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HomeMy WebLinkAbout95-02303 9. Following this incident, Plaintiff Ruth Mentzer's right hand became infected, and she was admitted to Carlisle Hospital, where Dr. Thomas J. Green operated upon the right wrist joint. 10. As a result of Defendants' negligence, as described more fully below, the Plaintiff, Ruth Mentzer, has sustained serious and permanent injuries, which include, but are not limited to the following: ;i I: !I :1 II I i I i II II " I I " I' II I !I I, Ii Ii " " Ii II :1 I , i a. multiple wounds over the hands and arms; and b. infected right wrist, resulting in permanent loss of joint motion and use of the wrist and hand. 11. As a result of the aforementioned injuries, Plaintiff Ruth Mentzer was forced to incur medical expenses, which are currently in excess of $18,000.00, in an effort to restore herself to health, and because of the nature of her injuries, Plaintiff will be forced to incur similar expenses in the future, and claim is made therefore to the extent permitted by law. 12. As a result of the aforementioned injuries, Plaintiff Ruth Mentzer has undergone and in the future will undergo great physical and mental pain and suffering, great inconvenience in carrying out her daily activities, loss of life's pleasures and enjoyment, and claim is made therefor. 13. As a result of the aforementioned injuries, Plaintiff Ruth Mentzer has been and in the future will be subject to great humiliation, embarrassment, scarring and diSfigurement, and claim is made therefor. 2 comrr I RUTH IOINTIIR v. BTAlf and NARY CRUXLICB 14. Paragraphs 1 through 13 are hereby incorporated by reference as if set out in full. 15. All of Plaintiff's damages, as hereinbefore related are the direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, in that they: a. owned and kept an animal with known vicioua tendencies on their premises, making them strictly liable for any bodily injury which the animal inflicted or caused to be inflicted. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Ruth Mentzer demands judgment against Defendants in an amount in excess of Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs and in excess of any juriadictional amount requiring compulsory arbitration. comrr II RUTH IIINTIIR v. BTAlf and NARY CRUXLICB 16. Paragraphs 1 through 13 are hereby incorporated by reference as if set out in full. 17. All of the damages of Plaintiff as hereinbefore described are also the direct and proximate results of the negligence of Defendants in that they: a. permitted their dog to roam unrestrained off of their property in violation of the Act of 3 J " . .- . , ~u ~1.'1 H".l ~,wn'l" I........'ll) .,,~~.., "'III'" ."",~,....n~."'i ,- - :J: . :a () :a 101 . iii .. . )> III !:! . . r c: :l 0 c z . :a 0 0 " :e p ~ " :a ~ 1'1 1l .. z ii r x I'l I'l z r ... . z " -< . z 0 VI n ~ ~ z . 0 .. -t . " !( . UI ,.. 0 ~ .. . . " . ~ Z '" ~ :u . '" ii Z .. z :l UI 0 ,. ~IIFL I j.T' ".I-.TI11 'l J ''" t\SE till: 1 ',I')'.', \",,' ';l.;\.i ! C(lMtlIIlIWf.AITII nF ITtlll:. 'n ';;, n ';, : COI.!IlTY liF 1:II1Hl[EI,;!I, ttEtn;;I;li RUTIi ',",. l;!jlll'I\.I -II :.:1',\11 iT ,." ClH10Er\t./..llr' ('IHIIlI:>,. r','lll' "1'.' .lIt! i. '.111' ". iil'+ ,j'll 1'lIlLIL 1i,\\i(;1l11"':, .11' : : I' "cl"l!" nll'_'::;: 'I .", I II \' 1 .i d 11 '1 t.IJ t ,W, ;idY:<. 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"';h,.:' _:.::--, /'i.ll [,; :;FI li 1"1. ilL!, il l.t_ ,jt. 11 t')'_I" !1Y P4e.ilf":h~~-' S\iOl n and ,- 111.'. ':1 \ h d , I, , ,- till c- J~ dolY "Ilko..( I 'J .-'i:C ," i'. Pl" \ f 0 - ___ A't.<- . 1\.t.J~~- I r.;. -} r,,'lh""!"I'.~l - '~-:---",... , 1.&\ \Ulllllill.............(l) IUloYIfO ttl"'e' ..HII.L'''I~'Il. _""'IIt.. :J: . :a () :a ... . iii ~ . )> III 101 . . r c: :l 0 c z . :a 0 0 " :e p ~ " :a ~ 1'1 1l .. Z 0 r X I'l ~ I'l z r -< . z " . Z 0 VI n ~ ~ ~ . 0 -t . " !(UI . ,.. 0 ~ . .. . Z ~ . . ~ .. :u ): ~ 0 Z z ::l UI 0 RUTH MENTZER, Plaintiff Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA . · No.: 95-2303 Civil Term · CIVIL ACTION - LAW . . · JURY TRIAL DEMANDED v. STAN CRUMLICH and MARY CRUMLICH, ANSWER WITH NEW MATTBR OF DBFBNDANTS TO PLAINTIFF' S COMPLAINT 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted and denied. It is denied, as alleged, that the Plaintiff was walking her cat in her back yard, near where it borders a vacant lot, for, on the contrary, Plaintiff admitted to the Defendants that she was trespassing on PennDOT adjacent property at the time of the incident and she knew or should have known that she should not have walked on that property with her cat at that time; the remaining allegations of this paragraph are denied in conformance with Rule 1029(e). 5. The averments of paragraph 5 are denied inasmuch as the Plaintiff admitted to the Defendants, following the incident, that she was trespassing on PennDOT adjacent property at the time of the incident and that she knew or should have known she should not have walked on that property with her cat at that time; otherwise, the averments of paragrapli 5 are admitted. 6. The averments of paragraph 6 are denied and, on the contrary, it is averred that the Defendants had not left their dog out of the house but, instead, the dog was let out by their son, Joshua, who then and there was exercising control and supervision of the dog and the dog was under the reasonable control of Joshua; by way of further answer, the Plaintiff admitted following the incident that she was trespassing on PennDOT adjacent property at the time of the incident and she knew or should have known not to have walked on that property with her cat at that time and, by way of further answer, it is not believed that the Defendants' dog got closer than three feet from the cat, which was just barking, circling the cat, without making any contact with the cat or the Plaintiff, and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. 7. The averments of paragraph 7 are denied for, on the contrary, the Plaintiff admitted, following the incident, that it was a "freak accident" and she knew or should have known that she should have let go of the leash and allowed the cat to get up the tree and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. B. The averments of paragraph B are denied inasmuch as the Plaintiff admitted, following the incident, that the dog did not bite her and it is believed, based upon information and belief, that the Defendants' dog did not at any time bite the Plaintiff and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. 