9e. ADCT. BAL J? O1/Ol/O 6 1/0 166 3 2 101 9 21 3 2 20401 4 8 45 4 6 221 0 1 D 4 O1/O1/0 O1/0 -16 4 2 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 20401 4 8 -16 2 204 5 9 0 0 C .P 02/01/0 601/3 1683 2 101 8 7 21 4 9 20379 9 9 45 4 249 6 5 D D C A 02/01/0 2/1 -164 2 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 20379 9 9 -164 2 233 1 3 00 0 0C 10 02/OI/0 60Z/ -8 8 OTHER ES O TRANS 203799 9 -8 2 8 224 8 5 00 0 OD P 03/01/06 a 3/0 1683 2 101 7 0 21 86 203583 3 45 4 6 269 8 1 00 0 00 4 03/01/06 3/1 -164 2 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 203583 3 -16 2 2533 9 00 0 00 2 03/01/0 3/1 -330 0 HAZARD I N CE 203583 3 -33 DO 2203 9 OO D 00 P 04/01/06 4/0 1683 2 101 6 2 21 94 203366 9 45 4 2654 5 0 0 0 9 04/01/0 04/1 -703 2 MDNICIPAL T 203366 9 -703 2 1951 3 0 00 D 4 04/01/D 04/1 -164 2 PRIVATE M R GAGS IN 203366 9 -16 2 17' 1 0 0 00 P 5/01/06 5/0 1679 3 101 5 4 21 02 203148 7 44 67 2233 8 0 00 0 4 DS/01/06 5/0 -162 7 PRIVATE R -GAGS IN 203148 7 -162 87 2070 1 0 00 0 A 06/01/06 5/3 1679 3 101 4 21 1 202929 6 44 67 2516 8 0 00 4 06/01/06 06/0 -162 7 E PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 202929 6 -16 87 2354 1 00 P 07/01/06 06/3 1679 3 1.1 2 22 0 202709 6 44 67 2BOO 8 0 00 D 4 07/01/06 07/0 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 202709 6 -162 87 2637 1 0 0 D P 08/01/06 08/0 1679 3 101 6 22 30 202488 6 44 67 3084 8 0 0 0 4 08/01/06 8/1 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGS IN 202488 6 -162 87 2921 1 0 00 001 3 08/01/0 8/2 -2480 2 St?00L T 202488 6 -2460 Z 441 9 0 0 001 P 09/01/06 9/0 1679 3 101 0 5 22 1 202265 5 44 67 888 6 0 0 001 k 09/01/06 09/1 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGE IN 202265 5 -162 7 725 9 D 0 001 1 10/01/0 0/0 1679 3 1009 4 223 52 202042 3 44 67 1171 6 0 00 01 F O/01/06 0/2 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGS IN 202042 3 -162 87 1008 9 0 00 01 ? 1/01/06 0/3 1679 3 1008 3 22 63 201817 0 44 67 1455 6 0 00 Of k 1/O1/D 1/0 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGS IN 201817 0 -162 87 1292 9 0 00 OI ? 12/01/06 12/0 1679 3 1007 22 5 201591 5 44 67 1739 6 0 00 OC F 12/01/05 /0 -162 7 PRIVATE M R GAGS IN 201591 5 -16 7 1576 9 0 00 OOC EXHIBIT ? r F PAID 12161.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12161.67 0.00 0.00 ANCE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ONCE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3183.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 UNAPPLIED FUNDS J UN-2b-206( M: 08 r June 25, 2007 Mr. and Mrs. McClintock 63 Meade Drive Carlisle, PA 17013 ?>-LLIIVGFR I?vG a +? Ce READY Dear Mr_ and Mrs. McClintock 717 975 0697 P.06122 As per the request of Agnes E. McClintock I visited your home in "Wertz Run Heights" at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle PA 17013 on Sunday June 24, 2007 for the purpose of ascertaining a fair market opinion of value for the above residence. Your home was constructed by Snider & Miller Builders in 2005 with the following amenities: • Approx. 2000 s.f. 2-story colonial style "Shiloh II" home with brick and vinyl exterior. f • 4 bedrooms, 2.5 baths • Full concrete basement • 2"x6" exterior walls t • Dining room, Living room, Laundry room • Full, covered front porch I • 2-car garage w/openers and double wide asphalt driveway • Ceramic tile flooring in entry, hallway, Powder Room and Kitchen • LR, DR, and all Bedrooms are carpeted. • Full baths and Laundry have vinyl flooring Gas forced hot air heat and Central Air Conditioning • Public water and sewer, Comcast Cable, Embarq telephone, 1JG1 Natural Gas, PP&L electric and York Waste Disposal- • Cumberland County, North.Middleton Township, Carlisle School System- - The opinion of value I place on this home, when comparing it to other existing home tor- sale on the market at present in "Wertz Run Heights" reighk:orhood would be approximately $279,000.00. 'This analysis has not been performed in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice which require value to art as unbiascd, disinterested third parties with impartiality, objectivity and independence without accornmodatlon of pcrsonai interest. It is not to be const?-ued as an appraisal and may not f e used as such for any purpose. Thank you for this opportunity, Norman 1. Dellinger; Realtor/Owner Central State Realty r:' IG Rilr<<=r ?Iglnvc7v ? C??tl.?l? INS D I HNF HHDCL I FF i 221 NE Park Plaza Dr„ Suite 230 Vancouver, WA 98684-3401 800-833.4678 www.hosts.com March S, 2007 Ms. Marylou Matas Attorney at Law Saidis, Flower & Lindsay 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Dear Ms. Matas: Re: Ryan McClintock Units in HOSTS As of October 18, 2006, Michael Ryan McClintock had. 150 Units in HOSTS Educational Research LLC. These Units were granted pursuant to the Company's Unit Incentive Plan and are subject to a purchase option by the Company in the event of Ryan's termination from HOSTS up to five years from their issuance. The date of issue was March 31, 2002. The current value of the award ofthese Units is $0. Please let me know if you need any further information concerning this matter. Sincerely, HOSTS Educational Research LLC hn S . Tall Secretary . d Special Counsel Cc: R. McClintock ?? ?' o r- " -n ?' ???' ?_ ? ?,-,,; , ?..?- -n ` f -r` t"y? ? % "- " . ? ?. "YC? ?.? :'- tV ?? ` ? ?r C - ?r R In the Court of Common Pleas of CUMBERLAND County, Pennsylvania DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION AGNES E. SCHUTTE-MCCLINTOCK ) Docket Number 07-48 CIVIL Plaintiff ) vs. ) PACSES Case Number 916109264 MICHAEL R. MCCLINTOCK ) Defendant ) Other State ID Number ORDER AND NOW, to wit on this 9TH DAY OF JULY, 2007 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 0 Complaint for Support or 0 Petition to Modify or ® Other ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE filed on JUNE 26, 2007 in the above captioned matter is dismissed without prejudice due to: THE PARTIES ENTERING INTO A MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE REQUEST FOR APL BEING WITHDRAWN. THE CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR JULY 30, 2007 IS CANCELED. XC: PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT DIANE G. RADCLIFF, ESQ. MARYLOU MATAS, ESQ. 0 The Complaint or Petition may be reinstated upon written application of the plaintiff petitioner. BY THE COURT: . vyrpi?rlx ul-zx,7. , C L. JUDGE DRO: R.J. SHADDAY Service Type M Form OE-506 Worker ID 21205 V I/ I 'WA DIANE G. RADCLIFF, ESQUIRE 3448 Trindle Road, Camp Hill, PA 17011 Phone: 717-737-0100 Fax: 717-975-0697 E-mail: dianeradcliff@comcast.net July 6, 2007 Cumberland County Domestic Relations 13 North Hanover Street P.O. Box 320 Carlisle, PA 17013 Attention RJ Shadday JUIL ? 