Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-3442 ROBERT H. BARRETT, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNA. v. NO. d 1- ?fN?. PENNSYLVANIA mSTORlCAL & MUSEUM COMMISSION AND BOROUGH OF CARLISLE, Defendants U.S. M.D. CT. OF PA. NO.l:-CV-99-873 (JUDGE KANE) TO THE CLERK OF COURTS: Please enter judgment against the Plaintiff, Robert H. Barrett, pursuant to the Exemplification of Judgment of the United States Middle District Court of Pennsylvania, Docket No, I :CV -99-873, attached hereto as Exhibit" A", "T ..,f, .1,,"'1..............- S >l.u"," &~ _~o - k>4~ D~ '("_ ~p... I<Itl","""''''"..-o lU..s..-v..... Go......."._ IN \,,~ A....~..,.- IOl" ~ S"oo ..:>D . RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: D, MICHAEL FISHER ATTORNEY GENERAL BY . drige #208 enior D uty Attorney General Financial Enforcement Section Office of Attorney General 15th Floor Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 Phone: (717) 787-7188 Fax: (717) 705-7243 DATED: '7 ~~.?-<l-cr- EXHIBIT "A" , Ad 11>~ (Rev. 5/85) Exemplification Certificate UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE District of PENNSYLVANIA EXEMPLIFICATION CERTIFICATE I, Mary E. D'Andrea , Clerk of this United States District Court, keeper of the records and seal, certifY that the attached documents: Order 04/28/00, (Doc. 35) are true copies of records of this Court. In testimony whereof I sign my Harrisburg City name and affix the seal of this Court, in this District, at on July 2, 2002 Date ~~ ~W--,- (By) Deputy Cle Mary E. D'Andrea Clerk I, Hon, Yvette Kane , a Judicial Officer of this certifY that Mary E. D'Andrea , named above, is and was on the date Clerk of this Court, duly appointed and sworn, and keeper of the rec rds and seal, and that this certificate, the attestation of the record, are in accordance with the laws of the 'ted States. .!!:> (j "'.)'1 2. 002--' Date Judge. U.S. District Court Title I, Mary E. D'Andrea keeper of the seal, certifY that the Honorable Mary E. D'Andrea Clerk , Clerk of this United States District Court, Yvette Kane Judicial Officer named above, is and was on the date noted a Judicial Officer of this Court, duly appointed, sworn and qualified, and that I am well acquainted with the Judicial Officer's official signature and know and certifY the above signature to be that of the Judicial Officer. In testimony whereof I sign my name, and affix the seal of this Court Harrisburg in this State, on .:Ji:) 1,-, '?, ) ::::l CY>) City , Date ~ ~ - 'lU---,-,-,-, (By) Deputy Clerk .. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ROBERT H. BARRETT, CIVIL ACTION NO.1 :CV-99-873 Plaintiff (Judge Kane) v. ORDER FILED HARRISBURG. PA IWR 2 8 2000 MARY~. '.' . 0 ......b~m~K Par._ .r~' / PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL AND MUSEUM COMMISSION, and BOROUGH OF CARLISLE, Defendants On April 10, 2000, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order granting the motions to dismiss and motions for Rule 11 sanctions filed by the Borough of Carlisle ("Borough") and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. With regard to the Borough's motion for Rule 11 sanctions, this Court granted the Borough's request for the Plaintiff to pay the Borough's reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in connection with its defense of this action. The Court directed the Borough to file documentation supporting its request within ten (10) days of the Court's Order, and permitted Plaintiff to file any response to that documentation within five days thereafter, On April 14, 2000, the Borough filed its Certification in support of its request for reasonable attorneys' fees, documenting the Borough's expenditure of $4,499.31 in attorneys' fees and expenses associated with its defense of this lawsuit. Plaintiff failed to file any response to the Borough's documentation. '-"--''''. ",;",d i/~.';r'. ';'.".'.''''.. .'\.'0......: ;'.". '.' \-J.:.-fiL..". ~. 0.". -' D. a~t0- -.I:.';:a;--'-"'~--.';'.':I:" ::;",'.---- a'v ,.;:;., ".r ~,,_ 0"' , ?'/ ,/'Id-/ , __ VJ.~:t;,C2a:d.LJ::';: f' -- O~ul:y Gl,ar\< .- Upon consideration of the Borough's submission, the Court finds that $4,499.31 constitutes a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees and expenses, and Plaintiff will be directed to pay that sum to the Borough under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (c)(2). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $4,499,31 to the Borough within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order. 2, The Clerk of Court is directed to close this file. ~.rt,,~~ YVETTE NE United States District Judge Dated: April ;<5:~oo. 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA " ------"'-"'-'--"-"'" ROBERT H. BARRETT, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1 :CV~99~873 Plaintiff (Judge Kane) v. F~ LED H/\RRISBUF1G, PA PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL AND MUSEUM COMMISSION, and BOROUGH OF CARLISLE, " -- ,~,~ }. G ~ ~ Defendants f"flov r" ""11 ~"-'.J./. ......:.' j .r.lble," f"'l.' I-~.." ,... >'"c'".....- ......., 'I' "". 