3 9. Denied in conformance with Rule 1029(e). 10. It is denied, as alleged in paragraph 10, that the Defendants were negligent or that their contended negligence caused or contributed to the injuries alleged or that the injuries alleged were proximately caused by the alleged negligence and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. 11. It is denied, as alleged in paragraph 11, that the Defendants were negligent or that their contended negligence caused or contributed to the injuries alleged or that the injuries alleged were proximately caused by the alleged negligence and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. 12. It is denied, as alleged in paragraph 12, that the Defendants were negligent or that their contended negligence caused or contributed to the injuries alleged or that the injuries alleged were proximately caused by the alleged negligence and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. 13. It is denied, as alleged in paragraph 13, that the Defendants were negligent or that their contended negligence caused or contributed to the injuries alleged or that the injuries alleged were proximately caused by the alleged negligence and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. COUNT I Ruth Mentzer v. stan and Marv Crum1ich 14. Defendants incorporate by reference as if set out in full their answers to paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 15. The averments of paragraph 15 consist of legal conclusions of the Plaintiff and/or her counsel which, under the 4 Rules of civil Procedure, need no response and are deemed to be denied; however, to the extent an answer may be required, it is denied that the Defendants owned or kept an animal with known vicious tendencies on their premises for, on the contrary, the dog owned by the Defendants was neither vicious nor known to be and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant; by way of further answer, it is denied that there was a material act by the Defendants or conduct by the Defendants which caused, directly or otherwise, the alleged injuries; it being further denied that the answering Defendants are liable strictly or otherwise and proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. WHEREFORE, Defendants, Stan and Mary Crumlich, demand that the Complaint be dismissed and judgment entered in their favor and against all parties without cost to it but together with such costs, expenses and attorneys fees as authorized by law and which the Court deems necessary, just and appropriate under the circumstances. COUNT II Ruth Mentzer v. Stan and Marv Crum1ich 16. Defendants incorporate by reference as if set out in full their answers to paragraphs 1 through 15 above. 17. Many, if not all, of the averments of paragraph 17 consist of legal conclusions of the Plaintiff and/or her counsel which, under the Rules of Civil Procedure are deemed to be denied and no response is necessary; to the extent, however, an answer may be r~quired, it is denied that the Defendants permitted their dog to roam unrestrained off their property in violation of the Act or 5 other provisions of law as alleged for, on the contrary, the dog was not let out by the Defendants but, instead, was let out by their son, Joshua, and Joshua was then and there supervising and controlling the dog and the dog was under the reasonable control of Joshua at times material to the Plaintiff's Complaint; by way of further answer, it is denied that the answering Defendants took inadequate precautions to keep their dog restrained for, on the contrary, the dog had been let out by Joshua and Joshua was exercising supervision and control over the dog and the dog was then and there under the reasonable control of Joshua, it being denied, as alleged, that the answering Defendants knew or should have known that as a consequence of the circumstances it developed after Joshua was supervising and controlling the dog, that the alleged consequence or harm was possible and strict proof thereof to the contrary is demanded if relevant at time of trial. WHEREFORE, Defendants, Stan and Mary Crumlich, demand that the Complaint be dismissed and judgment entered in their favor and against all parties without cost to it but together with such costs, expenses and attorneys fees as authorized by law and which the Court deems necessary, just and appropriate under the circumstances. NEW MATTER 18. Following the incident, generally referred to by the Plaintiff in her Complaint, the Plaintiff, Ruth Mentzer, admitted to the Defendants that she was trespassing on PennDOT adjacent property at the time of the incident and that she knew or should 6 have known that she should not have walked on that property with the cat at that time. 19. Following the incident, generally referred to by the Plaintiff in her Complaint, she, Ruth Mentzer, admitted to the Defendants that the dog did not bite her at any time. 20. Following the incident, generally referred to by the Plaintiff in her Complaint, she admitted to the Defendants that this was a "freak: accident" and that she should have let go of the leash attached to the cat so that the cat could run up a tree at the time of the incident. 21. At the time of the incident referred to generally by the Plaintiff in her Complaint, the dog had not been let out by the named Defendants but, instead, had been let out by their son, Joshua; Joshua then and there was exercising supervision and control of the dog and although the dog was then without a leash, he was exercising supervision and control of the dog, and the dog was under the reasonable control of Joshua. 22. At the time of the incident referred to generally by the Plaintiff in her Complaint, the Defendants dog, being supervised and controlled by Joshua, who had let the dog out, did not get closer than three feet from the Plaintiff and/or her cat and was circling, without contact with the Plaintiff or her cat, and was just barking at the time of the incident referred to by the Plaintiff; to the extent the Plaintiff attempts to place liability upon the named Defendants by virtue of their son, such claim is 7