9 2007 Re: Michael Ryan McClintock vs. Agnes Elizabeth McClintock Cumberland County Divorce No. 07-48; Pacses No. 916109264 Dear Ms. Shadday: I am pleased to advise you that on July 5, 2007 the parties entered into a Marital Agreement whereby they resolved all issues,between them. As part of that agreement Mr. McClintock will be paying Mrs. McClintock alimony, the payment of which is to be paid directly to Mrs. McClintock unless there is a future default on payment. Based upon the terms of the parties' agreement, the original of which will be filed in the above referenced divorce file, there is no need to have the support/APL conference scheduled in this case for July 30"', 2007 at 10:3C am. I am therefore requesting that you take whatever action is necessary to suspend further action on these files and to cancel the July 30th conference. Should you require anything further from me to :effectuate this request, do not hesitate to contact me. Very truly yours DIAK-6-. RA? LIFF, ESQUIRE Transmitted to Addressee by mail cc: Marylou Matas, Esquire by mail Agnes Elizabeth McClintock by mail File 52-07-D - Co IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY STATE OF PENNA. MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK VERSUS AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK No. 07-48 DECREE IN DIVORCE AND NOW, 740 IT IS ORDERED AND MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK DECREED THAT AND , PLAINTIFF, AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK , DEFENDANT, ARE DIVORCED FROM THE BONDS OF MATRIMONY. THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OF THE FOLLOWING CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED OF RECD N THIS ACTION FOR WHICH A FINAL ORDER HAS NOT YET BEEN ENTERED; k0v The terms of the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement dated July 5, 2007 are incorporated, but not merged, into this Decree in Di PROTHONOTARY YV IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff Vs File No. c: 7- 4 IN DIVORCE De dart NOTICE TO RESUME PRIOR SURNAME Notice is hereby given that the Plaintiff / defendant in the above matter, [select one by marking "x"] prior to the entry of a Final Decree in Divorce, or x after the entry of a Final Decree in Divorce dated 74 o 7 hereby elects to resume the prior surname of CYC4 , and gives this written notice avowing his / her intention pursuant to the provisions of 54 P.S. 704. Date: / 7 ),)/c Signature Z4? 7 - Si ture of name being resumed COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ) COUNTY OF X,,A, ,,/ ) On the 13 day of ? 200 before me, the Prothonotary or the notary public, personally appeared the above affiant known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within document and acknowledged that he / she executed the foregoing for the purpose therein contained. In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand hereunto set my hand and official seal. PROTWI?IOT? NOTARY PUBUC CARLISLE CumeERLAw can COURTHOUSE MY COMMISSION ES JAMMY4.201 0 Pr thonotary or Notary Public n ? U? W ? ?v W ?.i O ., _z i• Vii.. • AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/Wa AGNES E. McCLINTOCK Plaintiff/Petitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, Defendant/Respondent : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 2007-48 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE Prior Judicial Assignment: The Honorable Edgar B. Bayley, Judge - See paragraph 20 Concurrence/Nonconcurrence: No concurrence - See paragraph 21 PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND NOW, comes Plaintiff, Agnes Schutte, pro se, who files the instant Petition for Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement and in support thereof, avers as follows: 1. Petitioner is Agnes E. Schutte, (hereinafter "Wife"), Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, who currently resides at 7232 N New York Ave, Apt 6, Portland, Oregon 97203. 2. Respondent is Michael Ryan McClintock (hereinafter "Husband"), who currently resides at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17013. 3. On January 2 2007, Husband filed a Complaint in Divorce under Section 3301(c) of the Divorce Code. 4. A Marital Settlement Agreement dated July 5, 2007 (hereinafter the "MSA"), was filed with the Court on July 6, 2007. A true and correct copy of the MSA is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and it is incorporated by reference herein. 5. The parties were divorced by Decree entered July 10, 2007, which incorporated, but did not merge the terms of the MSA. 6. Paragraph Sixteen (16) of the MSA, provides that Husband shall pay to Wife the sum of $750.00 per month for twelve (12) months beginning August 1, 2007. 1 ? 1 7. Husband made the monthly alimony payments from August 2007, through December 2007. 8. Husband has breached the MSA by failing and/or refusing to make the payments required by the MSA since December, 2007. 9. Husband owes Wife alimony in the sum of $5,250.00. 10. In January 2008, Husband's attorney notified Wife through her attorney that Husband had lost his job and asked Wife to forego payments until such time as he found other employment. 11. Husband has since obtained employment, yet he has continued to violate the terms of the MSA by failing to make any additional payments to Wife. 12. Wife does not believe that any payments are forthcoming. 13. Husband's conduct is in direct violation of the terms of the parties' MSA and as a result he is in contempt of the parties' Divorce Decree dated July 10, 2007. 14. Husband has shown a complete disregard for the authority of this Court by continuing to violate the terms of the MSA incorporated into the Divorce Decree for approximately twelve (12) months. 15. Due to Husband's refusal to pay alimony as ordered by this Court, Wife will incur legal fees to enforce the parties' MSA. 16. Paragraph 21 of the MSA specifically provides that if either party fails to comply with any provision of the MSA that the breaching party shall be responsible for payment of legal fees and costs incurred by the other in enforcing their rights through formal court action, negotiations, or other remedies. ' r • 17. Wife has prepared this Petition pro se, but anticipates hiring legal counsel to represent her in this matter. 18. Wife anticipates incurring approximately $750.00 in attorney's fees to enforce the terms of the parties' MSA. 19. Section 3502 (e) of the Divorce Code provides, in pertinent part: If, at any time the party has failed to comply with an order of equitable distribution, as provided for in this chapter or with the terms of an agreement as entered into between the parties after hearing, the court may, in addition to any other remedy available under this part, in order to effect compliance with its order: (1) Enter judgment; .. . (2) Award interest on unpaid installments;... (6) Issue attachment proceedings, directed to the sheriff or other proper officer of the county, directing that the person named as having failed to comply with the court order be brought before the court, at such time as that court may direct. If the court finds, after hearing, that the person willfully failed to comply with the court order, it may deem the person in civil contempt of court and, in its discretion, make an appropriate order, including, but not limited to, commitment of the person to the county jail for a period not to exceed six months; (7) Award counsel fees and costs (9) Find the party in contempt. 20. The Honorable Judge Edgar B. Bayley executed the Divorce Decree on July 10, 2007. 