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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-04182 , ' 1'1 ii " " I' , , ' , , " " I" , , \ \ ''"' ,I .. -' ,Iii / " SAIDIS, GUIDO, SHUFF & MASLAND 26 w. Hilh Sired Carlisle. fA " RAYMOND PAUL FRANCES, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW v. NO. 94- CIVIL TERM JACQUELINE WINDOWMAKER, Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED COMPLAINT AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, Raymond Paul Frances, by and through his attorneys, Saidis, Guido, Shuff & Hasland, and avers as follows: 1. The Plaintiff is Raymond Paul Frances, an adult individual who resides at 2150 Queens Drive, Apartment no. B-4, Harrisburg, PA 17110. 2. The Defendant is Jacqueline Windowmaker, an adult individual who currently resides at 32 Center Street, Lot * 14, Mt. Holly SpringB, PA 17065. 3. The events hereinafter complained of occurred on or about October 17, 1993 at approximately 9:00 p.m. in South Middleton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, upon Route 34 (SR0034), approximately .2 miles North of Route 174 (SR0174). 4. At said time and place, Defendant was operating her vehicle in a general southbound direction on Route 34. Route 34 is a two-way undivided state road. 5. At said time and place, Plaintiff was occupying a 1982 Audi 4000S, which was disabled along the berm of the southbound lane of said Route 34. 6. At said time and place, the defendant's vehicle collided with Plaintiff's disabled vehicle. SAlOIS. GUIDO, SHUFF " MASLAND 26 W, Hllh S'm' Carlillh:, PA ." ,,, 7. Plaintiff's injuries and damages set forth herein were the direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant, then and there occurring. 8. Defendant was negligent generally and in the following particulars: a. Operating her vehicle in a reckless manner; b. Failing to yield the right-of-way; c. Failing to maintain a proper look-out; d. Fai ling to have her vehic Ie under proper control; e. Failing to stop before colliding with Plaintiff's vehicle; f. Failing to take action to avoid the collision with Plaintiff's vehicle; g. Operating conditions; and vehicle her faBt for too h. Failing to comply with the provisionB of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code relating to the operation of motor vehicles, specifically as it relates to the aforesaid acts of negligence. 9. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff sustained the following injuries, some or all of which may be permanent: a. Trimalleolar fracture to the left ankle; b. Bimalleolar fracture to the right ankle; c. Numerous scrapes, abrasions and contusions; d. Shock and injuries to the nerves and nervous system; and e. Disfigurement. 10. As a result of the injuries aforesaid, Plaintiff has been damaged as follows: " " a. He has suf fered and will continue to suffer great pain, inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation, mental anguish, discomfort and distress; b. He has been and will be required to expend large sumB of money for surgical and medical attention in excess of the required first party benefits under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 75 Pa. C.S.A. S 1701, et seq. c. He has been and will be deprived of his earnings in excess of the requi~ed first party benefits under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 75 Pa. C.S.A. S 1701, et seq.; , I t , d. His earning permanently impaired; e. He has been and will be deprived of his ability to enjoy the pleasures of life. power has been reduced and 11. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant then and there occurring, Plaintiff has sustained a total los~ of the value of his motor vehicle and has incurred towing and storing charges. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant in an amount in excess of Twenty Five Thousand and 00/100 ($25,000.00) Dollars, which amount exceeds the limits for compulsory arbitration under the Local Rules of this Court plus interest and costs. SAlOIS. GUIDO. SHUFF II MASLAND 26 W, Hllh S"".. C"II.lc, PA Dated: 7/J,&lr~/ . ., SAlOIS, GueL.S,~l1FF & MASLANO /- ,->>/ \ By: -...;..-'~ / ~~ Edward E. Guido, Esquire Supreme Court I.D. * 21206 26 West High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)1 43-6f22 ~~)i--- By: Will am C. Vohs, Esquire Supreme Court I.D. * 65208 Attorneys for Plaintiff @ d'; .. EE ~ M .. '!;r. .....r. t~ t,' ~,,,,,,. ~~"'-':.' ,....(.')(,)..', h,'T-,"':)'- (,) ~-~ :: ~~ ,',' . 1.11 . . j'. II:' ~''! t,r:) . 'I."I'S"": ~ ..t~ ~: ;, ,\, ~ 'h~ ... (,;> " t ~r-" ~ ~ ~.... - ~.~ ~ e. '.:J ~ * '-l ~ iJ., ) ... ~ lilr , ' , .....; OQ~ I." '::r ~'-.SJ o rr, r(- ::\\:i\ ~J i' -' RAYMOND PAUL FRANCES, . IN THE COURT OF CaMON PLEAS . . OF CVHBJ:RLAND COUNTY . Plaintiff . CIVIL ACTION - LAW . v. . JURY TRIAL DEMANDED . JACQUIILINE WINDOWMAl<ER, . . . NO. : 94-CIV-4182 . Defendant . . .".."""