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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-2974IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. Q2 - 197y Civil Action - Ldw KENNETH D. GLASER and PEARL M. RALPH W. CASTLE, JR. GLASER 1550 Williams Grove Road 395 Market Street Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Highspire, PA 17034 Plaintiff(s) and Address(es) VS. Defendant(s) and Address(es) PRAECIPE FOR WRIT OF SUMMONS TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: Please issue a Writ of Summons in the above-captioned action. Said Writ of Summons shall be issued and forwarded to the Cumberland County Sheriff in order to complete service upon Defendant. Dennis R. Sheaffer TUCKER ARENSBERG & SWARTZ 111 North Front Street P.O. Box 889 Harrisburg, PA 17108-0889 (717) 234-4121 Signature of Attorney Supreme Court I.D. #39182 Date: /p'O Z WRIT OF SUMMONS TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: YOU ARE NOTIFIED THAT THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFFS HAVE COMMENCED AN ACTION AGAINST YOU. Date:3 A ? .'I ara4so A-? 50747.1 q c b a2 O z? ',,, TTT C N w w N O :J fT1 cj ?m 0 SHERIFF'S RETURN - REGULAR CASE NO: 2002-02974 P COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND GLASER KENNETH D ET AL VS CASTLE RALPH W JR BRYAN WARD Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of Cumberland County,Pennsylvania, who being duly sworn according to law, says, the within WRIT OF SUMMONS was served upon CASTLE RALPH W JR the 2002 DEFENDANT at 1640:00 HOURS, on the 25th day of June , at 1550 WILLIAMS GROVE ROAD MECHANICSBURG, PA 17055 by handing to HENRIETTA CASTLE, WIFE a true and attested copy of WRIT OF SUMMONS together with and at the same time directing Her attention to the contents thereof. Sheriff's Costs: Docketing 18.00 Service 6.21 Affidavit .00 Surcharge 10.00 .00 34.21 Sworn and Subscribed to before me this day of ` 0 a13o.2 A.D. n p.? Q, rd e. rothonotary So Answers: R. Thomas Kline 06/26/2002 TUCKER ARENSBERG SWARTZ By: ?J? 1 Dep y Sheriff KENNETH DAVID GLASER AND PEARL M. GLASER vs RALPH W. CASTLE Case No. (12_297[ Statement of Intention to Proceed To the Court: The Plaintiffs intendsto proceed with the above captioned matter. Print Name Dennis R. Sheaffer Sign Name Date: i n/ i n l n5 Attorney for p l a 1 n r i f f s Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment. 1. Rule of civil Procedure New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The termination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local mles promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform statewide practice, preempting local rules. This role was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v. Eagle, 551 Pa. 360,710 A.2d 1104 (1998) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case may be dismissed pursuant to local mles implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901." Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amended to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of matters set forth in subdivision (a) of that rule continues to be applicable. II Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity, the course of the procedure is with the parties. If the parties do not wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and "the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of course terminating the matter with prejudice for failure to prosecute." If a party wishes to pursue the matter, he or she will file a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action has been terminated If the action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been terminated, that party may proceed under Rule230(d) for relief from the order of termination. An example of such an occurrence might be the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the filing of the petition to reinstate the action is important. If the petition is filed within thirty days of the entry of the order of termination on the docket, subdivision (d)(2) provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period, subdivision (d)(3) requires that the plaintiff must make a show in to the court that the petition was promptly filed and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty-day period under subdivision (d)(2). B. Where the action has not been terminated An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the filing of a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggrieved party may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOW, this -eday of dM&C2005, I, Kim A. Sakosky, Paralegal to Dennis R. Sheaffer, Esquire, for the firm of Tucker Arensberg, P.C., hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the within document, by mailing same by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: W. Darren Powell, Esquire Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP. 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, PA 17108 C_ _ o { S? O 'Pf - Ul 51 ?a rr7 -rr z?1 O FfI N q rfl CO < Kenneth D. and Pearl M. Glaser, vs Case No. 02-2974 Ralph W. Castle, Jr. Statement of Intention to Proceed To the Court: Plaintiffs Print Name Dennis R. Sheaffer intends to proceed with the above captioned matter. Sign Name Date: 10/27/08 Attorney for Plaintiffs Explanatory Comment The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated new Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 governing the termination of inactive cases and amended Rule of Judicial Administration 1901. Two aspects of the recommendation merit comment. 1. Rule of civil Procedure New Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 has been promulgated to govern the termination of inactive cases within the scope of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The termination of these cases for inactivity was previously governed by Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and local rules promulgated pursuant to it. New Rule 230.2 is tailored to the needs of civil actions. It provides a complete procedure and a uniform statewide practice, preempting local rules. This rule was promulgated in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shop v. Eagle, 551 Pa. 360,710 A.2d 1104 (1998) in which the court held that "prejudice to the defendant as a result of delay in prosecution is required before a case may be dismissed pursuant to local rules implementing Rule of Judicial Administration 1901." Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(b) has been amended to accommodate the new rule of civil procedure. The general policy of the prompt disposition of matters set forth in subdivision (a) of that rule continues to be applicable. II Inactive Cases The purpose of Rule 230.2 is to eliminate inactive cases from the judicial system. The process is initiated by the court. After giving notice of intent to terminate an action for inactivity, the course of the procedure is with the parties. If the parties do not wish to pursue the case, they will take no action and "the Prothonotary shall enter an order as of course terminating the matter with prejudice for failure to prosecute." If a party wishes to pursue the matter, he or she will file a notice of intention to proceed and the action shall continue. a. Where the action has been terminated If the action is terminated when a party believes that it should not have been terminated, that party may proceed under Rule230(d) for relief from the order of termination. An example of such an occurrence might be the termination of a viable action when the aggrieved party did not receive the notice of intent to terminate and thus did not timely file the notice of intention to proceed. The timing of the filing of the petition to reinstate the action is important. If the petition is filed within thirty days of the entry of the order of termination on the docket, subdivision (d)(2) provides that the court must grant the petition and reinstate the action. If the petition is filed later than the thirty-day period, subdivision (d)(3) requires that the plaintiff must make a show in to the court that the petition was promptly filed and that there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse both for the failure to file the notice of intention to proceed prior to the entry of the order of termination on the docket and for the failure to file the petition within the thirty-day period under subdivision (d)(2). B. Where the action has not been terminated An action which has not been terminated but which continues upon the filing of a notice of intention to proceed may have been the subject of inordinate delay. In such an instance, the aggrieved party may pursue the remedy of a common law non pros which exits independently of termination under Rule 230.2. 77, _ -1 `r dr?? w w A,r?