21. Wife sought the concurrence of Marylou Matas, Husband's counsel of record. Counsel does not concur with the Petition and indicated that she has had no contact with said client of late. 22. Wife now seeks to have this Honorable Court find Husband in contempt and enter an Order mandating that Husband pay her the sum of $5,250.00 in overdue alimony; Order that the sum be collected and enforced through the Domestic Relations Section as per the terms of the parties' MSA; award attorney's fees of $750.00; award to Wife her costs and expenses; award interest of six percent (6%) annually since Husband's default in January, 2008; and enter a judgment for all against Husband. WHEREFORE, Wife respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an Order finding Husband in contempt and directing as follows: A. Husband shall pay to Wife within ten (10) days of the entry of the Order the amount of $5,250.00 plus interest of six percent (6%) percent annually from January 1, 2008; B. Husband shall pay the sum of $750.00 as reasonable counsel fees as well as any expenses incurred by Wife for the filing, preparation, and disposition of the instant Petition; C. That a judgment be entered against Husband for the sum of $5,250.00 which would become a lien against Husband's real estate should he not pay the sum as ordered by this Honorable Court; D. That an Order be entered to be collected and enforced by the Domestic Relations Section of this Honorable Court, if necessary; and E. That any other relief the Court deems appropriate be ordered. Dated: is l8 0 Respectfully submitted, Agnes ,K Schulte, Plaintiff/Petitioner, Pro Se 7232 N New York Ave, Apt 6 Portland, Oregon 9720 AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK Plaintiff/Petitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, Defendant/Respondent : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2007-48 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this date, a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Petition for Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement was served upon the interested parties US first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Marylou Matas, Esquire Saidis, Flower and Lindsay 26 West High Street Carlisle PA 17013 The Honorable Judge Edgar Bayley Cumberland County Courthouse One Courthouse Square Carlisle, PA 17013 Dated: /2 Ttle to r - Agnes E. chutte, Plaintiff/Petitioner, Pro Se 7232 N New York Ave, Apt 6 Portland, Oregon 9720 4/6 0'7 • k4 Y Ct 4- '(CA- SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT, made this S?day of 2007, by and between MICHAEL RYAN McCLINTOCK, of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, party of the first part, hereinafter referred to as "Husband", AND AGNES ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK, of Galway, Ireland, party of the second part, hereinafter referred to as "Wife", WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, the parties hereto are Husband and Wife, having been married on May 23, 2002, Multnomah County, Oregon, and WHEREAS, diverse unhappy differences, disputes and difficulties have arisen between the parties and it is the intention of Wife and Husband to live separate and apart, and the parties hereto are desirous of settling their respective financial rights and obligations as between each other, and to finally and for all time to settle and determine their respective property and other rights growing out of their marital relations; and wish to enter into this Separation and Property Settlement Agreement; and WHEREAS, both and each of the parties hereto have had the opportunity to be advised of their legal rights and the implications of this Agreement and the legal consequences which may and will ensue from the execution hereof; and WHEREAS, Wife acknowledges that she has had the opportunity to be thoroughly conversant with and know accurately the size, degree, and extent of the estate and income of Husband and Husband acknowledges that he has had the opportunity to be thoroughly conversant with and know accurately the size, degree, and extent of the estate and income of Wife; NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration and of the mutual promises, covenants and undertakings hereinafter set forth which are hereby acknowledged by each of the parties hereto, --Page 1 of 16- Wife and Husband, each intending to be legally bound hereby, covenants and agree as follows: 1. Advice of Counsel: The parties acknowledge that they have received independent legal advice from counsel of their own selection or that they have elected not to seek independent legal advice and that they fully understand the facts and have been fully informed as to their legal rights and obligations and they acknowledge and accept that this Agreement is, in the circumstance, fair and equitable and that it is being entered into freely and voluntarily after having received such advice and with such knowledge that execution of this Agreement is not the result of any duress or undue influence and that it is not the result of any collusion or improper or illegal agreement or agreements and the parties hereto state that he/she, in the procurement and execution of this Agreement, has not been subject to any fraud, concealment, overreaching, imposition, coercion, or other unfair dealing on the part of the other, or on the part of the other's counsel. The provisions of this Agreement and their legal effect have been fully explained to Husband by his counsel, Marylou Matas, Esquire. The provisions of this Agreement and their legal effect have been fully explained to Wife by her counsel, Diane Radcliffe, Esquire. 2. Warranty gfDisclosure: The parties warrant and represent that they have made a full disclosure of all assets and their valuation prior to the execution of this Agreement. This disclosure was in the form of an informal exchange of information by the parties but also reflects the fact that the parties had personal knowledge before their separation of their various assets and debts all of which form the basis of this Agreement between the parties. 3. Personal Rights and Separation: Wife and Husband may and shall, at all times hereafter, live separate and part. They shall be free from any control, restraint, interference or authority, direct or indirect, by the other in all respects as if they were unmarried. They may reside at such place or places as they may select. Each may, for his or her separate use or benefit, conduct, carry on and engage in any business, occupation, profession or employment which to him or her may seem advisable. Wife and Husband shall not molest, harass, disturb, nor malign each other or the respective families of each other nor compel or attempt to compel the other to cohabit nor dwell by any means or in any manner whatsoever with him or her. --Page 2 of 16- 4. Dare of Execution: The "date of execution" or "execution date" of this Agreement shall be defined as the date upon which it is executed by the parties if they have each executed the Agreement on the same date. Otherwise, the "date of execution" or "execution date" of this Agreement shall be defined as the date of execution by the party last executing this Agreement. 