."....."""""""""""""".....""""""..""""".""""."""""""""""" f.- .".."""".."""""""""""""""".",.""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""".". f" PRAECIPE FOR ENTRY OF APPEARANCE TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Kindly enter the appearance of Lenahan & Dempsey, P.C. on behalf of the Defendant, Jacqueline Windowmaker, in the above- captioned matter. Lena~.... ~ ,.' ,( / By' Il -' ~ ~~IAN J. 'AllAN, ESQUIRE I.D. No.: 49760 Attorneys for Defendant, Jacqueline Windowmaker Lenahan & Dempsey, P.C. P.O. Box 234 Scranton, PA 18501-0234 (717) 346-2097 Dated: Auqust 17. 1994 RAYMOND PAUL FRANCES I IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY I Plaintiff : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW v. I : JURY TRIAL DBMANDBD JACQUELINE WINDOWMAKER, NO. : 94-CIV-4182 Defendant ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ANSWER. NEW NATTER AND CROSS CLAIM TO THE COMPLAINT 01' THB PLAINTIJ'r COMES NOW, the Defendant, Jacqueline Windowmaker, by and through her attorney, Brian J. Lenahan, Esquire, and hereby response to plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted in part. Denied in part. All factual averments contained within Plaintiff's Complaint Paragraph No.3 are admitted except for the approximate time of the incident which, based upon information and belief, occurred closer to approximately 9:10 pm. 4. Admitted in part. Denied in part. It is admitted that the Defendant, Windowmaker, was driving a 1988 Dodge Aries southbound on Rt. 34. The remaining averments contained within Plaintiff's complaint Paragraph No. 4 state legal conclusions to which no responsive pleading is required, and as such, the same is specifi- cally denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. 5, Denied. The factual averments contained within Plaintiff's Complaint Paragraph No. 5 state legal conclusions to which no responsive pleading is required, and as such, the same is specifi- cally denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. !nsofar as the averments are construed to be factual in nature and based upon reasonable information and belief, answering Cefendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or veracity of the allegations contained therein, and as such, the same are specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. By way of further Answer, it is specifically denied that the Plaintiff was operating a disabled vehicle. It is also specifically denied that Plaintiff's vehicle was along the berm of the Southbound lane of Rt. 34. To the contrary, while a portion of a 1982 Audi 4000S operated by the Plaintiff was on the berm of the Southbound lane of Rt. 34, the remaining portion of the Plaintiff's vehicle occupied a portion of the Southbound travel lane of Rt. 34. Further, Plaintiff's vehicle showed no signs of being disabled. Plaintiff had not placed any flashers on his car nor were his lights turned on at any times materially relevant hereto. 2 6. Denied. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, windowmaker's, vehicle colli.ded with Plaintiff's disabled vehicle. To the contrary, it is specifically denied that the plaintiff was maintaining a disabled vehicle. Further, while the cars did come in contact, it was the Plaintiff who recklessly, carelessly and negligently opened the driver's door of his 1982 Audi 40005 into the path of travel of the Defendant, windowmaker, causing the vehicles to come in contact. 7. Denied, The averments contained within plaintiff's Complaint Paragraph No. 7 state legal conclusions to which no responsive pleading is required, and as such, the same is specifi- cally denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. Insofar as the averments are construed to be factual in nature and based upon reasonable investigation and belief, answering Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or veracity of the allegations contained therein, and as such, the same are specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. By way of further Answer, it is specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowm~ker, was at any time negligent in this matter. To the contrary, the sole and complete cause of the accident complained of herein was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff. 3 8. A through H denied. The factual averments contained within Plaintiff's complaint Paragraph No.8, subsections A through H, state legal conclusions to which no responsive pleading is required, and as such, the same is specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. Insofar as the averments are construed to be factual in nature and based upon reasonable investigation and belief, answering Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or veracity of the allegations contained therein, and as such, the same are specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. More particularly, the Defendant, Windowmaker, specifi- cally denies that she was negligent at any time materially relevant hereto and further avers as follows: A. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a reckless manne>:. To the contrary, the Defendant, Windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a careful, safe and prudent fashion for all circumstances then and there existing. The sole and complete cause of this accident was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff. This careless, reckless and negligent action consisted of operating a vehicle when the Plaintiff knew or should have known that the same was not opera- tional. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in stopping his vehicle with a substantial portion of the 4 same in the travel portion of the Southbound lane of Rt. 34, Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in failing to warn of the presence of his vehicle. The Plaintiff was further negligent in opening his driver's side door directly into the path of an oncoming car which had the right of way. B. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowmaker, failed to yield the right of way. It is also specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowmaker, had the duty or obligation to yield the right of way. Further, the Defendant, Windowmaker, in fact, had the right of way. To the contrary, the Defendant, Windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a careful, safe and prudent fashion for all circumstances then and there existing. The sole and complete cause of this accident was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff, This careless, reckless and negligent action consisted of operating a vehicle when the Plaintiff knew or should have known that the same was not opera- tional. Further, the Plaintiff was care19ss, reckless and negligent in stopping his vehicle with a substantial portion of the same in the travel portion of the southbound lane of Rt. 34. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in failing to warn of the presence of his vehicle. The Plaintiff was further negligent in opening his driver's side door directly into the path of an oncoming car which had the right of way. 5 c. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowmaker, failed to maintain a proper lookout. To the contrary, the Defendant, Windowmaker, at all times materially relevant hereto maintained a proper and adequate lookout for all circumstances then and there existing. Also, the Defendant, Windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a careful, safe and prudent fashion for all circumstanc- es then and there existing. The sole and complete cause of this accident was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff. This careless, reckless and negligent action consisted of operating a vehicle when the Plaintiff knew or should have known that the same was not operational. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in stopping his vehicle with a substantial portion of the same in the travel portion of the Southbound lane of Rt. 34. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in failing to warn of the presence of his vehicle. The Plaintiff was further negligent in opening his driver's side door directly into the path of an oncoming car which had the right of way. D. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowmaker, failed to have her vehicle under proper control. In addition, the Defendant, Windowmaker, maintained her vehicle under proper and adequate control at all times materially relevant hereto. To the contrary, the Defendant, Windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a 6 careful, safe and prudent fashion for all circumstances then and there existing. The sole and complete cause of this accident was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff. This careless, reckless and negligent action consisted of operating a vehicle when the Plaintiff knew or should have known that the same was not operational. Further, the plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in stopping his vehicle with a substantial portion of the same in the travel portion of the southbound lane of Rt. 34, Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in failing to warn of the presence of his vehicle. The plaintiff was further negligent in opening his driver's side door directly into the path of an oncoming car which had the right of way. E. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, windowmaker, failed to stop before colliding with Plaintiff's vehicle. It is also specifically denied that the actions of the Plaintiff allowed the Defendant an opportunity to stop before colliding with the driver's door of the Plaintiff's vehicle. To the contrary, the Defendant, windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a careful, safe and prudent fashion for all circumstances then and there existing. The sole and complete cause of this accident was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff. This careless, reckless and negligent action consisted of operating a vehicle when the 7 plaintiff knew or should have known that the same was not opera- tional. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in stopping his vehicle with a substantial portion of the same in the travel portion of the southbound lane of Rt. 34. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in failing to warn of the presence of his vehicle. The Plaintiff was further negligent in opening his driver's side door directly into the path of an oncoming car which had the right of way. F. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowmaker, failed to take action to avoid collision with Plaintiff's vehicle. It is also specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowmaker, had an opportunity to take action to avoid a collision with Plaintiff's vehicle. To the contrary, the Defendant, Windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a careful, safe and prudent fashion for all circumstanc- es then and there existing. The sole and complete cause of this accident was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff. This careless, reckless and negligent action consisted of operating a vehicle when the Plaintiff knew or should have known that the same was not operational. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in stopping his vehicle with a substantial portion of the same in the travel portion of the Southbound lane of Rt. 34. Further, the plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in failing to warn of the presence of his 8 vehicle. The Plaintift was turther negligent in opening his driver's side door directly into the path ot an oncoming car which had the right of way. G. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, windowmakerr operated her vehicle too fast for the conditions. To the contrary, the Defendant, Windowmaker, operated her vehicle at a careful, safe and prudent speed at all times materially relevant hereto. Also, the Defendant, windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a careful, safe and prudent fashion for all circumstances then and there existing. The sole and complete cause of this accident was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff. This careless, reckless and negligent action consisted of operating a vehicle when the plaintiff knew or should have known that the same was not operational. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in stopping his vehicle with a substantial portion of the same in the travel portion of the southbound lane of Rt. 34. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in failing to warn of the presence of his vehicle. The Plaintiff was further negligent in opening his driver's side door directly into the path of an oncoming car which had the right of way. H. It is specifically denied that the Defendant, Windowmaker, failed to comply with the provisions of the Pennsylvan~a Motor Vehicle Code relating to the operation of motor vehicles speciti- 9 cally as it relates to any acts of alleged negligence. To the contrary / the Defendant, windowmaker, operated her vehicle in a careful, safe and prudent fashion for all circumstances then and there existing. The sole and complete cause of this accident was the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff. This careless / reckless and negligent action consisted of operating a vehicle when the plaintiff knew or should have known that the same was not operational. Further, the plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in stopping his vehicle with a substantial portion of the same in the travel portion of the Southbound lane of Rt, 34. Further, the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and negligent in failing to warn of the presence of his vehicle. The plaintiff was further negligent in opening his driver's side door directly into the path of an oncoming car which had the right of way. 9. A through E denied. The allegations contained within Plaintiff's complaint No. 9 state legal conclusions to which no responsive pleading is required, and as such, the same is specifi- cally denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. Insofar as the averments are construed to be factual in nature and based upon reasonable investigation and belief, answering Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or veracity of the allegations contained therein, and as 10 such, the same are specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. 