'r''" ';;;;j, """'-'''' .. ... -/':~.:,:'i~,,7;~::r~?:"'---'" MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Before the Court in the captioned action are a number of motions. Defendants Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission ("Commission") and Borough of Carlisle ("Borough") have both filed motions to dismiss and motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. In addition, Plaintiff has filed three motions requesting leave to file a brief in opposition to various motions. For the reasons stated below, all the pending motions will be granted. Backaround Plaintiff Barrett, who is proceeding oro se in this matter, filed this complaint on June 1,1999. On July 7,1999, the Commission filed its motion to dismiss the complaint, and, after requesting an extension of time, filed a supporting memorandum of law on August 18,1999. The Commission also filed its motion for sanctions on August 18, 1999, with a supporting memorandum and exhibits. Plaintiff failed to file a brief in opposition to the two motions within the time permitted by the Local Rules, On September 13, 1999, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a brief in oppositionc;lto the Certified fronLthe reeor . .::r1J7IO'--. - Date ~E D' 'ndrea, Clerk. e M~ .;.-- Wv-.--' _ Per \Je,puty Clork Commission's motion to dismiss, and on September 20, 1999, filed a motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the Commission's motion for sanctions, TIle "Borougtffileaits motion 'to OISnllssc-pjalnfiff'scomp1alntotTJuly.t3,-1999,arrd-..- -~ filed its supporting brief on July 23, 1999. On September 13, 1999, the Borough filed its motion for sanctions, and filed its brief in support on September 23, 1999. Plaintiff failed to file a brief in opposition to the Borough's motion to dismiss within the time permitted by the Local Rules. He filed a motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the Borough's motion to dismiss on September 7,1999. Plaintiff filed a timely brief in opposition to the Borough's motion for sanctions on October 12,1999, The Borough filed its reply brief on October 21, 1999. Discussion Plaintiffs complaint in this case continues the saga of litigation in this Court regarding properties owned by Plaintiff in the Carlisle Historic District The Court will not recount the history of Plaintiffs attempts to pursue his claims regarding the Carlisle Historic District here, but notes that Plaintiff has initiated or removed a total of eight actions in this Court in the past two years, all stemming from his dispute with the Borough of Carlisle regarding the condition of numerous properties owned by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's complaint in this case alleges that Defendants Borough and the Commission violated his due process rights and his right to just compensation for a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, by their actions with respect to properties owned by Plaintiff in the Carlisle Historic District Plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to 42 U,S,C. 9 1983. 2 --...--..--...-.--....--.---.... A. The Commission's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs complaint against the Commission is based on the Commission's _._.~ October 1, 1WS- cermicatlciff0f1l1eGart1S1e1=llstonc-oistrict:-The-Commissromaises--------- several arguments in its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, arguing: (1) that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that Plaintiffs complaint against the Commission is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution; and (3) that the complaint fails to state a claim under the due process or takings clauses, As noted above, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the Commission's motion, since he failed to file a brief within the time permitted by the Local Rules, In his motion, Plaintiff argues that his incarceration in Cumberland County Prison from July 7, 1999 to August 17,1999 prevented him from filing a timely brief in opposition to the Commission's motion. The Court notes that since Plaintiff was released from prison on August 17,1999, and the Commission filed its brief in support of its motion to dismiss on August 18,1999, Plaintiff's incarceration should not have prevented him from responding to the Commission's brief. However, since the Commission has no objection to Plaintiff's request to file a brief out of time, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the Commission's motion to dismiss, and deem the brief attached to his motion filed as of this date, With regard to the merits of the Commission's arguments, this Court finds that Plaintiffs claims against the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits federal courts from entertaining civil rights suits brought by private parties against states and their agencies, See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781,782 (1978). The Commonwealth has 3 specifically reserved its Eleventh Amendment immunity at 42 Pa.C.S.A. S 8521 (b). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the Commission are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dISrmssed:--- B. The Borouah's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against the Borough is based on its regulation of his property as part of the Carlisle Historic District, and its denial of two permit applications to perform work on Plaintiff's property, The Borough moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on several grounds pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). The Borough argues: (1) Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for insufficient service of process; (2) Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed under principles of issue preclusion; (3) Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a cognizable claim for due process violations or a violation of the takings clause; and (4) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the Borough's motion, since he failed to file a brief within the time permitted by the Local Rules, In his motion, Plaintiff argues that his incarceration in Cumberland County Prison from July 7, 1999 to August 17, 1999 prevented him from filing a timely brief in opposition to the Borough's motion. The Borough's brief in support of its motion was filed on July 23, 1999, during the time Plaintiff was incarcerated. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the Borough's motion to dismiss, and deem the brief attached to his motion filed as of this date. With regard to the merits of the Borough's arguments, the Borough first maintains that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 4 Procedure 12(b)(5), as Plaintiff failed to serve the Borough in the manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 40)(2), which provides that a municipality may be served by delivering a copy of the summons andComplainfto the riluniC1pality's chief executive officer or in a manner prescribed by state law. Under Pennsylvania law, a municipality may be served by handing a copy of the original process to: (1) an agent duly authorized by the political subdivision to receive service of process, or (2) the person in charge at the office of defendant, or (3) the mayor, or the president, chairman, or secretary or clerk of the tax levying body thereof. and in counties where there is no tax levying body. the chairman or clerk of the board of county commissioners. Pa, R. C. P. 422(b), Here. Barrett apparently directed a process server to deliver the summons and complaint to Edward Schorpp, the Borough's solicitor. According to the affidavit submitted by Schorpp in connection with the Borough's motion to dismiss, he is not the Borough's chief executive officer nor does he hold any of the positions which would allow Plaintiff to serve the Borough by delivering the summons and complaint to him. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for insufficiency of service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). Even if Plaintiff's complaint had been properly served on the Borough. this Court would still dismiss it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). the Court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The Court will not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action "unless it appears beyond doubt that the 5 plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle [him] to relief." Conlev v. Gibson, 355 U,S. 41, 45-46 (1957). To this end, the Court must focus on whether' the- pliiintiff fsentitleifto ()ffereviderii:e t()suppbrt his Claims, rather than whether he will ultimately prevail. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is required to accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the face of the complaint See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. ''The complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if it adequately put[s] the defendant[] on notice of the essential elements of plaintiff['s] cause of action." Nami, 82 F.3d at 65. Plaintiff's claims against the Borough of Carlisle are barred by the principle of issue preclusion. Issue preclusion questions may be resolved by a 12(b)(6) motion. See Brever v. Meissner, 23 F. Supp.2d 521,527 n.2. (ED, Pa. 1998) (citations omitted). The principle of issue preclusion mandates that "once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits involving a party to the prior litigation." Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). The requirements of issue preclusion are satisfied where: (1) the identicai issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision; and (4) the party being precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented in the prior action. See Ravtech COrD. v, White, 54 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1995). The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, in a previous state case between the parties, captioned as Barrett v. Borouah of Carlisle, No. 1431 CD. 1997 (Jan, 29, 6 1998), necessarily decided the constitutional issues raised by Plaintiff in this action,1 The previous state case arose out of Barrett's appeal of the Borough's denial of two demolition permits for property located Within the Carlisle HistoriC District Barrett appealed the Borough's denial to the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, The Common Pleas Court upheld the denial. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Common Pleas Court. In affirming the Common Pleas Court decision, the Commonwealth Court determined that the historic district certification process did not violate the Fifth Amendment takings or due process clauses, and the denial of construction permits, without an allegation of economic hardship, did not violate the Fifth Amendment's takings or due process clauses. The Court stated: With regard to the second issue [including Barrett's property within the historic district without his consent and the Borough Council's refusal to issue demolition permits], we conclude that neither the inclusion of Barrett's property in the historic district nor the denial of his demolition permit application resulted in an unconstitutional taking of his property. In Penn Central Transoortation Comoanv v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the historic designation of property without the owner's consent does not amount to a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but is rather a restriction on the owner's use of that property, Our supreme court has followed this holding, and it is now well-settled in Pennsylvania that "designation of a privately owned building as historic without the consent of the owner is not a taking under the Constitution of this Commonwealth." United Artist's Theater Circuit. Inc. v, Citv of Philadelohia, 535 Pa, 370, 386, 635 A2d 612,620 (1993). Moreover, a municipality's refusal to issue a demolition permit to the owner of property included in a The Borough has submitted a copy of the Commonwealth Court's decision in Barrett v. Borouah of Carlisle in connection with its brief in support of its motion to dismiss. As a matter of public record, the decision is properly considered in connection with a motion to dismiss, See Pension Benefit Guarantv Coro, v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F,2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (in deciding motion to dismiss, courts generally consider allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record). 7 historic district does not necessarily constitute an unlawful taking. See Park Home v. Citv of Williams port, 545 Pa. 94, 680 A.2d 207 (1996); Citv of Pittsburah v. Weinbera, 544 Pa, 286, 676 A.2d 207 (1996); United Artists' Theater Circuit. . . . Thus, applying Weinberg, in Park Home our supreme court concluded that, Where a prdpertydWher Who was denied a permit to demolish property included in a historic district failed to establish economic hardship by showing deprivation of the profitable use of his property, no unlawful taking had occurred. Based on Park Home, Barrett can only succeed on his claim that an unconstitutional taking of his property has occurred by presenting evidence to show that the Borough's historic designation of his property imposed an economic hardship upon him, or that it prevented a reasonable and beneficial use of his property. Because he has failed to present any evidence to sustain this burden, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that neither the inclusion of Barrett's three lots within the Borough Historic District nor the refusal to issue his demolition permit was an unconstitutional taking or a denial of due process rights. Commonwealth Court Opinion at 4-6, The language quoted above establishes that, in a previous state case between Plaintiff and the Borough, the Commonwealth Court after briefing of the issues necessarily determined that the designation of the Carlisle Historic District and the denial of a permit without the establishment of economic hardship do not constitute Fifth Amendment takings or due process violations. Accordingly, since Plaintiffs complaint here seeks to establish constitutional violations based on the designation of the Carlisle Historic District and the denial of two permits pursuant to the Borough's regulatory authority over the Historic District, the identical issues decided by the Commonwealth Court, Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating those issues, and his complaint against the Borough must be dismissed.2 2 This is the second time Plaintiff has attempted to relitigate these issues in federal court. Plaintiff's first case against the Borough in this Court, docketed at 1 :CV- 98-1109, was also dismissed by this Court pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, 8 Because Plaintiffs complaint against the Borough must be dismissed under principles of issue preclusion, the Court does not address the other arguments raised by the Borough. C, Rule 11 Sanctions Both the Commission and the Borough have filed motions for Rule 11 sanctions, As noted above, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the Commission's motion, since he failed to file a brief within the time permitted by the Local Rules, In his motion, Plaintiff argues that his incarceration in Cumberland County Prison from July 7,1999 to August 17,1999 prevented him from filing a timely brief in opposition to the Commission's motion. The Court notes that since Plaintiff was released from prison on August 17, 1999, and the Commission filed its motion and brief in support on August 18, 1999, Plaintiffs incarceration should not have prevented him from responding to the Commission's motion and brief. However, since the Commission has no objection to Plaintiffs request to file a brief out of time, the Court will grant Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the Commission's motion for sanctions, and deem the brief attached to his motion filed as of this date. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all litigants, including oro se parties, have an obligation to certify by their signature that their pleadings are not filed for an improper purpose and that their contentions are supported by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of the law, See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b), If a litigant fails to comply with Rule 11, he or she may be subject to sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c), "Frivolous filings are those that are both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry," Buster v. 9 Greisen, 104 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.), cert denied, _ U.S, _, 118 S. Ct 441 (1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted), Rule 11 sanctions are based on "an objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances." See Martin v, Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 1, The Commission's Motion The Commission's motion is based on the fact that, prior to the filing of Plaintiff's complaint in this matter, the decision of the Commonwealth Court in Barrett v. Borouah of Carlisle, No. 1431 C.D. 1997 (Jan, 29,1998), rejected Plaintiff's constitutional claims and pointed out the untimeliness of Plaintiff's challenge to the Commission's 1975 certification of the Carlisle Historic District Further, the Commission notes that Judge Muir of this Court issued an order in another case brought by Plaintiff regarding his properties in the Borough, docketed to 2:CV-99-997, denying Plaintiff's request for an filed its motion, Upon consideration of the briefs and exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claim against the Commission is frivolous. Even if the Court accepts Plaintiffs failure to understand principles of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Plaintiff should have known that a claim based on action taken by the Commission 25 years ago is beyond any statute of limitations, especially since the Commonwealth Court in its decision advised Plaintiff that any claim regarding certification of the Carlisle Historic District was without basis. Moreover, Plaintiff is not the typical oro se litigant As stated above, he has initiated or removed a total of eight actions in this Court in the past two years, all stemming from his dispute with the Borough over the condition of his properties. Further, Plaintiff has demonstrated his ability to research legal principles and present his arguments to the Court in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court. Finally, Plaintiff was previously advised of the requirements and potential sanctions of Rule 11 by Judge Muir. Accordingly, the Court finds that the imposition of sanctions is appropriate. When the Court considers a Rule 11 sanction, it should select one that is "calibrated to the least severe level necessary to serve the deterrent purpose of the Rule," Zuk v. Eastern Pennsvlvania Psvchiatric Institute of the Medical College of Pennsvlvania, 103 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted), Counsel for the Commission in this case seeks as a sanction Plaintiffs payment of the modest amount of 2 Yo hours of counsel's professional time at a reasonable hourly rate. The Court finds that, based on counsel's declaration submitted in support of his motion, a reasonable hourly rate is $200/hour. Accordingly, Plaintiff will be directed to pay the sum of $500 to 11 the Commission under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2). 2. The Borouah's Motion The Borough's motion is based, not surprisingly, on the fact that, prior to the filing of Plaintiffs complaint in this matter, the decision of the Commonwealth Court in Barrett v. Borouah of Carlisle, No. 1431 C.D. 1997 (Jan. 29, 1998), rejected Plaintiffs constitutional claims. As noted above, this is the second time Plaintiff has sought to relitigate the issues decided by the Commonwealth Court. Plaintiff brought a previous case against the Borough in this Court, docketed at 1 :CV-98-11 09, which was dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, The Borough argues that Plaintiffs repetitious filing of lawsuits pertaining to the same issues demonstrates that he refuses to reasonably investigate or acknowledge existing law. The Court agrees, Upon consideration of the briefs and exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claim against the Borough is frivolous. Plaintiffs repetitious pursuit of the same issues previously litigated and decided against him in state court constitutes an abuse of the litigation process. Despite Plaintiffs oro se status, he has demonstrated his ability to research legal principles and present his arguments to the Court in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that his failure to appreciate principles of issue preclusion stem from anything other than his willful disregard of the decisions of this Court and other courts. Further, Plaintiff was previously advised of the requirements and potential sanctions of Rule 11 by Judge Muir. Accordingly, the imposition of sanctions is appropriate to deter Plaintiff from filing yet another complaint concerning the same issues previously decided against him. 12 --------~._,.,... -"'-""'-""'''~._''''. '... As noted above, when considering a Rule 11 sanction, the Court should select one that is "calibrated to the least severe level necessary to serve the deterrent purpose bfthEfRUle;" ZUk~1 03F.3d at301':Here;the Borough suggests as a sanction payment of all unreimbursed costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in connection with this action. Further, the Borough suggests that an additional monetary penalty be imposed on Plaintiff, The Court finds that requiring Plaintiff to pay the Borough's reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in connection with this action is an appropriate sanction. As the Borough has not filed documentation supporting its request for attorneys' fees and costs, it will be directed to file such documentation supporting its request within ten days of the date of this Order. 