5. Tangible Personal Property: Husband and Wife do hereby aclmowledge that they have previously divided their tangible personal property, with Wife retaining the items listed on Exhibit A attached hereto and Husband retaining the items listed on Exhibit B hereto. Husband also shall retain possession and ownership of the family dogs, which are presently in his possession and for which he has maintained possession, care and maintenance of since the date of separation. Wife agrees that all of the property, including the family dogs, in the possession of Husband shall be the sole and separate property of Husband and Husband agrees that all of the property in the possession of Wife shall be the sole and separate property of Wife. The parties do hereby specifically waive, release, renounce and forever abandon whatever claims, if any, he or she may have with respect to the above items which shall become the sole and separate property of the other, with full power to him or her to dispose of the same as fully and . ? C t (X s t?vw e VzC to 4. t ff r e V ?aeA ( ac 4 -el 0 YyJ u u effectually, as though he or she were unmarried. and Cmre Qr -{&P dPoBr, Lha(( y i e /t o f I e Oar ? s? u n r. 10P -FN y atQ gi-i ep cAAy 6. der-Acguirec,f?Personal Prq?erty: Each of the parties shall hereafter own and ; far?y enjoy, independently of any claim or right of the other, all items of personal property, tangible or S intangible, hereafter acquired by him or her, with full power, in him or her to dispose of the same as fully and effectively, in all respects and for all purposes, as though he or she were unmarried. 7. Motor Vehicles: With respect to the motor vehicles owned by one or both parties, the parties agree as follows: a.) Wife shall retain sole and exclusive possession of the parties' 2003 Honda Civic. This vehicle is encumbered with a loan with an approximate monthly payment of $318. From the date of execution of this Agreement forward, Wife shall be solely and exclusively responsible for the payment of this loan. Wife shall make all --Page 3 of 16-- such payments in a timely fashion as they are due. Wife shall hold Husband harmless from and against all claims and action for collection activity whatsoever related to this loan/lease. This vehicle is titled in Wife's name individually and is owned pursuant to a lease agreement. Wife, or an authorized person on her behalf, shall remove the vehicle from the former marital residence at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, PA, within fifteen (15) days of execution of this Agreement. Wife bears all responsibility for liability for this vehicle from the date of separation forward and understands her responsibilities regarding insurance and liability. b.) Since the date of separation, Husband has purchased a vehicle for his own personal use. Wife shall make no claim to access to or use of that vehicle and waives any interest she has or may have in that vehicle. 8. Real Estate: During their marriage, the parties owned real estate located at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. This property was purchased in 2005 for $205,900 and has an approximate date of separation mortgage balance of $201,818. A copy of the 2004 Cumberland County tax assessment is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "C" which reflects the purchase price and approximate date of separation value. A copy of the 1098 federal tax form for 2006 is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "D" which reflects the approximate date of separation balance for the mortgage. A market analysis was performed on or about June 24, 2007, at which time it was determined that the property may sell for $279,000. A copy of the market analysis is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit T." This property is encumbered with a first mortgage due and owing to Sovereign Bank requiring the monthly payment of $1,708. From the date of separation forward, Husband shall maintain sole and exclusive responsibility for the repayment of the aforesaid mortgage and indemnify Wife and hold Wife harmless from any demand for payment or collection activity whatsoever. Husband shall retain excl s, e jguossession and ownershi of the re e hi?E p p pop rty. Wife s all vacate the premises within sways --Page 4 of 16-- of execution of this Agreement. The parties agree that Husband shall make a payment to Wife for her interest in the S ?M,It.W? property. Wife shall receive ° $43, 450, at the time that Husband refinances the mortgage or obtains a home equity loan. Husband shall make that payment to Wife within 60 days of execution of this Agreement. If Husband does not qualify for financing, then Husband shall list the home for sale with a realtor of his choosing and Wife shall receive 55% of the proceeds received after payment of all settlement costs. Husband shall be responsible for all aspects of the sale and Wife shall cooperate with the sale, signing all documents necessary for listing and settlement. Wife shall execute a deed transferring her interest in the property to Husband's name individually upon execution of this Agreement. This deed shall be held by + S allomeyin escrow and released to Husband or Husband's mortgage company to be filed contemporaneously with the filing of Husband's refinanced mortgage documents. Wife's name shall not be removed from the deed so long as her name is listed as a responsible party on the mortgage documents, but shall be promptly removed from the deed upon the refinancing of mortgage. For so long as Wife's name is listed on the mortgage as a responsible party, Husband and Wife shall be listed on the deed as joint owners with the right of survivorship. 9. Bank Accounts: For the mutual promises and covenants contained in this Agreement, Husband and Wife hereby waive all right, title, claim or interest they may have by equitable distribution in their respective bank accounts, checking or savings, if any, and each party waives against the other any duty of accounting for disposition of any jointly held funds. More specifically, Wife waives, relinquishes or transfers any right, title or interest she may have to the checking account or funds held therein in the parties' joint names with Orrstown Bank. Husband shall forward any documents necessary to close or otherwise remove Wife's name from this account to Wife's attorney within fifteen (15) days of execution of this Agreement. Wife shall promptly sign all necessary documents and return them to Husband or Husband's attorney. If it is discovered that other joint accounts exist, the parties shall divide --Page 5 of 16-- equally any funds in those accounts and promptly close those accounts within fifteen (15) days of execution of this Agreement. The parties waive and transfer any interest they have in the other's individual accounts, checking or savings that may have been established during the marriage. 10. Pension Interests: Husband hereby waives, relinquishes and transfers any and all of his right, title and interest he has or may have in Wife's pension or retirement account, as well as other accounts that Wife may have in her individual name or may have secured through her present or prior employment. Wife hereby waives, relinquishes and transfers any and all of his right, title and interest he has or may have in Husband's pension or retirement account, as well as other accounts that Husband may have in his individual name -or may have secured through his present or prior employment. Husband and Wife maintain that neither of them have established, maintained or have an interest in any pension or retirement account through present or prior employment that may have been earned during the marriage. Each party is satisfied with the disclosure of the other as it relates to all interests of this paragraph and the terms of this document. 