10. A through E denied. The allegations contained within Plaintiff's Complaint No. 10 state legal conclusions to which no responsive of pleading is required, and as such, the same is specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. Insofar as the averments are construed to be factual in nature and based upon reasonable investigation and belief, answering Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or veracity of the allegations contained therein, and as such, the same is specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. 11. Denied. The allegation contained within Plaintiff's complaint No. 11 states legal conclusions to which no responsive pleading is required, and as such, the same is specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. Insofar as the averments are construed to be factual in nature and based upon reasonable investigation and belief, answering Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or veracity of the allegations contained therein, and as such, the same is specifically denied and strict proof is demanded at time of trial. 11 WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, answering Defendant request judgment be entered in her favor along with interest costs and attorney's fees. !In IlATTIIR 12. Plaintiff's action is barred for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 13. Plaintiff'S action is barred by the appropriate statute of Limitations. 14. plaintiff's action is barred and/or limited by the applicable provisions of the pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibili ty Law. More particularly, Plaintiff's recovery is barred and/or limited by the Amendments made thereto insofar as they concern receipt of benefits from collateral sources. 15. plaintiff's recovery is barred and/or limited by the applicable provisions of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence statute which is plead herein in its entirety as an affirmative defense. 16, plaintiff's recovery is barred and/or limited by the Plaintiff's comparative and/or contributory negligence which consists, inter alia of the following: A. operating a motor vehicle which he knew was not safe to be operated on roads within the Commonwealth. 12 ,I I ! B. Failing to remove his vehicle once it was stopped fully and entirely from the road surface of Rt. 34 in Cumberland County, PA. C. Leaving a portion of his parked vehicle still within the travel lane of Southbound Rt. 34 in Cumberland County, PA. D. Failing to warn approaching vehicles including the vehicle operated by the Defendant, Windowmaker, of the presence of his vehicle parked on Rt. 34 in Cumberland County, PA. E. Failing to operate flasher lights on his vehicle. F. Failing to operate headlights on his vehicle. G. Failing to maintain a proper lookout. H. Failing to yield the right of way. I. Failing to take action to avoid collision with the vehicle operated by the Defendant, Windowmaker. .1. carelessly, recklessly and negligently opening the driver's door of his vehicle into the path of the vehicle operated by the Defendant, Windowmaker, thus bringing about the collision complained of herein. K. Failing to comply with the provisions of the Pennsyl- vania Motor Vehicle Code relating to the operation of motor vehicles. L. All other acts of negligence to be deduced through discovery. 13 17. plaintiff's recovery is barred and/or limited by the Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk. There was a risk known to the plaintiff in this matter which he voluntarily assumed, and as such, plaintiff's recovery is barred and/or limited by the same. 18. Plaintiff's injuries as alleged, the existence of the same being specifically denied, were not caused by the collision complained of herein but rather were attributable to pre- existing conditions and/or after occurring incidences neither aggravated nor caused by the incident of October 17, 1993. CROSS CLAIM COMES NOW the original Defendant, Jacqueline Windowmaker, by and through her counsel, Brian J. Lenahan, Esquire and hereby makes the following Cross Claim and in support thereof avers as follows: 19. Answering Defendant, Jacqueline Windowmaker, incorporates herein by references if more fully set forth at length all averments contained within her Answer and New Matter Paragrapsh 1 - 18. 20. Based upon all the allegations contained therein, it is specifically averred that as a direct and proximate result of the careless, reckless and negligent actions of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, Windowmaker, has sustained a total loss of the value of her motor vehicle for which recovery is sought. 