13 __~'__~'_.M_~__._"",_..___...,.,,. Order Accordingly, for all of the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED THAT: . Plainfiff'smotidn fdrleaveld -file abrieflnopposltion to Borough of .. Carlisle's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 15) is GRANTED. The brief attached to Plaintiff's motion is deemed filed as of this date. b) Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 17) is GRANTED. The brief attached to Plaintiff's motion is deemed filed as of this date, c) Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission's motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 22) is GRANTED. The brief attached to Plaintiff's motion is deemed filed as of this date. d) Defendant Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission's motion to dismiss (Doc. No.3) is GRANTED. e) Defendant Borough of Carlisle's motion to dismiss (Doc. No.5) is GRANTED. f) Defendant Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission's motion for Rule 11 sanctions (Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED, Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $500 to the Commission within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order. g) Defendant Borough of Carlisle's motion for Rule 11 sanctions (Doc, No. 18) is GRANTED. The Borough shall file documentation supporting its request within ten days of the date of this Oreer. Plaintiff shall file any response to that documentation within five days thereafter. ~J~ YVET E KANE United States District Judge Dated: April C ,2000. 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA * * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * * ... --- -April..10,2.00Q. Re: 1:99-cv-00873 Barrett v. Pennsylvania Histori True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the following: Robert H. Barrett 134 East High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Gregory R. Neuhauser, Esq. Office of Attorney General Strawberry Square 15th Floor Harrisburg, Pa 17120 Edward L. Schorpp, Esq. Law Offices of Edward L. Schorpp 127 W. High St. Carlisle, PA 17013 David Alan Fitzsimons, Esq. Mette, Evans & Woodside P.O. Box 5950 3401 North Front St. Harrisburg, PA 17110-0950 Elizabeth Goldstein Dixon, Esq. Mette, Evans & Woodside 3401 North Front Street P. O. Box 5950 Harrisburg, PA 17110-0950 --_.._~..,...__._"_." cc: Judge Magistrate Judge u.s. Marshal Probation u.s. Attorney Atty. for Deft. Defendant Warden Bureau of Prisons Ct Reporter Ctroom Deputy Orig-Security Federal Public Defender Summons Issued Standard Order 93-5 Order to Show Cause Bankruptcy Court Other DATE: LfJ/Ojod II I (/ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) with N/C attached to complt. and served by: U,S. Marshal () Pltf's Attorney ( ) ( ) ( ) with to: Petition attached & us Atty Gen ( ) DA of County ( ) mailed certified PA Atty Gen ( ) Respondents ( ) mail MARY E. D'ANDREA, Clerk BY: ~ De ty Clerk . . ROBERT H. BARRETT, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNA. v. NO. PENNSYL VANIA HISTORICAL & MUSEUM COMMISSION AND BOROUGH OF CARLISLE, Defendants U.S. M.D. CT. OF PA. NO.l:-CV-99-873 (JUDGE KANE) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, John J, Condrige, Esquire, Senior Deputy Attorney General, hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, on the d.~ 1\1' day of i~/ , 2002 addressed to the following: Robert H. Barrett 403 N. George Mason Drive Apartment # 3 Arlington, VA 22203-2508 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: BY . rige #208 enior uty Attorne General Financial Enforcement Section Office of Attorney General 15th Floor Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PAl 7120 Phone: (717) 787-7188 Fax: (717) 705-7243 ~ ...... 'A,j "" <9 '1 t s:? ~;:~ ~;:, <;s ;i 8 If'.- t~ ~!i ~3 7(= ~ V", -....c ~ ~ ~ ; ., ~ ~ ~ I:) '1"-:> ~ 'f '- ~ ~ ~ --- "" (~ , . o -1'; ---, 1'>...,) j'.C .-n ..., -..... C:? :)1 cO ':.~; ,~) " (:~?0 c:/" :,.-\ ~'" ~ v, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND CTY., PENNSYLVANIA : No. 02-3442 : Filed: 7/22/02 : Amount: $500.00 ROBERT H. BARRETT, Plaintiff PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL & MUSEUM COMMISSION AND BOROUGH OF CARLISLE, Defendant U.S. M,D, CT. OF PA. NO, I:CV-99-873 : License # LS-OO 1-99-0873 ORDER TO SATISFY TO THE PROTHONOTARY: You are hereby authorized and directed to satisfy the lien and judgment Against Robert H. Barrett, upon payment of your costs by Plaintiff This Order to Satisfy only relates to the Judgment filed on behalf of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. TOM CORBETT ATTORNEY GENERAL BY Dated: February 17, 2005