11. Investment Accounts: Each party waives any and all right, title or interest they have or may have in the other's investment accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual fiords and the like, that are not previously identified as bank accounts or pension interests. Specifically, Wife waives any interest she has or may have in Husband's HOSTS equity grants he earned through his employment with HOSTS Learning. The approximate date of separation value of those grants is $0, as shown on the attached statement attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "F." Husband and Wife maintain that neither of them have established, maintained or have an interest in any other investment account during the marriage or that may have earned interest during the marriage. Each party is satisfied with the disclosure of the other as it relates to all interests of this paragraph and the terms of this document. --Page 6 of 16- 12. Marital Debt• a. Post Separation Debt: Each party hereby confirms that they have not incurred any additional debt since their separation that has, in any way, obligated the other patty. In the event that either party contracted or incurred any debt since the date of separation on October 18, 2006, the patty who incurred said debt shall be responsible for the payment thereof regardless of the name in which the debt may have been incurred. Husband shall be responsible for the credit card debt incurred by him on the Orchard Bank Master Card since the date of separation. Husband shall make payment for that account and indemnify Wife and hold Wife harmless from any demand for payment or collection activity whatsoever. Husband shall remove Wife's name from said credit card as quickly as possible. b.. Future Debt From the date of this Agreement forward, neither party shall contract or incur any debt or liability for which the other party or his or her property or estate i might be responsible and shall indemnify and save the other party harmless from any and all claims or demands made against him or her by reason of debts or obligations incurred by the other party. C. Marital Debt: Husband and Wife do not believe there exists any obligations in their names jointly, other than the Orchard Bank Master Card listed above. Husband agrees to maintain responsibility for any debts that are listed in his name individually. Wife agrees to maintain responsibility for any debts that are listed in her name individually. 13. Warranty as to Post Sgparation and Future ObliF? ations: Husband and Wife each covenant, warrant, represent and agree that each will now and at all times hereafter hold harmless and keep the other party indemnified from all debts, charges and liabilities incurred by the Husband or Wife, respectively. 14. Li, fe Insurance: Each party agrees that the other party shall have sole ownership and possession of any life insurance policies owned by the other. Each party shall have the right to borrow against, cash in policies, change beneficiaries, and exercise any other incidents of ownership of the respective policies free of any right or claim by the other party. Each party --Page 7 of 16- C) Yak r .riffs s ?<<'! b- ,mac c?c 1v y ?N, - c , eT ;1? ly Fr; ;. 14 - • , pay11""A " cf (acre 4vxr\ 10 dctYS occLc/S JA VJ1iCh 4 VV4YJ4 4k w?Y fr?c?t ?S Sfi??l l lr?e fro& 41 a 9 N 'PdiW, S (Cd?WS (XACk (4U_k ( c4j,I ' S V_ a? S 0 k (1 shall sign any documents necessary to waive, relinquish or transfer any rights in such policies to the respective party who presently owns such policies. 15. Tax Re nd: The parties filed a joint return for the 2006 tax year and received a refund in the amount of $3034. After deducting the filing costs, there remains $2994. This refund shall be divided so that Wife receives t ! 4 9 7. , s C1111 _44 da, 'k- 6 IV FS WJO 16. o al rt Alimon Alimony P ndente L'te and Sbousal Maintenance: a.) Husband shall pay to Wife, as alimony, the sum of $756 nun beginning the for -am consecutive months, at which time all payments shall cease if they have not previously terminated as provided herein. These payments are not modifiable. Husband's obligation to pay under this paragraph will end and h VII be released from the obligation of d a 1 #" Pte, MGM 6 ,,,,1 r&LI 2119 JAr- O\ payment upon the death?or remarriage of Wife, or upon the 4;iA payment $756 rv?w 6kl u`cte'vet occurs first. Wife's estate, successors or heirs shall have 1 mRtyl no right to payments scheduled to be made subsequent to the Wife's death o? itbc?r?? CUoa % b.) Husband hereby waives any right or claims of any nature whatsoever relative to alimony, alimony pendente lite, spousal support, spousal maintenance, counsel fees and expenses against Wife. 17, Insurance: From the date of separation forward, Husband and Wife shall each be responsible for the cost of any unreimbursed medical expenses for all medical, dental, eye, and/or any other health 'related costs, to include and not be limited to psychological and counseling expenses, Husband maintains coverage for Wife's health insurance and shall maintain that coverage until the time a final decree in divorce is entered. 18. Mutual Releases: Husband and Wife each do hereby mutually remise, release, quitclaim, and forever discharge the other and the estate of such other, for all times to come and for all purposes whatsoever, of and from any and all right, title and interest, or claims in or against the property (including income and gain from property hereafter accruing) of the other or --Page 8 of 16-- against the estate of such other, of whatever nature and wheresoever situate, which he or she now has or at any time hereafter may have against such other, the estate of such other, or any part thereof, whether arising out of any former acts, contracts, engagements, or liabilities of such other as by way of dower or curtesy, or claims in the nature of dower or curtesy or widow's or widower's rights, family exemption, or similar allowance, or under the intestate laws, or the right to take against the spouse's Will; or the right to treat a lifetime conveyance by the other as testamentary, or all other rights of a surviving spouse to participate in a deceased spouse's estate, whether arising under the laws of (a) Pennsylvania, (b) any state, commonwealth or territory of the United States, or (c) any other country, or any rights which either party may have or at any time hereafter have for past, present, or future support or maintenance, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, costs or expenses, whether arising as a result of the marital relation or otherwise, except and only except, all rights and agreements and obligations of whatsoever nature arising or which may arise under this Agreement or for the breach of any thereof. It is the intention of Husband and Wife to give to each other by execution of this Agreement a full, complete, and general release with respect to any and all property of any kind or nature, real or personal, or mixed, which the other now owns or may hereafter acquire, except and only except, all rights and agreements and obligations of whatsoever nature arising or which may arise under this Agreement or for the breach of any thereof. 