14 VIRI'ICa'l'IOK The undersigned, having read the attached pleading, verifies that the within pleading is based on information furnished to counsel, which information has boen gathered by counsel in the course of this lawsuit. The language of tlll'l pl""lting Is that of counsel and not of signer. Signer verifies that he/she has read the within pleading and that it is true and correct to the best of signer's knowledge, information and belief. To the extent that the contents of the pleadings are that of counsel, verifier has rE'll..tj upon counsel in taklng this Verif ,.'~dtion. '!'he Verification is made subject to the penalties of 19 Pa. C.S. 54904 relating to unsworn falsification to authoritie.. Dated I ? /J /,/11 , I ~ I l / ~-" (f' LID WIIIDOl/IIAUI '-Y. , I ~ - ~ , , J , , 1 , ., , , Q Z ~ ~ < !i:i~a e :l31~<~ IE ~><fj;~~ o ~ ~ ~ ~g ~ 5~:Z:~~ ..lr..ll.~rao .., ..l:c . ~"'ll. ~ 6 e < (IJ . ' RAYMOND PAUL FRANCES, I IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff I CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. CIVIL ACTION - LAW JACQUELINE WI~DOWMAKER, NO. 4182 CIVIL 1994 Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED RIPLY TO DIPI.DANT'S .eN MATTER AND NOW, comes the Plaintiff, Raymond Paul Frances by and through his attorneys, Saidis, Guido, Shuff & Hasland, and replies to Defendant Jacqueline Windowmaker' s New Matter as follows: 12. Denied. The averments contained therein are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 13. Denied. The averments contained therein are concluBions of law to which no response is required. 14. Denied. The averments contained therein are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 15. Denied. The averments contained therein are conclusions of law to which no response is required. 16. Denied. The averments contained therein are conclusions of law to which no response is required. By way of further answer, Plaintiff responds to the specific factual allegations as follows: SAIDIS. GUIDO. SHl'FF " MASLAND 26 W, Ihili Slrecl CiUIi8Ie,PA A. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff knew his vehicle to be unsafe. To the contrary, Plaintiff had recently purchased the vehicle and had no way of knowing that the electrical system would shut down and disable the vehicle as it did. . , B. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff was negligent in failing to remove his vehicle fully and entirely from the roadway. To the contrary/ Plaintiff did remove his vehicle fully and entirely from the roadway. To the extent that any portion of the vehic Ie remained on the roadway, which is denied, Plaintiff was forced to come to a stop where he did because of a complete lOBS of power. His vehicle was struck by Defendant before he could manually remove it completely from the roadway. c. The response set forth in subparagraph (B) above i6 incorporated herein. D. Plaintiff did not have time to warn approaching vehicles prior to being struck by Defendant. SAlOIS. GUIDO. SHUFF & MASLAND 26 w, Hiah 5"..., Carlisle, PA E. Plaintiff was unable to operate hiB emergency flashers because of the complete failure of the electrical system on his vehicle. F. The response set forth in subparagraph (E) above is incorporated herein. G. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout. To the contrary/ he saw the approach of Defendant I s vehicle but was helpless to avoid the collision. H. It is specifically denied that Plaintiff failed to yield the right of way. To the contrary, he 2 PRAECIPE FOR LISTING CASE fOR TRIAL (tolJst be typewritten and sut:mitted in duplicate) , ' . 'ro THE PIPllllWl'MY Of' ClM3EIUNV romy P leMe lis t the following caSl!. , , (Check one) ( X) for JURY trial at the next tern of civil court:. for trial without a jury. ~ I_r) <.I, -------.---------------------------------- CAPl'IOO Of' CASE (entire c;,ption nust be stated in full) (check one) X) Civil Action - Law Raymond Paul Frances, Appeal fran Arbitration (other) (Plaintiff) VS. Jacqueline Windowmaker, The trial list will be called on 4/1 8/95 and N/A Trials comnence on ~ / , ~ / 'I ~ (Defendant) Pretrials will be held on 4/26/ 'I 5. (Briefs are due 5 days before pretrials.) (The party listing this case for triaJ. shall provide forthwith a copy of the praecipe to all counsel, pursuant to local Rule 214.1.) VB. No. .:11 A? Civil 19 '14 Indicate the attorney who will try case for the party who files this praecipe. F.nw",.n F. r.llinn. F."(:jllirp. 26 w""t Hi9h Strf!"t. Carlisle. ~A 17013 Indicate trial counsel for other parties if knowrll !lrian.1. Lenahan. ESQuire. Suit" 400 KanF! Ruilnin9. P.O !lox 234, Scranton, PA 18501 This case is ready for trial. Signed. 'v, ~ Date. oJ/'Ilf5 Print NarTe. F.,lw"..rl '" t::ll; rln . 'P.Clqllir~ Attorney fan Plaint l f f , , ~ , :w::: ~ VI f\j ,"') - >- ';~'":~ , , , ,