19. Divorc . At the time of execution of this Agreement, Husband has commenced an action for divorce against Wife. It is understood and agreed that any Decree in Divorce which may be issued between the parties shall incorporate this Agreement. Further: a.) This Agreement represents a complete, and final agreement as to their respective property rights which arose from the marital relation and therefore mutually waive any and all rights they may have under §3502, et. seq. of the Pennsylvania Code, Act. No 1980-26. b.) This Agreement may be offered in evidence in the action for divorce and may be incorporated by reference in the decree to be granted therein. Notwithstanding --Page 9 of 16-- such incorporation, this Agreement shall not be merged in the decree, but shall survive the same and shall be binding and conclusive to the rights of all parties. 20. Leal Fees: In the review and preparation of this Agreement each party shall bear his or her own legal fees. 21. Non-Compliance: If either party fails to comply any provision of this Agreement, the other party shall have the right, at his or her election, either to sue for damages for such failure, in which event the non-complying party shall be responsible for payment of legal fees and costs incurred by the other in enforcing their rights hereunder, whether through formal court action or negotiations, or to seek such other remedies or relief as may be available to him or her. 22. Egguitable Distribution: It is specifically understood and agreed that this Agreement constitutes an equitable distribution of property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by Husband and Wife or either of them during the marriage as contemplated by The Act of April 2, 1980 (P.L. No. 63, No. 26) known as "The Divorce Code," 23 P.S. 101 et seq. of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and as amended. ect of Agreement: It is specifically understood and agreed by and 23. Summaroff between the parties hereto, and each party accepts the provisions herein made in lieu of and in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all of the said parties' rights against the other for any past, present and future clams on account of support, maintenance, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, costs and expenses, equitable distribution of marital property and any other claims of each party, including all claims raised by them in the divorce action pending between the parties. 24. Tax Consequences: By this Agreement, the parties have intended to effectuate and by this Agreement have equitably divided their marital property. The parties have determined that such equitable division conforms to a right and just standard with regard to the rights of each party. The division of existing marital property is not, except as may be otherwise expressly provided herein, intended by the parties to institute or constitute in any way a sale or exchange of assets and the division is being effected without the introduction of outside funds or other --Page 10 of 16-- property not constituting a part of the marital estate. 25. Mutual Cooperation/Duty to Effectuate Agreement: Each party shall at any time and from time to time hereafter, take any and all steps and execute, acknowledge and deliver to the other party any and all further instruments and/or documents that the other party may reasonably require for the purpose of giving full force and effect to the provisions of this Agreement. 26. Reconciliation: The parties shall only effectuate a legal reconciliation which supersedes this Agreement by their signed agreement containing a specific statement that they have reconciled and that this Agreement shall be null and void; otherwise, this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. Further, the parties may attempt a reconciliation, which action, if not consummated by the aforesaid agreement, shall not affect in any way the legal affect of this agreement or cause any new marital rights or obligations to accrue. 27. Severabilitv: If any term, condition, clause or provision of this Agreement shall be determined or declared to be void or invalid in law or otherwise, then only that term condition, clause or provision shall be stricken from this Agreement and in all other respects this Agreement shall be valid and continue in full force, effect, and operation. Likewise, the failure of any party to meet her or his obligations under any one or more of the paragraphs herein, with exception of the satisfaction of the conditions precedent, shall in no way void or alter the remaining obligations of the parties. 28. No Waiver of Default: This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect unless and until terminated under and pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. The failure of either party to insist upon strict performance of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall in no way affect the right of such party hereafter to enforce the same, nor shall the waiver of any breach of any provision hereof be construed as a waiver of any subsequent default of the same or similar nature, nor shall it be construed as a waiver of strict performance of any other obligations herein. 29. Integration: This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding of the parties and supersedes any and all prior agreements and negotiations between them. There are no --Page 11 of 16- representations or warranties other than those expressly set forth herein. This Agreement shall survive integration by any court into any judgment for divorce and shall continue to have independent legal significance as a written contract separate from such judgment for divorce and may be enforced as an independent contract. 30. E ect of Divorce Decree: The parties agree that unless otherwise specifically provided herein, this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect after such time as a final Decree in Divorce may be entered with respect to the parties. 31. Waiver or Mg ication to be in Writing: No modification or waiver of any of the terms hereof shall be valid unless in writing and signed by both parties and no waiver of any breach hereof or default hereunder shall be deemed a waiver of any subsequent default of the same or similar nature. 32. a Lions: The captions of this Agreement are inserted only as a matter of convenience and for reference and in no way define, limit or describe the scope and intent of this Agreement, nor in any way effect this Agreement. 33. Agreement Binding on Heirs: This Agreement shall be binding and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executor, administrators, successors and assigns. 34. Governing Law: This Agreements shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. -Page 12 of 16-- IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set forth their hands and seals to two counterparts of this Agreement, each of which shall constitute an original, the day and year first above written. WITNESSES: Dat R MCCLINTOCK k_/0_) D e A 4S ELIZABETH McCLINTOCK --Page 13 of 16-- c r9? :13 r-; C D " 4 t.3 n AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK Plaintiff/Petitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, Defendant/Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2007-48 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AND NOW, this day of aaan-, 200-9 , a rule is hereby issued upon the Defendant, Michael Ryan McClintock to show cause, if any, why the Plaintiff's Petition for Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement should not be granted. Rule returnable -`! days from service thereof. I'll DISTRIBUTION: ?/Marylou Matas, Esquire, Saidis, Flower and Lindsay, 26 West High St, Carlisle PA 17013 Attorney for Defendant/Respondent Agnes E. Schutte, Pro Se, 7232 N New York Ave, Apt 6, Portland, Oregon 97203 l?./a3 fds Rv rruR r'nr TD'r. LJ L? ? .J N C . _ l AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK, Plaintiff/Petitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, Defendant/Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2007-48 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE NOW, comes Defendant, Michael R. McClintock, and answers the Petition for Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. By way of further response, the copy of the Petition that was served on Defendant through counsel did not have an Exhibit A attached. 5. Admitted. 6. Admitted. 7. Admitted. FLOWER ? LINDSAY ArBIMEMO-MW 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 8. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Husband has not made payments required by the MSA since December, 2007. It is denied that Husband has breached the MSA by willfully failing and/or neglectfully refusing to make said payments. Specific proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further response, the parties agreed in January 2008 that Husband would forego additional payments on a temporary basis, after his job loss. In December 2007, Husband's employer terminated his position, where he previously earned approximately $100,000 per year. 9. Admitted. 10. Admitted. 11. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Husband has obtained employment. It is denied that Husband has willfully violated the terms of the MSA by failing to make additional payments to Wife. By way of further response, Husband does not have the present ability to meet the alimony obligation of the MSA. Husband's current employment does not afford him the income to satisfy his total monthly alimony obligation to Wife at this time, however, Husband is not intentionally or willfully neglecting his obligations pursuant to the terms of the MSA. Husband intends to make payments to Wife when his income is sufficient to do so. 12. Respondent is without information or knowledge to form a belief regarding the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, paragraph 12 is denied. Specific proof thereof is demanded at trial. 13. Denied. It is denied that Husband's conduct is in direct violation of the terms of the parties' MSA and as a result he is in contempt of the parties' Divorce Decree dated July 10, 2007. Specific proof thereof is demanded at trial. 14. Denied. It is denied that Husband has shown a complete disregard for the authority of this Court by continuing to violate the terms of the MSA incorporated into the Divorce Decree for approximately twelve (12) months. Specific proof thereof is demanded at trial. SAMIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 15. Denied. It is denied that due to Husband's refusal to pay alimony as ordered by this Court, Wife will incur legal fees to enforce the parties' MSA. Specific proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further response, Wife has filed this Petition pro se and has not incurred any legal fees or costs. 16. Admitted. 17. Respondent is without information or knowledge to form a belief regarding the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, paragraph 17 is denied. Specific proof thereof is demanded at trial. 18. Respondent is without information or knowledge to form a belief regarding the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, paragraph 18 is denied. Specific proof thereof is demanded at trial. 19. Admitted. 20. Admitted. 21. Denied. It is specifically denied that Wife sought the concurrence of Marylou Matas, Esquire, counsel of record for Husband prior to the filing of this Petition. It is specifically denied that Counsel indicated to Wife that she had no contact with Husband. Specific proof thereof is demanded at trial. By way of further response, Counsel for Husband has had no contact with Wife prior to the filing of this Petition; Wife has not abided by the local rule which requires that she seek concurrence of the opposing party prior to the filing of the pleading. Furthermore, Husband believes and therefore avers that if Wife had made any such contact with Counsel or with Husband, negotiations could have taken place and a compromise may have been reached prior to any such filing. 22. Admitted. WHEREFORE, Husband respectfully requests this Honorable Court to dismiss Wife's SAIDIS, FLOWER & LIlVDS" 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA Petition for Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement. Respectfully Submitted, r Ma as, sq ire/ 26W t M 'n Street Carlisle, 17013 (717) 243-6222 Attorney for Defendant/Respondent VERIFICATION I verify that the statements made in the foregoing document are true and correct. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. §4904, relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities. 1 0 $ 0 9 Date AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK, Plaintiff/Petitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, Defendant/Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2007-48 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On the day of January, 2009, 1, Marylou Matas, Esquire, of the law firm of SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY, hereby certify that on this date a copy of the attached document was served on the following individual, via certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Agnes Schutte 7232 N. New York Ave., Apt. 6 Portland, Oregon 97203 SAIDIS, FLOWER & LINDSAY Ma Matas,'Es?uM Supreme-court ID No. 84919 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 717-243-6222 Attorney for Defendant SAIDIS, FWNVER SL LINDSAY alulaww-M 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA .ss Y AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK, PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 07-48 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this --" day of January, 2009, a hearing on the petition to enforce a marital settlement agreement shall be conducted in Courtroom Number 2, Cumberland County Courthouse, Carlisle, Pennsylvania on Monday, February 9, 2009, at 1:30 p.m. ,A`g'nes E. Schutte, Pro se 7232 N. New York Avenue Apt 6 I OR 97203 arylou Matas, Esquire For Defendant :sal y Edgar B. Bayley, J. l if CV AGNES E. SCHUTTE Vk/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK PlaintifVPetitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, Defendant/Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY,PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2007-48 CIVIL : CIVIL ACTION -LAW : IN DIVORCE Prior Judicial Assignment: The Honorable Edgar B. Bayley, Judge Concurrence: No - See Paragraph 5, below. PETITION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE AND NOW, this 6th day of February, 2009, comes Petitioner Agnes Schulte, by and through her counsel, Linda A. Clotfelter, Esquire, who respectfully files this Petition for Leave of Court to Appear at Hearing by Telephone, and in support thereof states as follows: 1. Petitioner is Agnes E. Shutte, (hereinafter "Petitioner"), an adult individual who resides at 7232 N New York Avenue, Apt. #6, Portland, Multnomah County, Oregon 97203. 2. Respondent is Michael R. McClintock, (hereinafter "Respondent") an adult individual who resides at 63 Meade Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17013. 3. A hearing is scheduled to occur before the Honorable Edgar B. Bayley, Judge on Monday, February 9, 2009 at 1:30. 4. Petitioner, who lives in Oregon and has very limited financial resources, is requesting leave of court to appear at the hearing by telephone. 5. Petitioner's counsel is waiting for Respondent's counsel to respond to Petitioner's request for concurrence. Since there has been no response, non-concurrence of Respondent is presumed. 6. The matter to be heard by the Court is the enforcement and modification of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement and more specifically, the alimony provision and Respondent's contempt of that term 7. Requiring Petitioner to appear in person at this hearing would cause extreme financial hardship and is not feasible given Petitioner's need to work and the distance that must be traveled to appear in person at the hearing. WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Agnes E. Schutte, respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Leave of Court to Appear at Hearing by Telephone and grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. Dated: 414 /01 Respectfully submitted, LAW FIRM OF LINDA A. CLOTFELTER 1. By: JAttmey A. Clotfelter, Esquire ID No. 72963 ast Trindle Road, Suite 100 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 (717) 796-1930 Telephone (717) 796-1933 Facsimile Attorney for Plaintiff AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK PlaintifVPetitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, Defendant/Respondent : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY,PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 200748 CIVIL : CIVIL ACTION -LAW : IN DIVORCE VERIFICATION I, Linda A. Clotfelter, Esquire, attorney for plaintiff Agnes E. Shutte, verify that Plaintiff is not within the jurisdiction and the statements in the foregoing PETITION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904, relating to unworn falsification to authorities. Date: )-I ? 0 L" da A. Clotfelter, Esquire A orney ID No. 72963 021 E. Trindle Road, Suite 100 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 (717) 796-1930 Telephone (717) 796-1933 Facsimile s AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK Plaintiff/Petitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, Defendant/Respondent : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY,PENNSYLVANIA NO. 200748 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOW, this _Uf?day of February, 2009, the undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO APPEAR AT HEARING BY TELEPHONE was served upon the opposing party by way of facsimile and United States first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Marylou Matas, Esquire Saidis, Flower & Lindsay 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 The Honorable Judge Edgar Bayley Cumberland County Courthouse One Courthouse Square Carlisle, PA 17013 Respectfully submitted, LAW FIRM OF LINDA A. CLOTFELTER Linl(a A. Clotfelter, Esquire Attey ID No. 72963 East Trindle Road, Suite 100 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 (717) 796-1930 Telephone (717) 796-1933 Facsimile Attorney for Plaintiff CZ C i • e -n '-q C.n AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AGNES E. McCLINTOCK : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff/Petitioner V. NO. 2007-48 CIVIL MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK, : CIVIL ACTION -LAW Defendant/Respondent : IN DIVORCE STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT 1. Plaintiff is Agnes E. Schutte, formerly known as Agnes E. McClintock, represented herein by Linda Clotfelter, Esquire. 2. Defendant is Michael R. McClintock, represented herein by Marylou Matas, Esquire. 3. The parties are former spouses, having been divorced by decree on July 10, 2007. 4. The parties executed a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement on July 5, 2007. 5. Paragraph 16 of the Agreement calls for the payment of alimony from Defendant to Plaintiff at the rate of $750.00 per month for twelve consecutive months, beginning in August 2007, for a total payment of $9,000.00. 6. Defendant paid five alimony payments to Plaintiff, for a total payment of $3,750.00. 7. Due to Defendant's failure to make the agreed upon alimony payments, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement. 8. The matter was scheduled to be heard by this Honorable Court on February 9, 2009, but the parties, to their credit, were able to resolve the issues amicably. 9. The parties would like the Court to enter into an Order in the form attached to formally resolve the parties' issues. . IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set forth their hands and seals to two counterparts of this Agreement, each of which shall constitute an original, the day and year first above written. WITNESSES: D to AAJA a /Da e R. McCLINTOCK ACNE E. S E f/k/a GNES E. McCLINTOCK ALED-OFFCE OF THE PROTHONOTARY 2009 APR -7 PM 2: 31 CUMS Ldr?`r? '),J PB ?iV?7Y.VANA AGNES E. SCHUTTE f/k/a AGNES E. McCLINTOCK Plaintiff/Petitioner V. MICHAEL R. McCLINTOCK? Defendant/Respondent APR 0 8 2009 cp : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2007-48 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION -LAW IN DIVORCE ORDER AND NOW, this W day of 40k. , 2009, upon consideration of the agreement reached by the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the claims raised in Plaintiff's Petition for Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement shall be resolved upon the following terms: 1. Michael R. M Clintock (Defendant), shall pay to Agnes E. Schulte (Plaintiff), the sum of $6,10 .50 (which is $5,250.00 for alimony due + $157.50 interest for 2/2008 - 2/2009 + $ 00.00 attorney's fees, costs and expenses) plus three (3%) annual interest as the total sum due for alimony pursuant to Paragraph' 16 on page 8 of the parties' Marita Settlement Agreement (MSA). 2. The paymentsl shall be made directly to Plaintiff by Defendant as follows: 4 a. At a r te of $100.00 per month, beginning in the month of March 2009. Extra principal payments may be made by Defendant without penalty. b. These payments shall only terminate when the sum is paid in full or upon the death of either party. The obligation will not terminate upon the remarriage or cohabitation of Plaintiff but is still to be considered alimony. C. The ra«e at which the payments are made shall increase to $250.00 per month When Defendant's income increases to $60,000 annually. Pending full payment, Defendant shall provide copies of his paystubs to Plaintiff on a quarterly basis. 11 BY THE COURT: EDGAR B. BA DISTRIBUTION: arylou Matas, Esquire, Sa Attorney for Defendant/Res ?.'hda A. Clotfelter, Esquire, Attomey for Plaintiff/Petition Flower and Lindsay, 26 West High St, Carlisl7/? 17013 lent 1 E . Trindle Road, Suite 100, Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 S ..[ ) N ur J i .? ?? ce- J